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Lori McDonald

Prof. Lloyd Totty

IMAG 1101 Imagery Intelligence

April 30, 2014

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect

against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on

behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not

including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.–Executive

Order 12333.1

Since the founding of the United States, counterintelligence is considered by many to be

one of the most important tools for our national security. The threat from foreign intelligence

and foreign entities has increasingly become more intricate, diverse, and more difficult to

counter than ever before. Counterintelligence has the job of defending the nation from both of

internal and external aggression. According to the Office of the National Counterintelligence

Executive, counterintelligence has both a defensive mission and an offensive mission for

protecting the nation. It must protect the nation’s secrets and assets against foreign intelligence

penetration, as well as find out what foreign intelligence organizations are planning to be able to

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counter those efforts. Counterintelligence is considered by many to be a highly specialized kind

of investigative work. According to Roy Godson, it is the identification and neutralization of a

threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manipulation of those services for the

manipulator’s benefit.1 Good intelligence practices depends on adequate and competent

counterintelligence programs to be able to provide the warning and protective measures against

those that have malicious intent against the United States and its sovereignty. The need for

counterintelligence throughout U.S. history has not gone away, and is not likely to in the future.

The United States, as a world superpower, will be the constant target of jealousies, resentments,

rivalries, and challenges to its economic well-being, security, and leadership in the world. 5

Although everyone in this country may not agree on the priorities or specifics of how

counterintelligence is conducted, there is no denying the fact that counterintelligence is essential

as a strong national priority.

Counterintelligence: The American Revolution

Counterintelligence in American history has its roots in the establishment of the first

American colonies prior to the revolutionary war and the formation of the United States as an

independent country. General George Washington was America’s first master spy.2 He made

excellent use of counterintelligence strategies, but never created an organization to coordinate

defensive counterintelligence or coordinate its activity. 3 Throughout the revolutionary war he

misled the British on many occasions. He also ran one of the largest espionage operations in

U.S. history through the use of deception, secret ink, informants, and covert action.2 One of the

more notable figures in early U.S. history for counterintelligence was John Honeyman. Playing

the role of a British spy, he was sent to Trenton New Jersey to watch the British. There he was

“caught” and “imprisoned” as a by Washington’s troops, then later “escaped” as a front to the

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British to gain their trust. He then went to the British and provided misinformation about how

the U.S. troops were badly disorganized and not ready for battle.2 The British, believing this

information to be true, were then able to be exploited by Washington in a surprise attack the day

after Christmas. Tactics such as this in early counterintelligence were commonplace; as

deception was the main tool utilized to misinterpret strength or weakness.2 Right at the onset of

the American Revolutionary War, the first patriot organization for counterintelligence was

created in New York in 1776 to 1778. 3 Called the Committee (later Commission) for Detecting

and Defeating, its role was to collect intelligence on and apprehend British spies and suspected

sympathizers. They also had the power to arrest, convict, jail, or deport those suspected of

supporting the British. The first director of this committee was John Jay. He was known as the

first chief of American counterintelligence.3 Several other members of this organization such as

Nathaniel Scott, Col. William Duer, and Capt. David Gray were able to use counterintelligence

measures to seek out and expose British agents, as well as mislead British troops by posing as

sympathizers that were “caught” by American forces and later “escaped” with information

designed to manipulate British actions. 3 Another well-known Revolutionary War figure, Col.

Benjamin Tallmadge, also played a role in early counterintelligence. The chief of the British

secret service, Maj. Andre, was reported through U.S. sources to be in contact with a “John

Anderson” who was expecting a surrender of a “major patriot installation”.3 Tallmadge learned

that “Anderson” had passed through the lines and was on his way to General Benedict Arnold,

the commander of West Point. Tallmadge had his forces find and apprehend “Anderson”, who

admitted his true identity as Maj. Andre. Benedict Arnold, learning that Andre was captured and

had most likely exposed him as a traitor, fled West Point before he could be captured and joined

the British forces. Without the use of effective counterintelligence, important military stations

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such as West Point may have been lost to British power, and the conclusion of the Revolutionary

