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A Fair Reading of ‘Ought implies Can’

Abstract: According to the principles ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) and ‘Reasons imply Can’

(RIC), it is never the case that you ought, or have reasons, to do something that you cannot do.

In this paper I argue that most readings of ‘can’ in the debate give rise to unfair moral

requirements. A reading which ensures that morality does not issue unfair moral requirements

yields the surprising result that it is seldom the case that we have reasons, or ought, to perform

full blown successful actions; rather, we, most of the times, only ought, and have reasons, to try

our best to perform them. In the paper I show that in addition to faring better than alternative

readings of OIC and RIC in the face of various counterexamples, the proposed reading of OIC

can also help us in answering a pressing objection in the debate on how reasons transmit from

ends to means, and why the agent is blameworthy in Frankfurt-style cases without having to

reject the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP).

1. Introduction

Case 1: Elsa has promised to pick up Jon at the airport. Elsa is a skilled driver and has

driven to the airport many times before. We would normally say that Elsa because of

her promise has a reason to pick up Jon at the airport. If we furthermore assume that

nothing counts against keeping the promise we might claim that Elsa ought to pick up

Jon at the airport.

Case 2: Anna is faced with the option of buying a lottery ticket in an as of yet

undetermined lottery. If Anna buys the winning lottery ticket she will receive a large

benefit. In this case, we would normally not say that the Anna has a reason to buy the

winning lottery ticket, or ought to buy the winning lottery ticket.1 Intuitively, this would

sound mistaken regardless of how high or low the probability of winning actually is as

long as the chance of winning is below one. This is so even if, for instance, the

probability that Anna will successfully buy the winning lottery ticket is higher than the

probability that Elsa will successfully keep the promise to pick up Jon at airport if she

tries her best to do so. What would sound correct is that Anna might have a reason, or

ought, to try her best to win the lottery, for instance by buying a lottery ticket.

The question is: Why would it be the case that Elsa has a reason, or ought to, keep her promise

but not the case that that Anna has a reason, or ought to, buy the winning lottery ticket? The

answer is usually that ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) and that picking up Jon at the airport is an action

that Elsa can do, but buying the winning lottery ticket is an action that Anna cannot do. So OIC

1 Unless of course, we are talking about epistemic or probabilistic reasons and ‘oughts’, but the reasons and ‘oughts’ I have in mind are moral reasons for actions, and moral ‘oughts’.

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accounts for the difference between in what Anna in Case 2 and Elsa in Case 1 ought to do. It is

of course possible that Anna is lucky and successfully buys the winning lottery ticket, so the ‘can’

that we have in mind is not the ‘can’ of nomological possibility, but a more restricted notion. In

this paper I will argue that while there is a distinction between the ability that Elsa has to pick up

Jon at the airport and the ability Anna has to buy the winning lottery, neither of them have the

ability in the strict sense necessary for a sensible reading of ‘ought implies can’. Strictly speaking,

it is not even the case for Elsa that she has a reason, or ought to, pick up Jon at the airport. All

that Elsa (or Anna for that matter) has a reason, or ought to, do is to try their best.

‘Ought implies can’ (OIC) is one of the more universally accepted principles within ethics. This

principle is usually accompanied by the principle that ‘reasons implies can’ (RIC). 2

While most subscribe to the principle ’ought implies can’ under its slogan formulation there is

less agreement once one starts to take the principle seriously and tries to analyze what we in the

principle mean by ‘ought’, ‘implies’, and perhaps especially, when it comes to how we are to

understand ‘can’. The same goes for the corresponding principle in terms of reasons, i.e., that

‘reasons imply can’. This paper will focus solely on the ‘can’-part.3

The disposition of the paper is as follows: first I expound on the idea about fair and unfair moral

requirements and its connection to OIC and RIC. The second section show how we, on my

interpretation of OIC and RIC, can answer a pressing objection launched by Niko Kolodny

(Forthcoming) in the debate on how reasons and ‘oughts’ transmit from ends to necessary

means. The third section distinguishes between three levels of abilities (Simple ability, Intentional

ability, and Moral ability4) and uses them to show how, and why, all rival interpretations of OIC

and RIC, except the one proposed in this paper, gives rise to unfair moral requirements and also

how we can respond to a family of counter-examples recently raised against OIC by Alex King

(2014). The fourth section elaborates how we are to understand what it means to try to do

something, and especially what it means to try your best to do something. The fifth section argues

2 There is an interesting debate on the relation between OIC and RIC, and whether or not they should be formulated

in the same way (Brownlee, 2010; Heuer, 2010; Streumer, 2007). I will assume that the same conditions are true for both OIC and RIC. 3 A question that I do not wish to pursue in this paper is whether the positive, or negative thesis for that matter, generalizes to epistemic and evaluative reasons. If, for instance, all of our epistemic reasons are not reasons to believe p but rather reasons to try to believe p then epistemic reasons are reduced to a sub-set of reasons for actions, namely the sub-set of reasons for trying where what one tries to do is to form a belief. A thesis that I think would be rejected by evidentialists and fitting-attitude theorists, who deny that there exist wrong kind of reasons to believe and to favour. OIC and RIC when applied to beliefs and attitudes should quite possible be analyzable in a different way than when applied to action. I owe my thanks to Wlodek Rabinowicz for this point. 4 The three levels of abilities and their labels, with the exception of ‘Moral ability’, is heavily inspired by Alfred R. Mele (2003).

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that a proper understanding of OIC and RIC opens up for fruitful avenues in answering Harry

Frankfurt’s challenge against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), a challenge that has

been a long-standing thorn in the side of OIC because of a convincing derivation of PAP from

OIC.

In order to fully understand any principle of this sort it seems prudent to understand the

motivations behind the principle in the first place, or as David Copp eloquently puts it: “If we

understand the motivation for the Maxim [OIC], we can attempt to discover a formulation of the

Maxim that does justice to its motivation and we can assess whether it needs to be qualified”

(Copp, 2003, p. 271)

Among others, Copp has argued that one of the motivations behind the principle ’ought implies

can’ is that it is a necessary condition that moral requirements are not unfair, and that it would be

unfair to be required to do something that you cannot do (Copp, 2003).5 Borrowing Copp’s

example, it would be unfair of a supervisor at the post office to require of an employee that the

she cook a soufflé within the next five minutes when the mail carrier does not even have the

ingredients at hand. There is a very intuitive sense in which the requirements of normativity in

general, and morality in particular, should be “fair”6. A moral theory that issues unfair demands

needs to be amended in order to preserve the fairness of the theory.7

5 Other motivations for the principles are that if reasons or ‘oughts’ are to be of practical use in our deliberation only acts that we can do should be included, i.e., there is no point deliberating about options that are not available to us. One motivation for OIC (but not for RIC) is that unless we have the principle we easily end up in moral dilemmas or we have to deny that ‘oughts’ agglomerate. Note that few, if any, would say conflicting reasons is a problem at all, and therefore cannot be a motivation for the reasons principle. Rather, a more common motivation is that it would give rise to ‘crazy’ reasons, e.g. reasons to dodge bullets or cure cancer by snapping our fingers. For more on crazy reasons see (Streumer, 2007). 6 Note that the notion of “fair” used by Copp is not supposed to read in a distributive manner. Exactly what it means to say that something is unfair in this non-distributive sense is hard to explicate. Henrik Andersson has suggested to me in personal conversation that it might got to do with the claim that morality cannot be too demanding. If doing something that you cannot do is not too demanding for morality, it seems hard to see how anything could be too demanding. 7 In light of recent criticism by Rob van Someren Greve it is perhaps so that we should view the claim “that morality

is fair” in a more metaphoric, or perhaps elliptic, way. It is perhaps not the case that morality as such issues unfair requirement. That would potentially be a category mistake. On pain of severely personifying morality, it just does not make sense to say that morality is something that can be fair or unfair, nor perhaps something which can issue requirements for that matter. Agents require things, and agents’ acts of requiring can be fair or unfair (van Someren Greve, 2014). One might still want to claim that it is sensible to claim that morality can require things of us. It is common to read claims about what rationality requires, e.g., to not have incoherent beliefs. Whether it would be sensible to make the further claim that morality can be ‘fair’ is, however, a bit more unclear. Luckily, I can be neutral on whether morality can be fair, or whether morality can issue demands. Whether morality itself can be fair or unfair, or it is just the case that agents cannot make unfair moral demands my argument will still inhibit the same structure. In accordance with Van Someren Greve’s argument one plausible way to understand the intuitive sense of morality only issuing ‘fair’ requirements is along the following lines: If it would be unfair for any agent (including A) to require of A that A φs then, intuitively, it cannot be the case that A is required/ought to φ.

