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Thedis cour se andpr act ic eof c o- de ve lopment i nEurope

5. The discourse and practice of

co-development in EuropeFlore Gubert1

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 15 years or so, the relations between migration and devel-

opment, and the influence they have on each other, have captured theattention of an increasing number of researchers and policy makers. In acontext of globalization and growing mobility, the former have devotedmuch work to assessing the developmental impact of migration for thecountries of origin. Part of their motivation has come from the spectacularincrease in remittance flows to developing countries, which are estimatedto have totaled $401 billion in 2012.2 Overall, their conclusions suggest thatthe impact of international migration strongly varies from one country toanother, depending on a number of factors among which are the numberof migrants, their characteristics, the type of migration, the conditions ofstay in host countries as well as the quality of institutions in sending coun-tries. However, it is generally acknowledged that remittances, at least inthe short term, improve the living standards of thousands of households,particularly in Africa, and that they are often better at combating transi-tory poverty than the external financial flows associated with developmentassistance because they are more precisely targeted. Migrants’ collectivecontributions through hometown associations have also been recognizedas significantly improving the provision of public goods in the localities oforigin. Last but not least, other less tangible contributions have been put

forward, such as the transfer of know-how and competencies, or the dif-fusion of ideas, values and behaviors towards migrant-sending countries.

Among European policy makers, the idea that migration is a force thatcan contribute to development has also gained ground. At the EU level,this is attested by the many communications that have been issued in thisarea for the last ten years or so, and the motivation displayed by policymakers for engaging in the migration and development area.3 However,there is a huge gap between EU discourse and EU concrete action towardsthe goal of making migration work for development. Indeed, if migration

were considered as having positive effects on development, and if develop-ment were a priority for the EU, one obvious policy option would be to

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114 International handbook on migration and economic development

open borders or, at least, to set more generous quotas for the legal entryof immigrants. Another policy option would be to allow migrants to earnmore and therefore to remit more, or to make return or circular migration

more likely by offering legal status to migrants or easing the availabilityof re-entry visas. What the EU and its member states have chosen insteadis to concentrate on trying to restrain labor migration and to combatirregular migration. And when development enters into the story, it isgenerally because decision makers see it as a cure for migration much morethan as a result from it. In other words, while endorsing and contributingto the mainstream discourse linking migration to development, the EUhas continued to erect barriers preventing migration and thus limiting itsdevelopmental potential.

Admittedly, things have changed a little in the last few years. Asunderlined by Collyer (2011), the most obvious example of widespreadpractical changes has been in relation to remittances, with many initia-tives taken here and there to lower the cost of transferring funds fromdestination to origin countries and to increase legal options for sendingmoney.4 Moreover, incoherencies at the national and supranationallevels have not inhibited civil-society actors from collaborating with aview to designing and experimenting programs aimed at reinforcing thedevelopment impact of migration. In the meantime, the content as well

as the form of migration and development discussions have been slowlychanging.In order to highlight and better appreciate these evolutions, this chapter

first presents a historical overview of European policy experience in thefield of migration and development. The discussion mainly focuses onthe emergence of the so-called co-development approach which was firstadopted in France before being emulated by other European countries. Aswill be made clear, different interpretations have been given of the term.Initially identified with policies to control migration flows and with the

promotion of returns, the concept of co-development has progressivelyevolved to encompass any measure aimed at promoting and supportingmigrants as agents for development. However, the experiences of France,the Netherlands, Spain and Italy with co-development policies shed lighton the diverse understanding and application of the concept.5 The chapterthen provides concrete examples of state and non-state initiatives in themigration and development field, and highlights good practices, chal-lenges and lessons learned. It ends with some concluding remarks on theway forward.

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The discourse and practice of co-development in Europe 115

I. CO-DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN EUROPE:A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the economic recession that followed the oil crisis of 1973, nationalgovernments in Europe have mostly seen migration as a phenomenon tobe controlled. As a result, European co-development policies have alwayshad the double agenda of curbing migration and encouraging returnswhile promoting development. However, the failure of return migrationpolicies in the 1970s and 1980s, together with the growing appreciationof the scale of migrants’ remittances and transnational practices, haveresulted in more optimistic views regarding migration and how it affectsdevelopment. Therefore policies have been recently implemented in several

European member states in order to increase the potential developmentalimpact of migration, and even if there are some remaining incoherenciesand ambiguities as to the objectives pursued, there are now many projectsunder way in the field of migration and development involving a variety ofstate and non-state actors.

I.1 The Early Phases of Europe’s Co-development Approach

(1970s–1980s): Voluntary Return Programs

The interest in the complex relationship between migration and develop-ment in Europe dates from the early 1970s. After the oil crisis of 1973,which resulted in a massive economic downturn and increasing unem-ployment, several Western European governments implemented morerestrictive immigration policies. Guest-worker recruitments were put toan end and borders were closed for low-skilled migrants. In the mean-time, various countries, including France, Germany and the Netherlands,started experimenting with development aid programs aimed at encour-aging migrants, especially unemployed ones, to return to their origin

countries. Most assisted voluntary return (AVR) programs, on paper atleast, were aimed at mixing different objectives: first, the effective and ‘sus-tainable’ return of legal and/or illegal immigrants; second, the increase insource-country development; and third, the reduction of the push factorsof migration from those countries. To this end, some of them includedvarious combinations of four types of assistance: financial support forreturn travel expenses; one-off grants; start-up grants or loans for micro-enterprises; and vocational training (Koser, 2001).6

In France, two successive programs were launched in 1977 and 1984respectively in the context of the first massive industry restructuring plansfollowing the economic recession, particularly in the automobile indus-try (Linares, 2009). The first program, called ‘Aide au retour’, granted

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financial support of up to 10 000 French francs (€1500) to legal migrantswilling to return home. Better known as the ‘Million Stoléru’ after thename of its initiator, this program failed to achieve its objective of 100 000

repatriations per year. At the time it was abrogated, in November 1981,only 94 984 persons had taken up the offer, most of whom were Spanishor Portuguese guest workers near retirement age (not the targeted Africanimmigrants) who had already decided to return to their home countries(Observatoire permanent de la coopération française, 1998, p. 119). Thesecond scheme, called ‘Aide publique à la réinsertion’ (APR), concernedlegal foreign workers from all countries (except EC citizens) at risk oflosing their jobs or unemployed for less than three months. Eligiblemigrants could benefit from a lump sum of 20 000 French francs (€3049)

to facilitate their reintegration into their country of origin. Their travelexpenses were borne by the state and they were entitled to unemploymentbenefit. As for the ‘Aide au retour’, the efficiency of this scheme provedto be limited. According to the figures provided by the French Office desMigrations Internationales (OMI), which was in charge of implement-ing the program, only 30 936 workers took advantage of the offer before1991 (although when one considers all family members, 70 481 personswere affected in total). This figure boiled down to 3237 for the 1991–99period and to 113 for the 2000–05 period (Secrétariat Général du Comité

interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration, 2007). Other return orreintegration programs followed in subsequent years: in 1991, a returnscheme targeting illegal resident migrants or failed asylum seekers (the so-called ‘Invités à quitter la France’, or IQF) was launched (‘Aide au RetourVolontaire’, ARV), followed, one year later, by a similar scheme targetingmigrants in a difficult financial situation or in distress (‘Aide au RetourHumanitaire’, ARH) (see Figure 5.1a).