War may have had a different outcome. With the close of the Revolutionary War and the

establishment of a new nation, there were many different opportunities to create a

counterintelligence service; however it wasn’t until the Civil War that a federal agency created a

counterintelligence agency.3

Counterintelligence in the American Civil War

Six weeks after the election of Pres. Lincoln, South Carolina seceded from the Union. In

February of 1861, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia, Alabama, Florida and Mississippi followed,

forming the Confederate States of America. When President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers

after Fort Sumter was fired upon in April 1861, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and

Tennessee joined the Confederacy. 4 This was the onset of the Civil War. At the beginning,

neither the North or South had any significant intelligence or counterintelligence capability; and

leaders operated their own espionage rings. President Lincoln was concerned that the capital

was permeated with southern sympathizers, so he elected Allan Pinkerton to take on the role as

counterintelligence chief. 4 Pinkerton was very effective in stopping the flow of intelligence to

the Confederacy. He also was an important player in intelligence gathering in 1861 and 1862

when he organized a system for intelligence gathering and double agents to obtaining military

information in the Southern states.4 The Confederacy did not formerly establish a Secret Service

Bureau until November 1864; with the conclusion of the war being in April 1865.4 The full

extent of the Confederacy's counterintelligence operations and activities will never be known due

to Judah Benjamin, the Secretary of State for the confederacy. As the Union Army entered

Richmond, he ordered all espionage records to be burned.

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As the country advanced towards the beginning of WWI, the U.S. had little to no functioning

intelligence organization with any capability for counterintelligence operations. The modern

concept of a counterintelligence community did not exist. Even with this deficit of

counterintelligence capability, in March 1892 the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was

created. It was considered by the U.S. government to be one of the most reliable and

authoritative source of information with regard to foreign military affairs.6 To be adequately

prepared for WWI, the War College in 1917 organized the Military Intelligence Section, or

MIS.3 The new MIS was headed by Major Ralph Van Deman. The initial threat addressed by

federal officials was the activity of German agents, including sabotage and espionage directed at

the United States in the period before America entered the war. In the MIS, Van Deman

distinguished the difference between positive intelligence and negative intelligence. Positive

intelligence is the action of gaining information on the enemy. Negative intelligence denies

information to the enemy. Until this point, the intelligence community did not have a specific

focus on counterintelligence, and did not specifically distinguish between positive and negative

intelligence. The MIS was in charge of policies, plans, collecting, and control of espionage and

counterespionage activities. Until the MIS developed these policies and guidelines, the War

Department had never previously collected counterintelligence information.2 After the WWI

began and the draft had been implemented, the MIS investigators believed that the military had

been infiltrated by enemy agents and sympathizers. Congress strengthened the ability of federal

investigations by enacting the Espionage Act of 1917 to assist the war effort.6 This led to the

MIS creation of an extensive network of clandestine agents in the Army made up of intelligence

officers from the U.S. civilian population.2 The growing number of incident reports generated

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by this system prompted the expansion of the MIS, and led to the formation of the Corps of

Intelligence Police, or CIP. 3 While Military Intelligence started out as simply a division of the

War College, it evolved into its own branch, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) when the

War College Division was abolished. 2 In September of 1918 the supervision of all the

counterintelligence operations was transferred from the positive branch to the negative branch.

This allowed for censorship to deny the flow of information to the enemy, as there were concerns

about Mexico providing Germany with information about the U.S. 2 The counterintelligence

efforts of the Secret Service, the Bureau of Investigation (later the FBI), and War Department's

Military Intelligence and Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence were insignificant and not

coordinated and unprepared to deal with the disingenuous espionage and sabotage ring organized

in the United States by German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff. 6

Counterintelligence in the World Wars

Between WWI and WWII, there were several advances in developing agencies that

helped to further the counterintelligence community, although it lacked the structure that we

know today. In 1939, the Counterintelligence Branch was established in the Army’s MID. Also

in June of 1939 the president assigned all investigations of espionage and counterespionage to

the MID and the ONI, however later in that year in September the president reallocated those

responsibilities solely to the FBI.6 After WWI, intelligence was not handled in a coordinated

manner, and there was a serious lack of coordination between the Navy and Army intelligence.

