5. the romanian countries-libre

8/18/2019 5. the Romanian Countries-libre

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/5-the-romanian-countries-libre 1/15

THE ROMANIAN COUNTRIES

IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT

(1672-1676)

DANIEL FLAUT

The Peace of Buczacz, signed on October 18th 1672, imposed Poland difficultconditions: the Polish had to pay an annual tribute of 22 000 ducats, they also had to giveup their rights over Podolia and to accept the establishment of the Ottoman garrisons insome of their fortresses, and, moreover, Ukraine (from the right side of the Dnieper river)was left under Turkish sovereignity1. All these facts aimed to ‘‘secure the Ottomans’position in the East of Europe and to force Poland to accept the political influence of thePorte.”2 The Peace of Buczacz was a crucial moment for the relations between the twostates3; the Ottomans did not intend to control Poland, but ‘‘to bring it within its politicalangle and use it as an element of counterbalancing Russia’s power.”4

Due to its amendments, the Peace Treaty of Buczacz represented a newrecognition of the Porte’s influence over the Romanian Countries, too. According to itsconditions, Poland became once again the guarantee of the Ottomans supremacy over theRomanian Countries.5 The situation of the Romanian Countries, especially Moldavia’s,worsened significantly after the conquest of Kamyanets fortress by the Ottomans.Geostrategically, this is how the Ottomans planned to control the space between theCarpathians and the Danube; ‘‘Moldavia became a crossing road towards Kamyanets’’,and, most of all, ‘‘the Vizier was planning the unification of the territories (under Turkishrule) from Hungary, Podolia and Ukraine, and, implicitly, Moldavia’s and Wallachia’stransformation into pashalics.”6 This plan was soon abandoned because there could havebeen a revolt of the Moldavians, which could have endangered the newly-conquered fiefsof the Padishah, still unstable at that time.7

1 Tahsin Gemil, Ţările române în contextul politic interna ţ ional 1621-1672, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti,1979, p. 211; I. Moga, Rivalitatea polono-austriacă şi orientarea politică a ţărilor române la sfâr şitul

secolului XVII , Cluj, 1933, p. 17; Moldova în contextul rela ţ iilor politice interna ţ ionale 1387-1858 ,alcă tuitor I. Ieremia, Chişină u, 1992, no. 124, p. 232-233; Francis Dvornik, Slavii în istoria şi civiliza ţ ia

europeană, Editura All Educational, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 424.2 Tahsin Gemil, op. cit., p. 211-212.3Veniamin Ciobanu, Românii în politica Est-Central europeană 1648-1711, Institutul European, Iaşi,1997, p. 91.4 Tahsin Gemil, op. cit., p. 212.5 The historian Veniamin Ciobanu considers this sovereignity as being a restrictive one (VeniaminCiobanu, op. cit., p. 91).6

Florin Constantiniu, De la Mihai Viteazul la fanario ţ i: observa

ţ ii asupra politicii externe române

şti, in„Studii şi Materiale de Istorie Medie” (subsequently referred to as „S.M.I.M.”), VIII, 1975, p. 128.

7 Ibidem; I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 18.



Daniel Flaut

58

The conquests made by the Ottoman Empire since 1672 represented the beginningof a series of Turkish-Polish wars, which, for two decades, transformed Moldavia into analmost permanent battle field and placed it, together with the other two RomanianCountries, “in the middle of the confrontations between the Porte, Poland and theHabsburgs’ Empire.”8

The conclusion of the Peace of Buczacz determined some tension in the Europeancapitals. As long as the Porte was free to handle once more Hungary’s problems, for the

Habsburgs’ Empire, which was threatened by France and Sweden, the peace meant a newconflict in the South East. Vienna showed a strict neutrality, and it would do the same forthe following years; thus, it refused to support the Polish against the Ottoman Empire.There could be sensed a vivid agitation in Rome, too, where Pope’s efforts of making aChristian anti-Ottoman coalition were useless; he was afraid that the political troubles inPoland aggravated by the peace, could make of this country a target of France’s policyagainst the Habsburgs’ Empire. The Papal nuncio, Buonvisi, was delegated with animportant mission in Warsaw, since February 1673, that of ending the internal politicaldisputes and getting the Polish and the Habsburgs closer one with the others in order tomake a strong alliance against the Porte. Despite the cardinal’s efforts, which, in the nextmonth, led to an agreement between King Michael Wisniowiecki and the confederates, thearistocracy was not in a hurry to equip for war, because the Polish and the Habsburgs’

attention was concentrated towards Rhine, upon the war between Emperor Leopold I andFrance.9

The amendments stipulated by the peace (in 1672) urged Russia into enterprisingsome diplomatic measures concerning the European powers, in order to support Poland. Thenegotiations between the Tsar’s Aleksey Mikhailovich delegate, general Menesius, and theHabsburgs from Vienna, in April 1673, did not reach any conclusion, because Leopold I wasmore preoccupied with his conflict against France.10

“As a consequence of the multiple disagreements existing between the Europeanstates”, and mostly due to the French-Habsburgs’ conflict, “nothing certain wasconcluded”. Only some Romanian rulers, secretly and sometimes even obviously,supported for a short period the Polish in their conflict against the Ottomans.11 For theRomanians, the salvation, at that time, seemed to be Poland12, which according to the

8 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 19.9 For details, see ibidem, p. 20-22.10 Istoria diploma ţ iei, ediţia a II-a, vol. I, Editura Ştiinţifică , Bucureşti, 1962, p. 258; I. Hudiţă , Histoire des

relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie au XVIIe siècle (1635-1683), Paris, 1927, p. 250.11 Mihail Dan, Ş tiri privitoare la istoria ţărilor române în cronicile ucrainiene, in ‘‘S.M.I.M.”, II, 1957, p. 242.12 Poland also represented an interesting political model for the Romanian gentry, who were interested inthe limitation of the power attributed to the ruler of the country within the internal politics. See, in thisrespect, Veniamin Ciobanu, ‘‘Modelul polonez” oglindit în literatura istorică medievală românească

(secolele XV-XVII). Considera ţ ii generale, in ‘‘Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol»,t. XXIV/2, 1987, p. 590-591; Constantin Rezachievici, Indigenatul polon - o formă însemnat ă de integrare

a nobilimii româneşti în cea europeană în Evul Mediu, in ‘‘Arhiva Genealogică ”, 3, 1996, no. 3-4, p. 205;Costin Feneşan, Diplomele de indigenat polon ale boierilor moldoveni Grigore H ăbăşescu şi Gheorghe

Hâjd ău, in ‘‘Arhiva Genealogică ”, 4, 1997, no. 3-4, p. 93-107; Gheorghe Lază r, Modelul politic polonez

şi reflectarea acestuia în sursele documentare româneşti (secolul al XVII-lea), in ‘‘S.M.I.M.” XVII,1999, p. 55-73.