In Germany, several return programs were set up in the 1970s for guestworkers and asylum seekers or refugees. Concerning the latter, the Ministry

for Family, Youth and Health gave the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM) the authority to implement the Reintegrationand Emigration Program for Asylum-Seekers in Germany (REAG) in1979, complemented by the Government Assisted Repatriation Program(GARP) in 1989 (Schibel, 2004). Both were humanitarian programs assist-ing with financial and operational support the voluntary return and migra-tion to third countries. Eligible candidates were (and have been since then)asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers and recognized refugees as wellas war and civil-war refugees, victims of forced prostitution or traffickingand other foreigners.7 More than half a million people have been assistedto return home voluntarily or emigrate to a third country since the startof the programs, which are still running (see Figure 5.1b). With regard to

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guest workers, the first repatriation support programs were implementedby German state governments (Länder) from 1975 onwards, but it was notuntil 1983, with the entry into force of the Act to Promote the Preparedness

of Foreign Workers to Return that the federal government authorized twosuch programs: one consisting in the immediate reimbursement of socialsecurity contributions and the other consisting of return aid amounting toDM10 500 per adult and DM1500 per child. Although both programs wereavailable to non-EC migrants willing to depart from Germany, the secondwas limited to those migrants who had become unemployed or forced towork reduced hours. Beneficiaries of both programs were prohibited fromreturning to Germany to work. Between 1975 and 1984, the social securityprogram approved 120 000 applicants, including 93 000 Turks, while the

return-aid program approved 16 920 applicants, including 14 459 Turks.The federal government did not renew them after June 1984, claiming thatit was job creation in the countries of origin that should form the basis fora return policy (Plewa, 2012).

In the Netherlands, the Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower andPromotion of Local Opportunities for Development (REMPLOD)scheme was introduced in 1974 and was targeted at guest workers fromTurkey, Tunisia and Morocco, who were encouraged to return homeand start entrepreneurial ventures in their country of origin with support

from the Dutch government. This scheme is generally put forward notonly as one of the oldest voluntary return programs in Europe, but alsoas the first one to explicitly point out economic development in migrants’countries of origin as one of its goals (Aumüller, 2004). For the DutchMinistry for Development Cooperation indeed, the idea was that, thanksto REMPLOD funding, returnees would establish new businesses and, byso doing, create the structural conditions needed for rural development.However, the results of the scheme actually fell short of those expected bypolicy makers, especially given its costs, so that it was put to an end in the

mid-1980s.In sum, the success of the early repatriation support programs imple-mented through the 1970s and 1980s has been only moderate. Even ifnone of these programs has been assessed in a comprehensive manner,a few conclusions can be drawn about the reasons for their failure toreach their goals. First, the financial incentive provided to returningmigrants has always been rather low, especially when compared withthe average amount of funds remitted each year by resident migrants orwith unemployment assistance. Second, in most schemes, re-entry intothe immigration country for work purposes was disallowed after thepayment of the financial grant. The beneficiaries of the programs werethus predominantly immigrants who would have returned anyway and

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did not care about exchanging their work or residence permits for money.Additional constraints explain the disappointing results of the programs,in which the financial sponsorship of return was coupled with a profes-

sional traineeship and/or a start-up grant. First, the lack of employmentor entrepreneurial opportunities in the countries of origin deterred manymigrants from applying, and resulted in a high failure rate among return-ees’ projects. Second, many targeted migrants were coming from theweakest segment of the migrant population, namely the unemployed orthe poorly integrated, who often lacked entrepreneurial skills and endedup creating businesses that proved unsustainable in the long run. Third,the offered training programs were often too short and inadequately tail-ored to employment prospects in the home countries. Last but not least,

neither the migrants nor the sending countries ever believed in the stateddevelopment intentions of most reintegration programs, which were seenas nothing but a means of making return policies acceptable.

I.2 The ‘More Development for Less Migration’ Approach (1990s)8

Despite the lack of success of most repatriation schemes, national govern-ments in Europe persisted in considering migration as a phenomenon tobe extensively controlled and in paying little attention to its development

potential. A sharp distinction between development policy and migrationpolicy was thus maintained. The early 1990s saw the conclusion of manybilateral readmission agreements by EU countries with third countries,in order to facilitate expulsion and control immigration.9 In the mean-time, return migration policies, while sometimes redesigned, continued.However, given the low development potential of return migration, policymakers put an increased emphasis on development aid as an instrumentto reduce migration.10 Generally referred to as the ‘root-causes’ or as the‘more development for less migration’ approach, this policy orientation

focused on identifying and tackling the causes of economically motivatedmigration so as to reduce emigration flows, or, in other words, to promote‘stay-at-home development’. It resulted in attempts to expand economicopportunities and improve social services and community infrastructurein specific migration-prone areas in order to absorb and sustain the returnof migrants to those regions.11

In France, this orientation translated into a program known as‘Programme Développement Local Migration’ (PDLM), consisting oflinking individual repatriation support with aid for local development inthree countries, namely Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. Sponsored by theMinistry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, andthe Office des Migrations Internationales, this program was first tried

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between 1993 and 1995 in three regions located near the Senegal River(Bakel in Senegal, Kayes in Mali and Guidimakha in Mauritania), beforebeing implemented on a broader scale from 1995 onwards. The program

had two components: the first one was aimed at helping migrants wishingto set up small-scale enterprises by allocating them a maximum grant of

€3600, conducting feasibility studies and providing assistance with plan-ning and marketing. Technical and managerial support of each projectwas also provided for one year. The grant was not allocated systemati-cally and was conditional on the quality of the project proposed. It wasavailable both to regularized and non-regularized migrants who hadspent at least two years in France. The second component was aimedat supporting various local development projects designed to make the

region more attractive and reduce migration flows (support to someparticular production sectors and to marketing organizations, upgratingof some farm roads etc.). To this end, a €2.6 million budget was investedover a period of five years. Although the scheme represented interest-ing opportunities for migrants, the number of projects has been ratherlimited. In addition to the 20 projects supported in its pilot phase, theprogram contributed to the creation of 100 projects per year between 1996and 2000 in Mali, mainly concerned with transport and commerce, anda total of 60 projects in Senegal (Kaba and Force, 2002; Raunet, 2005).