This was a significant failure on behalf of the intelligence community. The surprise attack on

Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a direct result of this failure at the inception of WWII. With the

American leaders unanimously stating “never again” with respect to the failure at Pearl Harbor, a

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centralized intelligence structure was established. 2 In 1942, President Roosevelt enacted several

changes to aid in the ability of the intelligence community to be able to foresee and handle

threats from foreign national powers, and also created new departments to accomplish this. He

established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), and

the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). 2 The OSS included specialists in many fields of language,

history, geography and economics, while the MIS performed various types of reconnaissance, as

well as analyzing signals and photo intelligence. 2 Together these groups helped strengthen the

nation’s counterintelligence ability. The CIC specifically addressed both the need and

importance of accurate, timely, and relevant counterintelligence. They recruited and trained

Army personnel to perform in their division to be able to perform security investigations and sent

detachments overseas. They also responsible for oversight on the Manhattan Project where the

Atomic bomb was developed and tested, as well as following U.S. forces into combat and

capturing German Scientists and work they were doing on developing their own atomic bombs or

rockets. 2 After the conclusion of WWII, the CIC also played an important role in bringing to

justice Nazis and war criminals. They completely infiltrated the enemy and countered any acts

of sabotage through assisting local authorities promote law and order, taking control of enemy

headquarters and arresting enemy agents. They also halted the spread of Nazi propaganda by

gaining control of radio and communications, as well as gaining many strategically important

informants. 2

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Post WWII: The Korean War, the Red Scare and beginning of the Cold War era

For this part in American counterintelligence history, it is important to describe the

beginning of the American Communist Party (CPUSA), as this was a time period of great tension

and fear of communism and Soviet control. The CPUSA was developed at the same time as the

large rings of Soviet espionage groups in the United States. 6 The CPUSA was founded in 1919

in Chicago and was an outgrowth of the Socialist Party, founded in 1900. 6 The early CPUSA

had an overwhelming majority of members that were of Jewish decent, and were foreign born

from Russian or other Eastern European nations. In the 1920s, the US government attempted to

penalize Communists for alleged spy activities. Many states even enacted laws denying members

of the Communist Party the right to hold public office or to obtain public jobs.6 In the 1940s,

states tried to deny jobs or force out members of the Communist party again, but the Supreme

Court ruled against it. The American historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that periodically in

American history, during times of great worry, many individuals turn to “conspiracy theories” to

explain their anxieties. The early post–World War II scene was such a period.6 The peace that

the American public expected after defeating the Nazis was not there, and they attributed that as

the result of widespread treason.6 The fear of the country being inundated with communist

supporters undermining American prosperity and overtaking those in government is referred to

as the Red Scare. 7 There were two main periods of time that the Red Scare was the most

pronounced. President Harry Truman was slowed down with the situation in Korea, and was

unwilling to commit the resources to win because the United States had to build up NATO to

defend Europe.6 As a result he did not focus on the Communist threat, and was deemed by

some right-wing politicians as being soft on communism, In 1945, President Truman abolished

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the OSS in favor of the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a stronger force for counterintelligence, the CIA’s main

objective was to coordinate national security intelligence.2 Following the conclusion of WWII,

much of the counterintelligence structures and systems from the U.S. Army and Air Force were

dismantled. This again, left a deficit of structure and strength in the intelligence community the

U.S. unprepared for the onset of the Korean War. The absence of serious and consistent

counterintelligence gave an open opportunity to the spread of communist espionage within

American government and industry. In the mid 1930’s, the FBI’s initiated their

counterintelligence program, however it wasn’t until the 1950’s that it had any real effect on

Communist espionage.7

On September 23, 1949, Truman announced that the USSR had exploded an atomic

device.6 This had a drastic impact on the US national security policy. This even started a fear in

the American public that began the Second Red Scare, which was a major contributing factor in

start of the Cold War.7 As the leader of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover greatly expanded his efforts to

undermine communist espionage efforts, and required loyalty oaths for all government

employees.6 The second Red Scare was more popularly known as “McCarthyism” after its is

most famous supporter Senator Joseph McCarthy. During that time he challenged anyone he

suspected of being a communist, which probably hindered any real investigation into actual

espionage more than it helped it.7 Following the revelation that the Soviets had atomic

capabilities that many feared they would use against the United States, the FBI investigated the

advancement of the newfound Soviet abilities and were able to decrypt material that indicated

the presence of a spy within the Manhattan project.7 They found Klaus Fuchs as their suspect.