The romanian countries in the international political context (1672-1676)

59

Peace of Buczacz was tributary to the Porte; thus, the Romanians and the Polish, for thefirst time in their history, were on the same side of the anti-Ottoman barricade, not only defacto, but also de jure.13

Simultaneously with the Pope’s efforts and despite the gentry’s reserve, the naiveŞtefan Petriceicu, the ruler of Moldavia, the country that was implicated the most in theefforts of consolidating the Porte’s dominions in the South East of Europe, submissive tothe orders of the Ottoman officials, was building a great plan; initially, this strategy was

planned by Russia and Poland, but the Venice people, the Moldavians, the Cossacks fromUkraine, the Kalmucks and the Shah of Persia were soon to join it against the Ottomans;the ruler of Moldavia succeeded to make Grigore I Ghica, the Wallachian ruler (who hadrecently regained the favours of the Porte), to join this plan, as well as he did “with PeterDeodat, the Archbishop of Sofia, on behalf of the Christians from Serbia, Bulgaria, Thraceand Macedonia.’’14 The Prince Mihail Apafi proved to me more cautious due to thepresence of the Ottoman armies at the frontiers of Transylvania.15

Peter Parchevich’s mission16, the delegate of the two Romanian rulers, in Warsaw,was to organize a Christian anti-Ottoman attack, but it did not have the anticipatory resultsbecause the Polish were mistrustful with the Moldavians and the Wallachians.17 The Polishruling class stepped aside any measure that could have disturbed the Ottomans, becausethey were hoping to get, in a peaceful manner, better conditions than those mentioned by

the Peace of Buczacz18, especially the revoking of the tribute of 22.000 ducats.The reality was a totally different one, as long as the Great Vizier of the Ottoman

Empire considered that the Polish envoy’s position (John Dibriz) expressed to the Portewas a reason for war and immediately ordered the beginning of hostile actions againstPoland. The resumption of the Polish-Turkish war was not in the best interests of France,while for the Habsburgs’ Empire it was favourable, because, as long as the Sultan waspreparing for a conflict on the Northern battlefield, the ruling house in Austria had noreason to fear the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor Leopold I was able to maintain asymbolic force in the East, as he was willing to subdue the Hungarian nobility and to sendthe majority of his troops against France. At its turn, France had to start diplomaticattempts in order to hinder the Porte’s intentions against Poland and to complicate thesituation on the Habsburgs’ Eastern battlefield so as to help the rebellious Hungarians.19

13 Veniamin Ciobanu, Românii în politica..., p. 91.14 I. Moga, op. cit., p. 23.15 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 94-95.16 His mission also concerned Vienna (see Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor (subsequently referred to as Hurmuzaki, Documente), vol. IX/1, 1650-1747 , ed. I. Slavici, Bucureşti,1897, no. CCCLXXXV, p. 273-274), Venice and Rome; I. C. Filitti, Din arhivele Vaticanului, I.

Documente privitoare la episcopatele catolice din Principate, Bucureşti, 1913, no. CXIII, p. 108.17 I. Hudiţă , Recueil de documents concernant l’histoire des Pays Roumains tirés des archives de France

XVIe et XVIIe siécles, Iaşi, 1927, no. 270, p. 183-184.18 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCLXXX, p. 271; I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 27; Veniamin Ciobanu, op.

cit ., p. 95.19 Zbigniew Wöjcik, From the Peace of Oliwa to the Truce of Bakhchisarai. International Relations in

Eastern Europe 1660-1681, in ‘‘Acta Poloniae Historica”, 1976, no. 34, p. 269.



Daniel Flaut

60

The two Romanian rulers, Grigore I Ghica and Ştefan Petriceicu, were implicatedin the anticipatory military actions of the Porte, at Khotyn and, although they weresuspected, especially the Moldavian ruler, of secret agreement with the Polish, they wereimpelled by the Ottomans to send them letters and messages, by which they had toexaggerate the power of the Turkish army, in order to make them respect the conditions ofthe truce made in 1672. The Porte hesitated to begin an armed conflict with the Polish dueto the insecure attitude of the Romanian rulers and for fear of a possible Polish-Russian

reconciliation. The Romanian rulers, especially Ştefan Petriceicu, played double, because,although they were in the Ottoman camp, at Khotyn, they were also sending secret lettersto the Polish, by which they explained that the Turkish insisted to ratify the peace exactlybecause they felt weak; thus, they (the Romanians) suggested the Polish to lead their armytowards Moldavia, where they would find allies.20

Although the Romanian rulers insisted on this matter, Poland was not ready for amilitary intervention in Moldavia.21 According to the letter sent by the Polish chancellor tothe Wallachian ruler, Grigore I Ghica, Poland’s ruling class were ready to renounce theirrights over Podolia in the Ottomans’ favour as a price for the annulment of the tributepayment.22 The negotiations between the Polish and the Turkish gave John Sobieski thetime to organize the future campaign, but, only to the end of October 1673, when they werecertain of the Porte’s military weakness, the Polish were ready to start the war, for real. As

Moldavia would be the battle scene, John Sobieski looked to secure his collaboration withŞtefan Petriceicu. At their turn, the Romanian rulers sent a letter, at the beginning ofOctober 1673, to King Michael Wisniowiecki, at Mogiel camp, and offered their servitude,in order to get Poland’s support against the Ottomans.23

Before the battle of Khotyn, fought on November 11th 167324, Ştefan Petriceicupassed into the Christian camp, a fact announced to Mihail Apafi, on the 24th of October25;he was followed by a group of Wallachian gentry and, then, during the battle, by Grigore IGhica, the Wallachian ruler.26 The moment when Ştefan Petriceicu decided to do that