This came as no surprise for its promoters, as the focus of the programwas on the quality of returns rather than on their quantity. Nevertheless,the figures were below expectations. In fact, the lack of success of theprogram was mainly due to the context in which it was created. At thesame time, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and StatelessPersons (OFPRA) was being reformed in order to toughen asylum policy,and more restrictive measures towards immigration were being adopted(Gubert, 2008). Many migrants thus perceived it as a way to humanizereturns and not to promote development. Moreover, many development

practitioners in both Mali and Senegal had concerns about the strong pri-ority given to migration-prone areas at the expense of other regions in theallocation of development aid. Lastly, the program was strongly criticizedfor not taking into account the role of Malian and Senegalese migrants’associations located in France in favor of local development initiatives.Indeed, while the focus at the state level was on the development poten-tial of return migration, several studies documenting the emergence ofAfrican immigrants’ associations in France and their role in the provi-sion of public goods in the localities or origin were being published (see,e.g., Quiminal, 1991; Lavigne Delville, 1991; Institut Panos, 1993; Daum,1995, 1998; Blion and Verrière, 1998). According to these studies, therewere, at the beginning of the 1990s, no fewer than 143 Malian migrants’

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associations registered in France, and about 400 such associations formedby migrants originating from the Senegal River Valley (Mali, Senegal andMauritania), with the majority of them initiating and funding projects

for the development of village infrastructures in their countries of origin.Despite their positive development-related accomplishments and growingrecognition by both international solidarity organizations and Frenchlocal authorities,12 these associations were completely ignored by thestate actors in charge of development planning policy and strategy. Moregenerally, the criticisms leveled at France’s PDLM or at similar programsin other European countries were much less of the contents of the schemeand its limited scope than the claim that unwanted migration can bestemmed through development. Thanks to a growing body of empirical

literature (see, e.g., Martin and Taylor, 1996), more and more voices wereraised at the time to push the idea that development stimulates migrationrather than reduces it, at least in the short and medium run. However, it isnow generally acknowledged that, with PDLM, France took its first steptowards a development-oriented migration policy and towards what hasbeen since then referred to as ‘co-development’ (De Haas, 2006; Möhl,2010). In 1997, a national symposium on international cooperation andsolidarity initiated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was heldwith the support of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State

Secretariat for Cooperation. It highlighted migrants’ positive role indevelopment cooperation and called for closer governmental engagementwith migrant associations without any return obligation. Following thissymposium, a co-development working group was created. It resultedin the publication of the influential Rapport de bilan et d’orientation surla politique de co-développement liée aux flux migratoires’ (Final Reporton the Co-development Policy Related to Migration Flows – Naïr, 1997).Based on the recognition that migrants were important actors in thedevelopment of their countries of origin, and that their contribution in

development should be valued and encouraged, this report encouragedoriginal proposals aimed at providing support to their projects, reinforc-ing the action of international solidarity organizations and ‘organizing’mobility in order to allow for the legal possibility of residing temporar-ily in France for employment purposes. The report also recommendedthat the support to migrant engagements in their country of origin be nolonger accompanied by return obligation (‘Codevelopment policy shouldnot be aimed at encouraging migrants to return if they do not want to.On the contrary, their legal presence in France is what enables them tocontribute in an efficient way to the development of their country ’ (p. 3)).In the meantime, however, the report was very cautious about the pos-sibility of relaxing France’s migration policy and did not depart from the

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‘more development for less migration’ approach (‘Codevelopment shouldnot be aimed at promoting new immigration flows, as it does not advo-cate liberalizing immigration. Its main focus is on facilitating migrants’

integration in France while encouraging solidarity efforts towards origincountries, in order to create the social conditions that will allow thepotential migrants to stay at home’ (p. 3)).

As highlighted by Magoni (2004), Sami Naïr’s report was a historicmilestone as it officially and for the first time acknowledged the role ofmigrants in the development of their countries of origin. It also gainedinternational attention as it was the first report referring to the politicalconcept of co-development and framing the term theoretically as well aspostulating objectives and concrete measures.13 Following the example of

France, several European countries will start to implement their own co-development policy. In the meantime, co-development will slowly makeits way into the European Union’s (EU) official policy process. However,different interpretations will be made of the concept. Depending on thecountry and the period in question, the term will refer to different areasof work, ranging from the exchange of development aid for migratorycontrol to the promotion of remittances, or of development projects initi-ated by migrant associations (Möhl, 2010).

I.3 The Various Approaches to Co-development (2000s)

Even if the first attempts to set up a common European asylum andimmigration policy and a ‘comprehensive approach’ to migration through‘partnership with third countries’ can be traced back to the end of the1990s,14 concrete policy initiatives aimed at enhancing synergies betweenmigration management and development cooperation were tried almostexclusively at the level of individual member states until the mid- 2000s.However, overall interest of Europe’s main immigration countries in co-

development has been fairly weak, with only France, Spain and to someextent the Netherlands and Italy engaging in a more visible policy effort.

France’s co-development approach

Considered as the ‘European cradle of codevelopment policy’ (Nijenhuisand Broekhuis, 2010), France usually serves as the reference frameworkeven if migration and development policies have been implemented else-where in Europe, and sometimes earlier than in France. What actuallymakes France special as compared to other European countries is thestated policy priority given to this issue, as illustrated by the nominationof a Deputy Ambassador for co-development in 2002, and by the crea-tion, in May 2007, of a ministry dedicated to designing and implementing

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co-development policy.15 However, as in any other European member state,policy discourses and practices in the migration and development field inFrance have remained quite ambiguous as to the objectives pursued.

Despite several political changes over the last 15 years and co-developmentbeing transferred from one ministry or state department to another, theagenda has always been strongly determined by migration issues.16

The ambiguities of the French co- development approach were apparentright from the start. After the publication of Naïr’s report, in 1998, thegovernment set up the ‘Mission Interministerielle au co-développement etaux migrations internationales’ (MICOMI), an interministerial committeewith representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry ofInterior and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Its task was to give a concrete

meaning to the policy concept of co-development and, to this end, topropose measures towards a partnership approach with countries of emi-gration with a view to promoting co-development while better controllingmigration flows. Created in the aftermath of the regularization programof 1997–98, however, MICOMI’s first assignment consisted in implement-ing a scheme, called the Contrat de Réinsertion dans le Pays d’origine(CRPO), which was specifically designed to encourage illegal migrantsfrom Mali, Morocco and Senegal who were not eligible for amnesties toreturn home voluntarily. This emphasis on return altered the credibility

of co-development and led to the dismantling of MICOMI (Lacroix,2009). At about the same time, however, tangible progress in engagingwith and learning from the migrants was made. The recognition of thepositive role of the migrants and their associations in the development oftheir origin countries allowed them to gain representation in the advisorycouncils of French development policy, namely the Haut Conseil de laCoopération Internationale (HCCI) and the Comité interministériel de laCoopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID) (Möhl, 2010).To give more voice and power to migrants’ interests, a national platform

called the Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues desMigrations (FORIM), federating between 600 and 700 associations, wascreated in 2002, with the assigned task of representing them in the differ-ent interest groups and structures involved in policy making. Progress wasalso made from 2000 onwards in designing new tools of cooperation withthird countries. One such new tool was the program implemented throughthe bilateral co-development convention signed with Mali in December2000. This convention materialized in 2002 with the launch of a three-year (2003–05) program of €2.6 million funded by the French Ministryof Foreign Affairs within the framework of the ‘Fond de SolidaritéPrioritaire’.17 Supervised by the newly appointed Deputy Ambassador forco-development, its aim was fourfold: (1) supporting local development