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So if we assume that one of the main motivations behind OIC is to preserve that moral

requirement are fair in respect to the agent’s ability then any example of moral requirements that

we intuitively judge to be unfair with respect to the agent’s ability should be a moral requirement

that is undercut by OIC.8

I will be defending the following interpretation of ‘can’ in OIC and RIC:

CAN: An agent, A, can φ iff it is true that if the agent were to try her best to φ then the

agent would φ.9

There are three ways to interpret this principle, depending on how you understand the ‘would φ’:

The Actualist interpretation, the Highly Likely interpretation, and the Definite interpretation. The

difference between the three interpretations can easily be shown with the following example.

Case 3: Joan, a skilled basketball player is about to try her best to sink a free throw. If

she nets the free throw Joan’s team will win the championship. Joan sinks about .98 of

her free throws. The best ethicists in the world have reached the conclusion that, unless

OIC undercuts it, it is the case that Joan has strong reasons, and ought, to do it. The

only thing left to decide is whether she can do it or not. Things go as expected and Joan

nets the ball. Was it the case that she ought to have made the shot? In other words,

could she do it in the sense of ‘can’ in CAN?

The Actualist interpretation answers in the affirmative. It was the case that she ought to have

made the shot. According to this interpretation she could sink the ball; she had the ability to do

so, because in the actual world where she tried her best to do so, she succeeded. If she would

have missed, then according to the Actualist interpretation it was not the case that she ought to

have done it, because if she missed then it would not have been true that if she tried her best

then she would have successfully done it. In other words, if she actually makes the shot she had

the ability and if she does not make the shot then she did not have the ability to do so. The

Highly Likely interpretation also answers in the affirmative. It was the case that she ought to have

made the shot. According to this interpretation she could do it, i.e., she had the ability to net the

ball. This is true according to the Highly Likely interpretation regardless of whether she netted or

8 While I wish to remain neutral on the issue whether there are any other respects which could make a moral requirement unfair it is possible that there are such, a prime suspect would be moral requirements that demand that the agent has to impose on herself a great cost, or risk, i.e., supererogatory cases. Another, more contentious, suspect might be hypocrisy, e.g., it might be unfair to demand that someone else becomes a vegetarian if you yourself are not a vegetarian. 9 What it means to try, and especially try your best, and also how one ought to interpret that the agent would φ is of course something I will discuss and explicate more later on in the paper. Roughly speaking, my account will be in line with what we ordinary mean by “trying”, “trying your best”.

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not, because she nets it most of the times. It was very likely that she would succeed, and if she

would have missed she, according to this interpretation, would not have done what she ought to

have done. The Definite interpretation would say that regardless of whether she would have

made the free throw or not, it was not the case that she ought to have made the shot. According to

the Definite interpretation Joan could not have made the free throw; it was not an ability that she

had, because it was possible for Joan to try her best to make the shot and yet fail to do so.

The drawback of the Actualist reading of CAN become apparent when we consider the case of

Anna and the lottery once again (Case2). If the actual world is a world where Anna in fact will buy

the winning the lottery ticket if she tries her best to buy the winning lottery ticket, then it would

be the case that Anna has a reason, and ought, to buy the winning lottery ticket. But intuitively,

this is incorrect. For some readers this might seem more apparent if we assume that the

probability that Anna will successfully buy the winning lottery ticket is very low, such as, e.g.,

<0.001.

One of the main draw backs of the Highly Likely interpretation that we will return to when

discussing Howard-Snyder’s version of OIC in section 3, is that it leads to unfair attributions of

moral requirements. Say that Joan missed the free throw. According to the Highly Likely

interpretation this entails that she failed to do something that she ought to have done despite the

fact that she tried her best to do it. If Joan then would have complained and asked what she

should have done differently, what could the reply possibly be? It obviously cannot be that she

should have tried her best, nor can the answer be that she should have tried better than her best

since it is analytically true that she could not have tried better than her best. One possible reply

could be that what she ought to have done differently is not missing the shot. Such an answer,

however, has a bitter taste of unfairness. This is echoing the sentiment David Widerker expresses

in his (2003) piece: When someone does not do what they ought to have done. We must be able

to give a satisfactory answer the question “What should they have done instead?”. In what way is

Joan’s situation any different from Anna’s situation in regards to the lottery? Even if the

probability that Anna will buy the winning lottery ticket is as high as Joan’s chance to make the

free throw (.98) we would none the less want to firmly deny that Anna can, in the sense that

matters to OIC, buy the winning lottery ticket and that Anna has a (moral) reason, or (morally)

ought to, win the lottery. If so, then why would we not want to do the same in the case of Joan

just because she is a skilled free thrower and Anna is not a skilled winning-lottery-ticket-buyer?

The drawback of the Definitve interpretation is that it is very restrictive and revisionary – the acts

that we can do are few and far between. None the less, as I intend to show in this paper, it is the

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only interpretation that manages to give us a reading of OIC and RIC that does not result in

unfair moral requirements.

Given the Definite interpretation of CAN together with the following substantive presupposition

most of our statements about what we ought, or have reasons to, do come out as false:

Seldom: For any agent, A, it is seldom the case that A can do things in the sense

described in CAN.

The central premises CAN, Seldom, coupled with the premise that in all cases where we would

normally say that someone ought, or have reasons, to φ they can (in the sense of satisfying CAN)

try to φ, and that we when we ought, or have reasons, to try we, except under special

circumstances, ought, or have reasons, to try our best (see section 4) will support the following

claim:

ORT: Most of the time, it is not the case that we strictly speaking ought to φ ,or

have reasons to φ but rather that we ought to try our best to φ, or have reasons to try

our best to φ. 10

Despite the strict condition CAN, I can still try to do a lot of things. Despite it not being the case

Anna can buy the winning lottery ticket, she can still try her best to do so.

The idea that most of our moral ‘oughts’ and moral reasons for action are to try our best to do

certain things is a substantive idea, not a conceptual one. It is a part of an answer to the question:

what morally ought we to do? Or what moral reasons do we have? It is a consequence of a

conceptual analysis of the ‘can’ in ’ought implies can’ conjoined with the substantive idea that we

never, or at least seldom, can perform the actions that we ordinarily would say that we have

reasons, or ought, to do but that we can try to do these actions. It is, however, not substantive in

a thick sense. The proposal is compatible with all classical substantive views such as deontology,

10 Cf. H. A. Prichard’s insights in his article “Duty and Ignorance of Fact” where Prichard argues that: since we never know whether we have become paralyzed, we should not answer in an affirmative manner to the question: “Can I raise my arms?”. Consequently, Prichard argues that “It is simply that, contrary to the implications of ordinary language and of moral rules in particular, an obligation must be an obligation, not to do something, but to perform an activity of a totally different kind, that of setting or exerting ourselves to do something, i.e. to bring something about” (Prichard, 2002 (1932), p. 97). It should be noted that while Prichard’s view is in line with my own Prichard’s conclusion does not follow from his argument. Rather, it seems that on Prichard’s view, given that we should always answer “I do not know” to the question whether we can do something. From this a weaker thesis seems to follow, not that we never have obligations to do specific acts, but rather that we can never know. It is indeterminate whether we are under an obligation to do something because we can never know whether we can do it.

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consequentialism, or virtue ethics. 11 If one views OIC and RIC as substantive views of course,

my proposal is a substantive consequence of a substantive principle.12

2. Reasons for trying

As was said in the beginning, my proposal for the correct interpretation of ‘ought implies can’

and ‘reasons imply can’ is as follows:

OIC: It is necessarily so that if you ought to φ then you can φ where ‘can φ’ is interpreted as if you were to

try to φ then you would successfully φ.