20 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 31-32.21 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCLXXXVI, p. 274.22 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 30.23 Ibidem, p. 33; Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 96.24 For the entire campaign, see: I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 34-41; Constantin V. Obledeanu, Grecii în Ţ ara

Românească. Cu o privire generală asupra st ărei culturale pănă la 1717 , Bucureşti, 1900, p. 131; NormanDavies, Histoire de la Pologne, Paris, 1986, p. 331; Alexandru N. Tomescu, O pagină de eroism în istoria

românească a secolului XVII. Lupta de la Hotin - 1673, in ‘‘Acta Moldavie. Meridionalis”, 1990-1992, no. 12-14, p. 155-164; Francis Dvornik, op. cit ., p. 424.25 Istorič eskie svjazi narodov SSSR i Rumunji v XV - nač ale XVIII v. Dokumenti i materiali v trech tomach, t. II1633-1673, Izdatel’svo ‘‘Nauka”, Moskva, 1968, no. 118, p. 344-346.26 Reffering to the reason why the Romanian rulers hurried to step on the Polish side, the chronicler Ion Neculcesays: ‘‘they had to stay and fight against the Turkish and hinder them to get hold over the fortress of Khotyn, asthey had subdued Kamyanets. Because, once the Pasha subdues Khotyn, the entire Moldavia is subdued, and ourmaster has no country to rule anymore. And, allying themselves with the Polish, they urged them to come earlier,because they would join their forces against the Ottomans. So, the Polish gladly accepted and immediatellydeparted towards Khotyn” (Ion Neculce, Letopise ţ ul Ţării Moldovei de la Dabija Vod ă până la a doua domnie

a lui Constantin Mavrocordat , Editura Hyperion, Chişină u, 1990, p. 289); Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no.CCCXC, p. 276; Atanasie Comnen Ipsilanti, Scrieri bisericeşti şi politice în douăsprezece păr ţ i. Partea a

douăsprezecea şi cea din urmă (bucate alese), in Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. XIII/2, trad. de G. Murnu şi C.




61

move, he was sure that Dosoftei, the Metropolitan of Moldavia, gave his consent aboutit.27

The Polish victory from Khotyn gave them the possibility to advance towards theDanube. “After getting hold over Khotyn, the Polish army also occupied the fortressesfrom Suceava and Neamţ.”28 Ştefan Petriceicu’s position and Poland’s success at Khotyncould not bring the decisive victory that would have obtained Moldavia’s liberation.29 Dueto the interregnum in Poland, as a consequence of King Michael Wisniowiecki’s death,

with all its implications, stopped any Polish attempts on the Ottoman battlefield, becauseJohn Sobieski, who claimed the royal throne, did not think to continue his actions inMoldavia anymore.30 Ştefan Petriceicu, who was again on Moldavia’s throne (at thebeginning of December 1673, but only for a short time) due to the Polish support,understood that the Polish Catholic State could not crush the Ottoman force all by itself,thus he oriented his attention towards the Orthodox Russia.31

Orthodoxy was becoming very important within the development of theinternational relations in the East of Europe, as the anti-Ottoman conflict, which was thetarget of many political movements, had a religious impulse. The Russian Tsar’s role wasto defend the Christians from East, as he was a representative of Orthodoxy; he wassupported by his subjects and by the Russian clergy, by the Greeks and Serbian, throughtheir hierarchs, monks and priests who had arrived in Moscow, despite the Porte’s

opposition32, looking for consolation, reinforcement and, most importantly, charity; theircoming to Moscow was meant to proclaim the Tsar as the only Orthodox Emperor. 33 Beingaware of this fact, Ştefan Petriceicu and the ex-ruler of Wallachia, Constantin Şerban, whohad come from Poland, in Moldavia, in order to regain the Wallachian throne, sent, fromIaşi, on December 31st 1673, a letter, on behalf of both, to Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich; the

Litzica, Bucureşti, 1914, p. 145; I. Nistor, Contribu ţ ii la rela ţ iunile dintre Moldova şi Ucraina în veacul al XVII-

lea, in ‘‘Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii Istorice” (subsequently referred to as‘‘A.A.R.M.S.I.”), s. III, t. XIII, 1933, no. LXIII, LXIV, p. 218; Constantin Şerban, Românii şi problema

orientală (1683-1713), in ‘‘Revista de Istorie ”, t. 33, 1980, no. 10, p. 1954.27 Nicolae Iorga, Istoria Bisericii româneşti şi a vie ţ ii religioase a românilor , ediţia a II-a, vol. I,Bucureşti, 1930, p. 396.28 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 97.29 Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 129.30 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 98.31 Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 129; The Orthodox propaganda had begun in Moldavia. On July 3 rd 1673, a Russian merchant, Nicolai Ivanov, claimed that the inhabitants in Iaşi were expressing their wishof ‘‘uniting themselves with the Orthodox army’’ in order to free themselves from the Ottoman dominion(I. Nistor, op. cit., p. 197; no. LIX, p. 217); P. P. Panaitescu, Pribegia lui Constantin Ş erban şi a lui Ş tefan

Petriceicu şi testamentele lor , in ‘‘A.A.R.M.S.I.”, s. III, t. XXI, 1939, p. 383.32In 1661, a monk, who had been sent with a secret message to the Tsar on behalf of Constantin Şerban,during his short reign in Moldavia, on his way back to Iaşi, was caught by the Ottomans and sent to theGreat Vizier of the Porte, who tortured him. “For fear that the monks would keep in touch with Russia, theSultan forbade all the patriarchs, bishops or Orthodox abbots to pass in Moldavia or Wallachia.” In Iaşi, aswell, from Ştefan vodă Lupu’s order, the Bishop of Bethlehem, who wanted to ask charity from theRussian Tsar, was forced to go back (P. P. Panaitescu, op. cit ., p. 378).33The Patriarch Dositheus, from Jerusalem, realized this important role, when, in 1672, shortly before theconquest of Kamyanets, addressed to the Tsar, through Nicolae Milescu, his envoy at Moscow, alsoemphasizing the necessity of support against the Ottomans (G. Bezviconi, Contribu ţ ii la istoria rela ţ iilor

româno-ruse (din cele mai vechi timpuri până la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea), Bucureşti, 1962, p. 100).



