open-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/... ·...

SDI 2010 Crowe-Schirmer-Hammond2AC Blocks- Wave Two

CHS 2AC Blocks- Wave 2 CHS 2AC Blocks- Wave 2..........................................................................................................................................................................1

=====Aff Section=====............................................................................................................................................................................2Topicality Substantial - 50% 2AC...............................................................................................................................................................3Guam Shift 2AC (1/2).................................................................................................................................................................................4Guam Shift 2AC (2/2).................................................................................................................................................................................5---1AR --- No Link......................................................................................................................................................................................6---1AR---- Big Impact Cal...........................................................................................................................................................................7---A2: Genocide = Bad 4 the Biznak...........................................................................................................................................................8---A2: Guam bad for the alliance.................................................................................................................................................................9---A2: Guam Shift does shit to the environment.......................................................................................................................................10---Non-Unique...........................................................................................................................................................................................11---No Link..................................................................................................................................................................................................12---Guam Supports US presence.................................................................................................................................................................13---Guam Shift Good-Hawaii......................................................................................................................................................................14China DA 2AC..........................................................................................................................................................................................15---AT Okinawa key....................................................................................................................................................................................16----Containment Fails.................................................................................................................................................................................172AC Deterrence DA (1/2)..........................................................................................................................................................................182AC Deterrence DA (2/2)..........................................................................................................................................................................192AC Japan Object CP................................................................................................................................................................................20Consult CP Notes.......................................................................................................................................................................................212AC Consult NATO (1/2).........................................................................................................................................................................222AC Consult NATO (2/2).........................................................................................................................................................................23----Ext. Hege Turn.....................................................................................................................................................................................24Framework 2AC........................................................................................................................................................................................25Hillman 2AC (1/3).....................................................................................................................................................................................26Hillman 2AC (2/3).....................................................................................................................................................................................27Hillman 2AC (3/3).....................................................................................................................................................................................28----Should Avoid Losing Wars..................................................................................................................................................................29----Wargaming Framework........................................................................................................................................................................30----Ext: Wargaming Framing.....................................................................................................................................................................31----Realism Inevitable................................................................................................................................................................................32----War Isn’t Natural..................................................................................................................................................................................33Security K 2AC (1/3).................................................................................................................................................................................34Security K 2AC (2/3).................................................................................................................................................................................35Security K 2AC (3/3).................................................................................................................................................................................36Realism 2AC (1/2).....................................................................................................................................................................................37Realism 2AC (2/2).....................................................................................................................................................................................382AC Troop Withdrawal Good – Alliance Advantage (1/2).......................................................................................................................392AC Troop Withdrawal Good – Alliance Advantage (2/2).......................................................................................................................40----Ext. US Troops = Instability.................................................................................................................................................................41

=====Politics Links- Bidirectional=====...............................................................................................................................................42Afghan Withdrawal- Popular.....................................................................................................................................................................43Afghan Withdrawal Unpopular.................................................................................................................................................................44South Korea Withdrawal Popular..............................................................................................................................................................45Japan Withdrawal Popular.........................................................................................................................................................................46

1


=====Aff Section=====

2


Topicality Substantial - 50% 2AC A. Counter - Interpretation – a substantial reduction is 25% - military regulations prove.Major Steven N. Tomanelli et al, has served as a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, Chief of Acquisition and Fiscal Law for the Air Force s Air Mobility Command, and Senior DoD Counsel for the

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Army Lawyer, February 1994, Lexis Academic

1. Regulatory Changes--Notification Requirements for Termination or Reduction of Defense Programs.--The DOD has issued an interim rule requiring military departments and defense agencies to notify contractors of a potential termination of, or substantial reduction in, a defense program. n581 Under the new rule, each military department and defense agency must establish procedures for determining which defense programs are likely to be terminated or substantially reduced as a result of the submission of the President's budget or enactment of an appropriations

act. Within thirty days of such submission or enactment, agencies and military departments must notify affected contractors of the proposed termination or reduction. Affected contractors are those with a contract of $ 500,000 or more under a program identified as likely to be terminated or reduced by at least twenty-five percent. Within two weeks after receiving notice from the government, contractors must notify, among others, their affected employees and subcontractors of the proposed termination or reduction.

B. Prefer our interpretation-

Fair limits – our interpretation limits out small affs that tinker with missions, but at the same time doesn’t overlimit the topic

Sources – our interpretation cites actual military regulations, the military would know if they had a substantial presence in Japan

Brightline – our interpretation provides a clear distinction between what is and is not topical

C. Lit checks – the affirmative has on case arguments on the plan, so clearly they were prepared for the round

D. Reasonability – competing interpretations create a race to the bottom, we only have to prove that we are reasonably topical

3


Guam Shift 2AC (1/2) No link-

a) Their Kensei 10 card doesn’t assume a zero-sum redeployment- not all troops from Japan will automatically go to Guam

b) Troops won’t be transferred to Guam- it’s too expensiveMarchesseault, Jeff (anchor for Guam News Watch). 7/6/10. “U.S. Asks Japan to Pay More for the Military Buildup on Guam”. Guam News Watch. http://guamnewswatch.com/201007062437/Local-News/U.S.-Asks-Japan-to-Pay-More-for-the-Military-Buildup-on-Guam.html . DA: 7/25/10.

Japan will need to pay more for the military buildup on Guam and the Pentagon's reconsidering the mix of troops to be sent here. That's

the word from independent news sources in Japan. Kyodo News reports that US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is asking Tokyo to shoulder up to hundreds of millions of dollars more for the transfer of marines from Okinawa to Guam because the U.S. reportedly claims infrastructure costs on Guam are higher than expected. Japanese paper Yomiuri Shimbun reports a new proposal would change the makeup of Marines assigned from Okinawa to Guam. The alternate plan would

keep some of the 8,000 members of the third marine expeditionary force on Okinawa, while certain combat troops would be relocated instead.

c) Iraq troop withdrawal frees up more troops than the plan; if bases were fed by constant troop deployment, troops would already be in Guam, triggering the link Associated Press, staff writer, 8/30/2009 "U.S. military packing up to leave Iraq," http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32618785/ns/world_news-conflict_in_iraq/, da: 7/14

The U.S. military is packing up to leave Iraq in what has been deemed the largest movement of manpower and equipment in modern military history — shipping out more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment from tanks to antennas along with a force the size of a small city. The massive operation already under way a year ahead of the Aug. 31, 2010 deadline to remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq shows the U.S. military has picked up the pace of a planned

exit from Iraq that could cost billions. The goal is to withdraw tens of thousands of troops and about 60 percent of equipment out of Iraq by the end of next March, Brig. Gen. Heidi Brown, a deputy commander charged with overseeing the withdrawal, told The Associated Press in one of the first detailed accounts of how the U.S. military plans to leave Iraq.

Nowhere do they prove that they access physical genocide of the caliber their Card ‘3 card talks about. Their worst impact is “cultural genocide”, meaning at worst, troops may infringe upon Chamorro culture.

Doublebind- US troops have been in Guam for 66 year. That means that either

a) troops currently in Guam practice cultural genocide and the DA is non-unique, orb) there’s no brink to how many troops must be present to access the impact, which minimized their probability and the risk of a link

Non-Unique: Cross- apply Gersen 10 from the 1AC- Japan withdrawal is inevitable

No impact- No cultural genocide- Guamanians affirm their liberty regardless of US military presencePartido, Jerry (staff writer at Variety News. 7/23/10. “A different liberation”. Marianas Variety: Guam. http://mvguam.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13342:-a-different-liberation&catid=33:island-stri-by-gerry-partido&Itemid=60 . DA:7/25/10.

But liberation doesn't have to be always considered in the context of a separation with the U.S. Guam can achieve its own kind of

liberation, even under the current relationship with the U.S. We can start by diversifying our economy and making it less dependent on the feds. Our location is not just strategic militarily, it offers commercial opportunities as well and Guam can serve as a commercial bridge between east and west. If we can

successfully diversify our economy, we can show the world that we are not just dependent on federal dollars. In this sense we can be “liberated” to a degree from the

U.S. We can hold our head high and answer back to any snotty mainlander who says Guam can't live without federal dollars. A more dynamic economy would also mean more jobs and opportunities on island so that people no longer have to relocate to the mainland or join the military just to provide a

decent living for their families. In this sense, more residents would become economically liberated with more options to choose from. To achieve this, our leaders must spearhead a major overhaul of our education system to ensure that future generations would have the training to handle any new industries that Guam develops. Improving education will result in a highly trained workforce, which would ensure that Guam would be less dependent on foreign labor and

that the island will have the human capital to sustain a highly diversified economy. More importantly, education itself is a tool of liberation. Through education, Guam can achieve a different kind of

liberation – a liberation of the mind. Liberation is a state of mind and by inculcating the island's unique history and status to our children, future generations would be less shackled by Guam's past. Remember, people cannot be fettered if their minds are liberated, aware, and questioning.

4


Guam Shift 2AC (2/2) Case outweighs-a) Timeframe- Japan’s economy and East Asian tensions are on the brink. There is no brink to when cultural genocide leads to extinction and it would take years anyway, while our nuclear war scenarios cause extinction almost immediately

b) Probability- econ collapse historically creates global war, which will be even worse in the nuclear era. North Korea and China are already threatening to act. The US has been in Guam for 66 years with no impact, meaning even if they win the link and impact, we outweigh

c) Magnitude- cultural genocide is historically non-unique. Extinction outweighs because there’s no hope for culture when we’re all dead. We solve for 3 global wars and an extinction scenario- extinction because of global ecosystem failure always outweighs cultural genocide

d) Case turns the DA: if we allow East Asian tensions to rise, Guam will become a war zone. There will be even more troops and possibly even combat there. Global war breeds genocide and kills culture, as does the loss of key species.

5


---1AR --- No Link

A2 Natividad and Kirk:

this card says nothing about moving resources, but just “shifting military priorities” to the Pacific theater

A2 Schepers:

this card assumes the status quo move to Guam; nothing about free troops going to Guam

A2 Ogawa:

also assumes status quo; if marines stay in Okinawa, they’ll get moved to Guam, if they’re sent home, they won’t be

The rest of this article talks about how even if there will be a shift, it would be less than half the 8,000 marines that the neg assumes- only 1,856 marines would not trigger the impactSatoshi Ogawa, Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent, 7/3/2010, "U.S. rethinks marine corps' shift to Guam / Wants to keep command unit in Okinawa," http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T100702004810.htm; da: 7/25/10

The exact size of the combat unit to be relocated to Guam is yet to be determined, but according to an environmental impact assessment report unveiled by

the U.S. Navy in November on the construction of a base in Guam, about 1,856 personnel related to the 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters were to be relocated. The combat unit is likely to have close to the same number of personnel.

A2 Goodman/Kuzar:

cross-apply the AP 9 card- Iraq troop shift would have already triggered the impact

6


---1AR---- Big Impact Cal Case outweighs the disad because: 1) timeframe:

a) Japan’s economy is on the brink and US needs more money for econ recovery, even another year spent there will trigger Mead 09

b) South Asian tensions are building as both NK and China build up their nukes, constant risk of a strike causes global nuclear war

c) US has been stationed in Guam since post WWII and cultural genocide has yet to eradicate the population

2) probability:

a) econ collapse has led to fascist regimes and militarist control and global war in the past (i.e. WWII)- with today’s nuclear arsenals and ally system, global nuclear war as a result of extreme econ depression is likely

b) North Korea has been known to exercise their weapons arsenal, any more nuclear testing and East Asia could be “set on fire”- Kim Jong Il is a notable brinksman

c) China already stated that it considers bases and logistics support to Taiwan and surrounding area a threat, and a reason to retaliate (that’s Strait Times 2k)- attack is highly probable if the US continues to overstretch itself in East Asia

d)The probability of even troops flooding into Guam is sketchy and low; even if neg wins a link, cultural genocide not likely because Guam likes US there and not enough troops to trigger the impact

3) magnitude:

a) the decimation of human life outweighs cultural genocide because cultural decay is non-unique; hundreds of cultures have gone extinct due to globalization and modernization and no adverse effects

b) aff solves for a global nuclear war from econ collapse that could destroy the world as we know it

c) aff solves for global nuclear war from war with China that could “destroy civilization”- that’s like thousands of cultural genocides the aff prevents compared to the one that the neg prevents

d) aff solves a nuclear NK war that could encompass East Asia and maybe the rest of the world

e) not only do we solve for destructive global war three times over, but we also solve for extinction- the biggest genocide impact of them all

f) even if there’s a one percent risk that biodiversity in Okinawa and Futenma are key to global ecosystem, extinction due to biodiversity loss is way more important than cultural genocide – and you vote aff on that

7


---A2: Genocide = Bad 4 the Biznak

Turn- US base in Guam presents more job opportunitiesNadkarni 9/13/08 [ Dev, journalist for the Pacific Business Online, “US Base in Guam to Drive Region’s Economy” http://www.pacificbusinessonline.com/article/35/us-base-guam-drive-regions-economy7/25/10]

That address was well timed to coincide with the first major steps in the relocation of the long established US military base on the Japanese island of Okinawa to Guam in the western Pacific. The move is tipped to be one of the largest infrastructure projects the region has ever seen and is expected to cost US$15 billion over the next five years. In the remaining months of this year alone some US$220 million will be spent on preparatory work .Guam is termed an unincorporated US territory and has its own unicameral legislature headed by a governor. It was an obvious choice for the base because it is believed to be the best deepwater port in the region capable of harbouring a wide range of US navy

vessels. A new aircraft carrier purpose built for Pacific Ocean duties to be named ‘Guam’ will be based there when ready.Guam is also a regional transportation and commercial hub, employs a US standard telecommunications network, uses US currency and is a major holiday attraction mostly for American and Japanese tourists. The new base will see 55,000 people added to Guam’s population of 170,000 – about 20,000 of these being workers. The US government has exempted Guam from H-visa caps (H-visa relates to employment) upto the year 2014 to facilitate employment

processes, opening a flood of work opportunities for people both of the Pacific rim countries and the Pacific islands. Late last year, a delegation

of New Zealand businesspeople visited Guam to seek out opportunities. Since then a few New Zealand companies have already begun making headway in working on projects there.The main business opportunities are in the infrastructure sector, especially in the construction of port facilities, roadways, public works and telecommunications. But as the build up progresses, new opportunities are expected to open up in the services sector.

Alt causes: their Campbell 1 card says genocide is bad for the tourism industry- know what else is bad for the tourism industry? Nuclear war in East Asia because of econ collapse or North Korea or China, oil spills, economic downturns, lack of gay marriage, and dictatorships

If tourism is their internal link to the Guamanian economy, then our jobs internal link outweighs on the premise of common sense

8


--- A2: Guam bad for the alliance

We have the key internal link to the Japan-US alliance:

cross-apply 1AC Bandow 10- anti-Americanism in Okinawa chips away at the alliance; washington’s occupation continues to put the pressure on Japan until they force us out, which is way worse for relations than US leaving on their own

Reducing US presence in Japan reduces tension, sustaining the alliance long-termBandow ‘8 [Doug, FPIF contributor & former Special Assistant to Reagan, Foreign Policy in Focus Institute, "Bring Them Home...from Asia", September 19, 2008 Accessed: 6-25-10,

http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring_them_homefrom_asia]Finally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall U.S. relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that inevitably

accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in the middle of a foreign country and culture. The U.S. government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against U.S. beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food. As a result, President George W. Bush received a less-than-friendly reception when he visited in early August. In Japan, the heavy concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without the presence of U.S. military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to ones of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on government-to-government geopolitical relations.