RIC: It is necessarily so that if you have reasons to φ then you can φ where ‘can φ’ is interpreted as if you

were to try to φ then you would successfully φ.13

I want to stress that the reading of ‘can’ is only intended to capture the ‘can’ relevant for what we

morally ought, or have reasons, to do. There are other senses of ‘can’, such as e.g., the ‘can’ of

nomological possibility in which I can do a lot of things that is not captured by the narrow sense

of ‘can’ in OIC and RIC. I am not denying that there are other intelligible and correct usages of

‘can’ where it is true that I, for example, can take the bus to work, despite the risk of a traffic

accident. I am only claiming that it is not the sense of ‘can’ relevant to morality.

One argument in favour of my interpretation is how it allows us to answer puzzling counter

examples to other intuitive normative principles. For instance, the interpretation can be used to

answer the potentially devastating objection against the following intuitively compelling principle

on the connection between ends that you ought to achieve and the necessary means for achieving

the end. The principle says that if you ought to achieve some end, then you ought to take the

necessary means to achieving that end, and its corresponding principle in terms of reasons, i.e.,

reasons and ‘oughts’ fully transmit from ends to the necessary means. The two formulations for

the principle somewhat more formally go as follows:

Necessary Ought Transmission (NOT): If an agent, A, ought to φ and ψing is a necessary

means for φing then, and because of that, A ought to ψ.

11 In a sense it might rather be claimed they are incompatible with all of the mentioned normative theories if one interprets the theories as making claims to what actions we ought, or have reasons, to do. On the other hand if one rather interprets them as being theories about the sources or what type of facts give us reasons and being compatible with various ways to cash out what they are reasons for they are compatible. At least, my view is compatible with modified versions that are still Kantian, consequentialists or virtue ethical in spirit. Thanks to Frits Gåvertsson for pressing me on this point. 12 For an influential discussion about what sort of principle OIC is see (Vranas, 2007). 13 Cf. (Howard-Snyder, 1997, p. 246; Parfit, 2011, p. 160)

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Necessary Strong Reasons Transmission (NSRT): If an agent, A, has a reason to φ and ψing is

a necessary means for φing then, and because of that, A has a reason with at least the

same strength to ψ.

Niko Kolodny has recently argued that despite their intuitive appeal NOT and NSRT are false

(Forthcoming). He tries to argue for the falsity of NOT and NSRT by the following example:

Consider Lucky and Unlucky, who occupy parallel universes. Each has an antique sitting on his front

porch, which the rain threatens to ruin. A necessary means to saving the antique is taking a taxi back

home. There is reason to refrain from taking the taxi; it costs money, say $20. But this cost is outweighed

by the value of the antique, say $100. The only difference in their situations is that in Lucky’s universe, the

rain will be slow in coming, and so he is very likely to get him home in time, if he takes the taxi: say the

probability is .9. In Unlucky’s universe, by contrast, he is extremely unlikely to get home in time, even if

he takes it: the probability is .1 (Kolodny, Forthcoming, p. 8).

According to Kolodny, Lucky and Unlucky have equally strong reasons to save the antique but

Lucky has stronger reasons to take the taxi than Unlucky. According to NSRT they should have

equally strong reasons to take the taxi. Given this, Kolodny’s described case is a putative counter-

example to NSRT. Furthermore, according to Kolodny, Lucky ought to save the antique and

since “as far as saving the antique” is concerned Unlucky’s situation is the same Unlucky also ought

to save the antique (Kolodny, Forthcoming, p. 9). While this is controversial and can be

questioned I will for the sake of the argument grant this to Kolodny.14 Kolodny says that both

ought to save the antique, but while Lucky ought to take the taxi, this is not the case for Unlucky.

It is not the case that Unlucky ought to take the taxi. Thereby, Kolodny also views this as being a

counter-example to NOT. Just to reiterate, it is a counter-example to NOT because according to

NOT they both ought to take the taxi if both ought to save the antique, but intuitively it is not

the case that Unlucky ought to take the taxi. Or so the argument goes.

I believe that Kolodny is mistaken. Strictly speaking, it is false that Lucky and Unlucky ought to,

or have any reasons at all, to save the antique. Instead I want to argue that Lucky and Unlucky

have reasons to try his best to save the antique but that Lucky has stronger reasons to try his best

than Unlucky which in turn explains why it is the case that Lucky ought to try his best to save the

antique, while it is not the case that Unlucky, ought to try his best to save the antique. This in

turns explains why Lucky, but not Unlucky ought to (try his best) to take the taxi.

14 For a convincing paper arguing that Kolodny’s argument only works as long as one accepts the controversial thesis of Actualism, as opposed to Possibilism see (Kiesewetter, Forthcoming).

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To see this imagine the following: Lucky takes the taxi but unfortunately, despite the great odds

of .9, Lucky fails to save the antique. If Kolodny’s analysis of the scenario is correct, i.e., that

Lucky ought to save the antique. What Kolodny is then forced to say is that Lucky failed to do

something that he ought to have done, namely saving the antique. On some views it might even

be that failing to do what one ought to do always imply that one is blameworthy to some extent,

and that Lucky would now be blameworthy for failing to save the antique. The charge that Lucky

failed to do something he ought to have done has a taste of unfairness. After all, Lucky did

everything he could to save the antique. Therefore, I believe that we have good reasons to deny

that Lucky in this case ought to save the antique. He tried his best to save the antique. Would it

be fair of anyone require of him that he does more than to try his best? What more could be

asked of him? I propose that the following is an intuitive test that tracks whether an agent could,

in the relevant sense, do something:

Test: If an agent, A, tried their best to φ yet failed to φ then A could not, in the relevant

sense, phi.

In discussing whether Lucky and Unlucky ought to save the antique or not, it seems proper to

first address the question whether either actually can save it. Let us assume that they, in the strict

sense, can adopt the means necessary to saving the antique, but none of these means are sufficient

to guarantee that they will successfully save the antique. A more tenable analysis of the situation is

to say that Lucky ought, and have reasons, try his best to save the antique. This analysis avoids the

counterintuitive conclusion that when Lucky takes the taxi but unfortunately fails to save the

antique then Lucky fails to do something that he ought to have done. The same goes for

Unlucky, it is simply not the case that Unlucky has any reasons, or ought, to save the antique. He

only has reasons to try his best to save the antique.

The important question is whether Unlucky’s reasons to try his best to save the antique are at

least equally as strong as Lucky’s reasons to try his best to save the antique? To answer this

question we need to move on to a more substantive discussion of what determines the strength

of our reasons for trying on which I can here only speculate. One way to argue that Unlucky’s

reasons are weaker than Lucky’s is to look at the expected outcome of trying. The expected

outcome if Lucky were to try his best to save the antique is the value of the antique ($100) times

the probability of success (.9) minus the known cost of taking the taxi ($20), i.e. $70. In Unlucky’s

case the expected outcome is minus $10. Intuitively, this entails that Lucky has a stronger reason

than Unlucky to try his best to save the antique which in turn explains why Lucky has a stronger

reason to take the taxi than Unlucky and thereby saving the NSRT.

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The conclusions from these observations are that Kolodny is correct in claiming that Lucky has

stronger reason than Unlucky to take the taxi. This difference in strength is, however, explained

by their respective reasons to try to save the antique and NSRT. Likewise, this maneuver saves

NOT. Kolodny is correct when he claims that Lucky ought to take the taxi, but unlike Kolodny I

explain this via appeal to the fact that Lucky ought to try his best to save the antique and that

taking the taxi is a necessary means for trying his best to take the taxi.

For unlucky on the other hand it is not the case that he ought to take the taxi, but since it is also

not the case that Unlucky ought to try his best to save the antique that is not a problem for

NOT. The fact that Lucky ought to try his best to save the antique and not the case that Unlucky

ought to try his best to save the antique is explained by reference to the fact that the reasons in

favour of trying your best are in Lucky’s case stronger than the reasons to refrain from trying,

and the reverse is true in Unlucky’s case.