Daniel Flaut

62

letter was sent through Teodor, the Abbot of Saint Paul’s monastery, and was meant to askfor the Tsar’s protection, to which the Polish gentry also agreed.34 This attempt of theRomanian rulers came along shortly after Sava Brancovici’s, the TransylvanianMetropolitan, who, in 1668, expressed his ideas to the Tsar, suggesting a Crusade of theSerbian, Romanian and Bulgarian people, who were ready to join the Christian countries intheir struggle against the Turkish.35 Russia, which was preparing to play an important rolewithin the conduct of all Orthodox peoples, ‘‘was ready, this time forever, to perform on

the scene of the Romanian alliances”. Teodor, who had arrived at Moscow in February1674, assured the Tsar that the Polish King agreed with the extension of Russia’s authorityover Moldavia, ‘‘because this meant that they would not be so dangerously close to theTurkish border anymore.” 36 According to their response from March 10th 1674, theRussians allowed the isolated Romanian rulers to send their envoys to Moscow in order toattest their countries’ devotion, in case they had not already accepted to be officiallysubdued by the Polish.37 These discussions were to continue until August 1674, when thetreaty of loyalty was signed; this agreement contained 17 riders, according to which Russiaproclaimed itself ‘‘ready to have the Romanian Countries under its guidance and to sendthem military support against the Ottomans.”38

Their defeat at Khotyn determined the Porte to decide urgent measures concerningthe Romanian Countries. During the first days of year 1674, the Turkish came in Moldavia

and drove the Romanian rulers (who turned for Russian support) away. Ştefan Petriceicu’sdeposition was followed by the removal of the Moldavian Church Metropolitan. Becausehe had supported his ruler’s policy of orientation towards the Polish and the Russians, towhich the country’s church also agreed, the Metropolitan Dosoftei was forced to seekrefugee for a short while in Poland, together with Ştefan Petriceicu, he was substituted bythe Bishop of Roman, Teodosie.39 On Moldavia’s throne, the Ottomans brought

34 Istorič eskie svjazi narodov..., t. III 1673-1711, Izdatel’svo ‘‘Nauka”, Moskva, 1970, no. 1, p. 9-16; NicolaeIorga, Histoire des relations Russo-Roumains, Iaşi, 1917, p. 92; P. P. Panaitescu, op. cit ., p. 383-384.35 ‘‘because they live in great poverty, need and under straitened circumstances; if God wanted, all thesewould have their armies ready” (I. Lupaş, Istoria unirii românilor , Bucureşti, 1938, p. 176); The OrthodoxChurch from Transylvania, lacking any political support and being under heterodox pressure, asked more

than once the Russian protection. During this century, Moldavia – geographically closer to Moscow anddeveloping good connections with Kiev- was very close with these two, inheriting and improving the oldpolitical and ecclesiastical traditions. The Wallachian Church had less connections with the Russian worldand that happened only when there had been circumstances of an alliance between the Orthodox peoplesagainst a common enemy; this country let the ecclesiastical hierarchy to facilitate certain political actions.Except these circumstances, the connections of the Metropolitan Church of Ungro-Wallachia with Russiaremain limited and the information about them is poor. We can only suppose that the future metropolitans,who visited or lived in Russia before they were proclaimed in Ungro-Wallachia, still interacted with thehost-country and with its church.36 Florin Constantiniu, op. cit ., p. 129.37 Istorič eskie svjazi narodov..., t. III, no. 2, p. 16-22; Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des relations..., p. 92; Idem,

Istoria Bisericii româneşti..., vol. II, Bucureşti, 1930, p. 51-52.38 Mihail Dan, op. cit ., p. 243.39 Al. I. Ciurea, Ş irul mitropoli ţ ilor Bisericii ortodoxe din Moldova. Elemente esen ţ iale biografice şi

bibliografice, in ‘‘Teologie şi Viaţă ”, III (LXIX), 1993, no. 8-10, p. 68, 70; Paul Mihail, Noi ştiri privind

şederea Mitropolitului Moldovei Dosoftei în Polonia, in ‘‘Mitropolia Moldovei şi Sucevei”, 1985, no. 4-6, p. 412-416.




63

Dumitraşco Cantacuzino.40 Starting with Dumitraşco Cantacuzino, a ‘‘new stage of thedependence relations between Moldavia and the Porte began.”41

With its attitude, Poland not only demonstrated once more that it was unable tosupport the Romanian Countries in their struggle against the Ottomans, but it alsocontributed “to the decay of the Romanians’ political and juridical statute”. At the sametime, Poland, due to its own weaknesses, “had given Russia the opportunity to act freely inthe South East of Europe”. The reason why the Porte had taken special measures in the

Romanian Countries “was meant to consolidate the Turkish fiefs in the North of theDanube” against the Russian danger – which was slowly but surely coming – rather thanfearing the Polish.42

After their defeat at Khotyn, the Porte was interested to prolong the dynastic crisisand the internal political dispute (for the accession to the throne, between the two parties:the supporters of the French model and the supporters of the Austrian model) in Poland,which would gain him enough time to organize an anti-Polish campaign. The Ottomanruling class also wanted John Sobieski to be elected King, which could assure the Portewith the ratification of the Peace of Buczacz.43 Although Sobieski had been told by LouisXIV to support one of his candidates44, he tried to speculate the internal and the externalcircumstances, thus favouring the French plans of achieving the reconciliation between thePolish and the Turkish, in order to accede to Poland’s throne.