Fuchs, who was Jewish and a member of the CPUSA, had previously been a member of the

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German Communist party and had fled Germany when the Nazis took over. During FBI

questioning, he confessed to revealing secrets of the Manhattan Project to Soviet intelligence,

and named a second man, Harry Gold as his courier of information.6 When the FBI questioned

Gold, it began one of the biggest espionage cases in U.S. history. Gold named co-conspirator

David Greenglass as another person responsible for leaking atomic secrets. Greenglass, when

interrogated, fully confessed to his involvement and agreed to full cooperation with the FBI. He

named his sister and brother-in-law, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as his accomplices and leaders

of a Soviet Communist espionage ring.6 Julius Rosenberg worked on classified projects for the

Army Signals Corps from 1940 to 1945 until his membership in the CPUSA became widely

known. When the Rosenberg trial began in 1951, they were found guilty for conspiracy and

were sentenced to death. 6 This case was a milestone for the FBI’s counterintelligence

capabilities and respect gained by world entities.

The Cold War from 1947 to 1991 put the counterintelligence as well as intelligence

capabilities of the U.S. to the test. Every president during this period beginning with Harry

Truman had to design its foreign policy around the overwhelming fact that the United States was

in a potentially fatal competition with the Soviet Union. To the Counterintelligence Community,

this meant its resources and energy had to be focused on that threat.6 Called by some a

“bloodless war”, the Cold War was mainly a war of intelligence, counterintelligence, and

espionage. Tensions involving the Soviet Union along with its eastern allies, and the U.S. with

its allies, created a desire to prevent large scale fighting and the potential beginning of what

might become WWIII. At the height of the Cold War, there were as many as 80 different

intelligence agencies operating for or against one nation or another in Berlin.2

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From the 60’s to the 70’s: Counterintelligence during the Vietnam War era

The power of counterintelligence investigations and information is detailed information.

Agencies that deal with counterintelligence must be able to establish patterns, connections, and

associations to be able to provide accurate and relevant information. The problem with this

detailed information gathering in the 1960’s and 1970’s is the fear of the public that their rights

were being infringed upon because of the classified nature of much of the intelligence

community’s information collection techniques. The National Security Act of 947 provided the

CIA with the legal ability to “correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,

and provide the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence”.8 It outlined the purpose of the

CIA to investigating in the field of foreign intelligence with respect to counterintelligence.

Internal security functions were to be the responsibility of the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies. The CIA in the early 1960’s was directed to produce intelligence for the benefit of

policy makers, such as the capabilities of Soviet weapons systems or strategies. They conducted

clandestine operations to collect foreign intelligence and carry out counterintelligence for agency

heads such as the Directorate for Intelligence, the DDI.8 The DDO, or Directorate for Operations

was the unit that was responsible for the collection of information through covert collection of

information by human sources on issues such as international terrorism.

Counterintelligence community members such as the CIA and the FBI have to protect

their collection methods and abilities with a degree of secrecy. The ability of these agencies to

protect these secrets is essential to their work as it can endanger those in the field; make certain

targets more available to terrorists or alert foreign government to collection ability and give them

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the knowledge to counter those actions. The conflict with these measures of secrecy in how these

departments operate and what secrets that they keep is the fear of the American public that their

rights were being infringed upon and their expectation of privacy from government interference

was being violated. The role of counterintelligence in 1954 was scrutinized by President

Eisenhower in a special committee headed by Gen. James Doolittle that was to examine the

covert activities of the CIA. The committee found that the importance of counterintelligence was

vital to the strength of the country, and supported its objectives.8 In 1970, the Huston Plan was

proposed to confront domestic unrest with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection

activities of the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA.8 The Huston Plan was not implemented, but an

Interagency Evaluation Committee was established by the Counsel to the President.