3. How one can and ought to interpret ‘can’ in ‘ought implies can’

In this section I intend to explicate and defend my proposed version of OIC and RIC. I will do

this partly by showing that the other alternatives on the market face generate unfair moral

requirements and partly by showing how we on my approach can answer a new type of putative

counter-examples to OIC.

The interpretation of the morally relevant sense of ‘can’ in OIC and RIC has in this paper been

understood as it being true that if an agent tried his best to do something it is certain that she will

successfully do it.

This interpretation of OIC and RIC might still strike the reader as overly restrictive. It cannot be

deny that it is very restrictive, and that it is forced to conclude that many of our prima facie

plausible ought statements and reasons statements comes out as false – undercut by OIC and

RIC. This forces me to either to conclude that we are categorically mistaken in most of our moral

judgements, or that what we actually mean with phrases such as “A ought to φ” is that “A ought

to try her best to φ” and that we for pragmatic reasons exclude “the trying your best”-part.15

However, even if we are categorically mistaken, we are quite close to getting it right. In other

words it could be true that the agent ought to try to do what the prima facie plausible ought

statements claimed that the agent ought to do. The same thing goes for the reasons statements.

15 An anecdotal observation that I owe to Thomas Schmidt is that a lot of children talk in this manner, and only promise to try their best to do things.

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A worry with this proposal is that if an agent were to try to φ, and successfully φs. It would sound

peculiar to claim that the agent could not φ. Say that I try to take the bus to the university, and

despite the possibility of me slipping and breaking my legs and what not, I, as I do on most days,

succeed in taking the bus to the university. But as was stated earlier I need not deny that there is a

sense of ‘can’ in which I can take the bus to school. What I deny is that this is the sense of ‘can’

that is relevant to morality. The idea that there are different sense of ‘can’ and corresponding to

different senses of ‘ability’ is nothing that should strike us as too peculiar. There is a sense in

which I can roll a six on a fair die, especially in cases where I actually do so, but in a different

sense it is not something I can do, because I cannot do it intentionally. An initial observation

that opens up for the possibility that this idea to some extent may already be present in our

everyday language is that we often say things like “all you can do is to try your best”, “We can

only ask that you try your best”, “Yes, you failed but at least you tried your best. That’s what

matters”.

3.1 The Alternatives

I take it that the two main alternatives to my reading of ‘can’ in OIC and RIC is the ability plus

opportunity approach of Peter Vranas (2007) and P.A. Graham (2011) and the ‘highly likely’

approach of Frances Howard-Snyder (1997). Howard-Snyder’s version is more liberal than mine

in that it only demands that the agent is highly likely to succeed. I will call the ability plus

opportunity versions of OIC and RIC for Ability OIC and Ability RIC and Howard-Snyder’s

interpretation for the Liberal OIC and Liberal OIC. I will start of by discussing the ability plus

opportunity approach and then move on to the liberal approach. Ability OIC and Ability RIC are

characterized as follows:

Ability OIC: It is necessarily so that if you ought to φ then you can φ where ‘can’ is interpreted as you

having the ability to φ and the opportunity to φ.

Ability RIC: It is necessarily so that if you have a reason to φ then you can φ where ‘can’ is interpreted as

you having the ability to φ and the opportunity to φ

Vranas describes an agent having the ability to φ as follows:

The agent has the ability to do the thing in the sense of having the requisite skills, physical capacities, and

knowledge – even if psychologically she is ‘‘unable’’ to do it (e.g., she ‘‘cannot’’ get herself to stick her arm

into a cesspool to retrieve her wallet; cf. Stocker (1971, p. 311)), and even if it would be unreasonable to

expect her to do it (e.g., because she would die by doing it). (The agent’s skills etc. need not guarantee

12

success or even make it likely: she may have the ability to beat an opponent at chess even if the opponent

usually beats her.) (Vranas, 2007, pp. 169 - 170)

And according to Vranas an agent has the opportunity to φ if she is in a situation that allows her

to exercise her ability, e.g., her chess opponent does not refuse to play with her. It is not a

requirement that the agent knows that she, in Vranas’ sense, can φ, i.e., it is not necessary that the

agent knows that she is in a situation where she has the ability and the opportunity to φ (Vranas,

2007, p. 170).16

Vranas usage of ‘ability’ invites a brief discussion about a taxonomy of three different types of

ability inspired by Alfred Mele (2003). As J.L Austin (1956) points out, it follows from the fact

that an agent φied that there is a sense in which it is conceptually necessary that she was able to φ,

i.e., had the ability to φ. If Claire rolls a six on a fair die then she had the ability to do so. Mele

labels this thin notion of ability as Simple Ability (S-ability). So while Claire may have the S-ability

to roll a six. She cannot intentionally roll a six; she can only intentionally roll the die. This is,

according to Mele, because she lacks sufficient control over whether she successfully rolls a six or

not. This brings us to what Mele labels Intentional Ability (I-Ability). According to Mele it is

highly contested, and quite possibly vague, exactly how much control an agent needs in order to

do have the ability to do something intentionally. The way Mele goes about to close in on the

distinction is via some clear cut cases. Claire has the ability to intentionally roll the die, and Joan

from case 3 with a free throw percentage of .98 is I-able to net a free throw.17 Vranas seems to

situate the ability (or ‘can’) relevant for OIC somewhere in between S-ability and I-ability. Vranas’

account of ability is weaker than S-ability because according to Vranas having the ability need not

make it more likely, for instance he mentions that agents “may have the ability to beat to beat an

opponent even if the opponent usually beats her” (Vranas, 2007, p. 170). Vranas’ position is

stronger than S-ability since S-ability does not demand that the agent in question has any specific

skill, e.g., she need not have roll-a-six-on-a-fair-die-skill in order to be S-able to do it.

Mele’s third type of ability is what he calls Promise-Level Ability (P-Ability) can be illustrated by

case 3 of Joan with the .98 chance to net a free throw. According to Mele, Joan would likely not

agree to promise that she will sink it because she does not have sufficient control. She does not

16 Normally, one distinguishes between general ability and specific ability (Maier, 2014). At the present moment I have the general ability to play football despite the fact that I have not played football in years. I do not, however, have the specific ability to play football at the present moment because I do not have the opportunity to do so. So instead of talking about ability plus opportunity Vranas could just have said that we can do something if we have the specific ability to do it. 17 While Mele does not give us a lower probability bound where the agent is no longer I-able to do something. He rhetorically asks whether a success rate of .57 is sufficient for being I-able. So presumably, Mele takes it to be somewhere in the vicinity of .57.

13

have Promise-Level ability. Promise-Level ability is supposed to correspond to actions that are

within the actions control to such an extent that agents “with a firm grip on the concept of

promising who have no abnormal source of beliefs about what they will do must believe or

presuppose about their ability to A in order to sincerely promise to A” (A. R. Mele, 2003, p. 461).

I believe that Mele is correct in that there is this third level of ability but instead of Promise-Level

Ability I will call this type of ability Moral Ability (M-Ability). An agent has the M-ability to φ

when she satisfies CAN, i.e., an agent has M-ability iff were the agent to try her best to φ then the

agent would φ.18

Before moving on to the weaknesses of Vranas’ view I would like to introduce Howard-Snyder’s

interpretation. The reason for doing it in this order is that the two views to a large extent suffer

from the same weakness – they give rise to unfair moral requirements. Howard-Snyder’s view is

in one way more liberal than Vranas’ because it does not require that the agent has any skill in

what she is about to do, but more restrictive in the sense that it does demand, in contrast with

Vranas’, that it is highly likely that the agent will succeed in what she is about to do.

Howard-Snyder’s (1997, p. 244f) interpretation of OIC and RIC go as follows:

Liberal OIC: It is necessarily so that if you ought to φ then you can φ where ‘can’ is interpreted as if you

were to try to φ you would highly likely be successful in φing.

Liberal RIC: It is necessarily so that if you have reasons to φ then you can φ where ‘can’ is interpreted as if

you were to try to φ you would highly likely be successful in φing.

