37? //a/ y - digital library/67531/metadc... · 37? //a/ y dangerous changes? the effect of...
TRANSCRIPT
37? //a/
y
DANGEROUS CHANGES?
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL REGIME CHANGES ON
LIFE INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS, 1977 - 1993.
THESIS
Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
By
Sabine C. Zanger
Denton, Texas
August, 1998
Zanger, Sabine C., Dangerous Changes? The Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life
Integrity Violations. 1977-1993. Master of Arts (Political Science), August 1998, 95 pp.,
7 tables, 6 figures, 72 references.
This study develops a model of different types of political regime changes and
their effect on life integrity violations. The data covers 147 countries from 1977-1993.
Basic bivariate analyses and multivariate pooled cross-sectional time series analyses
employing Ordinary Least Squares regression with panel-corrected standard errors are
used. The results show that political regime change in general has no effect on state-
sponsored violence. Looking at different types of regime changes, the regression analysis
indicates that change from democracy to anocracy is positively correlated with levels of
repression at the level of p < .001. A change toward democracy from autocracy is
negatively related to human rights violations at the level of p < .01, once relevant control
variables are considered.
37? //a/
y
DANGEROUS CHANGES?
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL REGIME CHANGES ON
LIFE INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS, 1977 - 1993.
THESIS
Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
By
Sabine C. Zanger
Denton, Texas
August, 1998
Whereas Recognition of the Inherent Dignity
and of the Equal and Inalienable Rights
of all Members of the Human Family
is the Foundation of Freedom,
Justice and Peace in the World,...
Article 1.
All Human Beings are born Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights.
They are endowed with Reason and Conscience
and should act towards one another
in a Spirit of Brotherhood.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on December 10, 1948.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES vi
LIST OF FIGURES vii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 8
Conceptualizing Human Rights 8 The Nature of Human Rights 9 Western Liberalism as the Source of Human Rights 10 Universalism versus Cultural Relativism 13
The Repressive State 17 Do Human Rights Need Democracy? 18 The Role of Political and Socioeconomic Factors 22
Regime Change 34 Summary 36
in. THEORY AND OPERATIONALIZATION 38
Building a Model of Political Regime Change and Human Rights Violations 39 Change to Anocracy 42 Change away from Autocracy 43 Change from Democracy to Anocracy 44 Change to Democracy 45
The Dependent Variable: Life Integrity Violations 46 Measuring Regime Change 48 Operationalization of the Control Variables 53
Lagged Repression 53 Regime Type 54 Population Size 55 Economic Development 55 Civil and International Wars 56
IV
IV. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 58
Basic Descriptive Analysis 58 Multivariate Analysis 66
V. CONCLUSION 79
APPENDIX 85
REREFENCES 90
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1:
TABLE 2:
TABLE 3:
TABLE 4:
TABLE 5:
TABLE 6:
TABLE 7:
Construction of Democracy & Autocracy Indicators in
Polity III 86
Distribution of Regime Changes on a Continuous Scale 87
Summary of the Hypotheses and their Operationalization 88 Mean Scores for Human Rights Violations, taken from Amnesty International (AI) and State Department (SD) Reports before, during, and after Political Regime Changes 89
OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Dummy Regime Change Variable 69
OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Continuous Regime Change Variable 72
OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Different Regime Change Dummy Variables 74
VI
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1:
FIGURE 2:
FIGURE 3:
FIGURE 4:
FIGURE 5:
FIGURE 6:
The Distribution of the Different Types of Political Regime Changes 52
PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change (N = 92) 59
PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change to Democracy from Anocracy (N = 15) 60
PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change to Democracy from Autocracy (N = 69) 62
PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change to Anocracy from Democracy (N = 13) 63
PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change to Autocracy (N = 20) 65
Vll
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the subject of human rights has attracted increasing
attention among politicians and academics. Human rights influence foreign policies and
economic ties between countries, as the discussion about economic sanctions as a reaction
to repression in the People's Republic of China shows. Also the academic literature has
substantially increased over the last ten years. The "development and proliferation of
international human rights law and reporting, and a growing popular interest and concern for
human rights" (Poe 1997b, 1) can be observed.
This research attempts to identify and to explain how regime transitions affect human
rights violations. Human rights are understood in a more narrow sense of personal integrity
rights, identified as torture, political imprisonment, execution, and disappearance. The terms
'state repression', 'state terror', and 'human rights violations' are used interchangeably in this
study.
In general, research on state repression/human rights violations can be divided into
two basic groups, according to whether repression is treated as the cause or the result of
other phenomena. Extensive research has analyzed state-sponsored violence as a predictor
for foreign aid and vice versa. Other research has focused on the effect of foreign aid on the
level of government repression (Blanton 1994; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McCormick
and Mitchell 1988; Poe 1992; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe and Siriangsi 1994; Regan 1995;
Schoultz 1981; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984).
Another major branch of research aims to explain why human rights violations occur.
Scholars within this subfield concentrate on domestic and international factors that affect state
repression. Variables that have attracted the most attention are regime type, democracies and
military regimes in particular, level of economic development and economic growth rates, size
and growth of population, and civil and international wars (Davenport 1995, 1997; Fein 1995;
Garreton 1996; Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991, 1993; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick
1988; Park 1987; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1997; Poe et al. 1997b; Rummel
1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987).
Instead of dividing the human rights literature on the basis of whether state repression
is used as dependent or independent variable, the studies can be characterized according to
their definition of human rights and human rights violations. Based on Davenport (1997), Poe
(1997b) identifies "three separate traditions: human rights (...), state terror (...), and negative
sanction" (1997b, unpublished). King (1997) splits these three groups into two. The work on
human rights and state terror analyzes violations of "personal integrity rights" - torture,
imprisonment, politically motivated murder, and disappearances (e.g., Henderson 1991, 1993;
Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). The group that focuses on political, or
negative, sanctions is concerned with the violation of civil and political rights in a broader
sense (e.g., Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; King 1997).
As mentioned above, various studies analyze the effect of regime type on the level of
human rights violations (Fein 1995; Garreton 1996; Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991, 1993; King
1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1997; Poe
et al. 1997b). Studying threat perception and state repression, for example, Davenport (1995)
concludes that different regimes reacted differently to perceived threats. For example
democracies show a higher level of tolerance for dissident behavior than nondemocracies.
There seems to be a common understanding that the nature of a particular regime type has
some influence on the government's respect for basic human rights. The correlation between
a particular regime type and its level of human rights abuse is of interest not only to
academics, but also to policy makers. For example, Alexander Haig, Secretary of State under
President Reagan, saw violations of human rights as typical for communist countries
(Forsythe 1983). Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979), Ambassador to the UN under the Reagan
administration, argued that authoritarian regimes were more respectful towards human rights
than totalitarian, meaning leftist, regimes.
Little research has been done on the effect of regime change on repression. Many
studies are rather static and do not account for change. Most studies that do consider regime
change and its effect on state repression concentrate merely on democratization processes.
This paper tries to fill this gap in the human rights literature. In this research, I focus on
different types of regime change, such as on transition from an autocratic to a democratic
regime, and vice versa, and change toward mixed regime types, and their impact on state
repression.
The question, however, still remains, as to why this type of research is important.
What would we gain from a deeper insight into how governments treat their citizens during
a change in the political regime? Why is it necessary to do research on this subject? First of
all, the aim of most research on human rights is, presumably, to abate human suffering
someday. Every year the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International issue country
reports on human rights violations around the globe. These documents picture the situations
of millions of people that suffer under their own governments, which are meant to protect
them. It is not only in international wars where large numbers of people die, disappear and
are tortured. Violence is also used as a political tool by states against their own people and
against opponents within the system. The "Dirty War" in Argentina and the genocide under
Pol Pot in Cambodia, both in the late 1970s, or the massacres in Rwanda between 1990 and
1992 are only a few extreme examples of extensive state terror. Apart from these cases, which
captured the attention of an international audience, the reports from Amnesty International
and the U.S. State Department point out cases of life integrity violations that escape the
public eye, but that are nevertheless still present and terrorize the lives of people around the
world. If the international community is seriously interested in enforcing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it is necessary to know the causes that lead to state repression,
before any effective action can be taken. Greater awareness of the reasons behind the problem
increases the chances of quicker and better aimed reaction when the problem occurs. It might
even enable international organizations or nation states to employ prophylactic strategies and,
therefore, prevent serious human rights violations before they take place.
In the case of political regime changes, it is important for several reasons to know
more about their effect on state-sponsored violence. At least for a decade now it has been "en
vogue" to urge countries to democratize. This foreign policy motto has usually been
combined with making the countries open up their economy to free market competition. In
the light of the protection of life integrity rights of the people, the question arises how these
movements affect the citizens. What happens to the freedom of the citizens during the
democratization process? Are the benefits of a democracy expected to be effective during the
process of change? Does the transition to an authoritarian regime have a greater effect on
repression than does the transition to democracy? Are the human rights records in a new
democratic regime really better than under a previous authoritarian rule? Are changes in
human rights violations more significant when a country moves directly from an autocratic
regime to a democratic one or when the democratization process occurs in a more gradual
way?
Several countries have also been sliding down on the democracy scale over the last
two decades. For example, Zimbabwe is one of the countries that show increasingly less
tolerance for political opponents, as well as Burundi, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Haiti. The
question that the international community should be concerned about is not merely whether
more autocratic regimes will be more likely to repress their people, but also what will happen
during this transition period. If, for example, a change toward an autocratic regime increases
state repression, the United Nations, or other inter- or transnational organizations, could send
peace-keeping troops as soon as the regime change becomes apparent. Thus, the amount and
extent of repression used by the government during the transition period could be limited,
which is likely to be easier than controlling a situation that is already out of hand. To protect
human rights it appears to be crucial to react as soon as possible when human rights violations
become apparent, before oppression is too widespread to be controlled by international
forces. More knowledge on the relationship between human rights violations and regime
international forces. More knowledge on the relationship between human rights violations
and regime change might, therefore, enable the international community to limit the damage
of state-sponsored repression during the transition period.
For the purpose of this empirical study of state repression, I assume the existence of
basic universal rights. This study utilizes a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis to
answer these questions, covering 147 countries over the time period from 1977 to 1993
(N=2087). This research design allows researchers to analyze data across time and space
simultaneously. To measure human rights violation, I utilize the Political Terror Scale (PTS),
which was originally created by Michael Stohl, Mark Gibney, and colleagues (e.g., Gibney
and Dalton 1997; Poe and Tate 1994; Stohl and Carleton 1985). To capture changes in the
political regime type, I employ the Polity III data set, developed by Jaggers and Gurr (1995).
Various studies suggest that there is a statistically significant correlation between
variables, such as lagged repression, regime type, population size, involvement in civil or
international wars, and economic development on the one side and human rights violations
on the other side (e.g. Davenport 1995,1996; Henderson 1991,1993; King 1997; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). To account for the effects of these factors, I
include them in my analysis as control variables. The more democratic a country is the less
repression is expected to occur. Lagged repression, population size, and civil and
international wars are expected to be positively related to state violence, and economic
development is expected to decrease the use of state repression.
This thesis is structured as follows. In the second chapter, I discuss some of the main
arguments about human rights in general and analyze the relevant literature in the field of
personal integrity rights violations and negative state sanctions. I evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of the main studies in the field of human rights and point out gaps in the existing
literature. In Chapter ID, I develop a theory of political regime change and life integrity
violations. This section presents the core procedures and assumptions of the study and shows
why and how regime changes might affect the use of state terror during the transition period.
I argue that the transition from one regime type to another creates high instability and
uncertainty among the elites and the masses of a country. While the political system is not
protected by the rules and institutions of an established regime, influential groups in societies
will try to gain as much power within the new system as possible. I expect that the fight for
power among the elites and the struggle of the masses for increasing their share of influence
in the future system will lead to higher human rights violations during this transition period.
However, I expect the level of state terror to vary according to the type of regime change. A
change to autocracy, for example, I expect to be associated with more serious violations of
personal integrity rights, whereas a change to democracy is expected to decrease government
repression. Based on this theory, I develop hypotheses and empirically test them in a pooled
cross-sectional time series analysis.
The fourth chapter describes the operationalization of the variables and the statistical
procedures utilized in this study. This chapter also shows and discusses the results from the
analysis. And finally in Chapter V, I conclude with some comments on the implications that
can be drawn from this study for future research and policy makers.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter discusses important work that has been done in the field of human rights,
state terror, and negative state sanction. The literature review is divided into four sections.
In the first section, I present the theoretical discussion about the concept of human rights in
general. The second section of this chapter focuses on research that tries to identify
characteristics of repressive states, and the third section discusses the basic arguments about
the concept of regime change. Finally, I conclude with a summary of existing literature in the
field of state repression and regime change and the significance of this study within this area.
Conceptualizing Human Rights
The concept of human rights has many facets. Scholars try to specify the nature and
essence of human rights and their origins and generalizability across cultures. The first part
of this chapter, which I have entitled "Conceptualizing Human Rights", is divided into three
sections. First, I discuss the nature of human rights, as well as various types and dimensions
of this concept. Secondly, I present various arguments about the source of human rights, and
their connection to Western liberalism. And lastly, I present the main arguments on both sides
of the debate about cultural relativism and universalism.
The Nature of Human Rights
The nature of human rights has been the subject of controversial debates among
political theorists and philosophers. As one of the predominant contemporary human rights
theorists, Jack Donnelly (1989) approaches the concept of human rights by defining the
meaning of the element "right". According to Donnelly's understanding, a right contains three
parts, a right-holder ("A"), the object of the right ("x"), and a duty bearer ("B"). When "A
has a right to x with respect to B" (Donnelly 1989, 10), then, for example, a citizen ("A") has
the right to be free from torture ("x"), and the government ("B") has the duty to ensure that
the citizen can enjoy this right. A certain right might demand positive action from the side of
the duty-bearer to enable the right-holder to enjoy his or her right. In our example, this could
mean that the government has to protect its citizens from being tortured by guerilla groups.
Often the importance of a right becomes apparent only when the enjoyment of it is
denied. Donnelly calls this phenomenon the "possession paradox" (1989, 11). It is this
"possession paradox" that comes into play with human rights violations. Often, it is not until
a government uses oppression against its people that the victims themselves and especially the
international community become aware of how crucial it is to protect the basic personal
integrity rights of each human being.