In 1952, the CIA and the FBI began the practice of opening mail that they identified as having

potential intelligence value. The CIA targeted mail addressed to and from the USSR while the

FBI was less discriminate on the mail they chose to open, and targeted individuals that were

involved in current cases. The practice continued until 1966 when it was terminated by J. Edgar

Hoover, who believed that higher Government officials would not support him in the use of

questionable investigative practices.8

During this time, there were also concerns by the American public over wiretaps

conducted by the FBI because of the possibility that it was being used against citizens in a

warrantless manner. In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued a memorandum to the

Attorney General stating his view that electronic surveillance would be proper under the

Constitution for matters involving defense of the nation.8 In 1954, the unrestricted use of

microphone surveillance was authorized to Hoover for issues of national safety and security.8

However, in 1965, in a letter to the Attorney General, Director Hoover stated that with the

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“present atmosphere, brought about by the unrestrained and injudicious use of special

investigative techniques by other agencies and departments, resulting in Congressional and

public alarm and opposition to any activity that could in any way be termed an invasion of

privacy.”8 The practice of unrestrained wiretapping was then discontinued due to the concern of

violating American citizen’s 4th Amendment rights.

The Vietnam War also was a significant factor in the public mood and policies enacted

by the counterintelligence community. In this period from 1956 to 1975, being a publically

unpopular war, it exemplified public unhappiness with the government and what was perceived

as “big brother” and imperialism controlling the lives of U.S. citizens. The FBI’s

counterintelligence program was established in 1965 in response to the need to neutralize

individuals or organizations that advocated or participated in disorder on campuses and urban

riots and violence.

The U.S. Army during this era also established a more diversified branch to deal with the

increasing need for more refined counterintelligence. The U.S. Army Intelligence Command

(INSCOM) was established in 1965 to address this issue; however it was discontinued in 1974

and replaced with the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. In mid-1965, the Military Assistance

Command counterintelligence resources were very limited.9 Under the staff supervision of the

Counterintelligence and Security Division of the Military Assistance Command, the 704th

Intelligence Corps Detachment provided counterintelligence support to the command and served

in an advisory role with the South Vietnamese Military Security Service.9 This was the extent of

the U.S. Army counterintelligence ability at the start of the war. Reorganization of the original

counterintelligence staff in 1965 reformed the Army Counterintelligence and Security Division

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to the Counterintelligence Division.

Continuing into 1966, Colonel Goodman of the U.S. Army worked closely with the

Military Security Service and increased the counterintelligence ability of the Army with the

deployment of counterintelligence teams to each province of South Vietnam. These teams

participated regularly in combined operations; however the lack of linguists and the inability to

blend inconspicuously with the Vietnamese made the combined operations with English

speaking Vietnamese essential. By 1967, the counterintelligence effort by the U.S. Army finally

began to become more functional with the War effort. 9 The 135th MI group assumed the role

of executing the counterintelligence mission by confronting the effects of anti-American

propaganda by the Vietnamese that was of particular concern to American soldiers, and to install

a security program to prevent sabotage and secure communications.9 The Vietnam War was

challenging to American armed forces because it was a different type of conflict than anything

that had been experienced by the United States. It mainly consisted of guerilla military tactics by

the opposition, to which American forces had a steep learning curve overcoming and

understanding the counterintelligence aspects involved.10

Along with the political turmoil that was caused by the Vietnam War, the fear of the

public for potential violations of their 4th amendment rights and distrust of the intelligence

community became a serious issue. In 1972, the Watergate scandal involved the break-in and

theft of information at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate

Complex in Washington D.C. This event was associated with the illegal and clandestine efforts

of Nixon administration officials during his reelection campaign.8 The five men arrested in

association with the break-in had past CIA ties, furthering the public mistrust of the government