Their Tanaka/McCormack card provides no warrants as to why Japan hates the Guam shift- Bandow is specific about the reasons Japan wants the US out

US shift to Guam will strengthen the alliance AFP 7-15-09, [AFP publication, “Japan-Guam troop shift good for US: official” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Japan-Guam+troop+shift+good+for+US%3A+official-a01611929345 7/25/10]

Redeployment of more than 8,000 Marines from Japan to the US territory for Guam will help Washington by showing its staying power in the region, a US defense official said Wednesday. Japan's parliament earlier this year gave the green light for a multibillion dollar plan to shift the troops by 2014 to Guam from Okinawa, where the

heavy US military presence has long been controversial. The shift shows "we have territory in the Western Pacific, we are a resident power and there is not a question for us to pull back -- it is impossible for us to do so," said Scher, a deputy assistant secretary of defense. Scher,

testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also said the move was "part of the continuing alliance with Japan and putting that alliance on the right footing."Okinawa, a small subtropical chain, is home to more than half of the over 40,000 US troops in Japan, creating frequent friction with residents who accuse troops of causing noise and crime. Japan's conservative government has agreed to pay up to 2.8 billion dollars for infrastructure and other work to relocate 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents to Guam. The plan was criticized by the opposition, which questioned the true cost and pushed for the United States to completely remove one Marine

airfield rather than moving it to reclaimed land off Okinawa. Washington has an alliance commitment to protect Japan, which has been officially pacifist since World War II. The United States also stations some 28,500 troops in nearby South Korea to defend against a potential attack by the communist North.

9


--- A2: Guam Shift does shit to the environment

no internal link- the Natividad card simply wonders about trash from construction, but never says conclusively there will be the biodiversity loss that Diner assumes

no impact- we’ve had bases on Guam for a really long time, and no key species have been eliminated, culminating in human extinction

prefer our biodiversity scenario

a) more probable- 1AC McCormack 10 is conclusive about landfills overflowing Futenma and completely taking out the biodiversity of the turtles and dugongs and the seagrasses, if we move to Futenma, construction will increase the risk of species extinction

b) our impact will be swift and decisive- with only 50 dugongs left, we can’t afford to wait! Dugongs are on the brink of extinction, not to mention the sea turtles’ fragile ecosystem- Natividad doesn’t provide a brink

10


--- Non-Unique Non- unique: Chamorro culture declining in the status quoSchepers, Emile (doctorate in cultural anthropology, researcher, civil and immigrant rights activist). 6/28/10. “Guam: Proposed U.S. base expansion seen as threat”. People’s World. http://peoplesworld.org/guam-proposed-u-s-base-expansion-seen-as-threat/ . DA: 7/25/10.

As a result of the intensification of the U.S. military presence, major demographic, cultural and ecological changes have hit Guam. Today,

only 37 percent of the population is indigenous Chamorro; the rest are of Filipino, United States and others. The Chamorro language is declining. The local government has very limited powers, and the people of Guam, though U.S. citizens, neither have voting representation in Congress, nor the right to vote in U.S. presidential elections. Because the U.S. military has occupied 30 percent of the land, and because of the domination of the island economy by the United States, Guam, which until World War II grew enough food to feed its own people plus the U.S. military, now imports 90 percent of its food.

11


---No Link Troops from Japan will be relocated to South Korea, not GuamHutchison, Kay Bailey (senior U.S. Senator from Texas, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). “Foundation of U.S. Military Should be Built on American Soil”.

Johnson City Record Courier. 7/22 /10. http://www.jcrecordcourier.com/news/article/32617 DA: 7/25/10. DOD is also planning to spend millions to build deployment facilities in South Korea. The Pentagon proposes expanding U.S. presence from 30,000 service personnel to approximately 84,000 including families. This will require substantial taxpayer funding to build adequate housing, schools, hospitals, childcare facilities, and commissaries. Investing these resources overseas makes no sense when we are already building up infrastructure and deployment capabilities at U.S. bases, where amenities to support

military families are well-established. Similarly, plans to shift Marines currently stationed in Japan to the tiny island of Guam are problematic. This proposal is fraught with environmental concerns, insufficient existing infrastructure, an implausible timeline – and staggering costs (now estimated at $16 billion). With these considerable barriers, better basing alternatives should be explored.

Troops from Japan will be relocated to the USHutchison , Kay Bailey (senior U.S. Senator from Texas, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). “Foundation of U.S. Military Should be Built on American Soil”.

Johnson City Record Courier. 7/22 /10. http://www.jcrecordcourier.com/news/article/32617 DA: 7/25/10. In 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission reaffirmed this strategy and lauded the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to transform the military and re-station tens of thousands of military personnel in the United States. Congress has invested more than $14 billion to build housing, stationing, training, and deployment capacities at major military installations, such as Fort Bliss and Fort Hood. We have proven we can best deploy from the United States – and we can do it more cost-effectively

12

SDI 2010 Crowe- Hammond- Schirmer2AC Blocks- Wave 2

---Guam Supports US presence Guam is grateful to the US and wants continued presencePartido, Jerry (staff writer at Variety News. 7/23/10. “A different liberation”. Marianas Variety: Guam. http://mvguam.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13342:-a-different-liberation&catid=33:island-stri-by-gerry-partido&Itemid=60 . DA:7/25/10.

Guam will always be grateful to the U.S. for liberating the island from the tyranny of the Japanese during World War II. But at the same time, there is resentment as Guam continues to be an unincorporated territory of the United States without the same rights as other states in the union. The U.S. has Guam exactly where it wants it to be. Our island is sovereign American territory that the federal government can use without giving back any concessions, like statehood for instance. Through the years, calls have been made to change this unfair relationship. Statehood, which is one of the options that Guam continues to consider, is not really viable since we are thousands of miles away from the U.S. mainland and we have a low population base. To mainland politicians and policy-makers,

we might as well be on the moon. Independence is even less likely as the U.S. already has two major military bases on island which have grown even more vital with the continuing geo-political tensions in the region. Besides, what will happen to our economy if we gain independence? Aside from tourism, Guam is heavily dependent on military spending and federal dollars. As for commonwealth, one only has to look at the current difficulties of our neighbor to the north to realize that being a commonwealth may not be the way

forward either. At any rate, the CNMI has technically ceased to be a commonwealth with the federalization of its immigration and labor functions.The truth is that Guam will have to live with the fact that the U.S. will always be here. This is not really so bad considering the many benefits that the island gets from the U.S. It is hypocritical to say that the Guam-U.S. relationship is just one-sided. Guam, too, gets a lot in terms of economic assistance. Moreover, many islanders go to the mainland to enjoy greener pastures, get a higher education, and even more join the U.S. military to further broaden their opportunities. But liberation doesn't have to be always considered in the context of a separation with the U.S. Guam can achieve its own kind of liberation, even under the current relationship with the U.S.

US presence in Guam boosts property marketGlobal Property Market, 3-15-10, Global Property Market, “Military Expansion to Boost Guams Property Market, http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Pacific/Guam/Price-History7/25/10]

In 2009, Guam’s property market declined sharply, amid the global crisis. Demand from foreign investors fell especially sharply.The median price of single-family homes declined 7% in 2009 from a year earlier, according to the Captain Real Estate Group. When adjusted for inflation, the median price dropped by about 9%. Similarly, the median price of

condominium units fell by around 11% (-12% in real terms) over the same period.Guam’s housing market is expected to recover by the second half of 2010, as the military buildup starts. The planned military expansion in the island is the result of an agreement between the US and Japan to relocate around 8,000 US Marines and their dependants from Okinawa to Guam. In 2010, total real estate sales are expected to reach US$300 million, up from US$251 million in 2009. “The island’s real estate market saw overall sales dive last year, but by the second half of this year, the industry will see things start to rebound”, says Nick Captain of Captain Real Estate Group.In 2009, the median price of single family homes was about US$200,000, down from US$215,000 in 2008. The median price of condominiums dropped to US$140,000, from US$125,000.

Military Expansion to Boost Guam’s Property MarketGlobal Property Market, 3-15-10, Global Property Market, “Military Expansion to Boost Guams Property Market, http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Pacific/Guam/Price-History7/25/10]The military build-up, scheduled to start in mid-2010, is a result of an agreement between the US and Japan to relocate around 8,000 US Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The relocation is projected to be

completed in 2014, and to cost over US$10 billion.The move should create significant construction and infrastructure opportunities. Guam’s population is projected to increase by 20%, or by approximately 30,000 people, creating demand for additional housing . Two years ago, foreign real estate investment rose sharply in anticipation of the military buildup.Military households make up about 13% of total households in Guam, but the military housing market is independent of the local housing

market.Nevertheless, the military presence does impact the local housing market, in the following ways: Some military personnel choose to live off-base, Military dependents may have to live off-base, or choose to do so, Housing for construction workers, Housing for civilian workers, The military buildup results in improved economic prospects for the island Though Japan’s newly-elected government has signaled

that it is no longer so sure it wants to comply with the US-Japan bilateral agreement, the U.S. has affirmed that the program will proceed as planned. In May 2010, Japan will announce its decision.

13


--- Guam Shift Good-Hawaii

Guam Shift means more jobs for HawaiiChiem 7/2/10 [Linda, Pacific Business News journalist, “Guam Boom Means more Jobs for Hawaii” http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2010/07/05/story1.html?b=1278302400^3600071,7/25/10]

Hawaii companies gearing up for the business boom on Guam already are facing hiring and recruiting challenges that will only increase as the U.S. military’s multibillion-dollar buildup there takes shape.A number of Hawaii-based businesses, including general contractors and architectural and engineering firms, have landed lucrative multimillion-dollar contracts for construction projects on Guam, which is preparing for the U.S. military’s transfer of 8,600 U.S. Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa by 2014.The ambitious project, estimated to cost between $10 billion and $15 billion, will generate an estimated 20,000 new jobs, many of which could go to Hawaii residents.But recruiters and employers say getting workers to go to Hagatna, Guam’s capital, a 3,800-mile and seven-hour flight from

Honolulu, has been difficult given the heat, humidity and relative isolation often associated with the island.As a result, local companies are eyeing incentives and subsidies and even paying higher prevailing wages, depending on the job, to get workers to Guam.(The prevailing wage for the most common construction jobs on Guam, including carpenters, electricians, plumbers and welders, averages between $25,000 and $30,000 a year, according to the Guam Department of Labor.)“It’s coming up and I’m stashing people away, especially those who say they’re willing to go there, for when things really start picking up,” said Sandra Ohara, director of corporate accounts and government contracts for Adecco in Hawaii. “It’s difficult getting local people to go to Guam because they don’t want to commit to the standard two years there that’s typical for government work … The biggest challenge is the remoteness and the overall climate.” Companies will be looking to recruit workers from the Philippines, American Samoa, Southeast Asia and even the U.S. Mainland — processes made easier by the federal government’s easing of visa restrictions for hiring foreign

workers.Meantime, the Hawaii companies that already have workers on the ground in Guam have adapted to the worker shortfall by offering job incentives and subsidies.

14


China DA 2AC No Link –

Their link card is specific to navy forces and their being seen as a strong defensive mechanism. We only remove Marines.

We only remove the offensive forces that provoke China. There will still be the defensive presence necessary to deter.

Cross Apply Preble in 6 from the Alliance advantage that says that Japan can uniquely deter China absent a U.S presence. Case turns the DA.

Navy and Airforce checks ChinaGates 9 ( Robert, Secretary of Defense for the United States. “Submitted Statement on DoD challenges to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Department of Defense. http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx? SpeechID=1337. 1/27. July 26, 2010.

As we know, China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber-and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization in these areas could threaten America’s primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific : our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. We have seen some improvement in the U.S.-Chinese security relationship recently. Last year, I inaugurated a direct telephone link with the Chinese defense

ministry. Military to military exchanges continue, and we have begun a strategic dialogue to help us understand each other’s intentions and avoid potentially dangerous miscalculations. As I’ve said before, the U.S. military must be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum – including the armed forces of other nations. On account of Iraq and Afghanistan, we would be hard pressed at this time to launch another major ground operation. But elsewhere in the world, the United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any adversary that committed an act of aggression – whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Taiwan Strait. The risk from these types of scenarios cannot be ignored, but it is a manageable one in the short- to mid-term.

4. Their disad is applicable to both South Korea and Japan. Leaving troops in South Korea solves the advantage

5. No internal link– their Bandow evidence assumes a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Even then, it does not decisively say the U.S will be implicated

15


---AT Okinawa key Their evidence is flaweda) It doesn’t assume China war. No where in the card does it say that 20,000 marines can stop China’s army of 5 million

b) It talks largely about humanitarian aid, which is not the same as fighting China

c) It says that a visible military presence is key, but we leave behind the same airforce fly overs that the card advocates

d) US Marines are useless in Japan – they don’t help deterrence and they wouldn’t be used in conflictDoug Bandow 2010, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, June 18th, 2010 [“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010]The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on

Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do. The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units. Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops—insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the

Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia. General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?

16


----Containment Fails Chinese containment policy fails in the status quoMaginnis 10 (Robert Maginnis, retired Army lieutenant colonel, a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television and a senior strategist with the U.S. Army, “China's High Seas Aggression,” 05/20/2010, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37081)

China’s aggressive actions on the high seas, its rapidly expanding navy and its new global strategy suggest Beijing’s motivations are as much about geopolitical power as economics. That’s why the U.S. either accommodates its soon-to-be naval “peer competitor” or face the risk of military conflicts with the emerging superpower. Japan’s foreign minister expressed concern last week about China’s growing military aggression. “I wouldn’t use the word ‘threat’ – but we certainly will need to watch very carefully the nuclear arsenal and naval capabilities of China,” Katsuya Okada told the Wall Street Journal. Okada filed a protest with Beijing earlier this month over “obstructive behavior” by a Chinese survey ship in the East China Sea. Okada complained the Chinese ship chased a Japanese coast guard vessel that Tokyo said was conducting marine surveys within Japan’s economic zone. That was the third Chinese provocation over the past month.