Instead of demanding that you would successfully φ if you tried to φ, i.e., that you had the Moral

Ability to φ, the Liberal OIC and RIC only demand that it would be highly likely that you

succeeded if you tried. As you can see Howard-Snyder’s version corresponds to the Highly Likely

interpretation of CAN in section one.

Since Vranas himself illustrates his notion of ‘can’ by using the example of beating an opponent

of chess and Howard-Snyder in her paper uses an example involving the previously professional

18 Mele does not settle on a definition of Promise-Level Ability but discusses a proposal similar to mine where an agent has P-ability to φ if the agent knows her own abilities and has complete confidence that barring unexpected substantial external obstacles, if she sincerely promises to φ, she will φ (A. R. Mele, 2003, p. 464). His reasoning allowing the possibility of unexpected substantial external obstacles is that we would commonly promise to pick someone up at the airport even though we know that it is possible that we will be in a car accident. When what could cause us to fail to do the action is internal, we are much less likely to promise to do it, for instance we would not promise to sink a free throw even if the probability that we would make the free throw is higher than the probability that we will successfully pick someone up at the airport. Whether or not there is a deep distinction between internal and external ‘obstacles’ or just shallow folk psychology is of course open for debate.

14

tennis player Pete Sampras hitting a serve ace (Howard-Snyder, 1997, p. 244; Vranas, 2007, p.

170). It seems fair to follow to them and keep using the same type of example.19

The question is: Can it be the case that anyone morally ought to beat their opponent at chess?

Throughout the examples I will be assuming that an evil demon, an eccentric millionaire, or what

have you, is going to cause great suffering unless the chess opponent is beaten. I do this in order

to ensure that we are talking about what we morally ought to do. This will also ensure that unless

the action in question is in violation with OIC or RIC it is the case that the agent ought, and have

reasons, to do it.

According to both Vranas’ Ability-View and Howard-Snyder’s’ Liberal View, if there is a very

high probability that I, an agent with some chess skills, will successfully beat my opponent in

chess then according to the views presently under consideration I can do it in the sense that is

relevant for it to possibly be the case that I ought, or have moral reasons, to beat my opponent.

For instance suppose there is a .99 chance that I will beat Henrik at chess. To ensure that we are

talking about moral reasons and a moral ‘ought’ we us assume that an evil demon threatens to

torture my family if I lose, or make the stakes of the game known to anyone else. According to

the views under consideration, with the assumption that if we can, then we should avoid having

our family be tortured, it is the case that I ought to, and have reasons to, beat the not so talented

seven year old at chess. Given that I ought to do it, then it seems to be at least possible that I

might be blameworthy if I were to fail.

Given this scenario one should start of by asking at what level of probability Liberal OIC and

RIC claim that it ceases to be the case that I can do a certain action. Is it for instance the case that

I can defeat Magnus Carlsen at chess? Plausibly not, while might a miniscule probability that I

would beat the current chess world champion it is not the case that it is highly likely. Intuitively,

we would balk at the notion that I can beat Magnus Carlsen, in the sense of ‘can’ that is relevant

for it to be possible that it is the case that I ought to beat defeat Magnus Carlsen at chess. It

19 As have been pointed out to me by David Alm it might be the case that beating an opponent at chess, or winning a game of chess, is not an action at all but rather the result of an action. So since beating your opponent at chess is not a contender for being an action it cannot be the case that it is the action which we ought to, or have reasons to do. To this I have two replies, first off since the view I am arguing against accepts the case of beating your opponent at chess as not only in the range of possible situations but uses it as an example of what they have in mind I take it to be fair game. Secondly, while it is possible that under some theories of action it is not the case that beating your opponent in chess is not an action, it seems as at least Donald Davidson’s almost paradigmatic theory of action is committed to deem beating your opponent at chess as an action. In Davidson’s case of alerting the burglar by flipping the light switch this is seen as an action because it is intentional under some description (Davidson, 1980). Beating your opponent at chess is in just the same way intentional under some description, at least the description of moving the individual pieces, such as e.g., "1.e4c5 2.c3Nf6 etc.", is unquestionable a description of the action of beating your opponent at chess which is intentional.

15

seems to be a fruitless endeavor to try to give a non-arbitrary probability threshold for what

qualifies as highly likely. Consequently, Liberal OIC and RIC is bound to be pained with cases of

vagueness where it is indeterminate whether it is the case that an agent ought to φ. Vranas’

Ability-OIC on the other hand entail that I, in the scenario of Magnus Carlsen, morally ought to

beat him at chess; I have the pre-requisites, I have both the skill necessary to have the ability in

Vranas’ sense of the word and the opportunity, i.e., we are about to play a game of chess. So

under the Liberal OIC it is the case that I ought to beat Henrik but not the case that I ought to

beat Magnus Carlsen. Under Ability OIC it is the case that I ought to Henrik and the case that I

ought to beat Magnus Carlsen. In line with the different level of abilities it can be noted that I am

S-able to beat both, but only I-able to beat Henrik. I want to argue that I lack M-ability to beat

either of them. If we go back to why Mele labeled this level of ability Promise-Level Ability, it

was because it is only if we have this level of ability to do something that we would promise to do

it. One way to look at promises is to look at them as reasons generating. If I were to promise,

that would give me a reason to do it. An explanation to why I would not even promise that I

would beat Henrik is that it would be giving me a reason to do something that I might not deliver

on. I see no reason to think that there is any special threshold in regards to our ability when it

comes from reasons given by promises and reasons given by other sources, and if there is no

difference between these two sources the threshold in regards to our ability should be the same,

namely Moral Ability.

Say that I try my best to beat both of them, and yet lose to both. Did I fail to do what I ought to

have done? We can immediately see according to The Test20 on page 9 it cannot have been the

case that I ought to have beaten them. The moral requirement to beat them would have been

unfair.

One possible reply to this is to say that it is not unfair that morality requires that I beat the two,

but it would be unfair to blame me for failing to do so given that I tried my best. While this reply

might sound plausible for proponents of Vranas’ Ability OIC in the case of me versus Magnus

Carlsen given the high likelihood of failure, the real challenge for both Vranas’ and Howard-

Snyder’s proposals is the case of me versus Henrik. If the miniscule likelihood of me failing to

beat Henrik makes it so that I am not blameworthy when I fail after trying my best then it seems

as if any, no matter how small, likelihood of failure would qualify as an extenuating circumstance.

I am open to the possibility that there might be some merit to this proposal. My worry is that the

notion of what we morally ought to do we are left with to do become much less interesting and

20 “If an agent tries their best to do something yet fails, then it was not the case that they ought to have done it.”

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important if we divorce the notion of what we morally ought to do from the notion of what we

are blameworthy for doing to such a great extent as this reply is suggesting that we do. However,

if this proposal would turn out to be true and the notion of ‘can’ presented in this paper is not

the ‘can’ in ‘ought implies can’ but rather the ‘can’ in the potentially interesting principle

‘blameworthy implies can’, that in itself is a fascinating result.

While the argument that it would be unfair if morality required that we beat opponents in chess,

and as I believe, any other action where it is not necessary that the moral requirement will not

violate the The Test is not the final nail in the coffin I do believe that it gives the analysis of the

‘can’ in OIC as having Moral Level Ability an edge over the other alternatives on the market.

3.2 What to Do When You Cannot Sincerely Apologize

Another argument in favour of understanding the ‘can’ of OIC and RIC in terms of it being the

case that if the agent tried her best then she would do it, is that it can solve a class of persuasive

putative counter-examples to the idea of OIC put forward by Alex King. In her paper she makes

an interesting case for a class of actions which we undeniably cannot do, but which it none the

less sounds reasonable to say that we ought to do (King, 2014).21

The class of actions in question is the class of actions which not only require some behavior,

uttering of words or other bodily movements but also a certain mental states, such as the mental

states involved in a sincere apology. Some might say that if it is not sincere, then it is not an

apology. I do not want to commit myself to whether a non-sincere apology is an infelicitous

apology or not an apology at all. What I, and King, say is compatible with both views. King’s

example is of a child who ought to sincerely apologize to her Grandma for something that she

has done. The child says “sulkily and with a roll of the eyes, ‘Saw-rry’” (King, 2014, p. 318). In

this familiar situation the parent would presumably say that the insincere apology was not what

the child was obligated to do, and that the child ought to go back and really apologize to

Grandma. Another example that King uses is that of focus, sometime we ought to focus, for

instance on an important presentation. Focusing is something more than merely staring at the

45th slide. Exactly how these actions are to be understood is an interesting question on its own,

but all that King, or I need, is that fulfilling our obligation to apologize to someone, or focusing

on a presentation, involves some motivation, or mental state, beyond merely saying “sorry” or

blankly staring at the 45th slide.