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intelligence agencies. This fear of intelligence misuse was brought to a head in 1974 when the

New York Times published an article that accused the CIA of spying on the American public. To

address this problem, President Ford appointed a commission to look into these allegations. In

January of 1975, he signed an executive order creating the Commission on CIA activities.8 This

commission was named after Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, the chairman of the

commission. Its task was to investigate if the CIA had overstepped the boundaries safeguarding

4th amendment rights, and there were adequate procedures in place for intelligence and

counterintelligence activities. This commission foundseveral abuses by the CIA and the rights of

American citizens. As a result of the Rockefeller commission, the Civil Applications Committee

(CAC) was established in 1975.11 Its function was to provide communication between civil users

of intelligence and intelligence providers. As a response to a clear need for concise structure and

policy guiding intelligence and counterintelligence, in 1978 President Carter signed Executive

Order 12036 to reshape the structure of intelligence and provide detailed guidance on all aspects

of intelligence activities. In 1979, Executive Order 12139 addressed the exercise of authority

with electronic surveillance.8 It authorized the use of electronic surveillance for the purpose of

foreign intelligence purposes, without the need for a court order.8

The 1980’s: Counterintelligence Community Cooperation and Refinement

The 1980’s is referred in some texts as the decade of the spy. U.S. counterintelligence

either arrested or neutralized over 60 Americans who attempted or carried out acts of

espionage.11 While it was the cases against spy networks or agents that captured the attention of

the public, the most important milestone in counterintelligence during this decade was the

beginning of CI community cooperation. Careful to preserve the delicate balance between

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security and freedom, a broad range of improvements were made to the counterintelligence

community without adversely affecting the rights of individuals. A major counterintelligence

event that took place at this time was the signing of Executive order 12333 by President Ronald

Regan.11 Executive Order 12333 defined counterintelligence as “information gathered and

activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or

assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or

international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or

communications security programs.”11 This definition of counterintelligence is still used in the

CI community today. Executive Order 12333 is important in that it requires that agencies such as

the CIA coordinate with the FBI before conducting any foreign intelligence collecting activities

or counterintelligence. Likewise, the FBI must coordinate with the CIA before it does the same.11

In 1982, President Regan also signed the National Security Decision Directive-2. This Directive

further increased the sophistication in the intelligence community by developing standards and

doctrines for counterintelligence activities, as well as resolving any interagency differences

concerning the implementation of the new policies. 11 These further advances in

counterintelligence practices only served to strengthen the country’s ability to collect relevant

information, as well as correctly follow laws and statutes put into place to protect individual civil

liberties. The signing of these orders outlined the need for greater counterintelligence and

security awareness. In 1988, the Counterintelligence Center was created in the CIA. Its mission

was to improve coordination, management, effectiveness, and planning of counterintelligence

activities. This served the need for earlier involvement in cases of suspected espionage; and also

provides more timely and accurate information about suspect activities to strengthen U.S.

counterintelligence and security without violating constitutional rights. In 1989, President Bush

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signed the National Security Directive, which reorganized the structure of the National Security

Council.11 Threat analysis is now shared among U.S. counterintelligence, foreign intelligence

and security agencies. Development of an effective national counterintelligence strategy requires

centralized assessment of the threat posed. 11

Counterintelligence in the 1990’s through the end of the 20th Century

In the 1990’s through the year 2000 and beyond, the counterintelligence community continued to

improve its cooperation between CI community members, and refine its information collecting

capabilities to be among the best counterintelligence systems in the world. The use of satellites

and UAV technology innovated the way that the counterintelligence information was gathered

and utilized. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the American public began to

believe that there was little need for collecting foreign intelligence or countering espionage.

However, in 1994 the nation was shocked when the FBI arrested Hazen Aldrich Ames, who was

a senior CIA officer that had been spying for almost a decade for the Russians.11 As a

consequence of Ames’ betrayal of the nation and compromise of national security radically

altered U.S. counterintelligence.11 Congress demanded change and wanted adjustments in

counterintelligence policy. To address this, President Clinton issued an Executive Order called

the Presidential Decision Directive NSC-24 in 1994, which reorganized counterintelligence.