On April 10 and 21, a flotilla from China’s East Sea Fleet sailed through Japan’s Miyako Strait, a mineral-rich area disputed between the two Asian powers. During each passage Chinese helicopters circled near Japanese destroyers. These incidents irked the Japanese and they happened just days after warships from China’s North Sea Fleet returned from what the Chinese called “confrontation exercises” in the South China Sea, according to Stratfor, an American intelligence group. The U.S. Navy has been a victim of Chinese “confrontation.” In 2001, Chinese fighters intercepted and crashed into a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft and then forced it to land at a Chinese military airfield. In late 2007, a Chinese Song class submarine surfaced dangerously close to the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier, during a Pacific exercise. Last year, Chinese vessels aggressively maneuvered within 25 feet of the USNS Impreccable, an unarmed ocean surveillance ship, in the South China Sea. These aggressive actions suggest China’s navy is taking on a new and dangerous character. China’s aggressive naval behavior accompanies the regime’s growing and seemingly insatiable appetite for natural resources and the movement of its products to sustain a fast-growing economy. That means Beijing must depend on sea routes for transporting goods, which has become a factor

shaping its strategic naval behavior. Beijing’s motive for a large navy is more complex than trade. There is a rising tide of Chinese nationalism aimed at Japan and the U.S., China’s long-time naval rivals. A larger navy feeds Chinese national pride at its rivals’ expense and gives Beijing the tools to eventually reunify the “renegade province” of Taiwan by force if necessary. And it helps to control contested island groups off China’s coasts, which form a new outer-defense security belt. This multi-faceted motivation prompts China’s strategic military transformation. The Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review outlines that transformation: “China’s military has begun to develop new roles, missions, and capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests.” “We are going from coastal defense to far-sea defense,” Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet told Xinhua, the state news agency. Adm. Huachen explained, “With the

expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes.” An April editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese state owned newspaper, tried to dispel concern about its growing navy. “China does not hold an intention to challenge the U.S. in the central Pacific or engage in a military clash with Japan in close waters,” the Times wrote. But that statement radically expands China’s previously defined “core interests” to now include the South China Sea and the entire Western Pacific. The editorial then warns it’s time for the U.S. and Japan to "adjust their viewpoint when considering China’s moves. The time when dominant powers enjoyed unshared ‘spheres of influence’ around the world is over.” Then it concluded: “A growing Chinese navy is a symbol of China’s peaceful rise.” But that view is contradicted by China’s assertive behavior and its lust for a large, offensively-capable navy. Two decades of double-digit spending increases have radically grown China’s navy. The 225,000-man People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) is organized into three fleets and equipped with 260 vessels including 75 “principal combatants” and over 60 submarines. The U.S. Navy has 286 battle-force ships though the American fleet is qualitatively superior to the Chinese navy. In March, Adm. Robert Willard, the leader of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified Chinese naval developments were “pretty dramatic.” “Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region,” the

admiral said. Beijing’s “pretty dramatic” developments include plans to deploy two aircraft carriers by 2015. It already acquired four retired aircraft carriers: one from Australia and three ex-Soviet carriers. On March 21, the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag left the dry dock in Dalian, China, after refurbishment and now is undergoing the installation of electronics and weapons. A

2009 Pentagon report indicates China is training 50 navy pilots to operate Sukhoi SU-33s (navalized Flankers) for aircraft carrier operations. China’s navy uses a growing international network of ports known as the “pearl necklace.” Those permanent Chinese bases are along the shores of the Indian Ocean and the maritime routes to the strategic Strait of Malacca: Maldives, Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Seychelles and Pakistan. Beijing is actively negotiating with a number of African countries for permanent ports as well. Chinese naval units are also going on missions to new locations. Since 2008, the PLA-N has maintained three ships in the Gulf of Aden to conduct counter-piracy patrols and this March two Chinese warships docked in Abu Dhabi, the first time the modern Chinese navy made a port visit in the Middle East. China is also negotiating for a new base in Iran. China’s expansive trade interests coupled with its new naval strategy and an offensively capable navy requires Washington to make some tough decisions. Should the U.S. remain engaged in Asia to protect its economic and security interests? It appears the Obama Administration plans to maintain a credible force in the region for now. Recently, it transferred several nuclear submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific to help keep tabs on China’s submarine force. But keeping our navy right-sized to meet the Chinese and other global challenges may not be President Obama’s priority. Last

week U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, “The gusher [military spending] has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.” Gates asked, “Does the number of warships we have and are building really put America at risk when the U.S. battle fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined, 11 of which belong to allies and partners?” That statement doesn’t make sense based on the Pentagon’s 2009 report on China’s military power which indicates Beijing has 260 ships (and growing) compared to America’s 286. We can also train and equip regional allies like Japan. But most Asian allies can ill afford to deploy ocean-going ships to defend their vital interests from China’s superpower fleet. Finally, the U.S. ought to engage with China to remove its veil of secrecy about military programs and geopolitical intentions. Security cooperation programs – joint exercises, exchanges – can reduce some tension and maneuver-space agreements can help avoid needless confrontations. China is a rapidly growing naval power that will soon become America’s “peer

competitor.” Washington should engage Beijing at every opportunity to promote transparency and cooperation while maintaining a credible deterrent in Asia. Otherwise our economic and security interests will inevitably collide and we could easily land in a new cold war or worse.

17

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37081


2AC Deterrence DA (1/2) Non Unique – Deterrence of North Korea failing nowSeung Taek Kim, former director of ROK Ministry of National Defense’s U.S. Policy Division, Office of the Korea Chair at CSIS in January 2010, primarily focuses on the U.S.-ROK Alliance, specifically regarding

strategic flexibility, extended deterrence, and the future of USFK, July 2, 2010, “Rethinking Extended Deterrence,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100702_Rethinking_Extended_Deterrence-english.pdf

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States are allies that signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. The primary mission of the Mutual Defense Treaty is to prevent war and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula . The experience from the past sixty years shows that this security alliance has successfully served its purpose. For the U.S., it has effectively dissuaded and deterred North Korea from taking overt military actions on the Korean Peninsula by providing the ROK with “extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella” and displaying its overwhelming military force and political will to defend its ally from the North’s aggression. The ROK, confident in U.S. extended deterrence and security commitment to its defense, has also been assured of its security and has believed that the deterrence would hold effective. Such belief has been affirmed as the relative peace and status quo on the Korean Peninsula has lasted over the past sixty

years. However, the Cheonan incident revealed both the limit and vulnerability of the U.S . extended deterrence. It may have been able to prevent North Korea from launching a full scale attack on South Korea, but it has not been nearly as effective in preventing such

limited local provocation as the Cheonan incident. Since the current extended deterrence policy can only be invoked to authorize punitive measures to be taken in response to a military offense , it is almost impossible to invoke the extended deterrence to a limited local provocation like the Cheonan that is a small-scale, one-time incident. It appears as if North Korea has discovered this loophole—and successfully used it to its advantage. After all, there is yet to be a case in which the United States responded forcefully to such provocations, despite the fact that a number of similar incidences preceded the Cheonan that resulted in skirmishes between the South and North Korean navies near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea. A reevaluation of

the “extended deterrence” policy is necessary. Just as America’s nuclear arsenal consisting of thousands of warheads have failed to dissuade and deter Al-Qaeda from

committing acts of terrorism, so too has the extended deterrence policy of the United States been ineffectual in deterring North Korea from engaging in

limited local provocations and escalating tensions on the peninsula. What is more concerning is that the probability of a full-scale war between North and

South Korea may essentially be nil today, but the frequency of local provocations can be expected to surge in the coming years.

Link non-unique – Asian extended deterrence is hollow—North Korea prolifHayes, Melbourne University IR Professor, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, December 10, 2009 [Peter, "Extended Nuclear Deterrence, Global Abolition and Korea," http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/reports/2009/hayes-deterrence.pdf/view, 12/29/09]

Henceforth, the credibility of US END with allies in this region was tied up directly with the United States’ ability to stop and reverse (not merely contain by deterrence) the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapon s and use of nuclear threat to compel the United States and others to

negotiate with it—what I term the DPRK’s “stalker strategy.”5 As a result of nearly two decades of slow motion nuclear wrestling with the DPRK culminating in 2009 in the latter’s second, this time

successful, nuclear test, the credibility of US END has fallen to an all-time low. Since 2008, US nuclear hegemony based on END in East Asia has begun to unravel due to the havoc wrought by the North Korean nuclear breakout on the NPT-IAEA system as a whole, by its rejection of the authority of the UNSC as enforcer of the NPT-IAEA system, as a spoiler state for cooperative security institution building in the region, and by its direct challenge to US hegemony in its alliance relationships. Of

course, all the nuclear weapons states are responsible for the parlous state of the NPT-IAEA system. But in the case of the DPRK, the United States as a direct antagonist and primary player in the Peninsula is by far the state held most accountable for these dismal outcomes .

No link – a) U.S. presence is not key to deterrence. Japan themselves can deter. Extend Preble ‘6 card which discusses how Japan can deter China. Also, in the Meyer ‘9 card it outlines that U.S. bases cause North Korea to target missiles at Japan. So rather than insuring deterrence, it is prevented.

b) No spillover. Their Hakan Tunc ‘8 card only talks out of crisis and theater of war, but we are not doing that, we are simply withdrawing troops that have no purpose in Japan.

No impact – deterrence theory is non-falsifiable and counter-productive unless applied to specific scenariosGray, Ph.D., Reading University International Politics and Strategic Studies Professor, Former Advisor to US and British Gov't, National Institute for Public Policy Founder, Former Reagan President's General

Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament Advisor, Former Hudson Institute and International Institute for Strategic Studies Fellow, 8/1/2003 [Colin, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence," http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=211, da: 7/26/10]

Develop a more empirical theory of deterrence. In its immediate form, deterrence is always specific. It is about persuading a particular leader or leaders, at a particular time, not to take particular actions. The details will be all important, not be marginal. A body of nonspecific general theory on deterrence is likely to prove not merely unhelpful, but positively misleading. It is improbable that broad general precepts from the canon lore of American Cold War deterrence theory could yield much useful advice for the guidance of U.S. policy today. What the United States requires is detailed, culturally empathetic, understanding of its new adversaries. That understanding should include some grasp of the psychology of key decisionmakers, as well as knowledge of how decisions tend to be made. Readers should recall the words of Keith Payne quoted earlier. He said that if we could make the convenient assumption that “rationality alone fostered reasonable behavior,” then we could predict adversary behavior simply by asking ourselves what we would deem to be reasonable were we in their circumstances. If we can predict the reasoning of our enemies reliably enough, because of the general authority of our theory of deterrence, “the hard work of attempting to understand the opponent’s particular beliefs and thought can be avoided.” The fact that the Cold War did not conclude with World War III is not proof that Payne is wrong. It may well be that our strategy of deterrence was not severely tried. There may never have been a moment when the Soviet leadership posed the question, “Are we deterred?” Given the weight of the general stakes in the superpower contest, notwithstanding the blessed shortage of direct issues in contention, and the transcultural grasp of the horrors of nuclear war, it was probably the case that the success or otherwise of deterrence did not depend upon ine-grained strategic calculation or knowledge. Of course, one can write that with much more conidence today than one could during the decades when responsible oficials were obliged to assume that deterrence could be fragile. However, if

the United States now aspires to deter the leaders of culturally mysterious and apparently roguish states, the convenient assumption that “one size its all” with the (American) precepts

of deterrence, is likely to fail badly. It is bad news for those among us who are not regional or local specialists, but to improve the prospects for deterrence of such polities as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and the rest, there is no intelligent alternative to undertaking empirical research to understand those whom we strive to inluence. It will not sufice either simply to reach for the classics of American strategic thought, or to assume that the posing of a yet more decisive military threat must carry a message that speaks convincingly in all languages.

18

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=211


2AC Deterrence DA (2/2) Impact Turn -Hegemony causes global warGabriel Kolko, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 173-6

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only the United States has the will to maintain a global foreign policy and to intervene everywhere it believes necessary. Today and in the near future, the United States will make the decisions that will lead to war or peace, and the fate of much of the world is largely in its hands. It possesses the arms and a spectrum of military strategies all predicated on a triumphant activist role for itself. It believes that its economy can afford interventionism and that the American public will support whatever actions necessary to set the affairs of some country or region on the political path it deems essential. This grandiose ambition is bipartisan, and details notwithstanding, both parties have always shared a consensus on it. The obsession with power and the conviction that armies can produce the political outcome a nation's leaders desire is by no means an exclusively American illusion. It is a notion that goes back many centuries and has produced the main wars of modern

times. The rule of force has been with humankind a very long time, and the assumptions behind it have plagued its history for centuries. But unlike the leaders of most European nations or Japan, US leaders have not gained insight from the calamities that have so seared modern history. Folly is scarcely a US monopoly, but resistance to learning when grave errors have been committed is almost proportionate to the resources available to repeat them. The Germans learned their lesson after two defeats, the Japanese after World War II, and both nations found wars too ehausting and politically dangerous. The United States still believes that if firepower fails to master a situation, the solution is to use it more precisely and much more of it. In this regard it is exceptional—past

failures have not made it any wiser. Wars are at least as likely today as any time over the past century. Of great importance is the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe

and Moscow's restraining influence elsewhere. But the proliferation of nuclear technology and other means of mass destruction have also made large parts of the world far more dangerous. Deadly local wars with conventional weapons in Africa, the Balkans, Middle East, and elsewhere have multiplied since the 1960s. Europe, especially Germany, and Japan, are far stronger and more independent than at any time since 1945, and China's rapidly expanding economy has given it a vastly more important role in Asia. Ideologically, communism's demise means that the simplified bipolarism that Washington used to explain the world ceased after 1990 to have any value. With it, the alliances created nominally to resist communism have either been abolished or are a shadow of their original selves; they have no reason for existence. The crisis in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of US hegemony. Economically, the capitalist nations have resumed their rivalries, and they have become more intense with the growth of their economies and the decline in the dollar—which by 2004 was as weak as it has been in over fifty years. These states have a great deal in common ideologically, but concretely they are increasingly rivals. The virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons that existed about a quarter-century ago has ended with proliferation.?, Whether it is called a "multipolar" world, to use French president Jacques Chirac's expression in November 2004, in which Europe, China, India, and even eventually South America follow their own interests, or something else, the direction is clear. There may or may not be "a fundamental restructuring of the global order," as the chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) National Intelligence Council presciently reflected in April 2003, but the conclusion was unavoidable "that we are facing a more fluid and complicated set of alignments than anything we have

seen since the formation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949." Terrorism and the global economy have defied overwhelming US military power: "Our smart bombs aren't that smart."' Wars, whether civil or between states, remain the principal (but scarcely the only) challenge confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Ecological disasters relentlessly affecting all dimensions of the environment are also insidious because of the unwillingness of the crucial

nations—above all the United States—to adopt measures essential for reversing their damage. The challenges facing humanity have never been so complex and threatening , and the end of the Cold War, although one precondition of progress, is scarcely reason for complaceriby or optimism. The problems the world confronts far transcend the communist-capitalist tensions,

many of which were mainly symptoms of the far greater intellectual, political, and economic problems that plagued the world before 1917—and still exist. Whatever the original intention, US interventions can lead to open-ended commitments in both duration and effort. They may last a short time, and usually do, but unforeseen events can cause the United States to spend far more resources than it originally anticipated, causing it in the name of its credibility, or some other doctrine, to get into disastrous situations that in the end defeat the United States. Vietnam is the leading example of this

tendency, but Iraq, however different in degree, is the same in kind. Should the United States confront even some of the forty or more nations that now have terrorist networks, then it will in one manner or another intervene everywhere, but especially in Africa and the Middle East. The consequences of such commitments will be unpredictable. The United States has more determined and probably more numerous enemies today than at any time, and many of those who hate it are ready and able to inflict destruction on its shores. Its interventions often triumphed in the purely military sense, which is all the Pentagon worries about, but in all too many cases they have been political failures and eventually led to greater US