It is inherent to rights in general that they place a duty on someone. Rights have to be
enforced and protected. In the case of personal integrity rights, due to the sovereignty of a
state over the use of force within its territory, the duty to protect human rights lies, in the first
place, in the hands of the government. Because protecting the lives of their citizens is so
crucial, this obligation turns into a source of legitimacy for the government. If a government
10
cannot ensure the enjoyment of the basic human rights of its citizens, it loses its legitimacy
(see Donnelly 1989).
The question still remains, why personal integrity rights should be protected in the
first place. Raz, quoted by Freeman, offers a more specific definition of rights than Donnelly:
"A has a right to x only if the interest A has in having x is a sufficient reason for imposing a
duty on B" (Raz, quoted in Freeman 1995, 30). A similar statement is made by Henry Shue
(1996). He argues that "to have a right is to be in a position to make demands of others, and
to be in such a position is, among other things, for one's situation to fall under general
principles that are good reasons why one's demands ought to be granted" (Shue 1996, 13).
The concept of "sufficient reason" or "general principles" poses the question of what upon
grounds individuals can claim the possession of certain rights. Human rights theorists have
tried to answer these questions in specifying what is meant by "sufficient reason" and "general
principles."
Various scholars trace the beginning of human rights theory back to the work of
Hobbes and Locke (e.g., Almeida 1998; Donnelly 1989; Freeman 1994). Extensive research
has been done on Hobbes' and Locke's concept of human rights in relation to the state. Since
they are seminal theorists in the area of human rights, I briefly present the main argument of
this discussion on Hobbes' and Locke's view of citizens' rights in the following section.
Western Liberalism as the Source of Human Rights?
The question of where human rights come from and what exactly they are has
occupied theorists and philosophers for centuries. Not surprisingly, a consensus on a
11
definition of human rights has not yet been found. It is not the purpose of this study to
contribute to the discourse on the foundation and source on human rights. Instead, I focus
on presenting some core arguments from the early theories by Hobbes and Locke.
Hobbes creates theories of the state around individuals' natural rights. Laws are
derived from the need to protect the individual. In Hobbes' theory of the state, the foundation
for the political system is the natural right of self-preservation and not moral principles
(Almeida 1998). The Leviathan only comes into existence for the purpose to protect the lives
of the citizens. Hobbes justifies the "absolutist authority in the name of the individual right of
self-preservation" (Almeida 1998, 7). This idea is often borrowed by dictators and used in
their rhetoric to back up totalitarian rule. Locke, on the other side, does not create an
absolutist authority, but combines individual rights with constitutional constraints. Although
individual rights are transferred to a public authority, this transfer is limited (Donnelly 1989).
Locke includes the citizens' right of resistance when their government jeopardizes their
individual and natural rights (Freeman 1998).
According to Freeman "Modem human rights theory began with John Locke's claim
that we have certain natural rights because we have been made by God to last during his, not
our pleasure" (Freeman 1994, 497). Locke's idea of natural rights is also pointed out by
Tully. In contrast to Hobbes, "Locke's answer is that political power is a natural property of
individuals... It follows from this premise of political individualism that people are self-
governing, because they are able to exercise political power themselves; naturally free,
because they are not naturally subject to the will of others; and, third, naturally equal, because
they equally possess and have the duty and rights to exercise political power" (Tully 1993,
12
because they are not naturally subject to the will of others; and, third, naturally equal,
because they equally possess and have the duty and rights to exercise political power" (Tully
1993, 15). Locke derives the existence of a universal individual right from people being
naturally free, equal, and self-governing.
Donnelly (1989) makes the argument that human rights are based on human needs,
which evolve from human nature. Donnelly and Rhoda Howard vaguely define human
dignity as the "nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) relation
with society" (Howard and Donnelly 1986, 802).
Human dignity and human values are usually seen as the foundation for human
rights. But there is no consensus over what exactly human dignity and human values are and
where they come from. Freeman points out, that some scholars claim that there are "no
theoretical foundations for human rights" (Freeman 1994, 497). In their opinion, "our
prejudices are all that we have and there is no point in regretting that we lack what we cannot
have" (ibid.).
Instead of theorizing over the roots and fundamental reasons for human rights, human
rights activists usually focus on the human rights violations of repressive governments and
try to improve the situation of the people who suffer under these government. In addressing
human rights violations in various countries with different cultures, activists are confronted
with two principles that conflict with their cross-borders activism: state sovereignty and
cultural diversity. The question arises whether there are boundaries to the applicability of
human rights. Are some human rights guaranteed and accepted in certain cultures, but not
in others? Or is the concept of human rights a universal one, which should be respected in
13
the same way by all governments around the world? The controversy between universalists
and cultural relativists evolves around this problem of the generalizability of human rights.
Universalism versus Cultural Relativism
According to Freeman, "Cultural relativism underlies the assertion that external
agents should not interfere with the internal affairs of nation-states on grounds of
sovereignty" (Freeman 1994,494). This implies that a concept of human rights from one
culture cannot be transferred into another culture. According to cultural relativists, it cannot
be expected that there is the same respect for human rights across cultures.
Donnelly argues that "human rights represent a distinctive set of social practices, tied
to particular notions of human dignity that initially arose in the modern West in response to
the social and political changes produced by modern states and modern capitalist market
economies" (1989, 50). Looking at non-Western conceptions of human rights, such as in
Islam, traditional Africa or China, it seems that the individualism of human rights is specific
to the Western approach. The Western concept of human rights is based on the idea that each
individual possesses basic rights merely by being a human being.
In communitarian societies, community rights take precedence over individual human
rights. Howard and Donnelly define communitarian societies as "those that give ideological
and practical priority to the community (sometimes embodied in the state) over the
individual" (1986, 808). The basic difference between communitarian and liberal societies
is not the general absence of rights in the former, but that in community based societies the
rights of individuals are derived from their role in society. In these societies, rights are based
14
on criteria such as age, gender, lineage, and achievement (see Donnelly 1989). In short, "The
view of human dignity found in all communitarian societies is that the individual realizes
himself as part of the group by unquestioningly filling his social role or being loyal to the
state" (Howard and Donnelly 1986, 813).
Donnelly (1989) takes the position that only individuals are subjects of human rights.
Therefore, other actors such as organizations or ethnic groups, for example, do not have
human rights. Other scholars, on the other hand, assign human rights to groups as well.
Freeman (1995) differentiates between individual and collective human rights. According
to his argument, collective human rights are "not reducible to individual human rights. The
right to collective self-determination is not reducible to any set of individual human rights,
though it may be dependent on and necessary for such rights" (Freeman 1995, 39). He goes
even further and states that "Liberal individualism has traditionally failed to recognize its
own dependence on the assumption that nation-states have collective rights" (Freeman 1995,
39/40). Based on his perception of the liberal concept of human rights, individual rights are
also community rights, in the sense that they are based on the nation-state. Freeman argues
that in Locke's classic liberal theory "every individual equally had a set of natural rights, and
that government was legitimate only if it was based on the consent of the governed and
protected the fundamental rights of all" (Freeman 1995,25).
This crucial difference in the conceptualization of human rights leads to the question
of whether the Western idea of individual human rights is only applicable to Western
societies, or whether this concept can be expanded to all countries around the world.
15
One point of view suggests that the concept of human rights is a particularly Western
idea and has no relevance for other cultures. Cultural relativists perceive culture as the "sole
source of the validity of moral right or rule" (Donnelly 1989,109). Therefore, based on this
understanding, human rights are culture specific, and "outsiders are not competent to solve
problems that are internal to another culture" (Freeman 1994,494-495). An opposing view
is held by universalists, who see culture as being irrelevant to the legitimacy of moral rights
and rules.
A necessary tension arises between these two positions, because radical universalists
deny any national or subnational ethnic autonomy in defining and protecting human rights,
whereas for cultural relativists, it is culture which sets the standards for human rights.
Arguably there exists a cross-cultural consensus about some basic human rights (see
Donnelly 1989). Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." According to Donnelly
(1989), this is widely accepted as the lowest common denominator for protecting peoples'
basic rights. Freeman (1994), however, argues that a consensus does not produce a moral
obligation for dissident minorities to adopt the same view on human rights as the majority.
He points out that there might be a universal acceptance of human rights in word, as ideal
standards. But in practice human rights are not equally accepted or implemented (Freeman
1994). Hence, the "weakness of the practical consensus" (Freeman 1994,493) weakens in
turn the theoretical consensus.
16
It seems that the disagreements between cultural relativists and universalists will not
be solved in the near future. For the purpose of this empirical global study, I build upon
Donnelly's argument that certain human rights, such as the right to life integrity, should be
universal. Independent of specific cultural backgrounds and traditions, people should be free
from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and killing. Shue (1996) classifies these rights as basic
rights. Basic rights are defined as "everyone's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest
of humanity" (Shue 1996, 13). Basic rights are different from other rights because the
"enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights" (ibid,). He argues that
threats to physical security are the "most serious [...] hindrances to the enjoyment of any
right" (Shue 1994, 21). Everyone should be free from torture, killing and arbitrary
imprisonment, because "Being physically secure is a necessary condition for the exercise of
any other right" (ibid.).
Donnelly (1989) identifies four categories of human rights. The first category
includes personal rights, which are "minimal guarantees for individual bodily and moral
integrity" (Donnelly 1989, 34). This category corresponds with Shue's basic rights.
Donnelly's second category presents legal rights, meaning "procedural protection for
individuals in their dealing with the legal and political system" (ibid.). Civil liberties, the
third category, guarantee independence from the state, and the last category, political rights,
"empower citizens to participate in and ultimately control the state" (Donnelly 1989,35).
As mentioned earlier, it is not the task of this study to contribute to the philosophical
questions of whether universal human rights exist or where they might come from. The
presentation of the theories on human rights from Hobbes and Locke give a brief insight in
17
common arguments made about the origins of the rights of citizens. For the purpose of this
global empirical analysis, I assume the existence of some global basic rights, consistent with
the thinking of Hobbes and Locke, as well as Donnelly (1989), Howard and Donnelly (1986),
and Shue (1994). In analyzing data from 136 countries and drawing the same conclusions
from the empirical results for all countries, the concept of human rights is applied to all
countries in the same way.
The Repressive State
All human rights require both positive actions of the government and some form of
restraints on the state (Donnelly 1989). Therefore, "human rights have a special reference to
the state, in order to keep it an instrument to realize, rather than undermine, equal concern
and respect" (Howard and Donnelly 1986, 803). Because the concept of human rights is so
closely connected to national governments, it becomes obvious that the regime type of a
country plays a crucial role for the enjoyment or violation of personal integrity.
Howard and Donnelly state that "Individuals - regardless of who they are or where
they stand - have the inherent dignity and moral worth that the state must not merely
passively respect, but for which it must demonstrate an active concern. Furthermore,
everyone is entitled to this equal concern and respect" (1986, 803).
This study focuses on instances in which governments did not respect the "inherent
dignity and worth" of each individual, but rather employed repression against its people. Gurr
characterizes state terrorism generally as "coercive, life-threatening action" (1986,46). This
rather broad conceptualization of state terrorism focuses on the violation of basic life
integrity rights. Goldstein defines political repression as "government action which grossly
18
discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge
to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived
political beliefs." (Goldstein 1978, xvi). This more detailed definition widens the spectrum
of human rights and also includes the violation of civil liberty rights and political rights, such
as free speech and political participation.
These two definitions of state violence reflect the two main groups in human rights
studies. As outlined in Chapter I, one groups looks at state terror as violations of "personal
integrity rights" - torture, imprisonment, politically motivated murder, and disappearances
(e.g., Henderson 1991, 1993; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). This
approach is based on Gurr's (1986) definition of state terror cited above. To capture state-
sponsored terror, the effects of government actions on the people, such as killings and
disappearances, are measured.
The other group focuses on political, or negative, sanctions and views human rights
violations in the wider sense of civil and political rights violations (e.g., Davenport 1995,
1996, 1997; King 1997). These studies build upon the definition by Goldstein (1978) and
measure human rights violations from the government's point of view. This group measures
a government's actions in the form of negative state sanctions, instead of measuring the
violations from the side of the affected people.
In the following section, I discuss the achievements and shortcomings of important
studies of both areas that try to identify indicators that are most likely to lead to some form
of human rights violations.
19
Do Human Rights Need Democracy?
Some scholars argue that human rights are most likely to be respected and protected
under a "liberal" regime (see Donnelly 1989; Howard and Donnelly 1986). The question
whether democracies do indeed have better human rights records than more authoritarian
regimes or not has attracted much attention (Davenport 1997; Diamond et al. 1988; Fein
1995; Garreton 1996; Gurr 1986; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate
1994; Rummel 1985; Schmitter and Karl 1996).
Diamond et al. (1988) utilize Dahl's (1971) concept of "polyarchy" to specify the
determinants of a democratic state. Based on this definition, a democracy is characterized by
competition for offices, participation of the people in the decision-making process, and the
respect for civil and political liberties. This conceptualization of democracy already includes
the protection of several human rights. In an article analyzing the relevant literature, Rummel
(1985) comes to the conclusion that freedom inhibits domestic violence. He names this
phenomenon the "Freedom/Domestic Violence Proposition".
Similarly, Gurr argues that "democratic principles and institutions inhibit elites from
using state violence" (1986, 57). He clearly identifies reasons for why state repression is
unlikely to occur in democracies: "Democratic political norms emphasize compromise in
conflict and participation and responsiveness in relation between rulers and ruled, traits that
are inconsistent with reliance on violence as an instrument of rule or oppression" (Gurr 1986,
58). Again, the respect for individual human rights seems to be an inherent feature of
democratic regimes.
20
Leaders in democratic states are faced with regular elections, in which the electorate
voices its opinion on past and on potential policies of the candidates. "Modern political
democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions
in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of
their elected representative" (Schmitter and Karl 1996, 50). Democracies are built on the
principle of compromise and cooperation. The accepted norms of democracies as well as
their institutional structures seem to prevent governments from utilizing terror as a policy
option.
The question remains, how much democracy does a country need until government
repression becomes highly unlikely. It has been argued that stable autocratic systems often
show less abuse of life-integrity rights than unstable democracies (Fein 1995). In the
following section, I discuss a study that statistically analyzes the "relation between life
integrity violations and freedom in 145 states during 1987" (Fein 1995,170). This research
is based on the "More Murder in the Middle" hypothesis, which argues that authoritarian and
stable democracies are less oppressive than partial and unstable democracies. Fein theorizes
that by opening up the possibility of greater class and group conflict, the expansion of
democracy actually increases the motives for repression among elites and parties fearing a
populist victory" (1995,173).
