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Autocracy by Democratic Rules:

The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era

Steven LevitskyDepartment of Government

Harvard UniversityLevitsky@cfia.harvard.edu

Lucan A. WayDepartment of Political Science

Temple UniversityLway@temple.edu

March 25, 2003

Paper Prepared for the Conference, Mapping the Great Zone: Clientelism and the Boundarybetween Democratic and Democratizing, Columbia University, April 4-5, 2003. [This is a revised

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version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002.]

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Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the spread of democratic regimes during the1980s and 1990s, one aspect of the third wave of democratization has received less scholarlyattention: the emergence and persistence of mixed or hybrid regimes. In much of Africa, post-communist Eurasia, Asia, and Latin America, political regimes combined meaningful democratic andauthoritarian features during the 1990s. Though not a new phenomenon, hybrid regimes

proliferated after the end of the Cold War. In 2002, they easily outnumbered democracies amongdeveloping countries (Diamond 2002: 30-31; Schedler 2002: 47). In light of this proliferation,scholars created a variety of new regime subtypes, including hybrid regime (Karl 1995), semi-democracy (Case 1996), electoral democracy (Diamond 1999), illiberal democracy (Zakaria1997), semi-authoritarianism, (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), semi-dictatorship (Brooker 2000),soft authoritarianism (Means 1996), and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002b).

Nevertheless, the literature on these regimes remains underdeveloped. Two weaknessesare worth noting. First, scholars frequently place mixed cases in residual categories (such as semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian, or Freedom Houses partly free) that tell us little about the

regimes other than what they are not, which tends to obscure important differences among mixedcases.1 Second, much of the literature on mixed regimes suffers from a democratizing bias.2Mixed regimes are frequently treated as partial forms of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997), oras regimes that are in transition to democracy. Yet such characterizations may be misleading.Although some mixed regimes did in fact democratize during the post-Cold War period (Mexico,Serbia), others remained stable (Malaysia, Ukraine), moved in multiple directions (Albania,Zambia), or became increasingly authoritarian (Azerbaijan, Belarus). Various hybrid regimes havenow remained in place for more than a decade, which is longer than the life span of many LatinAmerican military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than treating mixed regimes as partial ortransitional democracies, then, it may be more useful to think about the specific types of regimes

they actually are.

This paper examines one type of hybrid regime, which we call competitiveauthoritarianism .3 Such regimes are authoritarian in that they do not meet standard proceduralminimum criteria for democracy. Elections are often unfair and civil liberties are frequently violated.However, they are competitive in that democratic institutions are more than faades. Rather, theypermit opposition groups to contest seriously forand sometimes even winpower. Thecombination of autocratic rule and democratic rules creates an inherent source of tension.Consequently, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by periodic crises in whichopposition challenges force incumbents to choose between cracking down and losing power. These

1For example, El Salvador, Latvia, and Ukraine each received a combined political and civil liberties score of sixorPartly Freefrom Freedom House in 199293. Yet whereas Latvia denied full citizenship rights for people ofRussian descent, El Salvador was characterized by widespread human rights violations and a lack of civilian controlover the military. Ukraine possessed broad citizenship rights and civilian control over the military, but civil libertieswere frequently violated and incumbents routinely manipulated democratic procedures.2Similar critiques can be found in Herbst (2001), Carothers (2002), and the articles in the April 2002 issue oftheJournal of Democracy.3This concept is discussed in greater detail in Levitsky and Way (2002).

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crises have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian entrenchment (Malaysia,Zimbabwe) to incumbent turnover without regime change (Ukraine, Zambia) to democratization(Peru, Serbia).

We seek to explain these diverging regime trajectories. We focus on three variables. The

first is incumbents organizational capacity to thwart opposition challenges, which we argue isenhanced by elite cohesion and strong coercive and electoral organizations. The second variable isthe organizational capacity of the opposition. Well-organized and united opposition movements aremore likely to topple autocratic incumbents than those that are poorly organized and/or divided.The third variable is countries linkage to, and dependence on, Western governments andinstitutions. Close ties to the West generally raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment duringthe 1990s. Thus, incumbent survival is most likely in countries with a cohesive elite and strongstates and governing parties, weak and divided oppositions, and weak ties to the West. Incumbentturnover is most likely in countries with weak states and governing parties, united oppositionmovements, and close ties to the West.

We apply this framework to 12 cases of competitive authoritarianism, all of which facedsome kind of regime crisis between 1990 and 2001. The cases are taken from five regions: Africa(Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Central Europe (Albania, Serbia), the former Soviet Union (Armenia,Russia, Ukraine), Latin America (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru), and East Asia (Malaysia). We findthat in cases of high Western linkage, such as countries in Central Europe and Latin America, evenautocratic incumbents with substantial coercive capacity were likely to yield to, rather than repress,serious democratic challenges. In cases of low Western linkage, outcomes hinged on theorganizational capacity of governments and their opponents. Where governments possessedsubstantial coercive capacity and strong ruling parties (Malaysia, Zimbabwe), or where they faced

weak and deeply divided oppositions (Kenya, Russia), incumbents survived crises. Where eliteswere fragmented and ruling party and state organizations were weak, and/or where oppositionmovements were united, incumbents fell (Ukraine, Zambia). Yet where competition was primarily aproduct of incumbent weakness, the removal of autocratic incumbents often did not result indemocratization, but rather in a new period of competitive authoritarian rule.

These results have important implications for comparative research on regimes and regimechange. First, they suggest that several factors that are said to contribute to democratic stability,such as elite cohesion, strong parties, and effective states, also contribute to the stability ofauthoritarian regimes. Elite fragmentation and state and party weakness limit incumbents capacity tobuild and maintain authoritarian rule, which may result in competitive politics and even incumbentturnover. Yet these factors are unlikely to contribute to stable democracy. In other words, the veryconditions that enhance pluralism and competition in some authoritarian regimes may simultaneouslyinhibit democratization (Way 2002a, Way 2002b). These results caution against viewingcompetitive authoritarianism as a halfway house on the road to democracy.

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Our findings also run counter to several contemporary approaches to regime change,particularly those that focus on elite attitudes and behavior and on institutional design.4 We find thatleadership choices are often better explained by domestic and international constraints than by thepresence or absence of democratic values,5and that in the absence of other structural factorssupporting pluralism, the long-term effects of democratic statecraft are often quite meager. We also

find that because formal political institutions in many competitive authoritarian regimes are weak andeasily manipulated by incumbents, institutional design is often better understood as endogenous toregime outcomes than as an independent cause of those outcomes. Our analysis of regime change isthus closer to approaches that emphasize structural factors such as the role of state power, thebalance of social forces, and international constraints (Skocpol 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, andStephens 1992; Collier 1999).

The Concept of Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarian regimes are regimes in which democratic institutions exist and are

widely viewed as the primary means of gaining and maintaining power, but in which incumbentsviolate democratic rules to such a degree that the regime cannot be labeled a democracy. Examplesinclude Croatia under Franco Tudjman, Haiti under Jean Bertrand Aristide, Malaysia underMahathir Mohammad, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin,Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, and Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, aswell as Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia,and Zimbabwe during much of the 1990s.6

Competitive authoritarian regimes are non-democratic in that they do not meet standardprocedural minimum definitions of democracy.7 Democratic regimes meet four minimum criteria:

(1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; (2) virtuallyall adults possess the right to vote; (3) civil and political liberties are broadly protected; and (4)elected authorities are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.8Althoughdemocracies may at times violate these criteria, such violations are not sufficiently severe orsystematic to impede challenges to incumbents. By contrast, competitive authoritarian regimes are

4For example, Robert Moser, summarizing a recent collection of essays on Russian politics, suggests that theproblems of Russian democracy arose primarily from poor elite decisions and institutional design (Moser2001: 10). On elite attitudes and decisions, see Di Palma (1990), Fis h (1998), and McFaul (2002). On institutionaldesign, see Stepan and Skach (1993), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Lijphart and Waisman (1996), and Fish (2001).5Thus, in certain contexts autocratic leaders have behaved democratically (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in

1991, Mexico in 2000), whereas in other contexts seemingly democratic opposition leaders have behavedin a highly undemocratic manner (Berisha in Albania, Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, Chiluba in Zambia).6Competitive authoritarianism does not encompass all hybrid regimes. Other regimes that mix authoritarian anddemocratic features include constitutional oligarchies (electoral regimes in which suffrage is denied to certaingroups, as in Latvia during the 1990s), semi-competitive regimes (electoral regimes in which a major political force isbarred from competition, as in Argentina between 1957 and 1966), and tutelary regimes (electoral regimes in whichnon-elected actors such as military or religious authorities wield substantial veto power, as in Guatemala in the1980s and Iran in the late 1990s).7On procedural minimum definitions, see ODonnell and Schmitter (1986: 8) and Collier and Levitsky (1997).8This definition is consistent with mid -range definitions of democracy. See Diamond (1999: 13-15).

