2.6: nuclear weapons - stanford university · india (potential1) pak (potential) nkorea (potential)...
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2.6: Nuclear Weapons
Alex Montgomery
2.6: Nuclear Weapons• Definitions and concepts• Nuclear optimists• Nuclear pessimists• Cases• Discussion
Definitions• Coercion/Compellence: A threat to punish the enemy
or deny the enemy’s military objectives if the enemydoes not change its behavior
• Deterrence: A threat to punish the enemy if the enemychanges its behavior
• Defense: A threat to deny the enemy’s militaryobjectives if the enemy changes its behavior
Nuclear Buzzwords• Triad: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs• First-Strike: Ability to eliminate an enemy’s nuclear
forces w/o retaliation• Secure Second-Strike: Ability to inflict sufficient
damage on an enemy after absorbing a first strike• Preventive First-Strike: Striking an enemy’s forces
before they develop a secure second-strike capability.
Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive
war during transitions• Development of survivable
second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental
nuclear war
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Nuclear Arsenals
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Nuclear Optimists
Van Evera• When technology favors
defense, wars less frequent• Nuclear weapons favor
deterrence, not defense, butsame logic applies
Pape• Conventional
– Punishment: not effective– Risk: even less effective– Denial: sometimes effective– Takes time
• Nuclear– Punishment: not effective– Risk: can be successful– Denial: not useful– Requires superiority
Waltz• Preventive/preemptive
strikes difficult, rare• States have strong incentives
to make nukes safe & secure– Nuclear accidents are rare– Second-strike Nuclear
deterrence is cheap and easyto ensure
• Wars will be less frequentand more limited
Nuclear Pessimists
Sagan• Military organizations are
likely to lead to deterrencefailures, insecure secondstrikes, and deliberate oraccidental war, due to their:– common biases– inflexible routines– parochial interests
• Wars may be more likely:– Stability/Instability Paradox
• Wars may be worse:– Accidental escalation
Paul• States believe that other
states will not use nuclearweapons in marginalconflicts– Moral revulsion– Desire not to escalate– Historical precedent– Disproportionate response
Cases• Difficult to determine how affects start of wars• Deterrence is difficult to measure• Best case (Cold War) had other variables
– Bipolarity– No land border
• Even more difficult to measure how affects war– Not clear when nuclear threats worked
• Japan 1945, Korea 1952-3, Suez 1956, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962– Look instead at cases of non-nuclear power attacks
• Korea 1950-3, Suez 1956, Algeria 1954-62, Vietnam 1965-73,Yom Kippur 1973, Sino-Vietnamese 1979, Afghan 1979-1989,Falklands 1982, Lebanon 1983, Gulf War 1990
Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive
war during transitions• Development of survivable
second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental
nuclear war
India/Pakistan:Militaries start preventive wars
Pakistan: Kargil 1999India: Brasstacks 1986
India/Pakistan:Survivability undermined by SOPs
India/Pakistan: Accidents rather frequent
1973 Yom Kippur War• “To President Sadat and his
advisors, a limited attackconfined to the occupiedSinai would preclude the useof nuclear weapons byIsrael.” (707)
• Limited-aims strategy: CrossSuez, hold first line of Israelifortifications, dig in.
1982 Falklands War• “The Argentine calculations
prior to the war rested onthe premise that Britainwould not use nuclearweapons to protect a far-away island group with littledirect economic or strategicvalue.” (709)
• Limited-aims strategy:occupy islands, pursuenegotiations.
Discussion• Brian Head • John Panfil