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2ac at: tWe meet--- the plan mandates offering Cuba the option to export nickel to the United States

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2ac at: burke

No impact to our technological thought, but abandoning empiricism turns the KLatour, 2(Bruno, Professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies, Environmentalism, pg.303)Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you:scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being.As formachines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, itsmark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly beenmodern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgottenBeing? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has reallybeen forgotten.As Levi-Strauss says, 'thebarbarian is first and foremost the man who believe in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987. p. 12). Those who have failedto undertake empirical studies ofsciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the

traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you optout of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, andyou hunkerdown in your forest -- thenyou will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not theworld! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but thatdoesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who haveall the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of thedifference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what themodern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has

never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been amodern world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter-revolutions to leadus back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

Rejecting tech leads to conservative backlash makes every impact worseBurke, 7(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR at the University of New South Wales,Beyond Security, Violence, and War Against the Other, pg. 93-94)Once weattempt to enact an ethics of responsibility thatchallenges existingpolitical ontologies,

especially nationalist ones, a new danger appears: it seems unmooring. By playing out what

Connolly calls 'a politics of disturbance through which sedimented identities and moralities arerendered more alert to the deleterious effects of their naturalisation upon difference' and 'apolitics of enactment through which new possibilities of being are propelled into establishedconstellations', the new ethics produces uncertainty - political and ontological. 'The politics ofdisturbance can backfire', he writes, 'inducing that identity panic upon which the politics offundamentalism feeds'. By antagonising conservativesand provoking them to cling to

fundamentalist certitudes, the deployment of such an ethics may unwittingly reinforce the verypolitics it is seeking to transform. The Israeli settler lobby, and the US government'sfundamentalist faith in the utility of military violence as a panacea for insecurity anduncertainty, are powerful contemporary examples of this problem. As Michael Barnett suggests,the post-Oslo process exacerbated such problems: the growing divisions within Israeli societyexemplified by Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in fact 'grew more severe, in no small measure due

to his secular and liberal response'.84 Buber senses this problem in advance, arguing that amovement from a form of existence based on IIt to one that privileges the You forsakes a

world that is 'ordered', 'detached' and 'somewhat reliable' for one that 'cannot be surveyed', thatmust live with contingency and surprise. This, he argues importantly, is still better, because itholds the promise of a more durable and stable world order: the encounters do not orderthemselves to become a world, but each is for you a sign of the world order. They have noassociation with each other, but every one guarantees your association with the world. The

world that appears to you in this way is unreliable, for it appears always new to you, and youcannot take it by its word.85 Connolly writes of 'the persistent need for a precarious balance

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between 'a politics of governance and a politics of disturbance, not only in the present, but inthe

regulative ideal of pluralistic politics itself'.86 This isnot appreciated by conservativesorfundamentalists(among these we could perhaps include uncritical nationalists)who privilegethe politics of statism, governance and 'security', and who see in the current structure of socialtruth and political order a promise of continuity, certainty and reassurance. It is not easy to avoidthis problem, andI believe that the more common response- seeking to avoid ittactically either bysoftening one's message or by confrontation - will not work. Even if we're lucky enough to defeatsuch forcesat the ballot box or, God forbid, by some more violent means, the discursive power of

their thinking remains untouched and may become more organised and determined.

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2ac at: deterrenceDeterrence is epistemologically verifiable---and our authors arent liars, stupid, or

blinded by whatever ideology they criticizesFrederick Kroon 96, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland,Deterrence and the Fragility of Rationality, Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Jan., 1996), pp. 350-377,

JSTORI take it that from the point of view of the early proponents of nuclear deterrence this would not be a concession of any worth. Theydidn't just think that nuclear deterrers were doing something that happened to be rational (and even moral); they thought that in the

specified circumstances nuclear deterrers were acting the part of properly rational agents, that nucleardeterrers were doing what a fully rational agent would be doing if put in the same difficultsituation, despite the monstrousness of what was threatened.Call this kind of position an "agent-rationalist" view of nuclear deterrence. More precisely, agent-rationalists about nuclear deterrence are those whothink that it is not only the act of threatening retaliation-in the sense of conditionally intending it-that is fullyrational in the specified circumstances; the agent who threatens retaliationin these circumstancescan also be fully rational, despite the fact that what she threatens to do is irrational.The contraryposition held by Kavka I call an "agent-irrationalist" view of nuclear deterrence. On such a view, deterrers must be irrational in someway, perhaps through having undergone a process of corruption that gives them irrational goals or makes them unable tounderstand the full implications of what they propose.9 (Although I am mainly interested in nuclear deterrence, the issues, ofcourse, are wider. Thus agent-rationalism and agentirrationalism can also be understood more broadly as views concerning the

rationality of agents who face "Special Deterrent Situations" in roughly Kavka's sense; these situations include our nuclear scenariosbut also many other possible situations of conflict between agents. While the argument of this article may be general enough toextend to all such situations, I shall continue to focus on the nuclear case.)10 In the same way, we may talk of "agent-moralism" and"agentimmoralism." Thus agent-immoralism about nuclear deterrence holds that because of the immorality of the retaliatory act,and despite the moral desirability of the threat, no morally good agent can seriously threaten retaliation in the nuclear scenariosdescribed.11 Any agent able to threaten retaliation must have undergone a process of moral corruption, or be affected in some otherway by an element of moral imperfection in her nature. (This is again Kavka's view, but versions of the view are held by many others;David Lewis, for example.) These various positions are not, of course, exhaustive. Take rationality again. Some theorists think thatthere can be no situation in which threatening nuclear retaliation is rational.12 If so, no fully rational agent could be a nuclear

deterrer. And in the mid-1980s (but no longer) David Gauthier held thatbecause threatening retaliation issometimes clearly rational, it would ipso facto be rational in those cases for a deterrer to act onher retaliatory threats should deterrence fail.If so, agent-irrationalist arguments can't get atoehold, and we can no longer deny full rationality to nuclear deterrers.While I reject these variouspositions, they are not the direct concern of this article. 13 The debate I am presently interested in is between agent-rationalists and