21 It should be mentioned that King ends her paper hinting at the possibility of describing OIC in terms of tryings (King, 2014).

17

King utilizes the sorts of obligation to make the following argument: Say that the child ought to

apologize to her Grandma, and by this we partly mean that the child says that she is sorry on the

basis of actual sorrow and regret. However, the child cannot get herself to feel sorrow or regret,

so she cannot sincerely apologize to Grandma. Note that it is not the case that it simply would be

psychologically hard for her to do, but that she genuinely cannot do so. The explanation for this

is that the child might, according to King, be too angry, too tired and confused, or too distracted

to feel the proper sentiments necessary for a sincere apology. It is impossible for her to sincerely

apologize to Grandma. Simply put, given OIC, that the child cannot sincerely apologize, and that

the child ought to sincerely apologize, we arrive at a contradiction. There are two ways to go,

either reject the claim that the person in question cannot do it, or reject the claim that the person

in question ought to do the action. Given the way the scenario is set up, it is the case that no

matter how well the child tries to sincerely apologize she will not succeed. For this reason I do

not think that rejecting the premise that the child cannot sincerely apologize has much merit.

This leaves us with the option of rejecting the claim that the child ought to sincerely apologize.

But King argues that intuitively, the child is not off the hook due to the mere fact that she cannot

sincerely apologize.

The reply of rejecting the premise that the child ought to sincerely apologize needs an

explanation for why the child is not off the hook.

A potential explanation would be to claim that while it is not the case that the child ought to

sincerely apologize to her Grandma now, the child is probably under and obligation to sincerely

apologize at a later time, when she can – the child ought to sincerely apologize when she can, but

not the case that she ought to when she cannot. A weakness for this type of answer is that it is

not applicable to all situations of this kind. Her Grandma might be on her death bed or if

someone is unable to focus on a presentation it might not be the case that you can focus at the

presentation at a later time, or by any other means be briefed about the content of the

presentation. The child should not get off the hook just because her Grandma is on her death

bed! If anything, it is the other way around. It should be stressed that I am not claiming that there

is no plausible way for the proponents of OIC to bite the bullet in these types of cases. I do,

however, contend that I do not think that this sort of grandstanding will persuade anyone in the

debate.

To me, King’s counter-example is one of the more convincing on the market against OIC.

Luckily, under my proposed version of OIC we have an answer that is not ad hoc readily available.

What the defender of OIC should say is to concede that it is strictly speaking not the case that

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she ought to sincerely apologize, but rather that she ought to try her best to sincerely apologize.

If one interprets the statement that the child ought to sincerely apologize to her Grandma as

saying that the child ought to try her best to sincerely apologize to her Grandma the putative

counter-example evaporates. It does, however, not do so merely by outright rejecting the

opponents’ first premise that the child ought to sincerely apologize or by outright rejecting OIC.

It retains all the premises of argument but with slight modifications to make them compatible.

Instead of:

1) The child ought to sincerely apologize to her Grandma,

2) The child cannot sincerely apologize to her Grandma,

We get,

1*) The child ought to try her best to sincerely apologize to her Grandma,

2*) The child cannot genuinely apologize to her Grandma, but she can try her best to do.

While 1) and 2) coupled with OIC leads to a contradiction, 1*) and 2*) coupled with OIC does

not. My guess is that defenders of traditional understandings of OIC would also like to make a

similar move, but on the more common understanding of OIC the move seems slightly ad hoc –

produced to solve this specific counter example. On my understanding of OIC the objection that

the move is ad hoc loses its force because not only does it garner support from everyday language,

it is a move that is supposed to be used almost across the board for all ‘ought’- and reasons-

statements.

In everyday language a common follow up after the parents scold the child for not sincerely

apologizing would be for the child to reply that the parents are being unfair! She cannot sincerely

apologize. To which the parents could reply, “Well, you still need to try! End of discussion.”

It is important to stress that the child can still try to sincerely apologize to Grandma. She can try

to get the fitting sentiments by for example deliberating about how she and her Grandma acted

when the slight is supposed to have occurred. I think everyone can agree that we certainly can try

to focus on presentation, perhaps by an inner-monolog pep-talk or by fixing your eyes on the

speaker and so forth.22

22 Of course it might plausibly be the case that when we fail to what we try to do in this situation, for instance when

I try to genuinely apologize but fail then I might have a new obligation to try to genuinely apologize at some later time or have some other obligation in virtue of my failing, but this does not mean, and this is important, that I failed to do what I ought to have done, namely to try to genuinely apologize. It is often the case that new obligations can arise from doing what we ought to do. If what I ought to do is give a student an F on her essay I might be under a new obligation to have a discussion with the student about why she got an F, and how she can improve. But a worry

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4. What does it mean to try to do something?

So far it has been argued that we should understand the ‘can’ in OIC and RIC as it being the

case that if the agent were to try her best to φ , then she would φ, i.e., that the agent has the Moral

Ability to φ. In order to fully understand exactly what the proposal is committed to the notion of

trying, and the modifier ‘trying your best’ cries out for further elaboration. In this section I will try

to say a few words about the nature of trying and suggest how one could go about to answer the

very much substantive question what it means to try your best.

In the philosophy of action there is an ongoing debate on how to understand tryings (Hornsby,

1995; Ludwig, 1995; A. Mele, 1989; Ruben, 2013, 2015, 2016; Schroeder, 2001).

For my present purposes I wish to remain as non-committal as possible in regards to the

different stances in the debate, such as if tryings should be understood in terms of volitions or

some basic action in terms of bodily movements. The main assumption about trying is the claim

that Jennifer Hornsby (1995) and other make, namely that if an agent φs this conceptually entails

that they tried to φ. So if I open a door, this entails that I tried to open the door. Another

assumption that I need is that we most of the time can try to do things. Or at the bare minimum,

that while it might not always be possible to try it is at least the case that in all cases where we

would normally say an agent ought to, or have reasons to, do something it is possible to try to do

it.23 Trying your best does not always mean trying your hardest. If I’m balancing on a thin rope, it

might be the case that if I try and focus too much on keeping my balance I might be more likely

to fall than if I try to not think too much about keeping my balance. In this scenario, trying my

best to keep my balance might be doing something entirely different than intensely trying to keep

my balance. Doing something entirely different than intensely trying to keep my balance is also a

way, a better way, of trying to keep my balance.

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as trying? Ulrike Heuer

has proposed that in order for something to count as trying to φ one has to do something else, ψ,

with the intention to φ, and ψing has to get one closer to φing. Heuer says that in order for

something to count as ‘getting closer’ ψing has to be a necessary part of a plan that, if completed,

Jan Gertken both pressed and answered for me is that what is a bit special with the case of trying to apologize to Grandma is that it is the very same obligation which arises. Normally, if I do what I ought to do it is not the case that what I now ought to do is the very same thing. But as Gertken said to me, this is not puzzling at all. If the same grounds of what we ought to do are still in place, the same obligation will be in place. For example, if I try to save someone, and fail the first time so the person is still drowning. Then I ought to try again. 23 This follows from the assumption that we normally, at the bare minimum, only claim that it is the case that an agent ought to, or have reasons to, do something if it is possible that they do it. If it is possible, then there are cases where they do it and since actually doing something entails that you tried to do it, it follows that it is possible to try to do it.

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achieves the intended result (Heuer, 2010, p. 241). For instance taking the first step while running

a marathon counts as trying because it is a necessary part of a plan that if completed achieves the

intended result, i.e. successfully running the marathon. Heuer explicitly says that her account

excludes that it is possible for one to try to do something if there is no possibility that one can, or

ever will, do it. I want to question the reasonableness of Heuer’s proposal.