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characterized by frequent and often severe violations of democratic procedure, such that the playingfield between government and opposition is markedly uneven.9 Incumbents routinely abuse stateresources, restrict the media, and manipulate electoral results, and journalists and oppositionpoliticians are frequently subject to surveillance, harassment, and, occasionally, arrest, exile, orviolent repression.

Yet competitive authoritarian regimes are not fully closed. In full-blown authoritarianregimes, formal democratic institutions such as elections, parliaments, and courts either do not existor exist merely as faades or legitimating mechanisms. They do not yield meaningful contestation forpower or generate uncertainty with regard to the allocation of political authority.10 In competitiveauthoritarian regimes, by contrast, the existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenasthrough which opposition groups may contest seriously forand occasionally win--power.Elections are often bitterly fought contests. Although fraud, unequal media access, and harassmentof the opposition stack the cards in favor of incumbents, elections often generate considerableuncertainty, and in some cases (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, Serbia in 2000), incumbents

lose them. Similarly, although institutions such as the courts, legislatures, and the media are oftenweak and/or subordinated to the executive, opposition forces may, on occasion, use them to poseserious challenges to the government. Although incumbents may repress these challenges, directassaults on democratic institutions tend to be costly in terms of both domestic and internationallegitimacy. Consequently, efforts to limit competition and suppress dissent often take more subtleforms, such as bribery, blackmail, and the manipulation of debts, tax authorities, compliantjudiciaries, and other state agencies to legally harass or persecute opponents.

Although competitive authoritarian regimes are not new,11they became especially prevalentin the post-Cold War period. The Western liberal hegemony that emerged in the wake of the

collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the legitimacy of alternative regime models, eliminatedmany alternative sources of financial and military support, and created strong incentives forperipheral states to adopt formal democratic institutions. As Andrew Janos (2000) has argued,liberal hegemony places a web of constraints on peripheral elites seeking to maintain goodstanding in the international community. In a non-hegemonic context, Western powers are also morelikely to tolerate (and in many cases, support) authoritarian regimes that present themselves asbuffers against Western rivals. This was clearly seen during the Cold War. The rise of the SovietUnion after World War II contributed to the emergence of both quasi-Leninist dictatorships andU.S.-backed anti-communist dictatorships in much of the Third World.

9Competitive authoritarianism must therefore be distinguished from unstable, ineffective, or otherwiseflawed regimes that nevertheless meet the minimum criteria for democracy, such as what GuillermoODonnell (1994) has called delegative democracies.10According to this definition, regimes in Egypt, Singapore, and the Central Asian republics were fullyauthoritarian during the 1990s.11Historical examples include Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in the 1920s, Argentina under the first Perngovernment (1946-55), Zambia in the 1960s, and the Dominican Republic in the 1970s.

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The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of Western liberal hegemony ofunprecedented scope. These changes increased the cost of building and sustaining authoritarianregimes in several ways. For one, the evaporation of alternative sources of military and economicsupport created an incentive for peripheral elites to remain on good terms with Westerngovernments and institutions. Other forms of international influence included demonstration effects,

direct state-to-state pressure (in the form of sanctions, behind the scenes diplomacy, and in somecases, military intervention), explicit conditionality (as in the case of European Union membership),and the activities of emerging transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The effects ofinternational pressure vary considerably across states and regions. Many autocratic governmentsbenefit from pockets of international permissiveness created by economic or security interests thattrump democracy promotion on Western foreign policy agendas. Nevertheless, for mostgovernments in lower and middle-income countries, the costs associated with the maintenance offull-scale authoritarian institutionsand the benefits associated with adopting democratic ones--roseconsiderably in the 1990s. As a result, even highly autocratic leaders were at times forced totolerate the uncertainties created by meaningful democratic institutions.

Crisis and Change in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Competitive authoritarian regimes may be relatively enduring.12 As long as autocraticincumbents do not cancel or openly steal elections or commit egregious human rights violations, theymay be able to hold onto power for many years. Using techniques such as bribery, co-optation,and various forms of legal persecution, governments may limit opposition challenges withoutprovoking massive protest or international repudiation.13Yet the coexistence of autocraticincumbents and democratic rules creates an inherent source of instability. The persistence ofmeaningful elections, formally empowered courts and legislatures, and an independent media

provides mechanisms through which opposition forces may periodically challenge the government.Such challenges present autocratic incumbents with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, overtrepressioncanceling elections, jailing opponents, ignoring Supreme Court rulings, or closing thelegislatureis costly, because the challenges are formally legal and often enjoy broad domestic andinternational legitimacy. On the other hand, if opposition challenges are allowed to run their course,incumbents risk losing power.14 Such situations frequently result in an incumbent crisis in thegovernment is forced to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost ofinternational isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost ofpossible defeat.

Such crises resulted in a variety of regime outcomes. In some cases (Kenya, Russia,Malaysia), incumbents weathered the storm. In other cases (Peru, Serbia), failed crackdownattempts eventually led to the removal of autocratic incumbents. In still other cases (Nicaragua,Zambia in 1991, Ukraine in 1994), incumbents lost elections and ceded power peacefully. Yet the

12Perhaps the clearest case of a stable competitive authoritarian regime is Malaysia. See Case (1996).13For an insightful account of such strategies in Ukraine, see Darden (2001).14These dilemmas are insightfully presented by Schedler (2002a).

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removal of autocratic incumbents does not always lead to democracy. As Table 1 shows, only halfof our cases of incumbent turnover (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia) resulted in democratization.In four cases (Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia), turnover was accompanied by the persistenceof competitive authoritarian rule. Hence, although the removal of autocratic incumbents creates anopportunityfor democratization, it should not be equated with democratization.

--Table 1 about here

We seek to explain the variation in regime outcomes shown in Table 1. Why are someautocratic governments able to weather the storms created by episodes of democratic contestation,often by cracking down and further consolidating authoritarian rule, while others lose power, eitherbecause they fail to crack down or because they attempt to crack down but fail? More broadly,what explains why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratize in the face of crisis whileothers remain stable or experience authoritarian retrenchment?

We begin with the assumption that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek toremain in office, and that extra-legal tactics (such as electoral fraud and various forms of repression)are among the options they consider as they pursue that goal. Given this assumption, threevariables are of particular importance in explaining regime outcomes: (1) incumbent capacity; (2)opposition unity and strength; and (3) the international context.

Incumbent Capacity

In large part, the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes in crisis hinges on the capacity ofincumbents to thwart opposition challenges. Maintaining an authoritarian regime requires substantialpolitical, organizational, and financial resources. Governments that possess such resources are

much more likely to survive opposition challenges than those that lack them. Three dimensions ofincumbent capacity are particularly important to regime survival: (1) elite cohesion; (2) coercivecapacity; and (3) electoral capacity.

Elite CohesionElite cohesion refers to the degree of discipline and loyalty that executives can command

from other regime elites, such as cabinet ministers, military leaders and other security officials, andparliamentary and party leaders. Just as elite cohesion is critical to democratic stability (Linz 1978;Higley and Gunther 1992), it is also critical to the survival of authoritarian regimes (Easter 1997;Roeder 2001). This is particularly true in periods of crisis, when incumbents must consider

strategiessuch as violent repression or electoral fraudthat can potentially bring high costs.Incumbents who cannot rely on key regime allies or subordinates during periods of crisis are lesslikely to risk such strategies, and if they adopt them, they are more likely to fail.

Regimes vary considerably on the dimension of elite cohesion. In some cases, due to weakstates, unstable political institutions, or deep ideological or ethnic divisions, incumbents repeatedly

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confront insubordination from within the government or the security forces.15 In other cases, due tostrong social or ideological ties or highly institutionalized parties or militaries, cases of defection orinsubordination are rare.

Coercive Capacity

Incumbent survival also depends on the governments capacity to repress or controlopposition forces. Coercive capacity is important on at least two levels. On one level, an effectivecoercive apparatus may employ low level repression (surveillance, harassment, detention, andoccasional beatings or killings) to intimidate citizens and discourage them from participating inopposition activities. On another level, an effective coercive apparatus must be able to reliablysuppress (or pre-empt though massive shows of force) opposition protests. Where incumbents lackthe capacity to crack down on such protests, they are more likely to fall.

Coercive capacity requires both an infrastructure of repression and effective control overthat infrastructure. In many regimes, this includes well-equipped and disciplined military and police

forces and an internal security apparatus equipped with secret police and extensive surveillanceoperations (including the use of phone tapping, media monitoring, and informant networks). It mayalso include state-sponsored paramilitary organizations and party-affiliated informant and thugnetworks. Other state agencies, such as the tax administration, may also be used as mechanisms forintimidating and controlling the media, the private sector, and much of the opposition. For such anapparatus to be effective, of course, incumbents must fully control it. Where presidents cannot relyon military, secret service, or other agencies of coercion to follow their orders, incumbent capacitywill be reduced.

