1. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHAPTER 7

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) Refers to efforts taken to protect one's own intelligence operations from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services. CI Should pervade all aspects of intelligence, but it is often pigeon- holed as a security issue. CI does not fit neatly with human intelligence, although CI is, in part, a collection issue. Nor does it fit with Covert action. Successful CI can also lead to analytical and operational opportunities. 2 3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) This makes CI one of the most difficult intelligence topics to discuss. Most nations have intelligence enterprises of some sort. As a result, these agencies are valuable Intelligence targets for other nations. Knowing if the other side is undertaking similar Efforts is extremely helpful. As well as knowing what they know. 3 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) However, counterintelligence is more than a defensive activity. There are at least three types of CI. Collection: gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities that May be aimed at one's own country Defensive: thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate one's service Offensive: having identified an opponent's efforts against one's own system, trying to Manipulate these attacks either by turning the opponent's agents into double agents or by Feeding them false information that they report home The world of spy and counterspy is murky at best. Like espionage, counterintelligence is a staple of Intelligence fiction. 4 5. INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS All intelligence agencies establish a series of internal processes and checks, the main purposes of which are to weed out applicants who may be unsuitable and to identify current employees whose Loyalty or activities are questionable. The vetting process for applicants includes extensive Background checks, interviews with the applicants and close associates, and, in the United States at Least, the use of the polygraph at most agencies. Most applicants likely have engaged in some level of experimentation: sexual drugs both 5 6. INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS Some may have committed minor criminal offenses. It is crucial, However, that applicants be forthcoming about their past and be able to prove that they are no longer Exhibiting behaviors that are criminal, dangerous, or susceptible to blackmail. The ideal candidate is not necessarily someone whose past record is spotless. 6 7. WHO SPIES ON WHOM? Some people assume that friendly spy agencies do not spy on one another But what constitutes "Friendly The United States and its "Commonwealth cousins Australia Britain Canada Enjoy a close intelligence partnership and do not spy on one another. Beyond that, all bets are off 7 8. WHO SPIES ON WHOM? 1990s, the United States allegedly spied on France for economic intelligence. In the 1980s, Israel willingly used Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. Navy intelligence employee who passed Sensitive U.S. Intelligence that he believed Israel needed to know. Aldrich Ames Robert Hanssen In the late 1990s, China stole nuclear secrets from the United States at a time when the two nations were strategic partners against the Soviet Union. 8 9. He betrayed his country, betrayed his fellow Americans for no reason other than greed, and he caused irreparable harm to the national security of the United States." - US Attorney Ken Melson For decades, thousands of Americans in the Government and private sector sworn oaths of allegiance to the States. The vast majority of these have honored their oaths and served pride, loyalty, and integrity. However, have faltered in their allegiance, discredit to their country, families, themselves. Such is the case of Robert Hanssen, whose lust for fame, and self-gratification led to his downfall as a betrayer of the United 9 10. "A nation can survive its fools and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within." -Cicero (106-43 B.C.) This quote illustrates the seriousness of the insider threat as well as the length of time this threat has been a concern. This poster highlights Cuba because of the success their recruited insiders have had against the United States over the years. 10 11. The Man of Steel's x-ray vision can't detect the spies among us, but we mere mortals, armed with the right information, can. Practice good security and report suspicious behavior, and you, too can become a CI Super Hero! 11 12. A longstanding premise in U.S. Government circles is that a security clearance does not equal "Need to Know." This is a critical issue since the continued loss of National Security information through unauthorized disclosures denigrates America's most sensitive intelligence and analytic capabilities. 12 13. The 1st Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was enacted to guarantee freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Violating this given right, by either leaking or mishandling sensitive information is not only wrong, it can endanger the lives of others and the security of the United States of America. 13 14. The pictures of seven convicted spies and a quote from George Washington. In the ensuing years, the number of convicted spies has increased, not withstanding Washington's warning that "There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the most attentive watch be kept..." 14 15. WHO SPIES ON WHOM? In the 1970s a "senior U.S. government official" (probably Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger) observed, "There is no such thing as 'friendly' intelligence agencies. There are only The Intelligence agencies of friendly powers, "WHAT'S A LITTLE SPYING AMONG FRIENDS? If that weren't the case, then there'd be no use for an intelligence service," Obama told reporters in Tanzania. "The United States and its coalition 'Five Eye' partners enjoy a close intelligence partnership and do not spy each on each other," writes former CIA officer Mark Lowenthal in his book "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy." The group includes the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. "Beyond that, all bets are off," he writes. 