To measure the level of life integrity violation Fein utilizes Amnesty International
Reports. To capture political rights and civil liberties she uses Freedom House rankings. Her
analysis examines 145 states during 1987. Her results indicate that there is little difference
in life-integrity violations between partly free and unfree states, "but partly free states are
21
Looking at the impact of civil liberties and political rights separately, Fein ranks the
countries on two different scales, one representing their respect for civil liberties and the other
one their respect for political rights. Comparing the countries that are ranked second on the
two scales in respect to their protection of life integrity, the author finds that "second best
states on civil liberties have much better records in terms of protecting life-integrity than do
the second best states on political rights" (Fein 1995, 176). This appears to support the
intuitive assumption that political rights are, in general, more likely to be violated by
governments employing repression in the form of killing, torture, political imprisonment, and
disappearances. Taking a closer look at the utilized data, however, the statistical result
appears to be self-evident. In the Freedom House measure Gastil defines political rights as
"rights to participate meaningfully in the political process [and] ... civil liberties as rights to
free expression, to organize and demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such
as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel and other personal rights" (Gastil
1988, quoted in Fein 1995, 175). This way of measuring democracy might not be able to
clearly separate the respect for human rights from a certain form of political regime type,
namely democracy. In this measure, states can only be coded high on "rights to free
expression, to organize and demonstrate" if they usually abstain from using repression
towards their opponents. Therefore, countries with high civil liberties are automatically on
the "better half' of the human rights scale.
Fein (1995) also tests for the effect of ethnic discrimination, war, development, and
inequality on life-integrity violations. However she does not clearly define these terms. It is
not clearly explained in her theory why she would expect a certain outcome either. Overall,
22
this study addresses an interesting topic, namely the relationship between different degrees
of democracy and government oppression. But again, this article captures only one moment
in time and also contains many flaws in its theory and operationalization, so that its findings
could be questioned for their validity and reliability.
The Role of Political and Socioeconomic Factors
Mitchell and McCormick (1988) try to identify economic and political indicators of
human rights violations. In the first part of their article, they discuss three key theories about
state repression, and in the second part they develop and empirically test a model of human
rights violations.
Mitchell and McCormick present three hypotheses, one borrowed from Robert
McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy and President of the World
Bank from 1986 until 1981. McNamara sees a linear relationship between wealth and the
human rights records of a particular country. He argues that economic modernization leads
to political stability, which in turn leads then to less human rights violations (see Mitchell and
McCormick 1988).
The second hypothesis is taken from the political scientist Samuel Huntington. It
hypothesizes the opposite of McNamara's theory on economic wealth and repression.
According to Huntington's argument, as presented by Mitchell and McCormick, the really
poor are too poor to protest, therefore, there is no need for governments to use repression.
This view perceives a curvilinear relationship between economic wealth and repression,
meaning that the very poor and very rich countries are expected to show low levels of human
23
rights violations, whereas countries between these two extremes are expected to have higher
state repression.
The third and last hypothesis is based on Marxist theory. This theory is based on the
assumption that capitalist countries with economic interests want "favorable conditions for
investment in the Third World" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 479). To establish and
maintain these favorable investment conditions, the capitalist counties try to prevent any
reforms that would give more benefits to the workers. Therefore, according to Marxist
theory, high involvement with external capitalist interests prevents revolution, contains
reform, and finally, leads to state repression (Mitchell and McCormick 1988).
The presentation of these arguments is both interesting and important, because it
points out different relationships between economic wealth and state repression. However,
Mitchell and McCormick do not build on these theoretical statements in the second part of
their article. The authors do not focus on testing the conflicting hypotheses on economic
development and repression. Instead, the empirical section of the study tests some hypotheses
that are not directly related to the argument made in the beginning. The authors do not
develop a theoretical framework from which they draw their hypotheses. More detailed
explanations for why they choose to analyze certain phenomena could improve the reader's
understanding of their argument.
In the empirical analysis, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) utilize three explanatory
variables. The first one is colonial experience. They hypothesize that British colonies have
better human rights records than do other colonies. The second political condition is
24
"newness" of the state, the last one is regime type. They also implement various control
variables, such as income, trade, and size of population.
The operationalization of the variables is not very convincing, however. For their
dependent variable, human rights violations, they code the Amnesty International Report 1985
for each country on a two-dimensional scale. The first scale measures the "degree of aibitrary
imprisonment, the other [one is] based upon the systemic use of killings and torture of
prisoners" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 484). It is not obvious why killing and torture
should be in the same category, and disappearance in another. They do not mention how they
capture disappearances in their measure. Their indicator for human rights violations is created
by adding up the two scales, the one that captures killing and torture, and the other one that
captures disappearances. Adding up the two scales to one indicator without weighting one
scale seems to distort the human rights records of some countries. It does not appear to be
adequate to put a country with hardly any imprisonment but widespread killing in the same
category as a country whose government keeps a high number of political prisoners, when it
is easier to kill the opponents than to imprison them.
To capture "newness" of a state, they employ a simple dichotomous measure. States
that achieved their independence before 1944 are coded "old" states, and states, which
became independent after 1944 are coded as "new" states. This cut-off seems to be very
arbitrary; the authors do not explain why they choose the year 1944 and why they only have
these two categories to capture the length of a state's independence.
The results of their analysis show that out of the three political variables, which are
colonial experience, newness of state, and regime type, only regime type is significantly
25
correlated with repression. Totalitarian regimes, which are operationalized as "second world,
Marxist nations" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 493), seem to be more repressive than
authoritarian regimes, which are operationalized as "military regimes and traditional
monarchies" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 488). The regime type hypothesis is only
confirmed for the political prisoner category, not for the torture/killing category. In general,
liberal regimes showed higher respect for human rights than authoritarian regimes.
The results confirm the hypothesis that the type of regime is an important indicator
for a country's human rights records. The major drawback is that this analysis focuses on one
point in time, employing only one annual report on human rights violations. Because it is a
static approach, this model cannot tap the question of how a change in regime type affects
state repression.
Henderson (1991) performs a similar analysis. His study also focuses on political and
socioeconomic variables. He utilizes a global cross-sectional analysis, but, as Mitchell and
McCormick (1988) do, captures one point in time and, therefore, misses any dynamic trends.
Henderson tests several hypotheses. The first one measures the correlation between
democracies and state repression. His findings support the argument presented above, that
democracies are likely to show higher respect for basic human rights than do other political
regimes (see Gurr 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Rummel 1985; Schmitter and Karl
1996).
The second hypothesis analyzes the impact of inequality on repression, where
inequality is expected to be positively related to state terror. The result shows a small but
statistically significant coefficient of 0.006 (Henderson 1991). However, the
26
operationalization of the independent variable is extremely questionable. The author uses the
inequality index as developed by Ward (1978). This is problematic, because the data used for
the independent variable is almost 10 years older than the data utilized to measure the
dependent variable. The phenomenon of inequality is likely to have changed over the past ten
years, but Henderson argues that a "slow pace of change in equality should allow any
conclusions to remain relevant" (1991,129). This argument, however, is not convincing and
not sufficient for explaining the use of these data.
Another problem arises with the hypothesis that an increase in the economic growth
rate leads to an increase in repression. The statistically significant coefficient of -.06 supports
the hypothesis (Henderson 1991). But looking again at the operationalization of the variable
that is supposed to measure economic growth, the validity of the result becomes questionable.
Henderson (1991) utilizes the average change in energy consumption rate from 1973 to 1984
to measure economic growth and correlates this with repression measured in 1985. Measuring
changes in energy consumption over this period of time is most likely distorted by the first
world oil shock and the creation of the OPEC cartell. I suggest that a dynamic process such
as growth could be captured better in a time-series analysis than comparing average growth
rates during previous 11 years with state violence measured only for one point in time. The
employed measurement does not seem to produce the expected results. In short, this study
by Henderson (1991) offers an interesting concept about correlates of life integrity violations,
because it includes political as well as socioeconomic variables. Due to the utilized data and
based on the statistical method employed, however, one can not be very confident about the
reliability of the results.
27
In a more complex study, Poe and Tate (1994) analyze the effect of various indicators
on human rights abuse, using pooled cross-sectional time series, covering 153 countries from
1980-1987. Their model contains the following explanatory variables: democracy, leftist
regimes, military regimes, population size and growth, level of development and economic
growth, British cultural influence, international war experience and civil war experience. They
also utilize lagged repression.
This article falls under the category of studies that explore correlates of state
terrorism, therefore, analyzing the violation of basic life integrity rights, in contrast to broader
civil and political rights. Opposed to Mitchell and McCormick, the human rights violations
of a country are coded on a one-dimension ordinal scale from one (almost no human rights
violations) to five (extensive repression). The information on murder, torture, forced
disappearance, and imprisonment for political reasons is obtained from reports of the U.S.
State Department and Amnesty International. This coding system was originally employed by
Gibney and Stohl (see Gibney and Dalton 1997; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Stohl and Carleton
1985).
Poe and Tate (1994) test several hypotheses. British cultural influence and the level
of development are expected to decrease state terrorism, whereas population size and growth
and economic growth are hypothesized to increase repression. Looking at regime types,
democracies are expected to show less state terror, whereas leftist and military regimes are
predicted to have higher human rights violations. The authors also test for the impact of the
experience of international and civil wars. Both phenomena are expected to result in an
increase in life integrity violations. This is based on the theoretical argument that civil and
28
international wars are perceived as a threat to the regime. Leaders who face some form of
threat are more likely to react with repression than they would be under normal conditions
(Poe 1997a, 1997b).
Based on their findings, Poe and Tate conclude that "population size, economic
standing or development, international war, civil war, and democracy affect levels of
repression" (Poe and Tate 1994, 865). The coefficients for these variables are found to be
statistically significant in the hypothesized directions. A strong coefficient for the lagged
endogenous variable indicates that state repression does not change quickly. Once the
apparatus for state repression has been set in place, it appears to have a self-perpetuating
effect (Davenport 1996). The relationship between military and leftist regimes turns out to
be statistically insignificant, as well as rapid increases in population and economic growth
rates. These results are confirmed in a similar study by Poe, Tate, and Keith, which analyzes
similar variables, but extending the time period from 1976 to 1993 (Poe, Tate, and Keith
1997).
Due to the utilized data and statistical methods, the study by Poe and Tate (1994) is
more sensitive to changes in time than the other studies discussed above. The analysis covers
a time-span of eight years. It is interesting to note that democratic regimes do have a
significant impact on the level of human rights violations, while militaiy and leftist regimes
do not (Poe and Tate 1994). This confirms the popular intuition and previous findings that
political regime types do play a role in countries' respect for human rights. But like most
other studies in this field, it does not say anything about regime changes in particular, this
question still remains unanswered.
29
Another study by Poe, Tate, and Lantrip (1997) concentrates on regional samples,
using again similar independent variables as in the above discussed article by Poe and Tate
(1994). In contrary to the results of the global analysis (Poe and Tate 1994), they find a
strong relationship between human rights violations and military and leftist regimes for the
Latin American and Caribbean regions (Poe, Tate, and Lantrip 1997). Therefore, the type of
regime might have an impact on human rights violations in some regions, but not in others.
The question on how the transition from one regime type to another affects state repression
is, again, not addressed.
Davenport (1995) performed a similar multivariate time-series study, covering 53
countries from 1948 to 1982. A basic difference of this approach in relation to the ones
discussed above is the conceptualization of the dependent variable. Davenport (1995) sees
repression from the point of the government as negative sanctions applied by the state. In this
operationalization, negative state sanctions include "censorship, ... as well as political
restrictions" (Davenport 1995, 694). The difference between the negative state sanction data
and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) is not only that the former measures sanctions employed
by the state, but the latter focuses on the violations suffered by the people. Also, Davenport's
negative state sanction measure is an event count measure, and the PTS is a standard-based
measure, where countries are assigned values according to previously determined categories.
Davenport (1995) analyzes the impact of political conflict and various state
characteristics, such as system type, coercive capacity, economic development and
dependency, on repression. He also controls for lagged repression. Later research (Davenport
1996) has supported the notion of including a lagged endogenous variable.
30
Davenport's findings (1995) show that the level of democracy and economic
development decrease the use of state repression, whereas lagged repression and political
conflict increase it. Furthermore, Davenport concludes, "all regimes do not respond to
domestic threats in the same manner" (Davenport 1995, 707). According to his findings,
nondemocracies appear to react most sensitively to multidimensional threats, whereas
transition-states are in the middle, and democracies seem to be the least sensitive regimes in
reaction to perceived threat. The linear relationship found between the level of democracy and
repression as a reaction to threat perception contrasts the "more murder in the middle"
hypothesis as presented by Fein (1995). The opposing findings ask for further investigation
of the relationship between political regimes and their respect for human rights
Several aspects of Davenport's analysis (1995) are important for this study. Like
findings from other articles (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994), it
reinforces the assumption that the political regime type plays a significant role for the level
of state repression. But, again, it leaves the question unanswered of what might happen during
a regime change. Like in other studies, lagged repression is highly significant (see Poe and
Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1997; Davenport 1996). The level of human rights violations
does not seem to change very quickly. One explanation of this phenomenon could be that
there is a self-perpetuating effect, "the coercive apparatus seeks to justify its continued
existence and increases its access to resources" (Davenport 1995, 691).
Davenport's (1995) results about domestic threat are supported by a study by Poe,
Tate, Keith, and Lanier (1997). According to their analysis, "when threats were present,
average levels of human rights abuses increase substantially in their immediately subsequent
31
time frame" (Poe et al. 1997,24). Another piece by Poe about violent and nonviolent threats
finds that "in contrast to nonviolent threats, violent ones increase the probability that regimes
will react by undertaking more human rights abuses, even where existing repression levels are
already quite high" (Poe 1997b, unpublished).
A more recent study by King (1997) utilizes the same operationalization of repression
as Davenport (1995), employing the negative state sanction approach. King (1997)
statistically analyzes the impact of domestic unrest, the extent of institutional democratization,
and the level of economic development on negative state sanction. To measure the level of
democratization, King (1997) utilizes Gurr and Jagger's Polity III data set on regime type and
political authority. These data have the advantage that they use only institutional categories,
such as constraints on the chief executive and the openness of executive recruitment (Gurr
and Jaggers 1995) for determining the level of democracy. The respect for civil and political
rights is not included, which is important for studies on human rights.