Electoral Capacity

A third dimension of incumbent capacity is electoral organization. Unlike their counterpartsin full-scale authoritarian regimes, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes must winelections. This must be done through a combination of voter mobilization and fraud, both of whichrequire an organizational infrastructure, often in the form of a party. Electoral machines areparticularly important whenas is often the case in competitive authoritarian regimes--incumbentslack widespread popular support. In such cases, unpopular incumbents must rely on local partystructures, patronage networks, various government agencies, andin post-Soviet countriesdirectors of enterprises to bring voters to the polls.

Beyond winning votes, electoral machines are also critical forstealingvotes. Marginal

electoral manipulation or fraudoften on the scale of 5-10 percent of the votecan be decisive forthe fate of unpopular incumbents. Like get-out-the-vote efforts, activities such as stuffing ordestroying ballot boxes, tampering with voter registration rolls, intimidating voters, or manipulatingelectoral results require the coordination and control of thousands of local officials and activists.Without a minimum of organization, such coordination is extremely difficult.

15Such was the case in many former Soviet republics, where the leading threats to incumbents have oftencome from former members of the government, particularly prime ministers.

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In general, then, incumbent capacity is enhanced by strong states and governing parties.

State strengthwhich entails both the domination of state officials over subordinates and thecapacity of state agencies to successfully implement the objectives of state officialstends to fosterelite cohesion and enhance the coercive and electoral capacity of incumbents. In the absence of a

minimum of state strength, governing elites tend to fragment, executives have a more difficult timeutilizing state agencies and regional administrations to intimidate opponents or manipulate electoralprocess, and governments will be less able to rely on repression to put down social and politicalprotest (Way 2002). Strong parties foster elite cohesion (through institutionalized patronagenetworks or shared ideology), facilitate electoral mobilization (and manipulation), and may carry outactivitiessuch as surveillance and intimidationthat enhance incumbents coercive capacity.Revolutionary parties are often particularly effective in these areas. Revolutionary struggles tend toproduce disciplined parties whose leaders and cadres exhibit high levels of ideological commitmentand internal solidarity.

Opposition CapacityA second variable that shapes the fate of incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes is

the strength of the political opposition. Strong opposition movements are more likely to defeatautocratic incumbents at the polls. They also raise the cost of repression, which increases thelikelihood that incumbents will choose not to crack down. We measure opposition capacity alongtwo dimensions: (1) cohesion; and (2) mobilizational capacity.

Opposition Cohesion

Opposition cohesion is often critical to the success of anti-authoritarian movements (Brattonand van de Walle 1997: 198-200; Corrales 2001). Divided oppositions may contribute to the

survival of autocratic incumbents in at least two ways. First, in the electoral arena, oppositiondivision often enables unpopular incumbents to win with a mere plurality of the vote. Althoughincumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes often lack majority support, their core support base,combined with incumbency advantages and vote rigging, usually helps to ensure at least 30-40percent of the vote. If opposition parties fail to coalesce behind a single candidate, such pluralitiesmay be sufficient to win.16 Polarized oppositions also enable autocratic incumbents to employdivide and rule strategies. In cases of severe internal division, one opposition party may work withthe incumbent to prevent the victory of a rival party.17

We measure opposition cohesion in terms of three levels. In cases of high cohesion,

virtually major opposition groups are organized into single party or coalition. In cases of mediumcohesion, opposition parties are fragmented but are not deeply divided along ideological, ethnic orother lines. The absence of deep cleavages makes it more likely that they will be able to unite intobroad anti-authoritarian coalitions during elections or moments of regime crisis. In cases of low

16A clear example is Kenya in 1992 and 1997.17Such debilitating splits emerged within the Mexican opposition in 1988 and between communist and non-communist opposition parties in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s.

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cohesion, opposition parties are deeply divided along ideological, ethnic, or regional lines. In suchcases, opposition parties often oppose each other as much, if not more, than they do the party inpower, which seriously inhibits the formation of broad anti-authoritarian coalitions.

Mobilizational Strength

A second component of opposition capacity is the ability of opposition movements tomobilize citizens against the government. The capacity to mount large and sustained protestmovements raises the cost of repression for incumbents. The repression of large demonstrationsrequires a more extensive use of force, which may bring severe costs in terms of both domestic andinternational legitimacy. Hence, the better organized and mobilized an opposition movement is, themore likely incumbents will be to cede power. In measuring mobilizational strength, we focus on (1)the strength of opposition party organizations; (2) the strength and independence of civil society,particularly labor, student, and human rights organizations; and (3) the degree to which civil societyorganizations are aligned with the political opposition.

The International Dimension: The Role of Western InfluenceThe third variable shaping the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes is the international

environment. International influences are difficult to measure and compare. For one, they take avariety of forms. Although some of these forms are easily observable (military intervention, explicitconditionality), others (demonstration effects, the diffusion of ideas) have subtler effects that aredifficult to measure. Moreover, the effects of the international environment vary across time, region,and individual states. Yet the effect of the international environment on regimes appears to beconsiderable.18Our hypothesis is that in the post-Cold War period, ties to the Westparticularlythe United States and the European Unionraise the cost of authoritarian entrenchment andstrengthen incentives for elites to play by democratic rules. We disaggregate Western influence into

two dimensions: linkageand leverage.

Linkage to the West

Linkage to the West takes a variety of forms. These include geographic proximity,economic integration, military alliances, flows of international assistance, international mediapenetration, ties to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other transnationalnetworks, and networks of elites employed by multilateral institutions and/or educated in Westernuniversities. During the post-Cold War period, these linkages raised the costs of authoritarianentrenchment in several ways. First, Western governments were more likely to promote or defenddemocracy in neighboring countries, particularly in Central Europe and Latin America.19 This was

the case for several reasons, including cultural proximity, fear of large-scale immigration or regionalconflict, and a greater penetration of Western media and international NGOs, which exposedauthoritarian abuses and generated pressure for Western responses. Second, the possibility of entryinto Western alliances and institutions (particularly the EU and NATO) created a strong incentive

18See Starr (1991); OLoughlin et al (1998); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); and Brinks and Coppedge (2001).19Thus, whereas Western governments were often inconsistent in their democracy promotion efforts in Africaand Asia during the 1990s, they intervened with greater force and consistency to block moves towardauthoritarianism in Central Europe and Latin America.

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for elites in neighboring countries to play by democratic rules (Gentleman and Zubek 1992;Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 25).20 Third, close proximity to the West increases the flow ofinformation and ideas across borders, which may influence elite and mass expectations about whatis (and is not) acceptable or possible. Where such information flows are high, it is often moredifficult for leaders to achieve an elite or mass-level consensus around authoritarian measures.

Finally, the presence within the government of Western-educated technocrats may provide anadditional source of resistance to overtly authoritarian acts. This resistance may be a product ofsocialization into democratic norms, but it may also be strategic: many technocrats seek to pursuecareers in Western and multilateral institutions and thus seek to avoid tarnishing their reputationsamong Western colleagues.

Western Leverage

Linkage is most influential when it is combined with economic and/or military dependenceon the West. Several factors may reduce the leverage of Western states and institutions andtherefore permit greater margin for authoritarian entrenchment. These include: (1) a strong

economy with a large domestic market or a highly valued commodity such as oil; (2) militarysecurity or other issues (such as drugs or immigration) that trump democracy promotion as a foreignpolicy goal for Western states; and (3) the presence or absence of a regional hegemon that is ableand willing to provide alternative sources of support. At times during the 1990s, China, Russia, andto a lesser extentNigeria and South Africa provided critical resources to non-democraticregimes in smaller neighboring states, which helped to mitigate the impact of the Western influence.21

Applying the Framework

This section applies the framework developed above to 12 cases of competitive

authoritarianism: Albania, Armenia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua under the Sandinistagovernment, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In all of these cases,competitive authoritarian regimes experienced at least one incumbent crisis between 1990 and2002. We define an incumbent crisis as a period of opposition contestation that forces thegovernment to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules and running a serious risk oflosing power. The cases fall into three distinct outcomes: (1) incumbent survival and regimepersistence (Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe); (2) incumbent turnover without democratization(Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia); and incumbent turnover with democratization (Mexico,Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia).

Incumbent Survival and Regime StabilityIn Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, autocratic incumbents survived oppositionchallenges throughout the 1990-2002 period, and as a result, regimes either remained stable orunderwent authoritarian entrenchment. All four cases were marked by relatively low Western

20This effect was clearest in the case of the EU, which has an explicit democracy clause, but initial talkstoward a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas have also included discussion of a democracy clause.21France occasionally played a similar role in francophone Africa.