agent-irrationalists, agent-moralists and agent-immoralists: philosophical opponents who all accept thatthreatening (nuclear) retaliation can be rational and moralwhere acting on the threats isnot.In this article I am mainly concerned to defend agent-rationalism about nuclear deterrence against its irrationalist critics. Thatis, my main goal is to show that we can coherently regard both of the following rationality claims as true: not only is the act offorming and maintaining deterrent conditional intentions perfectly rationalin the nuclearcircumstances envisaged, but in addition forming and maintaining such intentions is somethingthat rational agents are fully capable of,despite their knowing that such intentions,conditionally enjoin an irrational act. I thereby take myself to be defending nuclear deterrenceagainst an important and persuasive philosophical attack on the character of thoserunning the policy.By implication, however, I will also be defending an agent-moralist view of nuclear deterrence andhence defending deterrence against another kind of attack on the character of those running the policy. For the moral case turns outto be similar and in some ways easier. Although there are conclusive reasons of a moral kind against applying a nuclear sanction

should deterrence fail, I claim that broadly the same kind of argument can be used to show that a rational and moral agent

isnonetheless

able to form and have the relevant conditional intention to apply such a sanction.

Andnothing, as far as I can see,would restrict this conclusion very strongly to certain favored accounts ofmorality, such as some version of consequentialism. While agentmoralism is not the focus of this article, I hopeto say enough to justify these claims.Why supposefor a moment that rational agents cannotform and sustainsuch deterrent intentions? I can think of five more or less seductiveargumentsto this effect, some reconstructed fromthe literature on the topic, others independently plausible. All are based directly or indirectly-on the content of theconditional intentions contemplated and on the implications for a rational agent whocontemplates such intentions. Recall the problem. Because of what any such intention enjoins, we allegedly have acircumstance where an agent satisfies the following conditions: P: PI, the agent is (fully) rational; P2, she conditionally intends to dosomething E if a certain event C happens; P3, it is clear to her that if C should happen it would be irrational to do E. This triad of

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conditions appears inconsistent, however, which suggests that no rational agent can have such a conditionalintention in full knowledge of what it involves. But then neither , it seems, can a rational agent formsuch an intention in full knowledge of what it involves; deterrence can't even get started unlessthe deterring agent first becomes irrational.Different agent-irrationalist arguments provide different ways ofshowing how the tension inherent in (P) argues for agent-irrationality. But before I begin my survey of these arguments, let me say a

bit more about the idea of agent-rationality itself. The substance of my critique will be that, one way or another, agent-

irrationalist arguments variously mislocate or misdescribe aspects of this idea.What follows issupposed to be uncontentious. To describe an agent as rational is to characterize the agent asepistemically responsible:such an agent responds to evidencein the right sort of way,

believing propositions when the evidence supports them(but at any rate not when it iscognitively unsafe to adopt such beliefs) and deciding how to act by taking proper account of herdesires and beliefs regarding the likely outcome of actions. This is clearly a dispositional notion, forsomeone is correctly described as rational to the extent that she is disposed to function in this

way, not just that perchance she always does function in this way. But note that the disposition ischaracterized in terms ofa more local rationality: options open to a person have the property of

being rational if they are supported by her evidence in the right sort of way or if they reflect herbeliefs and desires in the right sort of way.

Effective deterrence controls escalation and is the best predictor for warSharp 8Assoc. Dep. General Counsel for Intl Affairs @ DOD & Adjunct Prof. of Law @Georgetown(Former Dir. Of Research at the Law Library of Congress, Democracy and Deterrence:Foundations for an Enduring World Peace, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, May,2008, Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr.)http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdfMoore concludes in Solving the War Puzzle that war arises from the interaction of all three Waltzian levels (individual, state ornational, and international), whereas some proponents of the democratic peace principle focus only on government structures toexplain war and some traditional realists focus only on the international system. Both realists and democratic peace proponents tendto emphasize institutions and systems, whereas Moore reminds us that peopleleadersdecide to pursue war: Wars are not simplyaccidents. Nor, contrary to our ordinary language, are they made by nations. Wars are made by people; more specifically they aredecided on by the leaders of nation statesand other nonnational groups in the case of terrorismwho make the decision to commitaggression or otherwise use the military instrument. These leaders make that decision based on the totality of incentives affecting

them at the time of the decision. . . . . . . [Incentive theory] tells us that we simply have abetter chance ofpredicting war, and fashioning forms of intervention to control it, if we focus squarelyon the effect of variables from all levels of analysis in generating incentives affecting theactual decisionsmade by those with the power to decide on war .42 Incentive theoryfocuses on the individual decisions that lead to war and explains the synergistic relationship between theabsence of effective deterrence and the absence of democracy. Together these three factorsthe decisions of leaders made without

the restraining effects of deterrence and democracyare the cause of war:War is not strictly caused by an absenceof democracy or effective deterrence or both together. Ratherwar is caused by the humanleadership decision to employ the military instrument. The absence of democracy, theabsence of effective deterrence, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of bothare conditionsor factorsthat predispose to war. An absence of democracy likely predisposes by [its] effect onleadership and leadership incentives, and an absence of effective deterrence likely predisposes by its effect on incentives from factors

other than the individual or governmental levels of analysis. To understand the cause of war is to understand

the human decision for war; that is, major war and democide . . . are the consequence ofindividual decisions responding to a totality of incentives .43

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2ac at: anthro

Their author doesnt actually think we should let a bunch of people dieKochi and Ordan, 8(Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queens University, Noam, linguistand translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, An Argument

for the Global Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Issue 3)It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon thenotion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced.In this sense, and given thelikelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink

what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words,whether or not the act ofglobal suicide takes place might wellbe irrelevant. What is more important is the form of criticalreflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that

would be worthwhile. The pointthen of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity isthe attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Suchan ethics attempts to takeinto account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence andinflict harmand the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm.Through the ideaof global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of thecontinuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the

idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard wetry to forget, suppress or repress it.