military and political involvement. Its virtually instinctive activist mentality has caused it to get into situations where it often had no interests, much less durable solutions to a nation's problems, repeatedly creating disasters and enduring enmities. The United States has power without wisdom and cannot, despite its repeated experiences, recognize the limits of its ultrasophisticated military technology. The result has been folly and hatred, which is a recipe for disasters. September 11 confirmed that, and war has come to its shores. That the United States end its self-appointed global mission of regulating all problems, wherever, whenever, or however it wishes to do so, is an essential precondition of stemming, much less reversing, the accumulated deterioration of world affairs and wars. We should not ignore the countless ethical and other reasons it has no more right or capacity to do so than any state over the past century, whatever justifications they evoked. The problems, as the history of the past century shows, are much greater than the US role in the world: but at the present time its actions are decisive, and whether there is War or peace will be decided far more often in Washington than any other place. Ultimately, there

will not be peace in the world unless all nations relinquish war as an instrument of policy, not only because of ethical or moral reasoning but because wars have become deadlier and more destructive of social institutions. A precondition of peace is for nations not to attempt to impose their visions on others, adjudicate their differences, and never to assume that their need for the

economic or strategic resources of another country warrants interference of any sort in its internal affairs. But September 11 proved that after a half-century of interventions the United States has managed to provoke increasing hatred. It has failed abysmally to bring peace and security to the world. Its role as a rogue superpower and its promiscuous, cynical interventionism has been spectacularly unsuccessful, even on its own terms. It is squandering vast economic resources, and it has now endangered the physical security of Americans at home. To end the damage the United States causes abroad is also to fulfill the responsibilities that US politicians have to their own people. But there is not the slightest sign at this point that voters will call them to account, and neither the AMerican population nor its political leaders are likely to agree to Rich far-reaching changes in foreign policy. The issues are far too grave to wait for US attitudes and its political process to

be transformed. The world will be safer to the extent that US alliances are dissolved and it is isolated, and that is happening for many reasons, ranging from the unilateralism, hubris, and preemptory style of the Bush administration to the fact that since the demise of communism, the world's political alignments have changed dramatically. Communism and fascism were both outcomes of the fatal errors in the international order and affairs of states that World War I spawned. In part, the Soviet system's disintegration was the result of the fact it was the aberrant consequence of a destructive and abnormal war, 11,);t at least as important was its leaders' loss of confidence in socialism. And suicidal Muslims are, to a great extent, the outcome of a half-century of US interference in the Middle East and Islamic world, which radicalized so many young men and women ready to die for faith. Just as the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 created Bolsheviks, the repeated grave errors of the United States, however different the context or times, have produced their own abnormal, negative reactions. The twenty- first century has begun very badly because the United States continues with its aggressive policies. They are far more dangerous than those of the twentieth century. The destructive potential of weaponry has increased exponentially, and many more people and nations have access to it. What would once have been considered relatively minor foreign policy problems now have potentially far greater consequences. It all augurs very badly. The world has reached the most dangerous point in recent, or perhaps all of, history. There are threats of war and instability unlike anything that prevailed when a Soviet-led bloc existed. Even if the United States abstains from interference and tailors its actions to fit this troubled reality, there will be serious problems throughout much of the world. Internecine civil conflicts will continue, as well as wars between nations armed with an increasing variety of much more destructive weapons available from outside powers, of which the United States remains, by far, the most important source. Many of these conflicts have independent roots, and both principles and experiences justify the United States staying out of them and leaving the world alone. Both the American people and those involved directly will be far better off

without foreign interference, whatever nation attempts it. US leaders are not creating peace or security at home or stability abroad. The reverse is the case: its interventions have been counterproductive, and its foreign policy is a disaster. Americans and those people who are the objects of successive administrations' efforts would be far better off if the United States did nothing, closed its bases overseas and withdrew its fleets everywhere, and allowed the rest of world to find its own way. Communism is dead, and Europe and Japan are powerful and both can and will take care of their own interests. The United States must adapt to these facts. But if it continues as it has over the past half-century, attempting to satisfy its vainglorious but

irrational ambition to run the world, then there will be even deeper crises and it will inflict wars and turmoil on many nations as well as on its own people. And it will fail yet again, for all states that have gone to war over the past centuries have not achieved the objectives for which they sacrificed so much blood, passion, and resources. They have only produced endless misery and upheavals of every kind

19


2AC Japan Object CP 1. Perm do both- Solves the Link to the DA and solves the aff- No new base is built and troops are removed

2. Doesn’t even come close to solving the aff- It’s a Disad to the CP

a) TROOPS is the key internal link to stability in Asia- that’s the 1AC AP and Bandow Evidence

b) The presence of the Futenma base tanks the Japanese Economy that collapses the globe – causes extinction

c) Can’t solve North Korea talks- they wont come to the table unless the US withdraws from Japan- that’s Layne, Auslin and Meyer

c) Doesn’t solve Bio D- presence of troops collapses biodiversity- it comes first- causes the Extinction of all Life on Earth- that’s Diner

Fourth is theory

International fiat voter for fairness and education

1. Aff Ground—there are an unmanageable number of countries—its impossible to research how every one could potentially solve the aff advantages

2. Education—the topic focus is US troop presence—the CP shifts the debate to other actors—that’s an incoherent model of decision-making because no policymaker could choose between the advocacies—decision-making is key to education and should be the filter for neg ground

3. Justifies Object Fiat--The object of the advantage includes lack of international solutions—the CP fiats out of this—that justifies CPs that fiat out of any advantage impact and utopian counterplans to avoid global problems—that kills aff ground

And Condo is a voter

Offense: ---Timeskew – skews 2AC time allocation because we can’t predict what the 2NR will go for

---Strat Skew – skews our offense forces us to make our worse arguments because they’re shorter – the neg becomes a moving target which kills clash

---Multiple Worlds Bad – forces the aff to contradict themselves which destroys education

---Interpretation – read the cp dispo – gives the aff the strategic option of the straight turn and it limits the number of options the neg can read

Defense: ---Infinitely Regressive – nothing to constrain the neg from reading four counterplans in the 1NC

---Depth Over breath – good to have in depth education about an argument than a shallow education

---Not Reciprocal – the aff is stuck with one policy option so the neg should be too.

---Reject the team not the argument – conditionality is a punitive measure – kicking the counterplan doesn’t punish the neg

20


Consult CP Notes During CX ask:

If Japan decides to accept the plan initially, do they get the chance to change their mind?

If they say no:

It is not genuine consultation that they claim is necessary

If they say yes:

The perm will solve.

To extend perm – do the plan and consult over enforcement in the plan in 1AR:

If it is genuine consultation, Japan should be able to change their mind. Then the perm solves the net benefit. If Japan cannot change their mind, the consultation is not genuine, so they don’t solve the net benefit.

21


2AC Consult NATO (1/2) 1. Perm – Do Both

2. Non-binding consultation can solve the net benefit and our turnsDaily Oklahoman - 6-12-2001WITH his arrival in Spain this morning, President Bush begins a five-day trip to European countries, many of whose leaders are eager to lecture him on missile defense, global warming and - following the execution of

Timothy McVeigh - the death penalty. We hope the president will listen politely but stay the course. The United States always should consult with its allies. But consultation doesn't mean conformity with a raft of liberal-to-socialist views now popular in a number of European capitals. "You can go through the motions of consulting as long as you don't ask and do tell," Kenneth Adelman, a veteran of the Reagan administration, told the New York Times. "You can ask opinions, but the fact is Europeans don't like change and Americans like change." Bush represents change - change from the arms-control dogma of the 1970s and '80s that remains gospel in Europe and change from reactionary

environmentalism that mostly ignores the livelihoods of everyday people. We're not under any illusion that Bush can change minds while he visits Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Poland

and Slovenia. But perhaps he can convince our friends that America's positions are principled and well-reasoned while dispelling the stereotype that the U.S. selfishly shoots from the hip. In fact, there's a fine line between the "unilateralism" of which the U.S. is accused by Europe and get-out-front leadership from which the world's lone remaining superpower should not shrink. Missile defense and global warming are excellent examples. Bush and his administration think mutually assured destruction as a deterrent to nuclear war is outdated and illogical. Mutual vulnerability to annihilation doesn't give terrorist or rogue states a moment's pause, nor does it leave options in the event of an accidental launch. This message Bush will deliver to Russia's Vladimir Putin near the end of the trip. On global warming, Bush accurately reflects the 97-0 sentiment of the U.S. Senate, which opposes the Kyoto treaty's unfair and unrealistic guidelines on the use of fossil fuels. The

administration is working on rational responses to a warming planet, trying to determine the real effect of human activity. Bush wins if he can convince the Europeans to cool down their rhetoric until more is known. The president also wins if he can , on an overall level, help Europe understand who he is and how , in his governance, he will protect America and its sovereignty as a first course. Americans do care what Europeans think, but in the end they and their president must be prepared to lead even at the risk of ruffling some feathers along the way.

3. Consult Counterplans are a voting issue –

A. They fiat a moving targets-the outcome of the counterplan is never a stable advocacy and prevents us from generating offense against the result

B. They aren't predictable-there are an infinite number of actors that can be consulted-there are over 500 individual tribes, tribal governments, Congress, the President, and every random foreign country in the world

C. They rely on time-frame fiat, which is no different from delay counterplans, no affirmative could win a debate

D. Permute-do the counterplan, and then do the plan-its legitimate-the counterplan relies on time frame fiat which means the permutation is reciprocal and it solves the net benefit if they say yes; if they say no, the counterplan gets the case as a disad

4. CP takes too long Gordon ‘86 NATO Indecisiveness Delays Arms Projects http://www.aviationnow.com

The inability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to make firm budget commitments has delayed implementation of cooperative weapons development projects with the U.S. , according to William H. Taft, 4th deputy Defense secretary. The Defense Dept. already has legislative and budget authority

to start the programs, and officials are disappointed by European governments' failure to move more rapidly , Taft said here. Taft recently returned from a visit to urge European and Midd le Eastern allies to complete action on joint projects. Defense officials hope that allied officials will sign several agreements when the independent European planning group (IEPG) holds its next meeting in Madrid in January. The deputy secretary visited government officials and industrial failities in France, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. Despite U.S. efforts to negotiate satisfactory agreements to implement programs identified earlier this year by NATO armaments directors, only one memorandum of understanding, on the standoff airborne radar demonstration system, has been signed, Taft said (AW&ST June 23, p. 26). Three other memoranda have been signed on programs proposed under U.S. cooperative projects legislation originally sponsored by Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.). NATO officials have been receptive to the idea of cooperative projects, even in Spain and the Netherlands where the balance of defense procurement is very much in favor of the U.S. "They've seen over five or six years that the U.S. has made a real effort, even if it is not paying off for them," Taft said. The U.S. has an approximate balance with the United Kingdom and a deficit with France. Modernization Burden The Defense Dept. has been concerned about the role the Southern European allies -- Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey -- might play in the initiative, because of their relative lack of development, industrial advancement and available research and development funds. These nations now depend on U.S. security assistance for defense modernization, but Defense Dept. officials hope to shift that burden partly onto the countries' local industry through the mechanism of arms cooperation, he said.

Reduction of an ally's dependence on U.S. security assistance can benefit both countries .

5. Germany’s support doesn’t prove consensus. Germany is only one country of many and there must be a unanimous vote.

22

http://www.aviationnow.com/


2AC Consult NATO (2/2) 6. Perm – Do the plan and consult over enforcement of plan

7. Perm Consult and do the plan no mater what

8. Perm Do the Plan and Consult over Afghanistan Policy- That solves, NATO ONLY CARES ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

7. NATO decline happening nowHendrickson ‘7 . Choice. MiddletownVol. 44, Iss. 7; pg. 1242, 1 pgs “NATO after 9/11: an alliance in continuing decline”Rupp (Purdue Univ., Calumet) examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's evolution since the Cold War's end. Using an array of journalistic evidence, coupled with interviews with NATO officials, the author

maintains that NATO is clearly in decline. While this military alliance will continue to survive, Rupp argues that its relevance in modern security affairs is increasingly in question. He points to a number of political factors to reach this conclusion, noting the wide military capabilities gap between the US and the rest of the allies, the unilateral tendencies of American foreign policy under President George W. Bush, the ongoing challenges in NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and the strong diplomatic differences between the US and Europe over Iraq. Much of Rupp's argument is based upon the general theme produced by Robert Kagan, who claims that the NATO allies share no perceived unifying threat to promote cooperative solutions. This book is well researched and provides much for NATO optimists to consider. Summing Up: Recommended Upper-division undergraduates through practitioners.-R. C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University

8. No impact- The U.S. will maintain beneficial relations with key allies even if NATO collapsesMichael Gallagher, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Winter 2003 Houston Journal of International Law

NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe,

and isolate the U nited S tates from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The U nited S tates has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this

commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The U nited S tates will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the U nited S tates. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States-Europe security] partnership.”

9. Turn- Consultation Destroys US LeadershipCarroll 9 (James FF, Notes & Comments Editor – Emory International Law Review, J.D. with Honors – Emory University School of Law, “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security”, Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis DA 7/16/10)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean, however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

ExtinctionKhalilzad, Rand Corporation 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation. “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding

principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global

environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts.

Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the U nited States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers , including a global nuclear exchange . U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

23

http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=23193&TS=1277235281&clientId=17822&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD


----Ext. Hege Turn Nato hurts us powerchristopher layne, visiting fellow at the foreign policy studies at the cato INSTITUTE, 2k1 (“Death Knell for NATO? The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and Defense Policy,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 394, April 4. http://www.cato.org/pubs/ pas/pa394.pdf)

No doubt, self-styled Atlanticists within the administration, and in the broader foreign policy community, will argue that NATO is as important as ever. But that is not true. After the Cold War, it became fashionable in some strategic circles to argue that NATO had to “go out of area or out of business.” In fact, the alliance does not add to U.S. capabilities outside Europe, and never has. Since the Korean War, with the partial exception of the Persian Gulf War, NATO and the Western European allies have either opposed, or refrained from supporting, U.S. strategy and military interventions outside Europe. Although some individual U.S. allies might come to Washington’s assistance in a future crisis in the Middle East or East Asia (as Britain and France did, for example, in the Gulf War), NATO as an institution almost certainly would not. In fact, far from augmenting America’s grand strategic posture, in important ways NATO has become a yoke that limits U.S. options. The European allies are attempting to use the alliance to constrain the United States’ taking strategic initiatives that Washington believes further U.S. strategic interests but the Europeans find inimical to their perceived interests. European opposition to American plans to deploy a national missile defense system is a case in point . Given the divergent strategic outlooks of the United States and

Western Europe, Washington can expect similar European opposition in the future to American strategy in East Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The time has come for the United States to withdraw from Europe militarily and to let the Europeans take care of the Balkans and similar parochial matters while the United States directs its attention to maintaining its global geopolitical interests outside Europe. Implicitly, some Bush administration policymakers recognize the need for restructuring the U.S.-European relationship.4 4 If the administration accepts ESDP and the RRF as legitimate expressions of European autonomy —and thereby acknowledges NATO’s diminishing relevance—it no doubt will be subject to accusations that it is “isolationist.” The fear of such criticism—which truly is a canard—should not unduly trouble the administration, because it is easily rebutted

24


Framework 2AC Interpretation- the neg should defend the status quo or a competing policy advocacy

Standards

a) education- it’s more educational to focus on policymaking specific to the topic. Ks are generic and the same ones are run every year. Policymaking education is more applicable to the real world

b) predictable ground—there are an infinite and unpredictable number of Ks to be run, but the aff is limited to a few policy options.

c) At the least, we should get to weigh our impacts against theirs- this checks K mooting the 1AC

voter for fairness and education

25


Hillman 2AC (1/3) Perm- withdraw from Japan and love war while psychologically examining the subconscious. The perm solves:

We can combine a love of war with a love of peace. This is critical to avoid idolizing the warrior and making war inevitable.STUHR, 8 [John, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Emory University; “A Terrible Love of Hope,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 22:4]

If Hillman is right, he is only partly right. We may have a terrible love of war. But we can and do have other loves as well . It is not

my only love, but I confess to an unshakable, terrible love of hope, and peace too. Because I do not share Hillman's [End Page 283] Jungian psychological commitments, I am not sure that this love is archetypal or universal. Maybe Paul Simon is right that " everybody loves the sound of a train in the distance," that "the thought that life could be better is woven indelibly into our hearts and our brains."10 Or

maybe only some people love this sound, and maybe this thought is woven only precariously into some hearts and bones sometimes. But I am sure that this love of hope and peace has a history and expression equal in duration and depth to those of love of war. I am sure that for every General Patton, quoted by Hillman, who

proclaims love of war beyond love of life, there is a General MacArthur, who proclaimed just as strongly, "I have seen war. . . . I hate war." Or there is a General (and President) Eisenhower, who observed in 1953 that war "is not a way of life at all in any true sense" but only "humanity hanging on a cross of iron." Or there is a General Sherman, who said that "war is hell." Or there is a Senator John McCain, who said: "War is wretched beyond description, and only a fool or a fraud could sentimentalize its cruel reality." And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers of hope and peace often have answered this question in one or both of two ways. The first is the way of individual self-transformation. I think of this strategy as an "Inward Bound" program. "War and peace start in the hearts of

individuals," Pema Chodron writes.11 The way to peace is the way of turning hearts of war into hearts of peace and nonviolence; hearts open to what Gandhi called the "infinite possibilities of universal love," universal truth, and the God within us all; and hearts in community and communion with one another.12 All we need is love—though, of course, that is a lot, and this

way is difficult. It requires that we reject as our ideal the strategic warrior: War will exist, John F. Kennedy said, "until that distant day when the conscientious objector enjoys the same reputation and prestige as the warrior does today."