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influence and either (1) high incumbent capacity or (2) weak and/or divided oppositions. Table 2summarizes the cases. In Malaysia, a strong state and governing party, together with low Westerninfluence and a weak and divided opposition, enabled the Mahathir government to survive thechallenge posed by Anwar Ibrahim and theReformasimovement in 1998-99. In Zimbabwe, apowerful repressive apparatus, low Western influence, and the support of South Africa enabled the

Mugabe government to suppress an electoral challenge mounted by a strong and united opposition.In Kenya, greater Western influence and only moderate incumbent capacity nearly resulted in thedefeat of the Moi government, but a deeply divided opposition enabled Moi to survive two electoralchallenges. Finally, in Russia, which was characterized by low incumbent capacity, low Westerninfluence, and a weak and divided opposition, Boris Yeltsin managed to fend off a challenge by theDuma and win re-election in 1996.

--Table 2 about here--Kenya

After a period of relatively mild one party rule under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), Kenya

became increasingly authoritarian during the 1980s under President Daniel Arap Moi. Oppositionparties were banned and civil liberties severely restricted (Kamua 1991; Throup and Hornsby1998). In 1991, however, domestic and international pressure forced President Moi to restoremultiparty competition, which transformed Kenya into a transformed into competitive authoritarianregime and created an immediate incumbent crisis.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Moi government possessed moderate incumbentcapacity. Elite cohesion was moderate. Although Moi confronted substantial elite fragmentationresulting in both cabinet instability and an attempted coup--during his initial years in office (Throupand Hornsby 1998: 31-33, 45), he consolidated control over the governing Kenya African National

Union (KANU) during the 1980s. Nevertheless, Moi never achieved the elite cohesion of theKenyatta period (Throup and Hornsby 1998). The governments coercive capacity was relativelyhigh. The Kenyan state has historically been one of the strongest in Africa (Jackman and Rosberg1982: 9, 12; Widner 1992: 14). Central to this coercive capacity was the Provincial Administrationestablished under colonial rule (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 10-11). During the 1980s, Moidoubled the size of army, expanded the police forces, and increased the states surveillance capacity(Widner 1992: 125, 144). Finally, the governments electoral capacity was moderate. Apredominantly patronage-based party, KANU had been very weak under Kenyatta (Widner 1992:31-32, 39-40). During the 1980s, however, Moi infused it with state resources, revitalized localorganizations, and created a youth wing and other ancillary organizations (Widner 1992; Throup

and Hornsby 1998: 36-38, 354-355). As a result, party membership skyrocketed (Berg-Schlosserand Siegler 1990: 139), and KANU became an increasingly effective mechanism of control(Widner 1992). During the 1990s, KANU was by far the largest party in Kenya, and the onlyone with an established presence in every part of the country (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 339,179).

Opposition capacity was medium-low. On the one hand, Kenyan civil society, based onchurch organizations, lawyers groups, and the Kikuyu-dominated business community, had

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developed a moderate mobilizational capacity by the 1990s (Widner 1992: 190, 202; Throup andHornsby 1998: 302-303). On the other hand, the political opposition was deeply divided alongethnic lines, particularly between the Kikuyu and the Luo, which made the formation of a broadopposition front difficult (Oyugi 1997; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 141, 589-90).

Western influence in Kenya--scored as medium--is relatively high by African standards(Berg Schlosser and Siegler 1990: 153) but lower than in Latin America and Central Europe. Ondimensions such as geographic proximity, media and cultural penetration, and technocratic linkage,Kenya scores fairly low. However, Kenya maintained close ties to the West during the Cold War,and Great Britain retained immense strategic interests in the country through the 1990s.22Moreover, because nearly a third of government expenditure was derived from foreign assistanceduring the 1990s, international donor countries enjoyed substantial leverage over the Moigovernment (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 74, 266-270).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: In the context of a prolonged economic downturn and

increased civic protest, the Moi government confronted a deep political crisis in the early 1990s. InJuly 1991, opposition leaders, including Luo leader Oginga Odinga and Kikuyu leader KennethMatiba, created the multi-ethnic Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). Thegovernment successfully repressed incipient pro-democracy protests (Throup and Hornsby 1998:66), but this repression drew the ire of Western governments. In November 1991, the Paris Groupof international donors suspended $350 million in aid and explicitly linking its restoration to politicalreform (Barkan 1993: 91; Barkan and Ngethe 1999: 185). This pressure was decisive: within twoweeks, opposition parties were legalized, paving the way for multiparty elections in 1992 (Throupand Hornsby 1998: 87-88).

The aid cutoff ushered in KANUs darkest hour (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105). Withthe government reeling from the Western freeze on aid, and with a united FORD presenting areal threat (Barken 1993: 92), KANU elites began to defect to the opposition (Throup andHornsby 1998: 105, 93-96). However, two factors enabled Moi to survive the crisis. First, thesecurity forces remained intact and under Mois control (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105), whichallowed the government to launch a low-level campaign of violence against the opposition (Throupand Hornsby 1998: 371), including attacks on the media, the burning of opposition headquarters,and state-sponsored ethnic clashes that left thousands dead (Barkan 1993: 93; Throup andHornsby 1998: 380-81; Adar 2000: 116-120). Second, FORD divided along ethnic lines, withLuo elites creating Ford-Kenya and Kikuyu leaders joining FORD-asili (Oyugi 1997). Although the

1992 election was far from fair--KANU engaged in intimation and ballot stuffing in rural areas(Throup and Hornsby 1998: 289, 454-462)it was the FORD split that effectively ensuredPresident Mois re-election (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 118). Moi won just 36 percent of thevote, but with the opposition vote divided, KANU managed to retain the presidency and win aparliamentary majority. Western governments accepted the results and external assistance was

22Africa Today, June 2002, p. 13.

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and Indian minorities, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) emphasized Malay communal issuesand sought the creation of an Islamic state (Crouch 1996: 66-67).

Finally, Malaysia is a case of low Western influence. Due to its relatively developed anddiversified economy, Malaysia enjoyed substantial autonomy from Western governments and

institutions. Malaysias major trading partners were Japan and Korea, not the U.S. or Europe, andit was able to turn to these countries (and increasingly, to China) as alternative sources of assistance(Felkner 2000: 55-59). Finally, relative to Latin America and Central Europe, the influence of theWestern-based media, international NGOs, and Western-educated technocrats was low (Milne andMauzy 1999: 146-47; Salleh 1999: 195).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The Mahathir government confronted its most severe test inthe wake of the countrys 1997 financial crisis (Funston 1999: 176). The challenge came fromFinance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a popular politician who many viewedas responsible for overcoming the 1997 crisis. When Anwar moved to challenge Mahathir

politically, Mahathir sacked him, and when Anwar began to mobilize protests against thegovernment in September 1998, he was arrestedand later convictedon charges of sexualmisconduct. Anwars detention sparked the emergence of the opposition Reformasi movement,which was backed by a range of parties and NGOs (Funston 1999: 173-76). Anwars wife, WanAzizah, created the National Justice Party, which, together with the DAP and PAS, launched thebroad-based Alternative Front to challenge UMNO in the 1999 elections. On the internationalfront, U.S.-Malaysian relations reached an all-time low (Chin 1998: 189), and the IMF and U.S.government officials publicly backed the Reformasi movement (Funston 1999: 183; Singh 2000:534). These developments left the government as vulnerable as it had ever been (Case 2001:51).

Mahathir survived the challenge. On the external front, Western institutions ultimatelyexerted little leverage over the Mahathir government. Malaysia spurned the IMF and, with financialassistance from Japan, its economy recovered in 1999 (Felkner 2000: 55, 57; Case 2001: 43).Domestically, Mahathir was able to deploy an armada of packed regime institutionsthe media,the police, the judiciary, and the national election commissionto prevent Anwar from challenginghis leadership (Slater 2001: 23). State security forces were remarkably effective in suppressingthe popular dissent that arose after Anwars sacking (Slater 2001: 14, 24). At the same time,opposition forces remained weakly organized (Boo Teik 2000: 4; Slater 2001: 23). Consequently,although UMNOs electoral performance in 1999 was its worst in 40 years, the governing BN

retained more than three-quarters of the seats in parliament. The government cracked down onopposition groups after the election (Muzaffar 1999), and soon afterward, ideological conflictbetween the DAP and the PAS led to the break up of the opposition coalition. Hence, substantialincumbent capacity, together with a weak and divided opposition allowed the Mahathir governmentto survive the 1998-99 crisis with relative ease.