King's (1997) results parallel Davenport's (1995) and Poe and Tate's (1994) findings,
that the more democratized a country, the more it respects the rights of its citizens. King also
draws the conclusion that in transitional states, political activities of the masses are perceived
as threats by the elites and, therefore, are prone to experience oppression from the
governments. However, it does not seem to be appropriate to utilize the results of this
research for making conclusions about political regimes in transition periods, because the
study focuses on partial democracies, and not on regimes during a transition period. King
(1997) analyzes countries that are on the middle of the democracy-spectrum, meaning that
these countries show some democratic institutions, which are not fully developed. Hence, this
32
does not mean that these countries are undergoing a regime transition. They might be stable
partial democracies. It is apparent, that changes in the political regime type have not yet been
systematically analyzed in the research by King (1997).
Only one study (Davenport 1997) could be found that analyzes the effect of regime
change on state repression. In this study, Davenport (1997) tests, in a pooled cross-sectional
time-series analysis of 49 countries from 1948 to 1982, the relationship between changes in
the level of democracy and the use of negative state sanctions. He considers short- and long-
term effects and employs economic development, political conflict, dependency, and lagged
repression as control variables. To measure the dependent variable, state repression, he
employs the indicator of negative sanctions as developed by Taylor and Jodice (1983), and
for the level of democracy he utilizes Gurr's (1990) Polity III data set. The author also
includes the occurrence of national elections as an indicator of democratization.
Utilizing this complex model, Davenport (1997) statistically tests several hypotheses.
The first hypothesis states that democracies show less repression than autocracies. He also
expects that the process of democratization decreases repression, whereas the process of
autocratization increases repression. He hypothesizes generally, that a change in the system
type increases repression. This, however, is not consistent with the expectation of
democratization decreasing negative state sanctions. A regime change results in an increase
in repression, because during the period of change leaders are expected to be more sensitive
to domestic threat and are more eager to maintain domestic order, and, therefore, more
willing to use repression during the transition period (Davenport 1997).
33
Davenport's (1997) findings reveal interesting patterns. He concludes from his
statistical analysis that the more democratic a country, the more the country respects the
rights of its citizens. However, extreme moves away from and toward democracy seem to
increase repression, as well as changes toward autocratic regimes (Davenport 1997). Also
interesting to note is that by employing an ARIMA intervention model, Davenport finds that
the impact of change on negative state sanctions seems to be contemporaneous and short-
termed (Davenport 1997). The variance he explains with his models ranges from 49% to 52%
(Davenport 1997).
Davenport's (1997) study is an important asset to the existing research in this field.
This approach accounts for the impact of dynamic processes, namely regime changes. The
author does not exclusively focus at the level of democratization, but also on regime changes
away from democracy. He also analyzes the duration of the impact of regime change on
negative state sanctions. Nevertheless, some procedures in this study remain unclear,
particularly the way the regime change variable is coded. The author creates a dummy
variable to capture cases of polity interruption, polity interregnum, polity transition, and
missing values. The dummy variable for change is coded "1" when one of these situations is
present, and "0" when not (Davenport 1997). This method is questionable for a few reasons.
First, it is not clear why missing data should appear as change. Data might simply not be
available, without any change in the system occurring. From Davenport's description of his
regime change dummy variable, it is not clear why missing value equals change. Secondly, it
is also not obvious why polity interruption, polity interregnum, and polity transition are
necessarily indicators for a political regime change. The fact that a country is occupied by a
34
foreign nation, which is coded as "polity interregnum" in the Polity III data, does not
automatically indicate any kind of regime change. The national government is temporarily not
in political control over the country. Therefore, in the correct sense of the meaning of
negative state sanction, during the period of "polity interregnum" it is not the national
government which is responsible for any sanctions on political and civil liberties. Also, a
country that is occupied by a foreign force does not automatically undergo a regime change.
It seems to be a good intention to include these cases, which are otherwise coded as
missing values. But this should be explained with a specific theoretical justification, which is
not given. To sum up, this research by Davenport (1997) analyzes questions so far untapped
about regime change and human rights violations with statistically sophisticated methods. But
still far more research in this area needs to be done.
Regime Change
After examining the pertinent literature on human rights violations, the conclusion can
be drawn that regime type is a crucial predictor of that country's respect for human rights.
Many questions about the role of democracies and partial democracies are still unanswered,
however. Unfortunately, only few studies have looked at the effect of regime change on state
terror. The following part deals with work that has been done on political regime change.
In order to identify regime change, it is necessary to first specify a definition for
regime. Lawson defines a political regime as "the formal and informal organization of the
center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines
who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are
35
not" (Lawson 1993, 185). A similar definition is offered by Kitschelt (1992). According to
his conceptualization, political regimes are "rules and basic political resource allocations
according to which actors exercise authority by imposing and enforcing collective decision
on a bounded constituency" (Kitschelt 1992, 1028). Both definitions address the basic
structure of the political system, not specific governments. And both definitions stress the role
of political regimes in determining the allocation and legitimate use of power within the
country. Because a political regime determines the allocation and use of domestic power, it
becomes self-evident that citizens or groups of societies have vivid interests in shaping, or at
least in influencing, the regime type of their country. A regime change is defined as "a change
in (or abandonment of) the principles and norms governing the nature of the regime" (Lawson
1993, 186).
Many case studies have been done on regime changes in particular countries, but only
few articles address the issue of regime change in a general manner. Lichbach (1981)
compares and tests the structuralist and functionalist argument of regime change. According
to the structuralist argument, "regimes change because they are not constructed properly; that
is, when the polity's political institutions are flawed" (Lichbach 1981, 54). "Flawed" in this
case essentially means being unable to produce consistent polities. According to Gurr (1974),
consistent polities are a crucial component of a stable regime. "The authority characteristics
of'coherent' polities are logically or psychologically consistent with one another and thereby
enhance the polity's capacity to endure" (Gurr 1974, quoted in Lichbach 1981, 55). It seems
that Gurr uses the terms 'coherent' and 'consistent' interchangeably. Coherent polities can
only be produced on the basis of coherent institutions. Therefore, incoherence within the
36
institutions leads to disruptions within the political process. And disruptions within the
political process are likely to result in more frequent changes of the political regime type,
according to the structuralist argument.
The functionalist argument for regime change is based on the performance of the
respective regime. It hypothesizes that a regime change will take place when the polity
experiences performance crises. Lichbach's analysis (1981) suggests that both functionalist
and structuralist arguments offer valid explanations for many occurrences of regime change.
Lichbach statistically tests both arguments and finds empirical support for both the
structuralist and the functionalist view on regime change.
Summary
The discussion of existing literature in the field of state repression and human rights
violations leads to the following conclusion. There seems to be an agreement on the effect of
certain variables on the level of human rights violations in a country. Larger populations are
associated with more repression, whereas higher economic development is associated with
less repression, once other variables are controlled for. It is also undisputed that fully
developed democracies have low human rights violations, when other factors are held equal.
And finally, previous state repression is found to be an important indicator of the present use
of repression (Davenport 1997,1996; Henderson 1991, 1993; Mitchell and McCormick 1988;
Park 1987; Poe and Tate 1994). On the other hand, there are divergent positions, particularly
on classifying the relationship between different level of democracies and state repression
(Davenport 1997; Fein 1995; King 1997; Rummel 1985).
37
There are basically three major critiques that can be made about the existing body of
literature on human rights. First, the theoretical concepts, which the empirical analyses are
based on, are often not very well elaborated. Assumptions are often not clearly stated. The
description of theoretically expected interactions and relationships between the explanatory
variables and the phenomena that are sought to be explained often lack clarity as well. Instead
of deriving hypotheses from a well-developed theory in a logically consistent manner,
explanatory variables that have been found to be important in previous studies are merely
added to the equation. Secondly, many studies only take a snapshot in time. Because they are
static, they have difficulty capturing any kind of change. And thirdly, the impact of different
types of regime changes have not yet been included into models of state repression in a
systematic and comprehensive way.
In the next chapter I formulate a theory that attempts to address these shortcomings
in the existing literature.
CHAPTER IE
THEORY AND OPERATIONALIZATION
The review of the literature showed that many different variables have been
examined for their effect on government oppression. In this study, I attempt to develop an
approach that builds on findings from previous work and expands on it. The goal of this
paper is to contribute to the body of knowledge on why human rights violations occur,
focusing on the effect of political regime changes on state repression.
Previous work revealed the crucial role of the political regime type of a country to
predict its respect for basic human rights of its citizens (Fein 1995; King 1997; Poe and
Tate 1994; Rummel 1985). Due to limitations in the research designs of many pieces, no
conclusions could be drawn on dynamic effects, such as the impact of a change in regime
type on the respect for life integrity rights. I propose advanced pooled cross-sectional
time series analysis to explore some questions of how different types of political regime
changes are correlated to certain levels of human rights violations.
In this chapter, I discuss several theories in the field of human rights and political
regimes. Some of these theories have conflicting expectations regarding the effect of
particular kinds of regime changes on state repression. This chapter presents several
hypotheses that are drawn from a variety of theoretical perspectives and explains the
operationalization of the variables used to statistically test the models.
38
39
Building a Model of Political Regime Change
and Human Rights Violations
Examining the literature on political regimes, it becomes apparent that the concept
of power is closely entangled with political regimes. Political regimes are identified as
"rules and basic political resource allocation" (Kitschelt 1992, 1028), or elsewhere as
"the formal and informal organization of the center of political power" (Lawson 1993,
185). The group that establishes a new political regime determines the distribution of
power and sets the ground rules on how the power will be used in the new system. The
regime decides, which individuals, social groups, alliances etc., hold power. Thus, a
regime change is usually characterized by a change in the power distribution within the
country. The structure and nature of a political regime clearly has an enormous impact
on all parts of society.
As defined in Chapter II, regime change can be characterized as "a change in (or
abandonment off the principles and norms governing the nature of the regime" (Lawson
1993, 186). The period of the change itself can, therefore, be characterized by an absence
of established rules and clear power allocation in the system. The political regime has
started to break free from its old structures and constraints, and it has not yet fully
adopted its new shape. During the transition period from the old to the new regime, the
political system is in an extremely malleable condition.
This openness of the system and the uncertainty about the future regime affects
both the powerful elites and the masses. The groups or individuals that were in charge of
the country under the old regime are likely to hold on to as much power and influence
40
during the transition period as possible, in order to still have a share in the new regime.
On the other hand, groups who had no significant influence under the former regime are
most likely to fight for their "fair" share of the system so that they might be able to shape
the future distribution of political influence to their liking. Thus, the instability during the
time of a political regime change creates tension among the different segments of the
population. I theorize that this instability coupled with the fight over influence in shaping
the new regime results in an increase in human rights violations.
Arguably domestic unrest and violence in general might increase during a
transition period. However, in this study, I focus only on violence exercised by the state.
Violence within a country can only be classified as state terrorism, if "terrorism occurs
with the explicit or implicit approval of authorities" (Gurr 1986, 48).
These expectations are supported in several publications. In a cross-national
study, Markus and Nesvold (1972) test the impact of political instability on governmental
coerciveness. Their results indicate a linear relationship: "The higher (lower) the level of
instability, the higher (lower) the level of coerciveness in the same time period" (Markus
and Nesvold 1972, 236). Gurr goes even further and argues more specifically that state
terrorism "should be seen as arising from conflict situations created by interactions
among elites and their opponents" (Gurr 1986, 45). This statement supports the argument
made above, that the struggle among groups of society during a regime change leads to
higher state violence during this period of time. Also, weak regimes are perceived as
being more likely to use violence toward their opponents than strong regimes (Gurr
1986). A regime during a transition period is prone to be a weak regime, because it lacks
41
an established and organized center of power (Lawson 1993). Hence, an increase in state
violence appears to be likely.
The notion that weak regimes are more likely to employ oppression than strong
ones is also supported by Poe (1997a). Utilizing a formal decision-making model for the
reaction of regimes that perceive domestic threats, "Leaders of particular states are
hypothesized to be willing to take action to increase their Strength, or decrease the Threat
posed to their regime by their political opponents, in periods of Alarm when they
perceive that the Threat is increasing relative to Strength" (Poe 1997a, n.d.). Because the
position of the ruling elite is usually questioned during a regime change, the rulers
perceive their political strength as very weak. At the same time, "their perception of the
probability that a movement posing a domestic Threat (T) will topple their regime" (ibid.)
is very high. Hence, in order to change the Strength/Threat-ratio to their favor, the leaders
are likely to use oppression against domestic opponents "to induce terror in the populace"
(ibid.).
Based on these assumptions, namely that the change of a political regime type
leads to an increase in instability, and, in turn, higher levels of instability lead to an
increase in state repression, every type of change is expected to result in higher life
integrity violations. I, therefore, hypothesize the following:
Hi: A change from one political regime type to another increases the level of life integrity violations in the same year when the change occurs.
42
Change to Anocracv
Different types of regime change do not necessarily have to show that same
pattern in human rights violations during the transition period. According to Fein (1995),
for example, totalitarian regimes produce better human rights records than do partial
democracies. This poses the question, whether a shift from a partial democracy to an
autocracy is coupled with a decrease in government repression, and, vice versa, whether a
transition from an autocratic regime to a partial democracy results in an increase in state
violence.
In order to address this question, I utilize three different categories of political
regimes and analyze the changes between them. In addition to the two main categories
'democracy' and 'autocracy', I implement a third category 'anocracy' for mixed regime
types, meaning regimes that lie in between a democratic and an authoritarian regime.
Gurr originally used the expression "anocratic polity" to describe a regime whose
essential quality was "its relative lack of political power and institutionalism" (1974,
1487). In this study, the term 'anocracy' is used to describe a political regime that cannot
be identified as a coherent democracy or autocracy but one that shows mixed institutional
attributes (see also Enterline 1997; Gurr 1990; Maoz and Abdolali 1989).
The character of mixed institutional structures and power distributions might
result in instability and might encourage different groups of society to drag the system
into their preferred direction.
H2: A political regime change to an anocratic regime increases the level of life integrity violations during the year of the change.
