ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION,Petitioner v.

LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITANBANK AND TRUST CO., and

PRODUCERS BANK,Respondents.

G.R. No. 133179 ( March 27, 2008)FACTS

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-terminated and withdrawn without her consent. With this, the Court defined a money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, as follows: 

[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer. 

(In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the petitioner and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.)

Subsequently, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Bank’s account in Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans’ placement should be deposited in FCC’s account purportedly as payment for FCC’s money market placement and interest in Producers Bank.

ISSUE

 Whether or not there was an unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank.

HELD

Yes. The Court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals. The Court maintained that: “Allied correctly claims in its petition that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him.””

In this manner, the Court held that “It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers

Bank, should be considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCC’s money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Bank’s payment thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the endorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.”

Thus, the Court averred that Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount (P1,158,648.49 ) of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.

G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs.

ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant’s laundrywoman Agustina Tagaca filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty.Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.

The petitioner filed his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer when the administrative case was dismissed.

Subsequently, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. Complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor during the proceedings in the libel case. The lower court then acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court as to the civil liability of the accused made no pronouncement.

However, instead of appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.

Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action for damages.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Article 29 (When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted) and Article 33 (which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect) of the New Civil Code cited by the petitioner were not applicable in the case at bar since the Court maintained that “The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.” In this line, the Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes

dishonor, or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood. Thus, the Court’s findings revealed that the disputed answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer." The Court dismissed the case due to lack of merit on the part of appellant Jesus B. Ruiz and petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol.

HEIRS OF THE LATE DOCTOR CORAZON DIAZ-LEUS, namely, her husband, CLETO P. LEUS and children, CEZAR LEUS, DRA. CORAZON D. LEUS, JR., and CLARISSA LEUS, petitioners,

vs.HERNANI MELVIDA, ALMARIO ROSAS, VICTORY LINER, INC., SPOUSES LEONISA GALI and JESUS GALI

and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 77716 (February 17, 1988)

FACTS

Accused Hernani Melvida was the driver of a Plymouth car, travelling North, while Almario Rosas was the driver of a Victory Liner Bus travelling South. The said Plymouth car and the Victory Liner figured

in an accident along the North Expressway.The car then was allegedly driven at a fast speed and in a negligent manner causing it to swerve to the left. As a result, the car bumped on the rear portion by the Victory Liner bus and dragged about 50 meters off the cemented road. In this situation, the passengers of the car namely Dr. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio Carbilledo died while Mrs. Leonisa Gali suffered serious physical injuries. The drivers of both vehicles were then charged of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Double Homicide, Serious and Slight physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

Upon arraignment Melvida and Rosas entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court found Accused Hernani Melvida guilty of the offense charged and acquitted Almario Rosas. The heirs of Dr. Diaz-Leus appealed to the Court of Appeals, only with respect to the civil aspect. According to the CA, the vehicular accident cannot be attributed to any negligence on the part of appellee Rosas, that it was a fortuitous event which appellee Rosas could not prevent.

The CA also found that “since the appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon appellee Rosas’ negligence which does not exist it follows that his acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability and therefore the offended parties may no longer appeal and recover damages from said appellee Rosas.”

Further, CA awarded damages for the death of Dra. Leus in the amount of P200,000.00 (the amount of P704.96 net yearly income multiplied by 14 years, or P9,869.44 is the amount which should be awarded to appellants) without interest.

ISSUE

Whether or not the trial court should be ordered to determine the civil liability of Rosas and subsidiary civil liability of the owners of the car and the bus to the heirs of Dra. Diaz-Leus in accordance with Article 29 of the Civil Code

HELD

Yes. The Court affirmed that the findings of the Court of Appeals were a complete exoneration of Rosas. As the Court declared: “Since petitioner's appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon Rosas' alleged negligence which has been found not to exist, this Court must likewise uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling that Rosas' acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability which bars herein petitioners from recovering damages from Rosas. Since Rosas is absolved from any act of negligence which in effect prevents further recovery of any damages, the same is likewise true with respect to his employer victory Liner, Inc. which at most would have been only subsidiarily liable.” The Court then denied the petition.

NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA BESAS DE BERNALDES and JOVITO BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., as Guardian-ad-litem, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION, INC., defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-18193 (February 27, 1963)

FACTS

Plaintiff-Appellants, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's passenger trucks(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on the way to Tagbilaran. However, the bus fell off a deep a high cliff in barrio Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito.

Hence, a complaint for damages against apellee, Bohol LandTransportation Co. was filed. On the other hand, defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds: (1) that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and (2) that it did not state a cause of action.

Subsequently, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the driver of the bus involved in the accident, was charged with double

homicide thru reckless imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Further, appellees, through their attorneys, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages.

The motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment and dismissal of the the case were sustained by the lower court. The offended party appeals.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.

2. Whether or not the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the prosecution of the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of contract, in an independent and separate action.

HELD

Yes. The Court found the appeal interposed by appellants to be meritorious as pursuant to Article 31 of the Civil Code which provides that “ when the civil action is based uponan obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceedindependently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Thus, the Court held the following grounds for finding the appeal meritorious:

1. The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against appellee's driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case

2. True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene — whether properly or improperly we do not here decide — in the criminal action against appellee's driver, but if that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity, the claim could have been only against the driver but not against appellee who was not a party therein

3. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity

4. appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against him may be instituted for the same act or omission

DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA, defendants-appellees

66 SCRA 299 (August 29, 1975)

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizureupon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

(2) Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

HELD

(1) No. The Court held that the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without proper warrant.