Under this Order, the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) was created to

coordinate CI activities and resolve interagency disagreements.11 Unlike previous similar

groups, the NACIPB reported to the National Security Council. In addition, the order created a

National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) to share and evaluate information regarding

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foreign intelligence.11 In 1995, Congress recognized that countries not previously considered

intelligence threats were stealing American technology and decided to take action.

In 1996, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, was signed by the President to address countries

that were stealing American technology.11 In 2002, the attacks of 9/11 led the Bush

administration to establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).12 Having both law

enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, it redefined the relationship between law

enforcement and intelligence agencies. 9/11 made it clear that intelligence efforts needed to

change quickly to meet the global threat of terrorism. Also with these attacks and the increased

threat from terrorist networks, there was an increased demand for imaging of the U.S. With

concern for the process of gathering these images, the Senate Intelligence Committee directed

the DCI to coordinate with NIMA and the NRO to provide a report on processes in which

satellites would be used 12 The Bush administration also implemented the Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004, in which the Director of National Intelligence was created

as a replacement for the DCI.12 The DNI helped to further and coordinate its activities with law

enforcement. Because of the turmoil caused in the past with intelligence and counterintelligence

gathering practices interfering with the 4th amendment rights of U.S. citizens, there was what

some described as an intelligence and law enforcement “wall” with respect to sharing of

information that was gathered on U.S. persons.12 The newly created DNI along with the USGS

formed an Independent Study Group (ISG) to review these obstacles to the sharing of

information. As a result of the ISG, Homeland Security was suggested as an intermediary

between the intelligence community and law enforcement. To be able to accomplish this, a new

Domestic Applications Office, or DAO, was created. In 2007, the DNI designated Homeland

Security to take charge of another new office, the NAO.12 This caused concern about using spy

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satellites against the American public and infringing on their civil liberties. A hearing to address

these issues was conducted in 2007, where many civil liberties organizations criticized the

NAO.12 Bush addressed these concerns by establishing a framework for the NAO that ensured

that it followed the U.S. Constitution and existing laws. Another advancement made for the

counterintelligence community was the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006. 12 In this Act, the

President, through the Attorney General, can authorize electronic surveillance for up to 45 days

if it is deemed necessary to protect the U.S. from terrorist activity. Once Bush left office and

President Obama was elected, his administration immediately began a review of the NAO, and

decided to abolish it. 12

The counterintelligence community: Practices and Policies Today

Today, counterintelligence is more than just what people see as traditional spies passing

U.S. secrets to foreign governments. It involves the activities those who would complete actions

against the prosperity of the U.S. such as stealing valuable trade secrets of American universities

or business, cyber threats, or economic sabotage. The FBI today is the lead agency for exposing,

preventing, and investigating intelligence activities on U.S. soil.13 Through the use of the

Counterintelligence National Strategy, the FBI continues to address threats using a full suite of

investigative intelligence capabilities.

Although the Counterintelligence National Strategy is classified, the overall goals are to

keep weapons of mass destruction and like technology from falling into the wrong hands. This

strategy is key for using intelligence to keep threats from becoming reality. Besides protecting

U.S. citizens from physically destructive forces such as WMD’s, the national strategy also strives

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to protect the secrets of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as protect the nation’s critical

assets such as advanced technologies and sensitive information in the defense, intelligence,

economic, financial, public health, and science and technology sectors. 13 It also performs the

more traditional role to counter the activities of international spies. Being able to achieve this

level of security involves strategic partnerships of sharing coordination of knowledge and

resources of the FBI, the U.S. intelligence community, other U.S. government agencies, and

global partners to combat foreign intelligence activities. 13 A new and emerging threat that is

receiving more emphasis each day is cyber security. FBI Counterintelligence Assistant Director

Frank Figliuzzi stresses the importance of deterring foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threats

to government and private sector information systems. In an increasingly technologically savvy

world, “Sometimes, the bad guys don’t have to physically be in the U.S. to steal targeted

information…sometimes they can be halfway around the world, sitting at a keyboard.” 13

In the years since 9/11, the FBI has transformed itself into an intelligence-driven organization.