Focusing on non-human lives turns the alternative their authorKochi and Ordan, 8(Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queens University, Noam, linguistand translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, An Argumentfor the Global Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands, Volume 7, Issue 3)Finally, it is important to note that such a standpoint need notfall intoa version of green or eco-fascism thatconsiders other forms of life more important than the lives of humans. Such a positionmerelyreplicates in reverse the speciesism ofmodern humanist thought. Any choice between

the eco-fascist and the humanist, colonial-speciesist is thus a forced choice and is, in reality, a non-choice that should be rejected.The point of proposing the idea of the global suicide of humanity is rather to help identifythe way in which we differentially value different forms of life and guide our moral actions by rigidly adhered to standards of life-

value. Hence the idea of global suicide, through its radicalism, challenges an ideological or culturally dominant idea of life-value.Further, through confronting humanist ethics with its own violence against the non-human, the idea of global suicide opens up aspace for dialectical reflection in which the utopian ideals of both modern humanist and anti-humanist ethics may be comprehendedin relation to each other. One possibility of this conflict is the production of a differing standpoint from which to understand thesubject and the scope of moral action.

Their link card is horrible--- its about hamburgers and the food industry --- the agtech advantage is based off of having enough food to feed humans and animals intimes of crises

Extinction outweighs and turns the impactMatheny, 7 (J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6,2007, Ought we worry about human extinction?, online: http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm)

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate thepotential benefits of human survival and/or the risksof human extinction. If we survive thenext few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or

more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years.If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may benothing more importantthan reducing the near-term risks of human extinction. Keywords:extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare,environmental ethics Word count: 3,400 Introduction It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons,that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has

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generally been considered a terrible possibility. Its surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosophers Indexsuggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have writtenmore about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; ormaybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues. In this paper I argue that the possibility ofhuman extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave.

Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, itwould also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earthuninhabitable. The value of future lives Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers nonchalance toward human extinction is due inlarge part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the

future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the qualityand number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most peoples intuition about extinction (that itsbad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessarycondition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For

instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences,achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an earlydeath is bad(at least in part)because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, onthis view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view isplausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction isbad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here. I start from the premise that we ought to increasemoral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this

maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings. Lifes prospects The human population isnow 6 billion(6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion(1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe afew orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk,

2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramaticintervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is locatedin a field of thousands of asteroidsand comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit theYucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% ofanimals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion

years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In onebillion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature.Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earths water, and terrestrialtemperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive thesechanges, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd,

Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dimprospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentiencesurviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentientsanother billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems,giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Lifemight survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond thedecay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of

sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentiencefrom 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained(which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, only a human civilizationwould be remotelycapableof carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, its likely

we will develop technologiesneeded for at least one of these projects . We may already possess thetechnologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, werelikelyto develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids andplanets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994;

Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makeshuman survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all knownsentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years.We ought then paymore attention towhat Bostrom (2002) has called existential risks -- risks where an adverse outcome wouldeither annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.Such risks include:an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts,creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth;

greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause anuclear winter, shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design,killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a true vacuum or strangelets,

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destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of theserisks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees(2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom(2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively. Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so weshould treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probabilities are orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could bejustified to invest in extinction countermeasures. Matheny (2007) found that, even with traditional social discounting, investingin asteroid detection and mitigation is justified under standard cost-effectiveness analysis. Ought humanity be saved? Evenaccepting that future lives have value and that extinction risks can be cost-effectively reduced, there could still be reasons not to

worry about human extinction. For instance, human lives might have negative moral value, in which case human extinctioncould be a good thing. This might have been Bertrand Russells sentiment when he wrote, Although it is a gloomy view tosuppose that life will die out, sometimes when I contemplate the things that people do with their lives I think it is almost aconsolation.[6] In the 20th century, more people, in absolute numbers, died of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before.But in the same century, more people did not die of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. So even if we're especiallypessimistic about average human welfare during the last century compared to others, it would be hard to argue that total welfaredecreased. As long as average welfare was greater than zero that is, the average life was preferable to suicide then thecentury was a success for humanity. We will be capable of even greater moral nightmares in this century than in the last, but wewill also be capable of securing greater welfare for a larger fraction of humanity. I suspect in this century, the average life willagain be worth living, assuming we survive the century to judge. We should be more pessimistic when we review how nonhumananimals have fared in the last century. At present around 50 billion animals are raised and killed each year to feed humanity.(Many million animals are used for clothing, product testing, research, and entertainment, but their numbers are insignificant

by comparison.) Since World War 2,with the invention of "factory farming," farm animals welfare hassignificantly deteriorated, as they now live in conditions that frustrate their most basic instincts (Singer, 2002, chapter3).At the same time, were probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstratescompassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know toolittle, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possiblewithout any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman

animals, though it will take some time. Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikelywe willcontinue to use animals for very longat least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use ofanimals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with inefficient

technologies that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies-- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites formeat more efficiently and safely(Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they willlikely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised.This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number ofgood lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century foranimal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farmingwould represent around 1012 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 1021 animal life-years humanity could save by

protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years. The century of industrialized animal use would thus bethe equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. Toaccept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. Ifhuman life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguishedwhen the Sun entersits Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdoms best long-term hope for survival.

Framework the neg has to defend the status quo or a competitive policyalternative and the affirmative needs to defend the effects of its advocacy and someof its representations.