Their alt card’s solvency is based on loving war and psychological examination, not the rejection of troop withdrawal

War has always existed- it’s human nature. Simply examining the subconscious won’t solve for it.

Perm- do the plan and reject fact-based descriptions of war in all other instances.

Double Bind either the perm will overcome all residual links or the Alt isn’t strong enough to overcome the status quo.

We don’t need to embrace war in every instance as long as we don’t engage in pure pacifism.CAVARERO, 9 [Adriana, Professor of Political Philosophy at the Università degli studi di Verona, Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, p. 63-4]At the start of the third millennium, in other words in the era of so-called global war, a prime example of this is a book published in the United States by James Hillman in 2004. It is entitled A Terrible Love of War and is

based on the Jungian theory of archetypes. But the book stands out not because of the reference to Jung, or to psychoanalysis in general, but because of the nonchalance with which Hillman recuperates and mixes together the main strands of twentieth-century naturalistic thought on violence to corroborate his thesis. He maintains that war “belongs to our souls as an archetypal truth of the cosmos” and that this archetypal truth is, as the title of his second chapter puts it, “normal.” He proceeds with an analysis of the theme of a horror that remains human even in its atrocious inhumanity,

adding that war is sublime and belongs to the sphere of religion. “If war is sublime, we must acknowledge its liberating transcendence and yield to the holiness of its call.”

This does not mean, obviously, that Hillman wishes for a perpetual state of war. His aim is rather to get rid of the “pacifist rhetoric” that, in denying the natural – psychic – root of the phenomenon, impedes comprehension of it.

Evolutionary biology is a better explanation of human behavior than psychology. It’s more comprehensive and provides a root cause of war.THAYER, 4 [Bradley, Ph.D., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, international and national security affairs senior analyst at National Institute for Public Policy, Darwin and International Relations, pg. 10-11]

While the discipline of international relations has existed for many years without evolutionary biology, the latter should be incorporated into the discipline because it improves the understanding of warfare, ethnic conflict, decision making, and other issues. Evolution explains how humans evolved during the late Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene epochs, and how human evolution affects human behavior today. All students of human

behavior must acknowledge that our species has spent over 99 percent of its evolutionary history largely as hunter-gatherers in those epochs. Darwin’s

natural selection argument (and its modifications) coupled with those conditions means that humans evolved behaviors well adapted to radically different evolutionary conditions than many humans – for example, those living in industrial democracies – face today. We must keep in mind that the period most social scientists think of as human history or civilization, perhaps the last three thousand years, represents only the blink of an eye in human evolution. As evolutionary biologist Paul Ehrlich argues, evolution should be measured in terms of “generation time,” rather than “clock time.” Looking at human history in this way, hunting and gathering was the basic hominid way of life for about 250,000 generations, agriculture has been in practice for about 400 generations, and modern industrial societies have only existed for about 8 generations. Thus Ehrlich finds it

reasonable to assume “that to whatever degree humanity has been shaped by genetic evolution, it has largely been to adapt to hunting and gathering – to the lifestyles of our pre-agricultural ancestors.” Thus, to understand completely much of human behavior we must first comprehend how evolution affected humans in the past and continues to affect them in the present. The conditions of 250,000 generations do have an impact on the last 8. Unfortunately, social scientists, rarely recognizing this relationship, have explained human behavior with a limited repertoire of arguments. In this book, I seek to expand the

repertoire. My central argument is that evolutionary biology contributes significantly to theories used in international relations and to the causes of war and ethnic conflict. The benefits of such interdisciplinary scholarship are great, but to gain them requires a precise and ordered discussion of evolutionary theory, an explanation of when it is appropriate to apply evolutionary theory to issues and events studied by social scientists, as well as an analysis of the major – and misplaced – critiques of evolutionary theory. I discuss these issues in chapter 1

26


Hillman 2AC (2/3) The alt doesn’t solve- it doesn’t actually causes us to go to war, only to think about war

Hillman is talking about conventional war, but we present scenarios for nuclear war. His theories aren’t applicable to the most destructive, global scenarios of war, which are impossible to love. This also proves case outweighs.

Focusing on literal wars is critical to learn useful lessons from them. War itself is not the worst evil; mishandling the practical execution of wars is. HANSON, 7 [Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, “Why Study War?” Summer, d/a: 7/26/10, http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_military_history.html]

The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward Coffman, a retired military history professor who taught at the University of Wisconsin, reviewed the faculties of the top 25 history departments, as ranked by U.S. News and World Report. He found that of over

1,000 professors, only 21 identified war as a specialty. When war does show up on university syllabi, it’s often about the race, class, and gender of combatants and wartime civilians. So a class on the Civil War will focus on the Underground Railroad and Reconstruction, not on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. One on World War II might emphasize Japanese internment, Rosie the Riveter, and the horror of Hiroshima, not Guadalcanal and Midway. A survey of the Vietnam War will devote lots of time to the inequities of the draft, media coverage, and the antiwar movement at

home, and scant the air and artillery barrages at Khe Sanh. Those who want to study war in the traditional way face intense academic suspicion, as Margaret Atwood’s poem “The Loneliness of the Military Historian” suggests: Confess: it’s my profession that alarms you. This is why few people ask me to dinner, though Lord knows I don’t go out of my way to be

scary. Historians of war must derive perverse pleasure, their critics suspect, from reading about carnage and suffering. Why not figure out instead how to outlaw war forever, as if it were not a tragic, nearly inevitable aspect of human existence? Hence the recent surge of “peace studies” (see “The Peace Racket”). The university’s aversion to the study of war certainly doesn’t reflect public lack of interest in the subject. Students love old-fashioned war classes on those rare occasions when they’re offered, usually as courses that professors sneak in when the choice of what to teach is left up to them. I taught a number of such classes at California State University, Stanford, and elsewhere. They’d invariably wind up overenrolled, with hordes of students lingering after office hours to offer opinions on the battles of Marathon and Lepanto. Popular culture, too, displays extraordinary enthusiasm for all things military. There’s a new Military History Channel, and Hollywood churns out a steady supply of blockbuster war movies, from Saving Private Ryan to 300. The post–Ken Burns explosion of interest in the Civil War continues. Historical reenactment societies stage history’s great battles, from the Roman legions’ to the Wehrmacht’s. Barnes and Noble and Borders bookstores boast well-stocked military history sections, with scores of new titles every month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles. The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank’s 88mm cannon, for

instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they end? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? How best to avoid wars or contain their worst effects? A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments. Neither our politicians nor most of our citizens seem to recall the incompetence and terrible decisions that, in December 1777, December 1941, and November 1950, led to massive American casualties and, for a time, public despair. So it’s no surprise that today so many seem to think that the violence in Iraq is unprecedented in our history. Roughly 3,000 combat dead in Iraq in some four years of fighting is, of course, a terrible thing. And it has provoked national outrage to the point of considering withdrawal and defeat, as we still bicker over up-armored Humvees and proper troop levels. But a previous generation considered Okinawa a stunning American victory, and prepared to follow it with an invasion of the Japanese mainland itself—despite losing, in a little over two months, four times as many Americans as we have lost in Iraq, casualties of faulty intelligence, poor generalship, and suicidal head-on assaults against fortified positions. It’s not that military history offers cookie-cutter comparisons with the past. Germany’s World War I victory over Russia in under three years and her failure to take France in four apparently misled Hitler into thinking that he could overrun the Soviets in three or four weeks—after all, he had brought down historically tougher France in just six. Similarly, the conquest of the Taliban in eight weeks in 2001, followed by the establishment of constitutional government within a year in Kabul, did not mean that the similarly easy removal of Saddam Hussein in three weeks in 2003 would ensure a working Iraqi democracy within six months. The differences between the countries

—cultural, political, geographical, and economic—were too great. Instead, knowledge of past wars establishes wide parameters of what to expect from new ones. Themes, emotions, and rhetoric remain constant over the centuries, and thus generally predictable. Athens’s disastrous expedition in 415 BC against Sicily, the largest democracy in the Greek world, may not prefigure our war in Iraq. But the story of the Sicilian calamity does instruct us on how consensual societies can clamor for war—yet soon become

disheartened and predicate their support on the perceived pulse of the battlefield. Military history teaches us, contrary to popular belief these days, that wars aren’t necessarily the most costly of human calamities. The first Gulf War took few lives in getting Saddam out of Kuwait; doing nothing in Rwanda allowed savage gangs and militias to murder hundreds of thousands with impunity. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin killed far more off the battlefield than on it. The 1918 Spanish flu epidemic brought down more people than World War I did. And more Americans—over 3.2 million—lost their lives driving over the last 90 years than died in combat in this nation’s 231-year history. Perhaps what bothers us about wars, though, isn’t just their horrific lethality but also that people choose to wage them—which makes them seem avoidable, unlike a flu virus or a car wreck, and their tolls unduly grievous. Yet military history also reminds us that war sometimes has an eerie utility: as British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart put it, “War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good

may come of it.” Wars—or threats of wars—put an end to chattel slavery, Nazism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet Communism. Military history is as often the story of appeasement as of warmongering. The destructive military careers of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler would all have ended early had any of their numerous enemies united when the odds favored them. Western air power stopped Slobodan Milošević’s reign of terror at little cost to NATO forces—but only after a near-decade of inaction and dialogue had made possible the slaughter of tens of thousands. Affluent Western societies have often proved reluctant to use force to prevent greater future violence. “War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things,” observed the British philosopher John Stuart Mill.

“The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.” Indeed, by ignoring history, the modern age is free to interpret war as a failure of communication, of diplomacy, of talking—as if aggressors don’t know exactly what they’re doing . Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, frustrated by the Bush administration’s intransigence in the War on Terror, flew to Syria, hoping to persuade President Assad to stop funding terror in the Middle East. She assumed that Assad’s belligerence resulted from our aloofness and arrogance rather than from his dictatorship’s interest in destroying democracy in Lebanon and Iraq, before such contagious freedom might in fact destroy him. For a therapeutically inclined generation raised on Oprah and Dr. Phil—and not on the letters of William Tecumseh Sherman and William Shirer’s Berlin Diary—problems between states, like those in our personal lives, should be argued about by equally civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence.

Our impacts outweigh – losing inevitable wars creates far worse impacts than preparing for literal conflict.SCHALL, 5[James, professor of government at Georgetown University, “When War Must be the Answer,” Policy Review, Dec/Jan]

It may well he true that noncombatant alternatives to war are always available, but there are things worse than war. Not to know what they are is tantamount to losing any real contact with or understanding of human experience or history. Not for nothing was the "history of war" studied by Machiavelli. Many "peaceful" alternatives to war are unhappy ones. One of them consists in being conquered by a hostile power, another in complete civilizational destruction. We read of Muslim and Mongolian armies before whose swords we would not like to fall, knowing that if we do, our culture, religion, and way of life, not to mention many of our lives, would disappear. No one in the decade before the sudden appearance of Mohammedan armies in the seventh century could have imagined the configuration of the world map today, a configuration in many areas due precisely to the permanent conquests of these earlier and later armies. The modern integrity of Europe is unimaginable without two victories over Muslim forces: one at Tours, one at Vienna.

27


28


Hillman 2AC (3/3) Their card says that psychological examination will solve back for fact-based representations of war, meaning the perm doesn’t link

Hillman’s argument is incoherent, and justifies the worst atrocities of warfare in the name of extinguishing the innocent. We are not warriors, we are policymakers.CAVARERO, 9 [Adriana, Professor of Political Philosophy at the Università degli studi di Verona, Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, p. 63-4]

As the reader will easily intuit, while the authors cited (often inappropriately) are highly disparate, it is principally categories deriving from psychoanalysis, the sociology of the sacred, and the anthropology of sacrifice that underpin the articulation of Hillman’s discourse. The theoretical density, as well as the internal problematic of these categories, which in his text are forced to undergo drastic

simplification, are transformed into banal clichés. In order to justify war as an unrenounceable and vital experience, Hillman often appeals not just to the authority of his authors but to a so-called common opinion that by now constitutes the vulgate, in the form of the stereotypical and the obvious, of those same a uthors. An example is the facility with which he takes for granted “our fascination with war films, with weapons of mass destruction, with pictures of blasted bodies and bombs bursting in the air.” To this Hillman adds, on a confessional note, “the fascination, the delight in recounting the dreadful details of butchery and cruelty. Not sublimation, the sublime.” Typical as well in the way it casts a shadow of abnormality – if not pathological stupidity or obtuseness – over those who do not share the fascination with butchery, Hillman’s thesis has its own stringent logic. Once violence is rooted in the natural realm of the impulses or, if one prefers, in the

archetypical order of the cosmos, the horror of war cannot fail to transmit its fascination both to everyone’s visual experience and to the literary practice of some. And, even more logically, it is combatants with firsthand experience in the field who savor the full fascination. The words of the soldiers that Hillman diligently reports in his text for the purpose of documenting his theory prove it. Among them, the words of a cinematographic version of General Patton stand out, when, faced with the devastation of battle and kissing a dying officer, he exclaims, “I love it. God help me, I do love it so. I love it more than my life.” Then there is the authentic declaration of a marine who confesses, “The thing I wish I’d seen – I wish I could have seen a grenade go into someone’s body and blow it up.” No one else, though, rivals the laudable capacity to synthesize of the anonymous American soldier who, in describing a bayonet charge, defines it as “awful, horrible, deadly, yet somehow thrilling, exhilarating.” In the name of a realism

grounded in the power of cliché, the entire repertory or war’s horror is thus reduced by Hillman to the realm of enjoyment. “The savage fury of the group, all

of whose members are out for one another’s blood,” which the celebrated work of Rene Girard inscribes in the phenomenology of ritual, becomes the trivial wage of the warrior. For that matter the stereotype of the soldier excited by killing has a long and prestigious history. A certain arousal by violence was already characteristic of Homer’s warriors, and the warmongering rhetoric of every age, ennobled by writers

and poets, is full of soldiers made happy by death. The events of the twentieth century, and even more those occurring right now, might suggest to the singers and scholars of massacre that they change register. Today it is particularly senseless that the meaning of war and its horror

– as well, obviously, as its terror – should still be entrusted to the perspective of the warrior. If it is true, as the historian Giovanni De Luna laments, that “wars, with the violence

and cruelty they unleash, appear to have a common ground (killing and getting killed), always the same and impervious to chronology,” it is also true that only warriors, after all, fit this paradigm. The civilian victims, of whom the numbers of dead have soared from the Second World War on, do not share the desire to kill, much less the desire to get killed. Nor does the pleasure of butchery, on which Hillman insists, appear to constitute a possible common ground in this case. You would have to ask the victims of the bombing, cooked by incendiary bombs in the shelters of Dresden, or those whose skin was peeled off by phosphorous bombs in the Vietnamese villages, where the pleasure and excitement was for them. And you would have to put the same question to the children blown up in many parts of the world by antipersonnel mines or to the engaged couple who, falling like marionettes from the Twin Towers in flames, took final flight in New York on the morning of September 11.