43
Change awav from Autocracy
A different type of regime change, which is analyzed in this paper, is the change
toward democracy. Opening a formerly closed system to political participation can be a
dangerous and destabilizing process. Garreton supports the assumption that newly
democratized states are likely to display higher human rights violations during the
transition period, because "political actors [...] are not wholly integrated into the
democratic game and sometimes even conspire against it" (Garreton 1996, 40). The
government within a new democracy might be afraid of "too much" political activity of
the masses and of the increasing influence of interest groups, such as labor unions, that
try to enter and shape the system. Usually "antidemocratic or authoritarian values,
mentalities, and attitudes" (ibid.) are still present after a country changed from an
authoritarian regime to a democracy. While leaders try to hold on to their exclusive
power, the people might push for faster opening and more political participation. The
ruling elites are not used to sharing their power, and the masses are not familiar with
democratic institutions and procedures. Therefore, the learning process might often be
difficult and violent. Hence, in addition to the instability-factor, a change away from an
authoritarian regime carries several other problems as outlined above, which are apt to
lead to greater repression.
H3: A political regime change away from an authoritarian regime leads to an increase in life integrity violations during the year of the change.
44
Change from Democracy to Autocracy
Looking at regime changes away from democracies, the following factors might
increase the threat perception of the regime in relation to its own strength and, therefore,
lead to an increase in state repression. In a democracy the public is used to participation
in the political process and shaping, to a certain extent, policy outcomes. The people are
likely to protest vehemently when the opportunity to participate is taken away from them,
by banning political parties, for example. Hence, the masses fight for maintaining their
political rights and influence in politics. If an authoritarian leader comes into power by
fraudulent elections or by a violent overthrow of a legitimately elected government, the
new ruler needs the assistance and backup of other powerful elites in the society.
However, if opposing elites are not satisfied with their assigned share of power and
influence, they might try to fight against the new ruler and push him or her out of power
again. All of these phenomena and procedures clearly increase the perceived threat by the
old leaders and are likely, therefore, to increase the use of repression.
Also, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are widely perceived as showing low
respect for the human rights of their citizens (Donnelly 1989; Howard and Donnelly
1986; Forsythe 1989). Unlike democratic regimes, political leaders in an autocratic
regime are not subject to regular elections and are not responsible to the same extent as a
democratic leader to the masses as a whole. Autocratic leaders might have to comply
with certain requirements of other elites in order to stay in power. But an autocratic
system does not usually provide for institutionalized channels for citizens to contribute
inputs into the policy-making process. The lack of these guaranteed and organized
45
procedures might force people to use "alternative" ways of making their opinion
acknowledged, such as violent protest and open rebellion against the government. Often
this leads to domestic unrest. A shift towards autocracy is expected to increase the use of
state repression in two ways. First, as described above, people that are used to participate
in the policy-making process are not likely to merely have these rights taken away from
them without resistance. And second, new autocratic leaders are likely to try eliminating
political opponents as soon as they get into power, probably with the use of physical
violence and oppression.
Two further hypotheses can be derived from these theoretical arguments:
H4: A political regime change away from a democratic regime leads to an increase in life integrity violations during the year of the change.
H5: A political regime change toward an authoritarian regime leads to an increase in life integrity violations during the year of the change
Change to Democracy
Based on previous work it can be hypothesized that moving toward a democratic
regime decreases state repression as soon as the transition process begins (Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Rummel 1985; Schmitter and Karl 1996). In this
case, the prospect of more freedom and civil and political rights under the new regime
might immediately lead to a greater respect for human rights, in spite of the instability-
factor of the regime change itself. As discussed in Chapter II, the respect for human
rights is seen as an inherent feature of democracies, democratic "traits ... are inconsistent
with reliance on violence as an instrument of rule" (Gurr 1986, 58). Therefore, it is likely
46
that the "democratic traits", which prevent the use of state repression, outweigh the
violence increasing instability during the transition period. The following hypothesis is
based on this "Freedom/Domestic Violence Proposition" (Rummel 1985).
H& A political regime change toward a democratic regime decreases the level of life integrity violations during the year of the change.
The Dependent Variable: Life Integrity Violations
As outlined at the beginning of Chapter I, the human rights literature can be
divided into two main groups. One group looks at human rights violations in the form of
personal integrity rights, such as the right of being free from torture, imprisonment,
politically motivated murder, and disappearances (Henderson 1991, 1993; Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). The other group focuses on political, or negative,
sanctions and is concerned with the violation of civil and political rights in a broader
sense (Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; King 1997). This study falls under the first category.
To measure the dependent variable, life integrity violations, I employ the Political
Terror Scale (PTS), which was originally created by Stohl, Gibney, and colleagues, and
later extended by other researchers (Stohl and Carleton 1985; Gibney and Dalton 1997;
Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 1998). The advantages of this measure are
that it concentrates on basic life integrity violations and that is available for many years
and covers almost all countries.
Amnesty International Human Rights reports and U.S. State Department Country
Reports were utilized for assigning categories to countries according to their respect for
life integrity rights. The contents of these two sets of reports were analyzed and a value
47
from one to five was assigned to each country for each year, according to where it fit on
the following scale:
Level (1) "Countries ... under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional ... political murders are extremely rare."
Level (2) "There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional... political murder is rare."
Level (3) "There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted"
Level (4) "The practices of (Level 3) are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life ... .In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas."
Level (5) "The terror of (Level 4) have been expanded to the whole population ... . The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals." (Gastil 1980, as quoted in Stohl and Carleton 1985)
For the statistical analyses in the following chapter, both data sets, the one based
on the Amnesty International reports and the other one based on the State Department
reports are employed. For the multivariate analysis, I do for most parts not present the
results from utilizing the State Department reports, because the difference is negligible.
As previous research has shown, in comparison to the Amnesty International reports, the
State Department seems to be slightly biased against leftist countries, whereas they tend
to treat their allies and trading partners less harshly in their human rights reports than
48
Amnesty International does (Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 1998). Although the biases of the
State Department reports are not very strong, for the most part, I only present the results
obtained from utilizing Amnesty International reports, because the differences in the
statistical results were extremely small. Where differences between the two exist, I
discuss the State Department results in the footnotes.
The original Political Terror Scale (PTS) from Gibney and Stohl (see Gibney and
Dalton 1997; Lopez and Stohl 1992; Stohl and Carleton 1985) was extended to 1993. For
the countries Amnesty International did not issue reports in a particular year, the score
was taken from the State Department Country Reports.
Measuring Regime Change
The operationalization of regime change used in this study is based on the May
1996 version of Jagger and Gurr's Polity III: Regime Type and Political Authority 1800-
1994 data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The advantage of this data set is that this it has
widely been used for measuring levels of democracy and autocracy (Bennett 1997;
Davenport 1996, 1997; King 1997; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992,
1993; Ray 1995; Siverson and Starr 1994). In addition to its availability for all the years
and countries necessary for this study, the Polity III data set is especially suited for this
analysis of human rights violations, because it operationalizes the regime types based on
institutional characteristics. Other measures such as the Freedom House Index (see Gastil
1980) and the Liberal Democracy Measure by Bollen (1993) include civil and political
rights into their measure of democracy. When correlating democracy with a human rights
49
measure, it is more appropriate to use a measure that employs institutional characteristics.
In including the respect for civil and political rights the measure of the dependent and
independent variable interfere with each other.
The Polity III data set operationalizes regime type with two different scales. One
captures institutional democracy, with values ranging from 0 to +10, with +10 standing
for a fully developed institutional democracy. The second scale measures the degree of
institutional autocracy, also ranging from 0 to +10. Democracies are coded based on "the
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive" (Jaggers and Gurr 1995,
471). Authoritarian regimes are characterized according to "a lack of regulated political
competition and a lack of concern for political and civil liberties" (ibid.). The specific
categories for the construction of democracy and autocracy can be seen in Table 1 in the
Appendix.
To obtain a single continuum for the institutional characteristics of political
regimes, the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score, "ranging from
positive ten for states that are purely democratic to negative ten for those which are
purely autocratic" (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 473). I collapse these 21 categories into three
general groups of regime types, autocracy, ranging from -10 to -4, anocracy, ranging
from -3 to +3, and democracy, ranging from +4 to +10. As used in other studies, an
anocracy is a mixed regime type with institutional characteristics from both democracies
and autocracies (Enterline 1997; Gurr 1990; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett
1993).
50
For this study, several dummy variables are created on the basis of these three
categories to test the six hypotheses regarding the effect of particular kinds of regime
changes. The first two variables measure regime change in general, without
distinguishing between different types of changes. The first one is the dummy variable
'regime change.' A country year is coded "1" in this dummy variable when a country
moves from one of the three regime type categories into another category, and it is coded
"0" for the years with no change.
The second variable is created to account for continuous change. For this variable,
the continuum democracy-autocracy (the autocracy score subtracted from the democracy
score) is lagged one period in time. Then the lagged variable is subtracted from the
original democracy-autocracy variable. The Polity III data set measures "polity
interruption" (-66) and "polity interregnum" (-77) (see Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989).
Although the countries coded "-66" or "-77" might experience high instability during
these years, which might in turn increase their human rights violations during that time, it
is not clear, who is exercising the violence during that time. But it is highly unlikely that
it is "the state", which represses the people, because in both cases, the national
government is not in control of the political power during a time of a polity interruption
and polity interregnum. Because this study focuses on state terror and not domestic
violence and unrest in general, I code these cases as missing values, as well as the first
year 1977 in the utilized data set.
The first year after a country was coded as "-88" in the original data set is
assigned the difference between the value of first year after the year coded "-88",
51
subtracted from the value of the last year before the country year coded "-88". This
continuous regime change variable ranges from -15 to +16. The distribution of this
variable can be seen in Table 2.
This table contains several interesting findings. It shows that for the vast majority
of the country-years there was no regime change (N = 1923). This indicates that political
regimes are, overall, extremely stable. The type of regime change found most often is a
move toward democracy of one point on the democracy-autocracy scale (N = 65). There
were clearly more changes toward democracy than changes toward autocracy during the
time between 1977 and 1993. And most of these changes toward democracy occurred in
countries that previously fell clearly in the autocracy category. For example, 40 cases
represent a change toward democracy of 10 point or more on the democracy-autocracy
scale (see Table 2 in the Appendix). This supports Huntington's argument that the late
twentieth century is experiencing a third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991).
To test hypotheses 2 to 6, several more specific regime change variables are
created, indicating the various directions of change. Hypothesis 2 argues that a change
toward anocracy increases the level of repression. To statistically test this hypothesis, two
variables are created, one indicating the transition from democracy ("democ—»anoc"), the
other one the transition to anocracy from autocracy ("autoc—•anoc"). Both dummy
variables are coded "1" for the year a change occurred, and "0" for all the other years1.
To capture change to democracy from anocracy and autocracy, dummy variables are
1 Like in the other regime change variables, the year 1977 is coded "99", as well as the years indicating either "regime interruption" or "regime interregnum."
52
created in the same way. Only one dummy variable is created to measure change toward
autocracy, because there are not enough cases to split this variable into two.
The value "-88" in Polity III for a polity transition is dealt with differently. If a
country was not coded as a democracy (or autocracy or anocracy respectively) in one
year, but was coded as a democracy the first year following the year in which the country
was assigned the value "-88", then all the transition years (-88) and the first year after
that were coded as "1". This indicates that a regime change to democracy (or to autocracy
or to anocracy respectively) was taking place. The distribution of the different types of
changes is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - The Distribution of the Different Types of Political Regime Changes
Types of Regime Changes
i To Democracy from Anocracy • To Democracy from Autocracy
s To Anocracy from Democracy • To Anocracy from Autocracy
i To Autocracy
Looking at the 34 changes toward anocracy, for most countries (21 cases) these
were movements away from autocracy, and only 13 times a country underwent a
transition away from a democratic regime toward an anocratic one. Only 20 shifts to
53
autocracy are identified in this data set. Clearly, most regimes tended to democratize,
when they underwent a regime change during this time.
Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the hypotheses and the variables that are
used to test them.
Operationalization of the Control Variables
The review of the literature on human rights has shown that besides regime type,
several other factors have been found to be correlated with the use of state repression.
The selection of the control variables for this study is based on the results from the global
analysis on personal integrity by Poe and Tate (1994). In this piece, the authors test
various socioeconomic variables in a pooled cross-sectional analysis. The results show
that lagged repression, the size of the population, as well as the involvement in civil and
international wars were positively related to the level of state violence, whereas the
higher economic development in a country, the lower the human rights repression was
(Poe and Tate 1994). These results are supported by a variety of other research papers
(Davenport 1996; Henderson 1991, 1993; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988).
Lagged Repression
Gurr hypothesizes that if elites used violence to secure their position in the past,
they are likely to employ violence in the future (Gurr 1986). This brings past levels of
human rights violations into play. In having previously employed repression to deal with
54
domestic opposition and threats, the national government has shown that it does not fear
to use repression as a policy-tool.
Empirical findings of Davenport's studies (1995, 1996) on lagged repression
support the argument to include a lagged endogenous variable in order to improve the
explanation of why state-sponsored human rights violations occur. He points out that,
once established, "the coercive apparatus seeks to justify its continued existence and
increases its access to resources" (Davenport 1995, 691). Also King (1997) argues that
the states' capacity for violence is an important factor in explaining governments' use of
repression. The resources used for government oppression might have a self-perpetuating
effect. Once the oppression apparatus is set up, it is likely to be used again. Thus, I expect
that the higher repression at time t, the higher repression will be at time t+1.
Regime Type
I include a continuous regime type variable to control for political regime type.
Incorporating a variable for regime type allows separating the effects the regime types
have on human rights violations from the effects that regime changes have on the levels
of state repression. To measure regime type I employ a continuous scale based on the
Polity III data set. This regime type variable is obtained by subtracting the autocracy
score from the democracy score, which creates a continuum ranging from -10
(autocracy) to +10 (democracy) as described above. This variable is expected to be
negatively related to life integrity violations, meaning that the more democratic a country
is the less violence it uses against its people.
55
Population Size
Henderson (1993) argues that population size is another indicator that is
correlated with state terrorism. In referring to Henderson's article (1993), Poe and Tate
(1994) point out two ways in which large populations may lead to higher repression.
First, merely because of a country having a larger number of people, it can use repression
against more people than a state with a very small population. And secondly, a larger
population size is expected to increase human rights violations, because "a large
population places stress on national resources and brings the threat of environmental
deterioration, further reducing available resources" (Poe and Tate 1994, 857).
Based on these previous empirical findings, the size of a country's population is
hypothesized to be positively related to life integrity violations, meaning the larger the
population size, the more life integrity violations are expected. Based upon the measures
of Poe and Tate (1994) population size is operationalized by employing the natural
logarithm of total national population. The natural logarithm was taken due to the skewed
distribution of the variable's values.