Russia

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Though more open than under Putin, Russia under Boris Yeltsin was nevertheless acompetitive authoritarian regime. Elections were marred by at least some fraud (Sobyanin 1994;Mendelson 2001; Fish 2001b), and in 1993, Yeltsin used the military to shut down Parliament. Inthis context, Yeltsin successfully weathered two major threats to his tenure: the 1993 challenge byParliament and the 1996 presidential election.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Under Yeltsin, incumbent capacity was quite low. For much ofthe 1990s, the Russian state was relatively weak. The central government faced numerouschallenges from the countrys 89 regions (cf. Treisman 1999), and control over military wasuncertain. The failure of the August 1991 attempted coup had been largely due to the armys refusalto follow orders from Soviet leaders (Remington 1997: 74), and in the immediate post-Sovietperiod, government officials were unsure of their capacity to command military forces (Foye 1993a:4, 6). Yeltsons electoral capacity was also weak. Like many post-Soviet politicians, Yeltsinrefused to invest political capital in building a pro-government party, but instead used divide and ruletactics to fend off opposition challenges. Several attempts at creating a ruling partyincluding

Democratic Russia (1990), Russias Choice (1993), and Our Home is Russia (1995)failed,in part due to Yeltsins unwillingness to support them (McFaul 1997: 16). As a result, Yeltsin wasunable to build a stable majority in the legislature.

Yet the opposition to Yeltsin was also extremely weak. For one, it was deeply divided. Asin Ukraine, the best-organized opposition forces were extremist, particularly the unreformedCommunist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Viewed by many observers as the onlyfunctioning party in Russia in the 1990s (cf. Sakwa 1997), the CPRF attracted a much more stableand loyal support base than other parties (Colton 1999). Yet the communists radical message ofre-nationalization and revival of the USSR and association with neo-Nazi groups meant that they

had great difficulty attracting majority support, and other leading opposition parties, such as theliberal Iabloka, refused to cooperate with them.

Finally, Western influence in Russia was comparatively low. Unlike Central Europeans, fewRussians traveled to the West or enjoyed access to Western-based media and NGOs. The shareof foreign direct investment in GDP hovered around 1 percent during the 1990s, and foreign aid asa share of gross national income never exceeded 1 percent (World Development Indicators).Finally, Russias nuclear and military capacities substantially reduced Western leverage.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The most serious threat to Yeltsins power came in 1993 when he

was challenged by the head of Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Vice President AleksandrRutskoi. In October of that year, Yeltsin attempted to dissolve the Supreme Soviet. However,Khasbulatov, and Rutskoi, backed by the Constitutional Court, refused to back down and, inalliance with Communist and nationalist forces, began mobilizing armed resistance against thepresident. Yeltsin survived the challenge because he manageddespite his precarious control over

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coercive structures--to convince the military to take the legislature by force.24 He also benefitedfrom the refusal of liberal opposition groups to back the Parliamentary rebellion.

The 1996 presidential election presented Yeltsin with a second crisis. At the outset of theelectoral campaign, Yeltsins public approval rating was in the single digits. Although the election

was marked by at least some fraud, Yeltsins survival was largely a product of oppositionpolarization. Because the leading opposition candidate was Communist leader Gennadii Zyuganov,Yeltsin was able to play into fears of a Stalinist revival among liberals and other anti-communistcritics. The unwillingness of opposition forces to unite behind Zyuganov allowed the unpopularincumbent to win re-election with 54 percent of the vote.

Since taking office in 2000, Vladimir Putin has addressed many of the weaknesses inYeltsins rule. He has weakened the oligarchs and regional elites, secured control over much ofthe media, and cracked down on various forms of dissent. He has also invested in a ruling party,Unit, which has been effective at subordinating the Duma to the presidents dictates. At the same

time, a strengthening economy and increased energy production has further eroded Westerninfluence. The combination of state strength, heightened international autonomy, and Putins partybuilding efforts all suggest that Russia is unlikely to democratize in the near future.

ZimbabweZimbabwe has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the end of white rule in 1980.

Despite regular elections and a degree of judicial independence, post-1980 politics was dominatedby the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and President RobertMugabe. The government strictly controlled the media and at times engaged in large-scale humanviolations.25 Although efforts to create a one-party state failed in 1990, violence and intimidation led

opposition parties to boycott elections in 1995 and 1996.26

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Zimbabwe scores high on the dimension of incumbentcapacity. Elite cohesion was moderate to high. Forged in the struggle against white rule, the newgoverning elite remained fairly united and cohesive during the 1980s, particularly after theZimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) was purged from the security forces (Darbon 1992: 2-3; MacBruce 1992: 212-213). Although fissures emerged in the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 76-77), aseries of purges allowed Mugabe to consolidate a vise-like grip on ZANU by the end of thedecade (Rotberg 2002: 236). The Mugabe governments coercive capacity was very high.Zimbabwe had one of the strongest states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 40-

41; Herbst 1990), with a particularly effective coercive apparatus (Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). TheRhodesian government had created a remarkably efficient and brutal state--including a repressive

24According to Yeltsins own account, he had an extremely difficult time finding the forces willing to undertake thistask: the army, numbering two and a half million people, could not produce even a thousand soldiers, not even oneregiment could be found to come to Moscow to defend the city (Yeltsin 1996: 276).25The most significant of these was the massive repression in Matabeland between 1982 and 1984, duringwhich several thousand people were killed (Weitzer 1984a: 545; Cokorinos 1984: 50; Rotberg 2002: 228).26Hence, politics was marked by elections without competition throughout much of the 1990s (Quantin 1992: 25).

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police force, an elaborate surveillance system run by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO),and an army capable of relocating 500,000 Africans into protected villages--as part of itscounterinsurgency war in the 1960s and 1970s (Herbst 2000: 17; Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). Notonly did this apparatus remain intact after 1980, but security spending increased dramatically andnew repressive bodies, such as the notorious Fifth Brigade, were added (Weitzer 1984a: 534;

MacBruce 1992: 214-215). ZANU also possessed relatively high electoral capacity. Due to theneed to wage a protracted guerrilla war, ZANU developed a stronger presence in the rural areasthan most African parties had at independence (Herbst 1990: 34). The party also sponsored arange of ancillary and paramilitary organizations--such as Womens and Youth Leagues and theZimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Associationthat were used to both mobilizesupporters and intimidate opposition activists (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Darbon 1992: 11; Sithole andMakumbe 1997).

Opposition capacity was relatively high in the late 1990s. Although opposition parties andcivil society had been weak during the 1980s (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 107-108; Sithole 1998:

28; Alexander 2000: 386),27

student, human rights, and church groups grew stronger and moreindependent during the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 82-83; Dorman 2002). In particular, the ZimbabweCongress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), whose membership soared to a reported 700,000 in 1998(Alexander 2000: 386-89), emerged as a force to be reckoned with (Sithole 1999: 85).Together with the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the ZCTU launched the broad-based NationalConstitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998. The next year, NCA and ZCTU leaders founded theMovement for Democratic Change (MDC), which united the opposition into a single, well-organized party (Alexander 2000: 389-391).

Western influence in Zimbabwe was relatively low. Because Rhodesia was largely cut off

from the West after its 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, it became relatively self-sufficient. Western media and NGO penetration are relatively low, as was the number of topZANU and government officials who maintained close ties to Western institutions. Westerninfluence was also limited by a regional hegemon: South Africa. South Africa was Zimbabwesleading trading partner, and Zimbabwe depended heavily on South Africa for fuel, electricity, andtransport (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Hamill 2001: 12).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: After running virtually unopposed in the 1995 (parliamentary)and 1996 (presidential) elections, ZANU faced a severe electoral challenge beginning in the late1990s. A major turning point came in February 2000, when a government-sponsored constitutional

reform package was defeated in a referendum (Sithole 2001). This set the stage for parliamentaryand presidential elections (in 2000 and 2002, respectively) in which ZANU would confront a unifiedopposition.

27The leading opposition party in the 1990 election, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, had no intelligiblestructures, no headquarters anywhere (Sithole 1998: 117).