29


----Should Avoid Losing Wars Morals are determined by the victors, so we have to prepare to win wars. The worst atrocities come when we let the tyrants win.SCHALL, 5[James, professor of government at Georgetown University, “When War Must be the Answer,” Policy Review, Dec/Jan]

We often, and rightly, ponder the horrors of war. Doing so is a growth industry particularly for those who do not choose to fight in them. Soldiers usually know more about the horrors of wars than journalists. They also know more about what it is like to live under a tyrannical system. The uncovering of gulags and concentration camps ought also to cause us to reflect deeply on what happens when unjust regimes acquire and remain in power. 9/11 could have been prevented with but a small use of force had we known that we had an enemy who would utterly surprise us by using passenger planes as weapons of war. A follower of Nietzsche, who thought Platonism and Christianity had failed because both lauded weakness, will see a certain nobility to wars and

power for their own dramatic sakes. Like many moderns, Nietzsche did not find any order in the universe except that imposed by his own will. Still, most sensible people can see that to prevent the rise of unlimited power or to remove it, once established, requires the legitimate use of adequate force against it. Often we perform this reflection about war's atrocities in isolation from real situations and without balance, for peace is not simply the absence of war .

"No war" can, and not infrequently does, end up meaning the victory of tyranny and the subsequent disarming of any opposition to itself. "No moral use of war" can, by the same logic, result in no freedom, no dignity. We need more serious reflection on what happens, both to ourselves and to others who rely upon us, when we lose wars or when our failure to act causes something worse to happen. Those who cry "peace, peace" often have unacknowledged blood on their hands because they failed to use adequate force when needed;

"To the victors go the spoils" is an ancient principle of fact, not rightness. Cowardice has never been considered a virtue. Nor has "turning the other cheek" served as an

acceptable excuse for allowing some evil — one we could have stopped except that our theories or fears prevented us from trying — to continue or conquer. Not a few worthy things have been eradicated forever because a war was lost. Eternal vigilance remains the price of liberty and much else that is worthy . In reading ancient history, as we should and for this very reason, we can still meditate with profit on the enormous cultural consequences of a success by Xerxes in Greece had Sparta and Athens not successfully defended them-selves against his armies. Nonetheless, good causes do not always win wars; neither, to say the same thing, do bad causes always lose them. Fortune is difficult to conquer. Nor do its consequences guarantee justice. St. Paul, as Dawson reminds us above, even suggests that wars and the sword punish our wrongdoings. The pope observes that we live in a world in which we want to deny that we commit any wrongs or sins and hence we lack any impetus for

correcting them within ourselves. Sins have dire consequences even if we call them virtues, as we often do. Still, we are not free not to think about this consequence that failure to act can make things worse. Nor can we deny that there is a comparative difference between "bad" things and "terrible" things. We can be as immoral and as inhuman by not acting as by acting. The history of lost wars is as important as the history of victorious ones, perhaps more so. The idea of an absolutely warless world, a world "already made safe for democracy," is more likely, in practice, to be a sign either of utopianism or of madness, and a world in which war is "outlawed" is more likely to mean either that we are no longer in the real world or that the devils and the tyrants — who allow us only to agree with them and do as they say — have finally won. We are naive if we think that formal democratic procedures, lacking any reference to the content of laws, cannot have deleterious effects. A democratic tyranny is quite conceivable, many think likely, and on a global scale. Globalization is not neutral. Not a few of the worst tyrants of history have been very popular and have died peacefully in bed in their old age amidst family and friends.

30


----Wargaming Framework The best framework for debate is a wargame: the role of the judge is to preside over the most educational method of winning the war. Only this interpretation provides useful education, and alternative methods ignore causal relationships.RUBEL, 6 [Robert, chairman of the Wargaming Department in the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, “THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF WAR GAMING,” Naval War College Review, 59:2, Spring]

Anyone who has conducted or has studied actual warfare knows well its massive complexities.1 These complexities do not relieve humans from the responsibility for making decisions—difficult decisions—aimed at navigating their organizations successfully through campaigns, be they in a theater of war or in the halls of the Pentagon. Minds must be prepared beforehand, both in their general, educated functioning and in the specific, sophisticated

understanding of conflict and the competitive environments they face. This preparation must be predicated on the internalization of “valid” knowledge about the conflict environment. There are many ways of gaining such knowledge: the study of history and theory, practical experience, and exposure to the results

of various kinds of research and analysis. Each of these methods of developing knowledge has its own particular epistemology—formally, a “theory of the

nature and grounds of knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity,” or more practically, rules by which error is distinguished from truth. War gaming is a distinct and historically significant tool that warriors have used over the centuries to help them understand war in general and the nature of specific upcoming operations. The importance of war gaming demands serious examination of the nature of the knowledge it produces. Before going farther, it is worthwhile to define exactly what we

mean by “war game.” Peter Perla provides as good a definition as any: a war game is “a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.”2 War gaming, rightly considered, is inherently a method of research, regardless of how people apply it. The essence of war gaming is the examination of conflict in an artificial environment. Through such examination, gamers gain new knowledge about the phenomena the game represents. The purpose of a game is immaterial to this central epistemological element. Moreover, the gaining of knowledge is inherent and unavoidable, whatever a game’s object. The real question is whether such knowledge is valid and useful . This question is all the more important because of the growing reliance on gaming techniques in an increasingly complex world. This article will attempt to initiate a professional dialogue on the underlying logic structure of gaming by examining the

epistemological foundations of gaming in general and ways in which the knowledge gained from specific games can be judged sound. Perhaps the most compelling reason to conduct such an inquiry is the possibility of insidious error creeping into war games. War gaming, even after centuries of practice, is still more a craft than a discipline, and it is quite possible for rank amateurs, dilettantes, and con artists to produce large, expensive, and apparently successful but worthless or misleading games for unsuspecting sponsors. There is little incentive to apply incisive criticism to games in which heavy investments have been made, and persons or organizations inclined to do so are hampered by lack of an established set of epistemological theory and principle. This does not mean that the majority of games are fatally flawed; it does mean that there is no accepted set of criteria to determine whether they are or not. Judgment as to the success and quality of a war game, especially one of high profile and consequence, is too often the result of organizational politics. EPISTEMOLOGY Some elaboration of the meaning of this somewhat esoteric term is essential. To avoid getting sidetracked by philosophical complexities, we can adopt a convention based on current thinking. One widely accepted branch of modern epistemological theory holds that knowledge results from the building of simplified mental models of reality in order to solve

problems. The “validity” of a model (or knowledge) emanates from its utility in problem solving.3 This approach seems sufficient for our purposes. Knowledge is a

practical human response to the challenges of our environment. Valid knowledge is that which has sufficient practical correspondence to our environment to be useful for problem solving. Readers with knowledge of modeling and simulation will immediately find resonances in this definition with widely used definitions of computer simulation validity

—for example, “substantiation that a computerized model within its domain of applicability possesses a satisfactory range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the model.”4 Thus we are not so much concerned with the validity of knowledge in an absolute sense as with the practical utility of knowledge emanating from a game relative to the projected warfare environment in which it will be applied. Most war games are oriented in some way to the future, either explicitly or inherently; accordingly, the predictive value of knowledge emanating from a game is critical. At this point many veteran gamers will cry foul, as it is widely accepted that war games are not predictive (although there are some who will disagree). To untangle this knot, let us go back to our baseline definition of valid knowledge—that which is useful for problem solving. This presupposes that the environment can to some degree be shaped by decisions. If it

were not, war gaming—in fact, any decision-support tool—would be irrelevant. If the environment is malleable, however, there are “right” and “wrong” decisions available to the decision maker.5 Ignorant decision makers would be at the mercy of chance; their decisions would be shots in the dark, or worse. An informed decision maker—one who possesses valid knowledge about the environment and the potential consequences of alternate choices—could do better than that in a future situation. Valid knowledge is predictive to that extent. However, since life in general and war in particular are influenced by thousands of little happenstances that are beyond the control of any single decision maker (a true definition of Clausewitz’s “friction”), “right” decisions do not guarantee success. If they did, war would be formulaic and gaming unnecessary. For that reason, although valid knowledge of the environment is inherently predictive— in that it indicates potentially valid cause-and-effect relationships through which decision makers can bring about their intent—a war game can never be truly predictive. Setting aside, for now, arguments about certain war games in history that have seemed in some way predictive, we are left with the uncomfortable question of what games are good for if they cannot truly predict. Indeed, why do we game at all?

31


----Ext: Wargaming Framing Maintaining focus on literal circumstances surrounding war is critical to make this debate round educational. Anything we learn otherwise will contribute to losing wars.RUBEL, 6 [Robert, chairman of the Wargaming Department in the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, “THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF WAR GAMING,” Naval War College Review, 59:2, Spring] Perhaps the best commentary on converting military history into useful knowledge is to be found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz regarded history as a real-life laboratory of war, one that can be mined for information useful for preparing the minds of future commanders. His approach was what he called Kritik, or critical analysis: researching the facts, tracing effects back to their causes, and evaluating the means employed.9

This process (which emerges from a close reading of Book Two, chapter 5, of his classic treatise On War) is as valid today as it was in Clausewitz’s time. These three steps constitute more than a method; they establish a criterion for the extraction of valid knowledge from a war game. It is not enough simply to list the facts of what happened in the game; these are meaningless in themselves, because the game was a simulation. We must examine why these events occurred—the combinations of player decisions and umpire determinations that produced them. Clausewitz

himself, however, acknowledges the limits of the method: at some point, results must be allowed to speak for themselves. The critic, “having analyzed everything within the range of human calculation and belief, will let the outcome speak for that part whose deep, mysterious operation is never visible.” 10 In

other words, war cannot be completely understood in its full complexity; ultimately criticism must recognize that there are factors at work whose functioning can be revealed only by the actual victories or defeats of a commander being studied. This is perfectly reasonable with respect to real warfare. It might also be true for war games, but its usefulness is limited by the fact that they are simulations. For example, a common method of introducing uncertainty into battle-outcome calculations is rolling dice to represent the probabilistic nature of certain phenomena, like sonar or radar detection. Beyond this narrow use of stochastic indeterminacy, game designers frequently aggregate complex interactions of large combat forces with a combination of dice rolls and structured combat-results tables. Here the die simulates the effects of a wide range of variables that are not explicitly modeled. It would be easy enough, lacking any other good explanation of the cause-and-effect relationships between player decisions and outcomes, to sense here the presence of invisible factors. But if such “deep, mysterious” elements exist in war games, they are not those of which Clausewitz speaks. A roll of the dice is simply that. To say it simulates unmodeled portions of reality is going too far. The most one can say is that there are physical forces at play on the die itself that players cannot calculate and therefore cannot predict. This is different from admitting one does not understand all the complexities of a real battlefield. Thus, we cannot approach the results of a war game as a military critic would the outcome of a real battle or campaign. Results of a war game cannot be used to fill in analytical blanks in the way Clausewitz describes, nor can theory or

judgment be derived from them in the way historians do from real events. Nevertheless, we can ascribe a certain significance to war-game outcomes. If the game is run according to a specific set of rules and those rules constitute a valid distilled simulation of reality, outcomes of individual “moves” or entire games can yield useful knowledge. To understand when this can be the case, we need to understand the difference between rigidly assessed and freely assessed war games. We describe as “rigidly assessed” those games that proceed strictly according to rules governing movement, detection, and combat. Such games produce situations governed by player decisions, the rules, and combat-results tables (manual or computerized). Assuming the

absence of artifacts and within the limitations of dice rolls, we can in such a case ascribe significance to game, or even move, outcomes. The game goes where the rules take it; if the rules and the combat-resolution tables are good representations of reality, the outcome constitutes artificial military history, and one can usefully work backward from outcomes and look for reasons. This would be so whether the game is played by hand around a board or at computer workstations. Inputs are generated, and these, by means of a known system, produce results that cannot be predicted or influenced. The game goes where it good.

32


----Realism Inevitable Humans have evolved to be self-interested, and this drives human and state-behavior.THAYER, 4 [Bradley, Ph.D., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, international and national security affairs senior analyst at National Institute for Public Policy, Darwin and International Relations, pg. 10-11]

In chapter 2, I explain how evolutionary theory contributes to the realist theory of international relations and to rational choice analysis. First, realism, like the Darwinian view of the natural world, submits that international relations is a competitive and dangerous realm, where statesmen [statespeople] must strive to protect the interests of their state through an almost constant appraisal of their state’s power relative to others. In sum, they must behave egoistically, putting the interests of their state before the interests of others or international society. Traditional realist arguments rest principally on one of two discrete ultimate causes, or intellectual foundations of

the theory. The first is Reinhold Niebuhr’s argument that humans are evil. The second, anchored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, is that humans possess an innate animus

dominandi – a drive to dominate. From these foundations, Niebuhr and Morgenthau argue that what is true for the individual is also true of the state: because individuals are evil or possess a drive to dominate, so too do states because their leaders are individuals who have these motivations . I argue that realists have a much stronger

foundation for the realist argument than that used by either Morgenthau or Niebuhr. My intent is to present an alternative ultimate cause of classical realism: evolutionary theory. The use of evolutionary theory allows realism to be scientifically grounded for the first time, because evolution explains egoism. Thus a scientific explanation provides a better foundation for their arguments than either theology or metaphysics. Moreover, evolutionary theory can anchor the branch of realism termed offensive realism and advanced most forcefully by John Mearsheimer. He argues that the anarchy of the international system, the fact that there is no world government, forces leaders of states to strive to

maximize their relative power in order to be secure. I argue that theorists of international relations must recognize that human evolution occurred in an anarchic environment and that this explains why leaders act as offensive realism predicts . Humans evolved in anarchic conditions, and the implications of this are profound for theories of human behavior. It is also important to note at this point that my argument does not depend upon “anarchy” as it is traditionally used in the discipline – as the ordering principle of the post-1648

Westphalian state system. When human evolution is used to ground offensive realism, it immediately becomes a more powerful theory than is currently recognized. It explains more than just state behavior; it begins to explain human behavior. It applies equally to non-state actors, be they individuals, tribes, or organizations. Moreover, it explains this behavior before the creation of the modern state system. Offensive realists do not need an anarchic state system to advance their argument. They only need humans. Thus, their argument applies equally well before or after 1648, whenever humans form groups, be they tribes in Papua New Guinea, conflicting city-states in ancient Greece, organizations like the Catholic Church, or contemporary states in international relations

33


----War Isn’t Natural The idea that war is “natural” makes it easier for evil leaders to manipulate facts and create political wars.STUHR, 8 [John, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Emory University; “A Terrible Love of Hope,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 22:4]

These and related experiences, rooted in a love of war, are not merely "natural ." Instead, they can be, and are, manufactured and manipulated and deployed. Today we have learned that Hermann Göring was right that it is easy for leaders to drag the people to war : "All you have to do is tell them they are being

attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country." Accordingly, those who hope for peace must invent democratic practices and institutions that mediate, intervene, and educate for different, fundamentally opposite experiences and policies. The politics of any effective love and hope for peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational

34


Security K 2AC (1/3) Perm do both

Perm do the plan and reject the ideology in all other instances

Perm- do the plan and the alt in all non-mutually exclusive instances

Double-bind; either the alt solves so well that it overcomes the effects of the aff, or the alt can’t overcome the effects of the one instance of the aff and it doesn’t solve

Their Neocleous ‘8 evidence concludes aff- it argues that the hole filled by the alt will eventually be refilled- proves no alternative solvency.