Permutation do the plan and endorse the suicide of humanity without rejectionwe can affirm and understand species-being, which solves ethical

exceptionalism they criticize

Alt doesnt solve the case, which outweighs even if we see humans as a socialconstruct that still doesnt remedy explicit political action isnecessary to avoid multiple scenarios for planet ending destruction

No link we never privileged humans our impacts all terminate in thedestruction of the entire planet--- i.e. the Baum and Trewavas ev

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Abandonment of humanist values facilitates atrocity and threatens extinction

Ketels, 96(Violet B, Associate Professor of English at Temple University, Havel to the Castle! The Power of the Word,548 Annals 45, November, Sage)

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given,repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did

not summon us to rescue.We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longerhear what the words meantor did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in thecold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we

must check the disastrous course of history.We were heedless of the lessonof his experience that only theunbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier ofencroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it

only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peacefor the individual, ofgenuine peace for mankind at large.2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained languageto the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience fromforgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on valuesthan tothoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience."Heirs of the ancient possessionsof higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragicaftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage againstmimesis and content,"* monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we havebought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5 Less certain about the power of language, that"oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paulde Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts."7 Truth and realityseem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We areembarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity ofwhat must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for thepresent, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seekwords for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It playstricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certifiedby science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides,memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off thepowerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become anobscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust neverhappened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How dowe nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not onlybefore but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and

deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. The cancer that haseaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasj Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogueadventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvokc as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389!9 Memory of bloodymassacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not toits past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people wagedonly one battleby widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs ofKosovo.... Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Floodthe Serbian New Testament."10 A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited." We standbenumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant

garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa-rat,"pathological suspicions about human motivesand meanings, the loosening of individualresponsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our

conscience, of our common sense and natural speechand thereby, of our actual humanity."12 Nothingless than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

The alternative is utopian there is no concrete action that can be taken to resolvethe impact

Representing human impacts is good key to our relationship with naturePlumwood 2(Val, PF PHILOSOPHY - UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason,PG. 138-40)Recognition, prudence and survival But by providing reasons for considering nature based on human prudence, are we notperpetuating the verv human-centredness and instrumentalism we should seek to combat, considering nature only in relation to ourown needs and as means to meet those needs? This issue reveals another major area of difference between the cosmic model

implying elimination of human bearings and the liberation model of human-cent redness of the sort I have given. Only in the

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confused account of anthropocentrismas cosmic anthropocentrism is it essential to avoid anything

which smacks of humanbearings and preferences in the interests of pursuing superhuman detachment. On theliberation account of human-centred ness, there is no problem or inconsistency in introducing someprudential considerations to motivate change, or to show why, for example, human-centredness is not benign andmust lead to damaging consequences for humankind. To gain a better understanding of the role of prudence in the kinds of changesthat might be required, let us return to the marital example of Bruce and Ann. Let us suppose that instead of leaving right away, Annpersuades Bruce to try a visit to a marriage counsellor to see if Bruce can change enough to save their relationship. (We will have toassume that Bruce has some redeeming features I have not described here to explain why Ann considers it worthwhile going to allthis trouble). After listening to their stories, the counsellor diagnoses Bruce as a textbook case of egocentrism, an individual versionof the centredness structure set out above. Bruce seems to view his interests as somehow radically separate from Ann's, so that he isprepared to act on her request for more consideration only if she can show he will get more pleasure if he does so, that is, forinstrumental reasons which appeal to a self-contained conception of his interests. He seems to see Ann in instrumental terms not asan independent person but as someone defined in tenus of his own needs, and claims it is her problem if she is dissatistied ormiserable. Bruce sees Ann as there to service his needs, lacks sensitivity to her needs and does not respect her independence oragency. 24 Bruce, let us suppose, also devalues the importance of the relationship, denies his real dependency on Ann, backgroundsher services and contribution to his lite, and seems to be completely unaware of the extent to which he might suffer when therelationship he is abusing breaks down. Bruce, despite Ann's warnings, does not imagine that it will, and is sure that it will all blowover: after a few tears and tantrums Ann will come to her senses, as she has always done before, according to Bruce. Now thecounsellor, June, takes on the task of pointing out to Bruce that his continued self-centredness and instrumental treatment of Ann islikely to lead in short order to the breakdown and loss of his relationship. The counsellor tries to show Bruce that he hasunderestimated both Ann's determination to leave unless there is change, as well as the sustaining character of the relationship.June points out that he may, like many similar people the counsellor has seen, sutler much more severe emotional stress than herealises when Ann leaves, as she surely will unless Bruce changes. Notice that June's initial appeal to Bruce is a prudential one; June

tries to point out to Bruce that he has misconceived the relationship and to make him understand where his real interests lie. Thereis no inconsistency here; the counsellor can point out these damaging consequences of instrumental relationship for Bruce withoutin any way using, endorsing or encouraging instrumental relationships. In the same way, the critic of human-centredness can saywith perfect consistency, to a society trapped in the centric logic ofthe One and the Other in relation to nature, that unless it iswilling to give enough consideration to nature's needs, it too could lose a relationship whose importance it has failed to understand,has systematically devalued and denied - with, perhaps, more serious consequences for survival than in Bruce's case. The account ofhuman-centredness I have given, then, unlike the cosmic account demanding self-transcendence and self-detachment, does notprohibit the use of certain forms of prudential ecological argument, although it does suggest certain contexts and qualifications fortheir use. In the case of Ann and Bruce, June the counsellor might particularly advance these prudential reasons as the mainreasons for treating Ann with more care and respect at the initial stages of the task of convincing Bruce of the need for change.Prudential arguments need not just concern the danger of losing the relationship. June may also try to show Bruce how thestructure of egocentrism distorts and limits his character and cuts him off from the main benefits of a caring relationship, such asthe sense of the limitations ofth~ self and its perspectives obtained by an intimate encounter with someone else's needs and reality.Prddential arguments of all kinds for respect are the kinds of arguments that are especially useful in an initial context of denial,while there is still no realisation of that there is a serious problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking work for change. In the

same way, the appeal to prudential considerations of ecological damage to humans is especially

appropriate in the initial context of ecological denial. where there is still no systematic acknowledgement ofhuman attitudes as a problem, and resistance to the idea of undertaking substantial social change.Although reasons ofadvantage or disadvantage to the self cannot be the only kinds of considerationsin a framework whichexhibits genuine respect for the other, the needs of the self do not have to be excluded at any stage fromthis process,as the fallacious view of prudence as always instrumental and egocentric suggests.