Sobieski’s contacts with the Porte were initially assured by the Wallachian ruler,Grigore I Ghica. Even since the preparation of the military campaign at Khotyn, accordingto the Ottomans’ orders, the Romanian ruler had suggested the Hetman to seal the peacewith the Turkish, and in return they would have given him a loan to finance his “electioncampaign”. After the victory, from Grigore I Ghica’s amount of letters, Sobieski found outthat the Great Vizier pretended the loan back and the fulfillment of their commitmentstaken when they sent some relatives, as hostages, to the Porte. Due to some internalpolitical reasons, Sobieski could not accept it, but, instead, he suggested to give them theFrench guarantees. Although the Porte rejected the French interference, it still manifestedthe possibility to give the loan, under the same condition: the completion of theamendments established by the Peace from 1672.45

After Grigore I Ghica was removed from the throne, the negotiations were

continued, as the Porte commanded, by the new Moldavian ruler, Dumitraşco Cantacuzino.His envoy in Poland, Miron Costin, received -on April 10th, at Pilaszkowce- Sobieski’sassurance that in case the Moldavian ruler’s mediation of peace was successful, he would

40 ‘‘The Porte, seeing that the Moldavian ruler passed on the enemies side in the middle of the battle andthat their defeat was mainly due to the Moldavian and Wallachian traitors, thought that they would nevername a Moldavian ruler again, but a Greek one, who should have his home and relatives at Istanbul”(Dimitrie Cantemir, Via ţ a lui Constantin Cantemir , trad. rom. R. Albala, Bucureşti, 1961).41 Florin Constantiniu, op. cit ., p. 131; ‘‘Secretely, Petriceicu and some of his close acquintances, withoutthe knowledge and consent of his council, left the country and went to Poland; thanks to those the countryis now dying’’ (Miron Costin, Opere, ed. P. P. Panaitescu, Bucureşti, 1958, p. 122-123).42 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 103; Idem, Miron Costin şi ,,modelul polonez” (schi ţă de portret istoric),in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol», t. XXX, 1993, p. 390.43 Idem, Românii în politica..., p. 98.44 I. Hudiţă , Histoire des relations..., p. 252; Francis Dvornik, op. cit ., p. 425.45 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 48; Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 100.



Daniel Flaut

64

withdraw his troops from Moldavia. Through his delegate, colonel Siekerzinski, whoarrived in Babadag one month later, Sobieski was demanding the loan to be granted as aprice for the peace and a problematic friendship with the Porte, to which conditions theVizier could not approve.46

Although the Vizier gave a negative answer, the Porte contributed toSobieski’s proclamation as King of Poland, on May 21st 1674. Realizing that none ofits candidates could win, France finally gave its consent to Sobieski’s accession to the

Polish throne. To this decision Sobieski’s negotiations with the Porte had countedmuch and they also encouraged Louis XIV to hope for a Polish-Ottoman peace, whichwas so necessary at that specific moment for the French interests. If the peace wassigned, the French Kingdom could obtain a double advantage: first of all, it wouldenable the Turkish to go against the Habsburgs in Hungary, and later to hope for aPolish intervention against the House of Austria.47

The relational issue between Poland and the Porte considerably influenced theRussian-Polish contacts, too. Russia was worried by the Polish victory at Khotyn and bytheir coming in Moldavia, because it meant that Poland was becoming stronger and it couldalso threaten its policy in Ukraine. Fearing that Poland might remain the only beneficiaryof a possible defeat against the Ottomans, Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich decided tocommence again the offensive in Ukraine (from the right side of the Dnieper).48 Ivan

Samoilovici’s Cossacks and a Russian army occupied this part of Ukraine, at the beginningof 1674, without facing a real resistance.

The Porte considered that the Russian offensive in Ukraine (on the right side of theDnieper) was an offense to its address and, consequently, they sent military aid for HetmanDoroshenko. In August-September 1674, the Turkish-Tatar troops defeated the Russian atCzehrin, forcing them to withdraw towards Kanev, and then across the Dnieper. TheRomanian rulers, Dumitraşco Cantacuzino and Gheorghe Duca, also participated to thiscampaign. If the Moldavian ruler had the mission of building the bridge over the Dnister, atSoroca, George Duca’s subjects, together with the Turkish-Tatars, took part in the battlesfrom Ladîjin and Uman.49 In their letters from September 8th and 13th, the two rulers were

46 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 50; Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit., p. 101; Idem, Miron Costin şi ‘‘modelul polonez”..., p. 390.47 For more details, see I. Hudiţă , Histoire des relations..., p. 251-253; Henri Grappin, Histoire de la

Pologne des origines a 1922, Paris et Vienne, 1922, p. 119; Ilie Corfus, O nouă scrisoare a lui Miron

Costin, in ‘‘Studii”, 2, 1971, p. 239; Veniamin Ciobanu, Românii în politica..., p. 101; Idem, Miron Costin

şi ‘‘modelul polonez”..., p. 391; Francis Dvornik, op. cit ., p. 424.48By the Peace from Buczacz, Poland had given up its rights over Ukraine (from the right side of theDnieper), over a part of Podolia, including the Kamyanets fortress, thus advancing over the Ottomans’conquers. Doroshenko had received the territories Braclav and Kiev. In Ukraine, on the left side of theDnieper, in March 1672, a change of the power had occured. The Hetman Mnohohrisnyj had beensubstituted by Ivan Samoilovici, whose interest was to get Ukraine (from the right side of the Dnieper),with Russian support. Doroshenko infered the danger and asked the Ottomans’ help. The Hetman’s sonreturned from the Porte, at the beginning of September 1673, with 15 000 Turkish, in order to supportDoroshenko (Peter Bartl, Der Kosakenstaat und das Osmanische Reich im 17. und in der er sten Hälfe des

18. Jahrhunderts, in “Süd Ost Forsschungen”, XXXIII, 1974, p. 186); Veniamin Ciobanu, Românii în

politica..., p. 103.49 Mihail Dan, op. cit ., p. 243.