This is the most apparent in U.S. intelligence analyst program. Analyzing and disseminating

intelligence enables the FBI and it's domestic and international partners to get ahead of existing

and emerging threats. Prior to 9/11, there were approximately 1,000 intelligence analysts (IAs) in

the FBI. Now, there are more than triple that number. 13 The Directorate of Intelligence (DI)

manages all FBI intelligence activities and was established in 2005 as a key component of the

FBI’s National Security Branch. The entire intelligence analyst program is administered under

the DI, allowing intelligence and counterintelligence to be much more broadly and efficiently

connected to programs and current investigations. The FBI today is more than just a law

enforcement agency but also a national security intelligence entity.

The FBI’s national security mission is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive

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actions to protect the United States. 13 Their goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding

of the threats and penetrate national and transnational networks that have a desire or capability to

harm the U.S. For this mission to be successful, the FBI must understand the threat, integrate

intelligence and law enforcement capabilities in every FBI operational program, and expand the

contribution to the Intelligence Community knowledge base. 13

Along with the FBI, the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) is a

part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The mission of the ONCIX is to

provide effective leadership and support to the counterintelligence and security activities of the

US Intelligence Community, the US Government, and U.S. private sector entities who are at risk

of intelligence collection or attack by foreign adversaries.14 Since 2012, Frank Montoya has been

the National Counterintelligence Executive officer. This office focuses on many different aspects

of counterintelligence, however, recently has focused on cyber-enabled economic espionage.14

The ONCIX develops, coordinates, and produces foreign intelligence threat assessments,

national CI strategy for Government officials, priorities for CI operations, and CI program

budgets that reflect strategic priorities.14 In October 2011, President Obama issued Executive

Order 13587 establishing the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), under joint leadership

of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. 14 The primary mission of the

NITTF is to prevent, deter and detect compromises of classified information by malicious

insiders.14 The NITTF assists counterintelligence agencies to develop and implement insider

threat programs, as well as ensuring the program standards do not erode civil liberties. 14

A major focus of counterintelligence today is the increasing threat of foreign-based cyber

operations and economic espionage that can be carried out through wireless channels. The U.S.

relies on a cyber infrastructure for everything from communications to the management of

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critical infrastructure, to the command and control of the military. This dependence on

technology, along with the rapid rate of technological innovation, creates numerous

vulnerabilities that U.S. adversaries seek to exploit. 14 Foreign cyber attacks can be conducted

relatively cheaply and easily. They serve adversaries to collect intelligence or diminish the

effectiveness of the technology that we depend on. Cyber attacks are a very attractive option for

foreign intelligence organizations because they easily have the ability to offer high returns with a

low degree of risk. 14 Cyber crimes can also be carried out fairly anonymously and remotely,

and are relatively quick and inexpensive. Counterintelligence against cyber threats plays a

significant role in insider threat detection programs that can increase the likelihood of identifying

threat activities on our cyber networks. Counterintelligence collection and analysis increases how

cyber threats are understood, and how to defend against them. The NCIX focuses on offensive

CI operations help to identify adversarial tactics and thereby reduce the effectiveness of their

cyber operations. 14

Conclusion

Historically, the United States Counterintelligence has divided its intelligence gathering

capabilities and responsibilities for address foreign intelligence threats pragmatically, rather than

strategically.15 Throughout history this can be seen in the progression of the counterintelligence

capabilities from the Revolutionary war to what it has evolved to today. CI programs in the past

have served objectives that were very agency-specific. Now they have evolved into a

counterintelligence community that has interagency cooperation to meet the constantly evolving

strategic threat. Foreign Intelligence operations against the United States are now more diffuse,

more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially more successful than ever

before.15 Today’s major players in the CI community; the FBI, CIA, and DOD have responded

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to the collection requirements that have been refined to identify those who would exploit U.S.

vulnerabilities, and diminish emerging threats posed by foreign adversaries.

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