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Mugabe survived these challenges through massive and sustained repression. The 2000parliamentary election took place in an atmosphere of state-sponsored violence, in which journalistsand MDC activists were repeatedly attacked and government-backed war veterans carried outcampaigns of intimidation in rural areas (Rotberg 2000: 48; Sithole 2001: 166). Despite doctoredvoter rolls and some rigging (Compagnon 2000: 451; Rotberg 2000: 49), the MDC nearly won the

election, capturing 57 of 120 seats. Although the MDC hoped to topple Mugabe via Serbia-stylepost-election protests, the government responded with a show of brutal force that wasunquestionably successful, and further protests were cancelled.28

State-sponsored violence increased in the run-up to the March 2002 presidential election,which pitted Mugabe against popular MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangarai. In rural areas,government-backed war veterans invaded white-owned land and attacked MDC supporters.29Although the Supreme Court ruled that the land invasions were unconstitutional, the governmentignored these rulings, and in early 2001, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay resigned violent threats(Meredith 2002: 205-6). In early 2002, parliament approved legislation that made it illegal for

citizens to criticize the president or for journalists to operate without government accreditation, andthe military command declared that it would not accept an MDC victory.30 Just weeks before theelection, Tsvangirai was arrested on charges of plotting Mugabes assassination. On election day, areduction in the number of voting booths in (MDC-dominated) Harare left 350,000 registeredvoters unable to cast ballots. These measures, combined with severe rural intimidation, paved theway for an easy Mugabe victory.31

Neither opposition protest nor external pressure succeeded in forcing Mugabe from powerin the immediate aftermath of the election. The MDC organized mass protests, including a three-daygeneral strike, but the protests again fizzled in the face of massive repression. 32Although the EU and

U.S. imposed sanctions and Britain orchestrated Zimbabwes suspension from the Commonwealth,it quickly became apparent that Britain...enjoyed little or no leverage over the Harare government(Hamill 2001: 12). Mugabe benefited from the tacit support of the South African government, whichlobbied against international sanctions, refused to use its control over Zimbabwes power and fuelsupplies as leverage against Mugabe, andin stark contrast to Western governments--accepted the2002 election as legitimate.33 This support, together with the governments coercive capacity,enabled Mugabe to survive the crisis.

Turnover without Democratization

In Albania (1997), Armenia (1996-1998), Ukraine (1994), and Zambia (1991), incumbent

crises resulted in turnover but not full democratization. These outcomes were largely a product oflow incumbent capacity (except in Armenia), combined with relatively low levels of Western

28Africa Report, December 2000, p. 22-24; February 2001, p. 29.

29Africa Today, October 2000, p. 13, June 2001, p. 26-27; September 2001, p. 20.

30Africa Today, February, 2002, p. 22-23.

31Africa TodayApril-May 2002, p. 24.

32The Economist, 23 March 2002;Africa Today, April-May 2002, p. 20.

33Africa TodayApril-May 2002, p. 20-22.

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influence (except in Albania). The cases are summarized in Table 3. In Albania, a virtual statecollapse encouraged the intervention of European powers, which oversaw an election that broughtthe opposition to power. In Ukraine in 1994, the governments inability to control its own regionaladministrations contributed directly to the presidents electoral demise. In both Albania andUkraine, uncertain control over the military limited the options of incumbents and essentially forced

them to abide by democratic institutions. In Zambia, a bankrupt state and relatively weak,patronage-based party could not fend off a united and mobilized opposition. In Armenia, whichpossessed a relatively strong state, the government fell amidst severe elite fragmentation. InArmenia, Ukraine, and Zambia, incumbent turnover in a context of low Western influence led not todemocratization but rather to a continuation of competitive authoritarian rule. In Albania, whichexperienced greater Western influence during the 1990s, incumbent turnover resulted in a marginallydemocratic regime that was contingent on sustained external intervention.

--Table 3 about here--

AlbaniaFollowing its defeat of the communist Albanian Party of Labor (APL) in 1992, the

Democratic Party, led by Sali Berisha, governed Albania via a combination of authoritarian anddemocratic means.34 After a severe crisis and external intervention brought a change of governmentin 1997, Albania became more pluralistic but nevertheless remained on the borderline betweencompetitive authoritarianism and democracy.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity in Albania was very low in the1990s, due, in large part, to state weakness. As a result of a lack of any foreign assistance duringthe last 13 years of the communist regime (Johnson 2001: 181), the army suffered from minimal

training, shortages of food, fuel and ammunition, inoperable equipment, and an ineffective commandsystem (Vickers and Pettifer 2000: 46, 211-12). Coercive organs were further undermined underBerisha, who slashed military spending, purged as much as two-thirds of the military officer corps,and dismissed 70 percent of the secret police (Biberaj 2000: 324, 152-3; Vickers and Pettifer2000: 217). The government also lacked effective control over the military (Vickers and Pettifer2000: 62; Biberaj 1998: 93). After Berisha appointed a loyalist with no military experience asdefense minister in 1992, some senior officers openly refused to obey him.

Opposition strength was moderate. Though lacking the mobilizational muscle of theSerbian opposition, the Socialist Party--which was built upon the bases of the old APL--possessed

a national structure and attracted substantial support in rural areas. Moreover, the Socialistsdominant position within the opposition meant that opposition forces were relatively unified (Biberaj1998: 282). Finally, Albania was closely linked to, and highly dependent on, the West. At one

34Although a vibrant independent press developed under Berisha, the president prevented the emergence ofindependent television and radio and made frequent use of libel laws to silence criticism (Biberaj 2000: 161,221). In 1993, Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano was arrested on embezzlement charges in what was viewedby international human rights organizations as a move to silence opposition (Amnesty International NewsService 45/97).

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level, Albanias unique level of isolation from the world under Hoxha means that Albania lacks theweb of contacts with Western countries found in other more open communist regimes in CentralEurope. Nevertheless, the countrys proximity to Western Europe meant that Western governmentsquickly felt the impact of Albanias political crises. Estimates suggest that roughly 600,000 legal andillegal migrants fled from Albania into surrounding countries between 1990 and 1999.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Berishas fall from power in 1997 can be directly traced to thestates failure to control social unrest, which triggered intervention by neighboring countries fearful ofthe effects of a sustained crisis. In 1996, the Democrats won parliamentary elections that werewidely viewed as rigged (ODIHR Albania 1996). Both the OSCE and the United Statesgovernment demanded that new elections be held in disputed areas. Although the governmentinitially weathered the crisis, riots broke out in early 1997 after the failure of numerous pyramidschemes in which hundreds of thousands of Albanians had invested their savings. Uprisings brokeout in the south and armed bandits began roaming the countryside robbing banks, destroying publicbuildings and looting arms depots that had been abandoned by security forces (Schmidt 1998;

Biberaj 2000: 323). A state of emergency failed to quell the unrest, and in the ensuing disorder,Socialist leader Fatos Nano, who had been imprisoned since 1993, was able to walk out of prison.According to Johnson (2001: 179), weak military capacity was a major reason why the governmentsubsequently rejected the use of force.

International actors played a central role in resolving the crisis. In March 1997, the OSCEbrokered a compromise that established a government of national reconciliation and new elections.After the EU and NATO declined to send troops, Italy received a UN mandate to send aMultinational Protection Force of 6,000 to Albania. The force oversaw elections two months later inwhich the Socialists won two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Increased international engagement,

particularly in the wake of the 1999 crisis is Kosovo,35

resulted in greater political freedom after1997.36However, the removal of Berisha did not lead to full-scale democratization. Internationalhuman rights organizations continued to document substantial violations of civil liberties under theSocialists (Human Rights Watch 2001).

UkraineUkraine remained competitive authoritarian throughout the 1990s. President Leonid Kravchuk

repeatedly interfered with media coverage of the government during the early 1990s (Roeder 1994:79) and attempted fraud during the 1994 presidential elections (Democratic Elections in Ukraine1994). In 1994, Kravchuk lost to his former Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, who governed in an

increasingly autocratic manner over the rest of the decade.

35Both the collapse of the pyramid schemes and the Kosovo crisis motivated increased European Unioninvolvement in Albania through aid provision and civil society programs aimed at re-establishing controlover public utilities and policing (Johnson 2001: 175). Foreign aid per capita increased from being the 29thhighest in the world in 1994 ($52 per capita) to being the fourth highest in 1999 ($152).36For example, the press has become increasingly free with the emergence of independent radio andtelevision (U.S. Department of State 2000).

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity was low in the early 1990s. The post-communist governing elite was highly fragmented. No ruling party emerged. Rather, the party ofpower functioned via loose and unstable coalitions (Kuzio 1997: 21-22; Wasylyk 1994). Statecapacity was initially undermined by a deep cleavage between the Ukrainian speaking western partof the country and the predominantly Russian speaking east. During Kravchuks presidency, the

central government confronted secessionist demands and rebellions in several regions of the country.Kravchuk also faced problems creating a loyal national army. In the early 1990s, there wastremendous uncertainty concerning the loyalty of the armed forces and other security organs (Kuzio2000: 182), particularly given that military officers were overwhelmingly Russian (Foye 1993b: 62,63). Coup rumors abounded in 1993 (Kuzio 1993).

Opposition forces were also weak during the 1990s. Civil society was weakly organized,and opposition parties were little more than loose collections of like-minded elites. Although keyopposition forces (including the communists) united behind Kuchma in 1994, as the CommunistParty grew in strength, the opposition divided between anti-communist nationalists supporting

Ukrainian independence and the communists, who sought closer ties to Russia.