65

sending news in Transylvania about these happenings.50 “Sobieski, who was waiting forthe end of the campaign to see what advantages could he draw concerning the peacenegotiations with the Ottomans, did not support the Russian-Cossack troops in thesebattles.”51 Ivan Samoilovici had to retreat on the left side of the Dnieper. The Ukrainianpopulation (from the right side of the Dnieper), roughly judged by the Ottomans for theysupported Ivan Samoilovici, sought refugee on the other shore of the river. Ukraine (fromthe right side of the Dnieper) was left under Doroshenko’s control, whose position was

insecure, as well as the Tatars’.The Tsar’s wish to see his armies in Moldavia, also expected by the poor

Romanian rulers, Ştefan Petriceicu and Constantin Şerban as well, was not fulfilled. “Oneof the causes was Poland’s attitude, which did not like the idea that Russia would extendover Ukraine (from the right side of the Dnieper)”; due to Poland and to its expectativeattitude, the Tsar’s plan failed; Aleksey Mikhailovich intention was to liberate theChristians from the Ottomans control, and the Romanians were also hopeful in thisrespect.52 “The Russian envoy, Burţov, who was in Poland in the summer of 1674, hadtalked there with the Wallachian and Moldavian delegates about the possibility ofcollaboration.”53 Moreover, the petition sent to the Tsar, on August 1st 1674, contained anidealistic project of unifying Wallachia and Russia, elaborated by some Wallachian boyars,who found shelter in Warsaw, Radu – the 2nd logothete and Pătraşco – great logothete.54

Being aware of the fact that applying such a plan would have meant that theRussian conquers would not have stopped in Ukraine, but it would also extend to theRomanian Countries, so it would threaten its positions on the North side of theDanube, the Porte hurried to sign the peace with Poland. One of the conditionsmentioned in the peace was fulfilled in July 1674, when, before getting to Ukraine tosupport Doroshenko, the Ottoman army reconquered Khotyn and took under control,without any resistance, the fortresses Neamţ and Suceava, which had been occupied bythe Polish the autumn before.55 Although the Porte had done some compromises withPoland, being ready to give up the tribute mentioned by the Peace of Buczacz and togive them Podolia back, the peace negotiations between the two parties, mediated bythe Moldavian ruler and the Tatar Khan, did not reach any conclusion. The issue aboutKamyanets, which Sobieski demanded to be given back – because, in his opinion,

without it, his control over Podolia was useless – and to which the Porte did not wantto renounce, hindered any agreement between the Ottomans and the Polish. TheOttoman Empire not only failed to come to terms with the conditions demanded by thePolish, but they were not able to convince Sobieski to support them against Russia; on

50 Nicolae Iorga, Ucraina Moldovenească, in ‘‘A.A.R.M.S.I.”, s. II, t. XXXV, 1913, p. 348; Constantin V.Obledeanu, op. cit ., p. 137.51 Mihail Dan, op. cit ., p. 243.52 Ibidem.53 G. Bezviconi, op. cit., p. 100.54 Ibidem, p. 100-101; Istorič eskie svjazi narodov..., t. III, no. 4, p. 22-28; Tr. Ionescu-Nişcov, Memoriul

din 1674 al boierilor munteni către ţ arul Rusiei, in ‘‘Revista Arhivelor”, III, 1960, no. 2, p. 213 andsequel; Florin Constantiniu, op. cit ., p. 131; Gheorghe Lază r, op. cit ., p. 71, n. 120.55 Moldova în contextul rela ţ iilor politice interna ţ ionale, no. 125, p. 242-245; I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 53-54;Veniamin Ciobanu, Miron Costin şi ‘‘modelul polonez’’..., p. 391; Idem, Românii în politica..., p. 104.



Daniel Flaut

66

behalf of the Porte, the Tatar Khan asked him that, immediately after the Turkish hadreconquered Khotyn, as a condition for the concessions they had made.56

Without giving up their demands over Kamyanets, not for a minute, Sobieskibelieved that controlling the Ukrainian fortresses and the Cossacks would give him theopportunity to discuss with the Ottomans about the disputed territory from a leadingposition. That is why the Polish King began the campaign in Ukraine, taking advantage ofDoroshenko’s uncertainty and of the Tatar’s forces weakness. In November 1674, he laid

the siege of Kamyanets, and, in three weeks time, without being seriously opposed, tookUkraine (from the right side of the Dnieper to Czehrin) under control, where he foundDoroshenko ready to support him. The ex-Wallachian ruler, Constantin Şerban, had takenpart to the siege of the city Lisianka, leading an army of 6 000 people. Sobieski’s wish wasto continue the campaign in Moldavia, where, supported by the poor Romanian rulers,Ştefan Petriceicu and Constantin Şerban, he intended to conquer the fortresses Tighina,Ismail, Cetatea Albă, and, especially Chilia; he even thought, in case his plan failed, todestroy these fortresses.57 But, the Ştefan Petriceicu’s and Constantin Şerban’s hopes ofregaining the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia were vanished, because the campaign inMoldavia depended on Doroshenko’s participation, who had meanwhile refused to supportthe Polish, at the Russians suggestion.

Sobieski’s military enterprises determined the Porte to begin, in January 1675,

the preparation of an armed campaign against Poland. Fearing that the Tatars fromBugeac, together with the Romanian rulers’ army would invade his Kingdom, urgedSobieski think of new negotiations with the Porte. At the beginning of 1675,Doroshenko was discussing with the Polish, the Hetman offering himself to mediatethe conflict between Poland and the Ottomans. One of the Ottomans’ conditions was,as the nuncio from Warsaw was writing on March 13th 1675, for Doroshenko to beproclaimed Hetman of Ukraine, a new Ukraine would be under Turkish-Polishcondominium.58 Although France offered to mediate the peace59, and the Polish Kingwas writing about the same matter to the Moldavian ruler, Dumitraşco Cantacuzino60,in the summer, the Ottomans’ campaign in Ukraine began.61 This military enterprise, towhich the two Romanian rulers, Gheorghe Duca and Dumitraşco Cantacuzino, alsotook part, “exposed Wallachia and Moldavia to the destruction of both the Polish and

especially the Ottomans.”62 Meanwhile, Russia, which had found out about theTurkish-Polish negotiations, for fear that Doroshenko could obey to Poland, enteredUkraine (from the right side of the Diaper) and, while the Ottomans were defeated at

56 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCCIII, p. 283; no. CCCCVII, p. 284-285; Veniamin Ciobanu,

Românii în politica..., p. 105.57 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 56; I. Hudiţă , Recueil..., p. 227-228; P. P. Panaitescu, op. cit., p. 385; Mihail Dan,op. cit ., p. 243; Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 105-106.58 Peter Bartl, op. cit ., p. 188.59 Even since 1674, Forbin Janson had sent a trustful envoy to the Porte, with Sobieski’s agreement –Sauvans - in order to prepare the circumstances and to see if the Turkish accepted France’s mediation (I.Hudiţă , Histoire des relations..., p. 261).60 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 57-58.61 I. C. Filitti, Din arhivele Vaticanului, II. Documente politice 1526-1788 , Bucureşti, 1914, no. CXLVIII,p. 136; no. CL, p. 137.62 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 107.