15 16. Americans who spied for foreign countries CIA Aldrich Ames (1994) David Henry Barnett (1976) Larry Wu-Tai Chin (1985) William Kampiles (1977) Harold James Nicholson (1996) Sharon M. Scranage (1985) NSA David Sheldon Boone (1988 to 1991) Ronald Pelton (1980) FBI Robert Hanssen (1979 to 2001) Richard Miller (1984) Earl Edwin Pitts (1987 to 1992) Armed Forces Clayton John Lonetree (1987) Morris Cohen (1961) John Anthony Walker (1967) Other Kendall Myers (2009) Federal Contractors Christopher John Boyce (1977) Andrew Daulton Lee (1977) Jonathan Pollard (1984) Stewart Nozette (2009) 16 17. Interview of Eric O'Neill by KTLA 17 18. Jonathan Pollard Revealed 1985 18 19. 1994 Aldrich Ames Arrested for Espionage 19 20. WHY SPY? U.S. counterintelligence emphasizes personal financial issues in assessing security risks. Many people involved in the worst espionage cases suffered by the United States. Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, The Walker spy ring, Ronald Pelton. They Were motivated largely by greed, not ideology. Some exceptions were Julius Rosenberg, Alger Hiss, Larry Wu-tai Chin, and Ana Montes. 20 21. WHY SPY? By contrast, many involved in the worst espionage cases in Britain, for example? Spied because of ideological devotion to the Soviet Union. Kim Philly and his associates or George Blake Although espionage cases of either type (greed or ideology) can arise in either country, some Observers have been struck by the difference. It can be explained, in part, by the fact that Britain has had (and still has) a class system that makes ideology a more likely reason for betrayal. 21 22. WHY SPY? In the United States, the main competition has always been based on economic status, not social class spies may also be motivated by vengeance toward superiors or agencies, by blackmail against themselves or family members, by thrills, or by involvement with a foreign national. However, a Defense Department study released in April 2008 found that "divided loyalty" between the United States and the nation enlisting the spy had greatly increased as a motive for espionage. Although "need to know" was the standard for decades, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, many felt that this standard also served to impede the necessary sharing of intelligence. 22 23. WHY SPY? In 2003, the Intelligence community began to stress the "need to share," an important shift in emphasis. The clearest sign of this "data ownership" concept was the classification marking ORCON, or "originator controlled. ORCON means that any further distribution of intelligence or its inclusion in another document must be approved by the originating agency. ORCON reflects the concern that the intelligence could reveal a sensitive source or method, a sensitivity that those wishing to use the intelligence more broadly might not appreciate. 23 24. WHY SPY? In 2007, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell signaled a change in emphasis by promulgating a "responsibility to provide" standard. In other words, officers and agencies now will be evaluated by the degree to which they actively seek to share intelligence. Indirect costs include safes, couriers, and security officers to check officers' clearances, and color-coded or numerically tagged papers, to name a few. Other safeguards include the certified destruction of discarded material; the use of secure phones, which cannot be easily tapped, for classified conversations, In addition restricted access to buildings or to parts of buildings where sensitive material is used. 24 25. WHY SPY? It is also means, in a period of greatly increased hiring, like the one that began across the intelligence community in 2001, that hiring delays will likely increase. The risk-avoidance approach also means that some candidates, who may not actually pose a security risk, will not be hired because of the guiding cautious approach. There is evidence to suggest that these candidates face particular burdens under the risk avoidance approach, out of fear of divided loyalties, family left behind whose influence is unknown or who could become subject to external pressure, and so on. 25 26. WHY SPY? There is an irony here in that most of the worst espionage breaches suffered by the United States came from individuals whose families had been here for generations. As sensible as this approach may be, it can run into opposition from those people who are supposed to administer it, the individuals responsible for personnel security. These individuals are unlikely to see any benefit to clearing more people if this means they have also cleared the individual who becomes a security threat. This personnel policy shift will be an interesting test of the DNI's authority over intelligence officers who work in agencies that the DNI does not control directly. 26 27. Polygraph A polygraph (popularly referred to as a lie detector) measures and records several physiological signs such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and skin conductivity while the subject is asked and answers a series of questions. The polygraph was on the Encyclopedia Britannica 2003 list of greatest inventions, described as inventions that "have had profound effects on human life for better or worse." The efficacy of polygraphs is debated in the scientific community. The polygraph was invented in 1921 by John Augustus Larson, a medical student at the UC Berkeley & a police officer of the Berkeley PD. In some countries polygraphs are used as an interrogation tool with criminal suspects or candidates for sensitive public or private sector employment. 