Western influence in Ukraine was relatively low. International media and NGO influencewas low, and few elites were trained in the West. Ukraines dependence on the West was alsolow. Western aid represented a small share (about 1 percent) of gross national income and capitalformation during the 1990s (World Development Indicators 2001). In addition, economicdependence on Russia,37as well as close elite ties to Russia, meant that Russia served as animportant alternative hegemon for Ukraine.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State weakness and elite fragmentation contributed directly to

Kravchuks removal in 1994. Kravchuk lost the 1994 presidential race in part because of his weakgrip on his own administration in key locales in the east, where many state officials supported--andmanipulated--the voting process in favor of Kuchma.38Another important factor underminingKravchuks ability to retain power was his weak influence with security forces. Almost certainlyinspired by Yeltsins dissolution of the Russian legislature, Kravchuk contemplated disbandingparliament (FBIS-SOV 1 October 93: 25; Kravchuk 2002: 227) in 1993 in the midst of a deepconflict with parliament. According to his own account, however, Kravchuk was dissuaded fromtaking any action when the Ukrainian intelligence service rejected the idea (Kravchuk 2002: 228).

Ukraine did not democratize after Kravchuks removal. Indeed, Kuchmas ability to

consolidate state control over the regions and the security forces, together with an effective systemof internal surveillance and blackmail (Darden 2001), enhanced elite cohesion and allowed thepresident to govern in an increasingly authoritarian manner. In 1999, tight control over stateagencies enabled Kuchma to manipulate elections through widespread, systematic and

37In 1999, Russia accounted for 48 percent of Ukraines imports, most of which was natural gas and otherenergy resources (CIA fact-book). Ukraines energy debt to Russia is estimated to be between US$ 1.4 and2 billion.38See Kuzio (1996: 132-133); FBIS-SOV 3 August 1994: 38; and Democratic Elections in Ukraine (1994).

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coordinated action by [s]tate officials and public institutions at various levels (ODIHR 1999: 18;Darden 2001).39 Kuchma also benefited from a deeply divided opposition, as nationalist forcesopted to back the government when the Communists emerged as the leading contender for thepresidency in 1999. Finally, Kuchma benefited from the support of Russian president Putin,particularly in the wake of a 2000 scandal in which a leaked audiotape appeared to link the

president to the murder of an independent journalist (Levitsky and Way 2001).

ZambiaZambia experienced two incumbent turnovers between 1991 and 2001 but did not

democratize. In 1991, after two decades of single party rule under the United NationalIndependence Party (UNIP), longtime autocrat Kenneth Kaunda held multiparty elections and wasdefeated by union leader Frederick Chiluba. Yet the regime remained competitive authoritarian, aspolitics continued to be marked by fraud and regular abuses of civil liberties throughout the 1990s(Mphaisha 2000).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity under Kaunda was medium-low.The Zambian state is considered among the weakest in southern Africa (Lodge 1998: 25-26; Shafer1994). Kaunda ruled largely through patronage and never developed the kind of repressiveapparatus seen in neighboring Zimbabwe (Bratton 1994: 123; Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 88). Thesevere economic crisis of the late 1980s eroded the states capacity even further. Kaundas controlover the security apparatuses also appears to have been relatively weak: the government sufferedthree coup attempts between 1980 and 1990. The governments electoral capacity was moderate.Although UNIP possessed a national structure and maintained a large urban presence (Lodge 1998:32), it was a loosely structured, patronage-based organization with a fairly weak presence in ruralareas.40

Opposition strength was relatively high in the late 1980 and early 1990s. The labormovement, based largely in the copper sector, was particularly strong. The Zambia Congress ofTrade Unions (ZCTU), which had 380,000 members in 1980 (Bratton 1994: 113-114), was one ofthe most potent labor organizations in the region. The church also emerged as an important civicactor (Bartlett 2000: 435-6). The opposition was further strengthened by its internal cohesion. In1990, unions, students, and former government leaders founded the Movement for Multi-PartyDemocracy, which, under the guidance of ZCTU leader Frederick Chiluba, emerged as a unitedopposition front.

Finally, Zambias ties to the West were relatively weak. The countrys dependence on theWest was quite high. In the mid-1980s, it was the most indebted country in the world relative to

39Tax officers were used to blackmail local officials into getting out the vote (Darden 2001) and local andregional officials did everything from distributing campaign materials to threatening to cut off gas orelectricity supplies if villagers did not support Kuchma (ODIHR Ukraine 1999: 16-17).40According to Kees van Donge, UNIP was a maximum coalition of regional and other groups whoseinterests often had to be satisfied at the cost of party strength (1995: 209, 196; also Baylies and Szeftel 1992:78).

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GDP and received more per capita external assistance than any other African state (van de Walle1997: 29; Lodge 1998: 32). However, in terms of geographic proximity, elite linkages, and mediaand other influences, Zambia ranked low. The United States had few identifiable interests inZambia, and Zambia was low on the unusually crowded U.S. foreign policy agenda the early1990s (Carothers 1999: 69, 73).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: A combination of incumbent weakness and oppositioncapacity led to the collapse of one-party rule in 1991. During the second half of the 1980s, Zambiasuffered a severe economic shock due to declining copper prices. Due to its heavy reliance onpatronage, the crisis hit the government particularly hard (Bratton 1994: 124). Fiscal crisis andIMF-dictated food price increases led to riots in 1986 and 1990 (Lodge 1998: 32; Bratton 1992:85-86). The 1990 riots were followed by a coup attempt and mass demonstrations throughout thecountry. In this context, Kaunda agreed hold multiparty elections (Bratton 1992, 1994).According to Bartlett, political liberalization was the only alternative open for a regime that lackedthe will for, or the means of, repression (Bartlett 2000: 444). The MMD, which benefited from the

organizational strength of the ZCTU and a wave of defections from UNIP (Baylies and Szeftel1992: 81-83; Bratton 1994), overwhelmingly defeated UNIP in the 1991 election, and Kaundapeacefully handed the presidency over to Chiluba.

Although the Zambian regime remained competitive after 1991, it did not democratize.The Chiluba government repeatedly violated civil and political liberties, assaulted the independentmedia, and maneuvered to bar both Kaunda and his running mate from participating in the 1996presidential election (Bratton and Posner 1999; Mphaisha 2000). Chiluba was re-elected in 1996 inan election that was so riddled with abuse that UNIP opted to boycott it (Bratton and Posner1999). Chiluba retained power largely because the opposition was weak and fragmented, which

allowed the government to essentially dominate by default(Burnell 2001: 256-258). Yet thefragmentation of the MMD coalition prevented Chiluba from consolidating power. In 2001,Chiluba attempted to change the constitution in order to serve a third term. However, he facedsubstantial intra-party opposition and was forced to back down (Bongololo 2001). In December2001, in elections that were widely criticized, Vice President Levy Mwanawasa narrowly defeateda highly fragmented opposition (with just 29 percent of the vote), which allowed the MMD to retainpower for another term.

Armenia

Armenia has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In

1996, Levon Ter-Petrosian, an anti-communist opposition leader who had been elected president in1991, stole an election from his former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian. Less than two yearslater, however, Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign amidst severe elite fragmentation. Ter-Petrosians removal did not result in democratization, but rather in an increasingly authoritarianregime.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: In contrast to the other cases discussed in this section,the Armenian government possessed substantial incumbent capacity. State capacity was relatively

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high. Ter-Petrosian initially faced tremendous state building challenges as armed groups--usingweapons stolen from nearby Soviet army basesthat emerged to fight in the disputed Karabaghregion of Azerbaijan created problems of public order. Yet the government quickly disarmed andsubordinated these groups (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 20-22; Mitiaev 1998: 77-78). Armeniawon the war in Nagorno-Karabagh (capturing 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory) in 1992-1994

and emerged from it with a strong and disciplined military apparatus. In addition, the governingparty, the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which had emerged out of the broad-based late1980s movement to assert Armenian control over Karabagh, was relatively strong. The ANM wona majority of seats in the 1990 legislative elections. At the same time, however, elite cohesion wasrelatively low. The ANM was a heterogeneous coalition that included intelligentsia from thecommunist era, younger activists, and figures from the Communist establishment (Aves 1996: 4).Throughout the early 1990s, ANM leaders broke off to form their own parties (Libaridian 1999:10, 23-24; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 45-46).

Opposition capacity was medium-low. Civil society was fairly weak. Moreover,

opposition forces were fragmented into at least five groupings led by different ex-governmentofficials, as well as the Dashniak, a predominantly diaspora-based party. Unlike Russia andUkraine, however, no strong communist party polarized the opposition. For the most part,differences among the parties revolved around personalities and tactics.