Perm double bind either the alt can overcome the link to the plan or it cantovercome the status quo

Alt doesnt solve if it does its worse for non-humans

Machan, 4(Tibor, Distinguished Fellow and Prof. @ Leatherby Center for Entrepreneurship & Business Ethics @Chapman U., Putting Humans First: Why We Are Natures Favorite, p. 11-13)

Now, one can dispute Hospers, but only by averting one's gaze from the facts. If animals in fact did have rightsasyou and I understand the concept of rightsrights that entail and mandate a hands-off policy toward other rights possessorsmostof the creatures now lurking in lawns and jungles, at the very least all the carnivores,would have to be broughtup on murder charges.This is what all the animal rights champions fail to heed, including Ingrid Newkirk, radicalleader of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), who holds that it is unacceptable for us to use animals in any way

at all.13 This is why they allow themselves such vile thoughts as that "the world would be aninfinitely better place without humansin it at all."'4 If the scenario is absurd, it's so not because the concept ofanimal rights has been unfairly reduced to absurdity but because there is nowhere else to go. The idea of animal rights is

impracticable to begin with; any attempt to visualize the denizens of the animal world benefitingfrom and respecting rights must collapse into fantasy willy-nilly. The concept of rights

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emerged with the rise of human civilization precisely because it is needed by and applicableto human beings, given the specifically moral nature of human beings and their ambition to live with each other in mutualharmony and to mutual benefit. Rights have nothing to do with the lives of wolves and turtles because of what animal rightschampions themselves admit, namely, the amoral nature of at least the bulk of the animal world.15 Advocates of animal rights inat least one way do admit the vast gulf between animals and humans and that humans alone are equipped to deal with moral

issues.When they address us alone about these matterswhen they accept all the carnage thatis perpetrated by other living things, including what would be infanticide and worse if human

beings were to engage in itthey clearly imply that human beings are indeed special.Theyimply, first and foremost, that people are indeed the only living beings capable of understanding a moral appeal. Only humanbeings can be implored to do right rather than wrong. Other animals just don't have the capacity for this. And so theenvironmentalists don't confront them with any moral arguments no matter how politically incorrect the animals may be towardone another.

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2ac at: complexityFramework --- simulate the enactment of the plan, weigh consequences against thealt --- key to policy education, fairness and individual agencyHanghoj, 8(Thorkild, assistant professor at the University of Aarhus, Copenhagen,http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/

phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfiguretheir discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. TheseBakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices

and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtins dialogical philosophyalsooffers an explanation of why debate games(and other game types) may be valuablewithin an educationalcontext. One of the central features of multi-player games is that playersare expected to experience a simultaneouslyreal and imagined scenarioboth in relation to an insiders(participant) perspective andto an outsiders (co-participant) perspective.According to Bakhtin, the outsiders perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of humanunderstanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object ofhis or her creative understanding in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend itas a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because theyare located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by

others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it isin the

interaction with other voices that individualsare able to reach understanding and find their ownvoice. Bakhtin also refers to theontological process of finding a voice as ideological becoming, whichrepresents the process of selectively assimilating the words of others (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus,byteaching and playingdebate scenarios, it is possible to supportstudents in their process ofbecomingnot only themselves, but also inbecoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

Economic rationality is the best way to evaluate peoples decisionstheir cards still

assume rationality at its simplest forms

Montero 13- DPhil, University of Oxford (Tiago Montero, Starlings uphold principles of

economic rationality for delay and probability of reward, February 8, 2013,http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23390098, JL)

We argue that rationality principles, understood as the demand for logical consistencyin preferences,

should remain an integral and indispensable feature of predictive theoretical models of

behaviourboth because they support the logic of the models and because our data showthat they do hold

in the demanding tests we describe. This can be expanded to assert that, for a given state of a decisionmaker and its

environment, predictive models can safely include the assumption that choices will displayproperties such as transitivity. If either the subjects or their environments are not held constant, then rationality is not being tested.

Some recent theoretical contributions consistent with this view have not made this defence of rationality explicit. For instance, it has

been shownthat intransitivity in preference between food sources may be adaptiveif the subject is

driven by the experimental procedureto infer differences in the state of the world when presented with different

choices [31,35]. However, such differences in preferences still express rationality(i.e. transitivity) in terms of

the subjects maximand(i.e. Darwinian fitness) and are in fact expressions of state-dependent rationality once the

information driving the agents behaviour is included, as it should, in the description of its state. In our view, reports thatboth

human and non-human decision-makers systematically breach rationality principles([1,2,18], butsee also [20] for an alternative view) should not promote the demise of Homo economicus or non-human equivalents, but be

instead used to explore and illustrate how the rationality/optimality approach used by both

theoretical economists and behavioural ecologists applies to real-life agents. In a parametric series ofquantitative tests, we corroborated that the behaviour of captive starlings actually does fit the demands of well-established economic

rationality principles [9,12]. Starlings choices between multiple options differing in either delay to or probability of a food reward

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23390098http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23390098

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complied with strong stochastic transitivity and with the principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives, regardless of the

added options richness relative to a target option pair. We did not use alternatives differing in more than one dimension

simultaneously. Such tests are complicated because the scaling of utility (or preference) to physical dimensions probably includes

nonlinearities when different properties are traded against each other [1,3,6,18,32]. Demonstrations of full rationality in

unidimensional choices such as those shown here and results obtained in transitive inference experiments across multiple species

that are consistent with these results [4248] suggest that rational choice, rather than its opposites, is widespread, and should be

the foundation from which to interpret observations of logically inconsistent behaviour. Our view is that most reports of

apparent violations of logical decision principles in non-human studies result from failing tofollow preconditions for their validity, such as constancy of the agents physiological or

informational state, or lack of satiety effects from the commodity [10,27,2931,35,36].Variationsin preference followingvariations in subjects energetic reserves, or when the testing conditions allow subjects to infer differences in their circumstances,

are perfectly consistent with evolutionarily normative, rationality-based theoriesas is clear fromHouston et al. [31] and Houston [26]. This matters because if it were convincingly shown that when necessary conditions are

controlled, logical principles do not apply to decision processes, the foundation of normative modelling in behavioural biology would

melt away. This is relevant to decision-making across multiple taxa, including humans, and

highlights the value of integrating decision research across economics, psychology and biology.