Economic Development
Various studies support the argument that the higher the level of economic
development in a country, the lower the level of repression in that country (Davenport
1995; Henderson 1991; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994).
According to Henderson, "It is only logical to think that, with a higher level of
development, people will be more satisfied and, hence, less repression will be needed by
56
the elites" (1991, 1226). In a country with high levels of economic development,
governments are less likely to be faced with extreme domestic opposition. A ruling elite
that enjoys strong backup from its people can also build upon a Strength/Threat ratio that
is favorable to them (see Poe 1997a). It is therefore less likely to use violence against the
people. To operationalize economic development, I follow previous research such as Poe
and Tate (1994) and employ GNP per capita measures.
Civil and International Wars
In recent years various scholars have suggested that leaders' perception of
domestic threat and the presence of domestic violence are important factors in
determining a country's use of terror against its own people (Davenport 1995; King 1997;
Poe 1997a, 1997b; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1997a). In testing four different subsets
of domestic threat, Poe concludes that "in contrast to nonviolent threats, violent ones
increase the probability that regimes will react by undertaking more human rights abuses,
even where existing repression levels are already quite high" (Poe 1997a, n.d.). Civil war
presents the most serious and most violent domestic threat to the elites in power, where
"the authority of the regime in power is being challenged by an armed and organized
resistance controlled by a shadow government" (Poe and Tate 1994, 850). It is therefore
expected that the presence of civil war increases the life integrity violations during this
period of time.
57
Also the involvement in an international war is found to be positively correlated
with human rights abuse (Poe and Tate 1994). Governments may respond with repression
not only to internal threats but also external threats. This argument is supported by Gurr:
"Regimes facing external threats are likely to use violence against domestic opponents"
(1986, 60).
The operationalization of civil and international wars is borrowed from Poe and
Tate's study (1994). Both their measures of civil war and international war are based
upon Small and Singer (1982). To classify civil wars, "First, the government, as the
central authority in a country, must be involved as a direct participant in the war. Second,
there must be an effective resistance" (Poe and Tate 1994, 859). Civil war includes 1000
battle deaths and organized violence (see Small and Singer 1982). For a violent conflict
to classify as an interstate war the following criteria had to be met. "(1) [Tjhere was a
total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict,
(2) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more
personnel taking part in the hostilities" (Poe and Tate 1994, 859, based on Small and
Singer 1982).
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
Basic Descriptive Analysis
This chapter builds statistical models in order to empirically test the hypotheses
that have been developed in the previous chapter. To get a first impression of how the
levels of state repression change before and after a regime change, I utilize mean scores
of both human rights measures, based on Amnesty International and the U.S. State
Department. The measures are taken from the time points before, during, and after a
political regime change occurred. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 4 in
the Appendix.
Figure 2 shows the changes of the mean scores for human rights violations before,
during, and after any type of regime transition. This graph is based on the dummy regime
change variable. In every year this variable is coded "1" if a regime change between the
categories democracy, anocracy, and autocracy occurred. The mean scores from the
Political Terror Scale (PTS) are taken from five periods in time, two years before the
change, one year before the change, the year of the change, and one year and two years
after the regime change took place. The x-axis presents the time, the y-axis the mean
59
scores of the level of life integrity violations. The point 3 on the x-axis indicates the year
= t, where the regime change took place. This is pointed out by the vertical line .
Both the scale based on Amnesty International reports and the one based on State
Department reports are utilized. The graph shows the difference of these two measures. It
also demonstrates how both series of mean scores move together. The sample for this
analysis is all cases where a regime change took place.
Figure 2 - PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change (N = 92)
Political Regime Change
CO
<D O
CO c a <D
CO
H
4.0-
3.8-
3.6-
2.6.
t = Regime Change
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t + 2
Amnesty International-"*- State Department
Figure 2 does not confirm Hypothesis 1, which posited that during a political
regime change levels of life integrity violations increase. In the year previous to the
transition, x = 2, state terror is at the highest level during this particular five year time
11 = regime change, therefore 1 = t.2*, 2 = t_i; 3 = t; 4 = t+i; 5 = t+2
60
period. In the year following the change, x = 4, the level of repression decreases and rises
again in the second year after the regime shift, x = 5.
To get a clearer picture, the following figures show the PTS mean scores
separately for different types of regime changes. Both Figure 3 and Figure 4 display the
mean scores for human rights violations during regime transitions toward democracy.
Figure 3 shows the countries that were previously anocratic, and Figure 4 the ones that
were autocratic before the transition to democracy.
Figure 3 - PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change from Anocracy to Democracy (N = 15)
Change from Anocracy to Democracy
4.0
<L> O O
W G a <D
00 H P-4
t = Regime Change
— t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
— A m n e s t y International"-*— State Department
The hypothesis on democratization suggests that a transition toward a democratic
regime decreases levels of human rights abuse. It is expected that democratic norms,
such as making compromises, and democratic procedures, such as regular elections of the
executive, prevent leaders from utilizing violence and terror against their political
61
opponents. Therefore, as soon as a country adopts democratic institutions and procedures,
human rights are likely to be more respected by the government than they were under the
previous regime. Figure 3 and Figure 4 support this expectation. The graph in Figure 3
indicates a clear decrease in the level of repression from the year before until the year
after the change. However, it also shows a sudden increase in the second year after the
transition occurred. For the State Department scores the tendencies are not as clear, but
they also indicate the sharp increase in the second year after the change. This observation
raises the question of why human rights violations might increase in the second year after
a country adopted democratic institutions. One explanation for this upward trend might
be that the democratic norms and procedures are still new and neither the ruling elites nor
the masses are familiar with them. The new leaders might still feel insecure in allowing
full participation. One could argue that after a "honeymoon-period" of one year of
democracy, the elites utilize more pressure and violence against their political opponents
than before. From the view of the masses, on the other side, the citizens might not be
willing to accept any limitations to their newly acquired rights to participate in politics
and, therefore, fight for their political rights when they are in danger. As a result of that,
in a newly established democracy, the level of repression might increase shortly after the
change took place.
Overall the State Department scores are much lower than the Amnesty
International scores. This phenomenon applies to all types of changes for all five time
points with only a few exceptions. The highest mean value is reached by a score based on
62
the State Department. The time point is the year of the change to anocracy from
democracy.
Theoretically the values on the PTS range from 1 to 5, as outlined in Chapter HI.
But the mean scores taken during the two years before until the two years after a regime
change actually only range from 2.45 to 4.00. The lowest mean score of 2.45 is found in
the year of the regime transition from autocracy to democracy, measured with the
Amnesty International scale. The highest value of 4.00 is based on the State Department
scale and is shown in Figure 5 below.
Figure 4 - PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change from Autocracy to Democracy (N = 69)
Change from Autocracy to Democracy
CO <L> U O O
m
a a
I H 01
3.8-
3.6-t = Regime Change
3 . 4
3 . a
2.8-
2 .6 .
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
— A m n e s t y International-*- State Department
As shown in Figure 4, for a change to democracy in a country that was previously
an autocracy, the Amnesty International and State Department mean scores display a
63
clear downward trend. This, again, confirms the hypothesis that a change toward
democracy is correlated with a decrease in human rights violations.
Figure 5 shows the mean scores for state terror during the regime transition from
democracy to anocracy. This supports the hypothesis that the level of state-sponsored
repression increases in the year of a regime change. It also supports the two more specific
hypotheses, that a change toward anocracy increases repression and that a change away
from democracy increases repression as well.
Figure 5 - PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change from Democracy to Anocracy (N = 13)
Change fromDemocracy to Anocracy
4 Z 1
4 . 0 -
3 . S -
G 3 . 6 . o 3 . 6 .
O KS1 3 . 4 C5 AJ
s 3 . 2 .
UO ^ ft. H J .V>
OH 2 . 8 -
2 . 6 -
Regime Change
t-1 t t+1 t+2
• Amnesty International-*- Sate Department
It is interesting to note that there is a clear upward trend in repression, leading up
to the year of the change. This could suggest that the new elites need to use violence and
64
repression to bring about a change away from a democratic system. The people might
fight for the democracy, which could result in a violent reaction of the leaders.
This is one of the two mean score graphs in which the State Department scores
are higher than the Amnesty International ones. The level of life integrity violations
based on State Department reports during the year in which a change from a democratic
to an anocratic regime occurs reaches the mean of 4.00. As mentioned above, this is the
highest level of repression reached by the PTS mean scores during the five years of all
types of regime transitions.
Based on the simple descriptive analysis, the most dangerous type of transition
appears to be the one to anocracy from democracy. Citizens that are used to living in a
democratic country are not willing to merely give up their political participation they
enjoyed under the democratic regime. Leaders that want to take away democratic
institutions seem to exercise severe terror on the population in order to reach their goal.
The mean scores taken from the time of changes from anocracy to autocracy are
ambiguous. The complete results can be seen in Table 4.
The graph in Figure 6 clearly indicates, like Figure 5, that regime change
increases the level of state repression. Figure 6 supports the more detailed hypothesis that
a regime shift toward autocracy is correlated with an increase in human rights violations.
In this graph, the Amnesty International and State Department mean scores move
together very closely, more than in the other graphs. It is interesting to note, however,
that the level of life integrity violations significantly decreases, once the autocratic
regime is established. This could indicate that autocratic rulers get ride of their opponents
65
as soon as they get into power. The use of widespread terror seems to become
unnecessary once the system is established.
Figure 6 - PTS Mean Scores during Regime Change to Autocracy (N = 20)
Change to Autocracy
w i~i O 0
C/D §
1 C/D H 0M
t = Regime Change
t-1 t t+1 t+2
• Amnesty International-*- State Department
To summarize the results, several hypotheses are supported by the simple
descriptive analysis. The democratization-hypothesis is supported, meaning that there is a
strong relationship between democratization and decreasing human rights violations. The
repression mean scores are clearly declining, starting the year before the actual change.
The results are consistent for both measures, the Amnesty International and State
Department scores. The hypothesis that a shift away from democracy increases state
terror during the transition, and the one that a change toward anocracy results in an
increase in the year of the change are supported as well. Again, both the Amnesty
66
International and the State Department mean scores increase during the year of the
change from a democratic regime to an anocratic one. Also, the change toward autocracy
is correlated with an increase in life integrity violations. It remains to be seen, however,
whether these results hold true in sophisticated multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Analysis
To analyze the hypotheses in a more sophisticated research design, I employ a
pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) design. This technique has attracted increasing
attention among political scientists over the last decade. The main advantage of this
approach is that it allows to test hypotheses across time and space simultaneously (Beck
and Katz 1995; Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985). The problem with PCT data, however, is that
two methodological difficulties may arise. The first one is autocorrelation of the error
terms. Correlated error terms may reduce the standard errors and, therefore, raise the t-
value. This leads the researcher to be more apt .to reject the null-hypothesis, when such a
conclusion is unfounded. The second problem that may arise in a PCT design is
heteroskedasticity, which means that the error term is unequally distributed.
Heteroskedasticity also biases the standard errors, which poses a threat to inference
(Ostrom 1990; Stimson 1985).
Several approaches have been used to deal with the problem of autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity in PCT designs. One commonly used method is the Generalized
Least Square (GLS) approach (Stimson 1985).
67
Beck and Katz argue, however, that GLS "can lead to dramatic underestimates of
parameter variability" (1995, 634) in the PCT context. Small standard errors inflate the t-
statistics, which leads to overconfidence in the statistical significance of the empirical
results. According to Beck and Katz, the best solution available to date for dealing with
PCT designs is a combination of ordinary least squares parameter estimates with "panel-
corrected standard errors" (1995, 635) (PCSE). Beck and Katz utilize Monte Carlo
analysis to compare the GLS approach on the one side with the OLS with PCSEs
approach on the other. They find that OLS with PCSE leads to more accurate results than
GLS and is therefore superior to the GLS method. The statistical results presented below
are obtained by employing OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors, as
recommended by Beck and Katz (1995)3. Autocorrelation is controlled by including the
lagged dependent variable in the model.
The first model tests the impact of any type of regime change on the level of life
integrity violations, utilizing the regime change dummy variable, which is explained in
Chapter EI. Including the control variables, Model 1 is as follows:
AI,j = a + PiPTS(t-i)j + {^Population Sizetj + (^Economic Development^ + P4Civil
Wartj + [^International Wartj + ^Regime Typetj + p7Regime Change^ + etj.
' For ail multivariate analyses the statistical program STATA was utilized.
68
The dependent variable AItj is life integrity violations, based on Amnesty
International reports. piPTS(t.i)j is the lagged endogenous variable, a the constant and etj
the error term. The statistical results from this model are shown in Table 5.
All models were tested with two different dependent variables. First, I utilized the
Political Terror Scare (PTS) that is based mainly on Amnesty International reports, and
secondly, I employed the PTS that is based mainly on State Department reports. As
described in the previous chapter, missing data in the Amnesty International based PTS
scale were replaced by State Department data, when available, and vice versa. The
coefficients and their statistical significance employing the State Department measure
were almost identical to the results utilizing the Amnesty International based scale.
Due to the great similarity of the results, the tables only show the results with the
Amnesty International measure as dependent variable, because the Amnesty International
reports on human rights have found to be slightly more consistent than the human rights
reports issued by the U.S. State Department (Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 1998). The State
Department based results are reported in the footnotes when there are significant
differences between utilizing the Amnesty International or State Department measure.
The z-value is comparable to the better known t-ratio. The distribution of the z-
values for a large number of N is almost identical to the distribution of the t-values (see
Hamilton 1992). The t-ratio is a test of statistical significance. It is calculated by dividing
the coefficient by its standard error4. P > I z I stands for the level of statistical
significance. The chi2 statistic indicates whether "the hypothesis that all coefficients are
69
zero" (Hamilton 1992, 227) can be rejected. It is a measure of fit for the whole model.
The first model shown in Table 5 is highly statistically significant with a chi2 statistic of
6137.39.