Like many other post-Soviet countries, Armenia was weakly linked to the West during the1990s. The level of Western-based media, NGO, and technocratic linkage was low.41Facing a blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia was reliant on Western aid, whichaccounted for 58 percent of gross capital formation in 1999 (World Development Indicators).However, Russia, which remained very active militarily in the region, was the most important

neighboring power.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State strength and relatively weak Western influencefacilitated authoritarian regime-building in Armenia. Despite his oppositionist credentials, Ter-Petrosian responded in a harsh manner to opposition that emerged in the early 1990s. In December1994, Ter-Petrosian banned the Dashniaks, which was considered the most powerful party outsideof the ANM. During the 1995 parliamentary elections, the ANM tightly controlled local electoralcommissions, which denied registration to many opposition candidates (Dudwick 1997: 94-95;Fuller 1996: 45-46). In this context, the ANM won 62 percent of the seats in parliament.

A more potent opposition threat emerged in 1996, when, just weeks before presidentialelections, four parties united behind the candidacy of ex-Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian.Although official results stated that Ter-Petrosian won the election 52 percent to 41 percent, theresults were widely considered inaccurate and were condemned by the U.S. government and the

41Although Armenia has a very active and organized diaspora community, the ANM had relatively weak andoften hostile relations with diaspora groups, which had actively opposed the movement for independence inthe late 1980s (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 12-13).

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European Parliament. Manukian responded by leading a 150,000-strong demonstration thatattacked Parliament (Danielian 1996-1997: 128). Yet--unlike Zambia, Albania, and Ukraine--themilitary remained unambiguously loyal to Ter-Petrosian during the crisis (Fuller 1996: 43), andsecurity forces quickly put down the protests. Despite this apparent victory, the surprisingly strongopposition challenge convinced many ANM elites that the party was losing ground (Astourian 2001:

48, Danielyan 1998). Within months, a deep split emerged (Mitiaev 1998: 129), and in February1998, long-simmering disagreements over Karabagh policies led to widespread defections from theparty. As legislators abandoned the ANM, the government lost control over Parliament and Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign (Mitiaev 1998: 131).

Ter-Petrosians resignation and replacement by former Prime Minister Robert Kocharianpushed Armenia in an authoritarian, rather than a democratic, direction. In 1998, Kocharian wonelections that were characterized by substantial abuse, and in March 2002, Kocharian closed downTelevision A+, the most independent station in the country.

Incumbent Removal and DemocratizationIn Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Serbia, autocratic incumbents were removed from power

either through elections or in the context of post-election crises. In each of these cases, incumbentturnover was accompanied by a democratic transition. All four cases were characterized byrelatively high levels of incumbent capacity, which in some cases enabled governments to surviverepeated opposition challenges. However, high levels of Western linkage imposed severeconstraints on incumbents, which ultimately facilitated their removal. In all four cases, regime changeresulted in democratization. The cases are summarized in Table 4. In Mexico, a strong state andparty and a divided opposition allowed the PRI to remain in power during the 1990s, but in acontext of close integration with the United States, the government was unwilling to repress a

growing opposition was thus forced to cede power in 2000. In Nicaragua, an effective coercive andelectoral apparatus and a weak opposition allowed the Sandinista government to dominate politicsthroughout the 1980s, but a U.S.-sponsored war and embargo eventually compelled thegovernment to hold free elections and, once defeated, cede power. In Peru, although AlbertoFujimoris popularity and a weak opposition left the govnernment virtually unchallenged in the mid-1990s, governing party weakness and a unified opposition challenge compelled the government toengage in a series of political shenanigans thatin a context of strong international pressure--contributed to the regimes implosion in 2000. Finally, in Serbia, a regime characterized by arelatively strong state and party was badly weakened by a U.S.-led war, after which a well-organized and unified opposition movement forced Milosevic from power.

--Table 4 about here--

Mexico

Prior to the 1980s, Mexico was a full-scale authoritarian regime. The InstitutionalizedRevolutionary Party (PRI) thoroughly dominated politics, and elections were ritualistic pageants inwhich the PRI usually won more than 80 percent of the vote (Lindau 1996: 319). Beginning in the1980s, however, the regime became increasingly competitive. Although elections were marred byfraud, violence, and widespread abuse of state resources (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 87-88), the

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opposition National Action Party (PAN) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) slowlyemerged as serious contenders for power.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Mexico is a case of high incumbent capacity. Throughthe late 1980s, the regime was characterized by a remarkable cohesive ruling elite (Ronfeldt 1989:

435). The PRI served as an effective vehicle for resolving elite conflict, suffering only one majorfracture prior to 1987 (Ronfeldt 1989; Cornelius et al. 1989: 18). Moreover, the PRIs tightcontrol over the military ensured that the possibility of a coup was virtually nil (Wager 1995: 6,72). The PRI governments coercive capacity was also high. The Mexican Revolution produced astrong state bureaucracy (Centeno 1994: 45-73) and a disciplined military that played an activeand effectiverole in suppressing protest (Ronfeldt 1984a: 17; 1984b; Wager 1984). The armyput down peasant uprisings in several states during the 1960s, routed incipient guerrilla groups in thelate 1960s, and crushed large-scale student protests in 1968 (Ronfeldt 1984b: 64-65). The sizeand budgetof the armed doubled during the 1980s (Wager 1984: 160-169, 175; Grayson1990a: 269-270). Finally, the PRIs electoral capacity was high. Created as a mass party with

close links to labor and peasant organizations, the PRI became one of the worlds mostaccomplished vote-getting machines during the 1940s and 1950s (Cornelius 1996: 57-58). Itsstrength lay not only in its ability to deliver votes but also in its remarkable capacity to organizefraud,42which demonstrated clearly the partys capacity for control (Bruhn 1997: 40). Althoughthe PRI machine weakened during the 1980, it remained the only party with a truly nationalnetwork of campaign organizers as late as 1994 (Cornelius 1996: 59).43

Opposition capacity--scored as medium--was mixed. Whereas most civic and socialorganizations had been co-opted or repressed by the state before the 1980s, Mexico witnessed aremarkable flowering of civil society during the 1980s and 1990s (Schulz and Williams 1995: 3),

as church and student groups, social movements, NGOs, and independent unions, businessassociations, and media outlets proliferated (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 69-71; Lawson 2002). Duringthe 1990s, the opposition PAN and PRD developed relatively strong national organizations.However, opposition capacity was reduced by deep ideological differences between theconservative PAN and the leftist PRD, which made it difficult to construct a broad anti-PRIcoalition.

Finally, U.S. influence in Mexico was exceptionally high. Although the U.S. and Mexicomaintained an arms length relationship during the Cold War (Domnguez and Fernndez deCastro 2001: 3-10), the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in Mexicos linkages to (and

dependence on) the U.S. and international financial institutions (Kaufman Purcell 1997; Domnguezand Fernndez de Castro 2001).44 Rapid economic integration during the 1980s, which culminatedin the 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), quadrupled U.S.

42Local PRI branches organized ballot stuffing, as well as flying brigades, or groups of voters that weretrucked from polling station to polling station to cast multiple ballots (Cornelius 1996: 60).43According to Cornelius, the PRI mobilized 1.2 million activists on election day in 1994 (1996: 59-60).44For example, the U.S. and IMF orchestrated four major financial bailouts of Mexicototaling nearly $70million--between 1982 and 1995 (Aguayo 2000: 35).

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investment in Mexico and transformed Mexico into the U.S.s second largest trading partner (Levyand Bruhn 1999: 566). Political interactions between the U.S. and Mexico multiplied at all levels(Domnguez and Fernndez de Castro 2001: 75),45which expanded U.S. public interest in Mexicoand Mexican affairs (Domnguez and Fernndez de Castro 2001: 92). Consequently, Mexicangovernments were forced to accept the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress, public interest groups, and a

myriad of committees and commissions (Centeno 1994: 240). Increased linkage was also seen inthe rise of U.S.-educated technocrats to the top of the Mexican power structure (Camp 1985;Centeno 1994). U.S.-educated technocrats predominated in the governments of Miguel De laMadrid (1982-88), Carlos Salinas (1988-94), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) (Camp 1985;Centeno 1994).46 The emerging technocratic elite was fluent in English, was familiar with globalintellectual and ideological trends, and maintained close ties to the U.S. intellectual, political, andeconomic elite (Centeno 1994: 125-126). Finally, Mexico was penetrated by U.S.-based mediaand international civil society (Lawson 2002: 98; Dresser 1996b). International NGOs establishedclose ties to local human rights and pro-democracy groups, providing them with resources,protection, and access to the U.S. media and Congress (Dresser 1996b).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The PRI regime entered into crisis in 1988, when left-of-center PRI defector Cuauhtemoc Crdenas challenged Carlos Salinas for the presidency a