The perm solves—only working through political structures allows us to cause real world changeJeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [Government and Opposition 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation , however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the

notion of ‘ immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable . Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state,

a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional

violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and

sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life ’ , and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’.

Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘hows ecurity is to be redefined’, and in

particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on

instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars,

the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their

policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to

cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour (continued on next page) and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’

framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

Plan takes out the link- US removal of troops is by definition “de-securitizing” the area. It’s the prerequisite for the alternative. Proves the Perm Solves

35


Security K 2AC (2/3) Alt doesn’t solve- in practice, only securitizing and minimizing threats allows us to prevent future violencePH Liotta, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, ‘5 [Security Dialogue 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more

than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to

dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian

transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering

states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges , even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the

responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement . Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action. Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit

more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories . As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the

mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them . One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security

No link- Representing the potential for conflict and death does NOT reproduce the architecture of the security establishment nor result in violent calculationAlker, IR professor @ USC, 2005 p. 197-198(Howard. Critical Security Studies and World Politics Ed. By Ken Booth)

It is key to Waever's conception that the securitizing speech act, which has traditionally legitimated the use of force, has also invoked the right of a "state to mobilize, or take special powers, to handle existential threats." As Buzan, Wrever, and de Wilde carefully illustrate, such invocations can be regarding political, economic, cultural, societal, or environmental sectors of a domestic or international society; just as

clearly, the mere invocation of the words "security" or "defense" or "survival" does not, by itself, make something a security/securitized issue or threat . Previous case studies of security-enhancing successes, or breakdowns, need to be reanalyzed in these terms in order to derive more perceptive and practically useful ways to prevent debilitating and/or unsuccessful securitization dynamics. And the approach needs to be extended critically to include the much richer existing literature on strategies for crossing thresholds of violent collective behavior in ways that effectively allow for relatively prompt returns. And when reliably generalizable ways of characterizing emancipation are available, we can develop and better defend empirical generalizations

linking or delinking emancipation, securitization, and human well-being. The securitization approac h is constructively and practically oriented toward the multileveled analysis of the variety of security-

needing social entities I have just proposed.29 It certainly does not discredit the evaluative study of their impacts on ordinary human lives! It responds constructively, discursively, to the transnationalizing of concerns and the broadening of possibilities for reconceptualizing threats clearly present in, and encouraged by, critical security studies.30 Moreover, I find this discursive, intersubjectively oriented, community-linked, yet coherent approach suggestive of how to proceed in further decentering the statist bias of conventional security/strategic studies, without denying the relevance of states' contributions to vital topics like nuclear arms control , Napoleonic neighbors, and civil wars. Refocusing critical security studies to point toward existential threats to important groups, nations, practices, organizations, or technologies within particular transnational or interna¬tional societies or places gives concrete meanings to freedom from fear. Whether or not securitization helps achieve that goal-at what price for discursive communal-will formation-must be answered empirically, his¬torically, discursively. The corresponding search within relevant societies and communities for remedial, preferably nonsecuritized or desecuritizing, emancipatory, or redemptive practices is based on the pacifist belief that peace is best waged by peaceful means rather than the alternative maxim: to secure peace, prepare for war.31

36


Security K 2AC (3/3) Impact turn- Threats must be confronted—refusal to engage emboldens aggression, resulting in conflictThayer 6 (Bradley, Professor of Security Studies at Missouri State, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy,” Nov/Dec, 32-7)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong . The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

Wishing doesn’t make it so – deviating from power politics will leave us open for attackMurray 97 (Alastair, Professor in the Politics Department at the University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism)

This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts . Rather, what is problematic is his faith that such

change, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which

underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything, in his account, is up for grabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of. This generates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement . Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of

'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively

culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously, might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world, or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited, are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.

37


Realism 2AC (1/2) The affirmative fails to transform politics – policy makers cannot think outside of the system of realism Guzzini, senior research fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998 (Stefano, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p. 234-235)

Consequently, taking realism seriously as a still widely shared device for constructing knowledge, helps in raising the awareness of the way in which often very contestable historical analogies influence our understanding, and can predispose to action. Such a conceptual analysis is hence not an idle thought, but a prerequisite to seeing a larger variety of policy options and to facing possible self-fulfilling prophecies. CONCLUSION This chapter made three arguments about the present development of realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. First, it showed that the unity between diplomatic discourse and the discipline of International Relations, so self-evident in the times of Morgenthau, can no longer be upheld. Both worlds of international politics and of diplomacy have changed. Second, it showed a similar failure when realists tried to save the overlap of realism with the central explanatory theory of International Relations, that is, to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory or paradigm. This was illustrated by a critique of the Logic of Anarchy, the most elaborate revision of Waltz's theory which aims at responding to the critics of realism and neorealism alike. This work can neither provide a metatheoretically coherent realism, nor a version which would be acceptable to the present academic criteria of an empirical theory. As a rcsult of this double failure, realism is at a crossroads. Either it follows thc scicntific road, and then pursues its fragmentation within and outsidc thc narrowed discipline. Or it goes back to its normative and historical roots but, then, it can no longer cover the research agenda of International Relations, nor claim the scientific core position that it has been used to taking since 1945. In the past, realists have resisted this dilemma. This resistance, played out in both ways, has given cadence to realism's evolution, and until now, also the evolution of International Relations as a discipline. This has been the double story of this book. As long as this resistance continues, the story will continue. Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand, realist assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or

International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in plural terms. On the other hand, to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empiri cally wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners of inter national affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-makers to another, help

mobilizing certain understandIngs and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is . Realism is not a causal theory that explains International RelatIons, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make

sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical insights

that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly uncritically reproduce it.

Their epistemology arguments are wrong – realism is the most reliable predictor of international relations SOLOMON 1996 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism,” African Security Review, Vol 5, No 2, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

The post-modern/critical theory challenge to realism has been tested, and proved wanting. Realism remains the single most reliable analytical framework through which to understand and evaluate global change. Post-modernism can provide no practical alternatives to the realist paradigm. We know what a realist world looks like (we are living in one!); but what does a post-modernist world look like? As long as humanity is motivated by hate, envy, greed and egotism, realism will continue to be invaluable to the policy-maker and the scholar. In this regard it has to be pointed out that from the end of World War II until 1992, hundreds of major conflicts around the world have left some twenty million human beings dead.109 Neither has the end of the Cold War showed any sign that such conflict will end. By the end of 1993 a record of 53 wars were being waged in 37 countries across the globe.110 Until a fundamental change in human nature occurs, realism will continue to dominate the discipline of international relations. The most fundamental problem with post-modernism is that it assumes a more optimistic view of human nature. Srebrenica, Bihac, Tuzla, Zeppa, Goma, Chechnya, Ogoniland, and KwaZulu-Natal all bear testimony to the folly of such a view.

38


Realism 2AC (2/2) There are no prior questions to problem oriented IR- empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology ” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different

theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this

philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former . But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism

that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational

choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this

class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us . In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR . Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can

be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action , event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this

standpoint, ‘ theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justificatio n offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms . However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’ .6 Moreover,

this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity . The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view ’ —namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the

disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises

Even if some level of chaos is inevitable you can still prevent escalation of conflict Flynn, 07 (Stephen, senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation, p. 9-10)

Thinking about and preparing for when things can go very wrong need not be about becoming a nation of Chicken Littles. It is foolish and self-destructive to oscillate between immobilizing fear, on the one hand, and blithely going about our lives playing a societal version of Russian roulette, on the other. Natural disasters will happen, and not all terrorist attacks can be prevented. However, what is preventable is the cascading effects that flow from these disasters and attacks. The loss of life and economic fallout that disasters reap will always be magnified by our lack of preparedness to manage the risk actively and to respond effectively when things go wrong.

39


2AC Troop Withdrawal Good – Alliance Advantage (1/2) 1 –Bandow 10 is our internal link to relations - previous prime minister resignation is due to failing to remove US troops – This massive division among the public and the government will lead to collapse – this is empirically proven

2. Sakaguchi 9 is our internal link to the economy- the Japanese government is spending the majority of the money on bases, collapses its economy

AND here’s more ev - US military presence crushes Okinawan developmentMeyer ‘9 [Carlton, former Marine Corps officer, G2mil, “Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan, 2009, Accessed:6-25-10, http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm]

Over 27,000 U.S. military personnel and their 22,000 family members are stationed on Okinawa . The U.S. Air Force maintains the large Kadena airbase

on the island while the Army and Navy maintain several small bases. The Marines have a dozen camps and a small airbase at Futenma where loud helicopters anger nearby residents. (left) Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the foreign military presence has been rising for years. Their chief complaint is that Okinawa hosts over half of U.S. forces in Japan, which hampers economic development. After a series of violent criminal acts by U.S. servicemen, the U.S. military agreed in 1996 to reduce the impact of their presence. A few minor military facilities were consolidated while training and operational procedures were changed to reduce noise. The most significant concession was a promise to close the Marine Corps airbase at Futenma by 2003.

3. And forces not key to the alliance

A) The alliance is low now – The horrible misconduct of the marines and the degradation of the environment is toppling the alliance

b) The status quo is unsustainable – disagreements permeate all areas of the alliancePreble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

Addressing Regional Concerns Americans and East Asians alike must overcome their latent fears of Japan, albeit perhaps for different reasons. Americans must appreciate that a commitment to the status quo, which has the effect of inhibiting the emergence of independent Japanese military power, unnecessarily increases America’s own security burdens in the present and well into the future. On a deeper level, however, people in the United States who remain unalterably opposed to a fundamental reorientation of the current U.S.-Japan relationship must understand that reflexive obstructionism could do irreparable harm to the relationship of trust and cooperation so carefully cultivated since the end of

World War II. Obstruction implies mistrust, and it is hard to envision how the entire range of U.S.- Japanese relationships , military and diplomatic as well as political and economic, could continue to flourish in such an environment.

c) Japan already questions US security commitmentKlingner 9 [Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance August 26, 2009. Accessed on June 22, 2010]

As a result of the Bush Administration's decision to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, Tokyo now questions U.S. support for Japanese foreign policy priorities. Japan perceives a difference in the U.S. approach to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs . Although North Korea already has

nuclear weapons, Tokyo perceives the U.S. as not expending the same level of effort toward Pyongyang, causing some Japanese officials to question whether Washington believes that protecting Israel is more important than protecting Japan .

4. They say that withdrawal would topple the alliance but extend our Carpenter 9 ev from the 1AC - Reducing US presence in Japan reduces tension, sustaining the alliance long-termBandow ‘8 [Doug, FPIF contributor & former Special Assistant to Reagan, Foreign Policy in Focus Institute, "Bring Them Home...from Asia", September 19, 2008 Accessed: 6-25-10, http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring_them_homefrom_asia]

Finally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall U.S. relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that inevitably accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in the middle of a foreign country and culture. The U.S. government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against U.S. beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food. As a result, President George W. Bush received a less-than-friendly reception when he visited in early August. In

Japan, the heavy concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without the presence of U.S. military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to ones of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on government-to-government geopolitical relations.

40

http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring_them_homefrom_asia

http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm


2AC Troop Withdrawal Good – Alliance Advantage (2/2) The same threats do not exist anymore – drawing back US forces is a drastically better balancing strategy that preserves US/Japan relationsBandow ‘9 [Doug, senior fellow Cato Institute, Huffington Post, “Dealing with the New Japan: Washington Won’t Take ‘ No’ for an Answer”, Sep. 2 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/dealing-with-the-new-japa_b_275914.html) 6.25.10]

Actually, Americans should be as interested as Japanese in transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance. The current relationship remains trapped in a world that no longer exists . The imperial Japanese navy has been rusting away on the bottom of the Pacific for more than six decades; Douglas MacArthur departed as American regent in Tokyo nearly a half century ago; China buried Maoism with Mao Zedong more than three decades ago; the Cold War ended two decades ago; Japan retains the world's second (or third , based on purchasing power parity) largest economy despite "the lost decade." Yet Japan remains dependent on America for its security , a minor military player despite having global economic and political interests. There are historic reasons for Tokyo's stunted international role, but it is time for East Asian countries to work together to dispel the remaining ghosts of Japanese imperialism past rather than to expect America to continue acting as the defender of last resort. Since Japan and Asia have changed, so

should America's defense strategy. There should be no more troops based on Japanese soil. No more military units tasked for Japan's defense. No more security guarantee for Japan.

The U.S. should adopt a strategy of off-shore balancer, expecting friendly states to defend themselves, while being ready to act if an overwhelming, hegemonic threat eventually arises. China is the most, but still not very, plausible candidate for such a role--and even then not for many years.