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through the co-funding of development projects initiated by diasporaorganizations; (2) assisting in personal enterprises of migrants wishingto return to Mali or willing to invest from France; (3) mobilizing the

Malian scientific diaspora through brain circulation; and (4) improvingthe integration of young persons with a migratory background.18 Similarbilateral programs followed with Senegal,19 Morocco (€3.8 million) andthe Comoros (€2.5 million). The co-development agenda was thus muchbroader than in previous schemes and not solely intended to encourage thereintegration of migrants in their countries of origin. In addition, thanksto their increasing visibility, migrant organizations began to establish theirown networks in order to promote diaspora engagement in the countriesof origin. As highlighted by Möhl (2010), a decentralization process was

thus initiated, with responsibilities and powers progressively transferredfrom national state agencies to civil-society networks and migrant associa-tions, often working at the local level. All those efforts, undertaken with aview to distancing co-development policies from policies to fight undocu-mented migration and stimulate return migration were partly wiped outby the adoption of the Immigration and Integration Law of 2006 andthe creation, one year later, of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration,National Identity and Codevelopment, whose mission rested on threepillars: selective immigration; mandatory integration for long-term resi-

dents; and co-development (Chou and Baygert, 2007). In line with the twofirst objectives, a renewable three-year ‘Skills and Talents Permit’ (‘Cartecompétences et talents’), designed to facilitate the entry of new migrantswhose talents would be an asset for France, was introduced and the rulesfor family reunification were redefined in a restrictive way. The ‘Receptionand Integration Contract’ (‘Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration’) wasalso created for those migrants willing to settle in France. Regarding thethird objective, new co-development tools were designed (tax breaks formigrants’ productive savings, co-development prizes awarded to migrants

or diaspora organizations etc.). But the real shift came with the way inwhich the partnership with third countries was redefined. This shift wasmaterialized by the signature of bilateral agreements on concerted man-agement of migration flows (‘Accords de gestion concertée des flux migra-toires’) between France and its main partners.20 With those agreements,the commitment of countries of migrants’ departure and transit to combatillegal migration became a precondition for privileged access to legalmigration and to more easily benefit from development aid, which madeit clear that the focus of the Ministry was much more on migration man-agement than on development cooperation. The analysis of the budgetdevoted to the French Ministry of Immigration brings further support tothis assertion. At the time the Ministry was operating, between 2008 and

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2010, and despite the stated political priority given to co-development,the budget allocated to it represented only about 5 percent of the totalbudget of the Ministry (Table 5.1), and less than 1 percent of French ODA

(Table 5.2). It was also insignificant compared to the funds channeled bymigrants. The Malian diaspora remitted about €200 million in 2005, whilethe co-development program signed between France and Mali provided

€2.6 million over the 2003–05 period (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010).Therefore, at a time when co-development was given more visibility,

the discrepancies between stated objectives and actual means, and thestrategy consisting in using aid as leverage for increased migration con-trols ‘at source’, did nothing but further discredit the policy concept ofco-development.

The Netherlands’ co-development approach21

Just as in any other European immigrant-receiving country, Dutch immi-gration and immigrant integration policies have become more restrictiveand demanding since the 1990s. The Aliens Act of 2000 in particularmade the Dutch policy on asylum seekers stricter and the conditions forfamily reunification and marital migration less lenient. It also emphasizedremigration to stimulate and, if necessary, force undocumented aliensand rejected asylum seekers to return to their countries of origin (Snel

et al., 2003). In the meantime, migrant groups have been increasinglyforced to meet requirements for integration through the implementationof a system of compulsory introduction programs for newcomers since1998. This is also expressed in the attempts of the Dutch government toestablish ‘umbrella entities’, such as the Surinaams Inspraak Orgaan (SIO)(the Surinamese consultation body) and the Samenwerkingsverband vanMarokkanen in Nederland (SMN), its Moroccan equivalent, to repre-sent all migrant organizations in encounters with the Dutch government(Nijenhuis and Zoomer, 2012).

Parallel to this tendency towards more restrictive policies, theNetherlands has also undergone a shift in migration and developmentthinking, as illustrated by the publication of two Development andMigration Policy Memoranda in 2004 and 2008, respectively (Nijenhuisand Broekhuis, 2010). However, a close look at the proposed measures andstated objectives reveals that migration management policies, via circularand return migration programs, continue to dominate. The conclusions ofthe 2004 document, for example, acknowledge that there is considerableroom to improve the coherence between migration and development poli-cies, in particular through (1) improving the capacity building in the fieldof migration management and protection in the region; and (2) encourag-ing effective return of illegal migrants deemed necessary for the integrity of

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T a b l e

5 . 1

R e s p e c t i v e b u d g e t s a l l o c a t e d t o ‘ C o - d e v e l o p m e n

t ’ a n d ‘ I m m i g r a t i o n , a s y l u m a n d i n t e g r a t i o n ’ p r o g r a m

s i n t h e

F r e n c h b u d g e t , 2

0 0 8 – 2

0 1 3 ( i n m i l l i o n e u r o s )

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1

1

2 0 1 2

2 0 1 3

%

%

%

%

%

%

I m m i g

r a t i o n , a s y l u m a n d i n t e g r a t i o

n

6 0 9 . 6

9 5 . 5

5 1 3 . 8 9

5 . 4

5 6 0 . 4

9 4 . 1

5 6 1 . 4

9 4 . 9

6 3 1 . 9

9 5 . 8

6 7 0 . 9

9 7 . 3

I m m i g

r a t i o n a n d a s y l u m

4 1 4 . 2

6 4 . 9

4 3 6

8

1 . 0

4 8 0 . 6

8 0 . 7

4 8 8 . 6

8 2 . 6

5 6 0 . 3

8 4 . 9

6 0 4 . 7

8 7 . 7

I n t e g r a t i o n / a c c e s s t o c i t i z e n s h i p

1 9 5 . 3

3 0 . 6

7 7 . 8

1

4 . 5

7 9 . 8

1 3 . 4

7 2 . 8

1 2 . 3

7 1 . 6

1 0 . 9

6 6 . 2

9 . 6

C o - d e v e l o p m e n t

2 9 . 0

4 . 5

2 4 . 5

4 . 6

3 5 . 1

5 . 9

2 9 . 9

5 . 1

2 8 . 0

4 . 2

1 8 . 5

2 . 7

T o t a l

6 3 8 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

5 3 8 . 3 1 0

0 . 0

5 9 5 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

5 9 1 . 3

1 0 0 . 0

6 5 9 . 9

1 0 0 . 0

6 8 9 . 4

1 0 0 . 0

N o t e :