Linearity might not be true but complexity isnt 100% true either

Dr. Sebastian L. V. Gorka et al 12, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at theCollege of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, teaches Irregular Warfareand US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, et al., Spring 2012, The Complexity Trap,Parameters,http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf

These competing views of Americas national security concerns indicate an important and distinctive characteristic of todays global landscape:prioritizationis simultaneouslyvery difficult and very importantfor the United States. Each of these threats andpotential threatsal Qaeda, China, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global disease, andso oncan conjure up a worstcase scenario that is immensely intimidating.Given the difficulty of combiningestimates of probabilities with the levels of risk associated with these threats, it is challenging to establish priorities.Such choicesand trade-offs aredifficult,but not impossible. 30 In fact, they are the stock-in-trade of the

strategist and planner. If the United States is going to respond proactively and effectively to todaysinternational environment,prioritization is the key first stepandprecisely the oppositereactionto thecomplacency and undifferentiated fear that thenotion of unprecedentedcomplexity encourages. Complexity suggests a maximization of flexibility andminimization ofcommitment;but prioritizationdemands wise allotment of resourcesand attention in a waythatcommits American power and effortmost effectively and efficiently. Phrased differently,complexity induces deciding not to decide; prioritization encourages deciding which decisionsmatter most.Todaysworldofdiverse threatscharacterized by uncertain probabilities and unclear riskswilloverwhelmusif the specter of complexity seduces us intoeither paralysis or paranoia. Some priorities need to

be setif the United States is to find the resources to confront what threatens it most. 31 As Michael Doran recently argued in referenc e to the Arab Spring, the UnitedStates must train itself to see a large dune as something more formidable than just endless grain s of sand.32 This is not to deny the possibilityofnonlinear phenomena, butterfly effects, self-organizing systems that exhibit patterns in the absence of centralizedauthority,or emergent properties. 33 If anything, these hallmarks of complexity theory remind strategistsof the importance of revisiting key assumptions in light of new data andallowing for tacticalflexibilityin case of unintended consequences. Sound strategy requires hard choices and commitments,but itneed not be inflexible.We can prioritize without being procrustean.But a model in whicheverything is potentially relevant is a model in whichnothing is.

Perm do both

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdfhttp://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdfhttp://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdfhttp://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf

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Combining interpretative approach and complexity key

Cairney 10(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University,Bridging the Methodological Gap Between the Physical and Social Sciences: Complexity Theoryand Mixed Methodshttp://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_496.pdf,SEH)

Although the structure/ agency discussion is not unproblematic, it at least suggests that thereare people thinking seriously abouthow to overcome the wider philosophical issues regardinghow we characterise and observe complex social systems. It also opensthe door to mixedmethods and projects which seek to produce lessons between them. The debate on therelationship betweenstructures, rules, institutions and agency is central to the key questionsin political science regarding who or what exercises power

and why policy changes. It is alsoinextricably linked to the methods that we use to answer those questions. For example,whenusing complex systems theory and mathematical modelling to explain policy dynamics wemayfocus on the explanatory power of rules and norms that bind behaviour. When using aninterpretive approach and qualitative methods we may focus on the links between meaningandindividual action; the extent to which rules are understood differently and not followed uniformly. A mixed methods approach is therefore crucial to not only establish but alsoqualifythe value of complexity theory in political science. The divide between quantitativeandqualitative research in the social sciences has been compared to a religious or culturaldivide

that often undermines serious collaboration (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 227). Itremains to be seen if thedecision itself to collaborate negates much of this divide and if bothsides can combine methods while remaining reflective aboutpossible differences inphilosophical assumptions.

Conditionality is a voting issue

--- skews 2ac time and strategywe withhold our best offense, cannot cross apply,

only time to set up offense

--- education--- multiple condo options is less rigorous on the final question of the

debatebreadth is inevitable over the year

--- argument skillscondo encourages arg irresponsibility that kills advocacy skills

--- 2nr critical thinking most important and real world

--- c/i

The 1AC is scenario planning, it explores causal chains to make choices uncertainty isnt unknowabilityand imperfect knowledge can be good

Han 10(Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 26, 2010,Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making, online:http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.phpcmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f)

How do we assess future possibilities with existing dataand information? Do we have a systematic approach to

analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is

increasing and future international relations arehard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a

useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming eventsso thatpolicy makers can reduce the risks of

future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodologyisone of the most effectivemethods to

connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is tointroduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy

world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future

world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the

importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that

primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and

information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for

predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important

http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_496.pdfhttp://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_496.pdfhttp://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.phpcmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_in%20dex=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.phpcmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_in%20dex=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.phpcmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_in%20dex=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.phpcmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_in%20dex=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_496.pdf