Table 5 - OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Dummy Regime Change Variable Dependent Variable: PTS Amnesty International
Coefficient Beta Coefficient
Panel Corrected Standard Error
P > I z I
Constant PTSm Population Sizet
GNP per capitat
Civil Wart
International Wart
Regime Typet
Regime Changet
-.183 .138 -1.318 .187 .685*** .688 .018 38.309 .000 063*** .083 .009 6.717 .000
-.00002*** -.103 -.000002 -8.903 .000 .374*** .087 .056 6.634 .000 .128* .030 .053 2.425 .015
- Oil*** -.010 .002 -5.314 .000 .048 -.080 .074 .647 .517
N R2
Adjusted R2
chi2 (7) Pr > chi2 *
**
= 2037 = .722 = .721 = 6137.39 = .0000 = Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .001 level (two-tailed test)
The statistical significance of several explanatory variables in this model and in
the following ones could be tested with one-tailed tests. There is no reason to believe why
civil and international wars would decrease state repression. A one-tailed test for these
t = b / seb
70
two variables would be appropriate, because the relationship between civil and
international wars and repression can be expected to be negative. However, for the
explanatory variables of interest in this study, namely the regime change variables, it is
necessary to utilize two-tailed tests of statistical significance. For the regime change
variables it is crucial to test the kind of relationship and to analyze whether they have a
negative or a positive effect on the dependent variable. To be consistent and for
simplicity reasons then, two-tailed tests are used for all variables. Practically this makes
no difference in the inferences drawn from the results.
Table 5 show that the regime change dummy variable fails to reach statistical
significance. It has no effect on the level of life integrity violations, once the impact of
other factors (lagged repression, population size, GNP per capita, involvement in civil or
international war) is held constant. The first hypothesis as stated in the previous chapter,
therefore, has to be rejected. Political regime change, in and of itself, does not increase
state-sponsored violence during the year of the change. All the other independent
variables, which were borrowed from Poe and Tate (1994), are highly statistical
significant at the .05 level of statistical significance or better. Lagged repression is
positively related to present human rights violations and has the greatest impact on the
dependent variable. As expected, population size and involvement in civil and
international war are positively correlated with state terror, whereas economic
development is negatively related to human rights violations.
To test for multicollinearity, I utilized Pearson's correlation and the Klein test.
Multicollinearity is present when the independent variables are highly correlated. This
71
inflates the standard errors and, therefore, biases the inference of statistical significance.
The Pearsons's correlation correlates every independent variable with all the other
independent variables. The results showed that the correlation of the explanatory
variables is so small that it does not pose a problem for the regression analysis. The
strongest correlation between is -.415 between regime type and GNP per capita. The
Pearson's r for all the other correlations of the independent variables is lower than .2
Therefore, this test provides no evidence of mulitcollinearity posing a serious problem for
the statistical analysis. In the Klein test each of the independent variables is regressed on
the others and then the R2 from the model are inspected. The results from the Klein test
again clearly show that there is no difficulty with multicollinearity. The results for the
tests for high multicollinearity are the same for the following two models.
In the next model I replace the dummy regime change variable with the
continuous regime change variable. This variable measures changes on the democracy-
autocracy continuum from one year to the following year. The operationalization of the
variable is described in a more detailed form in Chapter III. The equation for Model 2,
employing a change variable that measures continuous regime change, is as follows:
Altj = a + p1PTS(t-i)j + p2Population Sizetj + p3Economic Development^ + p4Civil Wartj +
(^International Wartj + PeRegime Typetj + ^Continuous Regime Change^ + etj.
The results of Model 2 are shown in Table 6 below. The statistical results are
similar to the ones from the previous model. In comparison to the regime change dummy
72
variable, this directional regime change variable that measures change on a continuum
has a higher z score, but still fails to reach statistical significance at the .1 level. The
model as a whole, again, is highly statistically significant, but the regime change variable
is not. As mentioned above, multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this second
model either. Based on these first two models, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected. Political
regime change is not positively related to levels of life integrity violations in the year the
change occurs.
Table 6 - OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Continuous Regime Change Variable Dependent Variable: PTS Amnesty International
Coefficient Beta Coefficient
Panel Corrected Standard Error
z P > | z |
Constant -.171 .138 -1.242 .214 PTSt-i .687*** .692 .018 38.398 .000 Population Sizet .046*** .081 .010 4.670 .000 GNP per capitat -.00002*** -.107 -.000002 -9.103 .000 Civil Wart .372*** .085 .056 6.606 .000 International Wart .125* .029 .052 2.377 .017 Regime Typet -010*** -.072 .002 -4.974 .000 Regime Changet -.008 -.042 .007 -1.248 .212
N R2
Adjusted R2
chi2 (7) Pr > chi2 *
**
***
= 2034 = .723 = .723 = 6133.58 = .0000 = Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .001 level (two-tailed test)
73
In the following section, I divide the regime change variables into different types
of regime changes, as was done in the previous simple analyses. The following five
regime change variables are included in Model 3: change from anocracy to democracy;
change from autocracy to democracy; change from democracy to anocracy; change from
autocracy to anocracy, and change to autocracy. The variable names were created in the
following way. The first part of the name stands for the old regime type, and the second
part presents the new one. The arrow indicates the direction of the change (e.g.,
'anoc—•democ' indicates a regime change from anocracy to democracy). Because of the
small number of cases the variable 'change to autocracy' does not distinguish what
regime the country was before the change. The equation for Model 3 is:
AI t j = a + PiPTS(t-i)j + p2Population Sizetj + ^Economic Development^ + ^Civil Wartj +
pslnternational Wartj + ^Regime Typetj + P7Change from Anocracy to
Democracy (Anoc-»Democ)tj + pgChange from Autocracy to Democracy
(Autoc—>Democ)tj + PgChange from Democracy to Anocracy (Democ—>Anoc)tj +
PioChange from Autocracy to Anocracy (Autoc—>Anoc)tj + PnChange to
Autocracy (Change—»Autoc)tj + etj.
The fit of the model increase from chi2 = 6137.39 in Model 1 and 6133.58 in
Model 2 to chi = 6446.79 in the third model with the different regime change variables.
Again, the null-hypothesis that the model as a whole is not significantly different from
74
zero can be rejected. The model with the highest fit is, based on the chi, Model 3 with
the different kinds of regime changes as independent variables.
Table 7 - OLS Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors, Impact of the Different Regime Change Dummy Variables Dependent Variable: PTS Amnesty International
Coefficient Beta Coefficient
Panel Corrected Standard Error
z P > 1 z 1
Constant -.151 .137 -.100 .272 PTSm .696*** .690 .018 38.654 .000 Population Sizet .059*** .081 .009 6.365 .000 GNP per capitat -.00002*** -.105 -.000002 -8.852 .000 Civil Wart .346*** .085 .056 6.133 .000 International Wart .121* .030 .052 2.321 .020 Regime Typet -.010*** -.074 .002 -5.098 .000 Anoc—•Democt -.103 -.006 .161 -.639 .523 Autoc—>Democt -.332** -.035 .124 -3.671 .008 Democ—>Anoct 1.111*** .043 .279 3.977 .000 Autoc—*Anoct -.157 -.005 .145 -1.085 .278 Change—>^Autoct .299 .012 .229 1.305 .192
N R2
Adjusted R2
chi2 (11) Pr > chi2 *
**
= 2024 = .725 = .724 = 6446.79 = .0000 = Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test) = Significant at the .001 level (two-tailed test)
The R2 and the adjusted R2 also increase from Model 1 to Model 3, but the
changes are very small. All three models explain between 72.2% (Model 1) and 72.5%
(Model 3) of the variance in the dependent variable. The difference in the R2s between a
75
model that excludes the regime type and regime change variables to Model 3 is very
small. The main reason for this is that most of the variance is explained by the lagged
endogenous variable alone. As mentioned above, the correlation matrix of the
independent variables and the results of the Klein test (not shown) clearly indicate that
high multicollinearity is not present.
The effects of lagged repression, population size, civil and international wars,
gain, are highly positive and statistically significant. Economic development and regime
type are negatively related to human rights violations, also statistically significant at the
.001 level. In this model, two of the five regime change variables are highly statistically
significant in the expected direction.
The variable that measure change from autocracy to democracy loses its statistical
significance when the State Department reports are used instead of the Amnesty
International reports to measure the level of life integrity violations5. The regime change
from autocracy to democracy is negatively related to human rights violations in the year
the change occurs. The results show that when an autocratic country becomes a
democracy, its level of state-sponsored terror decreases by .33 units in the same year. In
the previous chapter, hypothesis 3 states that a change away from autocracy increases
human rights violations. Based on these results, hypothesis 3 has to be rejected. The
change away from autocracy to democracy decreases life integrity violations.
This result is contrary to the argument made by Garreton (1996), which states that
newly democratized countries show high levels of human rights violations. Also Figure 4,
76
which graphed PTS mean scores, shows that during a regime shift from autocracy to
democracy, the amount of state-sponsored terror is declining. One explanation for the
downward trend of repression during a regime transition to democracy in a country that
was previously autocratic might be that the population of that country is less apt to use
violent protest against the political leaders. Alternative ways of participating in the
political system and voicing one's opinion are available to citizens under a democratic
regime. Previous studies have shown that democracies have, in general, better human
rights records than other political regimes (Davenport 1997; Diamond et al. 1988; King
1997; Poe and Tate 1994; Schmitter and Karl 1996). Hypothesis 6 argues that a change
toward democracy decreases repression in the year of the change. This hypothesis is
supported. Based on the statistical results from this study, it appears that the
characteristics that cause democracies to have relatively few life integrity violations
outweigh the remaining elements of a previous autocratic regime already in the year the
regime change takes place.
The second regime change variable that is statistically significant at the .001 level
is the change from a democracy to an anocratic regime (Democ—»Anoc). During this type
of change, the level of state repression increases by 1.111 units6. In the previous chapter,
the graph of the change in the PTS mean scores during this type of regime change also
shows an increase in state repression in the transition year. Hypothesis 2 states that a
change toward a mixed regime with both democratic and autocratic features increases the
level of human rights violations. This hypothesis is supported only for countries that were
5 Utilizing the State Department based measure, the corresponding coefficient is -.149 with z = -1.254
77
democratic before the change. Hypothesis 4 argues that a regime transition away from
democracy results in an increase in state-sponsored violence in the same year. This
hypothesis is supported as well.
There are at least three possible explanations for the increase in state repression
during a regime shift from a democracy to an anocracy found in this analysis. First, as
mentioned earlier, citizens that are used to living under a democratic regime are probably
willing to fight for the rights they enjoyed under the democracy, when these rights are
endangered by the rise of a more authoritarian leader. Domestic unrest and violence
might be the result of people trying to hold on to the procedures, rules, and institutions
that allowed them political participation in the democracy and facilitated the people's
active involvement in politics.
Secondly, the rising leader, or elite group, is likely to perceive the people's
reaction to the shift away from democracy as a threat to the newly established regime.
This might lead to more repression from the side of the newly powerful group. This
argument is borrowed from Poe (1997b). He states that leaders are more likely to use
violent repression against their people when the perceived Strength/Threat ratio becomes
less favorable for them.
Finally, the third possible explanation for the rise of life integrity violations
during the change from a democratic country to an anocratic regime is the following. As
argued by Fein (1995), political regimes that are neither strongly democratic nor clearly
autocratic but "in the middle" show high human rights violations. In a mixed regime, as
6 Utilizing the State Department based measure, the corresponding coefficient is 1.145 with z = 4.099***
78
indicated by the category "anocracy", the country does not have clear characteristics of
either a democracy or an autocracy. Both the group of society that is in favor of a
democracy and the one that prefers an autocratic system might be present in that country.
Both groups are likely to try to move the system further into the direction they prefer,
because the regime does not have clear features of either a democracy or an autocracy.
The anocratic regime shows mixed characteristics from both types of political regimes.
This might result in a very unstable and violent atmosphere in the country, which tends to
display greater repression.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This research sought to contribute to the knowledge of why and when human
rights violations are likely to occur. It explored the effects of particular types of political
regime changes on levels of state-sponsored violence. This study grew out of the body of
work that has been done on political regime types and their impact on state repression.
Previous research suggest that democracies show significantly less human rights
violations than other political systems (Davenport 1997; Diamond et al. 1988; Fein 1995;
Garreton 1996; Gurr 1986; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate
1994; Rummel 1985; Schmitter and Karl 1996). Others make the argument that mixed
regimes are more repressive than authoritarian governments (Fein 1995).
In order to protect people from state repression it is important to know the
potential causes for state-sponsored violence. The question that has not attracted much
attention in academe yet was how a change from one regime type to another affected the
use of violence by governments against its opponents. The purpose of this study was to
reveal some patterns of regime transitions and their effect on human rights violations,
employing a pooled cross-sectional time series design.
The empirical results of this study indicate several interesting phenomena. First,
simple descriptive analysis and multivariate regression analysis suggest that a regime
change in general does not affect the level of violence and government repression. The
79
80
level of life integrity violations does not increase during the time period of the regime
transition.
The next step in this study was to examine how particular kinds of political
regime changes affected state repression. The changes in the mean scores obtained from
the Political Terror Scale (PTS) during certain kinds of transition show several interesting
findings. First, the mean scores for repression were decreasing during the transition to
democracy from a former autocratic regime, starting the year before the change. This
supports findings from previous studies on the correlation between democracy and state
repression (e.g., Davenport 1997; Fein 1995; King 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988;
Poe and Tate 1994;). As discussed in Chapters III and IV, the norms and practices
associated with a democratic system seem to inhibit leaders from using violence against
its opponents. Already in the years of the change toward democracy the level of life
integrity violations appears to decrease significantly. However, similar findings did not
arise for countries that were anocratic and then become democracies.
The second interesting result from the descriptive analysis shows, as hypothesized
in Chapter III, a change toward anocracy does indeed increase the violations of life
integrity rights, but only in countries that previously were democratic. I examined the
bivariate relationship between repression and the PTS mean scores during a transition
from democracy to anocracy. The line graph indicates that the level of repression is
higher in the year of the regime change than it is two years before or after the change.
Thirdly, a similar graph suggests that the transition to autocracy increases repression
during the year of the change as well.
81
The first two of these three bivariate results are supported by the multivariate
OLS regression analysis. The effect of democracy on human rights abuse is negative and
statistically significant. Again, this only applies to countries that were an autocracy
before the transition. Also, the results of pooled cross-sectional analysis confirm that the
change of a democratic system to an anocratic one is positively related to repression,
meaning the level of human rights violations increases in the year of the change.
However, the regression analysis does not confirm the increase in repression during the
change toward autocracy.
The OLS regression analysis with panel-corrected standard errors also supports
the results from the global analysis of life integrity violations by Poe and Tate (1994).
The level of repression used in the previous year has a significant impact on the present
level of human rights violations (see also Davenport 1996). It seems that once the state
apparatus for repression is in place, it develops a self-perpetuating effect. Additionally,
leaders that have used terror in the past are generally willing to use violence again in the
future.