5 Extend our Auslin 10 and Meyer 9 the only reason that North Korea refuses to negotiate and is a threat is due to our marines presence in Japan

6. Their ev also is not specific to troops – it talks about planes and ships none of which we remove

7. The SDF is strong enough to check East Asian conflictPreble 6 [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies @ Cato institute, Cato institute, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” April 16 2008, p. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf

As the total number of U.S. military personnel in Japan has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defensive capabilities have expanded. Japan is already an active player in East Asia, and it possesses the resources necessary for it to contribute to global security using a wide range of political, economic, and military mean s. Indeed, Japan’s total economic output ranks second only to that

of the United States. Japan has used a small portion of its great economic strength to upgrade its military capabilities, focusing particularly on qualitative improvement s, as opposed to the number of troops, ships, or planes.28 So even as Tokyo continued to brandish its pacifist constitutional principles, and while total

military spending as a share of GDP has remained at or just below 1 percent, the SDF has become a formidable, technologically advanced, and tactically diverse force whose ground, maritime, and air components boast nearly 240,000 active-duty personnel. The Maritime SDF includes 44 destroyers, 9 frigates, and 16 submarines, and the combined air power of the SDF includes 380 combat-capable aircraft plus other fixed-wing and helicopter assets.29 Japan’s defense expenditures are much smaller than those of the United States but are comparable to those of all other advanced industrial economies in real terms. In the mid- 1980s, Japan had the world’s sixth-largest defense budget behind the Soviet Union, the United States, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom; by the end of the decade, Japan trailed only the Soviet Union and the United States. Military spending continued to rise throughout the 1990s, and expenditures have remained stable since

then. According to official statistics compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan’s defense expenditures in 2004 were exceeded only by those of the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems likely, however, that Japan’s defense budget was also less than that of China (Table 1).30 Chinese defense figures are widely disputed, and are likely 40 to 70 percent higher than the Chinese government’s official statistics. Leaving those three countries aside, however, Japan almost certainly spends more than the other two permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Russia) but also more than Germany and almost three times as much as India, two other countries that aspire to permanent membership on the Security Council.

8. US Marines are useless in Japan – they don’t help deterrence and they wouldn’t be used in conflictDoug Bandow 2010, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, June 18th, 2010 [“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592, accessed June 28, 2010]The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on

Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do. The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China , unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units . Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops —insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the

Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia. General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan . I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?’”

41


----Ext. US Troops = Instability US troop deployments block regional resolutions in North Korea, Taiwan and China. Mark Beeson 2009, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Birmingham, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10, 2009.

The other issue that may be effectively creating a divide, or at least a growing sense of difference, between the East Asian and North America sides of the Asia-Pacific is the growing realisation that, while the hub and spokes architecture that the U.S. continues to dominate may further American grand strategy, it is not necessarily helpful in resolving specific East Asian problems or promoting greater regional cooperation. As Muthiah Alagappa points out, it is striking that ‘the development of international society has made the greatest progress in a subregion - Southeast Asia - after American disengagement and has made much less progress in a subregion - Northeast Asia – where the United States has continued to be engaged most heavily’.[59] Not only has Southeast Asia been

able to foster a sense of regional identity in the absence of direct American engagement - with no obvious loss of security or stability - but American policy has made little progress in resolving the East Asian region’s most intractable and dangerous confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Alagappa argues that American troop deployments across Northeast Asia may actually be making the resolution of stand-offs in North Korea, and between Taiwan and China, more difficult to resolve. Like Kang, Alagappa concludes that ‘the consequences of American disengagement- may not be as disastrous as posited’. [60]

US Marines are useless against China – a better balancing model would be led by Japan and drawing down from Okinawa is the catalystBandow 10, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, May 12, 2010(Doug, “Japan can Defend Itself”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804)

Checking China is next on the potential Okinawa mission list. However , no one expects the United States to launch a ground invasion of the People's Republic of China irrespective of the future course of events. Thus, the MEF wouldn't be very useful in any conflict. In any case, a stronger Japanese military — which already possesses potent capabilities — would be a far better mechanism for encouraging responsible Chinese development. There's also the kitchen sink argument: the Marines are to maintain regional "stability." Pentagon officials draw expanding circles around Okinawa to illustrate potential areas of operation. The mind boggles, however. Should U.S. troops be sent to resolve, say, the long-running Burmese guerrilla war in that nation's east, a flare-up of secessionist sentiment in Indonesia, violent opposition to Fiji's military dictator, or border skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand? It hard to imagine any reason for Washington to jump into any local conflict. America's presumption should be noninvolvement

rather than intervention in other nations' wars. Making fewer promises to intervene would allow the United States to reduce the number of military personnel and overseas bases. A good place to start in cutting international installations would be Okinawa. America's post-Cold War dominance is coming to an end. Michael Schuman argued in Time: "Anyone who thinks the balance of power in Asia is not changing — and with it, the strength of the U.S., even among its old allies — hasn't been there lately."

42


=====Politics Links- Bidirectional=====

43


Afghan Withdrawal- Popular Plan Popular-Public and Democratic SupportHuffington Post 10 (Binckes, Jeremy, staffwriter, 6/29/10, “Most Americans Support Afghanistan Withdrawal Plan”, DA, 7/25/10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/29/most-americans-support-af_n_629396.html)

A majority of Americans support President Obama's plan for withdrawing from Afghanistan starting in July 2011, according to a USA Today/Gallup poll released Tuesday. Fifty-eight percent of Americans said they agreed with the plan, while 38 percent opposed it. Most of the opposition was to having a

deadline at all -- 29 percent of respondents did not think that that U.S. should set a timetable. Self-identified Democrats overwhelmingly responded that they favored Obama's withdrawal plan. Independents favored the plan 57 percent to 36 percent, while Republicans opposed the plan 65 percent to 31 percent. On Tuesday, Gen. David

Patraeus said that any reduction in American forces in Afghanistan would be "conditions-based." He added that Americans will provide assistance and support in Afghanistan for years to come. Gallup interviewed 1,044 adults in all 50 states between June 25 and June 26.

No Support For War In Afghanistan-Hurt Obama’s PresidencyTHE RAW STORY 10 (‘Top antiwar Democrat:Afghanistan war could destroy’ Obama’s presidency Raw Story destroy’ http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0712/nadler-afghan-war-destroy-obama-presidency-democratic-congress/)

A n outspoken anti-war Democrat said ongoing US military efforts in Afghanistan could deeply imperil the presidency of Barack Obama and the

fortunes of the Democratic Party. “I think that this war, if it goes on and if it escalates, has the potential to destroy this presidency and to destroy the Democratic majorities in Congress," Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) told Raw Story in an interview. The New York congressman, who has called the Afghanistan war a "fool's errand," said he has no qualms opposing Obama and Democratic leaders on this sensitive issue ahead of the midterm elections, despite the harsh climate for his party. "When you’re dealing with war and peace you can’t think of it in those terms," he

said. "People are dying. The security of our country, the honor of our country, the lives of our men and women, the lives of foreign men and women – are at stake. And that’s a lot more important, frankly, than partisan advantage." For Nadler, his stance on Afghanistan hearkens back to when he disapproved of US efforts in Vietnam in the 1960s, which President Lyndon Johnson championed and escalated. "I got into politics opposing a president of my party – a president who was very good in most other respects – over the Vietnam war," he said

44


Afghan Withdrawal Unpopular Plan Unpopular-Gop OppositionsFOX NEWS 10 (7/4/10 “Senators, Afghan Ambassador Critizice Troop Withdrawal Timeline”, DA, 7/25/10, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/04/senators-afghan-ambassador-criticize-troop-withdrawal-timetable/)

Leading Republican lawmakers and the Afghan ambassador to the United States are voicing opposition to President Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting next year. Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, appearing on the Sunday talk shows while in the Afghan capital,

said Obama's decision to start pulling out in July 2011 is a mistake and will embolden Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists. The senators and the Afghan envoy, Said Tayeb Jawad, said withdrawal should be based on a conditions on the ground, not a fixed date. Their comments came as Gen. David Petraeus assumed command of the 130,000-strong international force in Afghanistan. "We are in this to win," he said, at a time of growing casualties and skepticism about the nearly 9-year-old war. Petraeus backs the withdrawal plan but has stressed it will also be based on conditions.

McCain, a former Navy pilot and the ranking Republican on Senate Armed Services Committee, called the deadline "indecipherable" and said it "certainly sounds an uncertain trumpet" to both allies and foes. "I know enough about warfare," the Arizona senator said. "I know enough about what strategy and tactics are about. If you tell the enemy that you're leaving on a date certain, unequivocally, then that enemy will wait until you leave."

Military opposes troop withdrawal Tiron, The Hill, ‘9 (Roxana, December 12, “Gates opposes troop withdrawal deadline for Afghanistan” http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/70165-gates-clinton-and-mullen-defend-afghan-plan)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he opposed setting deadlines for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan as he defended President Barack Obama’s new war

strategy. Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen on Wednesday made their first rounds on Capitol Hill to publicly sell Obama’s Afghanistan war plan to conflicted lawmakers still trying to digest the president’s announcement . Obama announced on Tuesday he will send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, some as early as the next few weeks. The president also announced his goal of beginning a U.S. troop withdrawal by the summer of 2011.

Gates said he agrees with the president’s July 2011 timeline but he would not agree with any efforts to set a deadline for complete troop withdrawal. “I have adamantly opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I oppose deadlines in Afghanistan . But what the president has announced is the

beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will be a gradual process and, as he said last night, based on conditions on the ground. So there is no deadline for the withdrawal

of American forces in Afghanistan,” Gates told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday afternoon. “July 2011 is not a cliff.” Gates’s comments came after lawmakers, particularly Republicans, attacked Obama’s plan to begin thinning out U.S. forces in the South Asian country by July 2011. Earlier in the day, during a Senate Armed Services Committee

hearing, Obama’s presidential rival, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), lamented the “arbitrary” deadline, which is not based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan

45


South Korea Withdrawal Popular Withdrawal From South Korea Makes Obama Look GoodKOREADPR.COM 09(“US troop withdrawal urged in south Korea”, August 16th, 2009, D/A: 7/25/2009, http://www.korea-dpr.com/ocn/?p=127)

The south Koreans’ growing tendency towards independence and peace against war has developed into a vigorous campaign to drive out US troops, the wrecker of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the root cause of all misfortune and sufferings of the nation. To mark the fifth anniversary of death of two

schoolgirls run over by a US armored vehicle voices calling for US troop withdrawal rocked the whole of south Korea this year. Civic organizations including the society of Candlelight for Independence and Peace to Cherish the Memory of Hyo Sun and Mi Son held a press conference in front of the Jongro District Office in Seoul in demand of the

restoration of the monument to candlelight for independence and peace. Speakers said that the monument reflects the will of the people to cherish the memory of the two schoolgirls, their desire for national independence and peace and their determination not leave their destiny in the hands of the US any longer. The press headquarters of the Southern Committee for the Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration, the Citizens’ Federation for Democratic Society, the south Korean Federation of University Student Councils and the National Council of Women Student Representatives declared that they would settle accounts with US troops, a warlike group and a group of murders and peace destroyers for all of their crimes, pledging themselves to launch a dynamic campaign to drive them out of south Korea. Different organizations including the People for Peace and Reunification, Hyangrin Church and Daejeon-Chungnam Solidarity for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declarationheld an anti-US solidarity meeting, the inaugural ceremony of the movement for a full-scale, popular campaign to drive out US troops, candlelit meeting, press conference and seminar and launched a ten million people signature campaign for the withdrawal of US troops in different parts of south Korea. The 172nd Friday rally against the US and war and for the withdrawal of US troops was held by the Solidarity for Implementing the South-North Joint Declaration and other civic organizations in front of the US embassy in Seoul on November 9

Presence in S. Korea is unnecessary Ha-Won July 27, 2010 (Lee, the Chosun Ilbo's Correspondent in washington. "Don't Rely Too Much on the Recent Korea-US Honeymoon." July 27, 2010)

It published a report just before the U.S. and South Korea launched a joint naval exercise in response to North Korea's sinking of the South's Navy corvette Cheonan, titled "The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous." As the title suggests, it urges the U .S. government to focus on alliances that have not lost their

raison d'être. Citing the Cheonan incident, it says, " There no longer is any cause to maintain a defense commitment that is all cost and no benefit to the United States." The think tank calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, saying their presence only complicates a solution to the North Korean nuclear impasse and proposed the scrapping of the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. The author of the report is Doug Bandow, a former aide to President

Ronald Reagan. In a recent seminar on the Korean peninsula, Bandow also insisted that it is time for the U.S. to pull out of South Korea. The report represents the

views of a small group of people in the U.S., including some lawmakers, but at present there is no chance that the administration will heed these calls. U.S. President Barack Obama has placed relations with South Korea at the top of his list of priorities, even dispatching his state and defense secretaries to the South at the same time. But the situation could change if the White House falls under the leadership of people who think otherwise. Many South Koreans remember the 1970s, when there were calls within the Carter administration to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. In fact, many U.S. officials wonder whether the Seoul-Washington alliance can continue forever. Some officials in Seoul may believe the alliance has reached new heights with the recent "two plus two" meeting between the foreign and

defense ministers, but not many in the U.S. feel that way. It is important to realize that the recent show of unity was triggered by temporary circumstances in Northeast Asian diplomacy . America's ties with Japan remain tense, while its relations with China have deteriorated since the start of the Obama administration, increasing the importance of ties with South Korea. The tasks that lie ahead for South Korea are evident. There is no need to recall memories of the previous administration, when tense relations with Washington led to conflict

between parties in the South. South Korea needs to grasp the potential causes of problems in relations with the U.S. and deal with them. At the same time, it must be aware that no alliance in history has been permanent . If unexpected events occur involving North Korea or strained ties between the U.S. and China, Seoul must realize that it cannot rely on other countries to overcome them. That is the best way to ensure a long-lasting and effective South Korea-U.S. alliance

46


Japan Withdrawal Popular Japan Withdrawal Popular- Obama Supports itCURTIS 10 (Gerald L., 5/27/10, American Foreign Policy Interests, DA, 7/25/2010, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/969010_918013288_922579813.pdf)

President Obama had been elected on a platform promising change, and he moved quickly once in office to make change happen to cancel plans to place a missile defense system in Eastern

Europe; to seek dialogue with Iran and Syria and North Korea; to proceed with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Political change in Japan was another matter entirely. The Obama administration did not hide its irritation with the Hatoyama government’s decision to take a fresh look at an agreement that had been reached between the LDP government and the United States to relocate a U.S. Marine air station in Okinawa or at Prime Minister Hatoyama’s call for the creation of an ‘‘East Asian Community,’’ which some in the administration believed reflected a desire to downgrade the U.S.–Japan alliance in favor of closer ties with China and other Asian states. The U.S.–Japan discord over the relocation of the Marine air base is unresolved at the time of this writing (March 2010). No matter how it is settled, there is no question that it has sowed a considerable amount of ill will toward Prime Minister Hatoyama among officials who deal with Japan in the Obama administration and that it has taken a toll on the Hatoyama government’s attitude toward the Obama administration as well. Neither Prime Minister Hatoyama nor his foreign minister, Katsuya Okada, was adept in handling the issue. There was too much thinking out loud about possible alternatives to the relocation agreement that had been concluded by the Bush administration and the LDP government in 2006, too many half-baked or totally unbaked ideas floated that made the situation only more confusing. But the lack of sophistication of the DPJ’s leadership in dealing with foreign policy is not the primary reason for discord between the United States and Japan over the basing issue. Whether the Hatoyama government lasts or not, whether

the DPJ stays in office for several years or not, Japanese foreign policy and the dynamics of Japan’s relations with the United States are changing. Americans are fond of referring to the alliance with Japan as the ‘‘cornerstone’’ of U.S. policy in East Asia. It is an apt metaphor because a cornerstone just sits there; it is inanimate and reliable, something you can confidently build on. But the Japanese cornerstone is shifting. Japan can be deceptive for those who do not look below the surface at the currents that are churning Japanese society and influencing how people think about their country and about the world in which they must live and survive. Japan is going through a major political transformation, one important aspect of which is a generational shift in political leadership

47

http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/969010_918013288_922579813.pdf

open-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comopen-evidence.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/... ·...

Documents