27 28. Polygraph In 2002, a review by the National Academies of Science found that in populations untrained in countermeasures, polygraph testing can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates above chance, though below perfection. US law enforcement and federal government agencies such as the FBI and the CIA and many police departments such as the LAPD use polygraph examinations to interrogate suspects and screen new employees. The belief underpinning the use of the polygraph is that deceptive answers will produce physiological responses that can be differentiated from those associated with non-deceptive answers, i.e., the polygraph is used for lie detection. Effectiveness may also be worsened by counter measures. 28 29. The polygraph, sometimes mistakenly referred to as a lie detector, is a machine that monitors Physical responses (such as pulse and breathing rate) to a series of questions A 2002 study by the National Research Council found that polygraphs are more useful in criminal investigations, where specific questions can be asked, than for counterintelligence, where the questions are more general and therefore are more likely to yield false- positive responses. 29 30. In addition to new employees, current Employees are polygraphed at intervals of several years; contractors are subject to polygraphs; and the machines are used with defectors. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency (NSA) all use polygraphs; the State Department and Congress do not. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began using Polygraphs in the aftermath of the 2001 Robert Hanssen espionage case, which revealed that Polygraphs had not been in use at the FBI. 30 31. Despite the fact that so many agencies use polygraphs as part of their security practice, there is no Standard procedure for these tests. Each agency administers polygraphs to its own standards, which, according to press accounts, can lead to different results for the same subject. Thus, intelligence agencies have what they call the lifestyle poly (Personal Behavior) and the counterintelligence poly (foreign contacts, handling of classified information). Beyond taking a polygraph (known as "being put on the box"), employees and prospective Employees are evaluated for other possible indicators of disloyalty. Intelligence increased the amount of personal financial information that intelligence personnel must report on a regular basis. 31 32. EXTERNAL INDICATORS AND COUNTERESPIONAGE Besides internal measures taken to prevent or to identify problems, counterintelligence agents look for external indicators of problems. They may be more obvious, such as the sudden loss of a spy network overseas, a change in military exercise patterns that corresponds to satellite tracks, or a penetration of the other services apparatus that reveals the possibility of ones own having been penetrated as well. As VENONA showed, SIGINT can offer indications of ongoing espionage, although the references to spying may be oblique and are unlikely to identify the spy outright. The serious problems resulting from having been penetrated by a hostile service also highlight the gains to be made by carrying out ones own successful penetration of the hostile service. Possible penetrations of ones own service or other services; The agents also present opportunities, as they are conduits to their own intelligence services. 32 33. PROBLEMS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Several problems arise in assessing counterintelligence operations. First, by its very nature, any counterintelligence penetration is going to be covert. Counterintelligence officers are unlikely to come across initially compelling evidence about a successful hostile penetration. Second, the basic tendency within any intelligence organization (or any organization, for that matter) is to trust its own people, who have been vetted and cleared. This appears to have been a problem in uncovering the espionage of Ames; the CIA was slow to look inward for the cause of severe losses of assets in Moscow. 33 34. PROBLEMS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE It was originally thought that Hanssen escaped detection for more than twenty years because of his familiarity with U.S. counterintelligence policy and techniques. However, a 2003 report by the Inspector General of the Justice Department (the FBI is part of that department) found that internal laxity and poor oversight allowed Hanssen, who was portrayed as erratic and bumbling, to avoid detection. Most telling, the FBI first concentrated on a CIA officer when hunting for the spy who turned out to be one of his or her own, Hanssen. James Angleton, who was in charge of the CIA's counterintelligence from 1954 to 1974, became convinced that a Soviet mole; A deeply hidden spy; had penetrated the CIA. Angleton was unable to find the mole, and some believe that he tied the CIA in knots by placing virtually anyone under suspicion. 