B e t w e e n 2 0 0 8 a n d 2 0 1 0 ,

t h e b u d g e t s a l l o c a t e d t o ‘ I m m i g r a t i o n , a s y l u m a n d i n t e g r a t i o n ’ a n d t o ‘ C

o - d e v e l o p m e n t ’ f o r m e d t h e t o t a

l b u d g e t

o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f I m m i g r a t i o n ,

I n t e g r a

t i o n ,

N a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y a n d S o l i d

a r i t y D e v e l o p m e n t . I n 2 0 1 1 a n d

2 0 1 2 ,

t h e y b e c a m e p a r t o f t h e b u

d g e t o f

t h e M i n i s t r y o f I n t e r i o r . I n 2 0 1 3 ,

t h e b u

d g e t a l l o c a t e d t o ‘ I m m i g r a t i o n , a s y l u m a n d i n t e g r a t i o n ’ r e m a i n e d i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f I n t e r i o r ,

b u t t h e

‘ C o - d e v e l o p m e n t ’ b u d g e t w a s m

e r g e d w i t h t h a t a l l o c a t e d t o ‘ S o l i d a r i t y w i t h d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s

’ a n d b e c a m e p a r t o f t h e b u d g e t

o f t h e

M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .

S o u r c e :

R é p u b l i q u e F r a n ç a i s e , P r o j e t

d e l o i d e f i n a n c e ,

E x e r c i c e s 2 0 0 8 ,

2 0 0 9 ,

2 0 1 0 ,

2 0 1 1 ,

2 0 1 2 ,

2 0 1 3 ( h t t p : / / w w w . p e r f o r m a n c e - p u b l i q u e

. b u d g e t .

g o u v . f r / r e s s o u r c e s - d o c u m e n t a i r e s / l o i s - p

r o j e t s - d e - l o i s - e t - d o c u m e n t s - a n n e x e s - p a r - a n n e e / , a c c e s s e d o n J a n u a r y 2 1 ,

2 0 1 4 ) .

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127

T a b l e

5 . 2

F r e n c h o f f i c i a l d e v e l o

p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e , 2

0 0 8 – 2 0

1 3 ( i n m i l l i o n e u r o s )

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

2 0 1 0

2 0 1 1

2 0 1 2

2 0 1 3

%

%

%

%

%

%

F i n a n c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c

a i d f o r d e v e l o p m e n t

9 7 2 . 2

3 1 . 6

1 0 4 1 . 5

3 3 . 0

1 1 8 6 . 8

3 5 . 5

1 1 7 0 . 1

3 5 . 1

1 1 9 1 . 9

3 5 . 8

1 1 6 1 . 9

3 7 . 2

S o l i d a

r i t y w i t h

d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s

2 0 7 2 . 0

6 7 . 4

2 0 8 6 . 8

6 6 . 2

2 1 1 9 . 9

6 3 . 4

2 1 3 4 . 0

6 4 . 0

2 1 1 3 . 3

6 3 . 4

1 9 4 5 . 2

6 2 . 2

C o - d e v e l o p m e n t

2 9 . 5

1 . 0

2 4 . 3

0 . 8

3 4 . 8

1 . 0

3 0

0 . 9

2 8

0 . 8

1 8 . 5

0 . 6

T o t a l

3 0 7 3 . 7

1 0 0 . 0

3 1 5 2 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

3 3 4 1 . 5

1 0 0 . 0

3 3 3 4 . 1

1 0 0 . 0

3 3 3 3 . 2

1 0 0 . 0

3 1 2 5 . 6

1 0 0 . 0

S o u r c e :

R é p u b l i q u e F r a n ç a i s e , R a p p o

r t s a n n u e l s d e p e r f o r m a n c e s , A n

n e x e a u p r o j e t d e l o i d e r è g l e m e n

t d e s c o m p t e s e t r a p p o r t d e g e s t i o n ,

A i d e

p u b l i q u e a u d é v e l o p p e m e n t ( y e a r s 2 0 0 8

, 2 0 0 9 ,

2 0 1 0 ,

2 0 1 1 ,

2 0 1 2 ,

2 0 1 3 ) .

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and public support for the asylum system and migration policy in general,assisted voluntary return and circular migration (De Haas, 2006). Whilethe contributions to development by migrants and their organizations are

recognized, no concrete measures to involve them in development coop-eration are proposed.

Nevertheless, the Dutch government indirectly supports migrant anddevelopment organizations by providing funds to co-financing agen-cies (i.e. development non-governmental NGOs such as Oxfam Novibor Cordaid) that perform co-development activities. One example isthe Linkis initiative instigated by the Directorate for InternationalCooperation (DGIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and imple-mented by the National Commission for International Cooperation

and Sustainable Development (NCDO) and five co-financing agencies(Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, ICCO, Hivos and Plan Nederland). In order toimprove the involvement of Netherlands-based individuals and (migrantand non-migrant) organizations in development cooperation, the Linkisonline facility was launched in 2004 to inform and advise groups ofcitizens on concrete opportunities to submit proposals for small-scaleprojects in developing countries (with co-funding of up to €50 000) withthe participating development agencies. In addition to the Linkis frame-work, Dutch co-financing agencies and other development NGOs also

have policies that are specifically targeted towards migrants and migrantorganizations. Oxfam Novib, for example, has initiated several activi-ties aimed at strengthening the involvement of diaspora organizationsand their members in development cooperation, such as: (1) the strategicfinancing of small and large development projects of diaspora organiza-tions; (2) capacity building in project management, fund-raising, lob-bying and so on; (3) supporting alliance building with other NGOs; (4)linking and learning/exchange visits; and (5) organizing expert meetingsand conferences (De Haas, 2006).

Thus, while the Dutch development agenda seems somehow subor-dinate to the migration agenda at the official policy level, developmentNGOs and diaspora organizations have managed to engage in fruitfulalliances supported by co-financing government funds for developmentcooperation (De Haas, 2006). More recently, Dutch municipalities withlarge groups of immigrants have also shown a growing interest in estab-lishing contacts with municipalities in main origin countries. In 2009,there were about 40 municipal twinnings from the Netherlands withimmigrant-sending countries such as Turkey, Suriname and Morocco, andthis number has been increasing since then (Hoetjes, 2009; Van Ewijk andBaud, 2009).