67

Liov, gained his obedience.63 As Doroshenko gave up his power, the “Ukrainiantroubles” ended as well; this represents one of the most delicate and less analyzedphase of the Cossack State’s history. Being disappointed of the Polish feudal variablepolicy, Grigore Hăbăşescu, Ştefan Petriceicu’s faithful Hetman, hoped that Russiawould continue its actions and to include the Romanian Countries as well. The isolatedMoldavian boyar asked Vasili Tiapkin, Russia’s resident at Warsaw, to influence theTsar “in sending troops, at least in Crimea, which was an important center of the

Ottomans forces.”64 Louis XIV strived, all this time, despite Sobieski’s victories, to convince Poland to

make peace with the Porte, because, as long as the war between the two states continued,the Ottomans did not represent a threat for the Habsburgs’ Empire, the main enemy of theKingdom. Simultaneously with these efforts, the French diplomacy succeeded, throughtheir envoy in Transylvania, Roger Akakia, to obtain the participation of the dissatisfiedHungarian and of Mihail Apafi against the Habsburgs’ Empire; their participation wasconfirmed by a Treaty project, signed at Făgăraş, on April 28th 1675, but the French refusedto commit to those as long as the Turkish-Polish peace was still uncertain. 65 At its turn, thePorte kept its strict neutral attitude, adopted immediately after the Peace of Buczacz,towards the rebellious Hungarians, despite the pressures made by the French diplomats andby the Prince Mihail Apafi. That was why he did not allow the Prince to enterprise any

action that could favour the dissatisfied, as long as the war against Poland continued. 66 France’s plans found Poland undecided due to the conflict between King and the

Sejm and to the endless struggle between the nobiliary groups.67 The hopes that the Frenchdiplomacy efforts of achieving a Polish-Ottoman reconciliation would succeed wereincreasing on June 11th 1675. Sobieski signed the secret Treaty with France, at Jaworów, inthe province Red Ruthenia, according to which he committed himself, in return of anannual payment from Louis XIV, to make peace with the Ottomans and to attack, togetherwith Sweden, either the elector from Brandenburg, in Prussia, or the Habsburgs’ Empire, inHungary.68 Moreover, in Poland’s advantage, Louis XIV promised that in a future treatywith the hostile coalition Austria-Brandenburg, the Netherlands was to give properattention to the Polish King’s claims over Prussia. As the political scales tipped on France’sfavour, Vatican began a big enterprise in order to achieve an Austrian-Polish alliance and

to convince the ruling class from Poland that it was necessary to continue the war againstthe Porte. Even if the Pope strived to get Poland out of the French political influence, hedid not succeed, because Sobieski asked for military aid from the Habsburgs, as a condition

63 Peter Bartl, op. cit., p. 188; Èmile Haumant, Histoire de la Russie, Paris, 1918, p. 339; Francis Dvornik,op. cit., p. 435.64 G. Bezviconi, op. cit ., p. 101.65 For more details concerning Roger Akakia’s mission in Transylvania, see I. Hudiţă , Histoire des relations..., p. 262-265; Idem, Recueil..., no. 354, p. 232-233; Ionnescu-Gion, Ludovicu XIV şi

Constantinu Brâncovenu. Studiu asupra politicei francese în Europa resăritenă (1534-1688-1715),Bucureşti, 1884, p. 122; Ioan Radonić, Situa ţ iunea interna ţ ională a principatului Ţ erii-Româneşti în

vremea lui Ş erban Cantacuzino (1678-1688 ), in ‘‘A.A.R.M.S.I.”, s. II, t. XXXVI, 1914, p. 949.66 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 110.67 Mihail Dan, op. cit ., p. 243.68 Zbigniew Wöjcik, op. cit., p. 271; Henri Grappin, op. cit ., p. 119; I. Hudiţă , Histoire des relations...,p. 271; Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 106-107.



Daniel Flaut

68

for their support; even though, Leopold I was not able to help them, because the Swedishand the French threatened him.

Despite all the efforts paid by the French diplomacy, by the Romanian rulers,Gheorghe Duca and Dumitraşco Cantacuzino, and by the Crimean Khan, year 1675 endedwithout a certain result concerning the peace discussions between the Ottoman and thePolish. The bone of contention between the two parties continued to be Kamyanets.69 Eventhough Sobieski was disposed, in July 1675, before the battle of Lemberg, to give it up,

with a territory of 25 km far, the Porte, being certain at that moment of its victory, refused,demanding the entire Podolia and Ukraine.70 The end of the year also brought the newchange on Moldavia’s throne. In its attempt to justify the failure of the anti-Polishcampaign in Ukraine, the Porte found Dumitraşco Cantacuzino guilty of the defeat sufferedat Bar fortress; thus, the Ottomans deposed the Moldavian ruler and substituted him, inNovember 1675, with Antonie Ruset, one of the former’s relatives.71

As the Tatar Khan refused to mediate the peace, both the Porte and Poland chosethe mediation of the two Romanian rulers.72 Even since the end of the year 1675, John IIISobieski asked Mihail Apafi, through his delegate Cazimir Giza, to get involved in thepeace discussions with the Porte.73 Similar efforts were paid by the Ottomans, in March1676, who were trying to get the Transylvanian Prince on their side. At the same time, thePorte gave credit to the Romanian rulers, Gheorghe Duca and Antonie Ruset, for the

mediation of the peace treaties.74 In this respect, the Wallachian ruler sent an envoy toCracow, on February 6th 1676, whose messages remained a secret; the next month, he sentanother delegate there, by whom he was asking the Polish King to send a representative atBucharest, in order to keep in touch with the development of the negotiations. In March1676, the Polish envoy, John Karkowski, arrived in Wallachia bringing a letter fromSobieski, who was asking Gheorghe Duca to send his letters to the Porte, to allow hisenvoy to stay in Bucharest and to pay all the necessary efforts to conclude the peace.Simultaneously, Cazimir Giza continued the negotiations with Istanbul, through MihailApafi, whose delegate, Brancovici, gave the Vizier the Polish proposals of peace, whichwere elaborated in five amendments.75

