Nature © Macmillan Publishers Ltd 1997

Sir — Appeals to human dignity, and to themoral obligation to protect it, have been afeature of responses to the cloning of Dollythe sheep (Nature 385, 810–813; 1997). Dr Hiroshi Nakajima, director general ofthe World Health Organization (WHO),said: “WHO considers the use of cloning forthe replication of human individuals to beethically unacceptable as it would violatesome of the basic principles which governmedically assisted procreation. Theseinclude respect for the dignity of the humanbeing.”

The European Parliament rushedthrough a resolution banning cloning,which stated as part of the rationale (clause6) that the parliament “believes it isessential to establish ethical standards,based on respect for human dignity, in theareas of biology, biotechnology andmedicine”. Neither of these augustauthorities provided a scrap of argument asto how the idea of human dignity is relevantto the ethics of cloning.

A first question to ask when the idea ofhuman dignity is invoked is: whose dignityis attacked and how? Is it the duplication ofa large part of the genome that is supposedto constitute the attack on human dignity?If so, we might legitimately ask whether andhow the dignity of a natural twin isthreatened by the existence of the othertwin. The notion of human dignity is oftenalso linked to Kantian ethics. A typicalexample, and one that attempts to provide

some basis for objections to cloning basedon human dignity, is Axel Kahn’s invocationof this principle in his Commentary oncloning (Nature 386, 119; 1997).

But the Kantian principle, which isgenerally interpreted as demanding that “anindividual should never be thought of as ameans but always also as an end”, crudelyinvoked, as it usually is, without anyqualification or gloss, is seldom helpful in amedical or bioscience context. It wouldoutlaw blood transfusions and abortionscarried out to protect the life or health of themother. It would also outlaw one form ofcloning, embryo splitting, which could allowgenetic and other screening by embryobiopsy. One embryo could be tested toascertain the health and genetic status of theremaining clones, and then destroyed. Tothis it is objected, pace Kahn, that one twinwould be destroyed for the sake of another.

It is bizarre and misleading to marshalthe Kantian principle as an objection eitherto using cell mass division to create clonesfor screening purposes, or to creating clonesby nuclear substitution to generate sparecell lines. It is surely ethically dubious toobject to one embryo being killed for thesake of another, but not to object to it beingkilled for nothing. In in vitro fertilization(IVF), for example, it is, in the UnitedKingdom, regarded as good practice tostore spare embryos for future use by themother or for disposal at her direction,either to other women who require donor

eggs, or for research, or simply to bedestroyed. It cannot be morally worse to usean embryo to provide information about itssibling than to use it for more abstractresearch or simply to destroy it. If it ispermissible to use early embryos forresearch or to destroy them, their use ingenetic and other health testing is surelyalso permissible. The same would surely gofor their use in creating cell lines fortherapeutic purposes.

A moral principle that has at least asmuch intuitive force as that recommendedby Kant is that it is better to do some goodthan to do no good. It cannot, from theethical point of view, be better or moremoral to waste human material that couldbe used for therapeutic purposes than to useit to do good. If it is right to use embryos forresearch or therapy then it is surely also rightto produce them for such purposes, as isusual in IVF. Kant’s prohibition does after allrefer principally to use. Of course some willthink that the embryo is a full member ofthe moral community with all the rights andprotections possessed by Kant himself.Although this is a tenable position, it cannotconsistently be held by any society thatpermits abortion, post-coital contraceptionor research with human embryos. John Harris Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UKe-mail: Rebecca.Bennett@man.ac.uk

correspondence

754 NATURE | VOL 387 | 19 JUNE 1997

Is cloning an attack on human dignity?

Protect patients’ rightsSir — Those of us who are concerned aboutthe increasing incidence of biomedicaldiscrimination and violations of medicalprivacy appreciate your attention to theseissues (Nature 386, 533; 1997). We need,however, to deal directly with the fact thatresearch scientists do not have anexemplary track record.

For example, recent media coverage ofthe Tuskegee experiment (see Nature 387,116; 1997) serves as a reminder of why theUnited States had to develop the institutionof Human Subjects Review Boards. Abusesof the rights of patients have contributed tothe increased development of notions ofappropriate informed consent.

In this regard, I believe your coveragehas put too much emphasis on the needs ofresearch scientists, while underplaying theintegrity and dignity of research subjects.For example, as the increasing number ofstate legislative enactments protectinggenetic information indicates, the donor orsource of the material must have control

over the sample and any access to it. As faras protecting the rights of the donor isconcerned, it is immaterial whether thethird party seeking access to the sample iswearing a lab coat or not.Philip L. Bereano(Chair, American Civil Liberties Committee onData Access, Storage, and Dissemination)Department of Technical Communication,University of Washington,Box 352195, Seattle, Washington 98195-2195, USA

He has no way of accounting for theuniqueness of an observation orconsidering the changes in ourunderstanding that can result frombreakthrough discoveries. His reliance oncitation is like poll-driven government: ithas some value but isn’t necessarily the best.

In particular, he says that, “although theHubble Space Telescope has been extremelysuccessful, Figure 1 shows that it has not yetjustified its high costs…”. I submit that thisconclusion is ridiculous and that, afterseeing the wealth of unique and revealingobservations that have been and are stillpouring from Hubble, an observationalscientist is driven to finding out what iswrong with Leverington’s arguments ratherthan accepting his conclusion. After all, ifwe assign a factor of 3 for uniqueness, thenthe space observations would meet even hisabsurd criteria.Jay M. PasachoffHopkins Observatory,Williams College,Williamstown, Massachusetts 01267, USAe-mail: jay.m.pasachoff@williams.edu

Hubble ‘worth the price’Sir — David Leverington claims to bemeasuring cost-effectiveness ofastronomical observations, and yourprovocative headline, “Star-gazing fundsshould come down to Earth,” shows that hisconclusion can lead to importantconsequences (Nature 387, 12; 1997). But,as his Correspondence shows, he is reallymerely measuring the number of timesvarious papers have been cited.