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Spain and Italy’s co-development approach

The Spanish and Italian experiences in the field of co- developmentare often discussed jointly because they share a number of similari-

ties. In terms of their migration history, both Spain and Italy havemoved from being predominantly emigration countries to countries thathave attracted large-scale immigration from Northern Africa (Morocco,Tunisia), Western Africa (Senegal), Eastern Europe (Romania, Ukraine,Albania) and, in the case of Spain, Latin America (Ecuador, DominicanRepublic). Their migrant communities are thus less established as well asrelatively less organized, which may partly explain why co-developmentpolicies in those two countries are still at the draft stage. By contrast toFrance, a traditionally centralized state, co-development initiatives in

Spain and Italy have taken place much more at the level of the munici-palities and regions than at the state level, and largely overlap with decen-tralized development practices (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004; Grillo andRiccio, 2004; Terrón, 2004; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). In Spain,co-development initiatives exist in Catalonia, the Community of Madrid,the Basque country, Valencia, Andalusia, Murcia, and Aragon, but notin other regions. In Madrid’s Master Plan 2005–08, for example, the termco-development is explicitly referred to as a strategic measure, treatingboth migrant organizations and migrants as ‘partners’ in the cooperation

projects with Madrid. Co-development is also included in the 2004–07 and2008–11 Master Plans for the Valencian Development Cooperation, withmeasures including awareness raising in the countries of origin about themigrants’ developmental potential; supporting the possibility of repatria-tion; recruiting active participants from the migrant residents in Valenciato promote development projects in their home countries; and establishingco-development agencies with town councils in towns with high propor-tions of migrants (Boni and Lacomba, 2011). In Catalonia, the FonsCatalà de Cooperació al Desenvolupament has started to work along

the lines of co-development since 1996 (Fauser, 2007). As emphasized byAcebillo-Baqué and Østergaard-Nielsen (2011), co-development at thelevel of local governments in Spain has often been grounded in concernswith migrant integration. Being directly confronted with large inflows ofimmigrants, municipalities and regions have tried to support developmen-tal projects initiated by migrants or their organizations while promotingtheir successful incorporation. The expansion of the municipalities andregions’ international cooperation with emigration countries has also beena way to increase the legitimacy of their international activities. The sameholds true in Italy, where a broad range of pilot schemes in the area of co-development has been attempted at the regional level since the 1990s, insuch regions as the Veneto, Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and

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Tuscany. Their main areas of action include workforce training, selectionand recruitment projects; mandatory and voluntary return; projects tocreate employment and reduce migratory pressure; and projects for the

optimal use of remittances (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004).In Spain, but not in Italy, co-development also entered the national

policy debate, but later on and with a different meaning.22 The termcodesarrollo first appeared in the Programa Global de Regulacion de laExtranjeria e Immigracion 2001–2004 (better known as Plan GRECO),during the second legislature of the Partido Popular from 2000 to 2004.Issued by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairsand Cooperation, the program included five action plans in the field ofco-development that much resembled those implemented within France’s

PDLM (Möhl, 2010): training programs for returnees, assisted returnprograms, micro-credit funding for productive activities; technical assist-ance in source countries as well as channeling remittances into productiveinvestments. The program was criticized for being highly centralized, disre-garding the engagement of the civil society and migrants in particular, andhaving a strong return component. In addition, the political will to addresscodesarrollo did not translate into a specific budgetary commitment, sothat the suggested measures were not implemented in practice (Terrón,2004). With the Socialist Labor Party coming into power, in March 2004,

new policy strategies focused on the integration of immigrants residing inSpain were initiated. In the meantime, codesarrollo shifted to the field ofdevelopment cooperation instead of immigration, and, as a consequence,the former elements of migration management and control of the PlanGRECO were replaced by development-oriented instruments. Since then,codesarrollo has been defined as a strategy aimed at facilitating the engage-ment of diaspora associations with the development of their countries oforigin. However, it has remained a concept that is much more discussed atthe regional level than at the national one.

In short, the meaning and application of co-development as a policyconcept, as well as the importance attributed to it, have been rather dif-ferent in France, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. However, and ashighlighted by Royo (2010), it seems rather clear that the use of the sameterm to refer to actions as different as return policies, the control of flowsand of borders, remittances or transnational relations has been one of theprincipal problems of co-development. It undermined trust and, to quoteJonathan Chaloff, did not form a ‘workable policy approach’ (Chaloff,2005). And even if efforts have been made in recent years to clarify andcircumscribe the concept in such a way as to limit it to any action or prac-tice linking migrant communities with the development of their countriesof origin, the damage has been done. This probably explains why, in both

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national and European policy discourses, the notion of ‘migration anddevelopment’ is now preferred over the concept of co-development.

As suggested by the above discussion, incoherencies at the official policy

levels did not prevent development agencies, regional and municipalgovernments, as well as NGOs, from partnering with and learning frommigrants or migrant organizations. This co-development ‘from below’, asopposed to ‘from above’, has led to an increasing number of (sometimesinnovative) programs and actions aimed at enhancing the contribution ofmigrants and diasporas in development processes, reviewed in the nextsection.

II. CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF STATE AND NON-STATE DIASPORA INITIATIVES IN EUROPE

As suggested by Carling (2008), there are several ways of classifyingdiaspora-related policy measures. One criterion may be whether theytarget emigrants explicitly or not. Special bank accounts for emigrants,remittance bonds or specific training sessions, for example, belong tothe first category, while any measure aimed at improving the investmentclimate in countries or regions of out- migration belong to the second.

Another criterion may be their scope. Some, such as those targeting remit-tances only, are narrowly scoped, while others, such as bilateral labormigration treaties or dual citizenship legislation, have a much wider scope.In what follows, we focus mainly on diaspora-related policy programs ormeasures initiated by European state and non-state actors that explicitlytarget migrants or migrant organizations and whose scope is to enhancethe developmental impact of remittances, be they individual or collective,financial or non-financial. This focus on remittances is driven by the con-siderable attention that they have attracted since the early 2000s, and all

the efforts undertaken since then to increase their volume and promotetheir productive use.Our review deals mainly with programs or measures that are quite small

scale and/or still in the experimental phase, and since their impact hasnot been properly assessed, it is unfortunately hazardous to say that theyachieved their purpose. Nevertheless, we make an effort as much as pos-sible to highlight good practices, challenges and lessons learned.23

II.1 Stimulating Transfers through Formal Channels

Among the measures that have been implemented to stimulate formalremittance methods, some consist in information campaigns about