The French ambassadors in Constantinople and Warsaw received reports from thePolish envoys, who were in Transylvania and Wallachia, and from the Romanian rulers as

well, which were related with the evolution of the peace discussions. From de Nointel’sletters sent to Forbin-Janson it resulted that the Romanian rulers wanted peace betweenPoland and the Ottoman Empire, because, only in that way, their states would be safe fromthe tasks of war and from the great number of robberies and destructions. 76

69 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 107.70 I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 59.71 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX /1, no. CCCCXIV, p. 288-289; Ion Neculce, op. cit ., p. 296; I. Moga,op. cit., p. 59-60; Veniamin Ciobanu, Miron Costin şi ‘‘modelul polonez’’..., p. 393.72 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCCXVI, p. 290-291.73 I. Moga, op. cit., p. 61.74 Veniamin Ciobanu, Românii în politica..., p. 107.75 I. Moga, op. cit., p. 62.76 The letters from March 1st and June 5th 1676 (see Ionnescu-Gion, op. cit., p. 120-121).




69

The situation of the Romanian Countries was, in fact, the main argument thatSobieski used in order to gain, in Poland’s advantage, the conclusion of the peace with theOttomans. Warsaw’s diplomacy tried to convince the Porte that the prolonging of the warwould have meant to impoverish Wallachia and Moldavia and, implicitly, the considerablecutback of the Ottomans’ income that was obtained from these provinces.77 According toone of the reports sent by Prince Mihail Apafi to the Porte, Sobieski suggested, as acondition for the peace, the ceding of a half of Podolia, its unification with Moldavia and

the equal control over Kamyanets, by the Polish and the Ottomans at the same time. In casethis proposal had been taken into consideration, its fulfillment would have broughtadvantages not only for Poland, but also for Wallachia and Moldavia; due to it there wouldhave existed a Polish-Ottoman balance and the permanent political and military dangerrepresented by the garrison of Kamyanets would have vanished.78

On May 25th 1676, the Wallachian ruler Gheorghe Duca informed Sobieski thatthey had communicated to the Porte the Polish point of view concerning the peacenegotiations, and that, from the Ottomans’ answer, resulted that they were ready to sign thepeace.79 Considering that the missions of the Polish envoys, who sought the mediation ofMihail Apafi and Gheorghe Duca, proved its enemy’s weakness, the Porte seemed to beless disposed to give up its demands in order to make peace. In its response addressed to deNointel and to the Polish envoys in Transylvania and Wallachia, the Porte, though it

renounced to the tribute and to the amount of money that Lemberg owed it, was not readyto sign the peace with Sobieski unless they gave it Ukraine and entire Podolia.80 Pocutiaand Ukraine were the reason why, for 4 years, the two parties had been fighting, andPoland never agreed to their ratification.

Contrary to the wishes of the Wallachian ruler and of Sobieski, the OttomanEmpire decided, in May 1676, through the Great Vizier Ahmed Köprülü, the beginning ofa new military campaign against Poland, in order to force it to accept the conditions askedby the Turkish.81 Surprised, Sobieski was preparing for war, but he waited for GheorgheDuca’s response, whom he asked for a detailed explanation concerning his honesty in thePolish-Ottoman discussions and about the Porte’s grants referring to the Polish envoys’free return in Warsaw. At his turn, the Moldavian ruler, Antonie Ruset, granted, on June 3 rd 1676, that the Polish envoy’s courier, who was in Wallachia, could cross his country. 82

The Tatars’ forces and the Romanian rulers’, Gheorghe Duca and Antonie Ruset,took part in the campaign against Poland. Even though the Polish attacked, in August 1676,the camp near the Dnister and set the bridge (built by Antonie Ruset) on fire, the monthbefore83, the Turkish-Tatar-Moldavian-Wallachian army stormed over Podolia, in the first

77 Ilie Corfus , Documente privitoare la istoria României culese din arhivele polone. Secolul al XVII-lea,Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1983, p. 298-299 (subsequently referred to as Ilie Corfus , Documente);Veniamin Ciobanu , op. cit ., p. 107.78 Veniamin Ciobanu, op. cit ., p. 107-108.79 Ilie Corfus, Documente, no. 188, p. 296-300.80 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCCXVII, p. 291-292.81 Mihail Dan, op. cit ., p. 244.82 Ilie Corfus, Documente, no. 189, p. 300-301; I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 62-63.83 Ion Neculce, op. cit., p. 296.



Daniel Flaut

70

autumn days of year 1676.84 The negotiations for peace continued during the militaryenterprises. Sobieski, who was in Lemberg, proposed, in September, through hiscommanders, to introduce as a discussion point an agreement with the Romanian rulerAntonie Ruset, by which the free Romanian-Polish trade to be granted.85

The battles continued and, despite all the resistance, there was a heavy siege of thefortress Żurawno and Sobieski was forced to surrender and to sign, on October 17th 1676, apreliminary peace, according to which the Ottomans kept Kamyanets, including a

surrounding territory in Podolia, as well as a part of Ukraine; the frontier was to beestablished in special negotiations that had to be hosted by the capital of the OttomanEmpire.86 The agreement of Żurawno put an end to a war that, for 4 years, had destroyedboth Moldavia and Poland, marking the failure of the Polish King’s attempts to removefrom his border the Ottoman danger.

84 I. Nistor, op. cit ., no. LXVI, p. 219.85 Hurmuzaki, Documente, IX/1, no. CCCCXVII, p. 291-292; no. CCCCXVIII, p. 292-293; for detailsabout the military campaign against Poland, see I. Moga, op. cit ., p. 63-66.86 Henri Grappin, op. cit ., p. 119; Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact of Europe, London, 1968, p. 179; I.Hudiţă , Histoire des relations..., p. 277; Nicolae Iorga, Histoire des relations..., p. 93; Idem, Ucraina moldovenească, p. 347; Veniamin Ciobanu, Miron Costin şi ‘‘modelul polonez’’..., p. 394; Idem, Românii

în politica..., p. 109; Francis Dvornik, op. cit ., p. 424, 435.




71

South Eastern Europe (1672). This map is from the Atlas to Freeman's Historical Geography, edited by J. B. Bury, Longmans Green and Co., Third Edition, 1903.

(www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/se_europe_1672.jpg)

5. the romanian countries-libre

Documents