First, say that I am administering medicine to you but I believe that I am giving you arsenic,

despite the fact that I am not getting any closer to poisoning you, in Heuer’s sense, by giving you

the medicine I, intuitively, still tried to poison you. We need to impose an epistemic condition on

trying.

Secondly, the need for an epistemic condition is shown by the following two cases. In the past,

when it was not known whether it was possible to build a perpetual motion machine, people did

things with the intention to do these things in order to build a perpetual motion machine.

Arguably, they tried to build perpetual motion machines. In a footnote Heuer denies that

according to her account they tried to build perpetual motion machines, instead they merely

believed that they tried to build perpetual motion machines (Heuer, 2010, pp. 241, footnote 210).

I propose that we should understand tryings in a slightly different way:

Trying: An agent A tries to φ iff there exists a ψ such that, 1) A ψs with the intention to φ

(partly) by ψing 2) A believes φing to be possible and 3) A believes ψing to be a means

towards φing.24

The first condition is meant to be neutral in regards to the debate whether trying has to involve

actual bodily movements or if mere volitions are sufficient. The condition also blocks

unintentional tryings: For instance, given the condition, I do not try to go to Rome when I’m

walking out my front door, despite the fact that walking out my front door is a means towards

me going to Rome, because I do not have the intention of going out the front door as a means

towards going to Rome. The second condition is quite weak; it only demands that the agent

believes φing to be possible. An agent may believe φing to be possible without it being the case that

φing actually being possible. Given the second condition we can, in contrast with Heuer, agree

that people have tried to build a perpetual motion machine and so forth.25 The third condition is

superfluous since it is entailed by the first condition but I want to make it explicit for the reason

that it brings forward an avenue to model trying our best on. If one believes that an agent cannot

24 For a thorough discussion on how to understand tryings see Green Werkmäster & Garcia & Andersson (manuscript). 25 Cf. (Ludwig, 1995).

21

intend to φ unless the agent believes φing to be possible, after all there are no means to

impossible ends, then the second condition is also superfluous. Given that one ψs with the

intention to φ (partly by ψing), then one has to believe that ψing is a means to φing and therefore

also believe that φing is possible.26 Additionally, it should be stressed that ψing and φing can be

identical, for instance be sometimes try to raise our hands by raising our hands. From this it

follows that whenever an agent φ, she tried to φ.27

Given the third condition we can model what it means to try your best by looking at how good

of a means ψing is towards φing. How one wants to analyze what it is for a means to be a good,

or even the best means, will in depend on more substantive views.

Trying to understand what trying our best means is open to for substantive disagreement, such as

e.g., whether we are talking about subjectively best or objectively best. Take the classical Frank

Jackson case of a doctor that can administer one out of three possible medicines, A, B, or C to a

patient. Medicine A will partly cure the patient, B and C will either completely cure the patient or

kill the patient. The doctor does not know which one out of B and C is the one that will

completely cure the patient and which one that will kill the patient. Let us assume that

unbeknownst to the doctor it is B that will completely cure the patient and C that will kill the

patient. If, what the doctor ought to do is to try his best to treat the patient, then an objectivist

will claim the best try to do so is by trying to give him the correct medicine, B. A subjectivist on

the other hand would say trying his best entails that the doctor tries to give the patient medicine

A.

Exactly how we should spell out what trying one’s best means is not within the scope of this

paper. All that needs to be said in this paper is to show that it is intelligible to compare different

tryings and to acknowledge that it is an interesting substantive discussion that will not lead to a

philosophical dead end but rather more interesting research.

A correct understanding of what it means ‘to try’ is important to an account of reasons to try, just

as a correct understanding of actions in general is important for an account of reasons for actions

in general. However, trying to settle such an intricate issue in this paper is overly ambitious.

Instead of arguing for my proposed conception of trying all that needs to be shown in this paper

as an intermediate step for a full analysis of the account is that in all the cases where we would

normally say that an agent ought to, or has reason to, do something, it is necessarily the case that

they can try, and even try their best to do it. And by ‘can’ I here mean satisfying CAN.

26 I owe this point to Henrik Andersson. 27 Throughout the paper I assume that φ-ing always refers to an intentional action.

22

The avid reader might notice some dialectic similarities between the present discussion and the

discussion on moral luck28. So I would like to take the time and point out some of the similarities

and the dissimilarities.29 First off all, it is possible to accept the account of OIC proposed in this

paper and take any stance in the moral luck debate. Take the traditional example regarding

resultant moral luck:

Case 4: Amanda recklessly drives down a road, i.e., Amanda fails to try her best to be a careful

driver, luckily nothing happens.

Case 5: Sandy recklessly drives down a road, i.e., Sandy fails to try her best to be a careful driver;

unfortunately, she kills a child who happens to cross the road at just the wrong moment.

It is in completely compatible on my reading of OIC to hold the view that Sandy in case 5 is more

blameworthy than Amanda in case 4.

That being said, the guiding intuition that started of the debate on moral luck illustrated here by

Thomas Nagel in the following way: “people cannot be morally assessed for what it not their

fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control” (Nagel, 1979, p. 25) can be said to

express the guiding intuition in this paper, namely that morality cannot be unfair, and to demand,

or hold us accountable, for things outside of our control is unfair.

Nagel does not defend, as so much as he asserts that the control principle is correct. When he

discusses the option of rejecting the control principle he writes that: “What rules out this escape

is that we are dealing not with a theoretical conjecture but with a philosophical problem. The

condition of control does not suggest itself merely as a generalization from certain clear cases. It

seems correct in the further cases to which it is extended beyond the original set” (Nagel, 1979, p.

26). The interpretation of OIC and RIC could be seen as offering support to the control principle

in that it could be a part of an explanation of the control principle if the interpretation of OIC

and RIC is conjoined with a certain views about the nature of blame.

28 The Moral Luck discussion is on the topic of whether an agent can be more blameworthy (or praiseworthy) than another agent when the only differences are factors that are beyond their control. For a further discussion on the problem of moral luck see (Nagel, 1979; Rivera-López, 2016; Schmidt, 2013). 29 Thanks are owed to Thomas Schmidt who pressed me on the similarities between OIC and Moral Luck.

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5. Reasons to try and the principle of alternative possibilities

One of the sharper thorns in the side of proponent of OIC is Harry Frankfurt’s famous

argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). 30 As David Widerker (1991) and

David Copp (1997) has argued, PAP can be derived from OIC, and therefore any counter-

example against PAP is a potential counter-example against OIC. I believe that by looking at

what we ought to try we can better answer Frankfurt’s challenge. I start this section of by

introducing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, and how it can be derived from OIC. And

then I move on to present Frankfurt’s argument against PAP, and show that regardless of how

the case is construed Frankfurt’s challenge can be met in a more satisfactory manner than

previous attempts.

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities tries to specify a necessary condition for someone being

blameworthy something that they have done. Frankfurt’s original formulation goes as follows:

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): A person is morally responsible for what she has

done, only if she could have done otherwise (Frankfurt, 1969).

Independently of each other Widerker and Copp argued that PAP is derivable from OIC if taken

in conjunction with the on its own plausible Widerker-Copp Principe:

Widerker-Copp Principle (WCP): An agent A is blameworthy for performing action φ if

only if A ought to not-φ (Copp, 1997, 2003; Widerker, 1991).

What WCP does is to give us another necessary condition for someone being blameworthy for an

action, namely that it must have been the case that the agent ought to have not done that action.

While this principle can be questioned I will take it to be true.31 The derivation of PAP from OIC

and WCP then goes as follows:

(1) An agent ought to φ only if she can do it. An agent is blameworthy for φing only if she

ought to not have done not-φ. (OIC)

(2) In cases where the agent cannot but φ it is not the case that she could not-φ. (from 1)

30 If one believes, as Vranas (2007) believes, that OIC is derivable from RIC then Frankfurt’s argument is also a problem for RIC. 31 For instance WCP seems to be incompatible with the possibility of suberogatory acts. An action is suberogatory if it is permissible that you do it, but that you are still blameworthy for doing it. For a further discussion on Subererogation see (Atkins & Nance, 2015; Driver, 1992; Liberto, 2012).