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existing remittance transfer mechanisms and transfer fees so as to improvethe efficiency of the remittance market. Examples of such measures arethe websites comparing remittance services offered by banks and money

transfer organizations, including the costs charged for various destina-tions that have been created in several European countries: Envoidargent.com in France, finansportalen.no in Norway; mandasoldiacasa.it in Italy;sendmoneyhome.org in the UK (which changed its name to fxcompared.com); geldtransfair.de in Germany; GeldNaarHuis.nl in the Netherlands;and so on. A few of them (the French, the Italian and the Norwegianones) have been certified by the World Bank, which has its own websitethat covers 220 ‘country corridors’ worldwide from 32 remittance-sendingcountries to 89 receiving countries (remittanceprices.worldbank.org). By

making the information on transfer fees publicly available, the envisionedconsequences are increased competition among providers, reduced trans-fer costs, better-informed remittance senders and higher use of formalremittance channels.24 To our knowledge, no evaluation of these remit-tance service comparison websites has been carried out, except for the‘Geld Naar Huis’ website, and the conclusions are rather mixed (Siegel etal., 2010, p.3). As stated in the report,

The website has experienced limited usage by members of its target audience,and its lacking visibility has resulted in meager impacts on migrants’ under-standing of the Dutch remittance market and operators functioning within it. . . The website has not had a significant impact on the behavior of remittancetransfer operators, especially as engagement with banks and money transferoperators (MTOs) has been limited at best.

The report ends with some suggestions for improvements that includeensuring more up-to-date and accurate information and providing userswith more information on financial news and services linked to remit-tances. Related to this, a randomized experiment was recently designed

to measure the impact of providing financial literacy training to migrantsin New Zealand and Australia, two countries that launched a remittancecost comparison website for sending money to the Pacific Islands, and,in the case of New Zealand, where regulatory reform led to the introduc-tion of new remitting methods (Gibson et al., 2014). Among other things,the training taught migrants the different elements that make up the costof sending remittances and how to compare costs across methods. Assuggested by the results, the training appears to increase financial knowl-edge and information-seeking behavior, and reduce the risk of switchingto more expensive remittance products. But no impact is found on thefrequency or the level of remittances. Some one-off measures have alsoattempted to remove the obstacles that deter migrants from opening

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bank accounts. The German National Development Agency (GIZ), forexample, tried to help banks become more accessible to migrants byorganizing a conference in 2009 that brought together Serbian banks and

several Serbian migrant organizations from Germany to discuss reasonsbehind migrants’ reluctance to use formal remittances channels (Aguniasand Newland, 2012). However, it is unlikely that this kind of measure willreally make a difference since there are many additional obstacles thatprevent migrants from opening bank accounts or using formal channelsagainst which destination countries cannot take direct action. The localbranches of commercial banks based in destination countries, for example,often require identification documents that migrants (at least the unau-thorized ones) cannot provide. In addition, some migrants may have had a

negative experience with banks in their home country and thus distrust thesystem. Another huge challenge that makes informal channels much morepreferable to (non-mobile) banks is the so-called ‘last mile’ of remittancetransactions, which refers to access to a contact point at which remittancerecipients can withdraw the cash sent. Banks in origin countries generallyhave a limited payout presence in rural and/or remote areas. And evenif innovative mobile-phone-based money transfer services have success-fully entered the remittance market and much improved the number ofremittance payout locations, they sometimes find it hard to compete with

informal systems that have proven effective for several years. In the caseof Mali, for example, despite the strong increase in the number of remit-tance payout locations (with, respectively, 315 and 1792 contact points forWestern Union25 and Orange mobile banking26), informal channels stillhave an estimated 59 percent of the market share in France (AfDB, 2008).Informal transfers include hand-carried cash transfers, in-kind transfers,or transfers sent through the ‘fax system’ (even if a fax machine is hardlyused). This last method relies on strong networks that connect Malianmigrants in France with people in Mali, generally traders. When a migrant

wants to remit, he gives a sum of money to a person in charge of central-izing the funds, who often resides in the same foyer and originates fromthe same village. This person then contacts the agent (the trader) closest tothe recipient and requests him to pay the amount (generally minus a com-mission) in exchange for a promise to be paid later. In the meantime, themigrant calls the recipient in the village to inform him of the availabilityof the funds or the goods. The trader gets paid later, either in cash or ingoods.

The fact that some migrants sometimes prefer to send goods is alsorarely analyzed and taken into account. As suggested by personal inter-views with migrants, the choice of sending goods instead of money is muchmore driven by their desire to control remittance use than by their wish

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to pay lower fees. This explains part of the success of the recently createdwebsite niokobok.com, which makes it possible for members of theSenegalese diaspora to buy food and other daily consumer goods online

for their origin households in Senegal. As suggested by some of the com-ments dropped by users of the website, having better control on remittanceuse is what made them choose this channel:27

This website is such a good idea! Otherwise how can you be certain that themoney you send is used for the house? (Comment posted by M. on August 15,2013, our translation) I love it. It is of very simple use, and when the family is far away, one isalways worried about how the money is spent. Now I am sure that they will eat.Congratulations! (Comment posted by J.T. on May 7, 2013, our translation)

As additional evidence, the level of control that migrants have over remit-tance use as a factor influencing remittance behavior has been recentlyconfirmed by three recent academic papers (Batista and Narciso, 2013;Batista et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2013). They all provide evidence that thegreater the control over remittance use, the higher the remittances. Thissuggests that enhancing the control exerted by migrants on remittance usecould also be a way to stimulate remittances.

II.2 Stimulating Investment of Remittances28

Most European migrant-receiving countries have attempted to facilitatethe establishment of businesses by entrepreneurial migrants in their coun-tries of origin. One of the first NGOs to embark on this issue is the DutchNGO IntEnt (which stands for INTernational ENTrepreneurship). It wascreated in 1996 in response to a growing number of successful migrantentrepreneurs operating in the Netherlands and wishing to start a businessin their country of origin, but who faced difficult access to information,

financial facilities and specialized services (De Haas, 2006). Initially exclu-sively funded by the Dutch government, the program has benefited fromadditional sources of funding from HIVOS, a Dutch co-financing agencyand the European Union. Up to 2000, business development services wereprovided to individuals originating from countries from which sizablepopulations in the Netherlands emigrated (Morocco, Suriname, Ghanaand Turkey). Since then, IntEnt has expanded its activities with servicesto migrants from Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, the NetherlandsAntilles (Curaçao) and Ethiopia. By 2009, more than 1500 potentialentrepreneurs had requested information from IntEnt, and 350 compa-nies had started up (IntEnt, 2009, cited by Kleush and Schuster, 2012).The program, which is tailored to the specific needs of migrant entrepre-

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neurs, is divided into three phases: (1) sourcing and selection in the start-ing country (e.g. informational meetings, intake interviews and generalworkshop sessions); (2) preparation for entrepreneurship (e.g. support for

writing business plans, country information workshops, market research,evaluation of business plans); (3) implementation of the entrepreneurshipin the program country (e.g. start-up coaching, financial support, and poststart-up support for a maximum of 1.5 years).29 Migrants are urged tofinance a major part of their businesses, but can get additional resourcesthrough grants of up to €50 000 from the Friends and Family Fund (FFF).To get funded, friends and family of the entrepreneur should providea guarantee for half of the investment to the FFF; the entrepreneur’sfinancial plan should be approved; and the entrepreneur should accept

guidance during the first year after start-up of their business (Agunias andNewland, 2012).