This study also strengthens the argument that both internal and external threats, in
the form of civil and international wars, increases the violations of life integrity rights
(King 1997; Poe and Tate 1994). And, as found in other research, economic development
decreases the level of state-sponsored violence (Davenport 1995, 1996; Henderson 1991;
Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994).
The findings on political regime changes and human rights violations contain
several important implications for policy making by governments and by non-
82
governmental organizations. The democratization of non-democratic countries seems to
have positive effects on the respect for personal integrity rights. This supports the idea of
Western democracies, which have pressured non-democracies to adapt democratic
institutions and procedures. However, it is also important to keep in mind other elements
that affect the use of repression. For example, utilizing economic sanctions to force a
government to allow political participation might not improve the country's human rights
record, but rather worsen the situation, since cutting economic resources could hinder the
country's economic development and puts pressure on the national governments. It can
also increase domestic pressure and even lead to domestic unrest and violence. Both
elements, less economic development and rising domestic unrest, change the leader's
perception of his or her strength in relation to the threat they face (Poe 1997a). Academic
research suggests that these developments are likely to increase the government's use of
repression (ibid.).
Scholars seem to agree that democracy improves a country's human rights
records, once other factors are controlled. Nevertheless, in promoting human rights,
politicians have to be careful in choosing the tools with which they try to make an
authoritarian country democratize.
The results of this research also showed that the shift of a political regime from a
democracy to an anocracy is positively correlated with the use of state repression.
Therefore, the international community, in the form of the United Nations or other
organizations such as Amnesty International, should be alert when a democracy adopts
more and more autocratic elements and becomes an anocracy. Knowing that this is a
83
dangerous situation for the population of the country, the international community could
monitor powerful elites more closely. This might enable international organizations to
protect integrity rights after the first signs of serious violations and, therefore, help to
prevent the leaders from utilizing extensive and widespread repression.
The knowledge of what leads governments to use repression is a crucial element
in effectively protecting citizens from killing, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. The
academic community has discovered important relationships between several
socioeconomic and political factors and repression. Nevertheless, this study raises several
questions that should be addressed in future research. It seems clear that some types of
political regime changes affect the level of state repression. This poses a question of what
happens when new leaders come into power and take over the system, without
immediately changing its structure significantly. What kinds of succession bear the
potential to increase the use of state-sponsored violence? This is a particularly interesting
and relevant question for counties in which the personality of the leader plays a crucial
role. Looking at China, Russia, and North Korea, for example, the saliency of succession
becomes apparent.
Besides trying to uncover potential causes behind human rights violations, other
questions need to be addressed that have not yet received much scholarly attention. If the
goal of the field of human rights studies is to protect people from the violations of their
basic rights by their governments, future research should make the effectiveness of
various policy tools the subject of analysis. What types of groups and organizations are
most likely to prevent and diminish the use of state tenor? Are governmental
84
organizations more successful than non-governmental groups? Axe bilateral actions
preferable to multilateral actions, or vice versa? What kinds of diplomatic actions are
most likely to reach aggressive leaders and affect their behavior? These are some of the
areas academic research on human rights should address in the future. Much in this field
of study has been discovered, but many more questions need to be approached in order to
better explain and prevent the violations of life integrity rights.
APPENDIX
TABLES
85
Table 1 - Construction of Democracy & Autocracy Indicators in Polity III
86
Authority Coding Democracy Autocracy
Authority Coding Score Score
Competitiveness of Political Participation 0 (a) Competitive 3 0
(b) Transitional 2 0
(c) Factional 1 0 (d) Restricted 0 1 (e) Suppressed 0 2
Regulation of Political Participation 0 1 (a) Factional/Restricted 0 1
(b) Restricted 0 2 Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment
(a) Election 2 0 (b) Transitional 1 0 (c) Selection 0 2
Openness of Executive Recruitment 0 (a) Election 1 0
(b) Dual: Hereditary/Election 1 0 (c) Dual: Hereditary/Designation 0 1 (d) Close 0 1
Constraints on Chief Executive (a) Executive Parity or Subordination 4 0 (b) Intermediate Category 1 3 0 (c) Substantial Limitations 2 0 (d) Intermediate Category 2 1 1 (e) Slight to Moderate Limitations 0 2 (f) Intermediate Category 3 0 3 . (g) Unlimited Power of Executive 0 4
Source: Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." Journal of Peace Research 32:472.
87
Table 2 - Distribution of Regime Changes on a Continuous Scale
Value of Regime Change
Frequency
-15 1 -14 3 -13 1 -12 2 - 11 1 -10 1 - 8 2 - 7 2 - 5 3 - 4 1 - 3 3 - 2 12 - 1 29 0 1923 1 65 2 21 3 13 4 8 5 4 6 3 7 5 8 1 9 3 10 7 11 2 12 6 13 5 14 10 15 5 16 5
Total 2147 Missing 522 Total ~~ 2669
88
Table 3 - Summary of the Hypotheses and their Operationalization
Hypothesis Summary Statement Variables
Hypothesis 1 Every type of political regime change increases the level of repression.
Dummy Regime Change: change; Continuous Regime Change:
continuous change.
Hypothesis 2 A regime change to an anocracy increases the level of repression.
Change from Democracy to Anocracy. democ—*anoc, Change from Autocracy to Anocracy: autoc—*anoc.
Hypothesis 3 A regime change away from an autocracy increases the level of repression.
Change from Autocracy to Democracy: autoc—*democ, Change from Autocracy to Anocracy: autoc—*anoc.
Hypothesis 4 A regime change away from a democracy increases the level of repression.
Change from Democracy to Anocracy: democ—+anoc;
Hypothesis 5 A regime change to an autocracy increases the level of repression.
Change to Autocracy: change-* autocracy.
Hypothesis 6 A regime change to a democracy decreases the level of repression.
Change from Anocracy to Democracy: anoc—*democ; Change from Autocracy to Democracy: autoc—*democ.
89
Table 4 - Mean Scores for Human Rights Violations, taken from Amnesty International (AI) and State Department (SD) Reports before, during, and after Political Regime Changes
Two Lags Before
One Lag Before
During One Lag Two Lags After After
Change AI 2.91
SD 2.73
3.06
2.83
2.88
2.81
2.80
2.66
2.88
2.75
Change to AI 2.86 Democracy FromAnocracy SD 2.57
2.87
2.47
2.67
2.50
2.62
2.46
3.00
2.67
Change to AI 3.20 Democracy From Autocracy SD 2.92
3.23
2.91
2.89
2.60
2.79
2.45
2.71
2.51
Change to AI 3.00 Anocracy From Democracy SD 2.60
3.14
3.14
3.71
4.00
3.50
3.17
2.82
3.45
Change to AI 2.89 Anocracy From Autocracy SD 2.78
2.90
2.70
2.90
2.67
2.81
2.81
2.95
2.89
Change to Autocracy
AI 2.86
SD 2.93
3.53
3.41
3.61
3.61
3.11
3.28
3.00
2.87
REFERENCES
Almeida, Joao M. 1998. "Human Rights, State Sovereignty, and International Society/' Paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data in Comparative Politics." American Political Science Review 89:634-647.
Bennett, Scott D. 1997. "Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992." Journal of Conflict Resolution 41:227-54.
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1994. "Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America." International Interaction 19:339-358.
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1993. "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures." American Journal of Political Science 37:1207-1230.
Carleton, David, and Michael Stohl. 1987. "The Role of Human Rights in the U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal." American Journal of Political Science 31:1002-1018.
Cingranelli, David L., and Thomas E. Pasquarello. 1985. "Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries." American Journal of Political Science 29:539-563.
Cingranelli, David, and David L. Richards, Jr. 1997. "Which Personal Integrity Rights Does a State Choose to Violate and Why?" Paper presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, Boulder, Colorado, USA.
Dahl, Robert. 1971. "Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition." New Haven: Yale University Press.
Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into why States Apply Negative Sanctions." American Journal of Political Science 39:683-713.
Davenport, Christian. 1996. "The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression." Political Research Quarterly 49:377-405.
90
91
Davenport, Christian. 1997. "Regime Change and Political Repression. Direction, Coherence, and Persistence." University of Boulder, Colorado. Typescript.
Diamond, Larry, JuanLinz, and Seymour M. Lipset, editors. 1988. Democracies in Developing Countries, Volume 4. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Donnelly, Jack. 1989. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Enterline, Andrew J. 1997. "Regime Changes, Geographic Neighborhoods, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington DC, USA.
Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987." Human Rights Quarterly 17:170-191.
Forsythe, David P. 1989. Human Rights and World Politics. 2 ed. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press.
Freeman, Michael. 1994. "The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly 16:491-514.
Freeman, Michael. 1995. "Are there Collective Human Rights?" Political Studies 43:25-40.
Freeman, Michael. 1998. "The Foreign Policy of Democratic Nationalism: New Labour and Human Rights 1997-." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.
Garreton, Manuel A. 1996. "Human Rights in Democratization Processes." In Constructing Democracy. Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg. Westview: Boulder.
Gastil, Raymond D. 1980. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1980. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
General Assembly of the United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 December.
Gibney, Mark, and Matthew Dalton. 1997. "The Political Terror Scale." In Human Rights and Developing Countries, ed. David L. Cingranelli. Greenwich CT: JAI Press.
Goldstein, Robert J. 1978. Political repression in Modern America: From the 1879 to the Present. Cambridge: Schenckman Publications Corporation.
92
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1974. "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971." American Political Science Review 68:1482-1504.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1986. "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis." In Government Violence and Repression. An Agenda for Research, ed. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1990. Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. 1989. The Polity II Codebook. University of Colorado at Boulder, Center for Comparative Politics.
Hamilton, Lawrence C. 1992. Regression with Graphics: A Second Course in Applied Statistics. Wadsworth, California: Duxbury Press.
Howard, RhodaE., and Jack Donnelly. 1986. "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes." American Political Science Review 80:801-817.
Henderson, Conway. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression." Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:120-142.
Henderson, Conway 1993. "Population Pressures and Political Repression." Social Science Quarterly 74:322-333.
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." Journal of Peace Research 32:472.
King, John C. 1997. "Ameliorating Effects of Democracy on Political Repression as Seen in 51 Countries Across 35 Years." In Comparative Human Rights: Theory, Explanatory Variables, and Persisting Paradoxes, ed. Christian Davenport. Michigan Press. Forthcoming.
Kirkpatrick, Jeane. 1979. "Dictatorship and Double Standards." Commentary 68:34-45.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?" American Political Science Review 86:1028-1034.
Lawson, Stephanie. 1993. "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization." Comparative Politics, 25:183-205.
Lichbach, Mark I. 1981. "Regime Change. A Test of Structuralist and Functionalist Explanations." Comparative Political Studies 14:49-73.
93
Maoz, Zeev, andNasrin Abdolali. 1989. "Regime Types and International Conflict: 1815-1976." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33:3-35.
Markus, Gregory B., and Betty A. Nesvold. 1972. "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability. An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns." Comparative Political Studies 5:231-243.
McCormick, James M., and Neil Mitchell. 1988. "Is U.S. Aid really linked to Human Rights in Latin America?" American Journal of Political Science 32:231-239.
McCormick, James and Neil J. Mitchell. 1997. "Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis." World Politics 49:510-525.
Mitchell, Neil J., and James M. McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations." World Politics 40:476-498.
Ostrom, Charles W. 1990. Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques. 2nd ed. Sage University Press Papers on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no.9. Beverly Hills. Sage.
Park, Han S. 1987. "Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies." Human Rights Quarterly 9:405-413.
Poe, Steven C. 1992. "Human Rights and Economic Assistance under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter." American Journal of Political Science 36:147-167.
Poe, Steven C. 1997a. "The Calculus of Human Suffering: Threats to Regimes' Rule and the Abuse of Human Rights". University of North Texas. Typescript.
Poe, Steven C. 1997b. "The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach to the Research on Human Rights and Repression." University of North Texas. Typescript.
Poe, Steven C., and James Meernik. 1995. "U.S. Military Aid during the Eighties: A Two-Stage Model." Journal of Peace Research 32:399-412.
Poe, Steven C., and Rangsima Siriangsi. 1994. "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid during the Reagan Years." Social Science Quarterly 75:495-507.
Poe, Steven C. and C. Neil Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." American Political Science Review 88: 853-872.
94
Poe, Steven C., C. Neil Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1997. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study, 1976-1993." Paper presented at the Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada.
Poe, Steven C., et al. 1997a. "Domestic Threats to Regimes' Rule and their Abuse of Human Rights across Time." Paper presented at the Comparative Human Rights and Repression Conference, University of Colorado Boulder Comparative Politics Center, Colorado, USA.
Poe, Steven C., et al. 1997b. "The Calculus of Human Suffering: Threats to Regimes' Rule and the Abuse of Human Rights." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, St. Louis, Missouri, USA.
Poe, Steven C., Tanya Vazquez, and Sabine Zanger. 1998. "How are these Pictures different? An Empirical Comparison of the U. S. State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995." Paper presented at the Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.
Ray, James Lee. 1995. "Global Trends, State-Specific Factors, and Regime Transition, 1825-1993." Journal of Peace Research 32:49-63.
Regan, Patrick M. 1995. "U.S. Economic Aid and Political Repression: An Empirical Evaluation of U.S. Foreign Policy." Political Research Quarterly 48:613-628.
Rummel, Rudolph J. 1985. "Libertarian Propositions on Violence within and between Nations: A Test against Published Results." Journal of Conflict Resolution 29:419-455.
Sayrs, Lois W. 1989. Pooled Time Series Analysis. Sage University Series Papers on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no.70. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Schmitter, Phillipe C., and Terry L. Karl. 1996. "What Democracy is ... and is not." In The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Schoultz, Lars. 1981. Human Rights and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shue, Henry. 1996. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
95
Siverson, Randolph, and Harvey Starr. 1994. "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 38:145-161.
Sloan, John, and Kent L. Tedin. 1987. "The Consequences of Regime Type for Public-Policy Outputs." Comparative Political Studies 20:98-124.
Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." American Journal of Political Science 29:914-947.
Stohl, Michael, and David Carleton. 1985. "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan." Human Rights Quarterly 7:205-229.
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton, and Steven Johnson. 1984. "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter." Journal of Peace Research 21:215-226.
Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David Jodice. 1983. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tully, James. 1993. An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ward, Michael D. 1978. "The Political Economy of Distribution: Equalities versus Inequality." Eldevier, NY: Elsevier North-Holland.