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both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection

with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding

of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore

other fields use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will

conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario

Methodology? This section begins with one major questionwhat is the scenario methodology?To answer this, somehistory regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his

famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makersin the United States should think ofand prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear warwith the Soviet Union.2 Usingscenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario

method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios areattempts to describe

in some detail a hypothetical sequence of eventsthat could lead plausiblyto the situation envisaged.4Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us

recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment.5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of

this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulatedifferent futures

with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories andclarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in

the Scenario Methodology The core of thescenariomethodlies inenabling policy makers to reach a

criticaldecisionat the present time based on thinking aboutallplausible future possibilities. Keyconcepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot

lines.7 Driving forces are defined as the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision, which could be many factors,including those that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes.8 Schwartz defines

driving forces as the elementsthat move the plot of a scenario, that determine the storys outcome.9 In a word, driving forces

constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to events that

have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose consequences have not yet unfolded.10 Predetermined elem ents

are givens which could be safely assumed and understood in the scena rio-building process. Although predetermined elements

impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties describe important deter minants

of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown.11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario

construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario anaysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and

most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might

undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines.13 In John Petersons terms, wild cards are not simple trends,

nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change

that challenges the outermost capabilities of todays human capabilities.14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the

process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is a

compelling story about how things happen and it describes how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with

predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties.15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the

scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: both are sequential descriptions of a situationwith the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned.16 Process and

Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some

uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties;rather, it is a

thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclearin the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, By carefully studying someuncertainties,

we gained adeeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was

certain and inevitable and what was not. In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps peoplefigure out more critical uncertainties by showing that what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be

predeterminedthat many outcomes were simply not possible.18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most

important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating knowns from

unknowns analystscould clarify driving forces because the process of separation between

predetermineds and uncertaintiesdemandsa fair amount of knowledge of causal relationshipssurrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction

process as follows: scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decisionmakers, ranks the most significant drivin g forces

according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of

scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces.21

Scenario planning solves predictive failure

Han 10Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 26, 2010,Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making, online:

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http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f)

In addition to providing the eclectic foundation for using multiple theoretical lenses in the field, thebuilding of

scenariosin analyzing world events could solve the difficulty of the matter of prediction in

social science research. Predicting the future is not an easy task. In the field of IR,

researchers making predictions tend to focus on their parsimonious assumptions and argumentsdrawn from a specific school of thoughtin which they are engaged. They present the rigor of their

theoretical explanations by refuting other theoretical perspectivesand make a prediction based on the victory

of their theories over other approaches. The problem, however, is that making a prediction based on

established theoriesand approaches can easily be disrupted as unexpected contingencieslike wild cards

occur.83 In other words, in a real world of politicstoo many uncertain factors are engagedand thuspolitics can be understood as a non-linear process toward unpredictable outcomes.84 There aremany real cases of the difficulty of prediction in social science . The failure to predict theend of the Cold War is one of them.85 During the Cold War era, many scholars explored the causes of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and

predicted that the Cold War would last quite a long time.86 Other scholars arguments for a quicker end to the Cold W ar were simply

dismissed along with such upcoming events as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Despite the difficulty of predictionin world politicssome factors are relatively clearand

easy to figure out, regardless of ones theoretical background. For instance, it is hard to deny that U.S. powerand influence is one of the critical factors in understanding the present world. In this sense, Robert Jervisis right when he argues that Since the United States is the most influential power in the world, to predict the future of world politics

requires us to predict the future of American foreign policy.87 When it comes to the study of a specific region in world pol itics,

though, things are more complicated. While understanding important variables such as U.S. foreign policy helps us to analyze more

accurately the future course of international politics in general, in order to predict the future dynamics of regional politics in particular

something more is needed.88 Given the complexity of regional issues making a prediction is still not an easy task. Given this backdrop

some scholars argue that prediction in the social sciences could be possible if we had some critical information regarding specific

issues.89 Among others, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita makes his case for the possibility of prediction, arguing

that if we know someinformationconcerning identified policy makers with some stakes, theirpolicy preferences(i.e. what they say they want), how salient the issue at stake is among these actors, and

how influential these policy makers are in terms of changing and shaping the outcomes, thenwecan predict upcoming policy decisionsand thus overall political outcomesbased upon these

influential policy makers strategic interactions with one another.90 Bueno de Mesquitas prediction comes from the

logic of how decision makers make various policy decisions in a game-theoretic term, with the supportof a computer-based simulate model. In other words, by using mathematical techniques such as computer simulation models in

predicting the future Bueno de Mesquitas argument is mostly dependent on rational choice theory which assumes self-interested

people and dictates their strategic interactions.91 Even if Bueno de Mesquitas efforts could partially work and tend to be successful

in predicting some emerging properties, it cannot be denied that various predictive efforts are limited andfor the most parteven

impossible when dealing with surprising events and unexpected contingencies.92 Moreover, these predictions may sometimes be just

estimates which are hard to project for the long term.93 The scenario method seems to be a good fitparticularly in this regard; that is, in order to cope effectively with upcoming surprises anduncertainties it is essential to rehearse as many future possibilities as one can and scenariothinking facilitates thisreasoning process. Despite sharing some similarities with other predicting toolssuch as a computer simulation model, the scenario method is fundamentally different from these methods. As one advocate for

scenario analysis points out, scenarios are more than just the output of a complex simulation model.Instead they attempt to interpret such output by identifying patterns and clusters of the millions of possible outcomes a computer

simulation might generateHence, scenarios go beyond objective analyses to include subjective interpretations.94

Debate solves even if not all predictions are correct debates that predict andweigh outcomes improve accuracy

Tetlock and Gardner, 11(Philip Tetlock is a professor of organizational behavior at the Haas BusinessSchool at the University of California-Berkeley, AND Dan Gardner is a columnist and senior writer for the Ottawa Citizen and the

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author of The Science of Fear, received numerous awards for his writing, including the Michener Award, M.A. History from York,"OVERCOMING OUR AVERSION TO ACKNOWLEDGING OUR IGNORANCE" July 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/11/dan-gardner-and-philip-tetlock/overcoming-our-aversion-to-acknowledging-our-ignorance/)