34 35. PROBLEMS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Angleton remains a controversial figure, but his activities give Some indication of the intellectual issues that can be involved me in spying and counterintelligence. For many years counterintelligence was a major source of friction between the CIA and the FBI. Lee, who was born in Taiwan, had been under investigation since 1994, but the investigation was fitful and inconclusive. A good example is Edward Howard, a CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) officer who was slated to be posted to Moscow in the 1980s. He eluded surveillance (using techniques he learned as a DO officer) and fled to Moscow, claiming that he had not been a spy but had been driven away by the CIA. 35 36. PROBLEMS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE If One is able to answer this question it will reveal the nature of the penetration and the goals of the Nation running the spy. Once a spy has been identified and arrested, the intelligence community conducts a damage assessment, to determine what intelligence has been compromised. In the United States, this cooperation often becomes a major negotiating point between government prosecutors and the spy's attorney: cooperation in exchange for a specific sentence or for consideration for the spy's family. Domestic phones can be tapped, but only after intelligence agents have obtained a warrant from a special federal court (the foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court), which was set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA, pronounced "fy-za"). Prosecuting intelligence officers for spying was a major concern for the intelligence agencies, which feared that accused spies, would threaten to reveal classified information in open court as a means of avoiding prosecution. 36 37. PROBLEMS IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE In 1999, as part of government-wide response to revelations about Chinese espionage, the FBI Proposed splitting its National Security division into two separate units, one to deal with counterespionage and the other with terrorism in 2003, the FBI created an Intelligence Division, concentrating primarily on terrorism the 2004 intelligence legislation formally recognized the new Office as the Intelligence Directorate. In addition to the FBI, which has the primary CI responsibility in the United States, and the CIA, the Defense Investigative Service and the counterintelligence units of virtually all intelligence agencies Or offices share some CI responsibility. The diffusion of the CI effort reflects the organization of the community and also highlights why coordination on CI cases has been problematic. 37 38. Great moments in espionage 38 39. LEAKS They may not be seen as being as dangerous as an espionage penetration but they can have obvious counterintelligence concerns, because leaks often entail the unauthorized release of classified information. (President Franklin Roosevelt, decrying leaks during his tenure, wondered why the British had so many fewer leaks, even though Britain had freedom of speech and tea parties.) The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (1982) makes it a crime for someone who has access to classified information to reveal the identity of a covert agent. The "pattern of activities" clause was aimed at individuals such as former CIA officer Philip Agree, who made a practice of revealing the identity of CIA case officers overseas after he quit the CIA. The Espionage Act (1917) has also been used in leak prosecutions. 39 40. LEAKS Enacted months prior to the United States' entry into World War 1, this act covers traditional espionage but is also deemed broad enough to cover leaks, even of information that is not classified but is related to the national defense. Use of the Espionage Act became controversial in 2006 when it was used as the basis for prosecuting two officials of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (commonly called AIPAC) who received classified information from a DOD official, Lawrence Franklin, and then passed it on to an Israeli official and a journalist. It can be argued that the president cannot leak because the president also has the right to declassify intelligence, but the motives behind a revelation can be debated, as they were in this case. 40 41. Bradley Manning Sentenced To 35 Years For Espionage 41 42. NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS One investigative technique that has been used in espionage cases, as well as counterterrorism, is National security letters (NSLs). The USA Patriot Act, passed after the 2001 attacks, expanded the authority to issue NSLs from FBI headquarters only to field offices, included terrorism as a cause as well as espionage, and eliminated the requirement that the information being sought pertain to a Foreign power or its agent. The most obvious is the fact that they are not subject to judicial review and that they come under a gag order, which raises civil liberties concerns. Second, The use of NSLs has expanded greatly since 2001. 42 43. 43 44. CONCLUSION As VENONA confirms, the espionage threat during the cold war was pointed and obvious. Russian espionage did not end with the cold war. Neither did U.S. activities against Russia, given the Russians arrested Agent of Ames's spying or the source who led to Hanssen. In 2003, Russia arrested Alexander Zaporozhsky, a former intelligence officer who had settled in the U.S. but had been lured Back to Russia, was sentenced to eighteen years for spying for the U. S. In 1999, The Cox Committee found that China had stolen U.S. nuclear weapons designs during the 1980s, when the two states were tacit allies against the Soviet Union. 44 45. A 2002 report prepared for Congress listed China, France, India, Israel, Japan, and Taiwan as being among the most active collectors. In 2001, Ana Belen Montes, a DIA analyst, was arrested for spying for Cuba. U.S. officials assume that much of the intelligence that Montes provided over seventeen years was shared by Cuba with Russia and possibly other nations. A 2002 report. Espionage against the U. S. by American Citizens, 1947-2001, prepared by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, noted changes in the demographics of U.S. citizens who spied against their country. . Since the end of the Cold war, spies have tended to be older, to have lower clearances, to be naturalized citizens instead of native- born, and to include more women. Thus, it would be naive to believe that the need for rigorous counter intelligence and counterespionage ceased with the end of the cold war. 45