Quite similar programs have been implemented since then, in theNetherlands30 as well as in other European countries. The Business Ideasfor Morocco program, for example, was created in 2009 with the KompassZentrum für Existenzgründung (Kompass Center for Business Start-ups) based in Frankfurt and the German Chamber of Commerce andIndustry (CCI) in Morocco to enable Moroccans who have completedtheir education in Germany to acquire the skills they need to set up a new

company in their home country. As with IntEnt, the program is dividedinto three phases. First, participants take part in introductory seminarsin Germany: they develop their business idea and clarify issues such asthe level of competition in Morocco and finding the right location. Thisis then followed by individual coaching sessions. An entrepreneur fromMorocco also attends the seminars, passing on experience to the buddingentrepreneurs. During the third stage, the participant receives advice andsupport in Morocco. By 2011, more than 150 Moroccans had benefitedfrom the program and created a business. An analogous program aimed

at young graduates originating from the Maghreb and Mashriq countries,notably Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Lebanon, has existed in Francesince 2011. Called the Programme d’Aide à la Création d’EntreprisesInnovantes en Méditerranée (PACEIM; Aid Program for the Creationof Innovative Businesses in the Mediterranean), it is administered bythe Institute of Research for Development, a French research organiza-tion that addresses international development issues.31 Laureates can befunded through grants of up to €35 000. The 2011 and 2012 editions ofthe program involved respectively 30 and 28 entrepreneurs. Since 2006,France has also had an agreement with Senegal to support diaspora ini-tiatives by Senegalese living in France through the Programme d’appuiaux initiatives de solidarité pour le développement (PAISD; Support

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Program for Initiatives Encouraging Development). Among other objec-tives, the PAISD supports migrants who wish to invest at home by pro-viding advice, expertise to start a small business, training and a follow-up

over 12 months.32 By June 2009, 36 months after its effective start date,the program had supported 221 projects of business creation in sectorsas diverse as agriculture, trade, tourism, ICT, transport and services.33 The volume of funds invested by entrepreneurs at the time amounted tomore than 2 billion CFA francs (about €3 million). Interestingly enough,returnees only made up about half of the participating entrepreneurs, withthe other half being individuals residing abroad and investing at distance.

Again, the success of all above-mentioned programs (whose list is farfrom exhaustive) is hard to assess since no rigorous evaluation has been

carried out so far. Follow-up reports, where they exist, highlight thenumber of newly created businesses and the number of jobs that have beengenerated, but they usually do not provide any information on failure rate,the average lifetime of businesses and so on. In a communication givenat a conference in New York in 2006, a staff member of the Dutch NGOIntEnt listed some of the lessons learned during the pilot phase of theproject: (1) enterprise promotion programs take time and most migrantentrepreneurs tend to underestimate the problems they have to overcometo be successful as businessmen in their country of origin; (2) the program

reaches relatively small numbers but the investments made are significantand sustainable; and (3) negative economic and political developments inthe country of origin have a direct and long-lasting effect on the willing-ness of the entrepreneurs to implement their plans. At a seminar organizedas part of the French Programme Migrations et Initiatives Economiquesin 2004, it was revealed that many projects face difficulties due to variousproblems such as lack of experience, vagueness and the often naïve char-acter of business plans, the heterogeneous character and lack of qualityof counterpart organizations, high costs and the difficult access to poorly

developed local credit markets (De Haas, 2006).It is very likely that most of these observations apply equally to all theschemes that have been designed in recent years to stimulate the produc-tive use of remittances. And among the reasons given for their limitedappeal, poor local conditions and unfavorable business investment climatecertainly are the most salient. However, two other factors may furtherhamper investment efforts. One relates to the distance management of thebusinesses created by migrant entrepreneurs. The latter often complain thattheir businesses are poorly managed by unqualified staff, friends or familymembers, leading to financial losses and business collapse. Certainly, theprogress of information and communication technologies (ICT), togetherwith cheaper airfares and the possibility of opening and managing online

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bank accounts, have enabled migrant entrepreneurs to oversee their busi-ness in person, but allowing dual citizenships for members of the diasporawould be additional progress. The second factor relates to the insurance

role of migrants, which has been much documented in the literature.34 Byserving as insurance for their families, migrants make up for the lack, orinadequacy, of local insurance markets. They also allow families to engagein activities that entail more risks but are potentially more profitable. Inthis perspective, remittances are not just another source of capital. Theshare of remittances earmarked for this specific purpose being generallyhigh, that for investment in productive projects can be nothing else butlow. Therefore, as long as migrants have the fundamental duty to supporttheir families, any measure aimed at attracting remittances towards pro-

ductive investment will only have mixed results. This may partly explainwhy the initiatives by French authorities to stimulate immigrant savingsin order to channel them into productive investment in countries of originfailed. In 2006 and 2007 respectively, two financial products especiallydesigned for immigrants, the so-called Compte épargne co-développement(CEC; (co-development savings accounts) and the Livret d’épargne pour leCodéveloppement (LEC); co-development savings passbook) were created.With a CEC, depositors could benefit from a tax exemption equal to 40percent of their savings, up to €20 000. In return, fund withdrawals were

only permitted to finance development projects in the origin country.35

Inother words, to qualify for tax relief, savings had to be spent on activitiescontributing to development. If not, depositors had to pay a penalty equalto the tax exemption with added interest. None of the products raised theinterest of the migrants, and both were suppressed in 2009.

II.3 Providing Outreach and Support to Migrant Organizations

Diaspora-led or migrant organizations are not a new phenomenon,

but their number has been increasing in recent years, as well as overallinterest in their transnational activities. This has resulted in severalpolicy initiatives aimed at maximizing their contribution to developmentthrough capacity building, matching funds or both. Most diaspora-ledorganizations, generally referred to as hometown associations (HTAs),are organizations spontaneously formed by migrants coming from thesame community of origin and wishing to maintain ties with and materi-ally support those left behind. They generally start as informal, small andunderfunded organizations, with volunteer staff whose time and resourcesare limited. And even if they mature over time, and turn into formalassociations, their leaders often lack the appropriate organizational andtechnical skills and capacities. In addition, most diaspora members do

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not have the necessary networks to access opportunities available in thecountry of settlement. To address this problem, a few NGOs and otherdevelopment actors have set up capacity-building programs specially

designed for migrant organizations. One of the pioneers in this field isthe Dutch development NGO Oxfam Novib.36 Sin

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