(2) Yes. The Court held that De Leon’s defense of good faith does not car him from beinge liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code which states, “ Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures.”

Hence, it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith because it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. However, Maddela was exempted under this liability as he was only acting under orders.

The Court then ordered that “The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.”

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975

TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that afterthe sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the ProvincialCommander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the ProvincialCommander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon andOrlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizureupon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with

authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. 8

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendantsshould have acted with malice or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the ProvincialCommander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not preventthe court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.160 SCRA 590April 15, 1988

FACTS

Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against known communist terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila.

Primarily, the complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. Thus, the complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory

statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

As a result, Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Subsequently, respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’ detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents.

ISSUES(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action

for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;

(2) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.

HELD

(1) No. The Court held that “the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.”

(2) No. The Court held that “The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the military and their subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.”

DYOGI v. YATCO et al.G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957

FACTS

An automobile driven by one Ligayu run over and mortally injured Teresita Dyogi. The driver was charged with information of homicide due to negligence. As a result, a civil action for damages against the owner of the car and the driver were brought by the the husband and children of the deceased. On the other hand, defendant argued that this civil action was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action arose out of criminal case which was still pending and which is not among those provided for in Art. 33 of the New Civil Code. Supreme Court allowed the mandamus filed by petitioners.

ISSUE

Whether or not civil action was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action arose out of criminal case which was still pending and which is not among those provided for in Art. 33 of the New Civil Code.

HELD

No. The Court held that “the reason most often given n for this doctrine is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rules as to the competency of witness and the weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always exists. Under the article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict culpa-aquiliana."

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.

G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990

FACTS

Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado, sideswiped a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila.

A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

As a result, defendants filed a petition for certiorari in the CA arguing that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.

HELD

Yes. The law provides that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action; provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

The Court held that “in this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.”

Hence, the Court maintained that although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before

the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.[G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]

FACTS

Respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, acted to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz and that they further acted that they acquired said lot from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. As a result, PBI purchased the said disputed lot. However, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother. As a result, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu and was the respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, , an action for “Injunctive Relief”, against PBI. Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving questioned lot.

On the other hand, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for “Damages and Attachment,” Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [6] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]

Thereafter, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8]

Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381.[9] On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondent’s motion.

In this line, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case.[11] The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19, 2001 and that a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.

ISSUE

Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of

the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent

HELD

No. The Court held that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document; that a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence; and therefore,in the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

De Leon vs. Mabanag70 Phil 202

FACTS

A pending case before the Supreme Court wherein Pedro De Leon was plaintiff-appellant and Felipe Juyco was defendant-appellee. The controversy hinged on whether a certain document introduced as evidence in that case was genuine or false. After the appellant had presented his brief, the appellee filed a motion alleging that the document which was attached to the record of the case was false and not the one presented in the lower court and he prayed the Supreme Court to investigate the matter and upon finding that the document was false to order the criminal prosecution of the responsible arty. The Supreme Court ruled that the matter will be decided when it resolves the case on the merits. Thereafter Juyco filed a criminal case in the City Fiscal’s office of Manila against De Leon claiming that De Leon falsified the document. At the preliminary investigation Juyco presented evidence in support of his criminal complaint. After that the investigating Fiscal required De Leon to present his evidence. De Leon requested the Fiscal to suspend the investigation until the Supreme Court has resolved the alleged falsification. The Fiscal denied De Leon’s request and informed De Leon that if he did not present evidence he will file a criminal case for falsification of a public document against him. De Leon filed this case against the City Fiscal to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation.

ISSUEWhether or not in the case at bar a prejudicial question was constituted.

HELDYes. The Supreme Court held that the falsification of the document directly affected the

morality of De Leon as a member of the bar and it was the duty of the Supreme Court to determine whether he was guilty of malpractice, a matter which constituted a prejudicial administrative question which must be resolved in an administrative case which, in turn, will determine the guilt or innocence of De Leon in relation to the criminal case for falsification.

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

FACTSPetitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on Sept. 14, 1988. However, they did not live together after marriage although they would

meet each other regularly. Subsequently, in 1989, when Liliana gave birth to a girl, Arthur stopped visiting her. The latter contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting. Liliana then filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation of engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2nd wife of Arthur). As a result, Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.

RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.

ISSUE

Whether or not pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy.HELD

No. The Court held that it is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting;that neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board as the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. The Court then maintained that they have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil :

“The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.”

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

The denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 172060 : September 13, 2010]

FACTSMaria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). The latter received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

As the petitioner was denied at the RTC, it likewise happened in the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

ISSUE Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that

warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitionerHELD

No. The Court held that the rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, he requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 was not met since the civil action wasfiled subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Moreover, the Court maintained that annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question. Thus, The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguished the crime of parricide from murderor homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related tothe issue in the criminal case of parricide.In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs.

THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.G.R. No. L-14534( February 28, 1962)

FACTS

The provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed a criminal case for bigamy against Zapanta upon complaint of Olimpia Yco. It was charged that Zapanta contracted marriage with Yco while he was still married to Estrella Guarin. About a month after the criminal case was filed against him Zapanta filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Two months later Zapantafiled a motion in the criminal case against him praying that the proceedings in said criminal case be suspended on the ground that the civil case which he had filed was a prejudicial question. The court denied the motion for suspension and proceeded with the criminal case.

ISSUEWhether or not petitioner’s filed motion in criminal case to suspend proceedings

therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in civil case was a prejudicial question.

HELDYes. The Supreme Court held that the civil action was prejudicial to the criminal case because if

the court in the civil action found that Zapantacontracted his marriage with Yco by means of duress, force andintimidation, his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.