24

(3) If it is not the case that she could not-φied then it cannot be the case that she ought to

have φied (from 1-2).

(4) If it is not the case that she ought to not-φ then she cannot be blameworthy for not not-

φing. (WCP)

(5) Therefore, an agent can only be blameworthy for what she has done if she could have

done otherwise (from 3, 4).

Frankfurt’s argument against PAP starts off with two cases:

Case 6: There is an agent Jack. Jack does the horrible act of φing and is blameworthy for

doing so.

Case 7: In this case we have the agent Jones. Jones also does the horrible act of φing but

in Jones cases there is an evil manipulator that for some reason or other really wants

Jones to φ. If Jones were to decide, or try, to not-φ, then the evil manipulator would

know about it and manipulate Jones in such a manner that Jones would φ.32 If Jones

decides or tries to φ on his own then the evil manipulator will not intervene. However,

the evil manipulator does not intervene because Jones decides to φ and φs on his own

accord.

The question that Frankfurt then poses is whether Jones is blameworthy for φing. If Jack in case 6

is blameworthy, then surely, Jones is just as blameworthy in the case 7. Frankfurt means that this

intuitively plausible judgement is in conflict with PAP. In the case 7 Jones could not have done

otherwise – he could not but commit the horrible act of φing – so therefore he should, according

to PAP, not be blameworthy. To be sure Frankfurt is not saying that Jones would be

blameworthy in if Jones is manipulated, and therefore φs. What he is saying is that Jones is

blameworthy in the cases where the manipulator does not intervene. If we agree with Frankfurt’s

intuition that Jones, in a case where there has been no intervention, is blameworthy we seem to

be forced to reject PAP, and consequently we need to give up OIC or WCP (or both).

I believe that we should accept the claim that Jones is blameworthy in cases of no intervention

but reject the idea that Jones could not have done otherwise, and thereby saving PAP. The idea is

that there is something Jones could have done, namely he could and tried his best to not-φ. Jones

is blameworthy for not trying his best to not-φ. And this is something that Jones can, but does not

do. As the Frankfurt scenario is set, we are free to accept that Jones cannot but φ, that Jones in

32 How the evil manipulator comes to know of Jones’ decision and how he manipulates is not important. The reader may fill in the story how she chooses.

25

the cases of no intervention is blameworthy for φing; or as we should rather say: In the cases of no

intervention Jones is blameworthy for not trying his best to not-φ.

In the case of Jones as described so far, Jones could have tried to not-φ by deciding to not-φ. Of

course, the evil manipulator would have changed Jones’s decision but everyone agrees that Jones

is not blameworthy in cases of intervention so those cases need not bother us. If Jones decided

to not-φ with the intention to not-φ by deciding to not-φing this surely qualifies as Jones trying to

not-φ according to the definition in section four. Proponents of WCP would usually need to say

that in order for Jones to be blameworthy it has to be the case that he ought to not-φ. But as the

Frankfurt case clearly illustrates, Jones cannot not-φ. The interpretation of CAN in this paper

however, opens up a new avenue for proponents of WCP that is not ad hoc. Instead of claiming

that Jones ought to not-φ what they should rather claim is that Jones ought to try his best to not-φ.

As some may note this could be taken to be a flicker of freedom defense33 in favour of PAP, but unlike

other flicker of freedom defenses it is on my view an implication of, and imbedded in, a wider view

about what we ought to do, given OIC, rather than a special solution to a special case which

suffers from an air of ad hocness (Capes, 2014; Robinson, 2012; Young, 2007).

However, some have argued that we can conjure a Frankfurt style case where the agent could not

have done other than not trying to not-φ, but that Jones in these cases is still blameworthy when

there has been no tampering from the manipulator. I will now show why these types of cases also

miss the mark in trying to disprove PAP. Admittedly, they reason why they miss their mark has

nothing to do with the account put forward in this paper. But no discussion of Frankfurt cases

can avoid talking about this second type of cases.

In the literature there are two kinds of manipulators. The one we have been discussing now only

intervenes when Jones decides, or tries, to not-φ. Call him the Bodyguard. The other kind of

manipulator is in some way clairvoyant and can perfectly predict the future. Call him the

Preemptor.34 Prior to Jones has the opportunity to try to not-φ the Preemptor, by some means,

correctly predicts whether Jones will try to not-φ. If, and only if, he predicts that Jones will try to

not-φ the Preemptor intervenes. Given the clairvoyant manipulator it seems as if it is not true

that Jones can try to not-φ and consequently defense of PAP would fail because intuitively Jones

is blameworthy if he φs and was not manipulated by the Preemptor even though Jones could not

33 The flicker of freedom defence in essence claims that no matter how the Frankfurt case is set up, there is still a flicker of freedom where the action could have done something. For further discussion about the flicker of freedom defence see (Capes, 2014; Davison, 1999; Fischer, 2006; Robinson, 2012; Stump, 1999; Young, 2007) 34 In calling the two kinds of manipulator Bodyguard and Preemptor I am following the terminology from (Vihvelin, 2013).

26

even have tried to not-φ. However, I would like to contest the claim that Jones in the case of the

Preemptor cannot try to not-φ. I would like to refer to Kadri Vihvelin (2013, p. 103) and the

distinction between it being the case that Jones never will try to not-φ and that he cannot try to

not-φ. Paraphrasing Vihvelin (2013, p. 102) example:

Case 8: Say that you and I are to flip a fair coin. You always bet tails and I always bet heads. The objective

probability of either outcome is .5. Unbeknownst to you, I have a clairvoyant manipulator friend. Prior to

flipping the coin my clairvoyant friend predicts whether it will come up heads or tails. If, and only if, he

predicts that it will come up as tails he intervenes in such a way so that the coin comes up as heads. In

about 50% of the times I win fair and square without any intervention. In the other 50% of the times I still

win, but unfairly due to intervention from my manipulator friend. Despite the fact that I always will win, it

is still true that the times I win fair and square the coin could have come up heads. In the cases of no-

intervention where the coin comes up as heads the objective probability that it will come up as heads is .5.

In the cases where my clairvoyant friend intervene the chance that the coin will come as heads is 1.

I see no reason for why the same reasoning should not apply to case 7 if we assume that the

bodyguard is a Preemptor. Just as a reminder, in the cases where the Preemptor or Blackguard

intervene both Frankfurt and defenders of PAP agree that Jones is not blameworthy. We are only

interested in the cases where the Preemptor does not intervene. The only cases where the

Preemptor does not intervene are cases where the Preemptor has predicted that Jones will (try to)

φ. This does not mean that Jones could not have tried to not-φ, only that he in fact always will

(try to) φ. For this reason, the cases of a clairvoyant pre-emptor cannot be proper counter

examples to PAP. The cases with a clairvoyant Preemptor only manages to show that Jones

always will (either by being manipulated or by his own accord) φ, not that he cannot try to not-φ.

Admittedly, we would have to adjust PAP and WCP to make it explicit that ‘could have done

otherwise’ part of PAP refers to the agent being able to try to do otherwise.

PAP*: An agent A is morally responsible for what she has done, only if she could have

tried to do otherwise.

If the analysis of OIC and RIC in this paper is correct, adjusting PAP seems more like a natural

adjustment rather than a burdensome concession.

27

6. Conclusion

Concluding, I believe that this paper is a first step towards a better understanding of OIC and

RIC. The reading of OIC and RIC in this paper is the only one that avoids ending up with unfair

moral requirements and in addition to that it can help us in other closely related areas of inquiry,

such as how ‘oughts’ and reasons transmit from ends to means and how to deal with Frankfurt

cases. I believe that the view that we, most of the time, only ought, or have reasons, to try our

best is a sympathetic view. It takes what is within the agent’s control seriously. Some might not

be convinced by the arguments in this paper, but at least I tried my best. What more could

reasonable be asked of anyone?

Jakob Green Werkmäster, Lund University

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