The optimists are right that there is much we can do at a cost that is quite modest relative towhat is often at stake. For example, why not build on the IARPA tournament? Imagine a systemfor recording and judging forecasts. Imagine running tallies of forecasters accuracy rates.Imagine advocates on either side of a policy debatespecifying in advance precisely

what outcomes their desired approach is expected to produce, the evidence thatwill settle whether it has done so,and the conditions under which participantswould agree to say Iwas wrong. Imagine pundits being held to account. Of course arbitrationonly works if the arbiter is universally respected and it would be an enormous challenge to create an analytical center whose

judgments were not only fair, but perceived to be fair even by partisans dead sure they are right and the other guys are wrong. Butthink of the potential of such a system to improve the signal-to-noise ratio, tosharpenpublic debate, to shift attention from blowhards to experts worthy of an audience, and toimprove public policy. At a minimum, it would highlight how often our forecasts and expectations fail, and if that were todeflate the bloated confidence of experts and leaders, and give pause to those preparing some great leap forward, it would be

money well spent. But the pessimists are right, too, that fallibility, error, and tragedy are permanentconditions of our existence. Humility is in order, or, as Socrates said, the beginning of wisdom is the admission ofignorance. The Socratic message has always been a hard sell, and it still isespecially among practical people in business andpolitics, who expect every presentation to end with a single slide consisting of five bullet points labeled The Solution. We have no

such slide, unfortunately.Butin defense of Socrates, humility is the foundation of the fox style ofthinking and much research suggests it is an essential component of good judgment inour uncertain world. It is practical. Over the long term, it yieldsbetter calibratedprobability judgments, which should help you affix more realistic odds than your competitorson policy bets panning out.

Perm do both

Even imperfect predictions are better than the alternative

Ulfelder, 11(Jay Ulfelder is Research Director for the Political Instability Task Force, Science Applications InternationalCorporation "Why Political Instability Forecasts Are Less Precise Than Wed Like (and Why Its Still Worth Doing)" May 5dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/why-political-instability-forecasts-are-less-precise-than-wed-like-and-why-its-

still-worth-doing/)If this is the best we can do, thenwhats the point?Well, consider the alternatives. Forstarters,we might decide to skip statistical forecasting altogetherand just target our interventions atcases identified by expert judgment as likely onsets. Unfortunately, those expert judgments are probably going to be an even less

reliable guide than our statistical forecasts, so this solution only exacerbates our problem.Alternatively,we couldtake no preventive actionand just respond to events as they occur. If the net costs of respondingto crises as they happen are roughly equivalent to the net costs of prevention, then this is a reasonable choice. Maybe respondingto crises isnt really all that costly; maybe preventive action isnt effective; or maybe preventive action is potentially effectivebut

also extremely expensive. Under these circumstances, early warning is not going to be as useful as we forecasters would like. If,however, any of those last statements are falseif responding to crises already underway is very costly, orif preventive action is (relatively) cheap and sometimes effectivethenwe have an incentive to useforecasts to help guide that action, in spite of the lingering uncertainty about exactly

where and when those crises will occur. Even in situations where preventive action isnt

feasible or desirable, reasonably accurate forecastscan still be usefulif they spur interested observersto plan for contingencies they otherwise might not have considered. For example, policy-makers in one countrymight be rooting for a dictatorship in another country to fall but still fail to plan for thateventbecause they dont expect it to happen any time soon.A forecasting model whichidentifies thatdictatorship as being at high or increasing risk of collapse might encourage thosepolicy-makers to reconsider their expectations and, in so doing, lead them to prepare better forthat event. Where does that leave us? For me, the bottom line is this: even thoughforecasts ofpolitical instability are never going to be as precise aswedlike, they can still be

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accurate enough to be helpful, as long as the events they predict are ones for which prevention or preparation stand adecent chance of making a (positive) difference.

No impact

Social science, empirics and objectivity makes policy predictions relatively

accurateChernoff 9(Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, Conventionalism as anAdequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory, 15:1, Sage)

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusionthat prediction is impossible.Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendthave attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction,as is Cox, who says quite simply, It is impossible to predict the future (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393).More recently, Heikki Patomki has argued that qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not

defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of prediction.14A determined predictionsceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of socialrelationships (which comprise open systems)to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simpleexamples maycircumscribe and help to refutea radical variety of scepticism.First, we all make reliablesocial predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a

spouse, child or parent will react tocertain well-known stimulithat we might supply,based on extensivepast experience. More to the point of IR prediction scepticism,we can imagine a young childin theUKwho(perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks upa bit of 19th-century British imperial lorethus gaining a sense of thepower of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the USUK invasion of Iraqin the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and(3) hearsa bit about communistChina and democratic Taiwan.Although the specific term preventative strike might notenter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited,thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would(possibly orprobably) launch a strike on China to protect it , much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast tothe child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual

information(e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK andChina) and hold some cause-and-effect principles(such as that states do not usually initiate actions thatleaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success).Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against

China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will notintervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely and even a few somewhatunlikely future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structureforces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be

required if such an attack were a real possibility.Any rational decision-maker in China mayuse some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific factsrelating to the Sino-British relationship to predict(P2) that the UK will not land its forces onChinese territoryeven in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. AChinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely

implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. Areflexivist theorist sceptical of predictionin IR might argue that the China example distorts the

notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. Butthe criticstemptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The

value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant.The fact that, undercurrent conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the UK willnot attack China, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also

argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. Butwe note that whilephysics and chemistry offer precise point predictions, other natural sciences, such as seismology,genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describethe predicted events in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability,for example, of a seismic event in the form some time in the next three years rather than two years from next Monday at 11:17

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am. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the

former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers.With the help of these non-point predictionscoming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the coursesof action(e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are

most likely to accomplish the leaders desired ends. So while point predictions are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often

attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thuscommit the straw man fallacyby requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any,theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-basedpredictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 Therange of theorists included in reflexivists here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions.From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendereda