a history of greece

ClassicsFrom the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, Latin and Greek were compulsory subjects in almost all European universities, and most early modern scholars published their research and conducted international correspondence in Latin. Latin had continued in use in Western Europe long after the fall of the Roman empire as the lingua franca of the educated classes and of law, diplomacy, religion and university teaching. The flight of Greek scholars to the West after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave impetus to the study of ancient Greek literature and the Greek New Testament. Eventually, just as nineteenth-century reforms of university curricula were beginning to erode this ascendancy, developments in textual criticism and linguistic analysis, and new ways of studying ancient societies, especially archaeology, led to renewed enthusiasm for the Classics. This collection offers works of criticism, interpretation and synthesis by the outstanding scholars of the nineteenth century.

A History of GreeceWidely acknowledged as the most authoritative study of ancient Greece, George Grote’s twelve-volume work, begun in 1846, established the shape of Greek history which still prevails in textbooks and popular accounts of the ancient world today. Grote employs direct and clear language to take the reader from the earliest times of legendary Greece to the death of Alexander and his generation, drawing upon epic poetry and legend, and examining the growth and decline of the Athenian democracy. The work provides explanations of Greek political constitutions and philosophy, and interwoven throughout are the important but outlying adventures of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Volume 5 deals with Greek history from the battle of Marathon through the Persian Wars and developments in Sicily down to the era of Perikles.

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A History of GreeceVolume 5

George Grote

CAMBRID GE UNIVERSIT Y PRESS

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Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

VOL. V

LONDON:JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1849.

PREFACE TO VOL. V.

V O L U M E S V. A N D V I .

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE

PEACE OF NIKIAS.

B.C. 490-421.

I HAD reckoned upon carrying my readers in thesetwo volumes down to the commencement of thegreat Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

But the narration of events, now that we are underthe positive guidance of Thucydides—coupled withthe exposition of some points on which I differfrom the views generally taken by my predecessors—have occupied greater space than I had foreseen :and I have been obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volumebeyond the usual size, in order to arrive even atthe Peace of Nikias.

The interval of disturbance and partial hostility,which ensued between that peace and the Athenianexpedition, will therefore be reserved for the be-ginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication ofwhich will not be long delayed.

G. G.Dec. 1848.

ERRATA.

Vol. V. p. 247, line 6, read the traveller Pausamas instead of Pausanias.— p. 257, line 5 from the bottom of the page, read Cape Poseidion

instead of Cape Poseidon.— p. 537, in line 1 of note, read Protagoras instead of Pythagoras.

CONTENTS.

VOL. V.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

From the Battle of Marathon to the March of Xerxes againstGreece.

Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. Hisdeath.—Succeeded by his son Xerxes.—Revolt and recon-quest of Egypt by the Persians.—Indifference of Xerxes tothe invasion of Greece—persons who advised and instigatedhim—persuasions which they employed—prophecies pro-duced by Onomakritus.—Xerxes resolves to invade Greece.—Historical manner and conception of Herodotus.—Xerxesannounces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors—Mardonius and Artabanus, the evil and good genius.'—Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project—his repeated dreams—divine command to invade Greece.—Religious conception of the sequences of history—commonboth to Persians and Greeks.—Vast preparations of Xerxes.—March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia—collection ofthe invading army at Sardis—his numerous fleet and largemagazines of provision beforehand.—He throws a bridge ofboats across the Hellespont.—The bridge is destroyed by astorm—wrath of Xerxes—he puts to death the engineersand punishes the Hellespont.—Remarks on this story of thepunishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no suffi-cient reason for disbelieving its reality.—Reconstruction ofthe bridge—description of it in detail.—Xerxes cuts a ship-canal across the isthmus of Mount Athos.—Superior intel-

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Pageligence of the Phoenicians.—Employment of the lash overthe workmen engaged on the canal—impression made there-by on the Greeks.—Bridge of boats thrown across the Stry-mon.—March of Xerxes from Sardis—disposition of hisarmy.—Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius—his son putto death by order of Xerxes.—March to Abydos—respectshown to Ilium by Xerxes.—Xerxes and his army crossover the Hellespontine bridges.—March to Doriskus inThrace near the mouth of the Hebrus—his fleet joins himhere.—Review and muster on the plain of Doriskus—im-mense variety of the nations brought together.—Numberingof the army—method employed.—Immense and incredibletotals brought out by Herodotus.—Comments upon theevidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness andjudge.—Other testimonies about the number of the Per-sians.—Xerxes passes in review the land-force and thefleetat Doriskus—his conversation with the Spartan king Dema-ratus.—March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward alongThrace.—Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on thecoast of Thrace—particularly Thasus and Abdera.—Xerxescrosses the Strymon—marches to Akanthus—zeal of theAkanthians in regard to the canal of Athos.—March ofXerxes toTherma—his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf.•—Favourable prospects of the invasion—zeal of the Mace-donian prince to assist Xerxes ]-58

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Proceedings in Greece from the Battle of Marathon to thetime of the Battle of Thermopylae.

Violent proceedings and death of Kleomenes king of Sparta.—Complaint of the iEginetans at Sparta against KIeomen6sand Leotychides, on the subject of the hostages which thosetwo kings had taken from iEgina.—The Spartans deliverLeotychides to the iEginetans, who require him to go withthem to Athens, to get back the hostages.—Refusal of theAthenians to give up the hostages—reprisals of the ^Egine-tans.—The iEginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a de-mocratical revolution in iEgina, in concert with Athens—the movement fails.—Treatment of the defeated conspirators—sacrilege.—The Athenians land a force in ^Egina—warwhich ensues.—Effect of this war in inducing the Atheniansto enlarge their military force.—Themistokle's and Aristeides,

CONTENTS. v

Pagethe chief men at Athens—intense rivalry between them.—Banishment of the latter by ostracism.—Conversion ofAthens from a land power into a naval power proposed andurged by Themistokles.—Views and long-sighted calcula-tions of Themistokles—he was at this time more essentialto his country than Aristeides.—Fleet of Athens—the sal-vation of Greece as well as of herself.—Valuable fund nowfirst available to Athens from the silver mines of Lauriumin Attica.—Themistokles prevails upon the Athenian peopleto forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in build-ing an increased number of ships.—Preparations of Xerxes—known beforehand in Greece.—Heralds from Persia todemand earth and water from the Grecian cities—many ofthem comply and submit.—Pan-hellenic congress convenedjointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth.—Important effect on Grecian mind.—Effects of the congressin healing feuds among the different Greeks—especially be-tween Athens and jEgina.—Alarm and mistrust prevalentthroughout Greece.—Terror conveyed in the reply of theDelphian oracle to the Athenian envoys.—Sentence of theoracle frightful, yet obscure : efforts of the Athenians to in-terpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistokles.—Greatand genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism of the Athenians—strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgement.—Unwillingness, or inability, on the part of a large proportionof Greeks, to resist the Persians.—Ambiguous neutrality ofArgos.—Different stories current in Greece about Argos—opinion of Herodotus.— Refusal or equivocation of theKretans and Korkyraeans.—Mission to Gelon at Syracuse—his reply.—Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defendthe defile of Tempe against Xerxes.—On arriving, they findthat it cannot be successfully held against him, andretire.—Consequences of this retreat—the Thessalians, andnearly all Hellas north of Kithseron, either submit toXerxes, or waver 59-93

CHAPTER XL.

Battles of Thermopylae and Arteraisium.

Engagement taken by the confederate Greeks against suchGreeks as joined the Persians.—Resolution taken to defendThermopylae as well as the adjoining strait of Euboea.—Passof Thermopylse and its neighbourhood.—The Greeks take

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post at Thermopylae.—Leonidas, king of Sparta, conductsthe force thither—the combined fleet under EurybiadSs oc-cupy the Euboean strait.—Numbers and composition of theforce of Leonidas.—Phocians and Lokrians.—Olympianand Karneian festivals—the Greeks could not bring them-selves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger.—Path over Mount (Eta by which Thermopylae might beevaded—Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot—the Phocians engage to defend it.—Numbers and com-position of the Greek fleet at Artemisium.—Three triremesof the Grecian fleet sent forward as scouts—their first en-counter with the Persian fleet.—Capture of these three tri-remes—panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandonArtemisium, and retire to Chalkis.—Imminent danger of theGreek scheme of defence—they are rescued by a terrificstorm.—Movements of Xerxes from Therma.—He arriveswith his army in the Malian territory, close upon the passof Thermopylae.—Advance of the Persian fleet—it is over-taken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast ofMagnesia.—Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm.—Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet—they re-turn from Chalkis to Artemisium.—Delay of Xerxes withhis land force near Trachis.—Impressions of Xerxes aboutthe defenders at Thermopylae—conversation with Dema-ratus, whom he will not believe.-—Doubts about the motivesascribed by Herodotus to Xerxes.—First attack upon Ther-mopylae—made by the Median troops—repulsed.—Repeatedattacks, b)' the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsedwith slaughter,—Embarrassment of Xerxes—he is relievedfrom it by hearing of the path over the mountain.—A Persiandetachment under Hydarnes march over the mountain path,driving away the Phocian guard.—They arrive in the rearof Leonidas.—Debate among the defenders of Thermopylaewhen it became known that the Persians were approachingtheir rear.—Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in thepass.—The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thes-pians, remain with Leonidas: the rest of the detachment re-tire.—Doubts about the Theban contingent.—Last exploitsand death of Leonidas and his band.—Individuals amongthem distinguished—scorn exhibited towards Aristodemuswho did not fight.—Fate of the Theban contingent.—Im-pressions of Xerxes after the combat—advice given to himby Demaratus—he rejects it.—Proceedings of the two fleets,at Artemisium and Aphetae—alarm among the Grecian fleet

CONTENTS. vii

Page—Themistokle's determines them to stay and fight, at theurgent instance of the Euboeans.—Important service thusrendered by Themistokle's.—Confident hopes of the Persianfleet—they detach a squadron to sail round Eubma, andtake the Greeks in the rear.—Sea-fight off Artemisium—advantage gained by the Greeks.—Second storm—increaseddamage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachmentsent round Eubcea.—Renewed sea-fight off Artemisium—indecisive—but the Greek fleet resolves to retreat.—Theyretreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermo-pylae—they go to Salamis.—Advance of the Persian fleet toEuboea—manoeuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect to thedead bodies at Thermopylae.—Numbers of dead on bothsides. Subsequent commemorating inscriptions.—Impress-ive epigram of Simonides. 94-140

CHAPTER XLI.

Battle of Salamis Retreat of Xerxes.

Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battleof Thermopylae.—No ulterior plan of defence formed—nonew position to be found capable of defending Attica—thePeloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth.—Hopeless situation of the Athenians—no measures yet takento remove their families from Attica.—The Athenians aban-don Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis,^Egina, Troezen, &c.—Unavoidable hurry and sufferings ofthe emigrants.—Energy of the Athenians, and unanimityof the leaders—Themistokle's proposes the restoration ofAristeides from exile.—Numbers and composition of thecombined Greek fleet at Salamis.—Xerxes occupies Athensand Attica—the Persian fleet enters the road of Phale'rum.—The Persian army ravage the Phocian townships in theirmarch from Thermopylae to Attica—pillage of the temple atAbse.—Persian division detached against the temple ofDelphi.—Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment.—Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens—the acropolis holdsout—is taken and sacked.—Atoning visit of the Peisistratidsto the ruined acropolis.—Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phale'-rum—debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle atSalamis—prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia.—Resolutiontaken by Xerxes to fight at Salamis.—Dissensions amongthe Greeks in the fleet at Salamis. Resolution taken to re-move the fleet to the Isthmus.—Ruinous consequences if

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that resolution had been executed.—Themistokles opposesthe resolution, persuades Eurybiade's and prevails upon himto reopen the debate.—Synod of Grecian chiefs again con-vened—Themistokle's tries to get the former resolution re-scinded—the Peloponnesians adhere to it—angry words.—Menace of Themistokles to retire with the Athenian squa-dron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis—Eury-biades takes upon him to adopt this measure.—The Pelo-ponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuseobedience. Third synod convened—renewed disputes; themajority opposed to Themistokles and determined on re-treating to the Isthmus.—Desperate stratagem of Themi-stokles—he sends a private message across to Xerxes, per-suading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, andthus render retirement impossible.—Impatient haste ofXerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping—hisfleet encloses the Greeks during the night.—Aristeidescomes in the night to the Greek fleet from ^Egina—informsthe chiefs that they are enclosed by the Persians, and thatescape has become impossible.—Position of Xerxes—orderof the fleets, and plan of attack.—Battle of Salamis—con-fusion and complete defeat of the Persians.—Distinguishedgallantly of Queen Artemisia.—Expectations of the Greeksthat the conflict would be renewed—fears of Xerxes forhis own personal safety—he sends his fleet away to Asia.—Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia—advice and re-commendation of Mardonius, who is left behind as generalto finish the conquest of Greece.—The Greeks pursue thePersian fleet as far as Andros—second stratagem of Themi-stokles by secret message to Xerxes.—Themistokles withthe fleet—levying money in the Cyclades.—Xerxes evacu-ates Attica and returns home by land, with the larger por-tion of his army.—Retreating march of Xerxes to the Helles-pont—sufferings of his troops. He finds the bridge broken,and crosses the strait on shipboard into Asia.—Joy of theGreeks—distribution of honours and prizes.—Honours ren-dered to Themistokles 141-196

CHAPTER XLII.

Battles of Platsea and Mykale.—Final Repulse of thePersians.

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kyme',and collects in the spring, at Samos.—The Greek fleet

CONTENTS. ix

Pageassembles in the spring at jEgina.—General adherence ofthe medising Greeks to Mardonius—revolt of Potidsea—which is besieged in vain by Artabazus.—Mardonius, afterwintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring inBoeotia. He consults the Boeotian oracles.—Mardoniussends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the mosthonourable terms of peace.—Temptation to Athens to acceptthis offer—fear of the Lacedaemonians that she would ac-cept it—Lacedaemonian envoys sent to Athens to preventit.—Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination tocarry on the war, in spite of great present suffering.—Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and <he Peloponne-sians towards Athens.—The Spartans, having fortified theIsthmus, leave Attica undefended : Mardonius occupiesAthens a second time.—Second migration of the Atheniansto Salamis—their bitter disappointment and anger againstSparta for deserting them.—Second offer of Mardonius tothe Athenians—again refused—intense resolution whichthey display.—Remonstrance sent by the Athenians toSparta;—ungenerous slackness of the Spartans.— LargeSpartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus.—Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into Boeotia.—Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally : Ther-sander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies betweenMardonius and Artabazus the second in command—zealand eagerness of the Thebans.—Numbers of the Greeks col-lected under Pausanias.—March of Pausanias over Kithse-ron into Boeotia.—He is attacked by the Persian cavalryunder Masistius, and much harassed—superior efficiency ofthe Athenians against cavalry—Masistius is slain.-—TheGreeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds andtake up a position nearer to Plat«a, along the Asopus.—Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself nearly op-posite to the Greeks on the other side of the As6pus.—Un-willingness of both armies to begin the attack—the pro-phets on both sides discourage first aggression.—Mardoniusannoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their sup-plies in the rear.—Impatience of Mardonius—in spite ofthe reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determineson a general attack: he tries to show that the propheciesare favourable to him.—His intention communicated to theAthenians in the night by Alexander of Macedon.—Pausa-nias changes places in the line between the Spartans andAthenians.—Mardonius again attacks them with his cavalry.

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—In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry,Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island.—Confusion of the Grecian army in executing this night-movement.—Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetusto obey the order for the night-march.—Mistrust of Pausa-nias and the Spartans, exhibited by the Athenians.—Pausa-nias moves without Amompharetus, who speedily followshim.—Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that theGreeks had retreated during the night—he pursues andattacks them with disorderly impatience.—Battle of Plataea.—Great personal bravery of the Persians—they are totallydefeated, and Mardonius slain.—The Athenians on the leftwing defeat the Thebans.—Artabazus, with a large Persiancorps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece—therest of the Persian army take up their position in the forti-fied camp.—Small proportion of the armies on each sidewhich really fought.—The Greeks attack and carry the for-tified camp.—Loss on both sides.—Funeral obsequies bythe Greeks—monuments—dead body of Mardonius—dis-tribution of booty.—Pausanias summons Thebes, requiringthe surrender of the leaders—these men give themselves up,and are put to death.—Honours and distinctions among theGreek warriors.—Reverential tribute to Platsea, as the sceneof the victory, and to the Plataaans : solemnities decreed tobe periodically celebrated by the latter, in honour of theslain.—Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed by the vic-tors, to hold meetings at Plataea.—Proceedings of the Gre-cian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Per-sians.—The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires toMykal§ in Ionia.—Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ioniansentertained by the Persian generals.—The Greeks land toattack the Persians ashore—revelation of the victory ofPlatoea, gained by their countrymen on the same morning,springs up in their minds before the battle.—Battle of My-kale—revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp—completedefeat of the Persians.—Retirement of the defeated Persianarmy to Sardis.—Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt thecontinental Ionians into their alliance—proposition to trans-port them across the iEgean into Western Greece—rejectedby the Athenians.—The Grecian fleet sails to the Helles-pont : the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remainto attack the Chersonese.—Siege of Sestos—antipathy ofthe Chersonesites against Artayktes.—Capture of Sestos—crucifixion of Artayktes.—Return of the fleet to Athens.... 197-272

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Events in Sicily down to the expulsion of the GelonianDynasty and the establishment of Popular Governmentsthroughout the Island.

PageAgrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B.C.—

Phalaris despot of Agrigentum.—Syracuse in 500 B.C.—oligarchical government under the Gamori or privileged de-scendants of the original proprietary colonists—the Demos—the Kyllyrii or Serfs.—Early governments of the Greekcities in Sicily—original oligarchies subverted in manyplacesby despots—attempted colony of the Spartan prince Do-rieus.—Kleander despot of Gela—B.C. about 500—First riseof Gelo and iEnesidemus in his service. Telines, the firstmarked ancestor of Gelo.—Gelo—in high command amongthe mercenaries of H ippokratds despot of Gela.—Fate of theIonic town of Zankle, afterwards Messina—it is seized bythe Samians—conduct of Hippokrates.—Hippokrates isvictorious over the Syracusans—takes Kamarina—dies—Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela.—Greatness ofGelo—he gets possession of Syracuse—and transfers theseat of his power from Gela to Syracuse.—Conquest ofvarious Sicilian towns by Gelo—he transports the oligarchyto Syracuse, and sells the Demos for slaves.—Increasedpower and population of Syracuse under Gelo—it becomesthe first city in Sicily.—Power of Gelo when the envoysfrom Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid—B.C. 481.—Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism againstthe barbaric interests in the islands. — Spartan and Athe-nian envoys apply to Gelo—his answer.—Carthaginianinvasion of Sicily, simultaneous with the invasion of Greeceby Xerxes.—The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar be-siege Himera—battle of Himera—complete victory gainedover them by Gelo.—Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily—hegrantspeace to the Carthaginians.—Conduct of Gelo towards theconfederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes.—Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and dis-tributed among the Carthaginian cities—their prosperity,especially that of Agrigentum.—Death and obsequies ofGelo.—Number of new citizens whom Gelo had introducedat Syracuse.—Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Sy-racuse—jealous of his brother Polyzelus—harsh as a ruler—quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thero of Agri-

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gentum—appeased by the poet Simonidls.—Severe treat-ment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thero.—Power andexploits of Hiero—against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhe-nians—against Anaxilaus—he founds the city of ./Etna—new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants—complimentsof Pindar.—Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Theroof Agrigentum. Thrasydseus, son of The'ro, rules Agri-gentum and Himera. His cruel government—he is defeatedby Hiero and expelled. —Great power of Hiero, after thedefeat of Thrasydseus—his death.—Thrasybulus, brotherand successor of Hiero—disputes among the members ofthe Gelonian family.—Cruelties and unpopularity of Thra-sybulus—mutiny against him at Syracuse.—Expulsion ofThrasybulus, and extinction of the Gelonian dynasty.—Popular governments, established in all the Sicilian cities—confusion and disputes arising out of the number of newcitizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonianprinces.—Internal dissensions and combat in Syracuse.—Defeat of the Gelonians—Syracuse made into one populargovernment, one city, one fortification.—Disorders in otherSicilian cities, arising from the return of exiles who hadbeen dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katanaand jEtna.—General congress and compromise—the exilesare provided for—Kamarina again restored as a separateautonomous city.—Reactionary feelings against the pre-vious despotism, and in favour of popular government, atSyracuse and in the other cities.—Italiot Greeks—destruct-ive defeat of the inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium 273-320

CHAPTER XLIV.

From the Battles of Platsea and Mykale down to the deathsof Themistokles and Aristeides.

Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece—hisown defects—inferior quality and slackness of most of hisarmy.—Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks.—Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with theinvasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great.—Noimprovement in warfare among the Persians during that in-terval of 150 years—great improvement among the Greeks.—Progressive spirit in Greece—operating through Athenianinitiative.—Conduct of Athens in the repulse of the Persians—herposition,temper, and influence, after that event.—Pro-

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Pageceedings of the Athenians to restore their city—jealous ob-structions caused by the Peloponnesians.—Stratagem ofThemistokle's to procure for the Athenians the opportunityof fortifying their city.—Athens fortified—confusion of theSpartans—disappointment of the allies.—Effect of this in-tended, but baffled, intervention upon Athenian feelings.—Enlargement of the walls of Athens.—Large plans of The-mistokles for the naval aggrandisement of the city—fortifiedtown and harbour provided at Peirseus—vast height andthickness projected for the walls.—Advantages of the en-larged and fortified harbour—increase of metics and of com-merce at Athens.—Resolution to build twenty new triremesannually.—Expedition of the united Greek fleet against Asia,under the Spartan Pausanias—capture of Byzantium.—Misconduct of Pausanias—refusal of the allies to obey him——his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes.—Pausanias,having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intole-rable in his behaviour. He is recalled to Sparta.—The alliestransfer the headship from Sparta to Athens.—Importanceof this change in the relations of the Grecian states.—Ten-dency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreignservice—Leotychides.—Momentary Pan-hellenic union un-der Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes—nowbroken up and passing into a schism with two distinct partiesand chiefs, Sparta and Athens.—Proceedings of Athens inher capacity of leader—good conduct of Aristeides.—For-mation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as presi-dent—general meetings of allies held in that island.—As-sessment of the confederacy and all its members, made byAristeides—definite obligation in ships and money—moneytotal—Hellenotamiae.—Rapid growth, early magnitude, ofthe confederacy of Delos : willing adhesion of the members.—State and power of Persia at the time when the confede-racy of Delos was first formed.—Conduct of Pausaniasafter being removed from the command—he prosecutes histreasonable designs in conjunction with Persia.—He is re-called to Sparta—imprisoned—put on his trial—tries toprovoke the Helots to revolt.—He is detected by the reve-lation of a slave—incredulity or fear of the Ephors.—Hisarrest and death—atonement made for offended sanctuary.—Themistokles is compromised in the detected treason ofPausanias.—Position of Themistokles at Athens—tendencyof Athenian parties and politics.—Effect of the events ofthe Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment—stimu-

xiv CONTENTS.Page

lus to democracy.—Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitu-tion—all citizens without exception are rendered politicallyadmissible to office : first, universal eligibility and electionof magistrates—next, sortition or drawing by lot.—Increaseof the power of the Strategi—alteration in the functionsand diminution of the importance of the Archons.—Admi-nistration of Athens enlarged—new functionaries appointed—distribution between Athens and Peiraeus.—Political ca-reer and precarious tenor of Themistokl6s—bitter rivalsagainst him—Kimon, Alkmaeon, &c. —his liability to chargesof corruption.—Themistokl6s is charged with acceptingbribes from Persia—acquitted at Athens.—Increased bitter-ness of feud, between him and his political rivals, after thisacquittal. He is ostracised.—While in banishment underostracism, the Lacedaemonians prefer a charge of treasonagainst him.—Flight and adventures of Themistokle's.—Themistokles gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with thePersian king.—Stories about the relations between the Per-sian king and Themistokles.—Real treatment of Themi-stokles in Persia.—Influence which he acquires with thePersian king.—Large reward which he receives—His deathat Magnesia.—Death of AristeidSs—his poverty 321-389

CHAPTER XLV.

Proceedings of the Confederacy under Athens as head.—Firstformation and rapid expansion of the Athenian Empire.

Consequence of the formation of the confederacy of Delos.—Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens.—Distinction between the Confederacy of Delos, withAthens as president—and the Athenian empire which grewout of it.—Tendency to confuse these two, and to imputeto Athens long-sighted plans of ambition.—The early years,after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, were yearsof active exertion on the part of Athens.—Our imperfectknowledge of them.—Necessity of continued action againstthe Persians even after the battles of Platsea and Mykale.This necessity was the cause both of the willing organisa-tion of the confederacy of Delos—and of the maritime im-provement of Athens.—Confederacy of Delos—sworn to byall the members—perpetual and peremptory—not allowingretirement nor evasion.—Enforcing sanction of Athens,strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod.—

CONTENTS.

Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies—substitu-tion of money-payment for personal service, demanded bythe allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelingsof Athens.—Change in the position, as well as in the feel-ings of Athens.—Growing unpopularity of Athens through-out Greece—causes of it.—Synod of Delos—gradually de-clines in importance and vanishes. Superior qualities andmerit of the Athenians as compared with the confederates ofDelos generally.—-Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos—assessment of Aristeides.—Events between B.C. 476-466.Eion—Skyros—Karystos.—Athens as guardian of theiEgean sea against piracy—The Hero Theseus.—First re-volt among the members of the confederacy of Delos—Naxos revolts and is reconquered.—Operations of Athensand the confederacy against Persia.—Defeat of the Persiansby Kitnon at the river Eurymedon.—Revolt of Thasos fromthe confederacy of Delos.—Siege of Thasos by the Athe-nians under Kimon.—Mines in Thrace.—First attempt ofAthens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymonabove Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain.•—Reduction of Thasos after a blockade of two years—it isdisarmed and dismantled.—Application of the Thasians toSparta for aid—granted, but not carried into effect—glimpseof hostilities between Sparta and Athens.—Trial and ac-quittal of Kimon at Athens.—Great increase of the Athenianpower.—Proceedings in Central Greece between470-464 B.C.Thebes and the Boeotian towns. Discredit of Thebes.—Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes overthe lesser Bceotian towns. Events in Peloponnesus—Ar-cadia—Elis, &c.—Terrible earthquake at Sparta 464 B.C.—Revolt of the Helots.—The Lacedaemonians invoke the aidof their allies against the revolted Helots.—March of theAthenians under Kimon into Laconia to aid them.—Mis-trust conceived by the Lacedaemonians of their Athenianauxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasureand change of policy at Athens.—The Athenians renouncethe alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos.Position of Argos—her conquest of Mykense and othertowns.—Megara becomes allied with Athens. Growinghatred of Corinth and the neighbouring Peloponnesian statestowards Athens.—Energetic simultaneous action of theAthenians—in Cyprus, Phoanicia, Egypt, and Greece—theybuild the first " Long Wall" from Megara to Nissa.—War of Athens against Corinth, ^Egina, &c. Total defeat

vi CONTENTS.

Page

of the ^g ine tans at sea.—The Athenians besiege ^Egina—the Corinthians, Epidaurians, &c. are defeated by theAthenians under Myronides.—The Long Walls betweenAthens and Peirseus are projected—espoused by Perikles,opposed by Kimon—political contentions at Athens—im-portance of the Long Walls.—Expedition of the Lacedae-monians intoBoeotia—they restore the ascendency of Thebes.—Intention of the Spartan army in BcEotia to threatenAthens, and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party op-posed to the Long Walls.—Battle of Tanagra—defeat ofthe Athenians.—Effects of the battle—generous behaviourof Kimon—he is recalled from ostracism.—Compromiseand reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties atAthens.—Victory of CEnophyta gained by the Athenians—they acquire ascendency over all Boeotia, Phocis, and Lokris.—Completion of the Long Walls—conquest of iEgina,which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered tributary.—The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus—their opera-tions in the Gulf of Corinth.—Defeat and losses of theAthenians in Egypt.—The revolted Helots in Laconia capi-tulate and leave the country.—Truce for five years concludedbetween Athens and Lacedaemonians, through the influenceof Kimon. Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia.—Death of Kimon at Cyprus—victories of the Athenian fleet—it returns home.—No farther expeditions of the Athe-nians against Persia—convention concluded between them.—Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention—doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of thosedoubts—confirmatory hints of Thucydide's.—Thucydides,son of Melesias succeeds Kimon as leading opponent ofPerikles.—Transfer of the common fund of the confederacyfrom Delos to Athens.—Gradual passage of the confederacyinto an Athenian empire.—Transfer of the fund was pro-posed by the Samians.—Position of Athens with a nume-rous alliance both of inland and maritime states.—Com-mencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens.—Revolt of Boeotia from Athens—defeat of the Athenians atKoroneia—they evacuate Boeotia.—Revolt of Phocis, Lokris,Euboea, and Megara : invasion of Attica by the Pelopon-nesians under the Lacedaemonian king Pleistoanax.—Eu-bcea reconquered by Perikles.—Humiliation and despond-ency of Athens.—Conclusion of the thirty years' truce.—Diminution of Athenian power.—Feud between Athens andMegara 390-472

CONTENTS. xvi

CHAPTER XLVI.

Constitutional and Judicial Changes at Athens under Perikles.

First establishment of the democratical judicial system atAthens.—Union in the same hands, of functions both admi-nistrative and judicial in early Athens—great powers of themagistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus.—Magi-strates generally wealthy men—oligarchical tendencies ofthe senate of Areopagus—increase of democratical sentimentamong the bulk of the citizens.—Political parties in Athens.Perikle's and Ephialtes, democratical: Kimon, oligarchicalor conservative.—Democratical Dikasteries or Jury-courts,constituted by Perikle's and Ephialtes. How these Dika-steries were arranged.—Pay to the dikasts introduced andmade regular.—The magistrates are deprived of their judi-cial, and confined to administrative functions.—Senate ofAreopagus—its antiquity—semi-religious character—largeand undefined controlling power.—Large pow'ers of thesenate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistentwith the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion.New interests and tendencies then growing up at Athen?.—Senate of Areopagus—a centre of action for the conser-vative party and Kimon.—Opposition between Kimon andPerikle's—inherited from their fathers—character and work-ing of Perikles.—Reserved, philosophical, and business-likehabits of Perikles —his little pains to court popularity—lessof the demagogue than Kimon.—Ephialtes belonging tothe democratical party, and originally equal to Perikle's ininfluence. Efforts of Ephialtes against magisterial abuse.—Kimon and his party, more powerful than Ephialte's andPerikles, until the time when the Athenian troops were dis-missed from Laconia. Ostracism of Kimon.—Measurescarried by Ephialtes and Perikles to abridge the power ofthe senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates.Institution of the paid dikasteries.—Separation of judicialfrom administrative functions.—Assassination of Ephialtesby the conservative party.—Commencement of the greatascendency of Perikles, after the death of Ephialte's. Com-promise between him and Kimon. Brilliant successes ofAthens, and sera of the maximum of her power.—Otherconstitutional changes.—The Nomophylakes.—The Nomo-thetse—distinction beiween laws and psephisms or special

viii CONTENTS.

Pagedecrees—process by which laws were enacted and repealed.—Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated tothe procedure in judicial trials.—Graph6 Paranomfin—in-dictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional pro-positions.—Working of the Graphe Paranom6n.—Conser-vative spirit in which it is framed.—Restraint upon newpropositions, and upon the unlimited initiative belonging toevery citizen.—Abusive extension of the GraphS Paranomonafterwards.~-It was often used as a simple way of procuringthe repeal of an existing law—without personal aim againstthe author of the law.—Numbers and pay of the dikasts,as provided by Perikle's.—The Athenian democracy, as con-stituted by Perikle"s, remained substantially unaltered after-wards down to the loss of Athenian independence—except-ing the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred andthe Thirty.—Working of the numerous dikasteries—theirlarge numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimida-tion—liability of individual magistrates to corruption.—TheAthenian dikasteries are Jury-trial applied on the broadestscale—exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in anexaggerated form.—The encomiums usually pronouncedupon the theory of jury-trial would apply yet more stronglyto the Athenian dikasteries.—Imperfections of jury-trial—exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries.—Powerfuleffects of the dikasteries in exercising and stimulating theintellect and feelings of individual citizens.—Necessity oflearning to speak—growth of professional teachers of rhetoric—professional composers of speeches for others.—Rhetorsand Sophists.—Polemics of Sokrates, himself a sophist,against the sophists generally.—Sophists and rhetors werethe natural product of the age and of the democracy.—Thedikasteries were composed, not exclusively of poor men, butof middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately 473-543

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OFXERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I N the last chapter but one of the preceding; vo- Resolutionsr r o of Darius

lume, I described the Athenian victory at Marathon, to invadethe repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the second"return of his armament across the iEgean to the mTdAsiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer bothEretria and Athens : an order which he had indeedexecuted in part with success, as the string ofEretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—butwhich remained still unfulfilled in regard to thecity principally obnoxious to Darius. Far fromsatiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persianmonarch was compelled to listen to the tale of anignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athe-nians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he com-menced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack

VOL. v. B

2 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II.

upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Re-solved upon assembling the entire force of his em-pire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops,horses, and ships both of war and burthen. Forno less than three years the empire was agitated bythis immense levy, which Darius determined toconduct in person against Greece1. Nor was hisdetermination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians,which broke out about the time when his prepara-tions were completed. He was on the point of under-taking simultaneously the two enterprises—the con-quest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—whenhe was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this in-tended march, he had nominated .as successorXerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendency ofthat queen ensured to Xerxes the preference overhis elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by aformer wife, and born before the latter becameking. The choice of the reigning monarch passedunquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without oppo-sition2. It deserves to be remarked, that though

1 Herodot. vii. 3, 4.2 Herodot. vii. 1-4. He mentions—simply as a report, and seemingly

without believing it himself—that Demaratus the exiled king of Spartawas at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a suc-cessor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, Persic, c. 23) :and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which todetermine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law ofregal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after hisfather became king, was preferred to an elder son born before thatevent. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alikecalculated to bestow a factitious importance onDemaratus,will be noticedin the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the

CHAP. XXXVIII.] ACCESSION OF XERXES. 3

we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atro-city perpetrated in the Persian regal family, thereis nothing like that systematic fratricide which hasbeen considered necessary to guarantee successionin Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had Succeededbecome the predominant sentiment in the mind of Xerxes.Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death,and it was fortunate for the Athenians that hiscrown now passed to a prince less obstinately hos-tile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes,personally the handsomest1 and most stately manamid the immense crowd which he led againstGreece, was in character timid and faint-hearted,over and above those defects of vanity, childishself-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, whichhe shared more or less with all the Persian kings.Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, theinvasion of Greece was very near proving success-ful : and it might well have succeeded altogether,had he been either endued with the courageoustemperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity,of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the B'c-4f5-forces of the empire in active preparation, pur- f^q^st

of Egyptbv the Per-grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his gi^ns

descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii.1-6) : and perhaps these descendants may have been among the personsfrom whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedi-tion of Xerxes. See vii. 239.

Plutarch (De Fraterno Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many re-spects different concerning the circumstances which determined thesuccession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

1 Herod, vii. 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Co-domannus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21).

B 2

HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II.

Indiffer-ence ofXerxes tothe inva-sion ofGreece—persons•who ad-vised andinstigatedhim—per-suasionswhich theyemployed—prophe-cies pro-duced byOnomakri-tns.

suant to the orders of Darius ; except Egypt,which was in a state of revolt. His first necessitywas to reconquer this country ; a purpose for whichthe great military power now in readiness wasfound amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued andreduced to a state of much harder dependence thanbefore: we may presume that the tribute was in-creased, as well as the numbers of the Persian oc-cupying force, maintained by contributions leviedon the natives. Achaemenes, brother of Xerxes,was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing toprosecute the schemes of his deceased father againstGreece. At least such is the statement of Hero-dotus-; who represents Mardonius as the grand in-stigator of the invasion, partly through thirst forwarlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtainthe intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Norwere there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforcehis recommendation both by the promise of helpand by the colour of religion. The great family of theAleuadse, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to othertowns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause thattheir principal members came to Susa to offer aneasy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas :while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still per-severed in striving to procure their own restorationat the tail of a Persian army. On the present oc-casion, they brought with them to Susa a new in-strument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a manwho had acquired much reputation, not by pro-phesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, in-terpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses

CHAP. XXXVIII.] PROPHECIES OF ONOMAKRITUS. 5

passing under the name of the ancient seer or poetMuseeus. Thirty years before, in the flourishingdays of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens,enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and con-sulted by him as the expositor of these venerateddocuments. But having been detected by the poetLasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolatingthem with new matter of his own, Hipparchus ba-nished him with indignation. The Peisistratidshowever, now in banishment themselves, forgot orforgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus withhis prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a personof oracular authority, to assist in working on themind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpola-tions, or his omissions, were now directed : forwhen introduced to the Persian monarch, he recitedemphatically various encouraging predictions where-in the bridging of the Hellespont, and the trium-phant march of a barbaric host into Greece, ap-peared as predestined ; while he carefully kept backall those of a contrary tenor, which portended cala-mity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus1, stre-nuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musseus,and other Grecian prophets whose verses were incirculation, expressly assures us. The religiousencouragements of Onomakritus, and the politicalcooperation proffered by the Aleuadse, enabled

1 Herodo t . vii . 6 ; viii. 20, 96 , 77 . ''Ovop.a.KpiTO$—KareKeye TWV

XPI&IAWV' el fiev Ti evioi tr<pd\pji (pepov ra Uepoy, rav fiev e'Xeye oiSev'

6 de ra evTv^crTara cKAeyd/xepos1, eXeye TOUT€ 'EWrjO'Troi'Tov a>s £ev%8rjvcu

Xpiov e'lrj VTT avftpbs Hepcreai, TTJV TC eXacrtv e^yed/zepos, &C.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophe-cies ; it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promisesor threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II.

Xerxes re-solves toinvadeGreece.

Mardonius efFectually to overcome the reluctanceof his master. Nor indeed was it difficult to show,according to the feelings then prevalent, that a newking of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge theboundaries of the empire1. The conquering im-pulse springing from the first founder was as yetunexhausted ; the insults offered by the Atheniansremained still unavenged : and in addition to thisdouble stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a capti-vating picture of Europe as an acquisition—" itwas the finest land in the world, produced everyvariety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good apossession for any mortal man except the Persiankings2." Fifteen years before, the Milesian Ari-stagoras3, when entreating the Spartans to assistthe Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth andproductiveness of Asia in contrast with the povertyof Greece—a contrast less widely removed fromthe truth, at that time, than the picture presentedby Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his originalviews, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principalPersian counsellors, and announced to them his re-solution to invade Greece, setting forth the mingledmotives of revenge and aggrandizement which im-pelled him, and representing the conquest of Greeceas carrying with it that of all Europe, so that thePersian empire would become coextensive with thesether of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.On the occasion of this invasion, now announced

1 JSschylus, Pers. 761.3 Herodot. vii. 5. &>s f/ Evpwjrr) 7repocaX\ijs x^PV> Kal 6Mpea iravrola

(pepei ra rjiiepa, (3a<riXe'i re fiovvco dvrjrav d^lrj (KTrjcrSai—X^PV waj"^>°-partp-qv (vii. 8). 3 Herodot. v. 49.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] HERODOTUS. 7

and about to take place, we must notice especiallythe historical manner and conception of our capital Historical• r T T I m • • r /~* manner and

informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece conceptionby Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, con- dotus.™"stitute the entire theme of his three last books, andthe principal object of his whole history, towardswhich the previous matter is intended to conduct.Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubt-less many which have a substantive importance andinterest of their own, recounted at so much lengththat they appear coordinate and principal, so thatthe thread of the history is for a time put out ofsight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together thelarger divisions of his history, omitting the occa-sional prolixities of detail, that such thread is neverlost in the historian's own mind: it may be tracedby an attentive reader, from his preface and thestatement immediately following it—of Croesus asthe first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, " GrseciaBarbariae lento collisa duello," in the expedition ofXerxes. That expedition, as forming the consum-mation of his historical scheme, is not only relatedmore copiously and continuously than any eventspreceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusualsolemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment,so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds usin many points of the second Book of the Iliad:probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reachedus, we should trace many other cases in which theimagination of the historian has unconsciously as-similated itself to them. The Dream sent by theGods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from


his project—as well as the ample catalogue ofnations and eminent individuals embodied in thePersian host—have both of them marked parallelsin the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight inrepresenting to himself the enterprise against Greeceas an antithesis to that of the Atreidse against Troy.He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes withas much familiarity as Homer into those of Aga-memnon, and introduces " the counsel of Zeus " asnot less direct, special, and overruling, than it ap-pears in the Iliad and Odyssey1: though the God-head in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tendsto become neuter instead of masculine or feminine,and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler,apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of aman : acting moreover chiefly as a centralized, orat least as a homogeneous, force, in place of thediscordant severalty of agents conspicuous in theHomeric theology. The religious idea, so oftenpresented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the God-head was jealous and hostile to excessive good for-tune or immoderate desires in man,—is workedinto his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moraland as the main cause of its disgraceful termination:for we shall discover as we proceed, that the histo-rian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarchcalls his " malignity," neither ascribes to his coun-trymen credit greater than they deserve for personalvalour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeatwhich their mismanagement laid open2.

1 Homer, Iliad, i. 3. Aios 8' eYeXetWo /3ovX?/. Herodotus is cha-racterized as 'Ofirjpov £r]\a>Tr)s—'OfxrjpiKwTaros (Dionys. Halic. ad Cn.Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske ; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

2 While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise de Herodoti Malignitate be

an assem-

CHAP. XXXVIII.] XERXES RESOLVES TO INVADE GREECE. 9

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described Xerxes a?.J nounces his

as having originally been averse to the enterprise, project toan assem

and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions ofMardonius : this was probably the genuine Persianbelief, for the blame of so great a disaster wouldnaturally be transferred from the monarch to some eâêvil counsellor1. As soon as Xerxes, yielding to g°od

"* ° genius.

persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chiefmen whom he had convoked, his resolution tobridge over the Hellespont and march to the con-quest of Greepe and Europe, Mardonius is repre-the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt,the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds—Dionysius of Hali-karnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a patternof excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respectwith Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticisingAthens, arising from his long banishment: 'H fikv 'Hpo86rov fSiddeinsev ana(riv eVtetK^ff, Kal TOLS jLtev dya&ois (rvvrjboiieiT}, rots Se KaKois avva\-

yoCcra" ij Se 9ovKv8tSov diadeais avdeKao-ros TLS Kal niKpa, Kal rfj irarpibi.

rrjs (pvyrjs /j.vrjiTi.KaKov(ra' ra fitv yap Apaprrifiara emêpxeTai Kal p.6Xa

aKpifitos, Tuiv fie Kara, vovv K€â>p7jKOTti>v Kaddira£ ov \ii\ivt\Tai rj aanep

r)vajRaa)i.ivos. (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Prsecip. HistoricisJudic. p. 774, Reisk.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucy-dides (though in other places he acquits him, dno iravros cf>dovov <a\Trdcn/r KoXaxfiar, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly uponHerodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were veryapt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fa,ct, exemplifyingthe laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge ofthem for purposes of future inference—but as if it were a branch offiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality.Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes sofar as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord inGreece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have passedinto history (triamfi Ka\ X^fl napa8odets, vwo T£>V ewiyiyvofie'i/av rjyvorjcrBcu,ibid. p. 768)—and that especially Thucydides ought never to havethrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many othercauses to which it might have been imputed (eVepcur exovra iroWaisa(popfials 7repia\j/ai ras alrias, p. 770).

1 Herodot. viii. 99. Mapboviov iv airiji riOivrcs : compare c. 100.


sented as expressing his warm concurrence in theproject, extolling the immense force1 of Persia anddepreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denomi-nated them) as so poor and disunited that successwas not only certain but easy. Against the rash-ness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experienceof Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, andtherefore uncle to the monarch. The age and re-lationship of this Persian Nestor emboldens him toundertake the dangerous task of questioning thedetermination which Xerxes, though professing toinvite the opinions of others, had proclaimed asalready settled in his own mind. The speech whichHerodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is thatof a thoughtful and religious Greek : it opens withthe Grecian conception of the necessity of hearingand comparing opposite views, prior to any finaldecision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreci-ating the Greeks and seducing his master intopersonal danger—sets forth the probability thatthe Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come anddestroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossedthe Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminenthazard which Darius and his army had undergonein Scythia, from the destruction—averted only byHistiseus and his influence—of the bridge over theDanube : such prudential suggestions being furtherstrengthened by adverting to the jealous aversionof the Godhead towards overgrown human power2.

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in atone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite

1 Herodot. vii. 9. 2 Herodot. vii. 10.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] DREAMS OF XERXES. U

of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so power- Xerees isfully, that before night they gradually alter his Artabanus'

^ j 6resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme,In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when adream appears : a tall stately man stands over him,denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily mandtocommands him to persist in the enterprise as an- Greece.nounced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still ad-heres to his altered purpose, assembles his councilthe next morning, and after apologising for hisangry language towards Artabanus, acquaints themto their great joy that he adopts the recommenda-tions of the latter, and abandons his project againstGreece. But in the following night, no sooner hasXerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and thesame figure again appear to him, repeating the pre-vious command in language of terrific menace. Themonarch, in a state of great alarm, springs fromhis bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informsof the twice-repeated vision and divine mandateinterdicting his change of resolution. " I f (sayshe) it be the absolute will of God that this expedi-tion against Greece should be executed, the samevision will appear to thee also, provided thou put-test on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepestin my bed1." Not without reluctance, Artabanusobeys this order (for it was high treason in any

1 He rodo t . vii . 15 . Et &v dtos (<TTI 6 Imiripmav xal ol TTO.VTB>S iv f)Sovfj

itTTi yeveadai (TTpaTrjkamrjv eiri rfjv 'EAAaSa, inavTr](reTai Kai trot TWVTO

TOVTO ovcipov, ofxoiws KCU ffiot ivreKkojievov, EupicrKcr) 5e wbe av yivo^va

TOVTat fl \dftois TT}V e/XTjif (TKevrjv Tvatrav, KCU cvftvs, fiera raiira t£oio €s

TOU ifibv Spovov, KO.1 ewaTa iu Koirrj rrj efifj Ka.TVTTva>creias, Compare

vii. 8 . 8(6s Te of/Vo) Syei, &c.


Persian to sit upon the regal throne1), but he atlength complies, expecting to be able to prove toXerxes that the dream deserved no attention." Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin,nor anything better than mere wandering objectssuch as we have been thinking upon during theday: this dream, of whatever nature it may be,will not be foolish enough to mistake me for theking, even if I be in the royal attire and bed ; butif it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shallmyself confess it to be divine2." Accordingly Arta-banus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and assoon as he falls asleep, the very same figure showsitself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dis-suadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for hissafety, from marching against Greece ? Xerxes hasalready been forewarned of that which he will suf-fer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escapeeither now or in future, for seeking to avert thatwhich must and shall be." With these words thevision assumes a threatening attitude, as thoughpreparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus withhot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, andruns to communicate with Xerxes. " I have hither-to, O king, recommended to thee to rest contentedwith that vast actual empire on account of whichall mankind think thee happy ; but since the divineimpulsion is now apparent, and since destruction

1 See Brissonius, De Regno Persarura, lib. i. p. 27-2 He rodo t . vii. 16. Ov yap 817 is TOVOVTO ye evrjOeirjs dvr)Kei TOVTO,

OTI 817 KOT£ eo-Ti TO emcpaivoiievov Tot ev ra virvco, &crre 86£ei efie 6pa>v <re

Spav, Ty <Tij eoSrJTi TeK.1xaip6p.evov el yap 8rj €7rt(poiTr)<Teie ye

(pairjv av Ka\ avTOS Belov elvai.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] DREAMS OF XERXES. 13

from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too altermy opinion, and advise thee to command the Per-sians as God directs ; so that nothing may be foundwanting on thy part for that which God puts intothy hands1."

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great Religiousexpedition of Xerxes to have originated : partly in of

nthePse-the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter re- hutory—ward on the field of battle at Platsea—but still more £™m

t°11

in the influence of " mischievous Oneiros," who is Persiansand Greeks.

sent by the gods (as in the second book of theIliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even tooverrule by terror both his scruples and those ofArtabanus. The gods having determined (as in theinstances of Astyages, Polykrates, and others) thatthe Persian empire shall undergo signal humi-liation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks,constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enter-prise against his own better judgement. Such reli-gious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiarto Herodotus, but as common to him with his con-temporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians,though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks bythe abundance of their epic or quasi-historicalpoetry: modified more or less in each individualnarrator, it is made to supply connecting links as

1 Herodot. vii. 18. 'En-el 8e daifiovii] TIS yiyvtrai 6pp.fi, KaV'EXKrjvas,as eoiKf, (pdoprj TIS KaraXafi^avfi BerjkaTos, iya> jizv KCU avrbs rpairo/uu,Kal TT)V yv&firjv fieTaridefiai HoUe Si ovra> OKCOS, roO 6eov napadl-SOVTOS, TOIV <rS>v ivherja-erai firjhiv.

The expression rov 8eov napadiSovros in this place denotes what isexpressed by TO XP£OV yiyvecr6cu, c. 17. The dream threatens Arta-banus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny—or inother words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.


well as initiating causes for the great events ofhistory. As a cause for this expedition, incom-parably the greatest fact and the most fertile inconsequences, throughout the political career bothof Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a specialinterposition of the gods would have satisfied thefeelings either of one nation or the other. Thestory of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tellsus1) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a conso-lation for the national vanity ; but it is turned andcoloured by the Grecian historian, who mentionsalso a third dream, which appeared to Xerxes afterhis resolution to march was finally taken, and whichthe mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely con-strued2 into an encouragement, though it reallythreatened ruin. How much this religious concep-tion of the sequence of events belongs to the age,appears by the fact, that it not only appears inPindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but per-vades especially the Persae of iEschylus, exhibitedseven years after the battle of Salamis—in whichwe find the premonitory dreams as well as the jea-

1 Herodot. vii. 12. Km drj KOV iv rfj VVKTI el&e o\jnv roirjvbe, as Xt-( n '

Herodotus seems to use ovecpov in the neuter gender, not oveipos inthe masculine : for the alteration of Bahr (ad vii. 16) of iavra in placeof emvros, is not at all called for. The masculine gender Sveipos iscommonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter Sveipov.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises ofthe early Turkish sultans, see Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osma-nischen Reichs, book ii. vol. i. p. 49.

- Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander,c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyag&s on the Ma-gians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i. 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totallywrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which inducedhim to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

CHAP. XXXVIII.] DREAMS OF XERXES. 15

lous enmity of the gods towards vast power andoverweening aspirations in man1, though withoutany of that inclination, which Herodotus seems tohave derived from Persian informants, to exculpateXerxes by representing him as disposed himself tosober counsels, but driven in a contrary directionby the irresistible fiat of the gods2.

1 ^Eschylus, Pers. 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare So-phocl. Ajax, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the (Edipus Tyrannus;Euripid. Hecub. 58; Pindar, Olymp. viii. 86; Isthrn. vi. 39; Pau-sanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word 8fi<riSai'/iG)v in Xeno-phon, Agesilaus, c. 11, sect. 8.—" the man who in the midst of successfears the envious gods "—opposed to the person who confides in itscontinuance; and Klausen, Theologumena jEschyli, p. 18.

3 The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of hishistory in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in hisown mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, Sittlich—religiose Leben-sansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112seg. Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment, running through, andoften overlaying or transforming, the matters of fact through a consider-able portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advertto the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus col-lected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similarto himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or lesshis original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. Therecan be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and ora-cles, the exegetse or interpreting guides around these holy places wereamong his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting somany different cities must have been constantly in a situation to haveno other person whom he could consult. The temples were interestingboth in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they ex-hibited, while the persons belonging to them were (as a general rule)accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both fromPausanias and Plutarch—both of whom, however, had books beforethem also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was notonly the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Herakles at Tyre,and of Belus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i. 181 ; ii. 3, 44,143), but also those of Delphi (Ae\<j)av oiSa ey£> OVTCOS aKoiaras ysv£cr-6ai, i. 20: compare i. 91, 92, 51); Dodona (ii. 52) ; of the IsmenianApollo at Thebes (v. 59); of Athene Alea at Tegea (i. 66); of Demeterat Paros (vi. 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of templeinspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthi6tis (vii. 197); of the Kabeiriin Thrace (ii. 51); of persons connected with the Heroon of Protesi-


Vastpre- While we take due notice of those religious con-parat ions 1 1 1 •of Xerxes, ceptions with which both the poet and the historian

Iaus in the Chersonese (ix. 116, 120). The facts which these personscommunicated to him were always presented along with associationsreferring to their own functions or religious sentiments, nor did He-rodotus introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such inhis history. The treatise of Plutarch—" Cur Pythia nunc non reddatOracula Carmine "—affords an instructive description of the ample andmultifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respectingthe eminent persons and events of Grecian history, so well fitted tosatisfy the visitors who came full of curiosity—<f>iko8edpoves, <f>tX6\oyoiand (\>CKofia6(ts (Plutarch, ib. p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in ahigh degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise :also Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, p. 417—ol Ae\(j>S>p Btokoyot,&c. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguishedin Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess relatedaltogether to private and individual affairs ; whereas, in earlier times,almost all political events came somehow or other under her cogni-zance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative pub-lic offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples,especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with thewhole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller,annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3, p. 157-162; DeHistoria atque Arte Periegetarum; also K. F. Herrmann, Gottes-dienstliche Alterthumer der Griechen, part 1. ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is not peculiarto Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants andhis age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister remarks (p. 31-136) : thoughit is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as thecontemporary poets: see the references in Monk ad Euripid. Alcestis,1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the con-duct, which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would de-serve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to thedespot (iii. 80) : he does not think himself obliged to call the gods justand merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousyin their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation doesnot reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found sideby side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite,appreciable causes : and this latter vein is what really distinguishes thehistorian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, inwhom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this pointillustrated in Creuzer, Historische Kunst der Grieschen, Abschnitt iii.pp. 150-159.

Jager (Disputationes Herodotese, p. 16. Gbttingen, 1828) professesto detect evidences of old age (senile ingenium) in the moralising colour

CHAP. XXXVIII.] PREPARATIONS AND MARCH OF XERXES. 17

surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barba-rians, we need look no farther than ambition andrevenge for the real motives of the invasion: con-sidering that it had been a proclaimed project inthe mind of Darius for three years previous to hisdeath, there was no probability that his son andsuccessor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortlyafter the reconquest of Egypt he began to make hispreparations, the magnitude of which attested thestrength of his resolve as well as the extent of hisdesigns. The satraps and subordinate officers,throughout the whole range of his empire, receivedorders to furnish the amplest quota of troops andmunitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war,horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of variouskinds, according to the circumstances of the terri-tory ; while rewards were held out to those whoshould execute the orders most efficiently. Forfour entire years these preparations were carriedon, and as we are told that similar preparations hadbeen going forward during the three years precedingthe death of Darius, though not brought to any ul-timate result, we cannot doubt that the maximumof force, which the empire could possibly be madeto furnish1, was now brought to execute the schemesof Xerxes. The Persian empire was at this mo-ment more extensive than ever it will appear at

which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe tohave belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his latteryears—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, exceptupon reasons which I have already disputed in my preceding volume.See Bahr, Commentatio de Vita et Scriptis Herodoti, in the fourthvolume of his edition, c. 6, p. 388.

1 He rodo t . vii. 19- X">POJ/ ^dvTa ipevvav TTJS i]Tretpov.

VOL. V. C


March ofXerxesfrom theinterior ofAsia—col-lection ofthe inva-ding army atSardis—hisnumerousfleet andlarge ma-gazines ofprovisionbeforehand.

any subsequent period; for it comprised maritimeThrace and Macedonia as far as the borders ofThessaly, and nearly all the islands of the iEgeannorth of Krete and east of Euboea—including eventhe Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and gar-risons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on thecoast of Thrace, while AbdeTa with the other Gre-cian settlements on that coast were numberedamong the tributaries of Susa1. It is necessary tobear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at thetime when Xerxes mounted the throne, as comparedwith its reduced limits at the later time of the Pe-loponnesian war—partly that we may understandthe apparent chances of success to his expedition,as they presented themselves both to the Persiansand to the medising Greeks—partly that we mayappreciate the after-circumstances connected withthe formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C, the vast armythus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters ofthe empire, at or near to Sardis ; a large portion ofit having been directed to assemble at Kritala inKappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, whereit was joined by Xerxes himself on the road fromSusa2. From thence he crossed the Halys, andmarched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing

1 Herodot. vii. 106. Kcn-forao-aw yap i'n Trporepou rayTrjs rr/s e' sXa-a-ios (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) xmapxoi iv rfj Opy'iKy KO\ TOV 'EXAJJO--novrov •navrayr). vii. 108. iSeSovXaro yap, i>s KOI Trporepov poi Sedrj-Xwrai, r] fif'xP' ©fecaXi))! iratja, Ka\ rju {mo fiatriXrja 8acriJ.o(p6pos, Meya-/3afcw re KaracrTpe^rajxivov Kai v<rrepov MapSovlov; also vii. 59, andXenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 11. Compare ^Eschylus Pers. 8/1-896,and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius,covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i. 209).

3 Herodot. vii. 2C-31.


through the Phrygian towns of Kelsense, Anaua andKolossse, and the Lydian town of Kallate"bus, untilhe reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were pre-pared for him. But this land force, vast as it was(respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther pre-sently), was not all that the empire had been re-quired to furnish. Xerxes had determined to at-tack Greece, not by traversing the iEgean, as Datishad passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a landforce and fleet at once: the former crossing theHellespont, and marching through Thrace, Mace-donia and Thessaly ; while the latter was intendedto accompany and cooperate. A fleet of 1207 shipsof war, besides numerous vessels of service andburthen, had been assembled on the Hellespontand on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia ; moreoverXerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceed-ing that which his father Darius had displayed inthe Scythian expedition, had directed the formationof large magazines of provisions at suitable mari-time stations along the line of march, from theHellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the fouryears of military preparation there had been timeto bring together great quantities of flour and otheressential articles from Asia and Egypt1.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed He throwsby the vast assemblage of men and muniments of boats acrosswar, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much pOnt.transcending all past, we might even say all subse-quent, experience—they were no less astounded bytwo enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of

1 Herodot. vii. 23-25.

C 2


a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos.For the first of the two there had indeed been aprecedent, since Darius about thirty-five years be-fore had caused a bridge to be thrown over theThracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march toScythia ; but this bridge, though constructed by theIonians and by a Samian Greek, having had refer-ence only to distant regions, seems to have beenlittle known or little thought of among the Greeksgenerally, as we may infer from the fact that thepoet iEschylus1 speaks as if he had never heard ofit, while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remem-bered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most im-posing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridgeof boats—or rather the two separate bridges not farremoved from each other,—which Xerxes causedto be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched fromthe neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic sideto the coast between Sestos and Madytus on theEuropean, where the strait is about an English milein breadth. The execution of the work was at firstentrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phoenicians andEgyptians, who had received orders long before-hand to prepare cables of extraordinary strengthand size expressly for the purpose; the materialused by the Phoenicians was flax, that employed bythe Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Al-ready had the work been completed and announcedto Xerxes as available for transit, when a stormarose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrathof the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe,burst all bounds ; it was directed partly against the

1 ^Eschylus, Pors. 731, 754, 873.


chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck The bridge° is destroyed

off1, but par t ly also against the Hel lespont itself, by a stormH e commanded tha t the strai t should be scourged Xerxes—hewith 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should belet down into it as a farther punishment: moreoverHerodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he j

' . Hellespont.

even sent irons for the purpose of branding it." Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers whileinflicting this punishment) this is the penalty whichour master inflicts upon thee, because thou hastwronged him though he hath never wronged thee.King Xerxes will cross thee, whether thou wilt ornot; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man,because thou art a treacherous river of (useless)salt water2."

Such were the insulting terms heaped by orderof Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont,—Hero-dotus calls them " non-Hellenic and blasphemousterms," which, together with their brevity, leads usto believe that he gives them as he heard them, andthat they are not of his own invention, like so manyother speeches in his work, where he dramatises,as it were, a given position. It has been commonhowever to set aside in this case not merely the

1 Plutarch (De Tranquillitate Animi, p. 470) speaks of them as ha-ving had their noses and ears cut off.

2 Herodot. vii. 34, 35. ivereWero hi) &v paTTi^ovras, Xeyeiv fidpftapd7-e Kal drdcrdaXa, Ti2 niKpov vbap, hecrirOTqs rot, SiKrjv imriBel rrjvbe, on

fiiv rjbiKrjcras, ovSev npos ine'ivov abiKov waBov. Kal (3a<riXevs p.ev Sep^rjs

Sia/3ij<rerai (re, rjv T( trv ye fioi~kr], rjv re Kal prf croi 8e Kara SLiajv apa

ovSels avdpamav 6vei, i>s iovri ho\ep& re Kal aXfivpq irorafia).

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to theHellespont—appears strange, -when we look to the subsequent conductof-Xerxes himself (vii. 53) : compare vii. 113, and vi. 76. The epi-thet salt, employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkablecharacter of the water.

22 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II

thi tOT of words> but even the main incident of punishmentthe punish- inflicted on the Hellespont1, as a mere Greek fablement m- x

meted on rather than a real fact: the extreme childishnesspont there and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the airdent reason o f a n enemy's calumny. But this reason will noteviits aPP e a r sufficient, if we transport ourselves back toreality. the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to

inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willingand designing attributes of human beings, is amongthe early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, andone of the primitive forms of religion : and althoughthe enlargement of reason and experience graduallydisplaces this elementary Fetichism, and banishesit from the regions of reality into those of conven-tional fictions, yet the force of momentary passionwill often suffice to supersede the acquired habit,and even an intelligent man2 may be impelled in amoment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the life-less object from which he has suffered. By the oldprocedure, never formally abolished, though gradu-ally disused, at Athens—an inanimate object whichbad caused the death of a man was solemnly triedand cast out of the border: and the Arcadian youths,when they returned hungry from an unsuccessfulday's hunting3, scourged and pricked the god Pan

1 See Stanley and Blomfield ad ^Eschyl. Pers. 731, and K. O. Miiller(in his Review of Benjamin Constant's work Sur la Religion), KleineSchriften, vol. ii. p. 59.

2 See Auguste Comte, Traite de Philosophie Positive, vol. v. lecon 52,pp. 40, 46.

3 See vol. ii. part 2. c. i. p. 297 of the present work; and compareWachsmuth, Hellenisch. Aiterthiimer, 2. i. p. 320, and K. F. Herrmann,Griech. Staatsalterthumer, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndes, seeHerodot. i. 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuches was thrown from his


or his statue by way of revenge. Much more maywe suppose a young Persian monarch, corruptedby universal subservience around him, to be capableof thus venting an insane wrath : and the ven-geance ascribed by Herodotus to Cyrus towards theriver Gynde~s (which he caused to be divided intothree hundred and sixty streamlets, because one ofhis sacred horses had been drowned in it), affordsa fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont byXerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testifyin this manner gratitude for service rendered byrivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion.While the grounds for distrusting the narrative arethus materially weakened, the positive evidence willbe found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxestook place when Herodotus was about four yearsold, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunityof conversing with persons who had witnessed and

horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died : hedirected his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accidenthad happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there(Herodot. vii. 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even duringthe time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of pre-serving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas ; after he had crossed it, thestream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii. 138) : see ananalogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Abus,Valerius Maxim, i. 5. 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, &c, Theagenes of Thasus,a statue was erected to his honour. A personal enemy, perhaps one ofthe 1400 defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath andrevenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down uponthis scourger and killed him ; upon which his relatives indicted thestatue for murder : it was found guilty by the Thasians, and throwninto the sea. The gods however were much displeased with the pro-ceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at lengtha fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to itsplace (Pausan. vi. 11. 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermesin Babrius, Fabul. 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.)


taken part in it: and the whole of his narrativeshows that he availed himself largely of such accessto information. Besides, the building of the bridgeacross the Hellespont, and all the incidents connectedwith it, were acts essentially public in their nature—known to many witnesses, and therefore themore easily verified—the decapitation of the unfor-tunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive,and even the scourging of the Hellespont, whileessentially public, appears to Herodotus1 (as well asto Arrian afterwards), not childish, but impious.The more attentively we balance, in the case beforeus, the positive testimony against the intrinsic ne-gative probabilities, the more shall we be disposedto admit without difiidence the statement of ouroriginal historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or inplace of, Phoenicians and Egyptians—were imme-diately directed to recommence the work, which

detail. Herodotus now describes in detail, and which wasdoubtless executed with increased care and solidity.To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremesand pentekonters blended together—were mooredacross the strait breastwise, with their sternstowards the Euxine and their heads towards theiEgean, the stream flowing always rapidly towardsthe latter2. They were moored by anchors head

1 Herodot. vii. 35-54 : compare viii. 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 14. 9.2 Herodot. vii. 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the

position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me tohave been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the com-mentators : see the notes of Bahr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, andespecially Larcher : Schweighauser is the most satisfactory. TOV pipHOVTOV imKapo-ias, TOV Se 'EWrjtTTrnvTnv Kara poov. The explanation

CHAP. XXXVIII.J PREPARATIONS AND MARCH OF XERXES. 25

and stern, and by very long cables. The numberof ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the

given by Tzetzes of iiriKapo-las by the word ir\ayias Seems to me hardlyexact: it means, not oblique, but at right angles with. The course ofthe Bosporus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is con-ceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles ; and theships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait,taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at rightangles with the Euxine sea. Moreover Herodotus does not mean todistinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the onebridge were TOV HOVTOV imKapo-las, and those of the other bridge TOV"EWrjinrovTov Kara p'oov, as Bahr and other commentators suppose : boththe predicates apply alike to both the bridges,—as indeed it stands toreason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also havebeen best for the other. Respecting the meaning of iiriKapo-ios in He-rodotus, see iv. 101 ; i. 180. In the Odyssey (ix.70 : compare Eustath.ad loc.) imKapcriai does not mean oblique, but headlong before thewind: compare iirinap, Iliad, xviii. 392. The circumstance stated byHerodotus,—that in the bridge higher up the stream or nearest to theEuxine, there were in all 360 vessels, while in the other bridge therewere no more than 314,—has perplexed the commentators and inducedthem to resort to inconvenient explanations—as that of saying, that inthe higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across,but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European sidewas lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side.This is one of the false explanations given of eViKapcriaj (slanting -schrag) :while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higherbridge presented their broadside to the current, is still more inadmissible.But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridgecompared with the other seems to admit of an easier explanation. Weneed not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges werequite close together : considering the multitude which had to cross them,it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distancefrom each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well supposethat the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the twoplaces chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of theupper bridge—which moreover might require to be made more secure,as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number ofvessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple andsatisfactory manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity :they run thus—i£evyvvcrav Se S8e- QevrrjKouTepovs KCU Tpirjpeas a-vvdevrcs,VTTO p.iv TTJV (these words are misprinted in Bahr's edition) np6s TOVEv^ftvov UOITOV i^rjKovrd T€ KCU rpirjKoo-las, vivo 8e TTJV ir€pr)V recrcrepes

Kal SeKa Ka\ rpirfKocrias (TOV JXZV Tlovrov, €7riKapo~ias, TOV 5e 'EXAr/crTroj'Toi;


Euxine was three hundred and sixty : the numberin the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over orthrough each of the two lines of ships, across fromshore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which

Kara poov), Iva avaKa^eirj TOV TOVOV TS>V tmhav' 0~vv6ivTes 8e, dyicvpas

KarfJKav Trepi/irjKeas, &c.

There is a difficulty respecting the words iva dvaKcox*v!l TOV TOVOV TO>Vorikav—what is the nominative case to this verb ? Bahr says in hisnote, sc. 6 poos, and he construes TO>V mkcov to mean the cables wherebythe anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see thatTO oTrka mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretchedacross from shore to shore to form the bridge: the very same wordsTav STTKCOV TOV TOVOV, applied to these latter cables, occur a few linesafterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to dvaxaxeir)is fj yetpvpa (not 6 poos), and that the words from TOV fiivIIovTov downto poov are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above : theexpress object for which the ships were moored was, " that the bridgemight hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched acrossfrom shore to shore." I admit that we should naturally expect dva-Kax™a>o-i and not dvaKaxevg, since the proposition would be true of bothbridges ; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is notinadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in thesingular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectnessin this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear outthis charge.

Herodotus (iv. 85), Strabo (xiii. p. 591) and Pliny (H. N. iv. 12 ; vi. 1)give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part.Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth : Tournefort allows about amile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give thedistance as something considerably greater—1130 or 1150 toises (seeMiot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusastates it at 700 toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii. p. 164). If we sup-pose the breadth to be one mile or 5280 feet, 360 vessels at an averagebreadth of 14J feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, " Elevenfeet is the breadth of a barge : vessels of the size of the smallest coasting-craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geographyof Herodotus, p. 127-)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyondHerodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him.But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the wholebreadth, without leaving any gaps between : we only know, that therewere no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through,except in three specified places.


discharged the double function of holding the shipstogether, and of supporting the bridge-way to belaid upon them. They were tightened by means ofcapstans on each shore: in three different placesalong the line, a gap was left between the ships forthe purpose of enabling trading vessels, in voyageto or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneaththe cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, twowere of flax and four of papyrus, combined for thesake of increased strength ; for it seems that in thebridges first made, which proved too weak to resistthe winds, the Phoenicians had employed cables offlax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrusfor the other1. Over these again were laid planksof wood, sawn to the appropriate width, securedby ropes to keep them in their places : and lastly,upon this foundation the causeway itself was form-ed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on eachside high enough to prevent the cattle which passedover from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be Xerxes cutsa ship-canal

1 For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archi- across themelus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of ^*^m^s °fHiero II. of Syracuse, ap. Athenaeum, v. 209. Athos.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (waxvrTjs xoiKaWovfj) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus ; but that inweight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxencable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because wedo not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an JEginseantalent: nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talentof commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished ascrxoivia oKrwdaKrvXa, egdaKrvXa—in which expressions, however, M.Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameterbe meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book, DasSeewesen der Athener, ch. x. p. 165.


performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cut-ting through of the isthmus which connects thestormy promontory of Mount Athos with the main-land1. That isthmus near the point where it joinsthe mainland was about twelve stadia or furlongsacross, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf:and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broadand deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast.In this work too, as well as in the bridge acrossthe Hellespont, the Phoenicians were found theablest and most efficient among all the subjects ofthe Persian monarch; but the other tributaries,especially the Greeks from the neighbouring townof Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forcesof the empire \ were brought together to assist.The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kyme1

and Phokaea, next at Elseus in the southern extre-mity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which pointit could protect and second at once the two enter-prises going forward at the Hellespont and at MountAthos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placedunder the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubar£s and Artachseus, and distributed undertheir measurement as task-work among the contin-gents of the various nations; an ample supply offlour and other provisions being brought for sale inthe neighbouring plain from various parts of Asiaand Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Hero-dotus respecting this work deserve special notice.

1 For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory ofAthos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii. 41.

2 Herodot. vii. 22, 23, 116 ; Diodor. xi. 2.


First, the superior intelligence of the Phoenicians, Superiorintelli & encc

who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos of thewhich had been occupied three centuries before by dans!1"their free ancestors, were now labouring as instru-ments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror.Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took theprecaution of beginning the excavation at a breadthfar greater than the canal was finally destined tooccupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave aconvenient slope for the sides: the others dugstraight down, so that the time as well as the toilof their work was doubled by the continual fallingin of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the de-gree of practical intelligence then prevalent, sincethe nations assembled were many and diverse.Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes musthave performed this laborious work from motivesof mere ostentation: "for it would have cost notrouble at all" (he observes1) to drag all the ships

1 Herodot. vii. 24 : i>s fiev ifie o-t)ft/3aXXed/ie!'oi' evpiuKctv, /j.£ya\o(f>po-(rvvrjs elveKa airo 3ep£r]s opvaazw exeXeve, iSekav re hvvap.iv aTroSeUvv-(rdait K.ai p.vrjp.6dvva \iir£(r6ai' Traptbv yap, ^irjdeva novov \a(36vras,TOV l&6p,bv ras vias dieipv<rai, opvcrcreiv GKeXeve diaipv^a rrj 6akd(r<Tr],efipos ws 8vo rpirjpeas irkieiv ofwv Z\a(TTpevp.ivas.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this exca-vation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up fromman to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole per-formed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, whichGrecian report ascribed to Crossus on the advice of Thales, was a fargreater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i. 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated oftenas a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x.) and by moderns (Cousinery,Voyage en Macedoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake.That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence :but in my judgement, even if no such traces now remained, the testimonyof Herodotus and Thucydides (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to provethat it had existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate


in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canalwas nowise needed. So familiar a process was it,in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., totransport ships by mechanical force across an isth-mus ; a special groove or slip being seemingly pre-pared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus

Employ- across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to betheiasn noted, that the men who excavated the canal atTrorkken Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these,engaged onthe canal— a t the same time the motives in which the canal originated : " The canalunjn-essjon (he says.) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As historythereby on does n o t ; mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes,the Greeks, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with

soil in the course of ages. It might however, without much labour, berenewed : and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navi-gation of the jEgaean: for such is the fear entertained by the Greekboatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents aroundMount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity ofthe mountain is subject during half the year, and which are renderedmore formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfana,that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offeringa high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern sideof the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justi-fied in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded tohis fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of theground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking.The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mar-donius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of thecapes Ampelus and Canastraeum was much less dangerous, as the gulfsafford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collectforces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there beany difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in compre-hending how the operation should have required so long a time as threeyears, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, andamong them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making ofcanals." (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 24. p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those ofMajor Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that Hero-dotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied threeyears,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminaryarrangements included—7rpoeToifid(ero ex rpiav crew KOV fhakiara isTov"A.8tx>v (vii. 22) .


be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, butfreemen, except in so far as they were tributaries ofthe Persian monarch ; and that the father of Hero-dotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject ofthe brave Queen Artemisia, may perhaps have beenamong them. We shall find other examples as weproceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, andfull conviction of its indispensable necessity, on thepart of the Persians1—even to drive the troops oftheir subject-contingents on to the charge in battle.To employ the scourge in this way towards free-men, and especially towards freemen engaged inmilitary service, was altogether repugnant both toHellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling: theAsiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it,as from various other hardships, when they passedout of Persian dominion to become, first allies,afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall becalled upon hereafter to take note of this fact whenwe appreciate the complaints preferred against thehegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Bridge ofXerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified thrownagainst the sea at its two extremities by compactearthen walls or embankments, they also threwbridges of boats over the river Strymon : and these

1 Herodot. vii. 22 : a>pv(r<rov VTTO nacrTtycov Travrodano'l rrjs (TTpaTtrjs'Biado^oi 5' i(poiT(ov.—vii* 56 : Bep^rjs 8e, intl re 5te/3^ e? TYJV TZvpayjvqv,idrjeiro TOV arpaTov VTTO fiaa-riycov StafialvoPTa.:—compare vii. 103, andXenophon, Anabasis, iii. 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards sub-ject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallelin the modern Turks. See the Memoires du Baron de Tott, vol. i. p. 256seqq., and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.


two works, together with the renovated doublebridge across the Hellespont, were both announcedto Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, onhis arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter481-480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast armyarrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, andwintered there, may reasonably be -doubted; butthe whole was united at Sardis and ready to marchagainst Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarchdespatched heralds to all the cities of Greece,except Sparta and Athens, to demand the receivedtokens of submission, earth and water: for thenews of his prodigious armament was well calcu-lated to spread terror even among the most reso-lute of them. And he at the same time sent ordersto the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia toprepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as hepassed on his march. That march was commencedat the first beginning of spring, and continued inspite of several threatening portents during thecourse of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enoughnot to comprehend, though according to Hero-dotus, nothing could be more obvious than its sig-nification '—while another was misinterpreted into

1 Herodot. vii. 57. Tepas <r(f>i ifyavr] fieya, TO Stpgtjs iv ovScvl \6yacwot,ri<raTo, Kaimp ei<rvfi^\rjTou iov' ITTTTOS yap ereice \ayov. EUOT;^/3XIJ-TOV 3>u rfjde lyevero, on efieXke p.ev iXav arpaTirjv eVi TTJV 'EXXdSa 3ep£nsayavporara <a\ /ieya\o7rpejr«(TTaTa, cmio-<o he nepl iavrov rp^av ij£eu>is TOV avrbv x<apov.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signifiedthat Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strengthand splendour, but that he would come back in timid and disgracefulflight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact—next,

CHAP. XXXVIII.] MARCH OF XERXES. 33

a favourable omen by the compliant answer of theMagian priests. On quitting Sardis, the vast host xwas divided into two nearly equal columns : a spa- fromcious interval being left between the two for theking himself with his guards and select Persians. army"First of all1 came the baggage, carried by beastsof burthen, immediately followed by one-half of theentire body of infantry, without any distinction ofnations : next, the select troops, 1000 Persian ca-valry with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter beingdistinguished by carrying their spears with thepoint downwards, as well as by the spear itselfwhich had a golden pomegranate at its other extre-mity, in place of the ordinary spike or point wherebythe weapon was planted in the.ground when the sol-dier was not on duty. Behind these troops walkedten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidlycaparisoned, bred on the Nissean plains in Media:next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eightwhite horses—wherein no man was ever allowed tomount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot

in the certainty of his interpretation—deserves notice, as illustratinghis canon of belief and that of his age. The interpretation is doubt-less here the generating cause of the story interpreted : an ingeniousman, after the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriatesimile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (Partu-riunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus), and the simile is recounted,either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it hadbeen a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedentfact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (TO fiavfil3\rjTov of He-rodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness as-serting it; while departure from the established analogies of natureaffords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occa-sionally send special signs and warnings.

1 Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, asgiven in the Cyroptedia of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1-20.

VOL. V. D


behind with the reins in his hand. Next after thesacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawnby Nissean horses ; the charioteer, a noble Persiannamed Patiramphe's, being seated in it by the sideof the monarch—who was often accustomed toalight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Im-mediately about his person were a chosen body of1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highestbreed among the Persians, having golden apples atthe reverse extremity of their spears, and followedby other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot,and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals be-cause their number was always exactly maintained,9000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver atthe reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000,distributed in front, rear, and on each side of thisdetachment, were marked by pomegranates of goldon their spears. With them ended what we maycall the household troops : after whom, with an in-terval of two furlongs, the remaining host followedpell-mell \ Respecting its numbers and consti-tuent portions I shall speak presently, on occasionof the great review at Doriskus.

story ofthe Qn e a c n side of the army, as it marched out ofrich Kappa- ^

dokianPy- Sardis, was seen suspended one half of the body ofthius—son J

puttodeath a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for theby order of <• • • , , , .

Xerxes. purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects ofPersia. It was the body of the eldest son of thewealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at

1 Herodot. vii. 41 . Mfra 8e rrjv anrov 8ifkf\eiirro Kal Mo oraSt'ovr,Kai eircna n \onrbs S/uXos fj'U ava/ii£.

CH.U-. XXXVIII.J CRUELTY OF XEKXES. 35

Kelaense, who had entertained Xerxes in the courseof his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and whohad previously recommended himself by rich giftsto the preceding king Darius. So abundant washis hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offersof pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedi-tion, that the monarch asked him what was theamount of his wealth. " I possess (replied Pythius)besides lands and slaves, 2000 talents of silver and3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 ofbeing 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do Ipresent to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves,which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied bythe strongest expressions of praise and gratitudefor his liberality ; at the same time refusing hisoffer, and even giving to Pythius out of his owntreasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wantingto make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latterwas so elated with this mark of favour, that whenthe army was about to depart from Sardis, he ven-tured, under the influence of terror from the vari-ous menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Per-sian monarch. His five sons were all about to servein the invading army against Greece : his prayer toXerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left be-hind, as a stay to his own declining years, and thatthe service of the remaining four with the armymight be considered as sufficient. But the unhappyfather knew not what he asked. " Wretch ! (repliedXerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about thy son,when I am myself on the march against Greece,with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends ?thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to

D 2


follow me with thy wife and thy entire family ?Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in hisears : on hearing good things, it fills the body withdelight, but boils with wrath when it hears the con-trary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madestgood offers to me, thou canst not boast of havingsurpassed the king in generosity—so now, whenthou hast turned round and become impudent, thepunishment inflicted on thee shall not be the fullmeasure of thy deserts, but something less. Forthyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality whichI received from thee shall serve as protection ; butfor that one son whom thou especially wishest tokeep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thypenalty." He forthwith directed that the son ofPythius should be put to death, and his body se-vered in twain : of which one-half was to be fixedon the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, ofthe road along which the army was to pass \

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolt-ing, has been already recounted respecting Darius,when undertaking his expedition against Scythia.Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentimentwith which the Persian kings regarded the obliga-tion of universal personal service, when they werethemselves in the field. They seem to have mea-sured their strength by the number of men whomthey collected around them, with little or no refer-ence to quality : and the very mention of exemp-tion—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek

1 The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii. 27, 28, 38, 39.I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of-Pythius; but inother respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] ARRIVAL OF XERXES AT ILIUM. 37

to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarchwas about to encounter—was an offence not to bepardoned. In this as in the other acts of Orientalkings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious,we trace nothing but the despotic force of personalwill, translating itself into act without any thoughtof consequences, and treating subjects with lessconsideration than an ordinary Greek master wouldhave shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed itsmarch to Abydos, first across Mvsia and the river respect

J shown to

Kai'kus—then through Atarneus, Karin6, and the y

plain of Th£be : they passed Adramyttium andAntandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most partof which was on their left-hand, not without someloss from stormy weather and thunder1. Fromhence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander,the stream of which was drunk up, or probably inpart trampled and rendered undrinkable, by thevast host of men and animals : in spite of the im-mortal interest which the Skamander derives fromthe Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as tomake this fact surprising. To the poems themselveseven Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute: heascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed thePergamus where Priam was said to have lived andreigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron god-dess Athene",—and caused the Magian priests tomake libations in honour of the heroes who hadfallen on that venerated spot. He even conde-scended to inquire into the local details2, abun-

1 Herodot. vii. 42.3 Herodot. vii. 43. derjcrdfiepos fie, ra'< Trvfio/ievos Kelvav (Kaara, &c,


dantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants ofIlium, of that great real or mythical war to whichGrecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to as-sign a precise date: and doubtless when he con-templated the narrow area of that Troy which allthe Greeks confederated under Agamemnon hadbeen unable for ten years to overcome, he couldnot but fancy that these same Greeks would fall aneasy prey before his innumerable host. Anotherday's march between Rhceteium, Ophryneium andDardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians ofGergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos,where his two newly-constructed bridges over theHellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotusdwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he mightdo so, since when we consider the bridges, the in-vading number, the unmeasured hopes succeededby no less unmeasured calamity—it will appear notonly to have been the most imposing event of hiscentury, but to rank among the most imposingevents of all history. He surrounds it with muchdramatic circumstance, not only mentioning themarble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill nearAbydos, from whence he surveyed both his massesof land-force covering the shore and his ships sail-ing and racing in the strait (a race in which thePhoenicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and allthe other contingents)—but also superadding tothis real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intendedto set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. Hefarther quotes certain supposed exclamations of theAbydenes at the sight of his superhuman power.

CHAP. XXXVI1I.J RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES. 39

"Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators1),why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Per-sian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring to-gether the whole human race for the ruin of Greebe?It would have been easy for thee to accomplish thatwithout so much ado." Such emphatic ejacula-tions exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotusor his informants throw into the scene, though wecannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny ofhistorical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in themind of Orientals2, the passage was ordered tobegin: the bridges being perfumed with frankin-cense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxeshimself made libations into the sea with a goldencenser, and offered up prayers to Helios, that hemight effect without hindrance his design of con-quering Europe even to its farthest extremity.Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespontthe censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persianscimitar—" I do not exactly know3 (adds the histo-rian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios,or as a mark of repentance and atonement to theHellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted

1 Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. *J2 Zev, ri (jrj dv&pl uhoficvos Hepay, Kalovpofia avri Alos t£ep£ea 6k\ievos, ditdfTTaTov TTJV 'EWaSa eBeXets iroirjcai,aya>v wavras dvSpanrovs ; Kal yap avev TOvreav e^rjv TOL Troteeiy TavTa.

2 Tacitus, Histor. iii. 24. " Undique clamor, et orientem solem, itain Syria mos est, consalutavere "—in his striking description of the nightbattle near Cremona between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespa-sian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished :compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8, p. 41, ed. Mutzel).

3 Herodo t . vii. 54 . ravra OVK e\a> drpeKiios hiaxpivai, oiire el ™

'HXI'OJ dvarideis KariJKf (s TO ntXayos, ovre el /*<rre/xeX?)ere oi roc '

TTOVTOV jxafTTiywiravTL, Kal dvrl TOVTO>V TTJV 6d\tt<Tuav f§


upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to theEuxine was devoted to the military force—the other,to the- attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of

Xerxes and burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals,cross over all wearing garlands on their heads, were the firstpoutinees" to pass over, and Xerxes himself, with the remain-bridges. jng a r m y j followed next, though in an order some-

what different from that which had been observedin quitting Sardis : the monarch having reachedthe European shore, saw his troops crossing thebridges after him " under the lash." But in spiteof the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate pro-gress, so vast were the numbers of his host, thatthey occupied no less than seven days and sevennights, without a moment of intermission, in thebusiness of crossing over—a fact to be borne inmind presently, when we come to discuss the totalscomputed by Herodotus'.

March to Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directedThracenear his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the

isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, betweenthe town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb

Mm here. of Helle on his right—the eponymous heroine ofthe strait. After passing this isthmus, he turnedwestward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas andthe iEgean sea—crossing the river from which thatGulf derived its name, and even drinking its watersup (according to Herodotus) with the men andanimals of his army. Having passed by the iEoliccity of iEnus and the harbour called Stentoris, hereached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus

1 Herodot. vii. 55, 56. Aii/3r) 8e 6 (rrparbs avrov iv ewra ^c'p^cri KCU€V (WTa €V<pp6vrj<Ti, zhiVVGas ovdepa ^povov-

CHAP. XXXVIII.] MUSTER OF THE ARMY OF XERXES. 41

covering the rich delta near the mouth of theHebrus : a fort had been built there and garrisonedby Darius. The spacious plain called by this samename reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium,and comprised in it the towns of Sale and Zone1,possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted onthe territory once possessed by the Thracian Ki-kones on the mainland. Having been here joinedby his fleet, which had doubled1 the southernmostpromontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thoughtthe situation convenient for a general review andenumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has Review andthere been brought together a body of men from the plainregions so remote and so widely diverse, for one l-ipurpose and under one command, as those whichwere now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of broughtthe Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannotpretend to form any definite idea ; about the varietyof contingents there is no room for doubt. " WhatAsiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus2, whoseconceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip hispowers of language) that Xerxes did not bringagainst Greece ?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone,comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the PersianGulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the iEgean and the

1 Herodot. vii. 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 1]. See some valuableremarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of thetown still called Enos, in Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nachBrussa, ch. vi. vol. i. p. 157-159 (Gottingen, 1841). Heshows reasonfor believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map asthe Gulf of Mnos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than itexists now.



Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians,the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and theLibyans from the desert near Kyr&ne*. Not all theexpeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Hero-dotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparableto this of Xerxes, even for total number; muchmore in respect of variety of component elements.Forty-six different nations1, each with its distinctnational costume, mode of arming, and local lead-ers, formed the vast land-force ; eight other nationsfurnished the fleet, on board of which Persians,Medes and Sakse served as armed soldiers or ma-rines ; and the real leaders, both of the entire armyand of all its various divisions, were native Persiansof noble blood, who distributed the various nativecontingents into companies of thousands, hundreds,and tens. The forty-six nations composing theland-force were as follows :—Persians, Medes, Kis-

1 See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61-96. In chapter 76,one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling andSchweighhauser), which, in addition to those specified under the headof the land-force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this sourcethat Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of theAthenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which theypretend to have vanquished forty-six nations—iviKrj<rafiev Zdvca !£ KalTeairapaKovTa : though there is no reason for believing that so great anumber of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (B.C. 192) about hisimmense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the con-temptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy.xxxv. 48-49)." Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inaudita-rum, Dahas, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymaeos—Syros omnes esse :haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam mili-tum genus:" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus(Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhe-torical turns about the number of nations, whose names even werehardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii. 4, 29 ; iv. 45, o.)," ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina," &c.

CHAP. XXXVIII.J MUSTER OF THE ARMY OF XERXES. 43

sians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakse,Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians,Gandarians, Dadikse, Kaspians, Sarangse, Paktyes,Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asiaand Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphla-gonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Syrians,Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thra-cians, Kabe'lians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians,Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who fur-nished the fleet were—Phoenicians (300 ships ofwar), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians(100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians(70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), iEolicGreeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeksfrom the islands in the iEgean (17): in all 1207triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars.The descriptions of costume and arms which wefind in Herodotus are curious and varied ; but it isimportant to mention that no nation except theLydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (par-tially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard)bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i. e.arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge1,—for hand combat in line as well as for defence ofthe person,—but inconveniently heavy either inpursuit or in flight) ; while the other nations werearmed with missile weapons,—light shields ofwicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbansor leather caps instead of helmets,—swords andscythes. They were not properly equipped eitherfor fighting in regular order or for resisting theline of spears and shields which the Grecian hop-



lites brought to bear upon them ; their persons toowere much less protected against wounds thanthose of the latter; some of them indeed, as theMysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears,but only staves with the end hardened in the fire1.A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, tothe number of 8000 horsemen, came armed onlywith a dagger and with the rope known in SouthAmerica as the lasso, which they cast in the fightto entangle an antagonist. The ^Ethiopians fromthe Upper Nile had their bodies painted half redand half white, wore the skins of lions and pan-thers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bowwith arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharpstone.

Numbering ft w a s a^ Doriskus that the fighting men of theof the army ° °

—method entire land-army were first numbered ; for Hero-mp oye . ^Q^us eXp r e s siy informs us that the various contin-

gents had never been numbered separately, andavows his own ignorance of the amount of each.The means employed for .numeration were remark-able. Ten thousand men were counted2, and packedtogether as closely as possible: a line was drawn,and a wall of enclosure built, around the spacewhich they had occupied, into which all the armywas directed to enter successively, so that the ag-gregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000each, was thus ascertained. One hundred andseventy of these divisions were affirmed by the in-

1 Herodot. vii. 61-81.2 The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to

have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the process is notdescribed in detail. (Herodot. iv. 870

CHAP. XXXVIII.J MUSTER QF THE ARMY OF XERXES. 45

formants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered,constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya andcamels from Arabia, with a presumed total of20,000 additional men1. Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch : his naval equipmentswere of corresponding magnitude, comprising notonly the 1207 triremes2 or war-ships of three banksof oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war andtransports. The crew of each trireme comprised200 rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians orSakse; that of each of the accompanying vesselsincluded eighty men, according to an average whichHerodotus supposes not far from the truth. If wesum up these items, the total numbers brought byXerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast ofDoriskus would reach the astounding figure of2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther immensemarch from Doriskus to Thermopylae, Xerxes ™bie°otaispressed into his service men and ships from all the by°Bero°Ut

people whose territory he traversed : deriving from dotus-

hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggre-gate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new landtroops, so that the aggregate of his force when heappeared at Thermopylae was 2,640,000 men. Tothis we are to add, according to the conjecture ofHerodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attend-ants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft

1 Herodot. vii. 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of enumerationwas employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards,before he marched his army to the field of Issus. (Quintus Curtius, iii.2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel.)

2 Herodot. vii. 89-97-


and ships of burthen, &c, so that the male personsaccompanying the Persian king when he reachedhis first point of Grecian resistance amounted to5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate ofthis army, the whole strength of the eastern world,in clear and express figures of Herodotus1, whohimself evidently supposes the number to havebeen even greater ; for he conceives the number of" camp-followers" as not only equal to, but consi-derably larger than, that of fighting-men. We areto reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines andfemale cooks, at whose number Herodotus does notpretend to guess: together with cattle, beasts ofburthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude,increasing the consumption of the regular army.

Comments To admit this overwhelming total, or anythingupon the i ievidence of near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the dis-Herodotus . , i • i •. 1 j j

and upon paragmg remarks which it has drawn down uponwitness and Herodotus are noway merited2. He takes pains tojudge. distinguish that which informants told him, from

that which he merely guessed. His description ofthe review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he hadevidently conversed with persons who were presentat it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgatedby the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and shipsof war great and small. As to the number oftriremes, his statement seems beneath the truth,as we may judge from the contemporary authority

1 Herodot. vii. 185-186. iirdyav travra rbv r/mov oTparov i< rrjs'Ao-lrjs. (vii. 157.) " Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," touse the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

2 Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Hero-dotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot, Aus seinem Buche sein Leben,ch. xxxiv. p. 176).


of iEschylus, who in the ' Persse' gives the exactnumber of 1207 Persian ships as having foughtat Salarais: but between Doriskus and Salamis,Herodotus1 has himself enumerated 647 ships aslost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No ex-aggeration therefore can well be suspected in thisstatement, which would imply about 276,000 asthe number of the crews, though there is here aconfusion or omission in the narrative which wecannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3000 small-er ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry,are far less trustworthy. There would be little orno motive for the enumerators to be exact, andevery motive for them to exaggerate—an immensenominal total would be no less pleasing to thearmy than to the monarch himself—so that themilitary total of land-force and ships' crews, whichHerodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival atThermopylae, may be dismissed as unwarrantedand incredible. And the computation whereby hedetermines the amount of non-military personspresent, as equal or more than equal to the mili-tary, is founded upon suppositions no way admis-

1 Only 120 ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) ashaving joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But 400 weredestroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia(vii. 190) ; and the squadron of 200 sail, detached by the Persiansround Eubcea, were also all lost (viii. 7) ; besides forty-five taken or de-stroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11).Other losses are also indicated (viii. 14-16).

As the statement of ^Eschylus for the number of the Persian triremesat Salamis appears well-entitled to credit, we must suppose either thatthe number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, orthat a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoriis,p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).


sible ; for though in a Grecian well-appointed armyit was customary to reckon one light-armed sol-dier or attendant for every hoplite, no such esti-mate can be applied to the Persian host. A fewgrandees and leaders might be richly provided withattendants of various kinds, but the great mass ofthe army would have none at all. Indeed, it ap-pears that the only way in which we can render themilitary total, which must at all events have beenvery great, consistent with the conditions of possiblesubsistence, is by supposing a comparative absenceof attendants, and by adverting to the fact of thesmall consumption, and habitual patience as tohardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiaticsoldier will at this day make his campaign uponscanty fare, and under privations which would beintolerable to an European1. And while we thusdiminish the probable consumption, we have toconsider that never in any case of ancient historyhad so much previous pains been taken to accumu-late supplies on the line of march: in addition to

1 Seeon this point Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, ch. xxiv. vol. ii.p. 70, 71 ; ch. xxxii. p. 367 ; and ch. xxxix. p. 435 (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 22—23.Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665,says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000,others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever beencounted. He says, " You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how sovast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field.The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance andsimple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire,translated by Brock, vol. ii. App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, " Les hommes eont si sobres, qu'ils s'accommodent de toutessortes d'alimens."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000men. (Histoire de Genghis, liv. ii. ch. vi. p. 193.)

CHAP. XXXVIII.] MUSTER OP THE ARMY OF XERXES. 49

which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnishsuch an amount of provisions, when the armypassed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Hero-dotus himself expresses his surprise how provisionscould have been provided for so vast a multitude,and were we to admit his estimate literally, thedifficulty would be magnified into an impossibility.Weighing the circumstances of the case well, andconsidering that this army was the result of amaximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chieflydemanded,—and that prayers for exemption wereregarded by the Great King as a capital offence—and that provisions had been collected for threeyears before along the line of march—we may wellbelieve that the numbers of Xerxes were greaterthan were ever assembled in ancient times, orperhaps at any known epoch of history. But itwould be rash to pretend to guess at any positivenumber, in the entire absence of ascertained data :and when we learn from Thucydides that he foundit impossible to find out the exact numbers of thesmall armies of Greeks who fought at Mantineia1,

1 Thucydid. v. 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes innumerable—avapidpryrov arpaTiAv (Anabas. iii. 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister toknow the numbers of an assembled Turkish army. In the war betweenthe Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encampedat Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us, " Le Visir medemanda un jour fort seVieusement si l'armee Ottomane etoit nombreuse.C'est a vous que je m'adresserois, lui disje, si j'etais curieux de lesavoir. Je l'ignore,me repondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en etre instruit? En lisant la Gazette de Vienne, me repliqua-t-il. Jerestai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, &c), aftermentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the

VOL. V. E


Other testi-moniesabout thenumber ofthe Per-sians.

we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability tocount the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We mayremark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcementsreceived afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, andThessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregatetotal ever afterwards increased ; for Herodotus takesno account of desertions, which yet must have beenvery numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous,without any interest in the enterprise ; and where-in the numbers of each separate contingent wereunknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots : if he counts the crews of the triremesapart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable),the total will then be considerably above a million.iElian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men : Dio-dorus1 appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly

numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Con-stantinople in 1826, observes, " On a dit et repete, que leur nombres'etoit eleve a huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accredited (it wasreally about 500). Mais les Orientaux en general, et les Turcs en par-ticulier, n'ont aucune idee des nombres : ils les emploient sans exacti-tude, et ils sont par caractere portes a l'exageration. D'un autre cote,le gouvernement a du favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapperl'imagination et inspirerune plus grande terreur." (vol. ii. p. 37.)

1 Ktesias, Persica, c. 22, 23; iElian, V. H. xiii. 3 ; Diodorus, xi.2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the noteof Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, p. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chcerilus, a few years younger than Herodotus,and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on theexpedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments ofit are all that is preserved : he enumerated all the separate nations whofurnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sak«e, butalso the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus)among them. See Fragments, iii. and iv. in Nseke's edition of Choerilus,p. 121-134. Josephua cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Havercamp.


other authorities. None of these witnesses enableus to correct Herodotus, in a case where we areobliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort anoriginal witness, having evidently conversed withpersons actually present at the muster of Doriskus,giving us both their belief as to the numbers, toge-ther with the computation, true or false, circulatedamong them by authority. Moreover, the contem-porary iEschylus, while agreeing with him exactlyas to the number of triremes, gives no specificfigure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in hisPersae a general sentiment of vast number, whichmay seem in keeping with the largest statement ofHerodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands andbrothers—the Baktrian territory has not been al-lowed to retain even its old men1. The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quiteas great as if its numbers had really correspondedto the ideas of Herodotus.

1 iEschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737- Heeren (in his learned workon the commerce of the ancient world, Uber den Verkehr der altenWelt,part 1. sect. 1. pp. 162, 558, 3rd edition) thinks that Herodotus hadseen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army atDoriskas. I cannot think this at all probable : it is much more reason-able to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who hadaccompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed withmany such. The Persian royal scribes or secretaries accompanied theking, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happento strike his attention (Herodot. vii. 100; viii. 90), or to exhibit re-markable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to theperson of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, ratherthan keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotusas to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgement: nor is hecorrect in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marchedwith their wives and families (p. 557-559.).

E2


Xerxes After the numera t ion had t aken place, Xerxesreview the passed in his chariot by each of the several cont in-S gents, observed their equipment, and put questions

— t o w n i c n the royal scribes noted down the answers :s

er- he then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme,sation with

the Spartan which had been already fitted up with a gut tent, andratus. ma sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored

in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every ves-sel completely manned for action. Such a spectaclewas well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogantconfidence, and it was in this spirit that he sentforthwith for Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta,who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether re-sistance on the part of the Greeks to such a forcewas even conceivable. The conversation betweenthem, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one ofthe most impressive manifestations of sentiment inthe Greek language1. Demaratus assures him that

1 When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be re-gretted that he does not specify them oftener) they seem to be frequentlyGreeks, such as Dikaeus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenusin Boeotia, Archias of Sparta, &c. (iii. 55 ; viii. 65 ; ix. 16). He men-tions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circum-stances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probablethat he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his de-scendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, nearthe jEolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii. 1, 6), and hemay thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartanking to Xerxes. Nevertheless the remarks made by Hoffmeister, onthe speeches ascribed to Demaratus by Herodotus, are well deservingof attention (Sittlich-religiose Lebensansicht des Herodotos, p. 118).

" Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings someman or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons ofwisdom. To Croesus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon :Croesus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part to-wards Cyrus and Kambyses: Darius, as a prudent and honest man,does not require any such counsellor ; but Xerxes in his pride has thesententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him ;

CHAP. XXXVIII.J MARCH OF XERXES. 53

the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians ofPeloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death,be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxesreceives the statement with derision, but exhibitsno feeling of displeasure: an honourable contrastto the treatment of Charidemus a century arid ahalf afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia1.

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with March ofthe army pursued his march westward, in three from<Do-divisions and along three different lines of road, warding"

Thrace —

while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel tions leviedto Polykrate*s, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one on theand the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by GrecianHerodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behaviour ^ coastand character of the various monarchs—criticisms which are nothing of Thracemore than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, —particu-Crcesus, or Artabanus on occasion of particular events. The speeches ^11*interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose asthose of Tacitus—to make the reader more intimately acquainted withthe existing posture of affairs or with the character of the agents—buta different purpose quite foreign to history : they embody in the narra-tive his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divinegovernment."

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rathertoo absolutely delivered.

1 Herodot. vii. 101-104. How inferior is the scene between Dariusand Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii. 2, 9-19, p. 20, ed. Mutzel.)

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and thesame antithesis as that which runs through the Persae of ^Eschylus;but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception ofthe real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation betweenXerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demara-tus himself or from his sons ; for the extreme specialty with which theLacedaemonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians,not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Hero-dotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respectingthe deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 seq.), andhis view of the death of Kleomenes as an atonement to that prince forinjury done, may seem derived from family information (vi. 84).


through the territories of seven distinct tribes ofThracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colo-nies : all was still within his own empire, and hetook reinforcements from each as he passed: theThracian Satrse were preserved from this levy bytheir unassailable seats amidst the woods and snowsof Rhodope*. The islands of Samothrace and Tha-sus, with their subject towns on the mainland, andthe Grecian colonies Diksea1, Maroneia, and Ab-de'ra, were successively laid under contribution forcontingents of ships or men; and, what was stillmore ruinous, they were further constrained to pro-vide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed :for the day of his passage the Great King was theirguest. Orders had been transmitted for this pur-pose long beforehand, and for many months thecitizens had been assiduously employed in collect-ing food for the army, as well as delicacies for themonarch—grinding flour of wheat and barley, fat-tening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls ; togetherwith a decent display of gold and silver plate forthe regal dinner. A superb tent was erected forXerxes and his immediate companions, while thearmy received their rations in the open regionaround : on commencing the march next morning,the tent with all its rich contents was plundered,and nothing restored to those who had furnishedit. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occu-pied seven days and seven nights in crossing thedouble Hellespontine bridge, must also have beenfor many days on its march through the territory,and therefore at the charge, of each one among

1 Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] XERXES REACHES THE STRYMON. 55

the cities, so that the cost brought them to thebrink of ruin, and even in some cases drove themto abandon house and home. The cost incurredby the city of Thasus, on account of their posses-sions of the mainland, for this purpose, was no lessthan 400 talents1 (=£92,800) : while at Abdera,the witty Megakreon recommended to his country-men to go in a body to the temples and thank thegods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfiedwith one meal in the day. Had the monarch re-quired breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderitesmust have been reduced to the alternative eitherof exile or of utter destitution2. A stream calledLissus, which seems to have been of no great im-portance, is said to have been drunk up by thearmy, together with a lake of some magnitude nearPistyrus8.

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians XerxesT-«- • i i-» i i crosses the

and the r ienans, between rangaeus and the sea, strymon—Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at Akantnus°the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine- ^AkM-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of thian!*m

J regard toAmphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown the canal

i • i • i i -»*• • • ! of Athos.

over the river, to which the Magian priests render-1 This sura of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute

charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprisingthe western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were includedall the Ionic and iEolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, &c.(Herodot. iii. 90).

2 Herodot. vii. 118-120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of thequantity of corn which would have been required for daily consump-tion, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, andreckoning one choenix of wheat for each man's daily consumption(= \ th of a medimnus). It is unnecessary to examine a computationfounded on such inadmissible data.

3 Herodot. vii. 108, 109.


ed solemn honours by sacrificing white horses andthrowing them into the stream. Nor were his re-ligious feelings satisfied without the more precioussacrifices often resorted to by the Persians: he hereburied alive nine native youths and nine maidens,in compliment to Nine-Roads the name of the spot':moreover he also left, under the care of the Pseo-nians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, whichhad been brought from the seat of empire, butwhich doubtless was found inconvenient on the lineof march. From the Strymon he marched forwardalong the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the ter-ritory of the Bisaltsenear the Greek colonies of Ar-gilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek townof Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos whichhad been recently cut through. The fierce king ofthe Bisaltse2 refused submission to Xerxes, fled toRhodope1 for safety, and forbade his six sons to jointhe Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, theynevertheless did so, and when they came back hecaused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities, which Xerxes had passed by,obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, andprobably few doubted the ultimate success of soprodigious an armament. But the inhabitants ofAkanthus had been eminent for their zeal and ex-ertions in the cutting of the canal, and had proba-bly made considerable profits during the operation:Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with

1 Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be speciallyPersian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes,sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, chil-dren of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

2 Herodot, viii. 116.

CHAP. XXXVIII.] XERXES ARRIVES IN GREECE. 57

them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praiseand presents ; though he does not seem to have ex-empted them from the charge of maintaining thearmy while in their territory. He here separatedhimself from his fleet, which was directed to sailthrough the canal of Athos, to double the twosouth-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, toenter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrivalat Therma. The fleet in its course gathered addi-tional troops from the Greek towns in the two pe-ninsulas of Sithonia and Pallene\ as well as on theeastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region March ofcalled Krusis or Krossaea, on the continental sideof the isthmus of PaMnL These Greek towns J j ^ in

were numerous, but of little individual importance. the.T^err,' r maic Gulf.

Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the inte-rior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of theAxius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes byland from Akanthus. He seems to have had a dif-ficult march, and to have taken a route consider-ably inland, through Pseonia and Krestonia—awild, woody, and untrodden country, where hisbaggage-camels were set upon by lions, and wherethere were also wild bulls of prodigious size andfierceness : at length he rejoined his fleet at Therma,and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, theancient Pieria, and Bottiteis, as far as the mouth ofthe Haliakmon1.

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount FavourableOlympus, the northern boundary of what was pro- oTtheinva-

sion—zealof the Ma-

1 Herodot. vii. 122-127. cedonianRespecting the name Pieria, and the geography of these regions, see prince to

the previous volume, vol. iv. ch. xxv. p. 18. assist


perly called Hellas; after a march through nothingbut subject territory, with magazines laid up be-forehand for the subsistence of his army—withadditional contingents levied in his course—andprobably with Thracian volunteers joining him inthe hopes of plunder. The road along which hehad marched was still shown with solemn reve-rence by the Thracians, and protected both fromintruders and from tillage, even in the days ofHerodotus1. The Macedonian princes, the last ofhis western tributaries, in whose territory he nowfound himself—together with the Thessalian Aleua-dae—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor didthe task as yet appear difficult: what steps theGreeks were taking to oppose him, shall be relatedin the coming chapter.

1 Herodot. vii. 116.

59

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARA-THON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLAE.

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greeceimmediately after the repulse of the Persians fromMarathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenes and Leotychid£s, the two kings of violentSparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eury-stheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid, ^n

race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning Sparta.the former Prokleid king Demaratus: and Kleo-menes had even gone so far as to tamper with theDelphian priestess for this purpose. His manoeuvrebeing betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmedat the displeasure of the Spartans, that he re-tired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia,where he employed the powerful influence of hisregal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arca-dian people against his country. The Spartans,alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him backwith a promise of amnesty. But his renewed leasedid not last long: his habitual violence of characterbecame aggravated into decided insanity, insomuchthat he struck with his stick whomsoever he met;and his relatives were forced to confine him inchains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces,he one day constrained this man to give him hissword, with which he mangled himself dreadfullyand perished. So shocking a death was certain to


receive a religious interpretation, but which amongthe misdeeds of his life had drawn down upon himthe divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine.Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of hishaving corrupted the Pythian priestess1: but theAthenians and Argeians were each disposed to anhypothesis of their own—the former believed thatthe gods had thus punished the Spartan king forhaving cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the avenging hand of the heroArgus, whose grove Kleomene's had burnt, alongwith so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanc-tuary in it. Without pronouncing between thesedifferent suppositions, Herodotus contents himselfwith expressing his opinion that the miserable deathof Kleomene's was an atonement for his conduct toDemaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hearthat the Spartans, usually more disposed than otherGreeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divineagency, recognised on this occasion nothing but avulgar physical cause: Kleomene's had gone mad(they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learntfrom some Scythian envoys who had come toSparta2.

complaint The death of KleomenSs, and the discreditof the jEgi- '

netansat thrown on his character, emboldened the iEgine-Sparta n '. _ °against tans to prefer a complaint at Spar ta respectingandLeoty! their ten hostages whom Kleomenes and Leoty-SbjTct c h i d e s h a d t a k e n awaY from the island, a little be-of the fore the invasion of Attica bv the Persians underhostages

whichthose Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to thetwo kings °had taken Athenians against aggression from iEgina at thatfromMgma. ' Herodot. vi. 74, 75. 2 Herodot. vi. 84.

CHAP. XXXIX.] AFFAIRS OF SPARTA. 61

critical moment. Leotychide"s was the survivingauxiliary of Kleomene's in the requisition of thesehostages, and against him the iEginetans com-plained. Though the proceeding was one unques-tionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece1,yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedae-monians against the deceased king and his acts, thatthe survivor Leotychide"s was brought to a publictrial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisonerin atonement to the iEginetans. The latter wereabout to carry away their prisoner, when a dignifiedSpartan named Theasid^s, pointed out to them thedanger which they were incurring by such an in-dignity against the regal person—the Spartans (heobserved) had passed sentence under feelings of tem-porary wrath, which would probably be exchangedfor sympathy if they saw the sentence realized.

Accordingly the iEginetans, instead of executingthe sentence, contented themselves with stipulatingthat Leotychide's should accompany them to Athens The Spar_and redemand their hostages detained there. The âns

tdeliver

Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite c£id^,t?of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king tans, whoset forth the sacred obligation of restoring a de- t o ^posit2: they justified the refusal in part by saying Athens! tothat the deposit had been lodged by the two kingsjointly, and could not be surrendered to one of stases

them alone: but they probably recollected that thehostages were placed less as a deposit than as a

1 Herodot. vi. 61 . KXeofievea, iovra iv Trj Alyivrj, Kal KOtva Trj 'EXXafitayaBa irpocepyaôîenov, &c.

5 Herodot. vi. 85 : compare vi. 49-73, and the preceding volume ofthis history, c. xxxvi. p. 437-441.


Refusal ofthe Athe-nians togive up thehostages—reprisals ofthe Jigine-tans.

The jEgine-tan Niko-dromuslaysa schemefor a demo-cratical re-volution iniEgina, inconcertwithAthens—the move-ment fails.

security against iEginetan hostility—which securitythey were not disposed to forego.

Leotychides having been obliged to retire with-out success, the iEginetans resolved to adopt mea-sures of retaliation for themselves : they waited forthe period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifthyear at Sunium, on which occasion a ship pecu-liarly equipped and carrying some of the leadingAthenians as Theors or sacred envoys, sailed thi-ther from Athens. This ship they found means tocapture, and carried all on board prisoners toiEgina. Whether an exchange took place, or whe-ther the prisoners and hostages on both sides wereput to death, we do not know; but the consequenceof their proceeding was an active and decided warbetween Athens and iEgina1, beginning seeminglyabout 488 or 487 B.C, and lasting until 481 B.C.,the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An iEginetan citizen named Nikodromus tookadvantage of this war to further a plot against thegovernment of the island: having been before (ashe thought) unjustly banished, he now organized arevolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy,

1 Herodot. vi. 87, 88.Instead of r)V yap SIJ TO'LUI JA0r)valournrevrrjpr)s eVi Sowio) (vi. 87), I

follow the reading proposed by Schomann and sanctioned by Boeckh—jrepTCTrjpis. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that timeshould have had any ships with five banks of oars (TrevTtjprjs): more-over, apart from this objection, the word nepTr/pris makes considerableembarrassment in the sentence : see Boeckh, Urkunden iiber das At-tische Seewesen, chap. vii. p. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greekwho constructed irevrqpus or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv. 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentaeterides, or solemnities celebrated everyfifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens : see Aristo-teles—noXir. Fragm. xxvii. ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii. 107.

CHAP. XXXIX.] REVOLT OF ;EGINA. 63

concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous in-vasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on theappointed day he rose with his partisans in armsand took possession of the Old Town—a strongpost which had been superseded in course of timeby the more modern city on the sea-shore, less pro-tected though more convenient'. But no Atheniansappeared, and without them he was unable to main-tain his footing : he was obliged to make his escapefrom the island after witnessing the complete de-feat of his partisans—a large body of whom, sevenhundred in number, fell into the hands of thegovernment, and were led out for execution. Oneman alone among these prisoners burst his chains,fled to the sanctuary of Dimeter Thesmophorus,and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of thedoor before he was overtaken. In spite of everyeffort to drag him away by force, he clung to itwith convulsive grasp : his pursuers did not ven-ture to put him to death in such a position, but theysevered the hands from the body and then executedhim, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping2

1 See Thucyd. i. 8.The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited,

bore the name of The City even in the time of Thucydides (ii. 15), at atime when Athens and Peirseus covered so large a region around andjnear it.

2 Herodot. vi. 91. Xe 'Pes ^ Kelvat einrecpvKviai r\aav rolcri (irunrcurrfjp(n.The word Reivai for tKtivai, " those hands," appears so little suitable inthis phrase, that I rather imagine the real reading to have been iceival(the Ionic dialect for Keual), "the hands with nothing attached to them:"compare a phrase not very unlike. Homer, Iliad, iii. 376, KMW) 8e Tpvrpd-Xeia afi eawero, &c.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias,and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at thetemple of Athene Chalkioekos (Thucyd. i. 134).


Treatmentof the de-feated con-spirators—sacrilege.

The Athe-nians landa force in

gwar whichensues.

the door-handle, where they seem to have long re-mained without being taken off. Destruction ofthe seven hundred prisoners does not seem to havedrawn down upon the iEginetan oligarchy eithervengeance from the gods or censure from theircontemporaries ; but the violation of sanctuary, inthe case of that one unfortunate man whose handswere cut off, was a crime which the goddess De1-me'te'r never forgave. More than fifty years after-wards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war,the iEginetans, having been previously conqueredby Athens, were finally expelled from their island :such expulsion was the divine judgement upon themfor this ancient impiety, which half a century ofcontinued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficientto wipe out1.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Niko-dromus arrived at iEgina one day too late. Theirproceedings had been delayed by the necessity ofborrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians,in addition to fifty of their own : with these seventy

1 He rodo t . vi. 9 1 . 'AJTO TOVTOV 8C Kai dyos <r<f>L iyeveTO, TO €K8v(ra<r8ai

ovx olol re iyevovro cm/j.r)xava>fievoi, dXV f(f)drj(Tav eKneo-ovres irporcpov

ex TTJS VJ]<TOV rj (T^iTkeav yevecr8m TTJV 8COV.

Compare Thucyd. ii. 27 about the final expulsion from ^Egina. TheLacedaemonians assigned to these expelled jEginetans a new abode inthe territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, wherethey were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians,in the eighth year of the war (Thucyd, iv. 57). Now Herodotus, whilehe mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and stillmore calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly havefailed to notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgement.We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tendto support the opinion thrown out in my preceding volume (chap,xxxiii. p. 305, note) respecting the date of composition of his history—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

CHAP. XXXIX.] WAR WITH JEGINA. 65

sail they defeated the iEginetans, who met themwith a fleet of equal number, and then landed onthe island. The iEginetans solicited aid fromArgos, but that city was either too much dis-pleased with them, or too much exhausted by thedefeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomene's, togrant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian vo-lunteers, under a distinguished champion of thepentathlon named Eurybates, came to their assist-ance, and a vigorous war was carried on, withvarying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, beingattacked at a moment when their fleet was in dis-order, so that they lost four ships with their crews :on land, they were more successful, and few of theArgeian volunteers survived to return home. Thegeneral of the latter, Eurybates, confiding in hisgreat personal strength and skill, challenged thebest of the Athenian warriors to single combat: heslew three of them in succession, but the arm ofthe fourth, Sophanes of Dekeleia, was victorious,and proved fatal to him1. At length the invaderswere obliged to leave the island without any deci-sive result, and the war seems to have been prose-cuted by frequent descents and privateering onboth sides—in which Nikodromus and theiEginetanexiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Atticanear Sunium, took an active part2; the advantageon the whole being on the side of Athens.

1 Herodot. ix. 75.2 Herodot. vi. 90, 91, 92, 93. Thucyd. i. 41. About Sophanes, com-

pare ix. 75-How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between

countries so near as ^Egina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailedVOL. V. F


Effect of The general course of this war, and especiallythis war in ° „ , . . . , , _ T . .

inducing the failure of the enterprise concerted with Niko-nians totn- dromus in consequence of delay in borrowing shipsmiitary6" fr°m Corinth, were well calculated to impress uponforce. t n e Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval

force. And it is from the present time that wetrace among them the first growth of that decidedtendency towards maritime activity, which coin-cided so happily with the expansion of their de-mocracy, and opened a new phase in Grecianhistory, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by therepulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dweltupon in my preceding volume. Miltiades, thevictor in that field, having been removed from thescene under circumstances already described, Ari-

Themi- steide"s and Themistokle"s became the chief men atAthens : and the former was chosen archon duringthe succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness

intense" i n magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteembe" from *he ge n e r a l public, not without a certain pro-

cism.

.—Ba- portion of active enemies, some of them sufferersn i s h m e n t o f * . . . . _ , ,

the latter by his justice. Ihese enemies naturally becamebyostra- partisans of his rival Themistokle"s, who had all

the talents necessary for bringing them into coope-ration : and the rivalry between the two chiefs be-came so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidlshimself is reported to have said, " If the Athenianswere wise, they would cast both of us into thebarathrum." Under such circumstances, it is nottoo much to say that the peace of the country wasdescription of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon,Hellenic, v. 1.)

CHAP. XXXIX.] NAVAL POWER OF ATHENS. 67

preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism,of which so much has been said in the precedingvolume. After three or four years of continuedpolitical rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a voteof ostracism, and Aristeide"s was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalryturned, we are unfortunately little informed. Butit is highly probable that one of them was, the im-portant change of policy above alluded to—theconversion of Athens from a land-power into asea-power, — the development of this new andstirring element in the minds of the people. Byall authorities, this change of policy is ascribedprincipally and specially to Themistokle's*: on that Conversionaccount, if for no other reason, Aristeides would from a "8

probably be found opposed to it—but it was more- Into a°wer

over a change not in harmony with that old- naval

° J power pro-

fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of posed and. urged by

life, and narrow range of active duty and experi- Tnemi-ence, which Aristeides seems to have approved incommon with the subsequent philosophers. Theseaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cos-mopolite than the heavy-armed soldier : the modernGreek seaman even at this moment is so to a re-markable degree, distinguished for the variety of hisideas, and the quickness of his intelligence2: the

1 Plutarch, Themist. c, 19.2 See Mr. Gait's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, Voyages

and Travels in the Mediterranean, p. 376-378 (London, 1802)." The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belong-

ing to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny ofthe Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerablenumber, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town,and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In theirmercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater

F2


land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexibleranks, the sea-service that of mutability and ad-venture. Such was the idea strongly entertainedby Plato and other philosophers1: though we mayremark that they do not render justice to the Athe-nian seaman, whose training was far more perfectand laborious, and his habits of obedience far morecomplete2, than that.of the Athenian hoplite or

integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepidnavigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly pre-ferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islandsof Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institu-tions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. Inpaying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom.The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock,from which the charges of victualing the ship are deducted. The re-mainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to thecrew and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank ;the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital ofthe cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed con-ditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from themoral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to theideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem toform a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence amongus. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which weexpect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstancestheir conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all tradi-tionary historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge towhich the term learning is usually applied. This, mingled with theother information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous cha-racter of mind which I think they possess."

1 Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistokl^s, c. 19. Iso-krates, Panathenaic, c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopcemen. c. 14. IIXIJI/'Enaixeivaivdav fikv tvioi \iyov<nvOKVOVVTO. yevcrai TWV Kara 6aKa<r<Tav axfteXeiuw TOVS TToXtras, OTVWS avr&

fir/ Xadaxriv avri /IOVI/XIM OTTXITGIV, Kara HXdrava, vavrai yevofievoi Kal

hiaCpQapevrts, anpatCTOV i< 7-ijs 'Acrlas Kal TWV vrjcrwv dneXdew iKOwrias :

compare vii. p. 301.2 See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 19),

attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank inthe city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

CHAP. XXXIX.] POLICY OF THEMISTOKLES. 69

horseman: a training beginning with Themistokle's,and reaching its full perfection about the commence-ment of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create Views anda navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, The- TLmistokles displayed all that sagacious appreciationof the circumstances and dangers of the time forwhich Thucydides gives him credit : and there can this time

J ° more essen-

be no doubt that Aristeide's, though the honester tiaitohisT . . ft i. • • • country

politician of the two, was at this particular crisis thanthe less essential to his country. Not only was nsteides-there the struggle with iEgina, a maritime powerequal or more than equal, and within sight of theAthenian harbour—but there was also in the distancea still more formidable contingency to guard against.The Persian armament had been driven with dis-grace from Attica back to Asia ; but the Persianmonarch still remained with undiminished meansof aggression and increased thirst for revenge ; andThemistokle's knew well that the danger from thatquarter would recur greater than ever. He be-lieved that it would recur again in the same way,by an expedition across the iEgean like that ofDatis to Marathon1; against which the best defencewould be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet.Nor could the large preparations of Darius for re-newing the attack remain unknown to a vigilantobserver, extending as they did over so manyGreeks subject to the Persian empire. Such posi-tive warning was more than enough to stimulatethe active genius of Themistokle's, who now pre-

1 Thucyd. i. 93. I8av (Themistokles) rf/s /3ao-iXeW a-rpanas TT\V KOTO.Bahacrcrav e<fiohov einopaTtpav rf/s Kara y^v ovcrav.


vailed upon his countrymen to begin with energythe work of maritime preparation, as well againstiEgina as against Persia1. Not only were twohundred new ships built, and citizens trained asseamen—but the important work was commenced,during the year when Themistokle's was eitherarchon or general, of forming and fortifying a newharbour for Athens at Peiraeus, instead of theancient open bay of Phale'rum. The latter wasindeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peirseuswith its three separate natural ports2, admitting ofbeing closed and fortified, was incomparably supe-rior in safety as well as in convenience. It is nottoo much to say, with Herodotus—that the iEgi-netan "war was the salvation of Greece, by con-straining the Athenians to make themselves amaritime power3." The whole efficiency of the

Ah resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turnedthe saiva- upon this new movement in the organisation ofGreece as Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable com-

pleteness through a fortunate concurrence of acci-dents ; for the important delay of ten years, betweenthe defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion bywhich it was to be avenged, was in truth the resultof accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, thedeath of Darius ; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxesat his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B .C, an invasion which wouldnaturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C,

i Thucyd. i. 14. Herodot. vii. 144. 2 Thucyd. i. 93.3 Herodot. vii. 144. OSTOS yap 6 nokefios (TWTCIS eo-<o<TE TOTC TTJV

cEXXa8a, dirayKcuras Bdkacraiovs yevfrrdcu 'ASijvaiovs.Thucyd. i. 18. VOVTIKOX iyivovro.

CHAP. XXXIX.] RESOURCES OF THE ATHENIANS. 71

and which would have found Athens at that timewithout her. wooden walls—the great engine of hersubsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new Valuablefleet could not have been built—a considerable erst avail-amount of public money—was also by good for- Atune now available to the Athenians. It is first inan emphatic passage of the poet iEschylus, and mines of

J. o r J Laurium

next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that in Attica.we hear of the silver mines of Laurium1 in Attica,and the valuable produce which they rendered tothe state. They were situated in the southern por-tion of the territory, not very far from the promon-tory of Sunium2, amidst a district of low hillswhich extended across much of the space betweenthe eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Ana-phlystus. At what time theyfirst began to be worked,we have no information ; but it seems hardly pos-sible that they could have been worked with anyspirit or profitable result until after the expulsion ofHippias and the establishment of the democraticalconstitution of Kleisthenes. Neither the stronglocal factions, by which different portions of Atticawere set against each other before the time of Pei-

* iEschylus, Persse, 235.2 The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by

modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr.Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greekgovernment. See his Reisen durch Griechenland, vol. i. pp. 39, 73.The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especiallynotices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, togetherwith the good harbour at that place—both circumstances of great valueat the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen ofshafts sunk in ancient times—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner asto satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.


sistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded byhis two sons—were likely to afford confidence andencouragement. But when the democracy of Klei-sthenls first brought Attica into one systematic andcomprehensive whole, with equal rights to all theparts, and a common centre at Athens—the powerof that central government over the mineral wealthof the country, and its means of binding the wholepeople to respect agreements concluded with indi-vidual undertakers, would give a new stimulus toprivate speculation in the district of Laurium. Itwas the practice of the Athenian government eitherto sell, or to let for a long term of years, particulardistricts of this productive region to individuals orcompanies—on consideration partly of a sum orfine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal toone-twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in theAthenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklesmade his proposition to enlarge the naval force, agreat sum1 arising from the Laurian mines, out ofwhich a distribution was on the point of being madeamong the citizens—ten drachms to each man.This great amount in hand must probably havebeen the produce of the purchase-money or fines

nan received from recent sales, since the small annualpeople to reserved rent can hardly have been accumulatedforgo the J

distribution during many successive years: new and enlargedof this . . . , °

fund, and enterprises in mines must be supposed to have beenrecently begun by individuals under contract with

increasednumber of .. „ , n ,ships. Herodot. vn. 144. Ore Aftjvcuoicrt yevofxevuiv XP^^TWV /icyaXav

iv TIB KOIWB, ra i< Tav fiiraXKcov <r(f>i npocrrjkBt rav OTTO Aavpeiov, e^ieA-

^8 d$ S S

CHAP. XXXIX.] INCREASE OF ATHENIAN NAVY. 73

the government, in order to produce at the momentso overflowing an exchequer and to furnish meansfor the special distribution contemplated. Themi-stokle"s availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with iEginaand the still more formidable menace from thegreat enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the peo-ple to forgo the promised distribution for the pur-pose of obtaining an efficient navy1. One cannot

1 All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which wepossess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought togetherin the valuable Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended tothe English translation of his Public Economy of Athens. He dis-cusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of thatDissertation : but there are many of his remarks in which I cannotconcur.

After multiplying ten drachmae by the assumed number of 20,000Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33J talents, hegoes on—"That the distribution was made annually might have beenpresumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, withoutthe testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not therefore to supposethat the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; butthat all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not re-quired for any other object, was divided among the members of thecommunity" (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotusthat all the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed:the treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury afterthe distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce ofthe mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Noris it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we areto take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he talksrather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing pur-poses—not about a regular distribution (" Nam cum pecunia publicaquse ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratuum quotannis periret."Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2). A story is told by Polysnus, from whom-soever he copied it—of a sum of 100 talents in the treasury, whichThemistokles persuaded the people to hand over to 100 rich men, forthe purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obli-gation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfiedwith the expenditure : these rich men employed each the sum awarded

74, HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II.

doubt that there must have been many speakerswho would try to make themselves popular by op-posing this proposition and supporting the distri-bution, insomuch that the power of the peoplegenerally to feel the force of a distant motive aspredominant over a present gain, deserves noticeas an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Prepara- Immense indeed was the recompense reaped forXerxes— this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greecebeforehand generally, when the preparations of Xerxes camem Greece. j - Q ^e m a t u red, and his armament was understood

to be approaching. The orders for equipment ofships and laying in of provisions, issued by theGreat King to his subject Greeks in Asia, theiEgean, and Thrace, would of course become knownthroughout Greece Proper—especially the vast la-bour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, whichwould be the theme of wondering talk with everyThasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festi-val games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory

to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people-(Polysen. i. 30). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus,and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely uponPolysenus separately.

I imagine that the sum of 33 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for thedistribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arisingfrom the mines. Themistokl6s persuaded the people to employ thewhole sum in ship-building, which of course implied that the distribu-tion was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of asimilar kind in former years, as M. Boeckh affirms, is a matter onwhich we have no evidence. M. Boeckh seems to me not to have keptin view the fact (which he himself states just before) that there weretwo sources of receipt into the treasury—original purchase-money paiddown, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that Iimagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived : thesmall reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the state-budget.

CHAP. XXXIX.J CONGRESS AT CORINTH. 75

evidences were public enough, without any needof that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled De-maratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted,from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approach-ing expedition1. The formal announcements ofXerxes all designated Athens as the special objectof his wrath and vengeance2, and other Greciancities might thus hope to escape without mischief:so that the prospect of the great invasion did not ^Jjf persia

at first provoke among them any unanimous dispo- t0 demandsitions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds water fromdispatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn cities—of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Helles-pont, addressed themselves to the different citieswith demand of earth and water, many were dis-posed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta,were any heralds sent; and these two cities werethus from the beginning identified in interest andin the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, inthis trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle :while both at the same time joined to convene aPan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth,for the purpose of organising resistance against theexpected invader.

I have in the preceding volume pointed out the Pan-hel-r ° A lenic con-

VarioUS steps whereby the separate states of Greece gress con-were gradually brought, even against their own jointly bynatural instincts, into something approaching more spartaS and

nearly to political union. The present congress, "u*h|;f

Isth'assembled under the influence of common fear from Corinth.—

Important

Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than effect onany political event which has yet occurred in Gre- mind.

1 Herodot. vii. 239. 2 Herodot. vii. 8-138.


cian history. It extends far beyond the range ofthose Peloponnesian states who constitute the im-mediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens,and is even summoned in part by her strenuousinstigation: it seeks to combine moreover everycity of Hellenic race and language, however distant,which can be induced to take part in it—even theKretans, Korkyreeans, and Sicilians. It is true thatall these states do not actually come, but earnestefforts are made to induce them to come: the di-spersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreatedto marshal themselves in the same ranks for a jointpolitical purpose1—the defence of the commonhearth and metropolis of the race. This is a newfact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideasunlike to anything which has gone before—enlar-ging prodigiously the functions and duties connectedwith that headship of Greece which had hithertobeen in the hands of Sparta, but which is about tobecome too comprehensive for her to manage—andthus introducing increased habits of cooperationamong the subordinate states, as well as rival hopesof aggrandizement among the leaders. The con-gress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such furtheradvance in the centralising tendencies of Greece,and seems at first to promise an onward march inthe same direction: but the promise will not befound realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value.While most of the deputies present came prepared,

1 Herodot. vii. 145. ^povqa-avres ei' /cms Iv T( yivmro TO 'Kai tl o-vyKvxjraVTes TOVTO irprjiro-aKV iratrns, as heivav (7n6vT<ov

CHAP. XXXIX.J MEASURES OF DEFENCE. 77

in the name of their respective cities, to swear re- Effects ofciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also ad- Hdressed all their efforts to appease the feuds anddissensions which reigned among particular mem-bers of their own meeting. Of these the most pro- Greeks—

especially

minent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war betweenstill subsisting between Athens and iEgina. The "! a"latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions ofmedisingl (i. e. embracing the cause of the Per-sians), which had been raised by her giving earthand water ten years before to Darius : but her pre-sent conduct gave no countenance to such suspi-cions : she took earnest part in the congress as wellas in the joint measures of defence, and willinglyconsented to accommodate her difference withAthens2. In this work of reconciling feuds, soessential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian The-mistokles took a prominent part, as well as Chei-leos of Tegea in Arcadia 8. The congress proceededto send envoys and solicit cooperation from such"cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent,especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan andSicilian Greeks—and at the same time to despatchspies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learningthe state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been de- Alarm andtected, and condemned to death by the Persian "generals, but released by express order of Xerxes,who directed that the full strength of his assembledarmament should be shown to them, in order that

1 Herodot. viii. 92. 2 Herodot. vii. 145.3 Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix. 9.


the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified.The step was well calculated for such a purpose :but the discouragement throughout Greece was al-ready extreme, at this critical period when thestorm was about to burst upon them. Even to in-telligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more tothe careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxeswith his countless host appeared irresistible, and in-deed something more than human1: of course suchan impression would be encouraged by the largenumber of Greeks already his tributaries : and wemay even trace a manifestation of a wish to get ridof the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects ofPersian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquilsubmission. This despair of the very continuance ofHellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even fromthe sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphiantemple ; when the Athenians, in their distress anduncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardlyhad their two envoys performed the customary sa-crifices, and sat down in the inner chamber nearthe priestess Aristonike, when she at once ex-claimed—" Wretched men, why sit ye there ? Quityour land and city, and flee afar ! Head, body,feet, and hands are alike rotten : fire and sword, inthe train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelmyou : nor only your city, but other cities also, aswell as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear,and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the

1 Herodot. vii. 203. ov yap 0e6v dvai TOV iirlovra em rrjv 'EXXaSa,oXX' SvSpamov, &c. : compare also vii. 56.

CHAP. XXXIX.] ANSWER OF THE DELPHIAN ORACLE. 79

hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the-sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow 1."

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the Terror con-lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to fthe earth by it, and durst not carry it back toAthens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yetto hope by an influential Delphian citizen named envoys.Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhandworking of these leadingDelphians on the priestess),who advised them to provide themselves with thecharacteristic marks of supplication, and to ap-proach the oracle a second time in that imploringguise: " O lord, we pray thee (they said), havecompassion on these boughs of supplication, anddeliver to us something more comfortable concern-ing our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary,but remain here, until death." Upon which thepriestess replied—" Athene with all her prayersand all her sagacity cannot propitiate OlympianZeus2. But this assurance I will give you, firm asadamant: when everything else in the land ofKekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athene"

1 Herodot. vii. 140.'AXX' 'LTOV e£ ddvToio, na/coi? 8' eniKiSvare 6v\iov.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, inthis case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness ;though Bahr and Schweighauser with other commentators try to in-fuse into it something of encouragement by construing 6v\u>v, fortitude.The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But evenwhen the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is)s

the particular phrases are always wild and vague.3 Herodot. vii. 141.

Ov Bivarat IlaXXaj At" 'OXi/xmov e iXdaaaBaiAitTcrofieur] 7roXXoia"t Xoyoty Kal [iTjTifti •nvKvfj.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Croesus of Lydia(i. 91).


that the wooden wall alone shall remain uncon-quered, to defend you and your children. Standnot to await the assailing horse and foot from thecontinent, but turn your backs and retire : youshall yet live to fight another day. O divine Sala-mis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women,either at the seed-time or at the harvest1."

Sentence of This second answer was a sensible mitigation offrightM,6 the first: it left open some hope of escape, thoughscure: faint, dark and unintelligible—and the envoys wroteth Athe- it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing"ians*0

;tin- probably the terrific sentence which had preceded

ingenuity it. When read to the people, the obscurity of theand success . .

meaning provoked many different interpretations.What was meant by " the wooden wall"? Somesupposed that the acropolis itself, which had ori-ginally been surrounded with a wooden palisade,was the refuge pointed out: but the greater num-ber, and among them most of those who were byprofession expositors of prophecy, maintained thatthe wooden wall indicated the fleet. But theseprofessional expositors, while declaring that thegod bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all ideaof a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity ofabandoning Attica for ever: the last lines of theoracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would de-stroy the children of women, appeared to them toportend nothing but disaster in the event of a navalcombat. Such was the opinion of those who passed

1 Teixos Tpiroyevu ^vKivov 81801 elpvcma. ZevsMavvov awopB-qrov TtXeOttv, TO <re reKva r 6vt)<rei.

'$2 6elr) 'SaKa/iis, CMTOXFIS 8e <rv reicua yvvaiK&v, &c.

(Herodot. vii. 141).

CHAP. XXXIX.] ADVICE OF THEMISTOKLES. 81

for the best expositors of the divine will: it har-monized completely with the despairing temperthen prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentencepronounced in the first oracle; and emigrationto some foreign land presented itself as the onlyhope of safety even for their persons. The fate ofAthens,—and of Greece generally, which wouldhave been helpless without Athens,—now hungupon a thread, when Themistokle's, the great ori-ginator of the fleet, interposed with equal stead-fastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the pro-per use of it. He contended that if the god hadintended to designate Salamis as the scene of anaval disaster to the Greeks, that island wouldhave been called in the oracle by some such epi-thet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that itwas termed " divine Salamis," indicated that theparties, destined to perish there, were the enemiesof Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encou-raged his countrymen therefore to abandon theircity and country, and to trust themselves to thefleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god,but with full determination to fight and conquer onboard1. Great indeed were the consequences which

1 Herodot. vii. 143. Tavrr) QtjxMTTOKXeovs dirocpaivoficvov, 'ABrjvaioiravrd a(f)i eyvatrav aiperwTfpa eivcu fiaXXov rj ra ra>v xprfcrpoXoyuv, otOVK e'ltav vavfiaxii)v apreecrdcu, dXXa iiiXmovTas x^PI" Thv 'Arrunji', aXXrjvTiva olitifciv.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true,respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated in-terpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in theAthenian assembly, and Herodotus may well have conversed with per-sons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle whichhe states to have been delivered to the Spartans—intimating that eitherSparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish—we may

VOL. V. G


turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjec-ture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded,by some plausible show of interpretation, that thesense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbiddinga naval combat, they would in their existing de-pression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Great and Even with the help of an encouraging interpre-genuine . . ,

Pan-hei- tation, however, nothing less than the most uncon-triotism'of querable resolution and patriotism could have en-fant— *~ abled the Athenians to bear up against such terrifictested^* denunciations from the Delphian god, and persistHerodotus, in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigra-as his own . J , . - , , . , • ,

judgement, tion. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truthupon his readers1: nay, he even steps out of hisway to do so, proclaiming Athens as the realsaviour of Greece. Writing as he did about thebeginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a timewhen Athens, having attained the maximum of herempire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, bymost of the Grecian states—he knows that theopinion which he is giving will be unpopular withhis hearers generally, and he apologizes for it assomething wrung from him against his will by theforce of the evidence3. Nor was it only that thewell doubt whetlier it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylae(Herodot. vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Poly<E-nus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistokles, inferiorto Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

1 Herodot. vii. 139. ov8e <r(f>€as xPr\vThpia </>o/3ef)a, i\66vra ZK Ae\(pS>v,Rat es Selfia fiakovTa, «re«re (Kkmeiv TTJV 'EXAdSa, &c.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many differentsources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we maycompare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, de-scribed by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

1 Herodot. vii. 139. ''Evdavra avayKair) cgepyofiat yvdojiriv dnode'ga-

CHAP. XXXIX.J RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS. 83

Athenians dared to stay and fight against immenseodds: they, and they alone, threw into the causethat energy and forwardness whereby it was en-abled to succeed1, as will appear farther in thesequel. But there was also a third way, not lessdeserving of notice, in which they contributed tothe result. As soon as the congress of deputiesmet at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essentialto recognise some one commanding state, and withregard to the land-force no one dreamt of contest-ing the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect tothe fleet, her pretensions were more disputable,since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, andlittle or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best shipsand seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was atfirst started, that Athens should command at sea and

crdai, enifpOovov fiev 7rp6s ran1 n\e6va>v avQpd>7ra)V' ofjuas 6*e, Trj ye

fioi (paiverai eival aXySes, OVK cVtO'^ija'a). Ei'Adrjvatoij KarappaybrjO'avres

TOV eiriovTO. KivSvvov, i^eXmov Ti)V o§er£pi)v, &c Nvv 8c, 'A.9r)vaLovs

av Tis \eya>u <ra>Trjpas ycvio-6ai rrjs 'EXXaSos, OVK av dp.apTa.voi TO dXrjBts,

&c.The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us

the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed,and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persianwar. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historianwrites for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments,prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed arethose who were so full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to herchiefly the honour of having beaten back the Persians ; and to maintain,that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesiansboth could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus ofCorinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponne-sian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea aswell as by land.

1 Herodot. vii. 139- iKofievoi Se rrjv 'EXXdSa irepieivai £\ev8epr]v,TOVTO TO 'FXXTJVLKOV TZCLV TO \oinbv, oo~ov jxr) e/ir]8icre, avrol ovroi ^craj/ of

ineyslpavres, ftal fiao-Ckia p.€Ta ye deovs avaxrafxivoi.

G 2


Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies mani-fested a decided repugnance, announcing that theywould follow no one but a Spartan. To the honourof the Athenians, they at once waived their preten-sions, as soon as they saw that the unity of theconfederate force at this moment of peril would becompromised1. To appreciate this generous abne-gation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we mustrecollect that the love of pre-eminence was amongthe most prominent attributes of the Hellenic cha-racter : a prolific source of their greatness and ex-cellence, but producing also no small amount bothof their follies and their crimes. To renounce atthe call of public obligation a claim to personalhonour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all vir-tues in a son of Hellen.

Unwilling- We find thus the Athenians nerved up. to thepitch of resistance—prepared to see their countrywastecl> and to live as well as to fight on shipboard,w ^ e n t n e necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet and yet prosecuting thebuilding of fresh ships until the last moment9—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader inthe common cause, while content themselves toserve like other states under the leadership ofSparta. During the winter preceding the march ofXerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmuswas trying, with little success, to bring the Greciancities into united action. Among the cities northof Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater numberwere either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the

1 Herodot. viii. 2, 3 : compare vii. 161.8 Herodot. vii. 144.

gp

Greeks toresist the

CHAP. XXXIX.] AMBIGUOUS CONDUCT OF THE ARGIVES. 85

greater part of Boeotia, or at least lukewarm in thecause of independence—so rare at this trying mo-ment (to use the language of the unfortunate Pla-tseans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertionof resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader1.Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerfulArgos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It wasone of the first steps of the congress to send specialenvoys to Argos, to set forth the common dangerand solicit cooperation ; the result is certain, thatno cooperation was obtained—the Argeians didnothing throughout the struggle; but as to their Ambiguous

°. ° b & . neutrality

real position, or the grounds of their refusal, con- f Atradictory statements had reached the ears of He-rodotus. They themselves affirmed that they wereready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite ofdissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exacting onlyas conditions that the Spartans should conclude atruce with them for thirty years, and should equallydivide the honours of headship with Argos. Tothe proposed truce there would probably have beenno objection, nor was there any as to the principleof dividing the headship : but the Spartans added,that they had two kings, while the Argeians hadonly one; and inasmuch as neither of the twoSpartan kings could be deprived of his vote, theArgeian king could only be admitted to a third voteconjointly with them. This proposition appearedto the Argeians (who considered that even the vm-

J Thucyd. iii. 56. eV Kaipois ols (rndviov rjv TUJV 'EWrjvcov Ttva dperrjprrj Sep^ov bvva.fi.fi avrvra^auBat.

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than theboasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in these times.See Demosthen. Philipp. iii. 37, p. 120.

86 HISTOET OF GREECE. [PART II.

divided headship was no more than their ancientright) as nothing better than insolent encroach-ment, and incensed them so much that they de-sired the envoys to quit their territory before sun-set—preferring even a tributary existence underPersia to a formal degradation as compared withSparta1.

S u c ^ w a s t h e s t o r y tol(* ^ ^ e A r S e i a n s them-selves, but seemingly not credited either by any

Greece

aboutArgos other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The pre-of Herodo- valent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secrettus' understanding with Xerxes, and some even affirmed

that they had been the parties who invited himinto Greece, as a means both of protection and ofvengeance to themselves against Sparta after theirdefeat by Kleomenes. And Herodotus himself evi-dently believed that they medised, though he is halfafraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in acloud of words which betray the angry polemicsgoing on about the matter, even fifty years after-wards2. It is certain that in act the Argeians were

1 Herodot. vii. 147-150.! The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, with-

out mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance.After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the de-fence of the Isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus,ethnically classified, he proceeds to say : TOI/TOW &V TO>V «rra l&viav atXoarai iro\is, wdpe£ rwv KareXe^a, in TOV jietrov inariaTo' el 8e i\cv-Bepoas (£e<TTt clirelv, IK TOV fiecrov Karfuxevoi epr]§i£ov (viii. 73).This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

Where he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by nomeans so free and categorical: compare vii. 152—he will give no opi-nion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians them-selves—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation,but without guaranteeing their accuracy—he delivers a general admo-nition that those who think they have great reason to complain ofthe conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny,

CHAP. XXXIX.] KRETANS AND K O R K Y R J E A N S . 87

neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was,that they did not choose to join any Pan-helleniclevy except in the capacity of chiefs ; but probablythe more powerful reason was, that they shared theimpression then so widely diffused throughoutGreece as to the irresistible force of the approach-ing host, and chose to hold themselves prepared forthe event. They kept up secret negotiations evenwith Persian agents, yet not compromising them-selves while matters were still pending; nor is itimprobable, in their vexation against Sparta, thatthey would have been better pleased if the Persianshad succeeded,—all which may reasonably be term-ed, medising.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was' equwoca-

borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and tionoftheKorkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus and Korky-proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined rseans'to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory in-junctions from the oracle1; the Korkyrseans pro-mised without performing, and even without anyintention to perform. Their neutrality was a se-that others have as much reason to complain of them—" And thus theconduct of Argos has not been so much worse than that of others"—ovra) drj OVK 'Apyetotct a tc^tora 7r€nolj]Tai.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian -war, when the history of He-rodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly fa-vourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedae-mon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian whoopenly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in thememorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incurodium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter areof little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeedunfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as beinguniversally believed {anavrcs io-ao-iv), which it evidently was not.



rious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out anaval force of sixty triremes, second only to that ofAthens. With this important contingent they en-gaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sailfrom Korkyra ; but they took care not to sail roundCape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Theirfleet remained on the southern or western coast ofPeloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Sa-latnis was known. Their impression was that thePersian monarch would be victorious, in which casethey would have made a merit of not having ar-rived in time ; but they were also prepared with theplausible excuse of detention from foul winds, whenthe result turned out otherwise, and when they werereproached by the Greeks for their absence1. Suchduplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollectthat it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to iso-late herself from Hellenic confederacies 2.

Geion°attO ^he e n v o y s w n o visited Korkyra proceeded on-Syracuse— Ward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syra-

cuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotusas more powerful than any state in Greece, I shallspeak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it issufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aidagainst Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so,whatever might have been his inclinations; for the

1 Herodot. vii. 168.2 Thucyd. i. 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian en-

voys in Thucydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of theKorkyrseans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invectivewhich they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly.(Thucydid. i. 37-42.) The conduct of Corinth herself, however, onthe same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

CHAP. XXXIX.J THE GREEKS ENTER THESSALY. 89

same year which brought the Persian monarchagainst Greece, was also selected by the Carthagi-nians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which keptthe Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their ownisland. It seems even probable that this simultane-ous invasion had been concerted between the Per-sians and Carthaginians1.

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the GrecianIsthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement into Thes-to their cause except some fair words from the defend*theKorkyraeans. It was about the time when Xerxes ^f^fwas about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning againstof 480 B.C, that the first actual step for resistance B.C. 480.was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians.Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleu-adse were among the companions of Xerxes, andthe most forward in inviting him into Greece, withevery promise of ready submission from their coun-trymen, it seems that these promises were in realityunwarranted : the Aleuadse were at the head onlyof a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, likethe Peisistratidse2: while most of the Thessalianswere disposed to resist Xerxes, for which purposethey now sent envoys to the Isthmus3, intimatingthe necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus,the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offer-ed their own cordial aid in this defence, addingthat they should be under the necessity of makingtheir own separate submission, if this demand werenot complied with, Accordingly a body of 10,000

1 Herodot. vii. 158-167. Diodor. xi. 22.2 See Schol. ad Aristeid., Anathenaic. p. 138.3 Herodot. vii. 172 : compare c. 130.


ghim,—andretire.

Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the commandof the Spartan Eusenetus and the Athenian Themi-stokl&s, were despatched by sea to Halus in AchseaPhthi6tis, where they disembarked and marched byland across Achsea and Thessaly1. Being joined bythe Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile ofTemp6\ through which the river Peneius makes itsway to the sea, by a cleft between the mountainsOlympus and Ossa.

On arriving, The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempe1

thatitnran- formed then, and forms still, the single entrance,°P e n throughout winter as well as summer, fromLower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly: thelofty mountain precipices approach so closely as toleave hardly room enough in some places for aroad: it is thus eminently defensible, and a fewresolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it theprogress of the most numerous host2. But theGreeks soon discovered that the position was such

1 Herodot. vii. 173.2 Herodot. vii. 172. TTJV icrpokrjv rrjv 'OXvfmiKqv. See the description

and plan of Tempi in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. ix. p. 280; andthe Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interestingdefile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frank-fort, 1834).

The description of Tempe in Livy (xliii. 18; xliv. 6) seems more ac-curate than that in Pliny (H. N. iv. 8). We may remark that boththe one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation andorganization of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greecein a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexanderthe Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of TempS by for-tifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a mili-tary communication. In the time of Xerxes, these natural difficultieshad never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtlessmuch greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in itsnarrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, p. 21-33).

CHAI\ XXXIX.] ALARM OF THE GREEKS. 91

as they could not hold,—first, because the powerfulfleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in theirrear; secondly, because there was also a secondentrance passable in summer, from Upper Mace-donia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes overthe range of Olympus ; an entrance which traversedthe country of the Perrhsebians and came into Thes-saly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defileof Tempe" begins to narrow. It was in fact by thissecond pass, evading the insurmountable difficul-ties of Tempe", that the advancing march of thePersians was destined to be made, under the au-spices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary tothem and active in their service ; who sent a com-munication of this fact to the Greeks at Tempe",admonishing them that they would be troddenunder foot by the countless host approaching, andurging them to renounce their hopeless position1.This Macedonian prince passed for a friend, andprobably believed himself to be acting as such indissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistanceto Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerousmediator; and as such the Spartans had good rea-son to dread him, in a second intervention of whichwe shall hear more hereafter2. On the presentoccasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ig-norant of the existence of any other entrance intoThessaly, besides Temp6\ until their arrival in thatregion. Perhaps it might have been possible todefend both entrances at once, and considering theimmense importance of arresting the march of thePersians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt

1 Herodot. vii. 173. 2 Herodot. viii. 140-143.


would have been worth some risk. So great wasthe alarm, however, produced by the unexpecteddiscovery, justifying or seeming to justify thefriendly advice of Alexander, that they remainedonly a few days at Temp6, then at once retiredback to their ships, and returned by sea to theIsthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxeswas crossing the Hellespont1.

Conse- This precipitate retreat produced consequencesquences of r l I T • T i

this retreat highly disastrous and discouraging. It appearedA s , and to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithseron and of

"U t n e Megarid territory without defence, and it servedKithsron either as reason or pretext for the majority of the

•waver.

either Grecian states north of that boundary to make theirsubmit to ,

Xerxes, or submission to Xerxes, which some of them had al-ready begun to do before2. When Xerxes in thecourse of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf,within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heraldswhom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokensof submission from a third portion of the Hellenicname — the Thessalians, Dolopes, iEnianes, Per-rhasbians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians,Phthiotid Achseans, and Boeotians—among the lat-ter is included Thebes, but not Thespia? or Platsea.The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted,but manifested active zeal and rendered much ser-vice in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus ofthe Aleuadse, whose party now became predomi-nant : they were probably indignant at the hastyretreat of those who had come to defend them8.

1 Herodot vii. 173, 174.3 Diodor. xi. 3. en Trapoiarjs rrjs iv roh Tf>7TE<7t (pvXaKqs, &c.3 Herodot. vii. 131, 132, 174.

CHAP. XXX[X.] ADVANCE OF THE GREEKS. 93

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passesof Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fractionmight probably have been induced to partake inthe resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries tothe invader. During the six weeks or two monthswhich elapsed between the retreat of the Greeksfrom Tempe* and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma,no new plan of defence appears to have been form-ed ; for it was not until that arrival became knownat the Isthmus that the Greek army and fleet madeits forward movement to occupy Thermopylae andArtemisium1.

1 Herodot. vii. 177-

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM.

Engage- j T w a s while the northerly states of Greece werement taken "

by the con- thus successively falling oft from the commonGreeks cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus

hGk took among themselves the solemn engagement, inevent of success, to inflict upon these recusant

brethren condign punishment—to tithe them inproperty, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth oftheir persons, for the profit of the Delphian god.Exception was to be made in favour of those stateswhich had been driven to yield by irresistible ne-cessity1. Such a vow seemed at that moment littlelikely to be executed: it was the manifestation ofa determined feeling binding together the stateswhich took the pledge, but it cannot have contri-buted much to intimidate the rest.

Resolution To display their own force, was the only effectivetaken to de- r J > j

fend Ther- way of keeping together doubtful allies; and thewen as the pass of Thermopylae was now fixed upon as thest^t1^ m o s t convenient point of defence, next to that ofBubcea. Tempe"—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to

the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhsebians, Magnates,Phthiotid Achseans, Dolopes, iEnianes, Malians,&c, who would all have been included if the latterline had been adhered to ; but comprising thelargest range consistent with safety. The positionof Thermopylae presented another advantage which

1 Herodot. vii. 132 ; Diodor. xi. 3.

CHAP. XL.] BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. 95

was not to be found at TempS ; the mainland washere separated from the island of Euboea only by anarrow strait, about two English miles and a halfin its smallest breadth, between Mount Kne'mis andCape Ke"naeum. On the northern portion of Eu-boea, immediately facing Magnesia and AchseaPhthiotis, was situated the line of coast called Ar-temisium; a name derived from the temple ofArtemis, which was its most conspicuous feature,belonging to the town of Histisea. It was arrangedthat the Grecian fleet should be mustered there,in order to cooperate with the land-force, and tooppose the progress of the Persians on both ele-ments at once. To fight in a narrow space1 wassupposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not lessthan on land, inasmuch as their ships were bothfewer in number, and heavier in sailing than thosein the Persian service. From the position of Ar-temisium, it was calculated that they might be ableto prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into thenarrow strait which severs Euboea to the northand west from the mainland, and which betweenChalkis and Bceotia becomes not too wide for abridge. It was at this latter point that the Greekseamen would have preferred to place their defence :but the occupation of the northern part of the Eu-boean strait was indispensable to prevent the Per-sian fleet from landing troops in the rear of thedefenders of Thermopylae.

1 Herodot. viii. 15-60. Compare Isokrates, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59.I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took

place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Pelo-ponnesian wars.


Pass of Of this Eubcean strait, the western limit is formedpyiae and by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into whichW h d the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course

from west to east between the line of Mount Othrysto the north and Mount GEta to the south—nearthe town of Antikyra. The lower portion of thisspacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius wasoccupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bor-dering to the north and east on Achsea Phthiotis:the southernmost Malians, with their town ofTrachis, occupied a plain—in some places consider-able, in others very narrow—enclosed betweenMount CEta and the sea. From Trachis the rangeof CEta stretched eastward, bordering close on thesouthern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between thetwo lay the memorable pass of Thermopylae1. Onthe road from Trachis to Thermopylae, immediatelyoutside of the latter and at the mouth of the littlestreams called the Phoenix and the As6pus, wasplaced the town of Anthela, celebrated for its tem-ples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic De-me'te'r, as well as for the autumnal assemblies ofthe Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats wereprovided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthe'la, the northern slopeof the mighty and prolonged ridge of QEta ap-proached so close to the gulf, or at least to an in-accessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf,as to leave no more than one single wheel track

1 The word Pass commonly conveys the idea of a path enclosed be-tween mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a nar-row passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marshground) on the other.


between. This narrow entrance formed the west-ern gate of Thermopylae. At some little distance,seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the sameclose conjunction between the mountain and thesea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate ofThermopylae, not far from the first town of the Lo-krians, called Alpe"ni. The space between thesetwo gates was wider and more open, but it wasdistinguished, and is still distinguished, by itsabundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sul-phureous. Some cells were here prepared forbathers, which procured for the place the appella-tion of Chytri or the Pans : but the copious supplyof mineral water spread its mud, and deposited itscrust over all the adjacent ground ; and the Pho-cians, some time before, had designedly endea-voured so to conduct the water as to render thepass utterly impracticable, at the same time build-ing a wall across it near to the western gate. Theyhad done this in order to keep off the attacks ofthe Thessalians, who had been trying to extendtheir conquests southward and eastward. The warmsprings, here as in other parts of Greece, were con-secrated to Herakle"s1, whose legendary exploitsand sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount OEta, Trachis, Cape Kenseum, the Li-chades islands, the river Dyras : some fragments ofthese legends have been transmitted and adorned

1 According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religiouslegend into matter of historical and physical fact, Herakles was sup-posed to have been an engineer or water-finder in very early times—Seivos Trepi £rjT7)<riv iSdrav Kal crvvayaryrjv. See Plutarch, Cum princi-pibus viris philosopho esse disserendum, c. i. p. 776.

VOL. V. H

98 HISTORY OF GKEECE. [PART II.

by the genius of Sophokle"s, in his drama of theTrachinian maidens.

The Greeks Such was the general scene—two narrow open-atThPermo- ings with an intermediate mile of enlarged roadvyx' and hot springs between them—which passed in

ancient times by the significant name of Ther-mopylae, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly,Pylse—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis,between the mountains and the sea, about two milesoutside or westward of Thermopylae, the road washardly less narrow, but it might be turned bymarching to the westward, since the adjacentmountains were lower, and presented less difficultyof transit: while at Thermopylae itself, the over-hanging projection of Mount CEta was steep, woody,and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessalyinto Lokris and the territories south-east of CEta,only through the strait gate1; save and except an

1 About Thermopylae, see Herodot. vii. 175, 176, 199, 200.' H 8' av bta Tprj^ivos eo-oSos is TTJU 'EXXaSa ca r t , rrj crreivoTaTOV, rjjii-

irkeBpov' oil fiivroi Kara. TOVT6 y eori TO arcivoTarov rfjs X^PV* TVS oXK^s,

dXX' i'fmpoo-Oe re Ocp/iOTrvXecav Kai 6Vtcr#e' Kara re 'A\7rr)vovs, omo-8e

iovras , iovo-a apat-iTos fiovvr)' Kai 'ijnrpoo-Be Kara QoiviKa TTOTafWV, &fui-

£IT6S aXkri fioivrj.

Compare Pausanias, vii. 15, 2. TO <TTSUOV TO 'HpaxXeiar re /lera^uKai Qepiio7rv\ea>v; also Strabo, ix. p . 429 ; and Livy, xxxvi. 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylae—(n-eu/orepiy yap iabaivtTO iov<rarrjs els Oecro-aXirjv, i. e. than the defile of Tempe\

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given byHerodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memo-rable event here before us ; for the configuration of the coast, the courseof the rivers, and the general local phsenomena, have now so entirelychanged, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In theinterior of the Maliac Gulf, three or four miles of new land have beenformed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the Gulfitself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate ofThermopylae is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has ma-

CHAP. XL.] BATTLKS OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. 99

unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain pathwhich will be presently spoken of. The wall origi-nally built across the pass by the Phocians wasnow half-ruined by age and neglect: but the Greekseasily re-established it, determining to await in thisnarrow pass, in that age narrower even than thedefile of Tempe1, the approach of the invading host.The edge of the sea-line appears to have been forthe most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor forsailing: but there were points at which boats couldland, so that constant communication could bemaintained with the fleet at Artemisium, whileAlpeni was immediately in their rear to supplyprovisions.

terially altered its course : instead of flowing into the sea in an easterlydirection considerably north of Thermopylae, as it did in the time ofHerodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of itscourse, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of thepass : -while the rivers Dyras, Melas, and Asopus, which in the time ofHerodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Sper-cheius and Thermopylae, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall intothe Spercheius. Moreover the perpetual flow of the thermal springshas tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil gene-rally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the roadbetween the two gates of Thermopylae as bearing north and south,whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing'of the appellation Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an un-defined portion of the eastern ridge of (Eta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylae, see thevaluable observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece,vol. ii. ch. x. p. 7-40; Gell, Itinerary of Greece, p. 239; Kruse, Hel-las, vol. iii. ch. x. p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes, "The hot springsissue principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone pre-cipices of (Eta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passesclose under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits twohorsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between thecauseway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very nearbeing buried with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a fewpaces into it from the paved road " (Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. viii.p. 247).

H 2


Lconidas,king ofSparta,conductsthe forcethither—the com-bined fleetunder Eu-rybiadesoccupy theEuboeanstrait.

Numbersand com-position ofthe force ofLeonidas.

Though the resolution of the Greek deputiesassembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointlyThermopylae and the Eubcean strait, had beentaken seemingly not long after the retreat fromTempe", their troops and their fleet did not actuallyoccupy these positions until Xerxes was known tohave reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were thenput in motion; the land-force under the Spartanking Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartancommander Eurybiade"s, apparently about the lat-ter part of the month of June. Leonidas was theyounger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law,of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenes, whoseonly daughter Gorgo he had married. Anotherbrother of the same family—Dorieus, older thanLeonidas—had perished, even before the death ofKleomenes, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant acolony in Sicily; and room had been thus madefor the unexpected succession of the youngest bro-ther. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmusto Thermopylae a select band of 300 Spartans—allbeing citizens of mature age, and persons who leftat home sons to supply their places1. Along withthem were 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Man-tineia, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200

1 Herodot. vii. 177, 205. tmXei-dixevos &»&pas r« TOVSrpirjKcxrlovs, Kai Toiui ervyxavov iraiSes iovres.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by pre-ference those who already had families : if such a man was slain, heleft behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to main-tain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of whichwas considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of thefather of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value,and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

CHAP. XL.] BATTLES OF THERMOPYLiE AND ARTEMISIUM. 101

from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenae. There werealso doubtless Helots and other light troops, inundefined number, and probably a certain numberof Lacedaemonian hoplites, not Spartans. In theirmarch through Bceotia they were joined by 700hoplites of Tbespiaj, hearty in the cause, and by400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leon-tiadds. It appears indeed that the leading men ofThebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy,decidedly medised, or espoused the Persian interest,as much as they dared before the Persians wereactually in the country : and Leonidas, when hemade the requisition for a certain number of theirtroops to assist in the defence of Thermopylae, wasdoubtful whether they would not refuse compliance,and openly declare against the Greek cause. TheTheban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, thoughagainst their real inclinations, and furnished a con-tingent of 400 men1, chosen from citizens of asentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the The-ban people, and the Boeotians generally, with theexception of Thespiai and Platsea, seem to have hadlittle sentiment on either side, and to have followedpassively the inspirations of their leaders.

1 Herodot. vii. 205 ; Thucyd. iii. 62 ; Diodor. xi. 4 ; Plutarch, Ari-steides, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming toa great degree the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appre-ciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible(De Herodoti Malign, pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copiedfrom a lost Boeotian author named Aristophanes, who tried to makeout a more honourable case for his countrymen in respect to their con-duct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus—B-qfiaiwv diro rrjr ercpas fiept&os <as rerpa-Ko<rioi—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyrsean government(Thucyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send themaway; also that of the Italian Cumie (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

102 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART H.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermo-and Lokri- r ,

ans. pyise, whence he sent envoys to invite the junc-tion of the Phocians and the Lokrians of Opus.The latter had been among those who had sent earthand water to Xerxes, of which they are said to haverepented: the step was taken probably only fromfear, which at this particular moment prescribedacquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justifiedby the plea of necessity in case the Persians shouldprove ultimately victorious1 : while the Phocians,if originally disposed to medise, were now precludedfrom doing so by the fact that their bitter enemiesthe Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxesand influential in guiding his movements 2 . TheGreek envoys added strength to their summons byall the encouragements in their power. " The troopsnow at Thermopylae (they said) were a mere ad-vanced body,preceding the main strength of Greece,which was expected to arrive every day : on theside of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already onguard : nor was there any cause for fear, since theinvader was after all not a god, but a man, exposedto those reverses of fortune which came inevitablyon all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition3 ." Such arguments prove buttoo evidently the melancholy state of terror whichthen pervaded the Greek mind : whether reassuredby them or not, the great body of the Opuntian

1 Diodor. xi. 4. 2 Herodot. viii. 30.s Herodot. vii. 203. \eyovres dt dyyekav, £>s airol p.tv fJKOiev jrpd-

bpojiot T5)V aWayv, ol fie XotnoX TO>I> o~vp.fxd^(av 7rpoo~BoKinoi iratrdv elo~trjfxepr}V Kai (rcpi e'irj §e6fO!> oi8cV ov yap Bfbv elvai TOV inlovra ejrirfjv 'EAXdSa, aXX' avBpanoV (ivai 8e 6vr)Tov ovheva, oiSe 'itrtadai, rep

it; dpxfjs yu/op.lva ov <rwefu'x#>;, Total 8e p.cyioToio-1 airecov,ra' 6(pel\etv 3>v Kai TOV ineXavvovra, ins iovra 6vr\Tov, dno rrjs 86£rjsiv civ*

KCIKOV


Lokrians, and 1000 Phocians, joined Leonidas atThermopylae.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, Olympianthere cannot be any doubt: and the question natu- ndan festi-rally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at Greeks1"5

once send their full force instead of a mere advanced bn them-guard ? The answer is to be found in another at- selves t0

. postpone

tribute of the Greek character—it was the time of these, evencelebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the hnminentl

banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival danger-

at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states'.Even at a moment when their whole freedom andexistence were at stake, the Greeks could not bringthemselves to postpone these venerated solemnities:especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whomthis force of religious routine appears to have beenthe strongest. At a period more than a centurylater, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energyof the Athenians had materially declined, we shallfind them too postponing the military necessities ofthe state to the complete and splendid fulfilment oftheir religious festival obligations—starving all theirmeasures of foreign policy in order that the Theoricexhibitions might be imposing to the people andsatisfactory to the gods. At present, we find littledisposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians.The latter, remaining at home to celebrate theirfestivals while an invader of superhuman might was

1 Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedsemon,Argos, Sikyon, &c.) which were under obligation of abstinence fromaggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival:other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantineia, &c, and of courseAthens, were not under similar restraint (Thucvd. v. 54, 75).


at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latterdays of their independence, who suffered the opera-tions of the besieging Roman army round their cityto be carried on without interruption during theSabbath1. The Spartans and their confederatesreckoned that Leonidas with his detachment wouldbe strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylaeuntil the Olympic and Karneian festivals should bepast, after which period they were prepared tomarch to his aid with their whole military force2 :and they engaged to assemble in Boeotia for thepurpose of defending Attica against attack on theland-side, while the great mass of the Athenian forcewas serving on shipboard.

Path over At the time when this plan was laid, they believedT a that the narrow pass of Thermopylae was the only

p y g means of possible access for an invading army. But—LlonidL Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for thefirst in- first nme that there was also a mountain path start-formea of _ A

it on reaching from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending—thePho- the gorge of the river Asopus and the hill calledgaged*"" Anopaea, then crossing the crest of CEta and derdefend it. s c e n c h n g i n the rear of Thermopylae near the Lokri-

an town of Alp£ni. This path,—then hardly used,though its ascending half now serves as the regulartrack from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salonaon the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the in-

1 Josephus, Bell. Judaic, i. 7, 3 ; ii. 16, 4 ; ibid. Antiqq. Judaic.xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jewsdefended themselves; but they would not break through the religiousobligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of thebesiegers. See Reimar. ad Dion. Cass. Ixvi, f.

2 Herodot. vii. 206 ; viii. 40.


habitants of Trachis, who in former days had con-ducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis,after the Phocians had blocked up the pass of Ther-mopylae. It was therefore not unknown to thePhocians: it conducted from Trachis into theircountry, and they volunteered to Leonidas that theywould occupy and defend it1. But the Greeks thusfound themselves at Thermopylae under the samenecessity of providing a double line of defence, forthe mountain path as well as for the defile, as thatwhich had induced their former army to abandonTemp§ : and so insufficient did their numbers seem,when the vast host of Xerxes was at length under-stood to be approaching, that a panic terror seizedthem; and the Peloponnesian troops especially,anxious only for their own separate line of defenceat the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thitherforthwith. The indignant remonstrances of thePhocians and Lokrians, who would thus have beenleft to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidasto forbid this retrograde movement: but he thoughtit necessary to send envoys to the various cities,insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, andrequesting immediate reinforcements2. So painfullywere the consequences now felt, of having keptback the main force until after the religious festivalsin Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this° ° . and compo-

m o m e n t i n t h e i r n a v a l a r m a m e n t , t h o u g h i t h a d i i f hi • e • i_ J. A Z. • • Greek fleet

mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisiumon the northern coast of Eubcea, under the SpartanEurybiades. It was composed as follows :—100

1 Herodot. vii. 212, 216, 218. ! Herodot. vii. 207.


Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizensof Platsea, in spite of their total want of practice onshipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athe-nian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis andlent to them by Athens, 18 JEginetan, 12 Sikyo-nian, 10 Lacedaemonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian,5 Trcezenian, 2 from Styrus in Eubcea, and 2 fromthe island of Keos. There were thus in all 271triremes ; together with 9 pentekonters, furnishedpartly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus.Themistokle's was at the head of the Athenian con-tingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; ofother officers we hear nothing1. Three cruisingvessels, an Athenian, an iEginetan, and a Trceze-nian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thes-saly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch theadvancing movements of the Persian fleet fromTherma.

Three tn- j(- w a s \yere j.naf. ^e grgj. blood was shed in thisremes or

the Grecian memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in thefleet sent * .

forward as .Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction oftheir erst Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes,probably supposing them to be the precursorsPersian of t n e entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athe-

nian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius,where the crew abandoned her, and repaired byland to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy:the other two ships were overtaken and capturedafloat—not without a vigorous resistance on thepart of the JEginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythes,fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with

1 Herodot. viii. I, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi. 12) makes the Athenian num-ber stronger by twenty triremes.

CHAP. XL,] BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. 107

wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admirehim, that they took infinite pains to preserve hislife, and treated him with the most signal mani-festations both of kindness and respect, while theydealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trcezenian vessel, which was thefirst to be captured, they found a soldier namedLeon, of imposing stature: this man was imme-diately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a pre-saging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps(observes the historian) his name may have contri-buted to determine his fate1. The ten Persian shipsadvanced no farther than the dangerous rockMyrm&x, between Skiathos and the mainland, Capture of

J these three

which had been made known to them by a Greek triremes-navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected generala pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. j ^Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence,communicated by fire-signals2 from Skiathos, and sium>and

J ° retire to

strengthened by the capture of the three look-out Chaikis.ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, thatthey actually abandoned their station, believingthat the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand3.They sailed up the Euboean strait to Chaikis, asthe narrowest and most defensible passage; leavingscouts on the high lands to watch the enemy'sadvance.

1 Herodot. vii. 180. ra^a 8' au TI KCU TOV OVO/IOTOS inavpoiTO.Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case

unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix. 91 ; and Tacit. Hist,iv. 53.

2 For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii. 5; andthe opening of the Agamemnon of iEschylus anil the same play, v. 270,300 j also Thucydides, iii. 22-80.

3 Herodot. vii. 181, 182, 183.


Imminentdanger ofthe Greekscheme ofdefence—they arerescued bya terrificstorm.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced uponthe generals by the panic of their troops, similar tothat which King Leonidas, more powerful thanEurybiades and ThemistoklSs, had found means toarrest at Thermopylae. It ruined for the time thewhole scheme of defence, by laying open the rearof the army at Thermopylae to the operations of thePersian fleet. But that which the Greeks did notdo for themselves was more than compensated bythe beneficent intervention of their gods, who op-posed to the invader the more terrible arms ofstorm and hurricane. He was allowed to bringhis overwhelming host, land force as well as naval,to the brink of Thermopylae and to the coast ofThessaly, without hindrance or damage; but thetime had now arrived when the gods appeared deter-mined to humble him, and especially to strike a se-ries of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to anumber not beyond what the Greeks could contendwith1. Amidst the general terror which pervadedGreece, the Delphians were the first to earn thegratitude of their countrymen by announcing thatdivine succour was at hand2. On entreating advicefrom their own oracle, they were directed to prayto the Winds, who would render powerful aidto Greece. Moreover the Athenian seamen, in

Herodot. vii. 184. /ze^pt [xev SSy TOVTOV TOV %wpov Kai TGIV Qepfioirv-\ia>v, dwadrjs re KOKOIV tfr/v 6 (TTparbs, Kai irkrjdos tr)v rrjviKavTa ?TI T6<TOV,&c.—viii. 13. eVotcfTO di •nav ino TOV deov, OKOS av i^urwBtir) ra 'EXXij-VIKM TO HepaiKov, /«;$£ 7roXXi» nKeop sir). Compare viii. 109; and Diodor.xi. 13.

s Herodot. vii. 178. AeX^oi 8e Sef-d/ievoi TO iiavrfj'tov, irpa>Ta ^.tv, 'EXXJJ-vav Toio-i fiovkOfitvouTi etvai ikev6ipoio-i i£r]yyei\av TO. xprja-dtvra avroio-i'Kai <J$I Bui/as KarappaStovo-i TOP fiapfiapov cgayy(t\avres, X&Plv dddvaTOV

d


their retreat at Chalk is, recollecting that Boreaswas the husband of the Attic princess or heroineOreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erech-theus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help moreeffective, or more opportune, than the destructivestorm, presently to be recounted, on the coast ofMagnesia, for which grateful thanks and annualsolemnities were still rendered even in the time ofHerodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi1.

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several Movementsof Xerxes

days, employing a large portion of his numerous fromJ . r . , , * . , , , Therma.

army in cutting down the woods, and clearing theroads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Ma-cedonia into Perrhsebia, which was recommendedby his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defileof Tempi2. Not intending to march through thelatter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it ;and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility ofblocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into

1 Herodot. vii. 189. The language of the historian in this chapter isremarkable : his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religiousacquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some othermiracles of iEkus, Aristaeus, Empedokles, &c, reproves his Pagan op-ponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting themiracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi. pp. 629, 630).

2 The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, andOloosson—"saltum ad Petram"—" Perrhsebiae saltum " (Livy, xlv. 21;xliv. 27). Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieriaor Lower Macedonia into Upper Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neigh-bouring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii.ch. xviii. p. 337-343, and ch. xxx. p. 430 ; also Boue, La Turquie enEurope, vol. i. p. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkes, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obligedto cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the earlypart of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).


one vast lake1. His march from Therma throughMacedonia, Perrhsebia, Thessaly, and Achsea Phthi-6tis, into the territory of the Malians and the neigh-bourhood of Thermopylae, occupied eleven or twelvedays2: the people through whose towns he passedhad already made their submission, and the Thessa-lians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts.His numerous host was still farther swelled by thepresence of these newly submitted people, and bythe Macedonian troops under Alexander; so thatthe river Onoch6nus in Thessaly, and even theApidanus in Achsea Phthiotis, would hardly sufficeto supply it, but were drunk up, according to theinformation given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achsea,he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend con-nected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and thesacred grove of the Athamantid family: he respectedand protected these sacred places—an incidentwhich shows that the sacrilege and destruction of

1 Herodot.vii. 130,131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympusand Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probableenough ; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy ofsome ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the juxtaposition ofsuch a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defilewalled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to supposethat he could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch whodisposed of an indefinite amount of manual labour, and who had justfinished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite suffi-cient to convert that which might have been said into that which wassaid, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes com-municated to Herodotus.

2 The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxesand his land force (Herodot. vii. 183) ; it arrived in one day on theSepias Akte or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (ibid), was then assailedand distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceededimmediately afterwards to Aphetse (vii. 193). When it arrived at thelatter places, Xerxes himself had been three days in the Malian territory(vii. 196).

C H A P . XL.] BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. I l l

temples imputed to him by the Greeks, thoughtrue in regard to Athens, Aba?, Miletus, &c, wasby no means universally exhibited, and is evenfound qualified by occasional instances of greatrespect for Grecian religious feeling1. Along the He arrivesshore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into ^ ' 'the Trachinian territory near Thermopylae, wherehe encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of thefleet, so as to combine his farther movements inadvance2, now that the enemy were immediately inhis front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point Advance of*• the Persian

of communication with the same ease as he had fleet—it isarrived before Thermopylae. After having ascer-tained by the ten ships already mentioned (whichcaptured the three Grecian guardships) that thechannel between Skiathos and the mainland was of Magne-

sia.safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with hiswhole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna3, his sta-tion in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after themonarch had begun his land-march; and reachedin one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia,not far from its southernmost promontory. Thegreater part of this line of coast, formed by the de-clivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rockyand inhospitable: but south of the town calledKasthanaea there was a short extent of open beach,where the fleet rested for the night before comingto the line of coast called the Sepias Akte4. The

1 This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, Sittlich-religiose Lebens-ansicht des Herodotus. Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

2 Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201. 3 Diodor. xi. 12.4 Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (Themistokles, 8) and Mannert (Geogr.


first line of ships were moored to the land, but thelarger number of this immense fleet swung at an-chor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition theywere overtaken the next morning by a sudden anddesperate hurricane—a wind called by the people ofthe country Hellespontias, which blew right uponthe shore. The most active among the marinersfound means to forestal the danger by beaching andhauling their vessels ashore; but a large number,unable to take such a precaution, were carried be-fore the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibcea,Kasthansea, and other points of this unfriendly re-gion. Four hundred ships of war, according to thelowest estimate, together with a countless heap oftransports and provision craft, were destroyed : andthe loss of life as well as of property was immense.For three entire days did the terrors of the stormlast, during which time the crews ashore, left al-most without defence, and apprehensive that theinhabitants of the country might assail or plunderthem, were forced to break up the ships driven

immense ashore in order to make a palisade out of the tim-T J bers1. Though the Magian priests who accompa-

nie(* t n e armament were fervent in prayer andsacrifice,—not merely to the Winds but also toThetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities ofSe'pias Akte"—they could obtain no mitigation un-der Gr. und Romer, vol. vii. p. 596), seem to treat Se'pias as a cape,

the south-eastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus,

who mentions it as a line of some extent (awaaa 17 OKITJ J? 'S.rjmas, vii.

191), and notices separately TTJV axptju TT)S Mayi/qo-i'ijr, vii. 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i. 560-580) seems sadly in-accurate. » Herodot. vii. 189-191.


til the fourth day1: thus long did the prayers ofDelphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the godsagainst superhuman arrogance, protract the ter-rible visitation. At length on the fourth day calmweather returned, when all those ships which werein condition to proceed put to sea and sailed alongthe land, round the southern promontory of Mag-nesia, to Aphetae at the entrance of the Gulf ofPagasse. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by thelaborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopesto escape the unseen atmospheric enemies whichhowl around that formidable promontory: the workof destruction to his fleet was only transferred tothe opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetse without* ment occa-

misfortune, they would have found the Euboean the Greek

strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, fleet—theyso that they would have come immediately intocommunication with the land-army, and wouldhave acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his divi-sion. But the storm completely altered this pro-spect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet atChalkis. It was communicated to them by theirscouts on the high lands of Euboea, who even sentthem word that the entire Persian fleet was de-stroyed : upon which, having returned thanks andoffered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeksreturned back as speedily as they could to Arteaii-

1 Herodot. vii. 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers ad-dressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indicationof scepticism to escape him : r^jiepas yap 8r) ixeip-a^ rpeh' reXos 8e,'ivrop.6. TC nouvvres Kal Karaeidovres yoouri TO avep.u> oi Mdyoi, irpos reTOVTOUTI, Kal 0iri Kal TTJUI Nrjprjto-i Bvovres, evavcrav rerdprrj fjn-epy' rjaWais KCOS avros £8l\a>v

VOL. V.


sium. To their surprise, however, they saw thePersian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhi-biting a formidable total and appearance at the op-posite station of Aphetas. The last fifteen ships ofthat fleet, having been so greatly crippled by thestorm as to linger behind the rest, mistook theGreek ships for their own comrades, fell into themidst of them, and were all captured. Sandoke's,sub-satrap of the iEolic Kyme—Aridolis, despot ofAlabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Pa-phos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, weresent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after ha-ving been questioned respecting the enemy: thelatter of these three had brought to Xerxes a con-tingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven hadfoundered in the storm, while the last was nowtaken with himself aboard1.

Delay of Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight ofT " Thermopylae, suffered four days to pass without

making any attack: a probable reason may befound in the extreme peril of his fleet reported tohave been utterly destroyed by the storm: butHerodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes couldnot believe (according to him) that the Greeks atThermopylse, few as they were in number, had anyserious intention to resist: he had heard in hismarch that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks,under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, buthe treated the news with scorn: and when a horse-man,—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and whoapproached near enough to survey their position,without exciting any attention among them by his



presence-—brought back to him a description ofthe pass, the wall of defence, and the apparentnumber of the division, he was yet more astonishedand puzzled. It happened too, that at the momentwhen this horseman rode up, the Spartans were inthe advanced guard, outside of the wall: somewere engaged in gymnastic exercises, others incombing their long hair, and none of them heededthe approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent pfor the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he Xerxeswas to think of such madness: upon which the defenderslatter reminded him of their former conversation py

at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans venationin the pass would resist to the death, in spite of ratus.whomthe smallness of their number, and adding, that it believe.was their custom, in moments of special danger, tocomb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of thisassurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not onlyoccupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable,before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believingthat the Greeks did not intend to resist, and thatthey would disperse of their own accord. He de-layed the attack for four days : on the fifth he be-came wroth at the impudence and recklessness ofthe petty garrison before "him, and sent againstthem the Median and Kissian divisions, with ordersto seize them and bring them as prisoners into hispresence1.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardlypossible to believe that we are reading historicalreality : we rather find laid out before us a picture

1 Herodot. vii. 208, 210. ircfnrei es avrovs MijSov? Kai Kto-o-i'ou? 6v-fiaScls, ivTeiKdfievos (T<pms fayprjvavTas ayav if oi\nv TTJV imvrov.

i2


of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form,ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined,like the interview between Croesus and Solon, topoint and enforce that moral which was ever pre-sent to the mind of the historian ; whose religiousand poetical imagination, even unconsciously tohimself, surrounds the naked facts of history withaccompaniments of speech and motive which nei-ther Homer nor iEschylus would have deemed un-suitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and theimmensity of host which he summoned, show thathe calculated on an energetic resistance; and though

Doubts t n e numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Per-about the r

motives sians, were insignificant, they could hardly have7 looked insignificant in the position which they thento Xerxes. 0 C C Upje cj—a n entrance little wider than a single

carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged spacesomewhat widened, and then another equally narrowexit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus1

that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth andwater to the Persian monarch, engaged at the sametime to seize the pass of Thermopylae on his behalf,and were only prevented from doing so by the un-expected arrival of Leonidas ; nor is it unlikelythat the Thessalians, now the chief guides ofXerxes2, together with Alexander of Macedon,would try the same means of frightening away thegarrison of Thermopylae, as had already been sosuccessful in causing the evacuation of Tempe". Aninterval of two or three days might be well be-stowed for the purpose of leaving to such intriguesa fair chance of success : the fleet meanwhile would

1 Diodor. xi. 4. 2 Herodot. vii. 174 ; viii. 29-32.


be arrived at Aphetse after the dangers of the storm:we may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxesin a manner somewhat less childish than it is de-picted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the First attackattack, animated as well by the recollection of their Jopyia;- r

ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of aven- Media/*he

ging the defeat of Marathon1, manifested great per-sonal bravery. The position was one in whichbows and arrows were of little avail: a close com-bat hand to hand was indispensable, and in thisthe Greeks had every advantage of organizationas well as armour. Short spears, light wickershields, and tunics, in the assailants, were animperfect match for the long spears, heavy andspreading shields, steady ranks2, and practisedfighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men ofthe Persian army, pressed on from behind, andhaving nothing but numbers in their favour, main-tained long this unequal combat, with great slaugh-ter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks.Though constantly repulsed, the attack was asconstantly renewed, for two successive days: theGreek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieveeach other when fatigued, since the space wasso narrow that few could contend at once ; andeven the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persianguards, and the other choice troops of the army,when sent to the attack on the second day, weredriven back with the same disgrace and the same

1 Diodor. xi. 6.2 Herodot. vii. 211 j ix. 62, 6 3 ; Diodor. xi. 7 : compare

Pers. 244.


Repeatedattacks, bythe besttroops inthe Persianarmy, allrepulsedwithslaughter.

Embarrass-ment ofXerxes—he is re-lieved fromit by hear-ing of thepath overthe moun-tain.

slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humi-liating repulse from a lofty throne expressly pro-vided for him: "thrice (says the historian, withHomeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne,in agony for his army1."

At the end of two days' fighting no impressionhad been made, the pass appeared impracticable,and the defence not less triumphant than coura-geous—when a Malian named Ephialte's revealedto Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented moun-tain-path. This at least was the man singled outby the general voice of Greece as the betrayer ofthe fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Per-sians, he fled his country for a time, and a rewardwas proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly forhis head ; having returned to his country too soon,he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lace-daemonians honoured as a patriot9. There werehowever other Greeks who were also affirmed tohave earned the favour of Xerxes by the same valu-able information; and very probably there mayhave been more than one informant—indeed theThessalians, at that time his guides, can hardlyhave been ignorant of it. So little had the pathbeen thought of, however, that no one in the Per-sian army knew it to be already occupied by thePhocians. At nightfall Hydarnes with a detach-

1 Herodot. vii. 212. 'Ev ravTyo-t rfja-i irpoo-68ot(Ti rfjs fia.xVs Myeratfiao-CKia, Brjtvfievov, rpis duaSpa/xetv ex TOV Bpovov, btitravra ircpl TTJ arpa-TIJJ. See Homer, Iliad, xx. 62; jEschyl. Pers. 472.

2 Herodot. vii. 213, 214; Diodor. xi. 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadesand Timaphernes, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain-path (Persica,c. 24).


ment of Persians was detached along the gorge ofthe river Asopus, ascended the path of Anopsea,through the woody region between the mountainsoccupied by the CEtseans and those possessed bythe Trachinians, and found himself at daybreaknear the summit, within sight of the Phocian guardof 1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the A

J detachment

noise of his army trampling through the wood1 under Hy.aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mu- march overtual, and Hydarn&s in alarm asked his guide taiVpatCwhether these men also were Lacedaemonians, f"™?,,.

cLWdy L l i e

Having ascertained the negative, he began the at-tack, and overwhelmed the Phocians with a showerof arrows, so as to force them to abandon the pathand seek their own safety on a higher point of themountain. Anxious only for their own safety, theybecame unmindful of the inestimable opening whichthey were placed to guard. Had the full numericalstrength of the Greeks been at Thermopylae, in-stead of staying behind for the festivals, they mighthave planted such a force on the mountain-pathas would have rendered it not less impregnable thanthe pass beneath.

Hydarne's, not troubling himself to pursue thePhocians, followed the descending portion of themountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and

1 Herodot. vii. 217, 218. h®s Te ^V Sie^awede yevofievov TTOWOV, & C .

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake : " Thestillness of the dawn, which saved the Phocians from being surprised, isvery characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when theoccurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances oc-curring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof ofthe accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece,vol. ii. c. x. p. 55.)


arrived in the rear of Thermopylae not long afterThey arrive midday1. But before he had yet completed hiso Leou?1 descent, the fatal truth had already been made

as' known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closingin upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and de-serters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymse-an2 named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with thenews : and even if such informants had been want-ing, the prophet Megistias, descended from thelegendary seer Melampus, read the approach ofdeath in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacri-fices. It was evident that Thermopylae could be nolonger defended ; but there was ample time for the

Debate defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidasamong the T • j i • • • . , , . , „ , ,

defenders were divided in opinion on the subject. Ihegreater number of them were inclined to abandon apy

known"that position now become untenable, and to reservethePersians themselves for future occasions on which they mightwere ap- J °

proacwng effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor isit to be doubted that such was the natural impulse,both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, underthe circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea ofretreat was intolerable. His own personal honour,together with that of his Spartan companions and ofSparta herself3, forbade him to think of yielding tothe enemy the pass which he had been sent to de-fend. The laws of his country required him toconquer or die in the post assigned to him, what-ever might be the superiority of number on thepart of the enemy4 : moreover we are told that the

1 Herodot. vii. 216, 217. 2 Diodor. xi. 9.3 Herodot. vii. 219. ivBavTa ifiovkevovro oi "E\\r)ves, Kai <r<\>ea>v f<rj(i-

frvroal yvSifiai. < Herodot. vii. 104.

CHAP. XL.J BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. 121

Delphian oracle had declared that either Spartaitself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to thePersian arms. Had he retired, he could hardlyhave escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece ^ eespecially, always burst upon the general who failed: to stay and

i M i • i • ii ii die in the

while his voluntary devotion and death would not pass.only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt himto the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as aking, and set an example of chivalrous patriotismat the moment when the Greek world most neededthe lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were The threei i - r ii i hundred

found fully equal to this act ot generous and devoted Spartans,self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to with theinspire the same sentiment to the whole detach- 1}™^™'ment: but when he found them indisposed, he at ^*h Leo/

r nidas : the

once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all un- rest of theseemly reluctance and dissension1: the same order ment retire,was also given to the prophet Megistias, who how-ever refused to obey it and staid, though he sentaway his only son2. None of the contingents re-

1 Herodot . vii. 220. TavTr; Kal fiaXXov Trj yvi>p.r) 7rAeicrTor cl/u, Aeavi-

§r)v, iirei re rjadero TOVS o-vfifidxovs iovras aTvpoBvpovs, Kal OVK fffeXovras

(rvvBiaKivdvveveiv, Ke\evo~al o~<p€as d7raWdo~o~eo'6aL' avrm 8e dirievai ov na-

XSs %XeLV' pevovn 8e avra K\(OS jxiya iXeiirero, Kal r) 'S.wdprqs evdai/xovlr)

OVK i£r)\ei(j)eTO.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less con-spicuous circumstances, of the Lacedsemonian commander Anaxibius,when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikrates in the territory ofAbydus (Xenophon, Hellenic, iv. 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedaemonianharmosts, all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men,when resistance was hopeless, "kvhpes, ifiol /lev KOKOV ZvBahe diroOaveiv;ifiels 8e, irplv ^vjiiil^ai rots irdkeplots, (TTrevdeTC els TTJV (TCOTrjpiav.

2 Herodot. vii. 221. According to Plutarch, there were also twopersons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired toplace in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home.


mained with Leonidas except the Thespian and theTheban. The former, under their general Demo-philus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans,and displayed even more than Spartan heroism,since they were not under that species of moralconstraint which arises from the necessity of actingup to a pre-established fame and superiority. Butretreat with them presented no prospect better thanthe mere preservation of life, either in slavery or inexile and misery; since Thespise was in Bceotia,sure to be overrun by the invaders1; while the Pe-loponnesian contingents had behind them theIsthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped

' still to be able to defend. With respect to theTheban contingent, we are much perplexed; forHerodotus tells us that they were detained by Le-onidas against their will as hostages, that they tookas little part as possible in the subsequent battle,and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as

Doubts soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thes-about the . _. ,

Theban pians alone remained with the bpartans ; andcontingent. p a u s a n i a S j though he mentions the eighty Myke-

nseans as having staid along with the Thespians(which is probably incorrect), says nothing aboutthe Thebans9. All things considered, it seems

They indignantly refused, and staid to perish in the fight (Plutarch.Herodot. Malign, p. 866).

1 The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfullyillustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platsea in the following year,they had no heavy armour (Herodot. ix. 30). After the final repulseof Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission ofnew citizens (Herodot. viii. 75).

2 Herodot. vii. 222. 6r)/3aioi ji(v ainovTes ejuevoi/, K<U OV fiovkoiievoi,Kare1)(e y<*p o^ptas Aeavidtjs, iv ojx^pav \6y<o noieifievos. How couldthese Thebans serve as hostages ? Against what evil were they intended


probable that the Thebans remained, but remainedby their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persianparty, as Diodorus represents them to have been,or perhaps because it may have been hardly lessdangerous for them to retire with the Peloponne-sians, than to remain, suspected as they were ofmedism: but when the moment of actual crisisarrived, their courage not standing so firm as thatof the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavouredto save their lives by taking credit for medism, andpretending to have been forcibly detained by Le-onidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Last ex-Thermopylae consisted of the 300 Spartans, with death ofa certain number of Helots attending them, toge- ^"hu*ther with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 The- band-bans. If there had been before any Lacedaemonians(not Spartans) present, they must have retired withthe other Peloponnesians. By previous concertwith the guide Ephialte's, Xerxes delayed his attackupon them until near noon, when the troops

to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him ?Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable.Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign, p. 865) severely criticises this state-ment of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds : among the manyunjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9; and Pausan. x. 20, 1.Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily

with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contin-gent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulatedthe story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics ofThebes before the battle of Thermopylae were essentially double-facedand equivocal : not daring to take any open part against the Greeksbefore the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenaeans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the Isth-mus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chancesof defence.


under Hydarnes might soon be expected in the rear.On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing thatall which remained was to sell the lives of his de-tachment dearly, did not confine himself to thedefensive1, but advanced into the wider space out-side of the pass; becoming the aggressor anddriving before him the foremost of the Persianhost, many of whom perished as well by the spearsof the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and mo-rass, and even trodden down by their own numbers.It required all the efforts of the Persian officers,assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip,to force their men on to the fight. The Greeksfought with reckless bravery and desperation againstthis superior host, until at length their spears werebroken, and they had no weapon left except theirswords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas him-self was slain, and around his body the battle be-came fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted alltheir efforts to possess themselves of it, but wererepulsed by the Greeks four several times, with theloss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothersof Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished innumber, and deprived of their most effective wea-pons, the little band of defenders retired, with the

1 The story of Diodorus (xi. 10) that Leonidas made an attack uponthe Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to theregal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order tosave his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughterin the camp, were at length overpowered and slain—is irreconcileablewith Herodotus and decidedly to be rejected. Justin, however (ii. 11),and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign, p. 866) follow it. The rhetoricof Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favour.Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas(De Herodot. Mai. ibid.) ; but it is not preserved.

CHAP. XL.J BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM. 125

body of their chief, into the narrow strait behindthe cross wall, where they sat all together on a hil-lock, exposed to the attack of the main Persianarmy on one side, and of the detachment of Hy-darnSs, which had now completed its march, on theother. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmedwith missiles, and slain to a man ; not losing cou-rage even to the last, but defending themselveswith their remaining daggers, with their unarmedhands, and even with their mouths1.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades individualsamong

—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amidst such them di-equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any —scorn e

individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodo- towards"1

tus mentions the Spartans Die'neke's, Alpheus and *"f^Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as stand- &dnot

ing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the firstbecame renowned2. "The Persian host (he wasinformed) is so prodigious that their arrows concealthe sun." " So much the better (he answered), weshall then fight them in the shade." Herodotushad asked and learnt the name of every individualamong this memorable three hundred, and even sixhundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still readthe names engraved on a column at Sparta3. Onealone among them—Aristodemus—returned home,having taken no part in the combat. He, together

1 Herodot. vii. 225. 2 Herodot. vii. 226.3 Herodot. vii. 224. envdofirjv be ml mravraiv T<DV TpiaKoo-lav. Pau-

sanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyrical oration andgymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour ofLeonidas, jointly with Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnishedhis laurels acquired at Plataaa. It is remarkable, and not altogethercreditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have beenmade partners in the same public honours.


with Eurytus another soldier, had been absent fromthe detachment on leave, and both were lying atAlpe"ni suffering from a severe -complaint in theeyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of thedetachment was come, determined not to surviveit, asked for his armour, and desired his attendantHelot to lead him to his place in the ranks ; wherehe fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departedand survived. Aristodemus did not imitate thisdevotion of his sick comrade: overpowered withphysical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—buthe returned only to scorn and infamy among hisfellow-citizens1. He was denounced as " the cow-ard Aristode'mus ;" no one would speak or commu-nicate with him, or even grant him a light for hisfire2. After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was

1 Herodot. vii. 229. 'A/DIOTOS^OJ/—Xct

a-avra anovottTr\<ra.i is 'S.iraprqv. The commentators are hard upon Ari-stodemus when they translate these epithets " animo deficientem, timi-dum, pusillanimum," considering that iKtato^v-^tre is predicated byThucydides (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotusscarcelyintends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effectof extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were differentstories about the cause which had kept Aristodemus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier named Pantites, who having been senton a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for thebattle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that hehanged himself—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitledto credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy intoThessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover the disgrace ofAristodemus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the differencebetween his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus : whereas Pan-tites stood alone.

2 See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned homealone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expeditionto the island of jEgina. The widows of the slain warriors crowdedround him, each asking him what had become of her husband, andfinally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August


at length enabled to retrieve his honour at thebattle of Platsea, where he was slain, after surpass-ing all his comrades in heroic and even recklessvalour.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band,we turn with repugnance to the desertion and sur-render of the Thebans. They are said to havetaken part in the final battle, though only to saveappearances and under the pressure of necessity:but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhaustedand disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillockwithin the pass, the Thebans then separated them- Fate of theselves, approached the enemy with outstretched contingent.hands, and entreated quarter. They now loudlyproclaimed that they were friends and subjects ofthe Great King, and had come to Thermopylaeagainst their own consent; all which was confirmedby the Thessalians in the Persian army. Thoughsome few were slain before this proceeding wasunderstood by the Persians, the rest were admittedto quarter; not without the signal disgrace, how-ever, of being branded with Jthe regal mark as un-trustworthy slaves—an indignity to which theircommander Leontiade"s was compelled to submitalong with the rest. Such is the narrative whichHerodotus recounts, without any expression of mis-trust or even of doubt.- Plutarch emphatically con-

1444), where 1500 Swiss crossed the river and attacked 40,000 Frenchand Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrancesfrom their commanders—all of them were slain, after deeds of un-rivalled valour and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men whoreceded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enter-prise desperate. These sixteen men on their return were treated withintolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte derSchweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 393).


Impres-sions ofXerxesafter thecombat—advicegiven tohim byDemaratua—he re-jects it.

tradicts it, and even cites a Boeotian author1, whoaffirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiade"s, was com-mander of the Thebans at Thermopylae. Withoutcalling in question the equivocal conduct and sur-render of this Theban detachment, we may reason-ably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding,as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feelingwhich prevailed in Greece after the repulse ofXerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over thefield after the close of the action, vented itself uponthe corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head hedirected to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But itwas not wrath alone which filled his mind: he wasfarther impressed with involuntary admiration ofthe little detachment which had here opposed tohim a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invin-cible—he now learnt to be anxious respecting theresistance which remained behind. " Demaratus,(said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side) thouart a good man: all thy predictions have turned outtrue : now tell me, how many Lacedaemonians arethere remaining, and are they all such warriors asthese fallen men?" " O king (replied Demaratus),the total of the Lacedaemonians and of their townsis great; in Sparta alone, there are 8000 adultwarriors, all equal to those who have here fought;and the other Lacedaemonians, though inferior tothem, are yet excellent soldiers." " Tell me (re-

1 Herodot. vii. 233 ; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign, p. 86?. The Boeo-tian history of Aristophanes, cited by the latter, professed to be foundedin part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magi-strates and generals—eK T&V Kara ap^ovTas viroii.vriixa.Taiv (c


joined Xerxes) what will be the least difficult wayof conquering such men ?" Upon which Demaratusadvised him to send a division of his fleet to occupythe island of Kythe"ra, and from thence to make waron the southern coast of Laconia, which would dis-tract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her fromcooperating in any combined scheme of defenceagainst his land-force. Unless this were done, theentire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled tomaintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where thePersian king would have far more terrible battlesto fight than anything which he had yet witnessed1.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achaemenesthe brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade themonarch from this prudent plan of action ; notwithout aspersions on the temper and motives ofDemaratus, who (he affirmed) like other Greeks,hated all power, and envied all good fortune, abovehis own. The fleet (added he), after the damagesustained by the recent storm, would bear no fartherdiminution of number : and it was essential to keepthe entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea,in one undivided and cooperating mass2.

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive inthe monarch his habitual sentiment of confidencein overpowering number: yet while rejecting theadvice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled theimputations against the good faith and sincere at-tachment of that exiled prince3.

1 Herodot. vii. 235. 2 Herodot. vii. 236.3 Herodot. vii. 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does

indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, andif asked for counsel, will keep back what he has best in his mind, unlesshe be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympa-

VOL. V. K


Proceed- Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylae hadf been not less actively employed by the fleets at

Aphetse and Artemisium. It has already beenmentioned that the Greek ships, having abandonedai^m

among the their station at the latter place and retired to Chal-Grecian -

fleet—The- kis, were induced to return by the news that thedetermines Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recentstorm,—and that on returning to Artemisium, the

Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeingthe enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sus-tained, still mustering in overwhelming number atthe opposite station of Aphetse. Such was theeffect of this spectacle, and the impression of theirown inferiority, that they again resolved to retirewithout fighting, leaving the strait open and un-defended. Great consternation was caused by thenews of their determination among the inhabit-ants of Eubcea, who entreated EurybiadSs to main-tain his position for a few days, until they couldhave time to remove their families and their pro-perty. But even such postponement was thoughtunsafe and refused: and he was on the point ofgiving orders for retreat, when the Eubceans senttheir envoy Pelagon to Themistokles with the offerof thirty talents, on condition that the fleet shouldkeep its station and hazard an engagement in defenceof the island. ThemistokMs employed the moneyadroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eu-rybiad&s, with large presents besides to the otherleading chiefs : the most unmanageable among themwas the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first

thises heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will givehim the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."


threatened to depart with his own squadron alone,if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to re-main. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized,by a present of three talents'.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at suchinglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotusrespecting the underhand agencies of this memo-rable struggle, there is no reason to call in ques-tion the bribery here described. But Themistokle'sdoubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled todo, by means of the Eubcean money, that which hewould have wished, and had probably tried, toaccomplish, without the money—to bring on anaval engagement at Artemisium. It was abso-lutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylae,and to the general plan of defence, that the Eu-bcean strait should be defended against, the Persian importantfleet, nor could the Greeks expect a more favour- rendered"18

able position to fight in. We may reasonably pre-sume that Themistokle's, distinguished not less bydaring than by sagacity, and the great originatorof maritime energies in his country, concurred un-willingly in the projected abandonment of Artemi-sium : but his high mental capacity did not ex-clude that pecuniary corruption which rendered thepresents of the Eubceans both admissible and wel-come—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, asthey supplied means of bringing over the other op-posing chiefs and the Spartan admiral8. It was

1 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 7 ; Herodot. viii. 5, 6.2 The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable : OSTOI re 8r/

jrAtjyeWey haponri (Eurybiades, Adeimautus, &c) , avcmeiieuj)x.£voi rjtrav,Kai Toi<ri Eu/3ocecri iKe)(a.pi(TTO' avros Tt 6 QijxifTTOKkirfs iKepbrjve, tkav-

6ave be ra Aowra %xa>v-

K2

132 HISTORY OP GREECE. [PART II.

finally determined therefore to remain, and if ne-cessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubceanstrait: but at any rate to procure for the inhabit-ants of the island a short interval to remove theirfamilies. Had these Eubceans heeded the oracles(says Herodotus1) they would have packed up andremoved long before : for a text of Bakis gave themexpress warning: but having neglected the sacredwritings, as unworthy of credit, they were nowseverely punished for such presumption.

Confident Among the Persian fleet at Aphetse, on the otherhopes of the ° r

Persian hand, the feeling prevalent was one ot sanguinehope and confidence in their superior numbers,forming a strong contrast with the discouragement

teke°theand o f t h e Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attackedGreeks in the latter immediately, when both fleets first sawthe rear. .

each other from their opposite stations, they wouldhave gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleetwould have fled, as the admiral was on the point ofordering, even without an attack. But this was notsufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut offevery ship among their enemies even from flightand escape2. Accordingly they detached 200 shipsto circumnavigate the island of Eubcea, and to sailup the Eubcean strait from the south, in the rear of

1 Herodot. viii. 20. O« yap Evfioces irapaxfn)(raixevoi TOV BUKL&OSXp7]O"n6v as oitbiv \eyovra, ovre TI i^Ko^xicravTo ov&ev, oiVe 7rpo€(rd£avTo,cos napeaop.evov crept TroXe/xov 7rep«rerea o"e incnrj(ravTO crcpltxi avroici TC\npr)yp.ara. BdxtSi yap aifie e^et irepi TOVTCOV 6 xprj<rp.6s'

$pa£eo fiapflapofpaivov orav fryov ets aXa flaWyBvfiXiuov, Ev/3oi'i;r ani-^iv •nokvivt)K.ahas alyas.

TOVTOMTL oe ovbev Toici ewecrb xp7]<rap.evoicri iv ro7o"t Tore irapeovci T€ Ka\TrpoaSoKifwicn KaKoicri, naprji/ a(pi <rvp.(popr} xpijadai irpos ra fieyiara.

2 Herodot. viii. 6. KCX ep.eXKov &r)8ev eMpevgeo-dai (oi "EXKrjvesY tSet5e ftijSe irvp<popov, Tea ineivav (JlepaStv) Xoyto,

CHAP. XL.J BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMIS1UM. 133

the Greeks—and postponing their own attack infront until this squadron should be in position tointercept the retreating Greeks. But though themanoeuvre was concealed by sending the squadronround outside of the island of Skiathos, it becameknown immediately among the Greeks, through adeserter—Skyllias of Skione". This man, the bestswimmer and diver of his time, and now engagedlike other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service,passed over to Artemisiurn, and communicated tothe Greek commanders both the particulars of thelate destructive storm, and the despatch of the in-tercepting squadron1.

It appears that his communications, respecting Sea%htthe effects of the storm and the condition of the aium—a™-"Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who g yresolved during the ensuing night to sail from their the Greeks-station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprisingthe detached squadron of 200 ships, and who evenbecame bold enough, under the inspirations of The-mistokles, to go out and offer battle to the mainfleet near Aphetsea. Wanting to acquire somepractical experience, which neither leaders nor sol-diers as yet possessed, of the manner in whichPhoenicians and others in the Persian fleet handledand manoeuvred their ships, they waited till alate hour of the afternoon, when little daylight re-mained3. Their boldness in thus advancing out,

1 Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respectingthe prowess of Skyllias as a diver.

2 Diodorus, xi. 12.3 He rodo t . viii. 9> dclXrjv 6^lr]U yivojx£vr)V Trjs fjfieprjs tpvha^avTes,

avToi iircLveirktoov eVl TOVS f3ap@dpovs, airontipav avrcov TTOtri<Ta(T0ai fiov~

Xofifvot. TTJS TC jxaffls Ka\ TOV 8teK7rAdov.


with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, asto-nished the Persian admirals, and distressed theIonians and other subject Greeks who were servingthem as unwilling auxiliaries: to both it seemedthat the victory of the Persian fleet, which wasspeedily brought forth to battle, and was numerousenough to encompass the Greeks, would be certainas well as complete. The Greek ships were at firstmarshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the inte-rior, and presenting their prows in front at allpoints of the circumference1; in this position, com-pressed into a narrow space, they seemed to beawaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed alarger circle around them : but on a second signalgiven, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowedout from the inner circle in direct impact againstthe hostile ships around, and took or disabled noless than thirty of them : in one of which Philaon,brother of Gorgus despot of Salamis in Cyprus, wasmade prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness atfirst disconcerted the Persians, who however ralliedand inflicted considerable damage and loss on theGreeks : but the near approach of night put an endto the combat, and each fleet retired to its formerstation—the Persians to Aphetse, the Greeks toArtemisium2.

T h e r e s u l t °f t m s fi^t day's combat, though in-increased decisive in itself, surprised both parties and diddamage to A l

the Persian much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. Butfleet, andruin to the 1 Compare the description in Thucyd. ii. 84, of the naval battle be-sent round t w e e n t n e Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedaemonian fleet,Euboea. where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

2 Herodot. viii. 11. TTOWUV napa hoi-ay ayavicrdfifvoi—c&c.


the events of the ensuing night did yet more. An-other tremendous storm was sent by the gods toaid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate ofGreece—the most violent wind, rain and thunder,prevailed during the whole night, blowing right onshore against the Persians at Aphetse, and thus butlittle troublesome to the Greeks on the oppositeside of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet,scarcely recovered from the former storm at SepiasAkte", were almost driven to despair by this repeti-tion of the same peril: the more so when theyfound the prows of their ships surrounded, and theplay of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies andthe spars from the recent battle, which the currentdrove towards their shore. If this storm was inju-rious to the main fleet at Aphetse, it proved the en-tire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavi-gate Eubcea, who, overtaken by it near the danger-ous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollowsof Eubcea), were driven upon the rocks andwrecked. The news of this second conspiracy ofthe elements, or intervention of the gods, againstthe schemes of the invaders, was highly encouragingto the Greeks ; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced themthe next day, raised them to a still higher pitch ofconfidence. In the afternoon of the same day, theysailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetse, andattacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships evenat their moorings ; the fleet having been too muchdamaged by the storm of the preceding night tocome out and fight1.

1 Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14 ; Diodor. xi. 12.

136 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART I I .

Renewed But the Persian admirals were not of a temper toArtemisium endure such insults—still less to let their master

hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day,sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek

solves to station at Artemisium, and formed themselves intoretreat.

a half moon ; while the Greeks kept near to theshore, so that they could not be surrounded, norcould the Persians bring their entire fleet into ac-tion ; the ships running foul of each other, and notfinding space to attack. The battle raged fiercelyall day, and with great loss and damage on bothsides : the Egyptians bore off the palm of valouramong the Persians, the Athenians among theGreeks. Though the positive loss sustained by thePersians was by far the greater, and though theGreeks, being near their own shore, became mastersof the dead bodies as well as of the disabled shipsand floating fragments—still they were themselveshurt and crippled in greater proportion with refer-ence to their inferior total: and the Athenianvessels especially, foremost in the preceding com-bat, found one half of their number out of condi-tion to renew it \ The Egyptians alone had cap-tured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistokles, as it seems, among them—de-termined that they could no longer venture to holdthe position of Artemisium, but must withdraw thenaval force farther into Greece2 : though this wasin fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylae, andthough the removal which the Eubceans were has-tening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men

1 Herodot. viii. 17, 18.2 Herodot. viii. 18. hp-q(Tfi.bv by cftovXevov eVoo is TTJV 'EXXdSa.


were forced to be satisfied with the promise ofThemistokles to give them convoy for their boatsand their persons; abandoning their sheep andcattle for the consumption of the fleet, as betterthan leaving them to become booty for the enemy.While the Greeks were thus employed in organ-ising their retreat, they received news which ren-dered retreat doubly necessary. The AthenianAbronychus, stationed with his ship near Thermo-pylse, in order to keep up communication betweenthe army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelli- at £gence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, s° *°and that the division of Leonidas was either de-stroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandonedArtemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Euboeanstrait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athe-nians bringing up the rear. Themistokles, con-ducting the latter, staid long enough at the variouswatering-stations and landing-places to inscribe onsome neighbouring stones invitations to the Ioniancontingents serving under Xerxes: whereby thelatter were conjured not to serve against their fa-thers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fightas little and as backwardly as they could. Themi-stokles hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detachsome of the Ionians from the Persian side, or atany rate, to render them objects of mistrust, andthus to diminish their efficiency1. With no longerdelay than was requisite for such inscriptions, hefollowed the remaining fleet, which sailed round thecoast of Attica, not stopping until it reached theisland of Salamis.

1 Herodot. viii. 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 9.


toeTmfcn T h e n e W S ° f t h g r e t r e a t o f t h e G r e e k fleet w a Sfleet to Eu- speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histisea to thenceuvres Persians at Aphetse, who at first disbelieved it, andXerxes in° detained the messenger until they had sent to as-

certain the fact. On the next day, their fleetThermo1* Passed across to the north of Eubcea, and became

master of Histisea and the neighbouring territory :from whence many of them, by permission and eveninvitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylaeto survey the field of battle and the dead. Respect-ing the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted tohave deliberately imposed upon the spectators : heburied all his own dead, except 1000 whose bodieswere left out—while the total number of Greekswho had perished at Thermopylae, 4000 in number,were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as tocreate an impression that their loss had been muchmore severe than their own. Moreover the bodiesof the slain Helots were included in the heap, allof them passing for Spartans or Thespians in theestimation of the spectators. We are not surprisedto hear however, that this trick, gross and publicas it must have been, really deceived very few1.According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000men were slain on the side of the Persians—no un-reasonable estimate, if we consider that they worelittle defensive armour, and that they were three

Numbers of days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodiesboth s'icies. i s s t a t e d bY t h e s a m e historian as 4000 : if this becommemo"' c o r r e c t> ^ m u s t include a considerable proportionrating in-scriptions, I H e r O ( j o t viii. 24, 25. ov p.rjv ovb" Ikavdave TOVS SiafiefirjKoTas

Se'pft/s ravra irprj£as nipt TOVS VfKpovt TOVS icovrov' KCH yap 5i) KalyeKolov

fy, &c.

CHAP. XL.] BATTLES OF THERMOPYLAE AND AKTEMISIUM. 139

of Helots, since there were no hoplites present onthe last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thes-pians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites wereof course slain in the first two days' battles, thoughapparently not many. The number who originallycame to the defence of the pass seems to have beenabout 7000': but the epigram, composed shortlyafterwards and inscribed on the spot by order ofthe Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to poste-rity the formal boast that 4000 warriors " from Pe-loponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or3,000,000 of enemies2." Respecting this allegedPersian total, some remarks have already beenmade : the statement of 4000 warriors from Pelo-ponnesus, must indicate all those who originallymarched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yetthe Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnishedwords to record this memorable exploit, ought notto have immortalized the Peloponnesians apartfrom their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of meritfully equal—especially the Thespians, who exhibitedthe same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and hisSpartans, without having been prepared for it bythe same elaborate and iron discipline. Whilethis inscription was intended as a general comme-moration of the exploit, there was another near it,alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan

1 About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylae, compare Herodot.vii. 202 ; Diodorus, xi. 4 ; Pausanias, x. 20, 1 ; and Manso's Sparta,vol. ii. p. 308 ; Beylage 24th.

Isokrates talks about 1000 Spartans, with a few allies. Panegyric,Or. iv. p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war atArtemisium : in fact his numerical statements deserve little attention.



dead separately: " Stranger, tell the Lacedaemo-nians, that we lie here, in obedience to their orders."On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted

impressive band received their death-wounds, a monument wassfmonide°s. erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas ;

decorated apparently with an epigram by the poetSimonides. That distinguished genius composedat least one ode, of which nothing but a splendidfragment now remains, to celebrate the glories ofThermopylae ; besides several epigrams, one ofwhich was consecrated to the prophet Megistias," who, though well aware of the fate coming uponhim, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

141

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES,

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with Surprisewhich the Greeks of after-times looked back onthe battle of Thermopylae, and which they havecommunicated to all subsequent readers, was that ^ t e jof just admiration for the courage and patriot- Thermo-ism of Leonidas and his band. But among thecontemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubt-less sincerely felt, was by no means predominant:it was overpowered by the more pressing emotionsof disappointment and terror. So confident werethe Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibi-lity of Thermopylae and Artemisium, that when thenews of the disaster reached them, not a singlesoldier had yet been put in motion : the season ofthe festival-games had passed, but no active stephad yet been taken \ Meanwhile the invadingforce, army and fleet, was in its progress towardsAttica and Peloponnesus, without the least prepa-rations—and what was still worse, without anycombined and concerted plan—for defending theheart'of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes atThermopylae, insignificant in proportion to his vasttotal, was more than compensated by the freshGrecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Notmerely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but alsothe great mass of the Boeotians, with their chief

1 Herodot. viii; 40, 71,73.


town Thebes, all except Thespise and Plataea, nowjoined him '. Demaratus, his Spartan companion,moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tieof hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leaderAttaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alex-ander of Macedon to most of the Boeotian towns2, aswell to protect them from plunder as to ensure theirfidelity. The Thespians on the other hand aban-doned their city and fled into Peloponnesus ; whilethe Platseans, who had been serving aboard the Athe-nian ships at Artemisium3, were disembarked atChalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose ofmarching by land to their city and removing theirfamilies. Nor was it only the land force of Xerxeswhich had been thus strengthened ; his fleet alsohad received some accessions from Karystus in Eu-bcea, and from several of the Cyclades—so that thelosses sustained by the storm at Sepias and the fightsat Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at leastin part repaired, while the fleet remained still pro-digiously superior in number to that of the Greeks4.

No ulterior At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, nearplan of de- ,. n r , , _, . . .

fence form- fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoysp reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time

capfXiedOf

t o a r r i y e fr°m t n e extremity of the earth at thedefending threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took anyAttica—the . .

Peioponne- adequate precautions against him : a reproach truesians crowdrt/?^ ' Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylffi atne Isthmus _ , . . , , • . , , . , . J

of Corinth. Kadmeian victory for Xerxes—which is true only in the letter, but notin the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the passthan the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious(Diodor. xi. 12) ; and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of theGreeks after the event (xi. 13-15).

2 Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864 ; Herodot. viii. 34.3 Herodot. viii. 44, 50. " Herodot. viii. 66.

CHAP. XLI.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 143

almost to the letter1. It was only when roused andterrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, thatthe Lacedaemonians and the other Peloponnesiansbegan to put forth their full strength. But it wasthen too late to perform the promise made toAthens of taking up a position in Boeotia so as toprotect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinthwas all that they now thought of, and seemingly allthat was now open to them: thither they rushedwith all their available population under the con-duct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother ofLeonidas), and began to draw fortifications acrossit, as well as to break up the Skironian road fromMegara to Corinth, with every mark of anxiousenergy. The Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, Eleians,Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians,Troezenians and Hermionians, were all present herein full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of10,000 each) working and bringing materials nightand day2. As a defence to themselves againstattack by land, this was an excellent position: theyconsidered it as their last chance3, abandoning allhope of successful resistance at sea. But they for-got that a fortified isthmus was no protection evento themselves against the navy of Xerxes4, whileit professedly threw out not only Attica, but alsoMegara and iEgina. And thus arose a new perilto Greece from the loss of Thermopylae : no otherposition could be found which, like that memo-

1 Thucyd. i. 69. TOV re yap MijSov airoi "(r/iev ano wcpdrav yrjs npo-repov iir\ He\oir6vvrj<TOV ihdovra, TtpXv TO. nap' v/ia>v afiW TrpoaTravrrjcrai,.

• Herodot. viii. 71- arvvhpafi.6vTes eV TO>U iroklwv.3 Herodot. viii. 74. 4 Herodot. vii. 139.

measure""

144 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART IT.

rable strait, comprehended and protected at onceall the separate cities. The disunion thus pro-duced brought them within a hair's breadth ofruin.

Hopeless If the causes of alarm were great for the Pelo-situation of T i i

theAthe- ponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of"" the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to

agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bceotiaiiesfr m reacty t o sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-Attica, operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no

measures to remove their families or property : butthey saw with indignant disappointment as well asdismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that theconqueror was in full march from Thermopylae,that the road to Attica was open to him, and thatthe Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in thedefence of their own isthmus and their own sepa-rate existencel. The fleet from Artemisium hadbeen directed to muster at the harbour of Trcezen,there to await such reinforcements as could be got

1 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 9. cf/tia /iev opyf) rr/s irpohotrlas etê rovs'A0r]valovs, ajia he bvaBvfiia Km. Karrjfaia p.efiov(Ojj.lvovs.

Herodot. viii. 40. SoKcon-es1 yap eipr]<T£iv He\cmovvr]o-iovs flwSijjuci ivrrj BOMTITJ vwoKaTrificvovs TOU fidpâpov, TO>V /j.ev cfipov oviev eov, ol 8e€7rvv6avovTO TOV >Xo'6p.6v avrovs reiîovras is TTJV TLehoTrovvrjtTOV, trcp\Trkfiarov bt iroiovfievovs irepieivai, Kax TavTT)V E)(ovTas iv (pvXatcy, ra rea\\a amevcu.

Thucyd. i. 74. 8re yovv r)p.(v (we Athenians) frt tram, ov irapeyeveaBe(Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokrates take pride in thefact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thoughtof making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or.iv. p. CO). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would havegranted them separate terms : his particular vengeance was directedagainst them. Isokrates has confounded in his mind the conduct ofthe Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the yearfollowing the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle ofSalamis against Xerxes.

CHAP. XL1.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 145

together : but the Athenians entreated Eurybiade"sto halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short timefor consultation in the critical state of their affairs,and to aid them in the transport of their families.While Eurybiad6s was thus staying at Salamis,several new ships which had reached Trcezen cameover to join him ; and in this way Salamis becamefor a time the naval station of the Greeks, withoutany deliberate intention beforehand '.

Meanwhile Themistokles and the Athenian sea- The Athe-men landed at PhaMrum, and made their mournfulentry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect ap-peared, there was little room for difference of l iesand

1 property to

opinion2, and still less room for delay. The autho- salamis,. . ^Egina,

rities and the public assembly at once issued a pro- Trcezen,&cclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove hisfamily out of the country in the best way he could.;We may conceive the state of tumult and terrorwhich followed on this unexpected proclamation,when we reflect that it had to be circulated and actedupon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Oropus,within the narrow space of less than six days; for nolonger interval elapsed before Xerxes actually ar-rived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrivedeven sooner8. The whole Grecian fleet was doubtlessemployed in carrying out the helpless exiles ; mostlyto Trcezen, where a kind reception and generoussupport were provided for them (the Troezenianpopulation being seemingly semi-Ionic, and ha-ving ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic

1 Herodot. viii. 40-42. 2 Plafo, Legg. iii. p. 699.3 Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was therefore but little time for the

breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydides,i. 18—diavoydevres iKkmelv rfjv noktv Kai avaa-Kevaadfi^voi, &c.

VOL. V. L


with Athens)—but in part also to iEgina: therewere however many who could not or would not gofarther than Salamis. Themistoklls impressed uponthe sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle,which had directed them to abandon the city andto take refuge behind the wooden walls ; and eitherhis policy, or the mental depression of the time,gave circulation to other stories, intimating thateven the divine inmates of the acropolis were for awhile deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athene1

Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed todwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiarattendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whosenourishment a honey-cake was placed once in themonth. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularlyconsumed; but at this fatal moment the priestessannounced that it remained untouched : the sacredguardian had thus set the example of quitting theacropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow theexample, confiding in the goddess herself for futurereturn and restitution. The migration of so many

andsufter- ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of"migrants6 tears and misery inferior only to that which would

have ensued on the actual capture of the city1.1 Herodot. viii. 41 ; Plutarch, Themistokles, c. x.In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the

liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their countryand seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents aresketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Wad-dington, in his Visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters vi. vii. x. Hestates, p. 92, " Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body,and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis.Upon these occasions, I am" assured, that many have dwelt in caverns,and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by theirown feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an in-temperate climate ; many from diseases contracted through the loath-

CHAP. XLI.J BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 147

Some few individuals, too poor to hope for main-tenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—con-fiding moreover in their own interpretation1 of thewooden-wall which the Pythian priestess had pro-nounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves upin the acropolis along with the administrators ofthe temple, obstructing the entrance or westernfront with wooden doors and palisades2. Whenwe read how great were the sufferings of the popu-lation of Attica near half a century afterwards,compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifica-tions of Athens at the first outbreak of the Pelopon-nesian war3, we may form some faint idea of the in-calculably greater misery which overwhelmed anemigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whi-ther, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little

someness of their habitations ; many from hunger and misery. Onthe retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. Butto what a country did they return ? To a land of desolation and famine;and in fact, on the first re-occupation of Athens, after the departure ofOmer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some timeon grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piraeus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks andVenetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis,iEgina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises,envoyees en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) sejeterent sur 1'Attique, mettant tout a feu'et a. sang. En 168S, les chro-niques d'Athenes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligesde se refugier a Salamine, a Egine, et a Corinthe, et que ce ne futqu'apres trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dansleurs champs. Beaucoup des villages de 1'Attique sont encore habitespar les descendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la derniere re-volution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise : mais leurphysionomiediffere autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque."(Buchon, La Grece Continentale et la Moree. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

1 Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presump-tuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistokles—'A0-qvai<ov roiis nXcov r t es TOV ^p'qa'fxov rj Qe^xifTTOKK^s eldevai vn\i'i^ov-

ras (i. 18, 2).2 Herodot. viii. 50. 3 Thucyd. ii. 16, 17.

L2


chance did there seem that they would ever revisittheir homes except as his slaves.

Energy of In the midst of circumstances thus calamitousnifns, and and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders"f theiead- of Athens lost their energy—arm as well as mindmistokiS" w a s s t r u n g t 0 t n e loftiest pitch of human resolution,proposes Political dissensions were suspended: Themistokl6stherestora- x .

tion of Ari- proposed to the people a decree, and obtained theirsteidesfrom . . . . , . , „ , j .

exile. sanction, inviting home all who were under sentenceof temporary banishment: moreover he not onlyincluded, but even specially designated among them,his own great opponent Aristeide"s, now in the thirdyear of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, andKimon the son, of Miltiadfis, were partners in thesame emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scaleof fortune among the horsemen of the state, wasseen with his companions cheerfully marchingthrough the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridlesin the acropolis, and to bring away in exchangesome of the sacred arms there suspended, thussetting an example of ready service on shipboard,instead of on horseback1. It was absolutely essen-tial to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aidof the poorer exiles, but still more for the equip-ment of the fleet: there were no funds in the publictreasury—but the Senate of Areiopagus, then com-posed in large proportion of men from the wealthierclasses, put forth all its public authority as well asits private contributions and example to others2,and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eightdrachms for every soldier serving.

1 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 10, 11 ; and Kimon, c. 5.2 Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic, v. 3, 5) had

in his mind, we cannot determine.


This timely help was indeed partly obtained bythe inexhaustible resource of Themistokle's, who,in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered orpretended that the Gorgon's head from the statueof Athene" was lost, and directing upon this groundevery man's baggage to be searched, rendered anytreasures, which private citizens might be carryingout, available to the public service1. By the moststrenuous efforts, these few important days weremade to suffice for removing the whole populationof Attica—those of military competence to the fleetat Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—to-gether with as much property as the case admitted.So complete was the desertion of the country, thatthe host of Xerxes, when it became master, couldnot seize and carry off more than five hundredprisoners3. Moreover the fleet itself, which hadbeen brought home from Artemisium partially dis-abled, was quickly repaired, so that by the timethe Persian fleet arrived, it was again in somethinglike fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together Numbersand compo-

at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force far sitionofthegreater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than G°reekfleet200 were Athenian; twenty among which, how- atSalamis-ever, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned bythem. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty iEginetan,twenty Megarian, sixteen LacedBemonian, fifteenSikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakiaand as many from Eretria, five from Troezen, threefrom Hermione", and the same number from Leu-kas ; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one fromKythnos ; four from Naxos, despatched as a con-

1 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. x. - Herodot. ix. 99-


tingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by thechoice of their captains and seamen to Salamis ;—all these triremes, together with a small squadronof the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made upthe total. From the great Grecian cities in Italythere appeared only one trireme, a volunteer,equipped and commanded by an eminent citizennamed Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games'.The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than thecombined force (358 ships) collected by the AsiaticGreeks at Lade*, fifteen years earlier, during theIonic revolt. We may doubt however whether thistotal, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger thanthat which actually fought a little afterwards at thebattle of Salamis, and which iEschylus gives de-cidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to tenprime and chosen ships. That great poet, himselfone of the combatants, and speaking in a dramarepresented only seven years after the battle, isbetter authority on the point even than Herodotus2.

: Herodot. viii. 43-48.2 iEschylus, Persffi, 347 ; Herodot. viii. 48 ; vi. 9 ; Pausanias, i. 14, 4.

The total which Herodotus announces is 378 ; hut the items -which hegives amount, when summed up, only to 366. There seems no wayof reconciling this discrepancy except hy some violent change whichwe are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Sala-mis were above 1000, those of the Greeks 700 (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i. 74) calls the total of the Gre-cian fleet at Salamis "nearly 400 ships, and the Athenian contingentsomewhat less than two parts of this total (vavs /lev ye is ras Terpa-Kocrias oXi'yo) eXacrcrovs T&V bio pmp&iv)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on thispassage, treat TWV 8VO fioipav as meaning unquestionably two parts outof three : and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold inconsidering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not atall carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot thinkthat we are here driven to such a necessity ; for the construction ofDidot and Goller (though Dr. Arnold pronounces it " a most undoubted

CHAP. XLI.J BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 151

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and x ?the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes Athens andand his host overran the deserted country, his fleet p"sian~the

occupying the roadstead of PhalSrum with the coastadjoining. His land-force had been put in motionunder the guidance of the Thessalians, two or threedays after the battle of Thermopylae, and he wasassured by some Arcadians who came to seek ser-vice, that the Peloponnesians were, even at thatmoment, occupied with the celebration of theOlympic games. " What prize does the victor re-error ") appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that al Siofioipai does not of necessity mean two parts out of three : in Thucydid.i. 10, we find Kalroi HeXonovvfjcrov T5>V Trevre Tas dvo jxoipai v4p.ovraif

where the words mean two parts out of Jive. Now in the passage beforeus, we have vavs p.ev ye is ras rerpaKoo-las okiya iXdcrcrovs TS>V dvo

ixoipav : and Didot and Goller contend, that in the word TerpaKoo-ias isimplied a quaternary division of the whole number—four hundreds orhundredth parts : so that the whole meaning would be—" To the aggre-gate/oar hundreds of ships we contributed something less than two."The word TcrpaKoo-ias, equivalent to reVcrapas eKarovrdSas, naturallyincludes the general idea of reo-crapas iioipds : and this would bring thepassage into exact analogy with the one cited above—ra>v wevre ras bioixoipds. With every respect to the judgement of Dr. Arnold on anauthor whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the groundson which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Goller tobe "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the asser-tion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, whostates the Athenians to have furnished 180 ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construc-tion of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought tocount as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two admissi-ble constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against alteringnumerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him intoaccordance with another, and without some substantive ground in thetext itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides,Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter T€TpaKoo~ias into TpiaKoo~las, inorder that Thucydides may be in harmony with Jlschylus and otherauthors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Goller wouldalter rpiaKoo-'iayv into rerpaicoo-icov in Demosthenes de Corona (c. 70), inorder that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Suchemendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are not toforce different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.


The Per-sian armyravage thePhociantownshipsin theirmarch fromThermo-pylae toAttica—pillage ofthe templeat Abse.

ceive ?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that theprize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantsechme'sson of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to haveburst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both ofthe monarch himself and of the bystanders—" Hea-vens, Mardonius, what manner of men are theseagainst whom tbou hast brought us to fight! menwho contend not for money, but for honour1!"Whether this be a remark really delivered, or adramatic illustration imagined by some contempo-rary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting asbringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life,which contrasts not merely with the manners ofcontemporary Orientals, but even with those ofthe earlier Greeks themselves during the Homerictimes.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermo-pylae and the borders of Attica, there were noneexcept the Phocians disposed to refuse submission:and they refused only because the paramount in-fluence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians madethem despair of obtaining favourable terms5. Norwould they even listen to a proposition of theThessalians, who, boasting that it was in theirpower to guide as they pleased the' terrors of thePersian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment tothe territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fiftytalents were paid to them3. The proposition beingindignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes throughthe little territory of Doris, which medised and

1 Herodot. viii. 26. IlaTrai, Map86vce, KOIOVS in' avSpas r/yayes pa-xt'(TOficvovs rjp.eas, 01 ov Trcpl ^prmdraiv TOP dyava noievvrat, dX\a irep\pj

2 Herodot. viii. 30. Herodot. viii. 28, 29.


escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Ke-phisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians.All of them were found deserted; the inhabitantshaving previously escaped either to the wide-spread-ing summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or evenstill farther, across that mountain into the territoryof the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen smallPhocian towns, the most considerable of whichwere Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and de-stroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy templeand oracle of Apollo at Abae better treated than therest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was thenburnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body ofmen to plunder Delphi, marching with his mainarmy through Bceotia, in which country he foundall the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiseand Plateea: both were deserted by their citizens,and both were now burnt. From hence he con-ducted his army into the abandoned territory ofAttica, reaching without resistance the foot of theacropolis at Athens1.

Very different was the fate of that division which Persian di-J . . vision de-

he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: tachedApollo defended his temple here more vigorously temple of6

than at Abse. The cupidity of the Persian king Delphl-

was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealthaccumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse dona-tions of Croesus. The Delphians, in the extremeof alarm, while they sought safety for themselveson the heights of Parnassus and for their familiesby transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consultedthe oracle whether they should carry away or burythe sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to

1 Herodot. viii. 32-34.


Failure,flight, andruin of thedetach-ment.

leave the treasures untouched, saying that he wascompetent himself to take care of his own pro-perty. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain,together with Akeratus, the religious superior: butevidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to en-courage them. The sacred arms suspended in theinterior cell, which no mortal hand was ever per-mitted to touch, were seen lying before the door ofthe temple ; and when the Persians, marching alongthe road called Schiste up that rugged path underthe steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts toDelphi, had reached the temple of Athene" Pronsea,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—twovast mountain crags detached themselves and rush-ed down with deafening noise among them, crush-ing many to death—the war-shout was also heardfrom the interior, of the temple of Athene". Seizedwith a panic terror, the invaders turned round andfled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also(as they themselves affirmed) by two armed war-riors of superhuman stature and destructive arm.The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report,adding that the two auxiliaries were the HeroesPhylakus and Autonoiis, whose sacred precinctswere close adjoining: and Herodotus himself, whenhe visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground ofAthene" the identical masses of rock which hadoverwhelmed the Persians1. Thus did the god repel

1 Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14 ; Pausan. x. 8, 4.Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent

repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the re-pulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus :there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple,though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on bothsides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched.


these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary andtreasures, which remained inviolate until 130 yearsafterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrile-gious hands of the Phocian Philomelus. On thisoccasion, as will be seen presently, the real pro-tectors of the treasures were, the conquerors atSalamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed since the departure x?T?esh

from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last Peisistra• 1 XT 1 1 - 1 1 * ^ S ™

term or his advance. He brought with him the Athens-members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtlessthought their restoration already certain—and. afew Athenian exiles attached to their interest. sacked-Though the country was altogether deserted, thehandful of men collected in the acropolis venturedto defy him: nor could all the persuasions of thePeisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place frompillage, induce them to surrender1. The Athenianacropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150feet, with a flat summit of about 1000 feet longfrom east to west, by 500 feet broad from north tosouth—had no practicable access except on thewestern side2: moreover in all parts where thereand the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschun-gen in Griechenland, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot,which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the travellerof these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes uponthe Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words ofMardonius, Herodot. ix. 42 : still less can it be reconciled with thestatement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the Delphian templewas burnt by the Medes.

1 Herodot. viii. 52.a Pausanias, i. 22, 4; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 76. Ernst

Curtius (Die Akropolis von Athens, p. 5. Berlin, 1844) says that the


seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was de-fended by the ancient fortification called the Pelas-gic wall. Obliged to take the place by force, thePersian army was posted around the northern andwestern sides, and commenced their operations fromthe eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west, called Areopagus1: from whence they bom-barded (if we may venture upon the expression)with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates;that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrowswith burning tow attached to them. The woodenpalisades and boarding presently took fire and wereconsumed: but when the Persians tried to mountto the assault by the western road leading up to thegate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them atbay, having provided vast stones, which they rolleddown upon them in the ascent. For a time, theGreat King seemed likely to be driven to the slowprocess of blockade; but at length some adventu-rous men among the besiegers tried to scale the pre-cipitous rock before them on its northern side, hardby the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which laynearly in front of the Persian position, but behindthe gates and the western ascent. Here the rock

plateau of the acropolis is rather less than 400 feet higher than the town :Fiedler states it to be 178 fathoms or 1068 feet above the level of thesea (Reise durch das Konigreich Griechenland, i. p. 2) ; he gives thelength and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Krnse, whosestatement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable To-pography of Athens, I do not find any distinct statement about theheight of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement (if heand Curtius are both correct) to refer only to the precipitous imprac-ticable portion of the whole rock.

1 Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post onthe Areopagus and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis—avTfTripyaxrav (jEschyl. Eumenid. 638).

CHAP. XLL] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 157

was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogetherunguarded, and seemingly even unfortified1: more-over the attention of the little garrison was all con-centrated on the host which fronted the gates.Hence the separate escalading party was enabledto accomplish their object unobserved, and to reachthe summit in the rear of the garrison; who, de-prived of their last hope, either cast themselvesheadlong from the walls, or fled for safety to theinner temple. The successful escaladers opened thegates to the entire Persian host, and the wholeacropolis was presently in their hands. Its de-fenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all itsdwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane,consigned to the flames2. The citadel of Athensfell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, verymuch the same as that which had placed Sardisin those of Cyrus3.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica pass- Atoningr r

n J r visit of the

ed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the Peisistra-tids to the

1 Herodot. viii. 52, 53 e/«rpo<r#e &v irpo rrjs aKponoXios, acroDOlisonurde be TS>V nvKscou Kal rrjs dvo&ov, TTJ SIJ oi're ns icpvkacrcre, OVT av

rfKiture pr) KQTE TIS Kara ravra dvafiair) dvBp&Tratv, TCLVTTJ dve(3r](rdv rives

Kara ro ipop TTJS Ke/cpo7ros Bvyarpbs 'AyXavpoVj KatTOinep dnoKpT)p.vov

iovros TOV %a>pov.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appearsclearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch. v. p. 261 ;Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 119; Forchhammer, TopographieAthens, p. 365, 366 ; in Kieler Philologischen Studien, 1841. Siebelis(in the Plan of Athens prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in hisnote on Pausanias, i. 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on theeastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions efinpoa-de wpo TYJS aKpoTroAmi appear to refer to theposition of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northernand western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached Athens fromthe north—and the western side furnished the only regular access. Thehill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their posi-tion. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

2 Herodot. viii. 52, 53. 3 Herodot. i. 84.


conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon thehome and citadel of its captors, as it also was upontheir sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediatelydespatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, whichis said to have excited unmeasured demonstrationsof joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictionsof his uncle Artabanus1. On the next day but one,the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders,or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offersacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, andatone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground:they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near thechapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the god-dess Athene", though burnt to the ground by therecent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shootof one cubit long—at least the piety of restoredAthens afterwards believed this encouraging por-tent2, as well as that which was said to have beenseen by Dikseus (an Athenian companion of thePeisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was nowthe day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusi-nian mysteries ; and though in this sorrowful yearthere was no celebration, nor any Athenians in theterritory, Dikeeus still fancied that he beheld thedust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, whichwas wont to accompany in ordinary times the pro-cessional march from Athens to Eleusis. He wouldeven have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, hadnot Demaratus deterred him from doing so : but heas well as Herodotus construed it as an evidencethat the goddesses themselves were passing over

1 Herodot. v. 102 ; viii. 53-99; ix. 65. ?8ee yap Kara TO Bcoirpomov•Kavav Tjyi/ ' A T ™ ^ TTJV iv rrj Ijnetpa, yevecrBai ijro i

2 Herodot. viii. 55-65.

CHAP. XLI.] BATTLE OF SALAMI S.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 159

from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis.But whatever may have been received in after times,on that day certainly no man could believe in thespeedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a freecity: not even if he had witnessed the portent of theburnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh withpreternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circum-stances of the Athenians then appear, not less totheir confederates assembled at Salamis than tothe victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis,the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay ofPhalerum, reinforced by ships from Karystus aswell as from various islands of the Cyclades, sothat Herodotus reckons it to have been as strongas before the terrible storm at Sepias Akte"—an esti-mate certainly not admissible1.

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended Xerxes P2-to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take fleet atcounsel with the various naval leaders about the - dexpediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now sonear him in the narrow strait between Salamis and fishtinsa

naval battle

the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take at salamistheir seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon counsel ofoccupied the first place and the king of Tyre the Artemisia.

1 Herodot. viii. 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement(Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250), "About 1000ships is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strengthof the Persian fleet at Salamis : and from these are to be deducted, inestimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which weresent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, 200 in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than theprobable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus,sthatships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortlyfollowing.

160 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II;

second. The question was put to each of themseparately by Mardonius, and when we learn thatall pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, wemay be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxeshimself must have been well known to them before-hand. One exception alone was found to this una-nimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Ka-ria; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech ofsome length, deprecating all idea of fighting in thenarrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if theland-force were moved forward to attack Pelopon-nesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamiswould return for the protection of their own homes,and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather asthere was little or no food in the island—and inti-mating, besides, unmeasured contempt for theefficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as comparedwith the Greek, as well as for the subject contin-gents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisiagave this prudent counsel, there is no reason toquestion ; and the historian of Halikarnassus mayhave had means of hearing the grounds on whichher opinion rested : but I find a difficulty in belie-ving that she can have publicly delivered any suchestimate of the maritime subjects of Persia—anestimate not merely insulting to all who heard it,but at the time not just, though it had come to benearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote1,and though Artemisia herself may have lived toentertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever

1 The picture drawn in the Cyropeedia of Xenophon represents thesubjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (ava\ia8es xai aavv-TaKToi), and even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the nativePersians (Xenophon, Cyropsed. viii. 1, 45).

CHAP. XLI.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 1C1

may have heen her reasons, the historian tells usthat friends as well as rivals were astonished at herrashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval Resolutionbattle, and expected that she would be put to death. Xerxes to

fBut Xerxes heard the advice with perfect goodtemper, and even esteemed the Karian queen themore highly: though he resolved that the opinionof the majority, or his own opinion, should beacted upon : and orders were accordingly issuedfor attacking the next day1, while the land-forceshould move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalerum, an omnipotent Dissensions•n i i -i • • • , i i i i among the

will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded Greeks inall real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast salamis!a*presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at ^ta^to0"Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured remove the

' ° fleet to the

dissension had been reigning. It has already been isthmus.stated that the Greek fleet had originally got to-gether at that island, not with any view of makingit a naval station, but simply in order to cover andassist the emigration of the Athenians. This objectbeing accomplished, and Xerxes being already inAttica, Eurybiades convoked the chiefs to considerwhat position was the fittest for a naval engagement.Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus,were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposedthat the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmusof Corinth, where it would be in immediate com-munication with the Peloponnesian land-force, sothat, in case of defeat at sea, the ships would findprotection on shore and the men would join in theland service—while if worsted in a naval action

1 Herodot. viii. 68, 69, 70.

VOL. V. M


near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an islandfrom whence there were no hopes of escape1. Inthe midst of the debate, a messenger arrived withnews of the capture and conflagration of Athensand her acropolis by the Persians: and such wasthe terror produced by this intelligence, that someof the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusionof the debate and the final vote, quitted the councilforthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare theirrowers, for departure. The majority came to avote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night wasapproaching, actual removal was deferred until thenext morning2.

N o w w a s f e l t t h e w a n t o f a P o s i t i o n l i k e t h a t o f

quences if Thermopvlse, which had served as a protection tothat resolu- x . > r

tiou had all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growthcuted6Xe" of separate fears and interests. We can hardly

wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corin-thian in particular, who furnished so large a navalcontingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance tofight at Salamis, and should insist on removing toa position where, in case of naval defeat, they couldassist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers onland. On the other hand, Salamis was not onlythe most favourable position, in consequence of itsnarrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks,but could not be abandoned without breaking upthe unity of the allied fleet ; since Megara andiEgina would thus be left uncovered, and the con-tingents of each would immediately retire for the

1 Herodot. viii. 70. « Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

CHAP. XLI.] CATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 163

defence of their own homes,—while the Atheniansalso, a large portion of whose expatriated familieswere in Salamis and iEgina, would be in like man-ner distracted from combined maritime efforts atthe Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place,probably not even the Peloponnesians themselveswould have remained in one body ; for the squa-drons of Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermioae", &c, eachfearing that the Persian fleet might make a descenton one or other of these separate ports, would gohome to repel such a contingency, in spite of theefforts of Eurybiade"s to keep them together. Hencethe order for quitting Salamis and repairing to theIsthmus was nothing less than a sentence of ex-tinction for all combined maritime defence ; and itthus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, likethe Athenians, iEginetans, and Megarians, werealso led by their own separate safety to cling to thedefence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition,however, and in spite of the protest of Themistokle"s,the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesianleaders carried the vote for retreat, and each ofthem went to his ship to prepare for it on the fol-lowing morning.

When Themistokle's returned to his ship, with fr ' stokles op-

the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon poses thehis mind, and with the necessity of providing for persuades'removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the anTpre-es

island as well as for that of the squadron—he found ^mtore"an Athenian friend named Mn&siphilus, who askedhim what the synod of chiefs had determined. Con-cerning this Mne"siphilus, who is mentioned gene-rally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfor-

M 2


tunately have no particulars : but it must have beenno common man whom fame selected, truly orfalsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistokle"s.On learning what had been resolved, Mne"siphilusburst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin whichits execution would entail: there would presentlybe neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggre-gate cause and country to fight for1. He vehe-mently urged Themistokle"s again to open the ques-tion, and to press by every means in his power fora recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a re-solution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistokleshad already in vain tried to enforce the same view:but disheartened as he was by ill-success, the re-monstrances of a respected friend struck him soforcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. Hewent instantly to the ship of Eurybiade"s, askedpermission to speak with him, and being invitedaboard, reopened with him alone the whole subjectof the past discussion, enforcing his own views asemphatically as he could. In this private commu-nication, all the arguments bearing upon the casewere more unsparingly laid open than it had beenpossible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, whowould have been insulted if openly told that theywere likely to desert the fleet when once removedfrom Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confiden-tially, and speaking to Eurybiades alone, Themi-stokle"s was enabled to bring him partially round,and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh

1 H e r o d o t . v i i i . 5 7 - OVTOI apa r)v airaipexri r a s vrjas d n o S a j ,nep\ ovhep.ir)s e n TTarpllios vavp,axf)<reism Kara y a p noXis e x a o r o i r p i -tyovTm, &c. Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.


synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, evenbefore Eurybiades had explained the object andformally opened the discussion, Themistokles ad-dressed himself to each of the chiefs separately,pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as tothe abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that theCorinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—" Themistokles, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, arescourged." " True (rejoined the Athenian), butthose who lag behind the signal win n

1 Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of thesememorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in themain distinct, instructive and consistent. It is more probable than thenarrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistokles suc-ceeded in fully convincing both Eurybiades and the Peloponnesian chiefsof the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that in spite of all their ef-forts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to theIsthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it withthe loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. Plu-tarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiades was the per-son who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themisto-kles, and with that view, first made to him the observation given inmy text out of Herodotus, which Themistokles followed up by thesame answer—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistokles, uponwhich the latter addressed to him the well-known observation—" Strike,but hear me" (Haragov fiev, anovaov hi). Larcher expresses his sur-prise that Herodotus should have suppressed so impressive an anecdoteas this latter : but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrativethat he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Tbemi-stokles gives no offence to Eurybiades, nor is the latter at all displeasedwith him : nay, Eurybiades is even brought over by the persuasion ofThemistokles, and disposed to fall in with his views. The personswhom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistokles are, the Pe-loponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They areangry too (let it be added), not without plausible reason : a formal votehas just been taken by the majority, after full discussion ; and here isthe chief of the minority who persuades Eurybiades to reopen the wholedebate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover it isAdeimantus, not Eurybiades, who addresses to Themistokles the remarkthat " persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged :" and he


Synod of Eurybiades then explained to the synod thatchiefs again doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called

them together to reconsider the previous resolve:o^the u P o n w h i c h Themistokles began the debate, andformer re- vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in thesolution re- J . ,

narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open watersat the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara

" and iEgina : contending that a naval victory at Sa-lamis would be not less effective for the defence ofPeloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus,whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latterpoint, they would only draw the Persians afterthem. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenianshad a prophecy assuring to them victory in this,their own island. But his speech made little im-pression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were evenexasperated at being again summoned, to reopen adebate already concluded,—and concluded in a waywhich they deemed essential to their safety. In thebosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially,makes the remark because Themistokle's goes on speaking to, and try-ing to persuade, the various chiefs, before the business of the assemblyhas been formally opened. Themistokles draws upon himself the cen-sure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before theproper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eury-biades, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and withoutany fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiades as the person whowas anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to preventThemistokles from offering any opposition to it: though such an at-tempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of theAthenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad jEschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story aboutEurybiades threatening Themistokles with his stick grew out of thestory as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was un-known. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fiton to the narrative of that historian : it does not consist with his con-ception of the relations between Eurybiades and Themistokles.


this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharplydenounced the presumption of Themistokle's, andbade him be silent as a man who had now no freeGrecian city to represent—Athens being in thepower of the enemy : nay, he went so far as tocontend that Eurybiad&s had no right to count thevote of Themistokle's, until the latter could producesome free city as accrediting him to the synod.Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, uponthe leader of more than half of the whole fleet, de-monstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Co-rinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus :it provoked a bitter retort against them from The-mistokles, who reminded them that while he hadaround him 200 well-manned ships, he could pro-cure for himself anywhere both city and territoryas good or better than Corinth. But he now sawT

clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcinghis policy by argument, and that nothing wouldsucceed except the direct language of intimidation.Turning to Eurybiade's, and addressing him per-sonally, he said—" If thou wilt stay here, and fightbravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wiltnot stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin1. For withus, all our means of war are contained in our ships.Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athe-nians shall migrate with our families on board, justas we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of

1 Herodot. viii. 61, 62. 2v el peveeis aiirov, tcai jxivav i'&eat dvijp aya-$6s' el be lit), avaTpeyjseis rr\v 'EXXaSa.

All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical phrase—somesuch words as oweiy TTJV 'EXXaSa or Kakws av ex01' being understoodafter ayados. I adopt their construction, not without doubts whetherit be the true one.


Menace of

kies to re-

the Athe-

to befought atSalarms—

y

himStoP°n

The Peio-

chiefs,Sia"

f 0 '

towards"refuse obe-dience.Thirdsynodconvened—reneweddisputes ;theroajo-ntyopposed

old, and which the prophecies announce that we areone day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereftof allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I amnow saying."

Eurybiade's had before been nearly convinced bythe impressive pleading of Themistokle's. But thislast downright menace clenched his determination,afid probably struck dumb even the Corinthian andP e l °P o r m e s i a n opponents : for it was but too plain,that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless.He did not however put the question again to vote,but took upon himself to rescind the previous re-solution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamisto fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing orunwilling' ; the succeeding dawn saw them prepa-ring for fight instead of for retreat, and invokingthe protection and companionship of the iEakidheroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax : they evensent a trireme to iEgina to implore iEakus himselfand the remaining iEakids. It seems to have beenon this same day, also, that the resolution of fight-ing at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleetwas seen in motion, towards the close of the day,preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturingto disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, stillretained unabated their former fears and reluctance,w n i c n began again after a short interval to prevailover the formidable menace of Themistokles, andwere further strengthened by the advices from theIsthmus. Ihe messengers from that quarter de-

1 Herodot. viii. 64. OZTO> fiev ni nepl 2aXaalm, e W i andni, en-fi TE iLvpvpiaorj eoo^e, avrov Trapt<TKeva£ovTO as vav[ia)pi<TOVTts•

C H A P . X L I . ] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 169

picted the trepidation and affright of their absent J ^ ^ d

brethren while constructing their cross wall at that determined. . . on retreat-

point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why ing to thewere they not there also, to join hands and to help s mus-

in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least onland, instead of wasting their efforts in defence ofAttica, already in the hands of the enemy ? Suchwe're the complaints which passed from man toman, with many a bitter exclamation against theinsanity of Eurybiades : at length the commonfeeling broke out in public and mutinous mani-festation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was de-manded and convoked1. Here the same angrydebate, and the same irreconcileable difference, wasagain renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamour-ing for immediate departure, while the Athenians,^Eginetans2, and Megarians, were equally urgentin favour of staying to fight. It was evident toThemistokles that the majority of votes among thechiefs would be against him, in spite of the ordersof Eurybiades; and the disastrous crisis, destinedto deprive Greece of all united maritime defence,appeared imminent—when he resorted to one laststratagem to meet the desperate emergency byrendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext

1 Herodot. viii. 74. ea>s p.iv Sr/ avrav dvrjp dvftpl napitrraTO, 6a>vp.aTroieifievot TTJV EvpvftiaSeai dj3ov\it]V reXos Se, i^eppayq es TO /«Voy,dvXKoyos TC SIJ iylvcTO, Kai iroWa iXeyero nepl TOW avT(bv, &c. ComparePlutarch, Themist. c. 12.

2 Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the iEginetansamong those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during thenight, and were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of The-mistokles. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are per-petually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The jEginetanshad an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleettogether and fighting at Salamis.


for stealing away from the synod, he despatched atrusty messenger across the strait with a secret

Desperate communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnusof Themi- his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek1 who under-sehdsTpri! stood Persian and had perhaps been sold duringsage amiss ^he l a t e I ° m c revolt, but whose superior qualitiesto Xerxes, a r e m a r k e ( j by the fact that he had the care andpersuading J

him to sur- teaching of the children of his master—was in-round the ° . ,Greek fleet structed to acquaint them privately in the name ofSght! and Themistokles, who was represented as wishing suc-rettrementr c e s s a t heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleetimpossible. w a s nof- on]y j n ^ e u tmost alarm, meditating im-

mediate flight, but that the various portions of itwere in such violent dissension, that they weremore likely to fight against each other than againstany common enemy. A splendid opportunity (itwas added) was thus opened to the Persians, if theychose to avail themselves of it without delay, first toenclose and prevent their flight, and then to attacka disunited body, many of whom would when thecombat began openly espouse the Persian cause2.

Such was the important communication despatch-ed by Themistokles across the narrow strait (onlya quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part)which divides Salamis from the neighbouring con-tinent on which the enemy were posted. It wasdelivered with so much address as to produce theexact impression which he intended, and the glori-ous success which followed caused it to pass for asplendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his namewould have been covered with infamy. What sur-

1 Plutarch (Themistokles, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a Persian by birth,which cannot be true. » Herodot. viii. 75.


prises us the most is, that after having reaped sig-nal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as astratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during theexile of his latter days1, as a capital service ren-dered to the Persian monarch : nor is it improbable,when we reflect upon the desperate condition ofGrecian affairs at the moment, that such facility ofdouble interpretation was in part his inducementfor sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes impatientbfistp of

shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting Xerxes toon the next morning: and he entered so greedily ^^any

into the scheme, as to direct his generals to closeup the strait of Salamis on both sides during the his fleet en-

closes the

night, to the north as well as to the south of the Greekstown of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any " °fopening were left for the Greeks to escape2. Thestation of the numerous Persian fleet was along thecoast of Attica—its head-quarters were in the bayof Phal&rum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy

1 Thucydid. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with iEschylus,Persae, 351 seq. See also Herodot. viii. 109, HO.

Isokrates might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by thePersians to Themistokles—QejurrroKKea 8', 6j iwip Tr/s 'EXXdfioj avroiisKarevavfidxrja-f, TOIV fisyiiTTtov hapeav rj^taxrav (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 74)—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagemby which Themistokl6s compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis againsttheir will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

2 ^Eschylus, Persa:, 370.Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he

even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far asregards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the com-munication of Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals,and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement ofthe contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two : but heomits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in theGreek camp.

172 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II,

those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved byart, which belonged to the deme of Peirseus—andwould perhaps extend besides to other portions ofthe western coast southward of Phale'rum : while theGreek fleet was in the harbour of the town calledSalamis, in the portion of the island facing MountiEgaleos in Attica. During the night1, a portionof the Persian fleet, sailing from Peireeus northwardalong the western coast of Attica, closed round tothe north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so asto shut up the northern issue from the strait on theside of Eleusis ; while another portion blocked upthe other issue between Peirseus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachmentof troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near tothat corner2. These measures were all taken du-

1 Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet ofXerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and theMegarid; that is, to sail round the south- western corner of the islandto the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the islandis separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where thefort of Budorumwas afterwards situated, during the Pelopounesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evi-dently implies that the Greek .fleet was enclosed to the north of thetowG of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that townand Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to meunnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had beenplaced there, they would have been far indeed removed from the sceneof the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to havetaken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

2 Herodot. viii. 76. Toio-i 8e cos mcrra eylvero ra dyye\6evra, TOVTOfiev, es TTJV wjcriSa rr/v 'P'DTTaAeiav, jiera^v Sakaiuvos re Ksijiivr^v Ka\ rrjs

T]7rcipov, TTOWOVS TSIV Hepcrecov a7re/3i/3acrai'" TOVTO Se, iweiSrj iyivovro

pivai vxiKxes, dvfjyov fiiv TO an-' eW«p?;r Kepas KV<\ovfievoi irpos TI\V 2a -

Xa/xira" avfjyov Se ol d/xtpl Tr/v Keoy TC KCU TTJV Kvvoo-ovpav Ttrayfievoi,

Ka.Teix.6v re pexP1- M m ™ X ' l ! irdvTa TOV TropBfiov Trjcri vrfua'i.

He had previously stated Phalerum as the main station of the Persianfleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The pass-age which I have just transcribed intimates what the Persians did to


ring the night, to prevent the anticipated flight ofthe Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrowstrait close on their own harbour, the next morn-ing.

accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbour ofSalamis: and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western(more properly north-western) wing, presents no extraordinary diffi-culty, though we do not know how far the western wing extendedbefore the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to theharbour of Peirseus, and began from thence its night-movement alongthe Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the secondpart of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that" those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, andbeset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What placesare Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated ? The only knownplaces of those names, are, the island of "Keos, not far south of CapeSunium in Attica—and the promontory Kynosura, on the north-easterncoast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seemshardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory,which would be too distant to render the movement which he describesat all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to thesame objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant.Hence Barthelemy, Kruse, Bahr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the namesKeos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and thesouth-easternmost) of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realisedtheir idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no au-thority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in theisland, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to securea reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place,if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that before this night -movement commenced, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part offthe island of Salamis : which appears to me highly improbable. What-ever station that fleet occupied before the night-movem,ent, we may bevery sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy:it was somewhere on the coast of Attica : and the names Keos and Ky-nosura must belong to some unknown points in Attica, not in Salamis.I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on theother hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the ob-jections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as com-monly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statementof Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspectthat on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too greata desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis thathe copies the name Kynosura (viii. 77).


Meanwhile that angry controversy among thecomes m ° J JO

the night Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistokle"sGreek fleet had sent over his secret envoy, continued withoutS S r abatement and without decision. It was the in-thatihey t e r e s t of the Athenian general to prolong the de-™ d o i e d bate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until thesians, and effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreatthat escape . ° .

has become impossible : nor was prolongation difficult in a caseimpossible. gQ ^ j ^ w n e r e tjjg majority of chiefs was on one

side and that of naval force on the other—espe-cially as Eurybiades himself was favourable to theview of Themistokle's. Accordingly the debate wasstill unfinished at nightfall, and either continuedall night, or was adjourned to an hour before day-break on the following morning, when an incident,interesting as well as important, gave to it a newturn. The ostracised Aristeide's arrived at Salamisfrom iEgina. Since the revocation of his sentenceproposed by Themistokles himself, he had had noopportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now forthe first time rejoined his countrymen in their exileat Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging,and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians toretire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bringthe news that such retirement had become imprac-ticable from the position of the Persian fleet, whichhis own vessel in coming from iEgina had onlyeluded under favour of night. He caused Themi-stokles to be invited out from the assembled synodof chiefs, and after a generous exordium whereinhe expressed his hope that their rivalry would forthe future be only a competition in doing good totheir common country, apprised him that the new


movement of the Persians excluded all hope of nowreaching the Isthmus and rendered farther debateuseless. Themistokle's expressed his joy at the in-telligence, and communicated his own secret mes-sage whereby he had himself brought the move-ment about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefsmight be forced to fight at Salamis even againsttheir own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidesto go himself into the synod, and communicate thenews : for if it came from the lips of Themistoklds,the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication.So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that theyrefused to accept it as truth even on the assertionof Aristeides : nor was it until the arrival of a Te-nian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, thatthey at last brought themselves to credit the actualposture of affairs and the entire impossibility ofretreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they preparedthemselves at dawn for the impending battle1.

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up Position ofalong the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had ^d^oTtheerected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one S^'Jnd

of the projecting declivities of Mount iEgaleos, attack-near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging

1 Herodot. viii. 79,80.Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeides, immediately

after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, notpretending to take part in the debate : Plutarch represents him as pre-sent and as taking part in it (Aristeides, c. 9). According to Plutarch,Themistokles desires Aristeides to assist him in persuading Eurybiades:according to Herodotus, Eurybiades was already persuaded : it was thePeloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both morecredible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the laterwriters.


the sea1—from whence he could plainly review allthe phases of the combat and the conduct of his sub-ject troops. He was persuaded himself that they hadnot done their best at Artemisium, in consequenceof his absence, and that his presence would inspirethem with fresh valour : moreover his royal scribesstood ready by his side to take the names both ofthe brave and of the backward combatants. Onthe right wing of his fleet, which approached Sala-mis on the side of Eleusis and was opposed to theAthenians on the Grecian left,—were placed thePhoenicians and Egyptians ; on his left wing theIonians2—approaching from the side of Peirseus,and opposed to the Lacedaemonians, iEginetansand Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet,however, had been on ship-board all night, in makingthat movement which had brought them into theiractual position : while the Greek seamen now beganwithout previous fatigue, fresh from the animatedharangues of Themistokle's and the other leaders:moreover just as they were getting on board, theywere joined by the triremes which had been sent to

1 iEschyhis, Pers. 473 ; Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silverfeet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved in the acropolisof Athens—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, 'Apyvpmovsblcppos.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestod6rus—affirmed that theseat of Xerxes was erected, not under Mount jEgaleos, but much fartherto the north-west, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under themountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistokle's, 13). If this writerwas acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him tohave ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes : but we may pro-bably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geographywhich marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognises the 'Hpa-KKflov (Persica, c. 26).

2 Herodot. viii. 85 ; Diodor. xi. 16.


iEgina to bring to their aid iEakus with the otheriEakid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroicaid, which tended so much to raise the spirits ofthe Greeks, the .ZEginetan trireme now arrived just.in time to take her post in the line, having eludedpursuit from the intervening enemy1.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to f jattack with the usual paean or war shout, which confusion

and coin-S confidently returned by the Persians ; and the pietedefeatp

latter were the most forward of the two to begin °ians.e

the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually near-ing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that someof them touched ground on their own shore : untilthe retrograde movement was arrested by a super-natural feminine figure hovering over them, whoexclaimed with a voice that rang through the wholefleet—" Ye worthies, how much farther are ye goingto back water ?" The very circulation of this fableattests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the

1 Herodot. viii. 83 ; Plutarch (Themistokles, c. 13 ; Aristeidls, c. 9 ;Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phanias respecting anincident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find suffi-cient ground forrejecting. Themistokles, with the prophet Euphrantides,was offering sacrifice bythesideof the admiral's gal ley, when three beau-tiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the firewas just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right,the prophet enjoined Themistokle's to offer these three prisoners as a pro-pitiatory offering to Dionysus Omestes : which the clamour of the by-standers compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarchstates in his life of Themistokles; in his life of Aristeides, he affirmsthat these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristei-des attacked it at the beginning of the action. Now Aristeides did notattack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that noprisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement ofthe action : there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners tosacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

VOL. V. N


commencement of the battle'. The brave Atheniancaptains Ameinias and Lykomede's (the former,brother of the poet iEschylus) were the first toobey either the feminine voice or the inspirationsof their own ardour: though according to the ver-sion current at iEgina, it was the iEginetan ship,the carrier of the iEakid heroes, which first set thishonourable example2. The Naxian Demokritus wascelebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action.Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged withthe beak of his ship full against a Phoenician, andthe two became entangled so that he could notagain get clear: other ships came in aid on bothsides, and the action thus became general. Hero-dotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he couldprocure few details about the action, except as towhat concerned Artemisia, the queen of his owncity : so that we know hardly anything beyond thegeneral facts. But it appears that, with the excep-tion of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently

1 Herodo t . viii. 8 4 . (pavelorav 8e SiaKe\ev(racrdai, firre m l anav

aKovcrai TO TO>V 'EWr}Vcov (rTpaTOTreftov, oveihiffarrav 7rpor€pou raSe' 7i2

8aip.6vioi, pixP1 K®<70V " • ' irpvfivav dvctKpovecrde;

iEschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of theGreeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, hedoes not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Hero-dotus brings before us.

The war-shout, here described by IEschylus, a warrior actually en-gaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day andthe improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the be-ginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio especially enjoins on hismen the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii. 89).

2 Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk ; Plutarch, De Herodot. Maligni-tate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi. 17), it wasthe Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured : if thefact had been so iEschylus would probably have specified it.


a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknow-ledge) were lukewarm and some even averse1—thesubjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generallywith great bravery: Phoenicians,Cyprians,Kilikians,Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes ser-ving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfythe exigent monarch who sat on shore watching theirbehaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to anywant of courage—but, first, to the narrow spacewhich rendered their superior number a hindrancerather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderlyline and discipline as compared with the Greeks:thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemedto turn against them, they had no fidelity or reci-procal attachment, and each ally was willing tosacrifice or even to run down others, in order toeffect his own escape. Their numbers and absence ofconcert threw them into confusion and caused themto run foul of each other : those in the front couldnot recede, nor could those in the rear advance2:the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steers-men lost control of their ships, and could no longeradjust the ship's course so as to strike that directblow with the beak which was essential in ancientwarfare. After some time of combat, the whole

1 Herodot. viii. 85 ; Diodor. xi. ] 6. JEschylus in the Persas, thoughhe gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens,does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks ashaving formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad jEschyl. Pers.42. Such silence easily admits of explanation : yet it affords an addi-tional reason for believing that the persons so omitted did not fight veryheartily.

a Herodot. viii. 86; Diodor. xi. 17. The testimony of the former,both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entirewant of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the per-sonal overlooking of Xerxes.

N2


Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughlyunmanageable, so that the issue was no longerdoubtful, and nothing remained except the effortsof individual bravery to protract the struggle.While the Athenian squadron on the left, whichhad the greatest resistance to surmount, broke upand drove before them the Persian right, the iEgi-netans on the right intercepted the flight of thefugitives to Phale'rum1 : Demokritus the Naxiancaptain wTas said to have captured five ships of thePersians with his own single trireme. The chiefAdmiral Ariabign^s, brother of Xerxes, attacked atonce by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly tryingto board one of them, and the number of distin-guished Persians and Medes who shared his fatewas very great2: the more so as few of them knewhow to swim, while among the Greek seamen whowere cast into the sea, the greater number wereswimmers and had the friendly shore of Salamisnear at hand. It appears that the Phoenician sea-men of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon theIonic Greeks ; and some of them, driven ashore du-ring the heat of the battle under the immediatethrone of Xerxes, excused themselves by denoun-cing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionicleaders might have been endangered if the monarchhad not seen with his own eyes an act of surprisinggallantry by one of their number. An Ionic triremefrom Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic

1 Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.2 The many names of Persian chiefs whom iEschyhis report9 as

having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his own,to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, Prafat. ad jEschyl.Pers. p. xii.


trireme, but was herself almost immediately rundown by an iEginetan. The Samothracian crew,as their vessel lay disabled on the water, madesuch excellent use of their missile weapons, thatthey cleared the decks of the iEginetan, sprung onboard, and became masters of her. This exploit,passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, inducedhim to treat the Phoenicians as dastardly calum-niators, and to direct their heads to be cut off:his wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) wereboundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to ventit1.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate ?before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Hali- gallantry ofkarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. L r

It appears that this queen maintained her full partin the battle until the disorder had become irretrie-vable ; she then sought to escape, pursued by theAthenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progressobstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassedcomrades before her. In this dilemma she preservedherself from pursuit by attacking one of her owncomrades ; she charged the trireme of the Karianprince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it downand sunk it, so that the prince with all his crewperished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vesselwhich he was following was that of Artemisia, no-thing would have induced him to relax in the pur-suit—for the Athenian captains were all indignantat the idea of a female invader assailing their city2;

1 Herodot. viii. 90.2 Compare the indignant language of Demosthenes a century and a

quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia queen of Karia, as the


but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy,and seeing her thus charge and destroy anotherenemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter,turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her toescape. At the same time, it so happened that thedestruction of the ship of Damasithymus happenedunder the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons aroundhim on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia,but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek.Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seestthou not how well Artemisia fights, and how shehas just sunk an enemy's ship ?" Assured that itwas really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied," My men have become women ; my women, men."Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exaltedto a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by thedestruction of one of his own ships ; among the crewof which not a man survived to tell the true story1.

enemy of Athens—ti/xets 8' ovres 'AdtjvaToi. pdpfiapov avBpamov, *at ravrayvvaiKa, <po^t]6rj<re(rde (Demosthenes, De Rhodior. Libertat. c. x. p. 197).

1 Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus re-specting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficientlyprobable j and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his ownwho were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extra-vagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he doesnot himself like the story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for hehimself insinuates a doubt, " I do not know whether she ran down theKalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it."Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was com-pletely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, wemay be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merelysuggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery.Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air oftruth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes,and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all thisreads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malign. Herodot. p. 8/3)that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia;


Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus givesus no estimate ; but Diodorus states the number ofships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, onthe Persian side as two hundred; independent ofthose which were made prisoners with all theircrews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the de-struction of all those troops whom they had landedbefore the battle in the island of Psyttaleia : as soonas the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeide\scarried over some Grecian hoplites to that island,overpowered the enemy, and put them to death toa man. This loss appears to have been much de-plored, as they were choice troops ; in great propor-tion, the native Persian guards1.

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet pr J > J tions of the

remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian Greeks thatfleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not T 0

to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken,And the Greeks themselves, immediately after theyhad collected in their island, as well as could be personal

safety—he

done, the fragments of shipping and the dead sendswsbodies, made themselves ready for a second en- l*7

gagement2. But they were relieved from thisnecessity by the pusillanimity3 of the invading mo-narch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a suddenrevulsion from contemptuous confidence, not onlyto rage and disappointment, but to the extreme ofbut he doubtless heard more about her than about the rest, and perhapshis own relatives may have been among her contingent.

1 Herodot. viii. 95 ; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9 ; iEschyl. Pers. 454-470.;Diodor. xi. 19.

2 Herodot. viii. 96.3 The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided

by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Iesusand Arbela (Arrian, ii. 11, 6 ; iii. 14, 3).


alarm for his own personal safety. He was pos-sessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrustagainst his naval force, which consisted entirely ofsubject nations—Phoenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians,Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, &c, with afew Persians and Medes serving on board, in a ca-pacity probably not well suited to them. None ofthese subjects had any interest in the success ofthe invasion, or any other motive for service exceptfear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks wereeven decidedly against it. Xerxes now came tosuspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, ofall these naval subjects1; he fancied that they couldmake no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreadedlest the latter should sail forthwith to the Helles-pont, so as to break down the bridge and intercepthis personal retreat; for upon the maintenance ofthat bridge he conceived his own safety to turn,not less than that of his father Darius, when re-treating from Scythia, upon the preservation of thebridge over the Danube2. Against the Phoenicians,from whom he had expected most, his rage brokeout in such fierce threats, that they stole awayfrom the fleet in the night, and departed home-ward8. Such a capital desertion made future naval

1 See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes(Herodot. viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisiaby the historian (viii. 68), which indicates the general conception of thehistorian himself, derived from the various information which reachedhim.

2 Herodot. vii. 10.3 This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly

given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled Phcenissce, had been preserved,

we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the

CHAP. XU.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES. 185

struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though atfirst breathing revenge, and talking about a vastmole or bridge to be thrown across the strait toSalamis, speedily ended by giving orders to thewhole fleet to leave PhaleTum in the night—notwithout disembarking, however, the best soldierswho served on board1. They were to make straightfor the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridgeagainst his arrival2.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who xfxes re-r r J solves to go

saw the real terror which beset his master, and back him-read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. _advice "*When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of mendation"his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was °fMard°-.

' o nms, who is

not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, left behindand fear for the personal safety of the monarch : it to finishwas farther embittered by anger against Mardonius, quesTof

Greece.Phoenician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athensonly three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, withThemistokles as choregus, four years earlier than the Persse of -lEschylus,which was affirmed by Glaukus to have been (7rapa7re7roirj<T8ai) alteredfrom it. The Chorus in the Phoenissse consisted of Phoenician women,possibly the widows of those Phoenicians whom Xerxes had caused to bebeheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes,Praef. ad ^Esch. Pers. p. ix.), or only of Phoenicians absent on the expe-dition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained theprize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme ordetails (see Welcker Griechische Tragoed. vol. i. p. 26; and Droysen,Phrynichos, iEschylos, und die Trilogie, p. 4-6).

1 Herodot. ix. 32.2 Herodot. viii. 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating

seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs ofCape Zoster (about half-way between Peiraeus and Sunium) for ships,and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration inthe Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, Pers. c. xxvi. ; Strabo, ix. p. 395 ; the two latter talk aboutthe intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it hadbeen conceived before the battle.


as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. Thatgeneral knew full well that there was no safety forhim1 in returning to Persia with the shame offailure on his head: it was better for him to takeupon himself the chance of subduing Greece, whichhe had good hopes of being yet able to do—and toadvise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe andeasy residence in Asia. Such counsel was emi-nently palatable to the present alarm of the mo-narch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a freshchance not only of safety, but of increased powerand glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure hismaster by representing that the recent blow was afterall not serious—that it had only fallen upon the in-ferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreignslaves, like Phoenicians, Egyptians, &c, while thenative Persian troops yet remained unconqueredand unconquerable, fully adequate to execute themonarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes mightnow very well retire with the bulk of his army ifhe were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) wouldpledge himself to complete the conquest, at thehead of 300,000 chosen troops. This propositionafforded at the same time consolation for the mo-narch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person :his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself onbeing consulted, approved of the step. The latterhad acquired his confidence by the dissuasive ad-vice which she had given before the recent deplo-rable engagement, and she had every motive nowto encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for

1 Compare Herodot. vii. 10.


his person, as well as relieving herself from the ob-ligation of farther service. " If Mardonius desiresto remain (she remarked contemptuouslyl) by allmeans let him have the troops : should he suc-ceed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish,the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so longas thou remainest safe, and thy house in power.Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thyexpedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, whileadopting this counsel and directing the return ofhis fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Hali-karnassian queen by entrusting her with some ofhis children, directing her to transport them toEphesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and The Greeks

pursue the

joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of PersianPhale'rum, and immediately put themselves in pur- as Andress u i t ; following as far as the island of Andros with-out success. Themistokleis and the Athenians are f ! . ?

stokles by

even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith secret mes-S3.£re t o

to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge Xerxes.of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution ofEurybiades and the Peloponnesians, who repre-sented that it was dangerous to detain the Persianmonarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklesreadily suffered himself to be persuaded, and con-tributed much to divert his countrymen from theidea ; while he at the same time sent the faithfulSikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intima-tion that he (Themistokl&s) had restrained the im-patience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and

1 Herodot. viii. 10] , 102.

188 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PAKT II.

burn the Hellespontine bridge—and that he hadthus, from personal friendship to the monarch, se-cured for him a safe retreat \ Though this is thestory related by Herodotus, we can hardly believethat with the great Persian land-force in the heartof Attica, there could have been any serious idea ofso distant an operation as that of attacking thebridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probablethat Themistokle's fabricated the intention, witha view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as ofestablishing a personal claim upon his gratitude inreserve for future contingences.

Such crafty manoeuvres, and long-sighted calcu-lations of possibility, seem extraordinary : but thefacts are sufficiently attested — since Themisto-kles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfil-ment of the obligation thus conferred—and thoughextraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, ifwe reflect, first, that the Persian game, even nowafter the defeat of Salamis, was not only not de-sperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded,if it had been played with reasonable prudence :next, that there existed in the mind of this eminentman an almost unparalleled combination of splendidpatriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish ra-pacity. Themistokle's knew better than any oneelse that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly

1 Herodot. viii. 109, 110; Thucyd. i. 137. The words JJVvpoo-enoirjaaTo may probably be understood in a sense somewhat largerthan that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact—not only was it false, that Themistokles was the person who dissuadedthe Greeks from going to the Hellespont—but it was also false, that theGreeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cor-nelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.


desperate, only a few hours before the late battle :moreover, a clever man tainted with such constantguilt might naturally calculate on being one day de-tected and punished, even if the Greeks provedsuccessful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands ofthe Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon the fleet—them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian, money inHe first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants delthat he came to demand their money, bringing withhim two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity.To which the Andrians replied, that " Athens wasa great city and blest with excellent gods : but thatthey were miserably poor, and that there were twounkind gods who always stayed with them and wouldnever quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness '.In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusingto deliver the money required ; for the power ofAthens could never overcome their inability." Whilethe fleet was engaged in contending against the An-drians with their sad protecting deities, Themisto-kles sent round to various other cities, demandingfrom them private sums of money on condition ofsecuring them from attack. From Karystus, Paros,and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himselfapart,from the other generals2, but it appears thatAndros was found unproductive, and after no verylong absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis3.

1 Kerodot. viii. 111. enel 'Avftplovs ye eivai yeconeivas €S ra jueytoraavrjKOvras, Ka\ #eois Stio dxprjO'Tovs OVK iKKemeiv <r(p£<dv rrjv vrjtrov, dWdel <p(.\o)(a>peeiv—lievirjv re Km 'Afirjxavlrjv.

Compare Alksus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii. 172.2 Herodot. viii. 112; Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 21—who cites a

few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.3 Herodot. viii. 112-121.


XerxesevacuatesAttica andreturnshome byland, withthe largerportion ofhis army.

Retreatingmarch ofXerxes tothe Helles-pont—sufferings ofhis troops.He findsthe bridgebroken, andcrosses thestrait onshipboardinto Asia.

The intimation sent by Themistokles perhapshad the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes,who remained in Attica only a few days after thebattle of Salamis, and then withdrew his armythrough Bceotia into Thessaly, where Mardoniusmade choice of the troops to be retained for his fu-ture operations. He retained all the Persians,Medes, Sakse, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as wellas foot, together with select detachments of the re-maining contingents : making in all, according toHerodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now thebeginning of September, and as 60,000 out of hisforces, under Artabazus, were destined to escortXerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius pro-posed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone far-ther military operations until the ensuing spring1.

Having left most of these troops under the or-ders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marchedaway with the rest to the Hellespont, by thesame road as he had taken in his advance a fewmonths before. Respecting his retreat a plentifulstock of stories were circulated2—inconsistent witheach other, fanciful, and even incredible : Grecian

1 Herodot. viii. 114-126.2 The account given by yEschylus of this retiring march appears to

me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persae, 482-513).That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions,is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we mustconsider in deduction—1. That this march took place in the monthsof October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest.2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winterand brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. ThatArtabazus also with another large division was in military operation inThrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of^Eschylus even as to the sufferings by famine must be taken with great

CHAP. XLI.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS—RETREAT OF XERXES. 191

imagination, in the contemporary poet iEschylus,as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juve-

allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon ap-pears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differ-ing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact (Hist.Greece, ch. xv. p. 351, 2nd ed.). " The river had been frozen in thenight hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice sud-denly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in thewaters"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after ^Eschylus—adding in a note," It is a little surprising that Herodotus when he is describing the mi-series of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so promi-nent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in jEschylus. Therecan however be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish auseful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus,as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts whichare only mentioned by later writers," &c.

That a large river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yardsbroad, and in latitude about N. 40° 501), at a period which could not havebeen later than the beginning of November, should have been frozenover in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of thearmy marching over it at daybreak—before the sun became warm—isa statement which surely requires a more responsible witness thanjEschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a " frost out ofseason" (x^f-Siv aapov), brought about by a special interposition of thegods. If be is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, exceptsuch as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice duringthe interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would ima-gine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them onlya short time for escape : whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contendwith—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the ad-vancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over theStrymon : nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not stillhave been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he hadaccompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the townand fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon, re-mained as an important strong-hold of the Persians some years afterthis event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by theAthenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persse would not criticise nicely the hi-storical credibility of that which ^Eschylus told them about the suffer-ings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when heplaced Mount Pangseus on the hither side of the Strymon, to personsmarching out of Greece (Persse, 494). But I must confess that, to mymind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet


nal\ delighted in handling this invasion with themaximum of light and shadow—magnifying thedestructive misery and humiliation of the retreat soas to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating theantithesis with unbounded licence of detail. Thesufferings from want of provision were doubtlesssevere, and are described as frightful and death-dealing : the magazines stored up for the advancingmarch had been exhausted, so that the retiring armywere now forced to seize upon the corn of thecountry through which they passed—an insufficientmaintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the barkof trees, and other wretched substitutes for food.Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, andoccasioned many to be left behind among the citiesthrough whose territory the retreat was carried;strict orders being left by Xerxes that these citiesshould maintain and tend them. After forty-fivedays' march from Attica, he at length found himselfat the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating fromSalamis, had arrived long before him2. But theshort-lived bridge had already been knocked topieces by a storm, so that the army was transport-ed on shipboard across to Asia, where it first ob-tained comfort and abundance, and where thechange from privation to excess engendered new

and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confi-dence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matterwith jEschylus—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

1 Juvenal, Satir. x. 178.Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relicta,In Caurum atque Eurum solitus ssevire flagellis, &c.

! Herodot. viii. 130.

CHAP. XU.] BATTLE OF SALAMIS — RETREAT OF XERXES. 19a

maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizensof Abdera still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara,which Xerxes had presented to them when he halt-ed there in his retreat, in token of hospitality andsatisfaction: and they even went the length of af-firming that never since his departure from Atticahad he loosened his girdle until he reached theircity. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifyingthe terror of the repulsed invader! who re-enteredSardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit,only eight months after he had left it as the pre-sumed conqueror of the western world1.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, Joy of theliberated from the immediate presence of the enemy distributioneither on land or sea, and passing from the extreme "nd prize™.of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged inthe full delight and self-congratulation of unexpect-ed victory. On the day before the battle, Greecehad seemed irretrievably lost: she was now savedeven against all reasonable hope, and the terrificcloud impending over her was dispersed"2. In thedivision of the booty, the iEginetans were adjudgedto have distinguished themselves most in the ac-

1 See the account of the retreat of Xerxes in Herodotus, viii. 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The de-scription given in the Persee of JEschylus (v. 486, 515, 570) is con-ceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin(ii. 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in afishing-boat. " Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutumpontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoria scapha trepidustrajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna et, sestimatione sortis humanae, re-rum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quera pauloante vix sequor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum mini-sterio, cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

2 Herodot. viii. 109. rjp-eis 8e, evprj/xa yap eip^xojuej' rj/Mas avrovs Kalrf)V 'EXXafia fir) SltoKw/xei' avSpas (pfvyovras.

VOL. V. O


tion, and to be entitled to the choice lot; whilevarious tributes of gratitude were also set apart forthe gods. Among them were three Phoenician tri-remes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax atSalamis, to Athene at Sunium, and to Poseidon atthe Isthmus of Corinth : farther presents were sentto Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whetherhe was satisfied, replied that all had done their dutyto him except the iEginetans : from them he re-quired additional munificence on account of theprize awarded to them, and they were constrainedto dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon astaff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there.Next to the iEginetans, the second place of honourwas awarded to the Athenians ; the iEginetan Po-lykritus, and the Athenians Eumene"s and Ameinias,being ranked first among the individual combat-ants1. Respecting the behaviour of Adeimantusand the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians ofthe time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourablepicture, representing them to have fled at the com-mencement and to have been only brought back bythe information that the Greeks were gaining thevictory. Considering the character of the debateswhich had preceded, and the impatient eagernessmanifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isth-mus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardnesson their part, when forced into a battle at the latterplace, would not be in itself improbable: yet inthis case it seems that not only the Corinthiansthemselves, but also the general voice of Greece,contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them

1 Herodot. viii. 93-122; Diodor. xi. 27.


as having behaved with bravery and forwardness.We must recollect that at the time when Herodotusprobably collected his information, a bitter feelingof hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth,and.Aristeus son of Adeimantus was among the mostefficient enemies of the former1.

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the Honours*• rendered to

chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate amongthemselves the first and second prizes of skill andwisdom. Each of them deposited two names onthe altar of Poseidon : and when these votes cameto be looked at, it was found that each man hadvoted for himself as deserving the first prize, butthat Themistokle's had a large majority of votes forthe second2. The result of such voting allowed noman to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs

1 Herodot. viii. 94 ; Thucyd. i. 42, 103. TO crcpotpbv /uo-os from Co-rinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii. 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry wordsin refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does notuphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxvii.p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, andon being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose ofbeing revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reason-able evidence: the statement of Diyllus, that he received ten talentsfrom the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much lessimprobable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the mag-nitude of the sum : but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom isnot satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes thelength of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of braveryand were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, whichhe cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucydp. xvi. insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that ofPlutarcn and Dio.

2 Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17: compare De He-rodot. Malign, p. 871) states that each individual chief gave his secondvote to Themistokles. The more we test Herodotus by comparisonwith others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggeratingspirit.

o 2


give a second prize without it; so that Themisto-kle's was disappointed of his reward, though exaltedso much the higher, perhaps through that very dis-appointment, in general renown. He went shortlyafterwards to Sparta, where he received from theLacedaemonians honours such as were never paid,before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crownof olive was indeed given to Eurvbiades as the firstprize, but a like crown was at the same time con-ferred on Themistokle's as a special reward forunparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, thefinest which the city afforded. Moreover, on hisdeparture, the 300 select youths called Hippeis,who formed the active guard and police of thecountry, all accompanied him in a body as escortof honour to the frontiers of Tegea1. Such demon-strations were so astonishing, from the haughtyand immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribedby some authors to their fear lest Themistokle'sshould be offended by being deprived of the generalprize—and they are even said to have excited thejealousy of the Athenians so much, that he wasdisplaced from his post of general and Xanthippusnominated2. Neither of these last reports is likelyto be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Hero-dotus : the fact that Xanthippus became general ofthe fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regularcourse of Athenian change of officers, and impliesno peculiar jealousy of Themistokle's.

1 Herodot. viii. 124 ; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.2 Diodor. xi. 27 : compare Herodot. viii. 125, and Thucyd. i. 74.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLAT^EA AND MYKALE.—FINAL REPULSEOF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians The Per-of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, after re-'they still anticipated success by land from the en- Greece,""11

suing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after ha- y ^ving conveyed the monarch himself with his ac- collects m

° J the spring

companying land-force across the Hellespont, re- at Samos.tired to winter at Kyme* and Samos: in the latterof which places large rewards were bestowed uponTheomlstor and Phylakus, two Samian captainswho had distinguished themselves in the late en-gagement. Theom&stor was even nominated de-spot of Samos under Persian protection1. Early inthe spring they were reassembled, to the number of400 sail, but without the Phoenicians, at the navalstation of Samos, intending however only to main-tain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly sup-posing that the Greek fleet would venture to attackthem2.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was n.c. 479.1 j_-r 1 i T /• • • * The Greek

such as to justify such belief in its enemies. As- fleet assem-sembled at iEgina in the spring, to the number of spring ate

110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychide's, it &advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward :nor could all the persuasions of Chian and otherIonian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan au~

1 Herodot. viii. 85. 2 Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.


thorities and to the fleet, and promising to revoltfrom Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should ap-pear, prevail upon Leotychides to hazard any ag-gressive enterprise. Ionia and the western watersof the iEgean had now been for fifteen years com-pletely under the Persians, and so little visited bythe Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, espe-cially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartanking, like going to the Pillars of Herakles1—not lessventuresome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedaemonian admiralAlkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst thepreserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat ofXerxes had produced less disaffection among hissubjects and allies than might have been antici-pated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessa-lian Aleuadse2, and the Boeotian leaders, still re-mained in hearty cooperation with Mardonius: nor

1 Herodot. viii. 131, 132 : compare Thucyd. iii. 29-32.Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in in-

ducing Leotychides to proceed even as far'as Delos—TO yap wpoaaTipcoTTCLV Seiyov i)v TOIUI "EXX^o't, ovre rial* ~)(coptov iovcL i^TTe[poi{Tit ffTpaTirjS

re iravra 7rXea eSoKet (Tvaf TTJV 8e 2d/ioj/ ewi(TTeaTO &6£y KCU 'HpaicKeas

This last expression of Herodotus has heen erroneously interpretedby some of the commentators as if it were a measure of the geogra-phical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he isdescribing. In my judgement, no inferences of this kind ought to befounded upon i t : it marks fear of an enemy's country which they hadnot been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate therisk beforehand—rather than any serious comparison between one di-stance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as werelittle used to the sea, we might say—" A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbonseemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which weshould merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as totheir geographical knowledge.

2 Herodot. ix. 1,2,67; viii. 136.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT^A AND MYKALE. 199

were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelityto him appeared questionable, among all the Greeksnorth-west of the boundaries of Attica and Mega-ris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that General ad-

herence ofany actual revolt occurred. Potidaea, situated on thethe Isthmus of Pall§ne, together with the other Ttowns in the long tongue of Pallene1, declared them- "evoitTofselves independent: and the neighbouring townof Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of besieged inBottiseans, was on the point of following their ex- Artabazus.ample. The Persian general Artabazus, on his re-turn from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, un-dertook the reduction of these towns, and succeededperfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slewall the inhabitants, and handed it over to a freshpopulation, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks underKritobulus of Tor6n6\ It was in this manner thatOlynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequenceand interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic.But Artabazus was not equally successful in thesiege of Potidsea, the defence of which was aidedby citizens from the other towns in Pallene1. A plotwhich he concerted withTimoxenus, commander ofthe Skionsean auxiliaries in the town, became acci-dentally disclosed : a considerable body of his troopsperished while attempting to pass at low tide underthe walls of the city, which were built across theentire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining thePallenaean peninsula to the mainland: and afterthree months of blockade, he was forced to renouncethe enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoinMardonius in Thessaly1.

1 Herodot. viii. 128, 129.


The latter, before he put himself in motion forg the spring campaign, thought it advisable to con-

fume's7' su& the Grecian oracles, especially those within thel i m i t s o f Boeotia a n d Phocis. He sent a Karian

spring in named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as theBoeotia. He J

A .

consuitsthe Kanan language, to consult Trophonius at Leba-oracieS

a.U deia, Amphiaraus and the Ismenian Apollo atThebes, Apollo at Mount Pt6on near Akrsephise,and Apollo at the Phocian Abae. This step wasprobably intended as a sort of ostentatious respecttowards the religious feelings of allies upon whomhe was now very much dependent: but neither thequestions put, nor the answers given, were madepublic : and the only remarkable fact which Hero-dotus had heard, was, that the priest of the PtoianApollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at leastin a language intelligible to no person present ex-cept the Karian Mys himself1. It appears howeverthat at this period, when Mardonius was seeking tostrengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plansfor establishing a separate peace and alliance withAthens against the Peloponnesians, some personsin his interest circulated predictions, that the daywas approaching when the Persians and the Athe-nians jointly would expel the Dorians from Pelo-ponnesus2. The way was thus paved for him to

1 Herodot. viii. 134, 135 ; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.8 Herodot. viii. 141. Aancbaifiovim de, avanvrfademts TU>V \oyiicv,

&s <r(peas XPe°" e o T ' ®H-a ™ < " aXXoicri Aapiev<n eKTriirreiv in Hfkmrov-

vrja-ov ino MrjSav re Kai 'Adrjvalatv, Kapra re cSetcrav /JIJ 6^ioXoyij(ro)(rt TW

H(pcrr) 'ABtjvaioi, &C.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the medisingparty in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point oftime to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expul-sion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and

CHAP, XUI.] BATTLES OF PLAT^EA AND MYKALE. 201

send an envoy to Athens—Alexander king of Ma-, . sends Alex-

cedon; who was instructed to make the most se- ander ofductive offers, to promise reparation of all the da- to "Athens,mage done in Attica as well as the active future f 1

friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the e ^Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the peace-price of their consent to form with him an equaland independent alliance1. The Macedonian princeadded warm expressions of his own interest in thewelfare of the Athenians, recommending them as asincere friend to embrace propositions so advan-tageous as well as so honourable : especially as thePersian power must in the end prove too much forthem, and Altica lay exposed to Mardonius and hisGrecian allies, without being covered by any com-mon defence as Peloponnesus was protected by itsIsthmus2.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found theAthenians re-established wholly or partially in theirhalf-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy andtolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes fromThermopylae the year before, might perhaps havebeen sufficient to detach them from the cause ofHellas : and even at the present moment, thoughthe pressure of overwhelming terror had disap-peared, there were many inducements for them toAthenians, could be even dreamt of. The Lacedaemonians are indeedsaid here "to call to mind the prophecies/'—as if these latter were old,and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that afabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probabilityat once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old col-lection like that of Bakis or Musseus. And Herodotus doubtless him-self believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit tothe Lacedaemonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to bealarmed by " calling these prophecies to mind."

1 Herodot. ix. 7. 2 Herodot. viii. 142.


accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alli-ance of Athens would ensure to the Persian generalunquestionable predominance in Greece, and toAthens herself protection from farther ravage aswell as the advantage of playing the winning game:while his force, his position, and his alliances, evenas they then stood, threatened a desolating anddoubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chiefbrunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this timesuffering privations of the severest character; fornot only did their ruined houses and temples re-quire to be restored, but they had lost the harvestof the past summer together with the seed of the pastautumn1. The prudential view of the case beingthus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise,and especially strengthened by the distress whichreigned at Athens, the Lacedaemonians were so

Temptation much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point,to accept* that they sent envoys to dissuade the Atheniansfearoftlie" fr°m listening to him, as well as to tender succourmanfthat°~ during t n e existing poverty of the city. Aftershe would having heard both parties, the Athenians deliveredLacedaemo- their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolu-sent toV°yS tion, which their descendants delighted in repeating.prehveenut. T o Alexander they said : "Cast not in our teeth

that the power of the Persian is many times greaterthan ours : we too know that, as well as thou : but

1 Herodot. viii. 142. Hi(^vfievoi<n jiivroi vp.1v (rvvaxdifieda (saythe Spartan envoys to the Athenians), KOX OTI Kapnav ia-TfprjSrjrehi^av 17817, Kal on olKo(f)86pr]a-6e x?°vov ^>r) ffoXXdji. Seeing that this isspoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of two crops must in-clude the seed of the preceding autumn : and the advice of Themistokle'sto his countrymen—Kai ns oiKirjv re avairkaacurQco, KCLL criropov dva<S>se'xeVa) (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases tocarry into effect.


we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resisthim. in the best manner we can. Attempt not thevain task of talking us over into alliance with him.Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall con-tinue in his present path, we will never contractalliance with Xerxes : we will encounter him in ourown defence, putting our trust in the aid of thosegods and heroes to whom he has shown no reve-rence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt.Come thou not to us again with similar propositions,nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will,into unholy proceedings : thou art the guest andfriend of Athens, and we would not that thoushouldst suffer injury at our hands1."

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was Resoluteof a similar decisive tenor : protesting their uncon- Athenians,6

querable devotion to the common cause and liber-ties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivabletemptations, either of money or territory, should spite ofinduce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, com- sent suffer-mon language and religion. So long as a single ng'Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be madewith Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans foroffering them aid during the present privations :but while declining such offers, they reminded themthat Mardonius, when apprised that his propositionswere refused, would probably advance immediately,and they therefore earnestly desired the presenceof a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia to assist in

1 Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a centuryand a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been " onthe point of stoning Alexander"—funpov deiv KareXevaav (Lykurg.cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 186)—one among many specimens of the care-less manner in which these orators deal with past history.

204 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART U.

Selfish in-difference

displayed

and the: a

the defence of Attica1. The Spartan envoys,promising fulfilment of this request9, and satisfiedto have ascertained the sentiments of Athens,departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athe-mans to the general cause of Greece, in spite ofpresent suffering combined with seductive offers forthe future, was the just admiration of their descend-a n^s a n ( j ^ e frequent theme of applause by theirorators3. But among the contemporary Greeks itwas hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaidby a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The samefeeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside oftheir own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangeredthe march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, nowmanifested itself a second time among the Spartansand Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus,which they had been so busy in constructing andon which they had relied for protection against theland-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left

1 Herodot. viii. 143, 144 ; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 10. Accordingto Plutarch, it was Aristeides who proposed and prepared the reply tobe delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style ofPlutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness ofHerodotus.

2 Herodot. ix. 7- crwdf/jievoi 8e rj/iiv TOV Hep<rr)v d.vTia<re<rdcu is rqeBotanrjv, &C.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantiallyin the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives(xi. 28).

3 Herodot. ix. 7. eViora/jeroi re on nepdaKfdaTfpov tori ofioKoyeeiv raHepcry /laKkou rj wokepJciv, &c.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the creditwhich she really deserved : they venture to represent the Athenians ashaving refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion,instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never madeany offers to them. See Isokrates, Or. iv. Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT^?A AND MYKALE. 205

unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed assoon as the forward march of Mardonius was anti-cipated. It was however still unfinished at thetime of the embassy of the Macedonian prince toAthens, and this incomplete condition of their spe-cial defence was one reason of their alarm lest theAthenians should accept the terms proposed. Thatdanger being for the time averted, they redoubledtheir exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall wasspeedily brought into an adequate state of de-fence and the battlements along the summit werein course of being constructed. Thus safe be-hind their own bulwark, they thought nothingmore of their promise to join the Athenians inBceotia and to assist in defending Attica againstMardonius : indeed their king Kleombrotus, whocommanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terri-fied by an obscuration of the sun at the momentwhen he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinationsof the gods in reference to the coming war, that heeven thought it necessary to retreat with the mainforce to Sparta, where he soon after died1. Besidesthese two reasons—indifference and unfavourableomens—which restrained the Spartans from aidingAttica, there was also a third : they were engagedin celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and itwas their paramount object (says the historian)2 tofulfil " the exigences of the god." As the Olympia

1 Herodot. ix. 10.2 Herodot. ix. 7. Ot yap AaxeSai/zdi'ioi opraôv re TOVTOV TOV xpovov

Kat <r(pi rjv 'YaKivBia' mp\ 7r\eicrTov 8' rjyov ra TOV 8eov Tropcrvveiu' afia

Se TO ret^dff o~<pi TO iv ro> 'IcOfxa eYeiêoi*, Kat rjhr) iiraXêts iAa/i/3ape.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the prac-tice for the Amyklsean hopiites to go home for the celebration of theHyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed(Xenoph. Heljen. iv. 5, 11).


and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now didthe Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of de-fence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelitytowards an exposed ally, and the bond of an expresspromise.

The Spar- Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavour-tans,having . . .

fortified the able reception which his proposals had received atAthens, put his army in motion forthwith fromo- Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and

"les Athens by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. Asa second h e marched through Boeotia, the Thebans, whotime. °

heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuadehim from farther military operations against theunited force of his enemies—urging him to try theefficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in thedifferent cities, for the purpose of disuniting them.But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica,heeded not their advice: about ten months after theretreat of Xerxes, he entered the country withoutresistance, and again established the Persian headquarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.)1.

Second Before he arrived, the Athenians had again re-l e - moved to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disap-

pointment and indignation. They had in vaind T boint- a w a i t e d the fulfilment of the Spartan promise thatment and a Peloponnesian army should ioin them in Bceotiaagainst for the defence of their frontier; at length, beingdeserting* unable to make head against the enemy alone, theythem. found themselves compelled to transport their fami-

lies across to Salamis2. The migration was far lessterrible than that of the preceding summer, since

1 Diodor. xi. 28 ; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. ol /xh oXXoi wavres nape'ixova-rpaTirjv KCU vvve<rifiakov is 'AOr/vas ocroi mp ijxrfhi^ov 'EAAijww ranTavTj; oiK-qnevav, &c. 2 Herodot. ix. 4.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT.EA AND MYKALE. 207

Mardonius had no fleet to harass them ; hut it wasmore gratuitous, and might have been obviated hadthe Spartans executed their covenant, which wouldhave brought about the battle of Platsea two monthsearlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so Secondanxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first Mardoniusabstained from damaging either the city or the Athenianscountry, and despatched a second envoy to Salamisto repeat the offers made through Alexander of j ^Macedon: he thought that they might now be which theylistened to, since he could offer the exemption ofAttica from ravage, as an additional temptation.Murychide's, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent torenew these propositions to the Athenian senate atSalamis ; but he experienced a refusal not less reso-lute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent toAthens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunatesenator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unani-mity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of thepropositions of Murychides. So furious was thewrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption,which his single-voiced negative provoked, thatsenators and people both combined to stone him todeath : while the Athenian women in Salamis, hear-ing what had passed, went of their own accord tothe house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wifeand children. In the desperate pitch of resolutionto which the Athenians were now wound up, an op-ponent passed for a traitor : unanimity, even thoughextorted by terror, was essential to their feelings1.

1 Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Ly-kurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the


Murychides, thoughhis propositions were refused,was dismissed without injury.

Remou- While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofsb the686" of their stedfast attachment to the cause of Hellas,Sparta— they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with

slackness"8 Megara and Platsea, to remonstrate with the Spar-of the Spar. j a n s o n their backwardness and breach of faith,tans.

and to invoke them even thus late to come forthat once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omit-ting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, itwould become imperatively necessary for them,against their will, to make terms with the enemy.So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors re-specting Attica and the Megarid, that they post-poned giving an answer to these envoys for tensuccessive days, while in the mean time theypressed with all their efforts the completion of theIsthmic fortifications. And after having thusamused the envoys as long as they could, theysame incident as having happened to a person named Kyrsilus, duringthe preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demo-sthen. de Corona, p. 296. c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii. 11. Thattwo such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians, is noway probable:and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is farthe more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we knowthat a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in theacropolis, and Kyrsilus might have been among them, if he had chosen.Moreover Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no delibera-tion ; while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokrates (Or. iv. Panegyric, p. 74. c. 42) states that the Athenianscondemned many persons to death for medism (in allusion doubtless toThemistokle's as one), but he adds—"even now they imprecate curseson any citizen who enters into amicable negociation with the Persians "—ev Se rots (rvXKoyois %TI KCU VVV apas Troiovvrai, e?Tis enuaipVKtveriuHep&ais TWV TVOKITWV. It is difficult to believe that in his time any suchimprecation can have been included in the solemnities whereby theAthenian meetings were opened.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT.&A AND MYKALE. 209

would have dismissed them at last with a negativeanswer—such was their fear of adventuring beyondthe Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos,whom they much esteemed and to whom they com-municated the application, reminded them that nofortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for thedefence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians becameallied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsulaopen by sea. The strong opinion of this respectedTegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfishpolicy would not be seconded by their chief Pelo-ponnesian allies, and brought to their attention,probably for the first time, that danger by sea mightagain be renewed, though the Persian fleet had beenbeaten in the preceding year, and was now at adistance from Greece. It changed their resolution,not less completely than suddenly; and they des-patched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citi-zens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helotsattached to him. And when the Athenian envoys,ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came onthe next day to give peremptory notice that Athenswould no longer endure such treacherous betrayal,but would forthwith' take measures for her ownsecurity and separate pacification—the Ephors af-firmed on their oath that the troops were alreadyon their march, and were probably by this time outof the Spartan territory1. Considering that this

1 Herodot. ix. 10, 11 ; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 10. Plutarch had reada decree ascribed to Aristeides, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and My-ronides, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xan-thippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was nowin command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so

VOL. V. P


step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluc-tant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that themystery of the night march, and the sudden com-munication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, inthe way of reply, would impress more emphaticallythe minds of the latter—who returned with thewelcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared theircountrymen for speedy action. Five thousandSpartan citizens, each with seven light-armed He-lots as attendants, were thus on their march to thetheatre of war. Throughout the whole course ofGrecian history, we never hear of any number ofSpartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 beingput on foreign service at the same time. But thiswas not all: 5000 Lacedaemonian Perioeki, eachwith one light-armed Helot to attend him, werealso despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in thesame struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford suf-ficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet

Large Spar- real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesiancollected cities followed the example, and a large army wasTnias ata"' n o w collected under the Spartan Pausanias.the isth- jf- appears that Mardonius was at this momentmus.

great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marchedoff in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness ofthe narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to meconvincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is moreprobable than anything which we can substitute in its place. TheSpartan foreign policy all depended on the five Ephors : there was nopublic discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these Ephors isconsistent and intelligible—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensi-ble to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can Ithink (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the manner of communication ulti-mately adopted is of the nature of a jest.


in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who,though professing neutrality, are said to have pro- ging Attica,mised him that they would arrest the march of the ! 'Spartans beyond their own borders1. We mayreasonably doubt whether they ever made such apromise ; but at any rate, the suddenness of themarch as well as the greatness of the force pre-vented them from fulfilling it ; and they were forcedto content themselves with apprising Mardoniusinstantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier.It determined that general to evacuate Attica, andto carry on the war in Boeotia—a country in everyway more favourable to him. He had for sometime refrained from committing devastations in orround Athens, hoping that the Athenians might beinduced to listen to his propositions ; but the lastdays of his stay were employed in burning and de-stroying whatever had been spared by the host ofXerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruit-less attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedae-monians which had been detached for the protec-tion of Megara2, he withdrew all his army intoBoeotia, not taking either the straight road to Pla-taea through Eleutherse, or to Thebes through Phyle,both which roads were mountainous and incon-venient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was metby some guides from the adjoining regions nearthe river Asopus, and conducted through the demeof Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself

1 Herodot. ix. 12.2 There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pau-

sanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have beenbrought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40. 2).


by a route longer but easier, in Bceotia on the plainof the As6pus: along which river he next daymarched westward to Sk6lus, a town in the terri-tory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Platsea1.He then took up a position not far off, in the plainon the left bank of the Asopus : his left wing overagainst Erythrse, his centre over against Hysise,and his right in the territory of Platsea: and heemployed his army in constructing forthwith afortified camp2 of ten furlongs square, defended bywooden walls and towers, cut from trees in theTheban territory.

Discourage- Mardonius found himself thus with his numerousarmy of army, in a plain favourable for cavalry ; with a campgenerally":8 more orless defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes3

1 m his r e a r >— a n ^ a considerable stock of provisionsn as well as a friendly region behind him from whence

quet: jea- to draw more. Few among his army, however, werelousies be- ° J

tween Mar-donius and » Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendale orAr us, Sphendaleis seems not certainly known (Ross, Uber die Demen vonin com- Attika, p. 138) ; but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stoodmand—zeal " near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading fromand eager- Dekeie;a through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tana-Thebans grianplain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Demi

of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123).Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that " Malakasa is

the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry couldconveniently halt."

It appears that the Boeotians from the neighbourhood of the As6puswere necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory ofOr6pus was at this time still a part of Bceotia : we do not certainlyknow at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Boeotians will be found to takeplace most frequently in this south-eastern region of Boeotia,—Tanagra,CEnophyta, Delium, &c.

2 Herodot. ix. 15.3 The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd.

i. 90).

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLA17GA AND MYKALE. 213

either hearty in the cause or confident of success':even the native Persians had been disheartened bythe flight of the monarch the year before, and werefull of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquetto which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mar-donius along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban orBoeotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressedfeeling, which were afterwards recounted to Hero-dotus himself by one of the guests present—an Or-chomenian citizen of note named Thersander. Thebanquet being so arranged as that each couch wasoccupied by one Persian and one Theban, this manwas accosted by his Persian neighbour in Greek,who inquired to what city he belonged, and uponlearning that he was an Orchomenian2, continuedthus: " Since thou hast now partaken with me inthe same table and cup, I desire to leave with theesome memorial of my convictions: the rather inorder that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so asto take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seestthou these Persians here feasting, and the armywhich we left yonder encamped near the river?Yet a little while, and out of all these, thou shaltbehold but few surviving." Thersander listenedto these words with astonishment, spoken as theywere with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and

1 Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67 ; Plutarch, Aristeide's, c. 18.3 Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as

a Theban—Ylepa-qv re KO.1 0r)^aiov iv Khivy eKaarrj—a proof of the in-timate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, whichis farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i. 51 (compare the Scholia adIoc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Theban family ofHerodotus and Asopodorus. The ancient mythical feud appears to havegone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later timesbetween these two towns.


replied—" Surely thou art bound to reveal this toMardonius, and to his confidential advisers : " butthe Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannotavert that which God hath decreed to come: noone will believe the revelation, sure though it be.Many of us Persians know this well, and are hereserving only under the bond of necessity. Andtruly this is the most hateful of all human suffer-ings—to be full of knowledge and at the same timeto have no power over any result1."—" This (ob-serves Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orcho-menian Thersander, who told me farther that hementioned the fact to several persons about him,even before the battle of Platsea." It is cer-tainly one of the most curious revelations in thewhole history; not merely as it brings forward thehistorian in his own personality, communicatingwith a personal friend of the Theban leaders, andthus provided with good means of information asto the general events of the campaign—but also asit discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected,the real temper of the native Persians, and even ofthe chief men among them. If so many of thesechiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent,in the cause, much more decided would be thesame absence of will and hope in their followers

1 Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is strikingand emphatic—ixtilrrrq fie o&vvrj <rori rap iv a.v8pa>noun avrfj, TrdK\a(ppovcovra pjSeror Kpareetv. It will have to be more carefully con-sidered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch uponthe scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happinessand duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position isthe direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics as to thesuperior happiness of the fllos OeaprjnKos or life of scientific observationand reflection.

CHAP. XL1I.] BATTLES OF PLATJEA AND MYKALE. 215

and the subject allies. To follow the monarch inhis overwhelming march of the preceding year, wasgratifying in many ways to the native Persians:but every man was sick of the enterprise as nowcut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, thesecond in command, was not merely slack butjealous of his superior1. Under such circumstanceswe shall presently not be surprised to find thewhole army disappearing forthwith, the momentMardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, theThebans and Boeotians were active and zealous,most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocianseven of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000hoplites, under Harmokyde's, had been tardy injoining him, having only come up since he retiredfrom Attica intoBceotia: and some of the Phocianseven remained behind in the neighbourhood of Par-nassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against thePersians. Aware of the feeling among this con-tingent, which the Thessalians took care to placebefore him in an unfavourable point of view, Mar-donius determined to impress upon them a lesson ofintimidation. Causing them to form in a separatebody on the plain, he then brought up his numerouscavalry all around them: while the Phtkne, orsudden simultaneous impression, ran through theGreek allies as well as the Phocians themselves,that he was about to shoot them down3. The

1 Herodot. ix. 66.2 Herodot. ix. 17. Sie|i}X#<r <£i}f«/, as Kcn-aKOVTieiartyeas. Respect-

ing <£>?P7, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykale, in thissame chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded and


general Harniokyde's, directing his men to form asquare and close their ranks, addressed to themshort exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and tobehave like brave Greeks against barbarian assas-sins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to thecharge, and advanced close to the square, with up-lifted javelins and arrows on the string, some fewof which were even actually discharged. The Pho-cians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with afirm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled aboutwithout any actual attack or damage. After thismysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescendedto compliment the Phocians on their courage, andto assure them by means of a herald that he had beengreatly misinformed respecting them: he at the sametime exhorted them to be faithful and forward inservice for the future, and promised that all goodbehaviour should be amply recompensed. Hero-dotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the suppositionis to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not reallyintend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field,and desisted from the intention only on seeing howmuch blood it would cost to accomplish. Howeverthis may be, the scene itself was a remarkable re-ality, and presented one among many other proofsof the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of thearmy1.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans,

lected " s l a m w ' th missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies—ire-under Pau- pio-rrja-as TOVS iavTov KarrjKovTure (Thucyd. viii. 108).sanias. 1 OVK e <a drpeKeas elnetv, otVc cI rjkBov /lev diroKeovres TOVS $a>Keas,

8er]8evTa>u Tav Be<r(ra\S)i>, &c. (Herodot. ix. 18).This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing

between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not with-out importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT^EA AND MYKALE. 217

the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed inBceotia : and not only had the position of Mardoniusalready been taken, but his camp also fortified, be-fore the united Grecian army approached Kithseron.in its forward march from the Isthmus. After thefull force of the Lacedaemonians had reached theIsthmus, they had to await the arrival of theirPeloponnesian and other confederates. The ho-plites who joined them were as follows: fromTegea, 1500; from Corinth, 5000, besides a smallbody of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidsea;from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600 ; from Sikyon,3000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Trcezen, 1000;from Lepreon, 200 ; from Mykense and Tiryns, 400;from Phlius, 1000; from HermionS, 300; fromEretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; fromAmbrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium,800 ; from Pale" in Kephallenia, 200 ; from ^Egina,500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara,they took up 3000 Megarian hoplites ; and as soonas they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, thearmy was completed by the junction of 8000 Athe-nian hoplites, and 600 Platsean, under Aristeides,who passed.over from Salamis1. The total force

1 Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausa-nias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by theGreeks who took part in the battle of Platsea (Pausan. v. 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus,except the Pales of Kephallenia : and he found in addition the Eleians,Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians and Melians. The five last namesare islanders in the iEgean : their contingents sent to Platsea must atall events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that theysent any—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet atthis moment on service, to which it would be natural that they shouldjoin themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Bromistcdt


of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700men : there were no cavalry, and but very few bow-men—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps withjavelins or swords, but none with any defensivearmour—the grand total was not less than 110,000men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were,as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance onthe 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attend-ance on the other hoplites—together with 1800Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badlyarmed as not to be reckoned in the ranks1.

March of Such was the number of Greeks present or nearPausanias _ •

over Ki- at hand in the combat against the Persians atthseroninto ,,, . , ,.

Bceotia. rlatsea, which took place some little time after-wards : but it seems that the contingents were notat first completely full, and that new additions9 con-tinued to arrive until a few days before the battle,along with the convoys of cattle and provisionswhich came for the subsistence of the army. Pau-sanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis,where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis:at Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrificesis plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palesof Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read FAAEIOIwhen it was really written IIAAEI2, in an inscription at that time about600 years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places thename of the Eleians strengthens this suspicion. Unless it be admitted,we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraudcommitted by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led themto alter a name originally belonging to the Pal6s. The reader will re-collect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and cura-tors at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (DeHerodoti Malignit. p. 873).

1 Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29.' Herodot. ix. 28. oi (TrufroiTaiDTfs re nal ol ap\rjv i\66vres 'EX

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLATYEA AND MYKALE. 219

were found encouraging, and the united army thenadvanced across the ridge of Kithseron, so as tocome within sight of the Persians. When Pausaniassaw them occupying the line of the Asopus in theplain beneath, he kept his own army on the moun-tain declivity near Erythrse, without choosing toadventure himself in the level ground. Mardo-

tacked by

nms, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the Persianthe plain, despatched his numerous and excellent Scavalry under Masistius, the most distinguishedofficer in his army, to attack them. For the mostpart, the ground was so uneven as to check their ciency of

. . , . , t n e Athe-

approach—but the Meganan contingent, which nianshappened to be more exposed than the rest, were cavalry—so hard pressed that they were forced to send to ^Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had notonly no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armedtroops of any sort with missile weapons ; while thePersians, excellent archers and darters, using verylarge bows and trained in such accomplishmentsfrom their earliest childhood, charged in successivesquadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with dartsand arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts ontheir cowardice for keeping back from the plain x.So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry,that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, ex-cept the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go tothe rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians,however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olym-

1 About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot.i. 136 ; Xenophon, Anabas. iii. 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and thejavelin (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 26 ; i. 9, 5 : compare Cyropsed. i. 2, 4).


piodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, imme-diately marched to the spot and took up the combatwith the Persian cavalry. 'For some time the strug-gle was sharp and doubtful: at length the generalMasistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty instature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mountedon a Nissean horse with golden trappings—chargingat the head of his troops, had his horse struck byan arrow in the side. The animal immediatelyreared and threw his master on the ground, closeto the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward,seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius beforehe could rise. So impenetrable were the defencesof his helmet and breastplatel however, that theyhad considerable difficulty in killing him, thoughhe was in their power: at length a spearmanpierced him in the eye. The death of the generalpassed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but assoon as they missed him and became aware of theloss, they charged furiously and in one mass to re-cover the dead body. At first the Athenians, toofew in number to resist the onset, were compelledfor a time to give way, abandoning the body ; butreinforcements presently arriving at their call, thePersians were driven back with loss, and it finallyremained in their possession 2.

The Greeks The death of Masistius, coupled with that finalquit the r

protection repulse of the cavalry which left his body in pos-session of the Greeks, produced a strong effect onboth armies, encouraging the one as much as it dis-heartened the other. Throughout the camp of

Platsea,along the i See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15 ; and the note of Miitzel.Asopus. j H e r o d o t i x gi, 22, 23 ; Plutarch, AristeidSs, c. 14.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT/EA AND MYKALE. 221

Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded,manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over allBceotia ; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle,was abundantly cut in token of mourning. TheGreeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their suc-cess, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded itround the army : even the hoplites ran out of theirranks to look at i t ; not only hailing it as a va-luable trophy, but admiring its stature and pro-portions '. And so much was their confidence in-creased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit theprotection of the mountain-ground, inconvenientfrom its scanty supply of water, and to take up hisposition in the plain beneath, interspersed only withlow hillocks. Marching from Erythne in a westerlydirection along the declivities of Kithseron, andpassing by Hysise, the Greeks occupied a line ofcamp in the Plateean territory along the Asopus andon its right bank ; with their right wing near to thefountain called Gargaphia2 and their left wing nearto the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of thePlatsean hero Androkrate"s. In this position they

1 Herodot. ix. 24, 25. olfiayfj re xpetojuevot a7rXeV<a" &natrav yap TTJV

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes andAtossa in the Persse of ^Eschylus, have often been blamed by critics:we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners ofOrientals of that day.

2 Herodot. ix. 25-30; Plutarch, AristeidSs, c. 11. rbrov'AvBpo-Kparovs rjpaov eyyvs aK(T€L TTVKVWV KCU <rvcrKLa>v devdpatv 7T€pL€^6fj.€vov.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pau-sanias, Ovrm fiev ovv ra^devres iiii rw 'AeraTra itTTparoTTtbevovro, as wellas the words which follow in the next chapter (31) — Oi /3dp/3apot, icv86-fievoi elvm TOVS "EXKrjvas ev IlXaTai^tri, 7raprj(rav Ka\ avrol «rt TOW'A<rambv rbv TOUTTJ peovTa—show plainly that the Grecian troops wereencamped along the Asopus on the Plataaan side, while the Persians


were marshalled according to nations, or separatefractions of the Greek name—the Lacedaemonianson the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthiansimmediately joining them—and the Athenians onthe left wing; a post, which as second in point ofdignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chieflyon grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusionof the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by theSpartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens1. Inthe field even Lacedaemonians followed those demo-

in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite or Thebanside of the river. Whichever army commenced the attack had to beginby passing the As6pus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by thetwo armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338 ; Kruse, Hel-las, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 9 seq., and ch. viii. p. 592 seq.: and the still morecopious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, Travels in NorthernGreece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 324-360. Both of them have given plans ofthe region ; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I can-not but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and thatboth Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the riverAsopus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus ; which wordsseem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that thefountain of Gargaphia was near the river towards the right of the Gre-cian position, and the chapel of Androkrates also near the river towardsthe left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor wouldsuch a site for a chapel of Androkrates be inconsistent with Thucy-dides (iii. 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right-hand of the first mile of road from Plataea to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, itwould not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer re-cognisable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by ColonelLeake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani which had been supposed byColonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platsea which accompaniesthe Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

Herodot. ix. 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C.396) and Mantineia (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to havedropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferredthe post in the line next to the Lacedaemonians (Xenoph. Hellen. iv.2, 19).


cratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecianmilitary operations: in this case, it was not thegenerals, but the Lacedaemonian troops in a body,who heard the argument and delivered the verdictby unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position,marched his army also a little farther to the west- position,ward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, himself S

divided from them by the river Asopus. At thesuggestion of the Thebans, he himself with hisPersians and Medes, the picked men of his army, side of the

Asopus.

took post on the left wing, immediately oppositeto the Lacedaemonians on the Greek right, andeven extending so far as to cover the Tegean rankson the left of the Lacedaemonians : Baktrians, In-dians, Sakae, with other Asiatics and Egyptians,filled the centre : and the Greeks and Macedoniansin the service of Persia, the right—over against thehoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-men-tioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, thoughhe estimates them conjecturally at 50,00c1: norcan we place any confidence in the total of 300,000which he gives as belonging to the other troops ofMardonius, though probably it cannot have beenmuch less.

In this position lav the two armies, separated only UnwMing-, r • i j - i • A A , nessofboth

by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and armies toeach expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on be- Shalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardo-nius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each *?th sides

• J ' discourage

a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascer- first aggres-tain the dispositions of the gods ; the two first had

1 Herodot. ix. 31, 32.

224 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PAKT II.

men from the most distinguished prophetic breedsin Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas*. Allreceived large pay, and the prophet of Pausaniashad indeed been honoured with a recompense aboveall pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for him-self as well as for his brother. It happened that theprophets on both sides delivered the same report oftheir respective sacrifices—favourable for resistanceif attacked ; unfavourable for beginning the battle.At a moment when doubt and indecision was thereigning feeling on both sides, this was the safestanswer for the prophet to give, and the most satis-factory for the soldiers to hear. And though theanswer from Delphi had been sufficiently encou-raging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes ofPlatsea2 had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausaniasdid not venture to cross the Asopus and begin theattack, in the face of a pronounced declaration fromhis prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the pro-phet employed by Mardonius, choose on his sideto urge an aggressive movement, though he had adeadly personal hatred against the Lacedaemonians,and would have been delighted to see them worsted.There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhapsencouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy,among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establishan oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy,like that which now existed at Thebes,—a con-spiracy full of danger' at such a moment, though

1 Herodot. ix. 36, 38. fiefU(r6a>fi£vos OVK okiyov.These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be

seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their adventures:compare also the history of Euenius, ix. 93.

3 Plutarch, AristeidSs, c. xi.; Thucyd. ii. 74.

CHAP. XLIL] BATTLES OF PLAMA AND MYKALE. 225

fortunately repressed1 by Aristeide's, with a hand atonce gentle and decisive. Moreover the annoyanceinflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidanceof the Thebans, was incessant : their constant as-saults, and missile weapons from the other side ofthe Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using it forsupplies of water, so that the whole army wasforced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at theextreme right of the position2, near the Lacedae-monian hoplites. Moreover the Theban leaderTimegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrivedover the passes of Kithseron in the rear of the Gre- Mardoniuscian camp, and the constant reinforcements of Greekshoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon ^y^andMardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off ^*;r°*such communication. The first movement of this p i i i hsort, undertaken by night against the pass calledthe Oak Heads, was eminently successful : a train,of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attackeddescending into the plain with its escort, all ofwhom were either slain or carried prisoners to thePersian camp : nor was it safe for any farther con-

1 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 13.2 Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. TTJV TZ Kpfjvrjv Tr/v Yapyarplrjv, air' r/s vhpd-

fTO irav TO 0-TpdTiv/j.a TO 'EXXrjvinov—epvKOfievot, Se OTTO TOV 'Ao-wnov, ovra

Br] inl TY)V Kprjvrjv i<poiT€OV' dnb TOV TTOTafiov yap o~(pt OVK e^-qv vd(op <po-

peeo-dai, VTTO Te TWV 'nnriav Kai To£evp.a.Ta>v.

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defendedby the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardoniuswas prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evidentfrom the account of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The posi-tion seems to have had no protection except what it derived from theriver Asfipus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it bythe incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, atonce diffuse and uninstructive, given by Diodorusof this battle (xi. 30-36),forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantialnarrative of Herodotus.

VOL. V, Q


voys to approach the Greeks1. Eight days hadalready been passed in inaction before Timegenidassuggested, or Mardonius executed, this manoeuvre,which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did notattempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof howmuch might be hoped from an efficient employmentof his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a generalaction. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer,his impatience became uncontrollable, and he de-termined on a general battle forthwith2. In vaindid Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from thestep—taking the same view as the Thebans, that ina pitched battle the united Grecian army was in-vincible, and that the only successful policy wasthat of delay and corruption to disunite them: herecommended standing on the defensive, by means

impatience of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned—which would allow time for distributing effective

reluctance6 bribes among the leading men throughout the va-rious Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Hero-

e- dotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, wastermineson repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthyattack: he of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms3.show that But while he overruled, by virtue of superiorde refcf- authority, the objections of all around him, Per-h7m?)blet0 s^a n s a s w e ^ a s Greek, he could not but feel daunted

by their reluctant obedience, which he suspectedmight arise from their having heard oracles or pro-phecies of unfavourable augury. He therefore sum-moned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian,and put the question to them whether they knew

1 Herodot. ix. 38, 39. 2 Herodot. ix. 40, 41.3 Herodot. ix. 42.


any prophecy announcing that the Persians weredoomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent:some did not know the prophecies, but others(Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, thoughthey did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer,Mardonius said, " Since ye either do not know, orwill not tell, I who know well will myself speak out.There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invadersof Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, andshall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, beingaware of this, shall neither go against that temple,nor try to plunder i t : on that ground therefore weshall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye whoare well-affected to the Persians—we shall get thebetter of the Greeks." With that he gave ordersto prepare everything for a general attack and battleon the morrow1.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Ther-sander was present at this interview, and may havereported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of thehistorian himself is not the least curious part of thewhole, as illustrating the manner in which theseprophecies sunk into men's minds, and determinedtheir judgements. Herodotus knew (though he doesnot cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mar-donius made allusion; and he pronounces, in themost affirmative tone2, that it had no reference tothe Persians : it referred to an ancient invasion ofGreece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But

1 Herodot. ix. 42.2 Herodot. ix. 43. TOVTOV S' i'ycoye rbv xpyvpo" T°v MapDovios e«re <?r

TLepvas c^ew, is 'iWvpiovs TC KOL TOV 'Ey\e\eQ>v trrparov ot'Sa Tre-Troii)fi€vov, aXX OVK is Uepvas. 'AXXa ra jiev Ba/a3f is Tounqv ri)V fidxi"etrn 7T€7roir}[jL€va, &c.

Q2

228 HISTORY OF GREECE. [ P A R T H .

both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) andMusseus had prophesied, in the plainest manner,the destruction of the Persian army on the banksof the Thermodon and As6pus. And these arethe prophecies which we must suppose the officersconvoked by Mardonius to have known also,though they did not dare to speak out : it was thefault of Mardonius himself that he did not takewarning.

His inten- The attack of a multitude like that of Mardoniustion com-municated was not likely under anv circumstances to be made

so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise : butthe latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit

ofMacedon. from Alexander king of Macedon ; who, riding upto the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of thenight, desired to speak with Aristeid&s and theother generals. Announcing to them alone hisname and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for theGrecian cause, as well as the hazard which he in-curred by this nightly visit—he apprised them thatMardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, couldnot by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, butwas nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, de-termined on an attack the next morning. " Be yeprepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in thiswar (said he) remember to liberate me also fromthe Persian yoke : I too am a Greek by descent,and thus risk my head because I cannot endure tosee Greece enslaved1."

1 Herodot. ix. 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable•—Xeyto 8e &v on Map8ovia> TC Ka\ rfj crrpaTtrj oi Sivarai ra (r(j>dyiaKaraBifiia yeve<rdar naXai yap av (fid^aBe, &C

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacri-fices : it could not be done.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLATJEA AND MYKALE. 229

The communication of this important message, ^ ^made by Aristeides to Pausanias, elicited from him places in

, . , . . • r the line be-

a proposal not a little surprising as coming irom a tween theSpartan general. He requested the Athenians to Ychange places with the Lacedaemonians in the line." We Lacedaemonians (said he) now stand opposedto the Persians and Medes, against whom we havenever yet contended, while ye Athenians havefought and conquered them at Marathon. Marchye then over to the right wing and take our places,while we will take yours in the left wing againstthe Boeotians and Thessalians, with whose armsand attack we are familiar." The Athenians readilyacceded, and the reciprocal change of order wasaccordingly directed: nor was it yet quite com-pleted when day broke, and the Theban allies ofMardonius immediatelytook notice of what had beendone. That general commanded a correspondingchange in his own line, so as to place the nativePersians once more over against the Lacedaemo-nians : upon which Pausanias, seeing that his ma-noeuvre had failed, led back his Lacedaemonians tothe right wing, while a second movement on thepart of Mardonius replaced both armies in the orderoriginally observed 1.

No incident similar to this will be found through-out the whole course of Lacedaemonian history. Toevade encountering the best troops in the enemy'sline, and to depart for this purpose from their pri-vileged post on the right wing, was a step well-cal-

1 Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 16. Here, as on manyother occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative ofHerodotus.


culated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, andcould hardly have failed to produce that effect, ifthe intention had been realized : it is at the sametime the highest compliment to the formidable re-putation of the native Persian troops—a reputationrecognised by Herodotus, and well-sustained atleast by their personal bravery 1. Nor can wewonder that this publicly manifested reluctance onthe part of the leading troops in the Grecian armycontributed much to exalt the rash confidence ofMardonius : a feeling which Herodotus, in Ho-meric style2, casts into the speech of a Persianherald sent to upbraid the Lacedaemonians andchallenge them to a " single combat with cham-pions of equal numbers, Lacedaemonians againstPersians." This herald, whom no one heard or

attacks cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiecef° r bringing out the feelings belonging to the mo-ment, was followed by something very real and ter-rible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by thePersian cavalry ; whose rapid motions, and showersof arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on thisday more than ever. The latter (as has been beforestated) had no cavalry whatever ; nor do their lighttroops, though sufficiently numerous, appear tohave rendered any service, with the exception ofthe Athenian bowmen. How great was the ad-vantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown bythe fact that they for a time drove away the Lace-dsemonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so asto choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the

1 Herodot. ix. 71.2 Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diome'd§s (Iliad, viii. 161).

CHAP. XL1I.] BATTLES OF PLAT^A AND MYKALE. 231

army had been prevented by the cavalry from re-sorting to the river As6pus, this fountain had beenof late the only watering-place : and without it theposition which they then occupied became unte-nable—while their provisions also were exhausted,inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persiancavalry, could not descend from Kithseron to jointhem l.

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Gre- In conse;quence 01

cian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate, the annoy--\ ir i • i i i a n c e ° f t h e

the resolution was taken, incase Mardonius should Persian ca-not bring on a general action in the course of the ™nks de"day, to change their position during the night, when ^there would be no interruption from the cavalry;and to occupy the ground called the Island, distantabout ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, andseemingly north of the town of Platsea, which wasitself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, im-properly so denominated, included the ground com-prised between two branches of the river 6ero£ 2,both of which flow from Kithseron, and after flowingfor a certain time in channels about three furlongsapart, form a junction and run in a north-westerlydirection towards one of the recesses of the Gulfof Corinth—quite distinct from the Asopus, which,though also rising near at hand in the lowest de-clivities under Kithseron, takes an easterly direc-tion and discharges itself into the sea oppositeEubcea. When in this so-called Island, the army

1 Herodot. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Plateans re-stored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (TO vSap avto-aaavTo) ;but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

2 See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, Travels inNorthern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

232 HISTOKY OF GREECE. [PART II.

ConfusionoftheGre-

gmovement,

would be secure of water from the stream in theirrear, nor would they, as now, expose an extendedbreadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry se-parated from them only by the Asopus1. It wasfarther resolved, that so soon as the army shouldonce be in occupation of the Island, half of thetroops should forthwith march onward to disengagethe convoys blocked up on Kithseron and conductthem to the camp. Such was the plan settled incouncil among the different Grecian chiefs ; themarch to be commenced at the beginning of thesecond night-watch, when the enemy's cavalrywould have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have de-termined, he passed the whole day without anygeneral attack : but his cavalry, probably elated byj - n e r e c e n t demonstration of the Lacedaemonians,were on that day more daring and indefatigablethan ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severesuffering2; insomuch that the centre of the Greekforce (Corinthians, Megarians, &c, between theLacedaemonians and Tegeans on the right, and theAthenians on the left), when the hour arrived forretiring to the Island, commenced their march in-deed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcertedplan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impa-tience to obtain a complete shelter against the at-

1 Herodot. ix. 51. "Es rovrov hy\ rbv âpov ifiovkeicravTO fifTaiTrr]vai,Iva Kal v8a.TL e'x<«crt xPââl a<p86va, Kai oi Imrecs crcpeas firj fTtvoiaro,wanep tear' Wv eovrav.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostilearmies, extended front to front along the course of the Asdpus.

3 He rodo t . ix. 5 2 . Keivrjv jxtv TTJV rffi(pr]v 7rairav, •wpoaKfifi.ivrjs Tijs

LTTTTOV, eixpv TT&VOV arpvTOv.

CHAP. XL1I.] BATTLES OF PLAT^A AND MYKALE. 233

tacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to theIsland, they marched a distance of twenty furlongsdirectly to the town of Platsea, and took up a posi-tion in front of the Herreum or temple of Here,where they were protected partly by the buildings,partly by the comparatively high ground on whichthe town with its temple stood. Between the posi-tion which the Greeks were about to leave and thatwhich they had resolved to occupy (i. e. betweenthe course of the Asopus and that of the Oeroe),there appear to have been a range of low hills:the Lacedaemonians, starting from the right wing,had to march directly over these hills, while theAthenians, from the left, were to turn them and getinto the plain on the other side1. Pausanias, ap-prised that the divisions of the centre had com-menced their night-march and concluding of coursethat they would proceed to the Island according toorders, allowed a certain interval of time in orderto prevent confusion, and then directed that theLacedBemonians and Tegeans should also begintheir movement towards that same position. Buthere he found himself embarrassed by an unex-pected obstacle. The movement was retrograde,receding from the enemy, and not consistent with

1 Herodo t . ix. 56 . Xiavtravlas—oT]firjvas dwrj-yf 8ia TWV KOKWV&V TOVS

XojTrois irduras' elirovro Se Kal Teyejjrcu. 'Adrjvaioi 8e raxOevres rj'iaav

rot %p,77aKiv rj AaK€$aip,6vtoi. Oi fiev yap TCOV re b'xBwv <XVT£IXOPTO Kal TTJS

iira>pei7]s TOV Kidcupawos. 'Adrjvaioi 8e, Karat rpatpdivres is TO ireSiov.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that

the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills,

which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though they were march-

ing along the plain :—Mapdovios—eVci^e ort AaiceSaip.ovLovs Kal Teyerjras

liovvovs' 'Adrjvalovs yap rpaTrofiivovs is TO Trtbiov vwo TO>V o\8a>v oi Ka-

Teapa.


Refusal ofthe SpartanlochageAmompha-retus toobey theorder forthe night-march.

Mistrust ofPausaniasand the

exhibitedby theAthenians.

the military honour of a Spartan: neverthelessmost of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obey-ed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, loch-age or captain of that band which Herodotus callsthe lochus of Pitana1, obstinately refused. Nothaving been present at the meeting in which theresolution had been taken, he now heard it for thefirst time with astonishment and disdain, declaring" that he for one would never so far disgrace Spartaas to run away from the foreigner2." Pausanias,with the second in command Euryanax, exhaustedevery effort to overcome his reluctance: but theycould by no means induce him to retreat; nor didthey dare to move without him, leaving his entirelochus exposed alone to the enemy3.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this sceneof indecision and dispute, an Athenian messengeron horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascer-tain what was passing, and to ask for the last direc-tions : for in spite of the resolution taken afterformal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrust-ed the Lacedaemonians, and doubted whether, afterall, they would act as they had promised: the move-ment of the central division having become knownto them, they sent at the last moment before theycommenced their own march, to assure themselvesthat the Spartans were about to move also. A pro-

1 There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Hero-dotus : the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus socalled (Thucyd. i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be cer-tain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending all pasttime—off ovS* eyei/ero 7ra>7rore.

s Herodot. ix. 53, 54. 3 Herodot. ix. 52, 53.


found, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but toowell justified by the previous behaviour of theSpartans towards Athens, is visible in this pro-ceeding': yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing theirpart in the preconcerted plan, had marched at onceto the Island, the Grecian army would have beensevered without the possibility of reuniting, andthe issue of the battle might have proved altoge-ther different. The Athenian herald found theLacedaemonians still stationary in their position,and the generals in hot dispute with Amomphare-tus ; who despised the threat of being left alone tomake head against the Persians, and when remind-ed that the resolution had been taken by generalvote of the officers, took up with both hands a vastrock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and castit at the feet of Pausanias, saying—" This is mypebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run awayfrom the strangers." Pausanias denounced him asa madman—desiring the herald to report the sceneof embarrassment which he had just come to wit-ness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not tocommence their retreat until the Lacedaemoniansshould also be in march. In the meantime the dis-pute continued, and was even prolonged by theperverseness of Amompharetus until the morningbegan to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain pausanias

longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that ^outthe refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really Amompha-

* r J retus, whospeedily fol-

1 Herodot. ix. 54. 'Adqi/aioi—el)^ov arpefias cr<peas avrovs tva ira)(6rj- ' o w s bun.<rav, inuTTaii.evoi TO. AaxeSai/ioyiW (ppovfjiiara, as aXXa (frpovtovruv KulaKKa \eyovrav.


left alone, would probably make up his mind tofollow. Having marched about ten furlongs, acrossthe hilly ground which divided him from the Island,he commanded a halt; either to await Amompha-retus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough torender aid and save him, if he were rash enough tostand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter,seeing that his general had really departed, overcamehis scruples, and followed him; overtaking and j oiningthe main body in its first halt near the river Moloeisand the temple of Eleusinian DemeteV. The Athe-nians, commencing their movement at the sametime with Pausanias, got round the hills to theplain on the other side and proceeded on theirmarch towards the Island.

Astonish- When the day broke, the Persian cavalry wereastonished to find the Grecian position deserted.

^ T n e y immediately set themselves to the pursuit ofretreated^ ^e Spartans, whose march lay along the higher andduring the more conspicuous ground, and whose progress hadpursues and moreover been retarded by the long delay of Araotn-them with pharetus : the Athenians on the contrary, marchingf without halt, and being already behind the hills,

were not open to view. To Mardonius, this re-treat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and con-temptuous confidence which he vented in full mea-sure to the Thessalian Aleuadse—" These are yourboasted Spartans, who changed their place justnow in the line, rather than fight the Persians, andhave here shown by a barefaced flight what they arereally worth ! " With that he immediately directedhis whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost

1 Hcrodot. ix. 56, 57.

CHAP. XLII.J BATTLES OF PLATÂ AND MYKALE. 237

expedition. The Persians crossed the Asopus, andran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell,without any thought of order or preparations forovercoming resistance : the army already rang withshouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowingup the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of thisdisorderly rush forward1: but the Thebans and theother Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius,appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther Battle ofthan the neighbourhood of the Demetrion or tem-ple of Eleusinian Demete'r, where he had halted totake up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by thePersian horse and next by Mardonius with the mainbody, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise theAthenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were theAthenians slack in complying with his request: butthey speedily found themselves engaged in conflictagainst the Theban allies of the enemy, and there-fore unable to reach him2. Accordingly the Lace-daemonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Per-sians single-handed without any assistance from theother Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within

1 Herodo t . ix. 59 . ihlaKov &>s 7ro8£>v exaa-ros elôv, ovre Koa/icd ovSevl

KOO-firjOevres, ovre rd^t. Kal OVTOI fUv (iiorj TC Kal SfiiXco inr/'iaav, c»savapiracrofieuoi rovs "EXXr/vas.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner inwhich the Persians advanced : Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mar-donius—iâ>v crvvreTayfievrjU TTJV Swa/up f7re< >e'peTO rots AaKedaijio-

vlois, &c. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17).Plutarch also says that Pausanias rjye rfjv SWTJV hvvajuv irpbs ras

UXaraias, &c, which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Hero-dotus. Pausanias intended to march to the Island, not to Platea : hedid not reach either the one or the other.



bowshot of their enemies, planted in the groundthe spiked extremities of their gerrha (or longwicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork,from behind which they poured upon the Greeks ashower of arrows1: their bows were of the largestsize, and drawn with no less power than skill. Inspite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted,Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of of-fering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were forsome time unfavourable, so that he did not ventureto give orders for advance and close combat. Manywere here wounded or slain in the ranks2, amongthem the brave Kallikrates, the handsomest andstrongest man in the army : until Pausanias, wea-ried out with this compulsory and painful delay, atlength raised his eyes to the conspicuous Herseumof the Platseans, and invoked the merciful inter-vention of He're" to remove that obstacle which con-fined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronouncedthe words, when the victims changed and becamefavourable3: but the Tegeans, while he was yetpraying, anticipated the effect and hastened forwardagainst the enemy, followed by the Lacedaemoniansas soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wickerbreastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown

1 About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 17.2 Herodot. ix. 72.3 Herodot. ix. 62. Km roicn AaKe8aifiovioi<n avriKa fifra TTJU fix1?"

Trjv HavcavUa iylvero dvoficvoiai ra <rcj)dyta xpyvTa. Plutarch exagge-rates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Herseon, visible to Pausaniasat the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army en-dured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, seeXenophon, Anabasis, vi. 4, 10-25; Hellenic, iii. 2, 17.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PhATMk AND MYKALE. 239

by the Grecian charge : nevertheless the Persians,though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge andhaving no defensive armour, maintained the fightwith individual courage, the more remarkable be-cause it was totally unassisted by discipline ortrained collective movement, against the drilledarray, the regulated step, the well-defended per-sons, and the long spears, of the Greeks1. Theythrew themselves upon the Lacedaemonians, seizinghold of their spears, and breaking them : many ofthem devoted themselves in small parties of ten toforce by their bodies a way into the lines, and to Great

. personal

get to individual close combat with the short spear bravery of8a n d t h e d a g g e r 2 . M a r d o n i u s h i m s e l f , c o n s p i c u o u s — t y

totally de-1 Herodot. ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians {e.ate,d' * n d

, 5 , Mardoniusare remarkable : \i)p,a.Ti fiev wv Kat papy OVK ecrowes1 rjcrav oi Uepo-aC s i a u l -

avoivkoi Se iovres, Kal irpbs, di/eTTttrrij/xovfj rjaav, Kal OVK O/IOTOI ToT<rievavTLOMTt (ro<pL7]i> TTXCICTOU yap o~(psas efi^Aecro rj eo~6rjs ipr)jxos iovo~a

ow\av' Ttpbs yap oTrXi'ras iovrts yvjxvrjTes ayiova. iiroievvro. Compare thestriking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made bythese badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in theLacedsemonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a de-scription of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,—and withthe battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which 1400 half-armed Swissovercame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrablefront of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable tobreak in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Win-kelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself uponthem, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vo-gelin, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi. p. 240,or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memora-ble incident.

2 For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii. 61.Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted

the Egyptian breastplates (SaiprjKas) : probably this may have beenafter the battle of Platsea. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders onhorseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case ofMasistius above narrated : by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habithad become more widely diffused (Xenoph. Anabas. i. 8, 6 ; Brisson,De Regno Persarum, lib. hi. p. 361), for the cavalry at least.


upon a white horse, was among the foremost war-riors, and the thousand select troops who formedhis body-guard distinguished themselves beyond allthe rest. At length he was slain by the hand of adistinguished Spartan named Aeimne"stus; his thou-sand guards mostly perished around him, and thecourage of the remaining Persians, already wornout by the superior troops against which they hadbeen long contending, was at last thoroughly brokenby the death of their general. They turned theirbacks and fled, not resting until they got into thewooden fortified camp constructed by Mardoniusbehind the Asopus. The Asiatic allies also, as soonas they saw the Persians defeated, took to flightwithout striking a blow1.

TheAthe- The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had beenthe left engaged in a serious conflict with the Boeotians ;

especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites im-Thebans. mediately around them, who fought with great

bravery, but were at length driven back, after theloss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban ca-valry however still maintained a good front, pro-tecting the retreat of the infantry and checking theAthenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabledto reach Thebes in safety ; a better refuge than thePersian fortified camp2. With the exception of theThebans and Boeotians, none of the other medisingGreeks rendered any real service : instead of sus-taining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never onceadvanced to the charge, but merely followed in thefirst movement of flight. So that in point of fact,the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecianarmy who really fought, were, the native Persians

1 Herodot. ix. 64, 65. 2 Herodot. ix. 67, 68.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT^HA AND MYKALE. 241

and Sakse on the left, and the Boeotians on theright: the former against the Lacedaemonians, thelatter against the Athenians1.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the Artabazus,combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, Persian*" 6

of whom some must doubtless have been native abandonsPersians, left the field without fighting and without "«contest

° ° and retires

loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in out ofo ' o J Greece

the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted the rest ofwith the nomination of Mardonius as commander- army take"in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure ^

inp

by deprecating any general action. Apprised that thefortified

Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the re-treating Greeks, he marshalled his division and ledthem out towards the scene of action, though de-spairing of success and perhaps not very anxiousthat his own prophecies should be contradicted.And such had been the headlong impetuosity ofMardonius in his first forward movement,—socomplete his confidence of overwhelming the Greekswhen he discovered their retreat,—that he took nopains to ensure the concerted action of his wholearmy : accordingly before Artabazus arrived at thescene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who hadbeen engaged under the commander-in-chief, alreadydefeated and in flight. Without making the leastattempt either to save them or to retrieve the bat-tle, he immediately gave orders to his own divisionto retreat: not repairing, however, either to thefortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at

1 Herodot . ix. 67 , 6 8 . Tcoi/ Se SWav 'EWrjvav T£>V /j-ira fiao-iXeos i6e-

XoKdKfovTav Ktu TSIV aXka>v avfx,fia)(a>v 6 was opiXos ovre

$€v\ oijT€ Ti aTvoBe^d^ievos effovyei1.

VOL. V. R


Small pro-portion ofthe armieson eachside whichreallyfought.

The Greeksattack andcarry thefortifiedcamp.

once the whole campaign, and taking the direct roadthrough Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and theHellespont1.

As the native Persians, the Sakse, and the Boe-otians, were the only real combatants on the oneside, so also were the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans,and Athenians, on the other. It has already beenmentioned that the central troops of the Grecianarmy, disobeying the general order of march, hadgone during the night to the town of Platsea insteadof to the Island. They were thus completely severedfrom Pausanias, and the first thing which theyheard about the battle, was, that the Lacedaemo-nians were gaining the victory. Elate with thisnews, and anxious to come in for some share ofthe honour, they rushed to the scene of action,without any heed of military order; the Corinthi-ans taking the direct track across the hills, whilethe Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched bythe longer route along the plain, so as to turn thehills and arrive at the Athenian position. TheTheban horse under As6podorus, employed inchecking the pursuit of the victorious Athenianhoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up inthorough disorder, charged them vigorously, anddrove them back to take refuge in the high ground,with the loss of 600 men2. But this partial successhad no effect in mitigating the ruin of the generaldefeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedaemoniansproceeded to attack the wooden redoubt whereinthe Persians had taken refuge. But though they

1 H;rodot. ix. 66. = Herodot. ix. 69.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLATJGA AND MYKALE. 2-13

were here aided by all or most of the central Gre-cian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle,they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailingwalls, that they made no progress, and were com-pletely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to theirassistance. The redoubt was then stormed, notwithout a gallant and prolonged resistance on thepart of its defenders. The Tegeans, being thefirst to penetrate into the interior, plundered therich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for hishorses, made of brass, remained long afterwardsexhibited in their temple of Athene' Alea,—whilehis silver-footed throne, and scimitar1, were pre-served in the acropolis of Athens, along with thebreastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall,effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaugh-tered without mercy as well as without limit; sothat if we are to credit Herodotus, there survivedonly 3000 men out of the 300,000 which had com-posed the army of Mardonius—save and except the40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his re-treat2. Respecting these numbers, the historianhad probably little to give except some vague re-ports, without any pretence of computation : about

1 Herodot. ix. 70; Demosthenes cont. Timokrat. p. 741. c. 33.Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the scimitar ofMardonius, contending that the Lacedaemonians would never have per-mitted the Athenians to take it.

' Herodot. ix. 70 : compare jEschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singlesout "the Dorian spear " as the great weapon of destruction to the Per-sians at Platsea—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this com-pliment ; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedyhad been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, andhe might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which theydeserved at Plataea. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta andAthens in like manner (Pyth. i. 76).

a 2


the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more atten-tion, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athe-nians. Herein however is not included the loss ofthe Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry,nor is the number of slain Lacedaemonians, not

b°h °d Spartans, specified : while even the other numbersactually stated are decidedly smaller than the pro-bable truth, considering the multitude of Persianarrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecianhoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch,that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in theaction, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed,nor indeed are we told that they took any activepart in the battle1. Whatever may have been thenumerical loss of the Persians, this defeat provedthe total ruin of their army: but we may fairlypresume that many were spared and sold intoslavery2, while many of the fugitives probablyfound means to join the retreating division of Arta-bazus. That general made a rapid march acrossThessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silenceabout the recent battle, and pretending to be senton a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he

1 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, statedthat all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribeMantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seemsimpossible to believe that no citizens belonging to the other nine tribeswere killed.

2 Diodorus indeed states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of thenumbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter ortake any prisoners (xi. 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spiteof his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost 10,000 men isstill less admissible.

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLATiEA AND MYKALE. 245

reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotusis correct (though it may well be doubted whetherthe change of sentiment in Thessaly and the othermedising Grecian states was so rapid as he implies),Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countriesbefore the news of the battle became generallyknown, and then retreated by the straightest andshortest route through the interior of Thrace toByzantium, from whence he passed into Asia: theinterior tribes, unconquered and predatory, ha-rassed his retreat considerably; but we shall findlong afterwards Persian garrisons in possession ofmany principal places on the Thracian coast1. Itwill be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higherthan ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their vie- Funeral ob-„ . I T - • 11 • sequies by

tory, nrst in burying the slain, next in collecting the Greeksand apportioning the booty. The Lacedaemonians,the Athenians, theTegeans, the Megarians and thePhliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a d°nius—

r ° distribution

separate tomb in commemoration : the Lacedse- of booty.monians, indeed, distributed their dead into threefractions, in three several burial-places: one forthose champions who enjoyed individual renown atSparta, and among whom were included the mostdistinguished men slain in the recent battle, suchas Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory cap-tain, Philokyon, and Kallikrates—a second for the

1 Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions of Demosthenes to Perdikkas kingof Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flightfrom Platsea, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too looseto deserve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was not then kingof Macedonia (Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 687. c. 51 ; and ireplSwrafemj, p. 173. c. 9).


other Spartans and Lacedaemonians'—and a thirdfor the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monu-ments, erected in the neighbourhood of Plataea bythose cities whose citizens had really fought andfallen, there were several similar monuments to beseen in the days of Herodotus, raised by othercities which falsely pretended to the same honour,with the connivance and aid of the Platasans2. Thebody of Mardonius was discovered among the slain,and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is evensaid to have indignantly repudiated advice offeredto him by an iEginetan that he should retaliateupon it the ignominious treatment inflicted byXerxes upon the dead Leonidas3. On the morrow

1 Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-placeonly to the other Spartans, apart from the Select. He takes no noticeof the Lacedaemonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in referenceto burial, though he had informed us that 5000 of them were includedin the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairlypresume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens gene-rally. As to the word ipias, or e'tpevas, or limeas (the two last beingboth conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any cer-tainty : we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

2 Herodot. ix. 85. TSv 8' SXXcov ocroi Kai (palvovrai iv HKaraijjtnioiwes Tatpoi, TOVTOVS Bi, ais eye) •KvvBavop.ai, eiraurxytiofitvovs rgaire&Toi rrjs fx.aj(r)st iicacrTovs xwjuara j(axrai Keiva, T&V imyivofieviiiv etve-K€v avdpanrioV eVet Kai AlyivrjTcaiv eori avToBi Kakeofievos ra<pos, TOV iyaaxoitt) Kai 8/xa erecri vcrrepov pera ravra, berjdevrav rSv AlyivrjTeav,XScrai KXedSi/i' TOV AVTO8LKOV, av&pa Itkarcuea, wpoijeivov iovra avTair.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless frompersonal inquiries made at Platsea.

3 Herodot. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to Grecianfeeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the iEginetan Lamp6n.In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made byHerodotus, not very creditable to the iEginetans : there is moreover athird (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the He-lots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to haveheard all these anecdotes at Platsea: at the time when he probablyvisited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabit-ants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubt-

CHAP. XLII.J BATTLES OF PLAT^EA AND MYKALE. 247

the body was stolen away and buried; by whom,was never certainly known, for there were manydifferent pretenders who obtained reward on thisplea from Artyntes the son of Mardonius: thefunereal monument was yet to be seen in the timeof Pausanias1.

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold andsilver in Darics as well as in implements and orna-ments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses,camels, &c, even the magnificent tent of Xerxes,left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included2.By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots col-lected all the valuable articles into one spot for divi-sion ; not without stealing many of the golden orna-ments, which, in ignorance of the value, they werepersuaded by the iEginetans to sell as brass. Afterreserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, togetherwith ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and theIsthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as gene-ral—the remaining booty was distributed amongthe different contingents of the army in proportionto their respective numbers3. The concubines of

less sympathised in the hatred of the Athenians against iEgina. Itdoes not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbe-lieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampon to crucifythe bodyof Mardonius—which has more the air of a poetical contrivancefor bringing out an honourable sentiment, than of a real incident. Butthere seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories.Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interestingto scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, hisdead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, andnailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1 ; iii. 1, 17).

1 Herodot. ix. 84; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.2 Herodot. ix. 80, 81 : compare vii. 41-83.3 Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus

only says—eXa/3ov eKaaTCU T&v a^ioi rjtrav (ix. 81).


the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distri-buted : there were probably however among themmany of Grecian birth, restored to their families ;and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidstthe flying Persians, with rich jewels and a nume-rous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausaniashimself, imploring his protection. She proved tobe the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoride'sof Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandat£s ; andhe had the satisfaction of restoring her to herfather1. Large as the booty collected was, thereyet remained many valuable treasures buried in theground, which the Platsean inhabitants afterwardsdiscovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platsea were theLacedaemonians, Athenians and Tegeans: the Co-rinthians and others, forming part of the army op-posed to Mardonius, did not reach the field untilthe battle was ended, though they doubtless aidedboth in the assault of the fortified camp and in thesubsequent operations against Thebes, and were uni-versally recognised, in inscriptions and panegyrics,among the champions who had contributed to theliberation of Greece2. It was not till after the

1 Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companionsof the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, formsa melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa: seeDiodor. xvii. 35 ; Quintus Curtius, iii. xi. 21 ; Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 2.

2 Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873 ; com-pare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that noneof the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platsea except the Lacede-monians, Tegeans, and Athenians : the orator Lysias repeats the samestatement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks)how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognise theexploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and othersincluded? But these inscriptions do not reallv contradict what is af-


taking of the Persian camp that the contingents ofElis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have beenamong the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalryfrom descending the passes of Kithseron, first reach-ed the scene of action. Mortified at having missedtheir share in the glorious exploit, the new-comerswere at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus :but the Lacedaemonian commander forbade them,and they returned home without any other consola-tion than that of banishing their generals for nothaving led them forth more promptly1.

There yet remained the most efficient ally ofJ J . summons

Mardonius—the city of Thebes ; which Pausanias Thebes, re-summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, re- surrender6

quiring that the medising leaders should be delivered Nup, especially Timegenidas and Attaginus. Onreceiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, selves UP>

D . ° and are put

and to adopt the still more effective measure of to death.laying waste their territory—giving notice that thework of destruction would be continued until thesechiefs were given up. After twenty days of endu-firmed by Herodotus. The actual battle happened to be fought onlyby a part of the collective Grecian army ; but this happened in a greatmeasure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, anduntil within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continu-ous line of position : moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer,they would have come up in time to render actual help. They wouldnaturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory ofthe entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platsea, and sawLacedaemonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian norjEginetan, &c, he would naturally inquire how it happened that noneof these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed thatthey were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities toerect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informsus that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Platseans.

1 Herodot. ix. 17-


ranee, the latter at length proposed, if it shouldprove that Pausanias peremptorily required theirpersons and refused to accept a sum of money incommutation, to surrender themselves voluntarilyas the price of liberation for their country. A ne-gociation was accordingly entered into with Pausa-nias, and the persons demanded were surrenderedto him, excepting Attaginus, who found means toescape at the last moment. His sons, whom he leftbehind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pau-sanias refused to touch them, with the just remark,which in those times was even generous1, that theywere nowise implicated in the medism of their father.Timegenidas and the remaining prisoners were car-ried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death,without the smallest discussion or form of trial:Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay orconsultation were granted, their wealth and that oftheir friends would effectually purchase voices fortheir acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves hadbeen induced to give themselves up partly in thatexpectation2. It is remarkable that Pausanias him-self only a few years afterwards, when attainted oftreason, returned and surrendered himself at Spartaunder similar hopes of being able to buy himself offby money3. In this hope indeed he found himself

1 See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife andchildren of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 5). Comparealso Herodot. iii. ]16; ix. 120.

2 Herodot. ix. 87, 88.3 Thucyd. i. 131. Kai ma-revav xPWaa'1 Sta\vcra.v TTJV biaft6ki)v.

Compare Thucyd. -viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs andgenerals of the Lacedsemonian and allied fleet (all except Hermokratesof Syracuse) received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interestsboth of their seamen and of their country : also c. 49 of the same book


deceived, as Timegenidas had been deceived before :but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicatingthe general impression that the leading men in aGrecian city were usually open to bribes in judicialmatters, and that individuals superior to this temp-tation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasionto dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness ofthe leading Greeks when I come to explain the ex-tremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among Honoursthe Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the lectionsbattle of Plataea, may well be doubted: and the am<«;gthe

' J Greek war-

silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an im- riors-portant statement of Plutarch, that the Atheniansand Lacedaemonians were on the point of comingto an open rupture, each thinking themselves en-titled to the prize—that Aristeide's appeased theAthenians, and prevailed upon them to submit tothe general decision of the allies—and that Megarianand Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dan-gerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plataeans,to which proposition both Aristeid£s and Pausaniasacceded 1. But it seems that the general opinionrecognised the Lacedaemonians and Pausanias asbravest among the brave, seeing that they had over-come the best troops of the enemy and slain thegeneral. In burying their dead warriors, the Lace-daemonians singled out for peculiar distinction Phi-lokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the loch-age, whose conduct in the fight atoned for hisabout the Lacedaemonian general Astyochus. The bribes received bythe Spartan kings Leotychides and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot.vi. 72 ; Thucyd. ii. 21).

1 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign, p. 873.


disobedience to orders. There was one Spartanhowever who had surpassed them all—Aristode'mus,the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Ther-mopylae. Having ever since experienced nothingbut disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, thisunfortunate man had become reckless of life, andat Platsea he stepped forth single-handed from hisplace in the ranks, performing deeds of the mostheroic valour and determined to regain by his deaththe esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartansrefused to assign to him the same funereal honoursas were paid to the other distinguished warriors,who had manifested exemplary forwardness andskill, yet without any desperate rashness, and with-out any previous taint such as to render life aburthen to them. Subsequent valour might beheld to efface this taint, but could not suffice toexalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honouredcitizens1.

Reverential But though we cannot believe the statement ofpiatsea, as Plutarch that the Platseans received by generalthe victory! v° t e the prize of valour, it is certain that they were

largely honoured and recompensed, as the pro-prietors of that ground on which the liberation of

decreed to

beperiodi- Greece had been achieved. The market-place andbratedly centre of their town was selected as the scene for*ne solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up byof the skin. pauSanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in

the name and presence of all the assembled allies.The local gods and heroes of the Platsean territory,who had been invoked in prayer before the battle,and who had granted their soil as a propitious field


CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLATJ1A AND MYKALE. 253

for the Greek arms, were made partakers of thisceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees ofthe engagements with which it was accompanied1.The Platseans, now re-entering their city, which thePersian invasion had compelled them to desert,were invested with the honourable duty of celebra-ting the periodical sacrifice in commemoration ofthis great victory, as well as of rendering care andreligious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors.As an aid to enable them to discharge this obliga-tion, which probably might have pressed hard uponthem at a time when their city was half-ruined andtheir fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, whichwas partly employed in building and adorning ahandsome temple of Athene—the symbol probablyof renewed connection with Athens. They under-took to render religious honours every year to thetombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in everyfifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleu-theria with gymnastic matches analogous to theother great festival games of Greece2. In consi-deration of the discharge of these duties, togetherwith the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and thewhole body of allies bound themselves by oath to

1 Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visitingthe field of Bebriacum where his troops had recently been victorious," instaurabat sacrum Diis loci " (Tacitus, Histor. ii. 70).

2 Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 19-21 ; Strabo, ix. p. 412 ;Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic monthBoedromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought;while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honour ofthe deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mssmak-te'rion. K. F. Herrmann (Gottesdienstliche Alterthumer der Griechen,ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.


guarantee the autonomy of Platsea, and the inviola-bility of her territory. This was an emancipationof the town from the bond of the Boeotian federa-tion, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebesas its chief.

Permanent But the engagement of the allies appears to haveconfederacy had other objects also, larger than that of protect-

m S Platsea, or establishing commemorative cere-to how monies. The defensive league against the Persiansmeetings at o o

Plata*. w a s again sworn to by all of them, and renderedpermanent: an aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites,1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose ofcarrying on the war, was agreed to and promised,the contingent of each ally being specified: more-over the town of Platsea was fixed on as the annualplace of meeting, where deputies from all of themwere annually to assemble1. This resolution is saidto have been adopted on the proposition of Ari-steides, whose motives it is not difficult to trace.Though the Persian army had sustained a signaldefeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble,or be reinforced ; indeed, even later, after thebattle of Mykale: had become known, va fresh inva-sion of the Persians was still regarded as not im-probable2, nor did any one then anticipate thatextraordinary fortune and activity whereby theAthenians afterwards organised an alliance such asto throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, thenorthern half of Greece was still medising, either inreality or in appearance, and new efforts on thepart of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascend-ency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be

1 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 21. 2 Thucyd. i. 90.


renewed, Aristeides and the Athenians had thestrongest interest in providing a line of defencewhich should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus,and in preventing the Peloponnesians from con-fining themselves to their Isthmus, as they haddone before. To take advantage for this purposeof the new-born reverence and gratitude which nowbound the Lacedaemonians to Platsea, was an ideaeminently suitable to the moment, though the un-foreseen subsequent start of Athens, combinedwith other events, prevented both the extensivealliance and the inviolability of Platsea, projectedby Aristeides, from taking effect1.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecianland army conquered at Platsea, the naval arma-ment under Leotychide"s and Xanthippus was en-

1 It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platsea after thevictory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the histo-rians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not ofsuspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attach-ment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engagingat the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who hadmedised—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuildthe temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave themin their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some ofthe injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state evenby the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Perikles, forty yearsafter the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, forthe purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples(Plutarch, Perikle's, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this allegedoath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorusprofess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, asthey give it, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those whohad voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlierperiod, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in themoment of victory: see Diodor. ix. 29 ; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19,p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokrates, Or. iv.; Panegyr. c. 41, p. 74;Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. AeKareiew, Cicero deRepublica, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one pre-ceding, of this history.


gaged in operations hardly less important, at My-g kale" o n ^ e Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders

Grecian of the flgg^ w h i c n numbered 110 triremes, havingttC6t r it

moves to advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed far-6 ther eastward, or to undertake any offensive opera-

Persians, tions against the Persians at Samos, for the rescueof Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially fromChios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid bothat Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one ofthem named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leoty-chide"s, that their countrymen were ready to revoltfrom the despot Theome"stor, whom the Persianshad installed there, so soon as the Greek fleetshould appear off the island. In spite of emphaticappeals to the community of religion and race,Leotychide"s was long deaf to the entreaty ; but hisreluctance gradually gave way before the perse-vering earnestness of the orator. While yet notthoroughly determined, he happened to ask theSamian speaker what was his name. To which thelatter replied, " Hegesistratus, i. e. army-leader."" I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leo-tychide"s, struck with the significance of this name),pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thycompanions prepare the Samians to receive us, andwe will go forthwith." Engagements were at onceexchanged, and while the other two envoys weresent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hege-sistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which wasfarther encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and bythe assurances of the prophet Deiphonus, hired fromthe Corinthian colony of Apollonia1.

1 Herodot. ix. 91, 92, 95 ; viii. 132, 133. The prophet of Mardo-

CHAP. XLII.J BATTLES OF PLAT^A AND MYKALE. 257

When they reached the Herseum near Kalami in T.he ?er:J sian fleet

Samos , and had prepared themselves for a naval abandonsn Samos and

engagement, they discovered that the enemy s fleet retires tohad already been withdrawn from the island to the \^neighbouring continent. For the Persian com-manders had been so disheartened with the defeatof Salamis that they were not disposed to fight againat sea : we do not know the numbers of their fleet,but perhaps a considerable proportion of it mayhave consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity wasnow very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea ofa sea-fight, they permitted their Phoenician squadronto depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet tothe promontory of Mykale* near Miletus2. Herenius at Platsea bore the same name, and was probably the more highlyesteemed for it (Herodot. ix. 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising 250 triremes (xi. 34).The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Dei-

phonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix. 93, 94).Euenius, as arecompense for having been unjustly blinded by his country-men, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible tohis descendants : a new prophetic breed was thus created, alongside ofthe Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, &c.

1 Herodot. ix. 96. eW! Se iyevovTo rrjs Sa/u'j/j npbs KaXdfiotcn, ol fiivavTov dpiAurdfLevoi Kara TO Mpalov TO TavTrj, 7rapeo~Keva£ovTO es

It is by no means certain that the Herseum here indicated is thecelebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80) : thewords of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple ofHere, in some other part of the island, is intended.

2 Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indica-tions known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us—Gseson, Skolopceis, the chapel of DemeteY, built by Philistusone of theprimitive colonists of Miletus, &c. (ix. 96) : from the language of He-rodotus, we may suppose that Gseson was the name of a town as wellas of a river (Ephonas ap. Athense.vi. p. 311.

The eastern promontory (Cape Poseidon) of Samos was separatedonly by seven stadia from Mykale" (Strabo, xiv. p. 637). near to the placewhere Glauke1 was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79)—modern observers makethe distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd.vol. ii. p. 465).

VOL. V. S


they were under the protection of a land-force of60,000 men, under the command of Tigranes—themain reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia :the ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart ofstones and stakes was erected to protect them,while the defending army lined the shore, andseemed amply sufficient to repel attack from sea-ward \

Mistrust of It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived.of the Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the

flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at firstg P r o P o s e d either to return home, or to turn aside

rals- to the Hellespont : but they were at last persuadedby the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleetand again offer battle at Mykale. On reachingthat point, they discovered that the Persians hadabandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land.So much had the Greeks now become emboldened,that they ventured to disembark and attack theunited land-force and sea-force before t h e m : butsince much of their chance of success depended onthe desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding ofLeotychides was, to copy the previous manoeuvreof Themistokles, when retreating from Artemisiura,at the watering-places of Eubcea. Sailing alongclose to the coast, he addressed, through a heraldof loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians amongthe enemy to revol t ; calculating, even if they didnot listen to him, that he should at least render themmistrusted by the Persians. H e then disembarkedhis troops and marshaled them for the purpose ofattacking the Persian camp on land ; while the Per-


CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF PLAT.EA AND .MYKALE. 2.VJ

sian generals, surprised by this daring manifesta-tion, and suspecting, either from his manoeuvre, orfrom previous -evidences, that the Ionians were insecret collusion with him, ordered the Samian con-tingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retireto the rear of the army, for the purpose of occu-pying the various mountain roads up to the summitof Mykale—with which the latter were familiar asa part of their own territory1.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a The Greeks° land to at-

distance from their own homes, and having left a tack the. i /-N i l u r Persians

powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mar- ashore—re-donius in Boeotia, they were of course full of the" victoryanxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and gainedby'

gextinguish the freedom of their country. It was their coun-

° J trymen on

under these feelings of solicitude for their absent the samemorning, is

brethren that they disembarked, and were made communi.ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the them beforeafternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the battle"the month Boedromion (about September) 479 B.C.By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plateeain Bceotia had been gained by Pausanias that verymorning. At the moment when the Greeks wereadvancing to the charge, a divine Phe'me' or messageflew into the camp—whilst a herald's staff was seenfloated to the shore by the western wave, the symbolof electric transmission across the iEgean—the re-velation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struckat once upon the minds of all, as if the multitudehad one common soul and sense, acquainting themthat on that very morning their countrymen in Bceotiahad gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At

2 Herodot. ix. 98, 99, 104.

S2


once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and thewhole array, full of joy and confidence, chargedwith redoubled energy. Such is the*account givenby Herodotus \ and doubtless universally accepted

1 He rodo t . ix. 100, 1 0 1 . lova-i Se crtpi ("EXXTJO-J) <£)jfiJ) re i

es TO (TTpaToneSov nav, KCU KTjpvKrj'iov icpdvrj eVt TTJS KVfiaraiyfjs Kel/ievov.

fj 8e </>>?/"? 8irj\8e (r(pi 2>8e, a>s ol "EWr/ves rrjv MapSoviov arpaTirjv

viK&ev iv BoiwTir] fia^ofievoi.. ArjXa Brj 7roXXoTo"t TCKiiripiouri EVTI 7aBeta TWV TTpr)yp*aT(nv' el Kai Tore rr)s avrrjs fjfjLeprjs (rvfiTTCTTTOvoTjs TOV re iv

liKaraifjcrt Kai TOV iv MUKOX^ [leWovros eo~eo~6at> rpthfiaros, (pVf17} Toltri

"EXXj/cri TOIO-I. TavTjj itraTviKeTO, oiore 6apo-ij<ral re TTJV o-TpaTir/v iroXXffl

fiaWov, Ka\ eBekeiv irpoBvixorepov Kivhweveiv yeyovevai &e VIKI)V TO>V

/xera Hav<raviea>'EXKrjv<ov op6a>s trfpi f) (j>r)fJ.r] (rvvefiaive i\8ov<ra'

TO fiiv yap iv H\aTairjo-i 7rpcot m rr)s f/fiep-qt iyivfTO' TO 8e iv MvKaXrj,

nepl SeiKrjV rjv Se dpp'ioSirj <T(f)i7rp\v TT)V <pr]p.riv iaaitiKeaBai, ovnmpl

o-(pea>v avraiv ovra, &>s Tav 'EWrjvav, fir) irepX MapSovlco TTTalo-r] rj 'EXXar.(os fxevroi 1} icXfldatv avrr) o~<pi itfeiTTaTO, fiaXKov Tt /cat ra^vrepov TTJV

wpoo-obov iTToievvro : compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c, 24, 25, aboutthe battle of Pydna.—The 4>*1M which circulated through the assem-bled army of Mardonius in Boeotia, respecting his intention to kill thePhocians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix. 17).

Two passages in ^Eschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and DeFals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the an-cient idea of 'brjp.r)—a divine voice or vocal goddess, generally consideredas informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one andthe same unanimous feeling—the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi.There was an altar to ^f)fi.j] at Athens (Pausan. i. 17, 1) ; compare

.Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the"Oo-cra of Homer, which is essentiallythe same idea as * ^ J J : Iliad, ii. 93. /lera de <r(pio-iv"Oo-o-a Se&tjei'Orpvvovo-' levai, ALOS ayyeXos ; also Odyssey, i. 282—opposed to theidea of a distinct human speaker or informant—rjv TIS rot emrja-i fiporwv,r) "Oo-o-av azovo-fls ' E K Atos, ijre fxaKio-Ta (pepei KXCOS avdpamoim; andO d y s s . xxiv. 4 1 2 . "Oo-ua S' ap' ayyeXos &Ka Kara TTTOKIV $XeT0 1T°-Vrrl>

Mvrjo-rqpcvv o-Tvyepbv davarov Ka\ Krjp' iveirovo-a. T h e word (cXi/Scay isused in the same meaning by Sophokles, Philoktet. 255 (see Andokidesde Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64) : and Herodotus in the passage now beforeus considers the two as identical—compare also Herodot. v. 72 : bothwords are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some unde-signed human word or speech, which in that particular case is con-sidered as determined by the special intervention of the gods, for theinformation of some person who hears it : see Homer, Odyss. xx. 100:compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719 ; Sophokles, CEdip. Tyr. 43-472 ;Xenophon, Symposion, c. 14. s. 48.

The descriptions of Fama by Virgil, iEneid. iv. 176 seq., and Ovid,

CHAP. XLIL] BATTLES OF PLAT^A AND MYKA.LE. 261

in his time, when the combatants of Mykale' werealive to tell their own story : he moreover mentions

Metamorph. xii. 40 seq., are more diffuse and overcharged, departingfrom the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended,those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occa-sionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes,and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent and contagious impressions of every kind, notmerely of fear. Livy, x. 28. " Victorem equitatum velut lymphaticuspavor dissipat." ix. 27. " Milites, incertum ob quara causam, lym-phatis similes ad arma discurrunt"—in Greek vvji(j)okrfTvroi; comparePolyaan. iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Mutzel, ad Quint. Curt,iv. 46, 1 (iv. 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks investedwith divinity under the name of ^rjfirj than by transcribing a strikingpassage from M. Michelet's Histoire de la Revolution Francoise. Theillustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view,which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind,furnishes an explanation pre-eminently satisfactory—has passed away inthe historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic de-scription of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs ;the common susceptibilities, common inspiration, and common sponta-neous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separateindividuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event—thecapture of the Bastile, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. i. p. 105).

" Versailles, avec un gouvernement organise', un roi, des ministres, ungeneral, une armee, n'etoit qu'hesitation, doute, incertitude, dans la pluscomplete anarchie morale.

" Paris, bouleverse, delaisse' de toute autorite le'gale, dans un desordreapparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plusprofond, l'unanimite des esprits.

" Le 13th Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'a se defendre. Le 14, ilattaqua.

"Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus lematin. Le soir e'toit plein de troubles, de fureur desordonnee. Le matinfut lumineux et d'une serenite terrible.

" Une idee se leva sur Paris avec lejour, et tous virent la mime lumiere.Une lumiire dans les esprits, et dans chaque cceur une voix : Va, et tuprendras la Bastille !

" Cela etoit impossible, insense, etrange a dire ; . . . Et tous le crurentneanmoins. Et cela se fit.

" La Bastille, pour etre une vieille forteresse, n'en etoit pas moms im-prenable, a moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie.


another of those coincidences which the Greekmind always seized upon with so much avidity—there was a chapel of Eleusinian Deme"ter close tothe field of battle at Mykal& as well as at Platsea.Diodorus and other later writers1, who wrotewhen the impressions of the time had vanished,and when divine interventions were less easily andliterally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as ifit were a report designedly circulated by the gene-rals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

Battle of The Lacedaemonians on the right wing, and theMykale—revolt of , . . . . , , r .the Ionians Le Peuple n avoit en cette cnse ni ]e temps ni les moyens de faire unin the Per- siijge re'gulier. L'eut il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas a craindre, ayantsian camp assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses muni-"Tfeat'of6 e tions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'epaisseur au somraet des tours,the Per- de trente et quarante a la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets : etsians. ses batteries, a elle, dont le feu plongeoit sur Paris, auroient pu en at-

tendant demolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine." L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce

fut un acte de foi." Personneneproposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent. Le long des

rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait a la foule—Ala Bastille—a la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous enten-doient: A la Bastille.

" Personne, je le repete, ne donna ['impulsion. Les parleurs du PalaisRoyal passerent le temps a dresser une liste de proscription, a juger amort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le prevot Flesselles, d'autres encore.Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrentpas un seul des faiseursde motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de depart, et ce n'estpas nonplus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramenerent les depou-illes et le"s prisonniers.

" Encore moins les electeurs qui siegeaient a l'Hotel de Ville eurentils l'idee de l'attaque. Loin de la, pour l'empecher, pour prevenir lecarnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aise'ment, ils allerent jusqu'apromettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, onne l'attaqueroitpas. Les electeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accuses;mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

" Qui l'eut ? Celui qui eut aussi le devoument, la force, pour ac-couiplir sa foi. Qui ? Le peuple, tout le monde."

1 Diodor. xi. 35 ; Polysen. i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished inrelating " tantam famsc velocitatem."

CHAP. XLII.] BATTLES OF VLA.TJEA AND MYKALE. 263

portion of the army near them, had a difficult pathbefore them, over hilly ground and ravine; whilethe Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Trce-zenians, and the left half of the army, inarchingonly along the beach, came much sooner into con-flict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platsea,employed their gerrha, or wicker bucklers plantedby spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from be-hind which they discharged their arrows, and theymade a strenuous resistance to prevent this defencefrom being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greekssucceeded in demolishing it, and in driving theenemy into the interior of the fortification, wherethey in vain tried to maintain themselves againstthe ardour of the pursuers, who forced their wayinto it almost along with the defenders. Evenwhen this last rampart was carried, and when thePersian allies had fled, the native Persians still con-tinued to prolong the struggle with undiminishedbravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and actingonly in small knots1, with disadvantages of armoursuch as had been felt severely at Plataea, theystill maintained an unequal conflict with the Greekhoplites; nor was it until the Lacedaemonianswith their half of the army arrived to join inthe attack, that the defence was abandoned ashopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the campput the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat:first, the disarmed Samians;. next, other Ioniansand iEolians; lastly, the Milesians who had beenposted to guard the passes in the rear, not only

1 Herodot. ix. 102, 103. Odroi 8e (Ilepa-ai), Kar oXiyovs ytvoptvoi,ijx&xovTO Toidi aU\ is TO TUXOS i<mi'irrov(Ti 'E\Xr;i<c»i/.


deserted, but took an active part in the attack ;and the Milesians especially, to whom the Persianshad trusted for guidance up to the summits ofMykale, led them by wrong roads, threw them intothe hands of their pursuers, and at last set uponthem with their own hands. A large number ofthe native Persians, together with both the generalsof the land-force, Tigranes and Mardont6s, perishedin this disastrous battle : the two Persian admirals,Artaynte's and Ithamithres, escaped, but the armywas irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships whichhad been dragged up on the shore fell into the handsof the assailants, and were burnt. But the victoryof the Greeks was by no means bloodless: amongthe left wing, upon which the brunt of the actionhad fallen, a considerable number of men wereslain, especially Sikyonians, with their commanderPerilaus1. The honours of the battle were awarded,first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Si-kyonians, and Troezenians; the Lacedaemonianshaving done comparatively little. Hermolykus theAthenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warriormost distinguished for individual feats of arms2.

Retirement The dispersed Persian army, so much of it atfeated Per- least as had at first found protection on the heights^ S of Mykale", was withdrawn from the coast forthwith

to Sardis under the command of Artaynte's, whom

1 Herodot. ix. 104, 105. Djodorus (xi. 36) seems to follow differentauthorities from Herodotus : his statement varies in many particulars,but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus thatof the Greeks ; but the latter says that 40,000 Persians and allies wereslain.

2 Herodot. ix. 105.

C H A P . X L I I . ] BATTLES OF PLATiEA AND MYKALE. 265

Masiste"s, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproachedon the score of cowardice in the recent defeat: thegeneral was at length so maddened by a repetitionof these insults, that he drew his scimitar and wouldhave slain Masiste"s, had he not been prevented bya Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras1, whowas rewarded by Xerxes with the government ofKilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he hadremained ever since his return, and where he con-ceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masist&s ;the consequences of his passion entailed upon thatunfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be de-scribed, by the orders of his own queen, the jealousand savageAme'stris2. But he had no fresh army readyto send down to the coast, so that the Greek cities,even on the continent, were for the time practicallyliberated from Persian supremacy, while the insularGreeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet Reluctancehad full confidence in their power of defending the tanstoPar"islands, and willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, continentalLesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects J ^of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engage- ance—Pro-

/ . ,-vr i i position to

ments of their alliance. We may presume that the transportdespots Strattis and Theomestor were expelled fromChios and Samos3. But the Peloponnesian com-manders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure r~rSected

autonomy to the continental cities, which could not Athenians.

1 Herodot. ix. 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Hero-dotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

2 Herodot. ix. 108-113. He gives the story at considerable length :it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regalpalace.

3 Herodot. viii. 132.


be upheld against the great inland power withoutefforts incessant as well as exhausting. Neverthe-less, not enduring to abandon these continentalIonians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offerto transplant them into European Greece, and tomake room for them by expelling the medisingGreeks from their sea-port towns. But this propo-sition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, whowould not permit that colonies originally plantedby themselves should be abandoned, thus impairingthe metropolitan dignity of Athens1. The Lace-daemonians readily acquiesced in this objection, andwere glad, in all probability, to find honourablegrounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dis-possession eminently difficult to execute2—yet atthe same time to be absolved from onerous obliga-tions towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athenseither the burthen of defending or the shame ofabandoning them. The first step was thus taken,which we shall quickly see followed by others, forgiving to Athens a separate ascendency and separateduties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for in-troducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next,Athenian maritime empire.

1 Herodot. ix. 106 ; Diodor. xi. 37. The latter represents the Ioniansand JSolians as having actually consented to remove into EuropeanGreece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consentedto it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

2 Such wholesale transportations of population from one continentto another have always been more or less in the habits of Orientaldespots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more moderntimes: to a conjunction of free states like the Greeks they must havebeen impracticable.

See Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, vol. i. bookvi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europedirected by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390-1400).


From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailednorthward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instanceof the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking pdown the Xerxeian bridge : for so imperfect was home, buttheir information, that they believed this bridge tobe still firm and in passable condition in September479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at Chersonese.the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his re-treat, ten months before (about November 480B.C.)1. Having ascertained on their arrival at Aby-dos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychide's andthe Peloponnesians returned home forthwith ; butXanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved toremain and expel the Persians from the ThracianChersonese. This peninsula had been in great partan Athenian possession, for the space of more thanforty years, from the first settlement of the elderMiltiade's2 down to the suppression of the Ionicrevolt, although during part of that time tributaryto Persia : from the flight of the second Miltiadesto the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480B.C), a period during which the Persian monarchwas irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, noAthenian citizen would find it safe to live there.But the Athenian squadron from Mykal£ were nownaturally eager both to re-establish the ascendencyof Athens and to regain the properties of Atheniancitizens in the Chersonese—probably many of theleading men, especially Kimon son of Miltiad&s,had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alki-

1 Herodot. viii. 115, 117 ; ix. 106, 114.2 See the preceding volume of this history, ch. xxx. p. 158 ; ch. xxxiv.

p. 368 ; ch. xxxv. p. 413.

268 HISTORY OF GREECE. PART II.

biades had in after days, with private forts of hisown1. To this motive for attacking the Chersonesemay be added another—the importance of its corn-produce as well as of a clear passage through theHellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontisto Athens and iEgina2. Such were the reasonswhich induced Xanthippus and the leading Athe-nians, even without the cooperation of the Pelopon-nesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—thestrongest place in the peninsula, the key of thestrait, and the centre in which all the neighbouringPersian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, hadgot together, under CEobazus and Artaykt£s3.

iettos— The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readilyof the'cher- j°ined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who,sonesites taken altogether by surprise, had been constrainedArtayktes. to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of

provisions or means of making a long defence.But of all the Chersonesites the most forward andexasperated were the inhabitants of ElaeuS'—thesouthernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated forits tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Pro-tesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as theforemost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leapashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor.The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed onthe sea-shore4, was a scene of worship and pilgrim-

1 Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 17. ra iavrov Teiyr).2 Herodot. vii. 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the

Hellespont, see Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat. c. 59.3 Herodot. ix. 114, 115. Ir^trrbv—(ppoipiov KCU (pv\a.Kr)V TOV iravrbs

'EXXijoTrocTou—Thucyd. viii. 62 : compare Xenophon, Hellenic, ii. 1,25.* Thucyd. viii. 102.


age not merely for the inhabitants of Elseus, butalso for the neighbouring Greeks generally, inso-much that it had been enriched with ample votiveofferings and probably deposits for security—money,gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes,and various other presents. The story ran thatwhen Xerxes was on his march across the Helles-pont into Greece, Artaykte"s, greedy of all thiswealth, and aware that the monarch would notknowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled,preferred a wily request to him—" Master, here isthe house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory,met his just reward and perished : I pray thee givehis house to me, in order that people may learn forthe future not to invade thy land "—the whole soilof Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs astheir rightful possession, and Protesilaus havingbeen in this sense an aggressor against them.Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and nottroubling himself to ask who the invader was, con-sented : upon which, Artaykt&s, while the armywere engaged in their forward march into Greece,stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carryingall the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he contentwithout still farther outraging Grecian sentiment:he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowedit, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuaryby visiting it with his concubines1. Such proceed-ings were more than enough to raise the strongestantipathy against him among the Chersonesite

1 Herodot. ix. 116 : compare i. 4. 'ApravKTrjs, dvrjp Tlepcrrjs, Scivbsfie Ka\ ardcrBaXos' or Ka). fia&iXea iXavvovra eV 'Adrjvas i^wdrqae, ranptoreo-iXeiM TOV 'I^X'KXOV xPVIiaTa *£ 'EXaiovvros i(f>eXd/Mvor. Com-pare Herodot. ii. 64.


Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athe-nians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a cer-tain length of siege, the stock of provisions in thetown failed, and famine began to make itself feltamong the garrison, which nevertheless still heldout, by painful shifts and endurance, until a lateperiod in the autumn, when the patience even ofthe Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted;nor was it without difficulty that the leaders re-pressed the clamorous desire manifested in theirown camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the sea-men kept together, the siege was pressed withoutrelaxation, and presently the privations of the gar-rison became intolerable; so that Artaykte"s and

Capture of CEobazus were at last reduced to the necessity ofSestos— _ J .

crucifixion escaping by stealth, letting themselves down withtes. y a few followers from the wall at a point where it

was imperfectly blockaded. CEobazus found hisway into Thrace, where however he was taken cap-tive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as asacrifice to their god Pleistorus: Artaykte's flednorthward along the shores of the Hellespont, butwas pursued by the Greeks, and made prisonernear iEgospotamos, after a strenuous resistance. Hewas brought with his son in chains to Sestus, whichimmediately after his departure had been cheerfullysurrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. Itwas in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents ascompensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and afarther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as per-sonal ransom for himself and his son. So deep wasthe wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred


ground, that both the Athenian commander Xan-thippus and the citizens of Elseus disdained every-thing less than a severe and even cruel personalatonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artaykte"s,after having first seen his son stoned to death be-fore his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixedfor the purpose, and left to perish, on the spotwhere the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed1. Thereis something in this proceeding more Oriental thanGrecian: it is not in the Grecian character to ag-gravate death by artificial and lingering prelimina-ries.

After the capture of Sestos the Athenian fleet Return of• i i - i i t h e fleet t o

returned home with their plunder, towards the Athens.commencement of winter, not omitting to carrywith them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge,which had been taken in the town, as a trophy toadorn the acropolis of Athens2.

1 Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Oi yap'E\aiov(not nfiapeovres ™TIp<oTeo'l\eG) eSeoyrd juu> Kara^py^aQr^vai Kai avrov rov (TTparryyov ravrrj 6

voos e<pep£.3 Herodot. ix. 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament

of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intendhis celebrated story respecting the proposition of Themistokles con-demned by Aristeides, to apply (Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 20; Ari-steides, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled topass the winter in the Thessalian harbour of Pagasse, when Themisto-kles formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships exceptthe Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a navalforce. Themistokles (he tells us) intimated to the people, that he hada proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; butthat it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon whichthey desired him to mention it privately to Aristeides. Themistoklesdid so: and Aristeides told the people, that the project was at onceeminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon whichthe people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, someallusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received


as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of He-rodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasse wasThessalian, and as such hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise:the fleet seems to have never heen there: moreover we may add, thaitaking matters as they then stood, when the fear from Persia was notat all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gainedby burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistokles wasnot very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeides to describe it inthe language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonicage, who wished to contrast justice with expediency and Aristeideswith Themistokle"s—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyricupon Athens in the days of her glory.

273

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THEGELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OFPOPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the third volume ofthis history, the foundation of the Greek coloniesin Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact,that in the sixth century before the Christian sera,they were among the most powerful and flourishingcities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this ge-neral fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of gg° J turn and

Gelo about 485 B.C., became the most powerful Geiasupe-city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela racusebl"and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, {°2—°°had been its superiors. The latter, within a few ^'"'ofyears of its foundation, fell under the dominion of Agrigen-one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despotenergetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Asty-palsea near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an earlysettler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make him-self despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. Hehad been named to one of the chief posts in thecity, and having undertaken at his own cost theerection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis(as the Athenian Alkmseonids rebuilt the burnt tem-ple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to as-semble therein a considerable number of men; whomhe armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of

VOL. v. T


a festival of Dimeter to turn them against the peo-ple. He is said to have made many'conquests overthe petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood :but exaction and cruelties towards his own sub-jects are noticed as his most prominent character-istic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishablememory. This piece of mechanism was hollow,and sufficiently capacious to contain one or morevictims enclosed within it, to perish in tortureswhen the metal was heated : the cries of these suf-fering prisoners passed for the roarings of the ani-mal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said tohave been himself the first person burnt in it byorder of the despot. In spite of the odium thusincurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot forsixteen years ; at. the end of which period a gene-ral rising of the people, headed by a leading mannamed Telemachus, terminated both his reign andhis life1. Whether Telemachus became despot

1 Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed anddiscussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Let-ters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet,p. 57-61, who however treats the pretended letters of Phalaris withmore consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally bedisposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficientevidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, afterhaving been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians tookAgrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he tookCarthage. See Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 4 ; Pindar, Pyth. i. 185 ; Polyb.xii. 25 ; Diodor. xiii. 90; Cicero in Verr. iv. 33.

It does not appear that Timseus really called in question the histo-rical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneouslysupposed to have done so. Timasus affirmed that the bull which wasshown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine :which was correct, for it must have been then at Carthage, from whenceit was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note ofBoeckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. i. 185.

CHAP. XLIIL] SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AND HIS DYNASTY. 275

or not, we have no information: sixty years after-wards, we shall find his descendant Theron esta-blished in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris Syracuse inthat the Syracusans reconquered their revoltedcolony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the islandbetween Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispos-sessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory1, g

' J scendants

With the exception of this accidental circumstance, of the ori-we are without information about the Sicilian cities ™until a time rather before 500 B.C, just when the theTwar between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished f^j1

the power of the latter, and when the despotism of Serfs-the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged forthe democratical constitution of Kleisthene's. Thefirst forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks,as among the cities of Greece Proper in the earlyhistorical age, appear to have been all oligarchical:we do not know under what particular modifica-tions, but probably all more or less resembling thatof Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy pro-prietors descended from the original colonisingchiefs) possessing large landed properties tilled bya numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrii,formed the qualified citizens, out of whom, as wellas by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen ;while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, com-prised the small proprietary cultivators who main-tained themselves, by manual labour and withoutslaves, from their own lands or gardens, togetherwith the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of

1 Thucyd. vi. 5 ; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. v. 19 : compare Wesselingad Diodor. xi. 76.

T2


two or three generations, many individuals of theprivileged class would have fallen into poverty andwould find themselves more nearly on a par withthe non-privileged; while such members of thelatter as might rise to opulence were not for thatreason admitted into the privileged body. Herewere ample materials for discontent: ambitiousleaders, often themselves members of the privileged

Early go- body, put themselves at the head of the popular op-oftheGreek position, overthrew the oligarchy, and made them-f selves despots ; democracy being at that time hardlyf known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of

subverted this change, preceded by occasional violent dissen-m many

places by sions among the privileged class themselves1, is allattempted that we are permitted to know, without those mo-the°Spartan difying circumstances by which it must have been

accompanied in every separate city. Towards ornear the year 500 B.C, we find Anaxilaus despot atRhegium, Skyth£s at Zankle\ Te"rillus at Himera,Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, andPansetius at Leontini2. It was about the year509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducteda body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx andEgesta, near the north-western corner of the island,in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitantsand founding a new Grecian colony. But the Car-thaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were closeadjoining and who had already aided in drivingDorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps

1 At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153 ; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic, v. 3, 1.2 Aristot. Politic, v. 8, 4 j v. 10, 4. Kal elsTvpavv(8a p,eTa/3a\Xei e£

i X ij p p / £

okiyapxias, aa-irep iv StxeXia a-^ebov al irkuarai TO>V apxalav' iv Aeov-TI'I/OIS eis TT]V Ttavmriov rvpavviSa, Ka\ iv TeXa els rip* JSXedvSpov, Kal ivaWais TroWais iroKcaiv oxravrcos.

C H A P . X L I I I . ] SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AND HIS DYNASTY. 277

in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to theEgestsean inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, aftera short period of prosperity, was defeated and slainwith most of his companions: such of them asescaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took posses-sion of Minoa, which bore from henceforward thename of Herakleia1—a colony and dependency ofthe neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peitha-goras was then despot. Euryleon joined the mal-contents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, andestablished himself as despot, until, after a shortpossession of power, he was slain in a popularmutiny2.

We are here introduced to the first known in-stance of that series of contests between the Phoe-nicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the strug-gles between the Saracens and the Normans in theeleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christiansera, were destined to determine whether the islandshould be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—andwhich were only terminated, after the lapse of threecenturies, by the absorption of both into the vastbosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginiansand Egestseans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, butalso made some conquests of the neighbouring

1 Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus: thisseems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are toassume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyedby the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards givenby Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been calledMinoa (Diodor. iv. 23).

A funereal monument in honour of Athenseus, one of the settlers whoperished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias,iii. 16, 4). 2 Herodot. v. 43, 46.


Grecian possessions, which were subsequently re-covered by Gelo of Syracuse1.

About B.C. Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander505

Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendencyGda—B.C. over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto-Krst°rL been> i f n o t a11 equal, at least all independent. Hisof?e}£ . powerful mercenary force, levied in part among thedemusiu Sikel tribes2, did not preserve him from the swordTeiines.the of a Geloan- citizen named Sabyllus, who slew himancestor of after a reign of seven years : but it enabled hisGelo- brother and successor Hippokrate"s to extend his

dominion over nearly half of the island. In thatmercenary force two officers, Gelo and iEneside1-mus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the con-spicuous family of the Emmenidse, and descendedfrom Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particu-larly distinguished themselves. Gelo was de-scended from a native of Telos near the TriopianCape, one of the original settlers who accompaniedthe Rhodian Antiphemus to Sicily. His immediateancestor, named Te'line's, had first raised the familyto distinction by valuable aid to a defeated politicalparty, who had been worsted in a struggle andforced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town ofMaktorium. Telines was possessed of certain pe-culiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holysymbols, with a privileged knowledge of the cere-monial acts and formalities of divine service underwhich they were to be shown) for propitiating the

1 Herodot. vii. 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplex-ing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

2 Polysenus, v. 6.

CHAP. XLIII.] SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AND HIS DYNASTY. 279

Subterranean Goddesses, Dimeter and Persephone:" from whom he obtained them, or how he got atthem himself (says Herodotus) I cannot say :" butsuch was the imposing effect of his presence andmanner of exhibiting them, that he ventured tomarch into Gela at the head of the exiles fromMaktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them inpower—deterring the people from resistance in thesame manner as the Athenians had bee.n overawedby the spectacle of Phye'-Athe'ne" in the chariotalong with Peisistratus. The extraordinary bold-ness of this proceeding excites the admiration ofHerodotus, especially as he had been informed thatTe"line"s was of an unwarlike temperament: the re-stored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and tohis descendants after him, the hereditary dignity ofhierophants of the two goddesses'—a function cer-

1 See about Telines and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153.TOVTOVS &v 6 Tr]\Lvr]s Karyyaye es FcA i*, €%O)V ov$€[iiav avbp&v bvvapiv,dXV I pa Tovrav T£>V 6eS>v. o6ev Se avra eXa/3c, r) avros iKTrjiraro, TOVTOOVK %XG> elnai. TQVTOMTI Se &v TTIGVVOS iatv, Karyyaye, in (p re ol dnoyovoiavrov Ipo^yavrai TU>V 6e&i> eaovrai : compare a previous passage of thishistory, vol. i. chap. i. p. 35.

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priest-hood (Olymp. vi. 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and Scholia adPindar. Pyth. ii. 27).

About the story of Phye personifying Athene at Athens, see above,vol.iii. of this history, chap. xxx. p. 141.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye thanto the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the thingsexhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vaguesense of the Greek and Latin neuter, Upa or sacra, includes the entireceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language : but theverbs connected with it, e^eiv, KeKrrjcr&ai, KOfiifciv, (paiveiv, Upa—lepo-<pdvrt]s, &c, relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly thecase with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the generalpublic but accessible only to those who went through certain prelimi-nary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honour of Demeter and


tainly honourable, and probably lucrative, connect-ed with the administration of consecrated property

Persephone, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece.The Xeyopeva or things said on these occasions, were of less importancethan the bp-afieva and tieiKvvfieva, or matters shown and things done(see Pausanias, ii. 37, 3). Herodotus says, about the lake of Sais inEgypt, 'Ev Se Ttj \ijxvr] ravTij ra. fte'iKrfka rcov iraBeav avrov (of Osiris)VVKTOS 7roiev<n, ra Kakeovai fivtrrr/pia Klyimrioi: he proceeds to statethat the Thesmophoria celebrated in honour of Demeter in Greece wereof the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported intoGreece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476) : compare Pausan.ii. 14, 2.

Aeli-ev TpmroXefia re, AioxKet re nKrjîirwaAp7jo~uoo~vvrjv icpwv' Kai €7re<ppadev opyia 7zaio~\Tlpe&ftvreprjg KeXeoioÔXjStos, off rdd" oirwirev etTi\6ovib3V avBpGmatv, &c.

Compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 25 ; Pindar, Fragm. xcvi. ; Sophocl. Frag.Iviii. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81:De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. as yap ol re\ovp.evoi /car' apxasiv 6opvfia> ical jiofj wpbs ahXrjKovs £>8<n>nevoi uvviatri, hpapivav dem l deiKWfi.i'vaiv TO>V lepcop, irpo(rixovcrlv V&1 pera ifioftov Kai (nanrrjs:and Isokratfis, Panegyric, c. 6, about Eleusis, TO. lepa K<U WV 8eU-vvfiev Kaff enaa-Tov iviavrov. These mysteries consisted thus chieflyof exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants,and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—&qa> Kai Kdpi;Spafia eyevecrdrjv fivariKov, Kai TTJV Tvkavrjv Kai rr\v ctpirayrjv Kai TO mvdos r/

'EXeva-ls SaBovxei. The word opyia is originally nothing more than aconsecrated expression for epya—Upa epya (see Pausanias, iv. 1, 4, 5),though it conies afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, mattersshown as well as matters done—ra opyia Kofilâv-—opyiav 'nu.vra'u&vtrvvderrjs, &c. : compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the cere-mony, together with the chest in which such of them as were moveablewere brought out—reXerrjs eyKvpova fivo-rlda Kio-rrjv (Nonnus, ix. 127).iEschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother,was bearer of the chest—Kio-r6(popos KOI XiKv6<popos (Demosthen. deCorona, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus (Cohort, ad Gent.p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chestsof the Eleusinian mysteries—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates,salt, ferules, ivy, &c. The communicant was permitted, as a part ofthe ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into abasket, afterwards putting them back again—"Jejunavi et ebibi cyceo-nem : ex cista sumpsi et in calathum misi : accepi rursus, in cistulamtranstuli" (Arnobius ad Gent. v. p. 175, ed. Elmenherst), while the


and with the enjoyment of a large portion of itsfruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distin- Geio—inhigh com-

guished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest mandof four brothers sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero,Polyzelus and Thrasybulus: and he further enno- Jbled himself by such personal exploits in the army despot of

of the despot Hippokrate"s as to be promoted to thesupreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to

uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking atit " even from the house-top."

Toy KaKadov Kariovra x a / -"" GaatiaBe /3c'/3aXoi

Mrj8' airb TS> re'yeos.

(Kallimachus, Hymn, in Cererem, 4.)Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, Aglaophamus (i. p. 51),

says, " Sacrorum nomine tam Graeci, quam Romani, prsecipue signa etimagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem dignari solent. Quaeres animum illuc potius inclinat, ut putem Hierophantas ejusmodi Upain conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasasacra et instrumenta aliave priscse religionis monumenta; qualia insacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare pos-sumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Nam-que non solum in templis fere omnibus cimelia venerandse antiquitatiscondita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quasinitiati summa, cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicerequidern liceret Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quae Hiero-phanta ostendit, ilia ipsa fuisse ayia (patrfiara sive simulacra Deorum,eorumque aspectum qui prsebeant 8eT|<u ra Upa vel nape^dv vel (patvewdici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantse actu tum Eleusiniorum sa-cerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nun-cupatum."

Compare also K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthiimer derGriechen, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de Haruspicum Responsis(c.ll), which is tran-scribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv. p. 148, demon-strates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance ofthe festival of the Megalesia : the smallest omission or alteration wassupposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves in 1845, showswhat immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may beproduced, even in the nineteenth century, by Upa b


his activity that the despot owed a succession ofvictories and conquests, in which the Ionic orChalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini andZankle", were successively reduced to dependence'.

Fate of the The fate of Zankl6—seemingly held by its despotof Zankie, Skyth^s in a state of dependent alliance under Hip-

pokrates, and in standing feud wTith Anaxilaus ofRhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Mes-sina—was remarkable. At the time when the

conduct ofHippo- Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Miletus re-krates

conquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a naturalsympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks inSicily towards the sufferers of the same race on theeast of the JEgean sea. Projects were devised forassisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode, andthe Zankleeans, especially, invited them to form anew Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of theSikels, called Kale Akte", on the north coast ofSicily—a coast presenting fertile and attractivesituations, and along the whole line of which therewas only one Grecian colony—Himera. This in-vitation was accepted by the refugees from Samosand Miletus, who accordingly put themselves onshipboard for ZanklS ; steering, as was usual, alongthe coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thenceacross to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast tothe strait of Messina. It happened that when theyreached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythes,the despot of Zankle", was absent from his city, to-gether with the larger portion of his military force,on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps un-dertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at



Kale" Akte1: and his enemy the Rhegian Anaxilaus,taking advantage of this accident, proposed to therefugees at Lokri that they should seize for them-selves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zankle\They followed his suggestion, and possessed them-selves of the city, together with the families andproperty of the ahsent Zanklseans ; who speedilyreturned to repair their loss, while their princeSkythe's farther invoked the powerful aid of hisally and superior, Hippokrate"s. The latter how-ever, provoked at the loss of one of his dependentcities, seized and imprisoned Skythfls, whom heconsidered as the cause of it1, at Inykus, in theinterior of the island; but he found it at the sametime advantageous to accept a proposition made tohim by the Samians, captors of the city, and tobetray the Zanklseans whom he had come to aid.By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreedthat Hippokrates should receive for himself all theextra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property andslaves belonging to Zanklseans, leaving the otherhalf to the Samians. Among the property withoutthe walls, not the least valuable part consisted inthe persons of those Zanklseans whom Hippokrateshad come to assist, but whom he now carried awayas slaves : excepting however from this lot, threehundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered

1 Herodot. vi. 22, 23. ^KV6TJV fitv TOV fiovvapxov rav ZayKKaiav, i>s<«n>/3aA<Wa rfjv iroKiv, 6 'limoRparrjs 7re8r)(ras, KCU TOV aScX^eov atrovHvdoyevea, es"lvvKov irokiv dTreVe/ix/z-e.

The words as awofiahovra seem to.imply the relation pre-existing be-tween Hippokrates and Skythes, as superior and subject ; and punish-ment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an importantpost.


Hippo-krates isvictoriousover theSyracusans—takesKamarina—dies—Gelo be-comes in hisplace despotof Gela.

over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probablylest they might find friends to procure their ransom,and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of thetown. Their lives were however spared by theSamians, though we are not told what became ofthem. This transaction, alike perfidious on thepart of the Samians and of Hippokrate's, securedto the former a flourishing city, and to the latteran abundant booty. We are glad to learn that theimprisoned Skythes found means to escape to Da-rius, king of Persia, from whom he received agenerous shelter—imperfect compensation for theiniquity of his fellow Greeks1. The Samians how-ever did not long retain possession of their conquest,but were expelled by the very person who had in-stigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium.He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian andMessenian race, recolonising it under the name ofMessene1—a name which it ever afterwards bore2;and it appears to have been governed either by him-self or by his son Kleophron, until his death aboutB.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippo-krate's of Gela was on the point of making the stillmore important acquisition of Syracuse, and wasonly prevented from doing so, after defeating theSyracusans at the river Hel6rus, and capturingmany prisoners, by the mediation of the Corin-thians and Korkyrseans, who prevailed on him to

1 Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (Politic, v. 2, I I ) represents theSamians as having been first actually received into Zankle', and after-wards expelling the prior inhabitants : his brief notice is not to be setagainst the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

2 Thucyd. vi. 4 ; Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 84 ; Diodor. xi. 48.


be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and itsterritory as a ransom. Having repeopled this ter-ritory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he wasprosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels,when he died or was killed at Hybla. His deathcaused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refusedto acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain theirfreedom ; but Gelo, the general of horse in thearmy, espousing the cause of the sons with energy,put down by force the resistance of the people. Assoon as this was done, he threw off the mask, de-posed the sons of Hippokrate"s, and seized thesceptre himself1.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to B.C. 491the ascendency enjoyed by his predecessor over theIonic cities, Gelo became the most powerful manin the island ; but an incident which occurred afew years afterwards (B.C. 485), while it aggrandisedhim still farther, transferred the seat of his power Greatnessfrom Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, hegetfpos-or oligarchical order of proprietary families, pro- Syracuse—bably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the He- ^ *™ns"lorus, were dispossessed of the government by a seat of his

, . . n •• , power from

combination between their serf-cultivators called the Geia toKyllyrii, and the smaller freemen called the Demos ; yracuse-

they were forced to retire to Kasmense, where theyinvoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That am-bitious prince undertook the task, and accomplishedit with facility ; for the Syracusan people, probablyunable to resist their political opponents when

1 Herodot. vii. 155; Thucyd. vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode ofPindar (v. 40), addressed to Chromius the friend^of Hiero of Syracuse,commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of theHelorus.


backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrenderedto him without striking a blow1. But instead ofrestoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Geloappropriated it to himself, and left Gela to begoverned by his brother Hiero. He greatly en-larged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened itsfortifications: probably it was he who first carriedit beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include alarger space of the adjacent mainland (or ratherisland of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina.

1 Herodot. vii. 155. 'O yap 6%ioy 6 TS>U Svpaicovo-lav imovri FeXavtnapaSkdoi rfiv noXiv Kai iavrov.

Aristotle (Politic, v. 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy priorto the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own law-lessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if thenarrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamoriwas not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects andslaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled,there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show inwhat degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative ofHerodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely uponthe expulsion. And the superior force, which Gelo brought to the aidof the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission ofthe Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Per-haps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those ofHerodotus : unless indeed we might venture to suspect that the nameof Gelo appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that ofDionysius. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into whichthe Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotismof Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him toacquire the supreme power ; but a similar assertion can hardly be madeapplicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which indeed democracywas only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names ofGelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Hali-karnassus (Antiq. Roman, vii. 1. p. 1314) : the latter however, in hisown statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, sincehe describes Hippokrates as brother of Gelo. We must accept the suppo-sition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give thedate of Gelo's occupation of Syracuse, has really given the date of Gelo'soccupation of Gela (see M. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann.49] B.C.).


To people this enlarged space he brought all theresidents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela ; which wasthus reduced in importance, while Syracuse becamethe first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addi-tion of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns ofMegara and Euboea. Both these towns, like Syra-cuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf culti-vators dependent upon them, and a Demos or bodyof smaller freemen excluded from the political fran-chise : both were involved in war with Gelo, pro-bably to resist his encroachments—both were be-sieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled thesecities, and who were the authors as well as leadersof the year, anticipated nothing but ruin at thehands of the conqueror ; while the Demos, whohad not been consulted and had taken no part inthe war (which we must presume to uave been car-ried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), feltassured that no harm would be done to them. Hisbehaviour disappointed the expectations of both.After transporting both of them to Syracuse, heestablished the oligarchs in that town as citizens,and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant thatthey should be exported from Sicily. " His con-duct (says Herodotus1) was dictated by the convic-tion, that a Demos was a most troublesome com-

1 He rodo t . vii. 156. Meyapeas re TOVS iv SiKcXirj, as

is oiwKoyirju irpoae-)(a'Pr\o~av> TOVS \i-iv avrav Tta^ias, aeipap-ivovs re no-

\eftov avra Kal TTpoa~&OKiovras dTro\ieo~6aL dia TOVTO, aycov is 2vpaKovo~as

TroXtrjras eVoiijtrf TOV Se brjp-ov ra>v Meyapiwv, OVK covra fj.€rmTtov rod

iro\(p,ov TOVTOV, ovhk 71po<rb£Kop.evov KaKov older/ TteiaecrBai, ayayav Kai

TOVTOVS is ras 'SvpaKovuas, direHoTO in i£aya>y§ in. 2jKeAii)f. TtJuro be

TOVTOV Kal Evfioeas TOVS iv 2uce\ifl iwolrjirt biaKpivas. 'EiroUe Se ravra

TOVTOVS afjitpoTepovs, vofA.lo~as 8rj[iot> tivai o~vvoiK7jp.a d^aptTWTaTov,


Conquestof variousSiciliantowns byGelo—hetransportsthe oli-garchy toSyracuse,and sellsthe Demosfor slaves.

Increasedpower andpopulationof Syracuseunder Gelo—it be-comes thefirst city inSicily.

panion to live with." It appears that the state ofsociety which he wished to establish was that ofPatricians and clients, without any Plebs; some-thing like that of Thessaly, where there was a pro-prietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestseor dependent cultivators occupying and tilling theland on their account—but no small self-workingproprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number toform a recognised class. And since Gelo was re-moving the free population from these conqueredtowns and leaving in or around the towns no oneexcept the serf-cultivators, we may presume thatthe oligarchical proprietors when removed mightstill continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to re-ceive the produce raised for them by others: butthe small self-working proprietors, if removed inlike manner, would be deprived of subsistence, be-cause their land would be too distant for personaltillage and they had no serfs. While therefore wefully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo consideredthe small free proprietors, as " troublesome yoke-fellows"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Gre-cian despot, unless where he found them usefulaids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarlytroublesome in his scheme of concentrating the freepopulation of Syracuse, seeing that he would haveto give them land in the neighbourhood or to pro-vide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and popula-tion, rendered Syracuse, the first Greek city in Si-cily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it didnot merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion


of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, wasthe greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appearsto have comprised the Grecian cities on the eastand south-east of the island from the borders ofAgrigentum to those of Zankl6 or Mess&ne*, toge-ther with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes.Messe'ne was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhe-gium, Agrigentum under that of Thero son ofiEneside'mus, Himera under that of Terillus ; whileSelinus, close on the borders of Egesta and theCarthaginian possessions, had its own governmentfree or despotic, but appears to have been alliedwith or dependent upon Carthage1. A dominionthus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute,besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispos-sessed many landed proprietors and having recolo-nised Syracuse, could easily provide both lands andcitizenship to recompense adherents. Hence hewas enabled to enlarge materially the military forcetransmitted to him by Hippokrates, and to form anaval force besides. Phormis2 the Msenalian, whotook service under him and became citizen of Sy-racuse, with fortune enough to send donatives toOlympia—and Agesias the Iamid prophet fromStymphalus3—are doubtless not the only examples

1 Oiodor. xi. 21.2 Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century

afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns(Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, &c.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106,107).

3 See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the SyracusanAgesias. The Scholiast on v. 5 of that ode—who says that not Agesiashimself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphalus to Sy-racuse—is contradicted not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, whereAg&sias is rightly termed both 'Apuas and "EvpaKocnos ; but also by thebetter evidence of Pindar's own expressions—O-VVOLKKTTTJP TI rav KKUVOLV

VOL. V. U


Power of

the envoys

48i~B O

of emigrants joining him from Arcadia; for theArcadian population were poor, brave, and readyfor mercenary soldiership ; nor can we doubt thatthe service of a Greek despot in Sicily must havebeen more attractive to them than that of Xerxes1.Moreover, during the ten years between the battlesof Marathon and Salamis, when not only so largea portion of the Greek cities had become subjectto Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasionhung like a cloud over Greece Proper, the increasedfeeling of insecurity throughout the latter probablyrendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immensepower and position which Herodotus representsGelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481B.C, when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth,confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit hisaid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: hecould offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us)20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, be-sides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecianforce as long as the war might last2. If this nu-

'S.vpa.Kocrcrav—o'Uofffv oiKade, with reference to Stymphalus and Syra-cuse— 8v ayKvpai (v. 6, 99, 101 = 166-174).

Ergoteles, an exile from Kn6ssus in Krete, must have migrated some-where about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth OlympicOde of Pindar.

1 Herodot. viii. 26.2 Herodot. vii. 157. a~v fie Svvdfuos re rjxeis iieyd\r)s, KCU fuHparoi rrjs

'EXXdSos OVK i\axi(TT-q fiha, ap^ovrl ye SLKCXIT/S : and even still stronger,C. 163. ia>v 'SiKiKirjs Tvpavvos.

The word apxov corresponds with dpxfj, such as that of the Athe-nians, and is less strong than rvpavvos.

The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed byHerodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

CHAP. XLIII.J SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AND HIS DYNASTY. 291

rnerical statement could be at all trusted (which Ido not believe), Herodotus would be much withinthe truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenicpower which would bear the least comparison withthat of Gelo1: and we may well assume such gene-ral superiority to be substantially true, though thenumbers above-mentioned may be an empty boastrather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for Plans of. , - , ° . . . b • . • , . * . • o - - i G e l o f o r

the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily strenthen-to combined and central operations. It appears Hellenism11

that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greekforces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the interests in

J r F f to t h e i s l a n ( j s .

Carthaginians and Egestseans, either wholly orpartially, from their maritime possessions in thewestern corner of the island, and of avenging thedeath of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he evenattempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartansand other central Greeks to cooperate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part exe-cuted it with the Sicilian forces alone2. We have

1 Herodot. vii. 145. TO. fie TiXavos ivprjjjiara jxeydXa iXiyeTO elvai'

ovftafiwv 'jZ\Xr]viKa>v Ta>u ov noXXbv p.i£ci>.2 Herodot. vii. 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus—•

"Avdpes "JiXXyves, Xoyov eôvres rrXeoveKTTjv, iToXp-r/craTe e/xe o-ip.fx.axov

inl TOV fidpfiapov 7mpaKa\covTfs i\8eiv. A i r c i 8e, ifitv nporcpov berjdev-

ros fiapfiapiKOv tTTparov arvvi7rd\jfaa-6ai, ore jxoi irpos Kap)(T]8ovlovs VCLKOS

a-vvrJTTTO, iTVKTKJjTTTOVTOs re TOV Aiopieos TOV 'Afaâudpibfio 7vpbs 'Eyeo-Talav

ifiovov fK77priâo-dai, viroTelvovros re Ta ifiiropia o-vv(\ev0epovv, aw' fav

ifilv fieydXat axpckiai T€ Kal iiravpio-i.es ytyovao-i' ovTe ijicv eiVexa rjXQeT*

fiorjBrjo-ovTes, OVTE TOV Atoptios (povov eKnpTjÔfjLevoi' TO 5C KaT vfieas, ra6echravra virb fiapfidpoio-t, vifitrai. 'AXXa tv yap fjplv Kal iiri TO tijieivov

KaTeo~Trj' vvv be, eVetS)) TrepieXrjXvSe 6 7r6Xep.os Kal dnlKTat is Vfiias, ourtobfj TiXcovos fivrjo-ns yiyove.

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information re-

specting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indi-

cate that the Carthaginians and Egestseans had made some encroach-


nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this ex-ploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and cham-pion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, andAgathokle's. But he had already begun to conceivehimself, and had already been recognised by others,in this commanding position, when the envoys ofSparta, Athens, Corinth, &c. reached him from the

Spartanand Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C, to entreat his aidAthenian .

envoys for the repulse of the vast host of invaders aboutGeio—his to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after remindinganswer. them that they had refused a similar application

for aid from him, said that far from requiting themat the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit,he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforce-ment (the numbers as given by Herodotus havebeen already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo ofthe entire Grecian force against the Persians. Hisoffer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by theSpartan envoy : and Gelo then so far abated in hisdemand, as to be content with the command eitherof the land-force or the naval force, whichevermight be judged preferable. But here the Athenianenvoy interposed his protest—" We are sent here(said he) to ask for an army, and not for a gene-ments, and threatened to make more : that Gelo had repelled them byactual and successful war. I think it strange however that he shouldbe made to say—-" You (the Peloponnesians) have derived great andsignal advantages from these sea-ports"—the profit derived from thelatter by the Peloponnesians can never have been so great as to be sin-gled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected—mv&u r/fitv (and not an hv ifiiv)—which must have been true in pointof fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the generalpurport of Gelo's speech.


ral; and thou givest us the army, only in order tomake thyself general. Know, that even if theSpartans would allow thee to command at sea, ivewould not. The naval command is ours, if theydecline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation inGreece—the only Greeks who have never migratedfrom home—whose leader before Troy stands pro-claimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks formarshalling and keeping order in an army—we,who moreover furnish the largest naval contingentin the fleet—we will never submit to be commandedby a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem tobe provided with commanders, but ye are not likelyto have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may returnas soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that theiryear is deprived of its spring1-"

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus tosolicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, andthat they solicited in vain, is an incident not to bedisputed : but the reason assigned for refusal—con-flicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historicaltransmission, than from the conceptions of thehistorian, or of his informants, respecting the rela-tions between the parties. In his time, Sparta,Athens, and Syracuse were the three great impe-rial cities of Greece, and his'Sicilian witnesses, proud

1 Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybius (xii. 26) does not seem to haveread this embassy as related by Herodotus—or at least he must havepreferred some other account of it—he gives a different account of theanswer which they made to Gelo : an answer (not insolent but) busi-ness-like and evasive—npayixaTiKaTarov aTroKpifia, &c. See TFragm. 87, ed. Didot.


of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribeto him that competition for pre-eminence and com-mand which Herodotus has dramatised. The im-mense total of forces which Gelo is made to promisebecomes the more incredible, when we reflect thathe had another and a better reason for refusing aidaltogether. He was attacked at home, and wasfully employed in defending himself.

480B.C. The same spring which brought Xerxes acrossnian inva- the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formi-sidiy, si- dable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo hadvrithtathe°US already been engaged in war against them (as has

been above stated) and had obtained successes,Xerxes. which they would naturally seek the first opportu-

nity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion ofGreece, organised for three years before, and draw-ing contingents not only from the whole easternworld, but especially from their own metropolitanbrethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated toencourage them : and there seems good reason forbelieving that the simultaneous attack on the Greeksboth in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concertedbetween the Carthaginians and Xerxes1—probablyby the Phoenicians on behalf of Xerxes. Neverthe-less this alliance does not exclude other concurrentcircumstances in the interior of the island, whichsupplied the Carthaginians both with invitation andwith help. Agrigentum, though not under thedominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and rela-tive Thero : while Rhegium and Messe'ne' under the

1 Ephorus, Fragment 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi. 1,20. Mitfordand Dahlmann (J?orschungen, Herodotus, &c, sect. 35, p. 186) call inquestion this alliaDce or understanding between Xerxes and the Cartha-ginians ; but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgement.


government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that ofhis father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seem tohave formed an opposing minority among the Sici-lian Greeks ; at variance with Gelo and Thero, butin amity and correspondence with Carthage1. Itwas seemingly about the year 481 B.C , that The'ro,perhaps invited by an Himersean party, expelledfrom Himera the despot Terillus, and became pos-sessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid toCarthage, backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, whoespoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tenderhis own children as hostages toHamilkar theCartha-ginian SufFes or general, the personal friend or guestof Terillus. The application was favourably enter-tained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in theeventful year 480 B.C, with a fleet of 3000 ships ofwar and a still larger number of store ships, disem-barked a land-force of 300,000 men : which wouldeven have been larger, had not the vessels carryingthe cavalry and the chariots happened to be di-spersed by storms"2. These numbers we can onlyrepeat as we find them,.without trusting them anyfarther than as proof that the armament was on themost extensive scale. But the different nations ofwhom Herodotus reports the land-force to have TheCartha-

i , i i • • • i . i g i n i a n army

consisted are trustworthy and curious : it included under Ha-Phcenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki,Sardinians, and Corsicans3. This is the first ex-

Himera—1 Herodot. vii. 165 ; Diodor. xi. 23 : compare also xiii. 55, 59. In victory

like manner Rhegium and Messene formed the opposing interest to gained overSyracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv. 44). them by

• Herodotus (vii. 165) and Diodorus (xi. 20) both give the numberof the land-force : the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

3 Herodot. vii. 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction


ample known to us of those numerous mercenaryarmies, which it was the policy of Carthage to com-pose of nations different in race and language1, inorder to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against thegeneral. Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkarmarched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shoreunder the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siegeto the town: while the Himerseans, reinforced byTheYo and the army of Agrigentum, determined onan obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates.Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aidfrom Gelo, who collected his whole force, said tohave amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, andmarched to Himera. His arrival restored the cou-rage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fight-ing, which turned out to the advantage of theGreeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinateand bloody, lasting from sun-rise until late in theafternoon ; and its success was mainly determinedby an intercepted letter which fell into the handsof Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntinesto Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse tohis aid, and intimating the time at which theywould arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructedto personate this reinforcement from Selinus, werereceived into the camp of Hamilkar, where theyspread consternation and disorder, and are even saidto have slain the general and set fire to the ships:

of Italy and France ; the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisykicannot be satisfactorily verified : Niebuhr considers them to have beenthe Volsci -. an ingenious conjecture.

1 Polyb. i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginianmercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly in-structive.

CHAP. XLIIL] SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AND HIS DYNASTY. 297

while the Greek army, brought to action at thisopportune moment, at length succeeded in triumph-ing over both superior numbers and a determinedresistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians ;the rest fled partly to the Sikanian mountains, wherethey became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partlyto a hilly ground, where, from want of water, theywere obliged to surrender at discretion : twentyships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and thesetwenty were destroyed by a storm in the passage,so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage withthe disastrous tidings'. Dismissing such unreason-able exaggerations, we can only venture to assertthat the battle was strenuously disputed, the victorycomplete, and the slain as well as the prisonersnumerous. The body of Hamilkar was never dis-covered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo :the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the de-feat of his army became irreparable, he had casthimself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he hadbeen offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice con-sisting only of a small part of the beast)2 to propi-tiate the gods, and had there been consumed. TheCarthaginians erected funereal monuments to him,

1 Diodor. xi. 21-24.2 Herodotus, vii. 167. aoifiara oXa Karayifav. This passage of He-

rodotus receives' illustration from the learned comment of Movers onthe Phoenician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was theusual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom withthe Phoenicians (Porphyr. de Abstin. iv. 15), to burn the victim entire:the Phoenicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems tohave been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of greatmisfortune or anxiety, the old habit was resumed (Movers, Das Opfer-wesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, p. 71-118).


graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthageand in their principal colonies' : on the field ofbattle itself also, a monument was raised to him bythe Greeks. On that monument, seventy yearsafterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from theplunder of this same city of Himera, offered thebloody sacrifice of 3000 Grecian prisoners2.

Supremacy We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forcesof Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign in-vader whom he had called in, and probably otherGreeks besides. All of them were now compelledto sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privi-lege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, whichwas granted to them without any harder impositionthan the tribute probably involved in that relation3.Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimi-

1 Herodot. vii. 166, 167- Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother :a curious proof of connubium between Carthage and Syracuse. At themoment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in398 B.C, there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both inSyracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships andother property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the firstinstant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all thisproperty (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginianswith merchandise in the Grecian cities, so soon after a bloody war hadbeen concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies oftrade.

2 Diodor. xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himeratook place on the same day as that of Salamis ; according to Diodorus,on the same day as that of ThermopylBe. If we are forced to choosebetween the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring theformer: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from tlje brief allusions of Herodotus, he musthave conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different fromDiodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust thedetails given by the latter.

3 I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded toin Diodorus xi. 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other" great benefit " Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.


dated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to askfor peace at Syracuse, which they are said to haveobtained mainly by the solicitation of Damarete1

wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talentsto defray the costs of the war, and of erecting twotemples in which the terms of the treaty were to bepermanently recorded1. If we could believe theassertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from theCarthaginians a stipulation that they would for thefuture abstain from human sacrifices in their reli-gious worship2: but such an interference withforeign religious rites would be unexampled in thatage, and we know moreover that the practice wasnot permanently discontinued at Carthage8. Indeedwe may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copyingfrom writers like Ephorus and Timeeus long afterthe events, has exaggerated considerably the. defeat,the humiliation, and the amercement, of the Cartha-ginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a veryfew years after the battle of Himera, represent afresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of presentuneasiness and alarm4: and the Carthaginian fleetis found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coastof Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother andsuccessor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian Conduct ofcities immunity from foreign war together with a wardstherich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving tto the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera,

against1 Diodor. xi. 26. Xerxes.2 Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 3 ; Plutarch, De SeraNuminis Vindicta,

p. 552, c. 6.3 Diodor. xx. 14.4 Pindar, Nera. ix. 67 (— 28 B.) with the Scholia.


Syracuse, and Delphi: and the epigram of Simo-nideV, composed for the tripod offered in the lattertemple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero,Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberatorsof Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victorsof Salamis and Platsea. And the Sicilians allegedthat he was on the point of actually sending rein-forcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spiteof the necessity of submitting to Spartan command,when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat ofthat prince reached him. But we find another state-ment decidedly more probable—that he sent a con-fidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with ordersto watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and incase it should prove successful (as he thought thatit probably would be) to tender presents and sub-mission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syra-cuse2. When we consider that until the very morn-ing of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecianindependence must have appeared to an impartialspectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder thatGelo should take precautions for preventing theonward progress of the Persians towards Sicily,which was already sufficiently imperiled by its for-midable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Per-sians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himeracleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrificcloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left asky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abun-

1 Simonides, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.2 Herodot. vii. 163-165 : compare Diodor. xi. 26 ; Ephorus, Fragtn.

I l l , ed. Didot.


dant plunder for recompense as well as distribution :among the most valuable part of the plunder werethe numerous prisoners taken, who were dividedamong the cities in proportion to the number oftroops furnished by each. Of course the largest Number of

prisoners

shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigen- taken atturn : while the number acquired by the latter wasstill farther increased by the separate capture ofthose prisoners who had dispersed throughout themountains in and near the Agrigentine territory, —their

. prosperity,

All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on especiallyGelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were 8"thus put in possession of a number of slaves aspublic property, who were kept in chains to work1,and were either employed on public undertakingsfor defence, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford arevenue to the state. So great was the total ofthese public slaves at Agrigentum, that thoughmany were employed on state-works, which elevatedthe city to signal grandeur during the flourishingperiod of seventy years which intervened betweenthe recent battle and its subsequent capture by theCarthaginians—there nevertheless remained greatnumbers to be let out to private individuals, someof whom had no less than five hundred slaves re-spectively in their employment2.

1 Diodor. xi. 25. al 82 yokels els 7rc8a$ KarctrTrjerav TOVS Siaipedevrasalxnah&Tovs, Kai TOVS SeSe/ieVous' Taw epyatv Sia TOVTIHV inecrKeva^ov.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed inpublic works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases ofTegea and Samos in Herodot. i. 66 ; iii. 39.

2 Diodor. xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and letout for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial projectconceived by Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, eapp. 3 and 4.


Death and The peace which now ensued left Gelo master ofof Geio. Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns

on the east of the island ; while Thero governed inAgrigentum, and his son Thrasydaeus in Himera.In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was un-questionably the chief person in the island ; more-over he was connected by marriage, and lived onterms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thero. Hisconduct both at Syracuse and towards the citiesdependent upon him, was mild and conciliating.But his subsequent career was very short: he diedof a dropsical complaint not much more than a yearafter the battle of Himera. while the glories of thatday were fresh in every one's recollection. As theSyracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive fune-rals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequiesshould be conducted in strict conformity to thelaw : nevertheless the zeal of his successor as wellas the attachment of the people disobeyed thesecommands. The great mass of citizens followed hisfuneral procession from the city to the estate of hiswife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers wereerected to distinguish the spot; and the solemni-ties of heroic worship were rendered to him. Nordid the respectful recollections of the conqueror ofHimera ever afterwards die .out among the Syracu-san people, though his tomb was defaced first bythe Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despotAgathokles1. And when we recollect the destruc-tive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginianinvasions, we shall be sensible how great was the

1 Diodor. xi. 38, 67 ; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29 ; Aristotle,EEoXiVfta ; Fragm. p. 106, ed. Neumann.


debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contempo-raries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but Number ofas a sort of second founder of Syracuse1, that Gelowas thus solemnly worshiped. The size, thestrength, and the population of the town were all sJ'racuse-greatly increased under him. Besides the numberof new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, theHybleean Megara, and the Sicilian Eubcea, we areinformed that he also inscribed on the roll of citi-zens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. Itwill moreover appear that these new-made citizenswere in possession of the islet of Ortygia, and theportion of the city closely bordering on it, whichbore the name of Achradina2—the interior strong-holds of Syracuse. It has already been stated thatOrtygia was the original settlement, and that thecity did not overstep the boundaries of the isletbefore the enlargements of Gelo. We do notknow by what arrangements Gelo provided newlands for so large a number of new-comers : butwhen we come to notice the antipathy with whichthese latter were regarded by the remaining citizens,we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizenshad been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power B-C.478.

passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers,Polyzelus and Hiero ; the former of whom marriedthe widow of the deceased prince, and was named,according to his testamentary directions, com-mander of the military force—while Hiero wasintended to enjoy the government of the city.Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, how-

1 Biodor. xi. 49. : Diodor. xi. 72, 73.


Hiero,brother andsuccessor ofGelo atSyracuse—jealous ofhis brotherPolyzelus—harsh as aruler—quarrel be-tween Hieroof Syracuseand TheroofAgrigen-tum—ap-peased bythe poetSimonides.

Severetreatmentof the in-habitantsof Himeraby Thero.

ever, the real power fell to Hiero—a man of energyand determination, and munificent as a patron ofcontemporary poets, Pindar, Simonides, Bacchy-lide"s, Epicharmus, iEschylus, and others ; but thevictim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in histemper—cruel, and rapacious in his government1—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espion.age which broke up all freedom of speech among bissubjects. Especially jealous of his brother Poly-zeius, who was very popular in the city, he des-patched him on a military expedition against theKrotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplish-ing his destruction : but Polyzelus, aware of thesnare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protectionfrom his brother-in-law the despot Thdron ; fromwhom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving arefusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms.He had already advanced on his march as far asthe river Gela, but no actual battle appears to havetaken place: it is interesting to hear that Simo-nides the-poet, esteemed and rewarded by boththese princes, was the mediator of peace betweenthem2.

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation,between these two powerful despots, proved thecause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city,under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thero, wasadministered by his son Thrasydseus—a youthwhose oppressive conduct speedily excited the

1 Diodor. xi. 67 ; Aristotel. Politic, v. 9, 3. In spite of the com-pliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (spoils acrrols, oi <f>8opeavayadois, gelvois 8e davjj.aa-rbs naTrjp, Pyth. iii. 71 = 125), his indirect ad-monitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen adPindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161-182).

2 Diodor. xi. 48 ; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii. 29.

CHAP. XLIII.] SICILIAN AFFAIRS.—GELO AttD HIS DYNASTY. 305

strongest antipathy. The Himereeans, knowingthat they had little chance of redress from Theroagainst his son, took advantage of the quarrel be-tween him and Hiero to make propositions to thelatter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion ofThrasydaeus, tendering themselves as subjects ofSyracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokrates,cousins of Th^ro, but at variance with him, andalso candidates for the protection of Hiero, wereconcerned in this scheme for detaching Himerafrom the dominion of Thero. But so soon aspeace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to The"roboth the schemes and the malcontents at Himera.We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratescollected some forces to resist Th^ro, but were de-feated by him at the river Himera1: his victory wasfollowed up by seizing and putting to death a largenumber of Himeraean citizens. So great was thenumber slain, coupled with the loss of others whofled for fear of being slain, that the population ofthe city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished.The'ro invited and enrolled a large addition of new ^ 0 1 ^citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood2. Hiero—

. . . against th.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Carthagi-Thelro and with his brother Polyzelus, is marked Tyrrhe-by several circumstances as noway inferior to thatof Gelo, and probably the greatest not merely in i"

the city of1 Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 173. For the few facts which can be ^ t n a

made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thero, see G oiler, De s a l e t r a n s . "Situ et Origine Syracusarum, ch. vii. p. 19-22. The Scholiasts of plantationPindar are occasionally useful in explaining his brief historical allu- ofinhabit-sions; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before a"n^~7-them for so doing. ments of

2 Diodor. xi. 48, 49. Pindar.

VOL. V. X


Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. Thecitizens of the distant city of Cumse, on the coastof Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhe-nian fleets, entreated his aid, and received fromhim a squadron which defeated and drove off theirenemies1: he even settled a Syracusan colony in theneighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, de-spot of Rhegium and Messene, had attacked, andmight probably have overpowered, his neighboursthe Epizephyrian Lokrians ; but the menaces ofHiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by theenvoy Chromius, compelled him to desist2. Thoseheroic honours, which in Greece belonged to theCEkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him ; andhe procured them by the foundation of the new cityof iEtna3, on the site and in the place of Katana,the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well asthose of Naxos. While these Naxians and Kata-naeans were directed to take up their abode atLeontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hieroplanted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city

1 The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with thename of Hiero and the victory at Cumae inscribed on it, yet remains asan interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offer-ings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus : see Boeckh, Corp. In-scriptt. Graec. No. 16, part i. p. 34.

2 Diodor. xi. 51 ; Pindar, i. 74 ( = 140) ; ii. 17 (— 35) with theScholia; Epicharmus, Fragment, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar.Pyth. i. 98; Strabo, v. p. 247.

3 'Ifpav OIKMTTTJS dvrl rvpavvov f3ov\6)i£vos clvai, KaT&vr)vi£f\a>v PaTvr)v fieTwvofiaae rrjv noKw, eavrov olKia-rfjV Trpo<rayopev<ras(Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i. 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among thecitizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should berecognised as CEkist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollodirected them to commemorate himself as CEkist (Diodor. xii. 35).


of iEtna: 5000 from Syracuse and Gela—with anequal number from Peloponnesus. They served as anauxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the eventof discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by thehistory of his successor : he gave them not only theterritory which had before belonged to Katana, butalso a large addition besides, chiefly at the expenseof the neighbouring Sikel tribes. His son Deino-menls, and his friend and confidant Chromius, en-rolled as an iEtnsean, became joint administratorsof the city : its religious and social customs wereassimilated to the Dorian model1, and Pindar dreamsof future relations between the despot and citizensof iEtna, analogous to those between king andcitizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius wereproclaimed as iEtnseans at the Pythian and Nemeangames, when their chariots gained victories ; onwhich occasion the assembled crowd heard for thefirst time of the new Hellenic city of iEtna. Wesee, by the compliments of Pindar2, that Hiero wasvain of his new title of founder; but we must re-mark that it was procured, not, as in most cases,by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous,but by the dispossession and impoverishment ofother Grecian citizens, who seem to have given noground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we seethe first exhibition of that propensity to violent

1 Chromius irrirponos rrjs K'irvqs (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix. I). Aboutthe Dorian institutions of iEtna, &c, Pindar, Pyth. i. 60-71.

Deinomen&s survived his father, and commemorated the Olympicvictories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi. 12,1).

2 Pindar, Pyth. i. 60 ( = 117) ; iii. 69 ( = 121). Pindar, ap. Strabo.vi. p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix. 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hierois proclaimed in some odes as a Sy racusan ; but Syracuse and the newly-founded .(Etna are iutimately joined together : see Nemea, i. init.

x2


and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants fromone seat to another, which was not uncommonamong Assyrian and Persian despots, and whichwas exhibited on a still larger scale by the successorsof Alexander the Great in their numerous new-builtcities.

Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that mes-of Rhe- sage of Hiero which had compelled him to spareS' ThSro'of the Lokrians; but such was the esteem enter-t™nS<Thra tained for his memory, and so efficient the govern-syaams, son ment of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom heof Thero, "'

rules Agri- constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messe'ne'Himera. were preserved for his children, yet minors1. Butgovernment a still more important change in Sicily was caused

bye" hJ t h e d e a t h o f t h e Agrigentine Thero, which tookd i i l b 472 Thi i

yand. p i a c e seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a

partner with Gelo in the great victory over theCarthaginians, left a reputation of good govern-ment as well as ability among the Agrigentines,which we find perpetuated in the laureat strains ofPindar—and his memory doubtless became stillfarther endeared from comparison with his son andsuccessor. Thrasydseus, now master both of Hi-mera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scalethe same oppressive and sanguinary dispositionswhich had before provoked rebellion at the formercity. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, heenlarged the military force which had been left byhis father, and engaged so many new mercenaries,that he became master of a force of 20,000 men,horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps,he might long have trodden With impunity in the

1 Justin, iv. 2.


footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently pro-voked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In anobstinate and murderous battle between these twoprinces, 2000 men were slain on the side of theSyracusans, and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines :an immense slaughter, considering that it mostlyfell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and notupon the non-Hellenic mercenaries1. But thedefeat of Thrasydseus was so complete, that he wascompelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, butfrom Sicily : he retired to Megara in Greece Proper,where he was condemned to death and perished2.The Agrigentines, thus happily released from theiroppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero :they are said to have established a democraticalgovernment, but we learn that Hiero sent manycitizens into banishment from Agrigentum andHimera, as well as from Gela3, nor can we doubtthat all the three were numbered among his subjectcities. The moment of freedom only commencedfor them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fateof the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydseus rendered Hiero Great .J J _ power of

more completely master of Sicily than his brother Hiero, afterGelo had been before him. The last act which we ofThrasy.hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his deathT ls

1 So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood—7rAct-oroi T£>V 7rapaTa£aii.£va>v 'EWrjviov7rp6s"EXkr)vas cwttrov (Diodor. xi. 53).

3 Diodor. xi. 53. e/cct 8avdrov KaTayvaxrOzls €TG~k€VTr](rev. This is aremarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppress-ive rvpavvos. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connectedwith Sicily, through the Hyblaean Megara, as well as Selinus.

8 Diodor. xi. 76. Oi Kara rrjv 'lepavos SvvauTtiav EK7re7rraKorc? £K ravihiwv rr6Xia>v—roirtav d' §crav T(\S>oi xai'AKpayavrlvm KO\ 'Ifiepaioi.


brothers-in-law\ the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium,who were now of age to govern. He encouragedthem to prefer, and probably showed himself readyto enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who hadadministered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus,for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythuscomplied readily with the demand, rendering anaccount so exact and faithful, that the sons ofAnaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain andgovern—or more probably to lend his aid to theirgovernment. This request he was wise enough torefuse : he removed his own property and retired toTegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards,of the complaint under which he had so long suf-fered, after a reign of ten years2.

B.C.467. On the death of Hiero, the succession was dis-Thrasybu-

lus, brother puted between his brother Thrasybulus, and his ne-cessor of phew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisansputes~ S of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, sur-meiXrs'of rounQiing his nephew with temptations to luxuriousthe Geio- pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and

Cruelties thus to seize the government for himself8. Thisand unpo-pularity ofThrasybu- ' Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also tolus-—mi- have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thero, and the daughter

? m S t o f a S v r a c u s a n named Nikokles : this last was the mother of his sonDeinomenes (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 112).

We read of Kleophron son of Anaxilaus, governing Messe'ne' duringhis father's life-time : probably this young man must have died, other-wise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 34).

2 Diodor. xi. 66.3 Aristotel. Politic, v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of

Gelo.Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264 seq.) has

discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilianchronology.


family division—a curse often resting upon theblood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading tothe greatest atrocitiesl—coupled with the conductof Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of themighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities ofHiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but with-out his energy, in Thrasybulus ; who put to deathmany citizens, and banished still more, for the pur-pose of seizing their property, until at length heprovoked among the Syracusans intense and uni-versal hatred, shared even by many of the oldGelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthenhimself by increasing his mercenary force, he couldnot prevent a general revolt from breaking outamong the Syracusan population. By summoningthose citizens whom Hiero had planted in his newcity of ^Etna, as well as various troops from hisdependent allies, he found himself at the head of15,000 men, and master of the interior strongholdsof the city—the island of Ortygia with Achradina,while the great body of the revolted Syracusanswere assembled in the outer city called Tyche\Though superior in number, yet being no matchin military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus,

1 Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. E( TOLVVV iOeXeis Karavotiv, €vpr]o~eis fievTOVS ldid>Tas vno TOVTCOV fid\io~Ta (piXoviievovs, TOVS 5e rvpdvvovs noWovsfjUv Traldas eavTcov aTTeKTOurjKOTas, noWovs d' vno naidcov avrovs dnoXa)-Xoras, iroWovs fie d8e\(f>ovs iv rvpawicnv dWyXotpovovs yeyevrnifvovs,noXkovs Se Kal vno yvvaiKtov TQ>V eavT&v rvpdvpovs diecpQapjievovs, KaiVTTO eTalpatv ye TGW fiaXio~Ta doKovvrcov <pik<ov tivai: compare Isokrates,De Pace, Orat. viii. p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judasa,after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—" Sibi ipsi reges imposuere :qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumpta per arma dominatione, fugascivium,urbium eversiones,—fratrum,conjugum,parentum,neces—aliaquesolita regibus ausi," &c.


they were obliged to invoke aid from the othercities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the commonenemy of freedom in the island, and holding outuniversal independence as the reward of victory.It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thero to espouse the causeof Thrasybulus : Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Hi-mera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded tothe call with alacrity, so that a large force, bothmilitary and naval, came to reinforce the Syra-cusans: Thrasybulus was totally defeated, first ina naval action, next on land, and obliged to shuthimself up in Ortygia and Achradina, where hesoon found his situation hopeless. He accordinglyopened a negotiation with his opponents, whichended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri,while the mercenary troops whom he had broughttogether were also permitted to depart unmolested1.The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and diedas a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fatefrom that which had befallen Thrasydseus son ofThero at Megara, though both seem to have giventhe same provocation.

B.C. 465. Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syra-of*Thras"- cuse, after a continuance of eighteen years2. Itsextinction ^a^ w a s n°thing less than an extensive revolutionof the Ge- throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of theIonian dy- . .~ • °

nasty. island there had grown up many petty despots,each with his separate mercenary force ; acting asthe instruments, and relying on the protection, ofthe great despot at Syracuse, All these were now

]- Diodor. ix. 67, 68. ' Aristotel. Politic, v. 8, 23.


expelled, and governments more or less democra-tical were established everywhere1. The sons ofAnaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer atRhegium and Mess^ne, but the citizens of thesetwo towns at length followed the general example,compelled them to retire2, and began their sera offreedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been Popular go-° r _ vernments,

expelled, the free governments established in their establishedi n rr , in all the

place were exposed at first to much difficulty and Siciliancollision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, £ 2 " "Hiero, ThSro, Thrasydteus, 'ihrasybulus, &c, had Sgoutall condemned many citizens to exile with con- ofth,e ,

J _ number of

fiscation of property ; and had planted on the soil newdtizens, , , and merce-

new citizens and mercenaries in numbers no less nanes do-considerable. To what race these mercenaries bTthfofe-belonged, we are not told: it is probable thatthey were only in part Greeks. Such violentmutations, both of persons and property, couldnot occur without raising bitter conflicts, of in-terest as well as of feeling, between the old, thenew, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon asthe iron hand of compression was removed. Thissource of angry dissension was common to all theSicilian cities, but in none did it flow more pro-fusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the newmercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, hadretired at the same time with him, many of themto the Hieronian city of iEtna, from whence theyhad been brought; but there yet remained themore numerous body introduced principally byGelo, partly also by Hiero—the former alone had

1 Diodor. xi. 68. 2 Diodor- xi. 78.


enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet re-mained. What part these Gelonian citizens hadtaken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctlystated : they seem not to have supported Thrasy-bulus as a body, and probably many of them tookpart against him. After the revolution had beenaccomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusanswas convened, in which the first resolution was, toprovide for the religious commemoration of theevent, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleu-therius, and by celebrating an annual festival to becalled the Eleutheria, with solemn matches andsacrifices. They next proceeded to determine thepolitical constitution, and such was the predomi-nant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returnedexiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dy-nasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who hadbeen domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were de-clared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harshand sweeping disqualification, falling at once upona numerous minority, naturally provoked renewedirritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens,the most warlike individuals in the state, and occu-pying, as favoured partisans of the previous dy-

intemai nastv, the inner and separately fortified sections ofdissensions 1 • •and combat Syracuse —Achradina and Ortygia—placed them-in Syracuse.

1 Diodor. xi. 73. TJJV re 'AxpaSivf/v Kai rf/v NijcroV dfirpoTepaiv TOIVroncov roirav eôvTaiv 'idwv reiôs, KaXuis KarcaKevaa-fievov.

Diodorus goes on to say that the general mass of citizens TO irposras 'EirOToAas Terpafip-ivov avrrjs eTrereiîaav—if we could venture toconstrue this last word rigidly, we might suppose that the parts of thecity, exterior to Achradina and the island, had before been unfortified.

Aristotle (Politic, v. 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations ofthe mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after theGelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship.


selves in open revolt; while the general mass ofcitizens, masters of all the outer sections of thecity, were not strong enough to assail with successthis defensible position. They could only block itup, and intercept its supplies, which the garrisonwithin were forced to come out and fight for. Thisdisastrous internal war continued for some months,with many partial conflicts both by land and sea :the general body of citizens became accustomed toarms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained vo-lunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable tomaintain themselves longer, the Gelonians wereforced to hazard a general battle, which, after auobstinate struggle, terminated in their completedefeat. The chosen band of 600, who had emi-nently contributed to this victory, received fromtheir fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a re-ward of one mina per head1.

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting Defeat ofb 6 the Gelo-

events are indicated rather than described, tell us mans—sy-scarcely anything of the political arrangements into ^T ewhich resulted from so important a victory. Pro-bably the Gelonians were expelled : but we may

cation.and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incidentcannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he bringsit to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had beenthe first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they becamethe inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardlymatter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them torebel; but this is not a case properlyadducible to prove the difficulty ofadjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathokles from Syracuse, nearly two cen-turies after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, bythe exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour(Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 282).

1 Diodor. xi. 72, 73, 76.


assume as certain, that the separate fortifications ofthe island and Achradina were abolished, and thatfrom henceforward there was only one fortified city,until the time of the despot Dionysius more thanfifty years afterwards J.

Disorders Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experiencedi f disorders analogous in character to those of Syra-

cuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the re-a c t i ° n against the Gelonian dynasty had brought

who had back in crowds the dispossessed exiles ; who, claim-ing restitution of their properties and influence, foundtheir demands sustained by the population gene-

Kyatenay'and rally. The Katanseans, whom Hiero had driven.Etna. from their own city to Leontini, in order that he

might convert Katana into his own settlement^Etna, assembled in arms and allied themselveswith the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer theirformer home and to restore to the Sikels that whichHiero had taken from them for enlargement of theiEtnaean territory. They were aided by the Syra-cusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hie-ronian partisans was dangerous : but they did notaccomplish their object until after a long contestand several battles with the iEtnseans. A conven-tion was at length concluded, by which the latterevacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy thetown and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia orInessa, upon which they bestowed the name ofiEtna2, with monuments commemorating Hiero as

1 Diodorus, xiv. 7.2 Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous

event, the destruction of the tomb of Agnon, the CEkist of Amphipolis,after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v. 11).


the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katanawas demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, nngerrea*s

came to be so intolerable, that a general congress and c.om-° _ ° promise—

was held between the various cities to adjust them, the exilesIt was determined by joint resolution to re-admitthe exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlerseverywhere : but an establishment was providedfor these latter in the territory of Messene. It ap-

r mous city.

pears that the exiles received back their property,or at least an assignment of other lands in compen-sation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabledto provide for their own exiles by re-establishingthe city of Kamarina *, which had been conqueredfrom Syracuse by Hippokrate's despot of Gelo, butwhich Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse,had made a portion of the Syracusan territory,conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse.The Syracusans now renounced the possession ofit—a cession to be explained probably by the fact,that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo toSyracuse, there were included not only the previousKamarinseans, but also many who had before beencitizens of Gela2. For these men, now obliged toquit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide anabode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restoredGeloan exiles ; and we may farther presume thatthis new city served as a receptacle for other bome-

1 Diodor. xi. 76". fiera 5e ravra Kafiaplvav fj,ev FeXwot KaroiKiiravTes

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be littledoubt that in Thucydides (vi. 5) the correction of Kara/dadr) vno TeXmmv(in place of virb TeXavos) is correct.



less citizens from all parts of the island. It wasconsecrated by the Geloans as an independent city,with Dorian rites and customs : its lands were dis-tributed anew, and among its settlers were menrich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus,as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympicvictories of the Kamarinsean Psaumis secured forhis new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a momentwhen it had hardly yet emerged from the hardshipsof an initiatory settlement '.

Reaction- Such was the great reactionary movement in Si-i t th? cily against the high-handed violences of the previ-

despotism, o u s despots. We are only enabled to follow it gene-andmfa raliy) but we see that all their transplantations andpuiargo- expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and allvernment, x

at Syracuse their arrangements overthrown. In the correctionother cities, of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new in-

justice was in many cases committed, nor are wesurprised to hear that at Syracuse many new en-rolments of citizens took place without any rightfulclaim2, probably accompanied by grants of land.The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now bequite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when theDemos or aggregate of small self-working proprie-tors was considered as " a troublesome yoke-fellow,"fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation: itis highly probable that the new table of citizensnow prepared included that class of men in largernumber than ever, on principles analogous to the

1 See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olym-piad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-esta-blished Kamarina. Tap veoiKov ebpav (Olymp. v. 9) ; air' (tyaytov is (pdos Toj/Se dapov atrrav (Olymp. V. 14).

Diodor. xi. 86. iroWGtv (IKTJ KCU « S eru^


liberal enrolments of Kleisthen£s at Athens. Inspite of all the confusion however with which thisperiod of popular government opens, lasting formore than fifty years until the despotism of theelder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best andmost prosperous portion of Sicilian history. Weshall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of itaiiotItaly, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a destructivefew words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge, inhabitants6

Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus,figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been no-ticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics.But it is also involved in the only event which hasbeen preserved to us respecting this portion of thehistory of the Italian Greeks. It was about theyear B.C, 473, that the Tarentines undertook an ex-pedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours theIapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and theother towns belonging to them. Mikythus despotof Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, des-patched 3000 of them by constraint as auxiliariesto the Tarentines. But the expedition proved sig-nally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to thenumber of 20,000 men, encountered the unitedGrecian forces in the field, and completely defeatedthem : the battle having taken place in a hostilecountry, it seems that the larger portion bothof Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuchthat Herodotus pronounces it to have been thegreatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge '.

1 Herodot. vii. 170; Diodor. xi. 52. The latter asserts that theIapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhe-

320 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART N.

Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion wereopulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whomsensibly affected the government of the city;strengthening the Demos, and rendering the con-stitution more democratical. In what particularsthe change consisted we do not know: the expres-sion of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that evenbefore this event the constitution had been po-pular \

gian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followedthe former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (hesays) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even be-came masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, asbefore, under the rule of Mikythus—we may remark that Diodorusmust have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of southernItaly, to talk of pursuit and flight from lapygia to Rhegium.

1 Aristotel. Polit. v. 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 3, 5)in which he comments on the government of Tarentum : and O. Miillerapplies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutionalchanges which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think thisjuxtaposition of thetwo passages unauthorized : there is nothing atall to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii. 9, 14.

321

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLAT.EA AND MYKALE DOWNTO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the re-pulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks,we now return to the central Greeks and the Per-sians—a case in which the triumph was yet more in-teresting to the cause of human improvement gene-rally. The disproportion between the immensehost assembled by Xerxes, and the little which heaccomplished, naturally provokes both a contemptfor Persian force and an admiration for the com-parative handful of men by whom they were soignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments arejust, but both are often exaggerated beyond the Causes ofpoint which attentive contemplation of the facts graceful re-will justify. The Persian mode of making war Xerx

5(which we may liken to that of the modern Turks', 5 s

now that the period of their energetic fanaticism defects—* w interior

has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly quality andand inefficient : t he m e n indeed, individually t aken , most of hisespecially the nat ive Pers ians , were not deficient Tendency toin the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their the^roismorganisation were wre tched—and their leaders yet °ftlM|worse. O n the other hand, the Greeks , equal, if notsuperior, in individual bravery , were incomparably

1 Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek re-volution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Turkishwarfare : compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron deTott, part iii.

VOL. V. Y

322 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PAUTII .

superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms : buthere too the leadership was defective, and the dis-union a constant source of peril. Those who, likePlutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his trea-tise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknow-ledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in theproceedings of the Greeks throughout these criticalyears, are forced to deal very harshly with the in-estimable witness on whom our knowledge of thefacts depends—and who intimates plainly that, inspite of the devoted courage displayed, not less bythe vanquished at Thermopylae, than by the victorsat Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly tothe imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness,of Xerxes*. Had he indeed possessed either thepersonal energy of Cyrus, or the judgement of Ar-temisia, it may be doubted whether any excellenceof management, or any intimacy of union, couldhave preserved the Greeks against so great a supe-riority of force ; but it is certain that all theircourage as soldiers in line would have been un-availing for that purpose, without a higher degreeof generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-ope-ration, than that which they actually manifested.

Comparison One hundred and fifty years after this eventfuloftheinva- , , ,

sionof period, we shall see the tables turned, and theXerxes with united forces of Greece under Alexander of Ma-<rfepersia°n cedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find

^ a t *n P e r s i a n o improvement has taken placeduring this long interval—that the scheme of de-

Great.—No °

improve- fence under Darius Codomannus labours under thement inamong the ' Thucyd. '• ^9. iTna-Ta/ievoi xal TOV fiapfiapov avrov irepl airm TOPersians mvUi'co acpakevTa, &c. : compare Thucyd. vi. 33.

CHAP. XLIV.] GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 323

same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that duringthatthere is the same blind and exclusive confidence in 150 yearspitched battles with superior numbers1—that theadvice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus,is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the samestamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issusby the same ruinous temerity as that which threwaway the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that thePersian native infantry (not the cavalry) even ap-pear to have lost that individual gallantry whichthey displayed so conspicuously at Platsea. Buton the Grecian side, the improvement in every wayis very great: the orderly courage of the soldierhas been sustained and even augmented, while thegeneralship and power of military combination hasreached a point unexampled in the previous historyof mankind. Military science may be esteemed asort of creation during this interval, and will befound to go through various stages—Demosthenesand Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agesilaus — Iphikrates—Epaminondas — Philip ofMacedon—Alexander2: for the Macedonian princesare borrowers of Greek tactics, though extendingand applying them with a personal energy peculiarto themselves, and with advantages of positionsuch as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. lathis comparison between the invasion of Xerxesand that of Alexander, we contrast the progressivespirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to

1 Thucyd. i. 142. irXrjdei rr/v ctjxadiav Bpacrvvovres, &c.2 See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenes,

c. 10, p. 123.

Y2


Progressivespirit inGreece—

through

initiative.

Conduct ofAthens in

the repulse

sians—her

event.

the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mindof Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid in-dividual, but never appropriating to itself new socialideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

ft- j s o u t of the invasion of Xerxes that those newpowers of combination, political as well as military,which lighten up Grecian history during the nexttwo centuries, take their rise. They are broughtinto agency through the altered position and cha-racter of the Athenians—improvers, to a certainextent, of military operations on land, but the greatcreators of marine tactics and manoeuvring inGreece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showedthemselves capable of organising and directing thejoint action of numerous allies and dependents—thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of theHomeric Agamemnon l—ability in command, withvigour in execution.

i n the general Hellenic confederacy, which hadacted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta,Athens could hardly be said to occupy any osten-sible rank above that of an ordinary member: theP o s t °f s e c o n c ' dignity in the line at Platsea hadindeed been adjudged to her, but only after a con-tending claim from Tegea. But without any dif-ference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye andfeeling of Greece no longer the same power asbefore. She had suffered more, and at sea had cer-tainly done more, than all the other allies put to-gether : even on land at Platsea, her hoplites hadmanifested a combination of bravery, discipline,

epov, /3ao-(Xeu? T ayaBos, Kparepos r alxpr)rr)S.Homer, Iliad, iii. 179-


and efficiency against the formidable Persian ca-valry, superior even to the Spartans ; nor had anyAthenian officer committed so perilous an act ofdisobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. Afterthe victory of Mykale, when the Peloponnesiansall hastened home to enjoy their triumph, theAthenian forces did not shrink from prolongedservice for the important object of clearing theHellespont, thus standing forth as the willing andforward champions of the Asiatic Greeks againstPersia. Besides these exploits of Athens collec-tively, the only two individuals, gifted with anytalents for command, whom this momentous con-quest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians :first Themistokles ; next, Aristeide's. From thebeginning to the end of the struggle, Athens haddisplayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotismwhich had been most ungenerously requited by thePeloponnesians ; who had kept within their Isth-mian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostileravage ; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—butthe second time by a culpable neglect in postponingtheir outward march against Mardonius. And thePeloponnesians could not but feel, that while theyhad left Attica unprotected, they owed their ownsalvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity ofThemistokles and the imposing Athenian navalforce.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sus-tained little or no mischief by the invasion, while Athenians"the Athenians had lost for the time even their cityand country, with a large proportion of theirmoveable property irrecoverably destroyed—-we

yponnesians.


might naturally expect to find the former, if notlending their grateful and active aid to repair thedamage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming therestoration of the ruined city by its former inhabit-ants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishnessagain prevalent among them ; ill-will and mistrustfor the future, aggravated by an admiration whichthey could not help feeling, overlays all their gra-titude and sympathy. The Athenians, on return-ing from Salamis after the battle of Plateea, founda desolate home to harbour them. Their countrywas laid waste,—their city burnt or destroyed, sothat there remained but a few houses standing,wherein the Persian officers had taken up theirquarters—and their fortifications for the most partrazed or overthrown. It was their first task tobring home their families and effects from the tem-porary places of shelter at Trcezen, vEgina, andSalamis. After providing what was indispensablynecessary for immediate wants, they began to re-build their city and its fortifications on a scale ofenlarged size in every direction1. But as soon asthey were seen to be employed on this indispensa-ble work, without which neither political existencenor personal safety was practicable, the allies tookthe alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, andurged her to arrest the work :—in the front of thesecomplainants probably stood the iEginetans, as theold enemies of Athens, and as having most to ap-prehend from her might at sea. The Spartans,perfectly sympathising with the jealousy und un-easiness of their allies, were even disposed, from

1 Thucyd. i. 89-


old association, to carry their dislike of fortifica-tions still farther, so that they would have beenpleased to see all the other Grecian cities systema-tically defenceless like Sparta itself1. But whilesending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendlyremonstrance against the project of re-fortifyingthe city, they could not openly and peremptorilyforbid the exercise of a right common to every au-tonomous community—nor did they even venture,at a moment when the events of the past monthswere fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulgetheir real jealousies as to the future. They affectedto offer prudential reasons against the scheme,founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion ;in which case it would be a dangerous advantagefor the invader to find any fortified city outside ofPeloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebeshad recently seconded Mardonius. They proposedto the Athenians therefore, not merely to desistfrom their own fortifications, but also to assist themin demolishing all fortifications of other cities be-yond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shel-ter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all ex-posed parties.

A statesman like Themistokle's was not likely to stratagembe imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he sawthat the Spartans had the power of preventing thework if they chose, and that it could only be exe-

" J opportu-

cuted by the help of successful deceit. By his ad- nityoffor-vice, the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, city.

1 Thucyd . i. 90- Ta fiev not avrol rjdtov av 6p5>i>T€s /J^re tKeivovs fX7]T*

aWov [irjdeva retôs eôvra, TO 8e n\zov, TCOV ^Vfjifxd^cov €ÔTpvv6vTO>v

Kai (pofiovfieiHov TOV re vavTiKov avrav ro nXr/Sos, o nplv ovx vwrjpê, KCU

Tr/v es TOV MTJSIKOV Tvokep.ov roXfiav ycvop.(vrjv.


saying that they would themselves send to Spartaand explain their views. Accordingly, Themisto-kle*s himself was presently despatched thither, asone among three envoys instructed to enter intoexplanations with the Spartan authorities: but histwo colleagues, Aristeide"s and Abronichus, by pre-vious concert, were tardy in arriving—and he re-mained inactive at Sparta, making use of theirabsence as an excuse for not even demanding an au-dience, but affecting surprise that their coming wasso long delayed. But while Aristeide"s and Abro-nichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiouslykept back, the whole population of Athens labouredunremittingly at the walls. Men, women, andchildren, all tasked their strength to the utmostduring this precious interval: neither privatehouses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnishmaterials; and such was their ardour in the enter-prise, that before the three envoys were united atSparta, the wall had already attained a height suffi-cient at least to attempt defence. Yet the intervalhad been long enough to provoke suspicion, evenin the slow mind of the Spartans, while the morewatchful iEginetans sent them positive intelligencethat the wall was rapidly advancing. Themistokle's,on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied thetruth of i t ; and the personal esteem entertainedtowards him was at that time so great, that his as-surance1 obtained for some time unqualified credit,until fresh messengers again raised suspicions inthe minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, The-mistokl^s urged the Ephors to send envoys of their

1 Thucyd. i. 91. TO fiev GeporoKXet imiBovro 8«x (j)i\iavavrov.


own to Athens, and thus convince themselves ofthe state of the facts. They unsuspectingly actedupon his recommendation, while he at the sametime transmitted a private communication toAthens, desiring that the envoys might not be suf-fered to depart until the safe return of himself andhis colleagues, which he feared might be deniedthem when his trick came to be divulged. Ari-steid^s and Abronichus had now arrived—the wallwas announced to be of a height at least abovecontempt—and Themistokles at once threw off themask : he avowed the stratagem practised—toldthe Spartans that Athens was already fortified suf-ficiently to ensure the safety and free will of its in-habitants—and warned them that the hour of con-straint was now past, the Athenians being in acondition to define and vindicate for themselvestheir own rights and duties in reference to Spartaand the allies. He reminded them that the Athe-nians had always been found competent to judgefor themselves, whether in joint consultation, or inany separate affair such as the momentous crisis ofabandoning their city and taking to their ships :they had now, in the exercise of this self-judge-ment, resolved upon fortifying their city, as a stepindispensable to themselves and advantageous evento the allies generally. Nor could there be anyequal or fair interchange of opinion unless all theallies had equal means of defence : either all mustbe unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as wellas the rest1.

1 Thucyd. i. 91- Ov yap olov T( ttvcu /xfj ano avmrakov Trapa&Kevfjso/xolov TI rj laov e'f TO KOIVOV ftovXevecrBm. *H wavras ovv dm^t'cTOns


Athens Mortified as the Spar tans were by a revelationconfusion which showed tha t they had been not only detectedtans—diT in a dishonest purpose, bu t completely outwittedrS'of'the — ^ e y w e r e a t the same t ime overawed by the de-aUies- cisive tone of Themistokles , whom they never af-

terwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection ofthe walls would have been practicable, though notperhaps without difficulty; to deal by force withthe fact accomplished, was perilous in a high de-gree : moreover the inestimable services just ren-dered by Athens became again predominant in theirminds, so that sentiment and prudence for the timecoincided. They affected therefore to accept thecommunication without manifesting any offence,nor had they indeed pu t forward any pretencewhich required to be formally retracted. The en-voys on both sides returned home, and the Athe-nians completed their fortifications; without ob-struct ion1—yet not without murmurs on the part ofthe allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta after-wards for having let slip this golden opportunity ofarresting the growth of the giant2 .

1 We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting therebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydid&s. It isthe first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events be-tween the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his professedhistory (i. 89-92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistokles, c. 19)and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7) seem all to have followed Thu-cydidSs, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, tothe effect that Themistokles accomplished his object by bribing theEphors. This would not be improbable in itself—nor is it inconsistentwith the narrative of Thucydide's ; but the latter either had not heardor did not believe it.

2 Thucyd. i. 69- Kai ravSe fyteis alrioi (says the Corinthian envoyaddressing the Lacedaemonians), TO re Trparov eda-avres avroiis (theAthenians) rr)V TTOKIV /xera ra Mr/diKa Kparvvai, Kai vcrepov ra p,aKpa


If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, Effect of. . - I T - t h i s intend

the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, ed.butbaf-whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed ™to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggra-vate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the inss-Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debarthem from that common right of self-defence whichwas exercised by every autonomous city exceptSparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought uponthem by their peculiar sufferings in the commoncause, and by the very allies who without theirdevoted forwardness would now have been slaves ofthe Great King. And the intention of the allies toobstruct the fortifications must have been known toevery soul in Athens, from the universal press ofhands required to hurry the work and escape inter-ference ; just as it was proclaimed to after-genera-tions by the shapeless fragments and irregularstructure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stonesand inscribed columns were seen imbedded1. As-suredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strongand weak—men, women, and children—must havebeen intense as well as equalising: all had enduredthe common miseries of exile, all had contributedto the victory, all were now sharing the same fatiguefor the defence of their recovered city, in order tocounterwork the ungenerous hindrance of theirPeloponnesian allies. We must take notice of thesestirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians

1 Thucyd. i. 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates thisinto a foolish conceit.


and acting upon a generation which had now beennursed in democracy for a quarter of a century andhad achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—ifwe would understand that still stronger burst ofaggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, andaptitude as well as thirst for command—togetherwith that still wider spread of democratical organi-sation—which marks their character during the ageimmediately following.

Enlarge- fhe plan of the new fortification was projectedwalls of on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of

the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about sevenmiles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre : butthe circuit of the previous walls is unknown, sothat we are unable to measure the extent of thatenlargement which Thucydides testifies to havebeen carried out on every side. It included withinthe town the three hills of the Areopagus, the Pnyx,and the Museum ; while on the south of the townit was carried for a space even on the southern bankof the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountainKallirhoe" \ In spite of the excessive hurry in whichit was raised, the structure was thoroughly solidand sufficient against every external enemy : butthere is reason to believe that its very large innerarea was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces,for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in

1 For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls ofAthens, see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer—Topo-graphie von Athen—published in the Kieler Philologische Studien. Kiel,1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researchesand published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideasof Forchhammer as to the course of the walls.


from the country with their property, were emi-nently useful to a Grecian city-community ; to nonemore useful than to the Athenians, whose principalstrength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habi-tually resided in large proportion in their separatedemes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step, in the renovation of Large plansAtnens alter her temporary extinction, was now stokiesforhappily accomplished: the city was made secure aggrandiagainst external enemies. But Themistokl&s, to ^l^0^whom the Athenians owed the late successful stra- fie(J1

t<"yu

andharbour

tagem and whose influence must have been much provided atstrengthened by its success, had conceived plans of vast heighta wider and more ambitious range. He had been j ss pro-'the original adviser of the great maritime start ^taken by his countrymen, as well as of the power-ful naval force which they had created during thelast few years, and which had so recently provedtheir salvation. He saw in that force both the onlychance of salvation for the future, in case the Per-sians should renew their attack by sea—a contin-gency at that time seemingly probable—and bound-less prospects of future ascendency over the Greciancoasts and islands : it was the great engine of de-fence, of offence, and of ambition. To continuethis movement required much less foresight andgenius than to begin it, and Themistokle's, the mo-ment that the walls of the city had been finished,brought back the attention of his countrymen tothose wooden walls which had served them as arefuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailedupon them to provide harbour-room at once safeand adequate, by the enlargement and fortification


of the Peirseus. This again was only the prosecu-tion of an enterprise previously begun ; for he hadalready, while in office two or three years before1,made his countrymen sensible that the open road-sted of PhaleTum was thoroughly insecure, and hadprevailed upon them to improve and employ in partthe more spacious harbours of Peirseus and Muny-chia—three natural basins, all capable of beingclosed and defended. Something had then beendone towards the enlargement of this port, thoughit had probably been subsequently ruined by thePersian invaders : but Themistokle"s now resumed

1 Thucyd. i. 93. eiteurt 8e Kal TOV Heipaieas ra Xoiwa 6 9e/«0T<weXijjolicohoixGiv (virrjpxro 8" UVTOV npoTepov enl Trjs ixdvov dp^rjs, r/s Kar ivi-avrbv ' A.8r)vaiois rjp^e).

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (Kar imavrbv)—Kara nvaiviavrov fjyefiav iyivtro' irpb Se TO>V Mr/SiKav r)p£* Oe/itoroKXijs evtavrbvcva.

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon,to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydides means to referthis dpxrj of Themistokles. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing theopinions of Dodwell and Corsini (see Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 481 B.C.and Preface, p. xv.), inserts ThemistoklSs as Archon Eponymus in 481B.C, the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and supposes the Peirsusto have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable :but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him(npo TU>V MIJ8LKS>V r/p^e Qep.icrTOKKrjs iviavrbv cva), in which I appre-hend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language : iviavrbvet/a in the accusative case denotes only the duration of the apypi, not theposition of the year (compare Thucyd. iii. 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydides meant to designate Themistoklesas having been Archon Eponymus, or as having been one of the nineArchons. He may have meant " during the year when Themistokl&swas StratSgus (or general)," and the explanation of the Scholiast, whoemploys the word rjytfiav, rather implies that he so understood it. TheStrategi were annual as well as the Archons. Now we know that The-mistokles was one of the generals in 480 B.C, and that he commandedin Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peirseus may havebeen begun in the early part of 480 B.C, when Xerxes was already onhis march, or at least at Sardis.

CHAP. XLIV.] CXRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 335

the scheme on a scale far grander than he couldthen have ventured to propose—a scale which de-monstrates the vast auguries present to his mindrespecting the destinies of Athens. Peirseus andMunychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortifiedspace as large as the enlarged Athens, and with awall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wallwhich surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit1, wasintended by him to be so stupendous both in heightand thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and toenable the whole military population to act on ship-board, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison2.We may judge how vast his project was, when welearn that the wall, though in practice always foundsufficient, was only carried up to half the heightwhich he had contemplated3. In respect to thick-ness however his ideas were exactly followed : twocarts meeting one another brought stones whichwere laid together right and left on the outer sideof each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls,between which the interior space (of course at leastas broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) wasfilled up, " not with rubble, in the usual manner ofthe Greeks, but constructed, throughout the wholethickness, of squared stones, cramped together withmetal4." The result was a solid wall probably not

1 Thucyd. ii. 13. 2 Thucyd. i. 93.3 Thucyd. i. 93. To Se vyjros rj/iurv fidXicrra er(\e<r6r] ov Sievoftro"

£(3OUXETO yap TO) /leyeOet, ml TW ira^ei d<pio-rdvai raj TS>V 7r6kep,ta>v em-

/3ouXar, dvdpimwv be ivofiifev okiyav <a\ Ta>v aj^peioraTiov dpicecreiv TTJV

(hvXaKrjv, Toils 5' aWovs €S Tas vavs ecr^rjcreirOai.4 Thucyd. i. 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived

from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to beseen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix. p. 411 : see edit. p. 293, Germ,transl. Compare Aristophan. Aves, 1127, about the breadth of the wallof Nephelokokkygia.


less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it wasintended to carry so very unusual a height. Inthe exhortations whereby he animated the peopleto this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured toimpress upon them that Peirteus was of more valueto them than Athens itself, and that it affordeda shelter into which, if their territory should beagain overwhelmed by a superior land-force, theymight securely retire, with full liberty of that mari-time action in which they were a match for all theworld'. We may even suspect that if Themisto-kles could have followed his own feelings, he wouldhave altered the site of the city from Athens toPeirseus : the attachment of the people to their an-cient and holy rock doubtless prevented any suchproposition. Nor did he at that time, probably,contemplate the possibility of those long wallswhich in a few years afterwards consolidated thetwo cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning oflarged and the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Perikles,fortified r

harbour— who espoused and carried out the large ideas orThemistokles, this same language about the capa-city of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively

Athens. o r c n i e n y upon maritime action. But the Athe-nian empire was then an established reality, whereasin the time of Themistokles it was yet a dream, andhis bold predictions, surpassed as they were by thefuture reality, mark that extraordinary power ofpractical divination which Thucydides so empha-tically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant

1 Thucyd. i. 93 (compare Cornel. Nepos, Themistok. c. 6). ratsvav<j\ Trpos airavTas av&i<


hope which had now passed into the temper of theAthenian people, when we find them, on the faithof these predictions, undertaking a new enterpriseof so much toil and expense ; and that too whenjust returned from exile into a desolated country,a't a moment of private distress and public impo-verishment. However, Peiraeus served other-pur-poses besides its direct use as a dockyard for mili-tary marine : its secure fortifications and the pro-tection of the Athenian navy, were well-calculatedto call back those metics or resident foreigners whohad been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes,and who might feel themselves insecure in return-ing unless some new and conspicuous means ofprotection were exhibited. To invite them back,and to attract new residents of a similar description,Themistokles proposed to exempt them from theMetoikion or non-freeman's annual tax l :'but thisexemption can only have lasted for a time, and thegreat temptation for them to return must have con-sisted in the new securities and facilities for trade,which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy,now afforded. The presence of numerous meticswas profitable to the Athenians, both privately andpublicly: much of the trading, professional, andhandicraft business was in their hands: and theAthenian legislation, while it excluded them fromthe political franchise, was in other respects equi-table and protective to them. In regard to tradingpursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citi-zens—that they were less frequently carried awayfor foreign military service. The great increase of

1 Diodor. xi. 43.

VOL. V. Z


their numbers, from this period forward, while ittended materially to increase the value of propertyall throughout Attica, but especially in Peirseusand Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us toexplain the extraordinary prosperity, together withthe excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout thecountry before the Peloponnesian war. The barley,vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts ofthe territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourish-ing deme of Acharnsex—and the fish obtained inabundance near the coast—all found opulent buyersand a constant demand from the augmenting townpopulation.

Resolution We are farther told that Themistokles 2 prevailedtwentynew o n the Athenians to build every year twenty newannual? ships °f the line—so we may designate the trireme.

Whether this number was always strictly adheredto, it is impossible to say : but to repair the ships,as well as to keep up their numbers, was alwaysregarded among the most indispensable obligationsof the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered anyopposition to the fortification of the Peirseus,though it was an enterprise greater, more novel,and more menacing, than that of Athens. ButDiodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themi-stokles thought it necessary to send an embassy to

1 See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy ofAristophanes so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of meticsand from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokrates, morethan a century after this period, Orat. iv. De Pace, p. 163, and Xeno-phon, De Vectigalibus, c. iv.

2 Diodor. xi. 43.


Sparta1, intimating that his scheme was to providea safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, inthe event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a con- Expedition. . o f the

siderable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian unitedforce : yet they did not prevent Athens from lend- againsting active aid towards the expedition which, in theyear after the battle of Platea (B.C. 478) set sail for p

Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships of Byzan-from the various cities of Peloponnesus2 were underhis command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty,under the orders of Aristeides and Kimon : other-triremes also came from the Ionian and insularallies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which islandthey liberated most of the Grecian cities from thePersian government: next they turned to the Bos-phorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege ofByzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese,was a post of great moment as well as of greatstrength—occupied by a considerable Persian force,with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of

1 Diodor. xi. 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassybeing sent to Sparta is probable enough—separating that fact from thepreliminary discussions which Diodorus describes as having precededit in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well asincredible. His story—that Themistokles told the assembly that hehad a conceived scheme of great moment to the state, but that it didnot admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assemblynamed Aristeides and Xanthippus to hear it confidentially and judge ofit—seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale ofthe project of Themistokles to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbour ofPagasee, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other projectfor enlarging and fortifying the Peiraaus.

2 Thucyd. i. 94 ; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 23. Diodorus (xi. 44) saysthat the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number : his statement is notto be accepted, in opposition to Thucydides.

z2


the monarch. The place was captured', seeminglyafter a prolonged siege : it might probably hold outeven longer than Sestus, as being taken less unpre-pared. The line of communication between the Eu-xine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

Misconduct The capture of Byzantium proved the signal formas—re- a capital and unexpected change in the relations ofallies V ^ the various Grecian cities ; a change, of which thehlTtreason" P r o x i m a t e cause lay in the misconduct of Pausa-abiecorre- n i a s but towards which other causes, deep-seatedspondence . ' .

with as well as various, also tended. In recounting the

history of Milt iades2 , I noticed the deplorable liabi-

lity of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by

success : this dis temper worked with singular rapi-

dity on Pausanias . As conqueror of Plateea, he

had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian ex-

perience, together with a prodigious share of the

plunder : the concubines, horses 8 , camels, and gold

plate , which had thus passed into his possession,

were well calculated to make the sobriety and dis-

cipline of Spar tan life i rksome, while his power

also, though great on foreign command, became

subordinate to that of the Epbors when he returned

home. His newly-acquired insolence was mani-

fested immediately after the bat t le , in the com-

memorative tr ipod dedicated by his order at Delphi,

which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as

commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Per-

sians : an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedaemo-

nians themselves were the first to mark their disap-1 Thucyd. i. 94.2 See the volume of this history immediately preceding, ch. xxxvi.

p. 502. 3 Herodot. ix. 81 .


probation, by causing the inscription to be erased,and the names of the cities who had taken part in thecombat to be all enumerated on the tripod1. Never-theless he was still sent on the command againstCyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture ofthis latter place that his ambition and discontentfirst ripened into distinct treason. He entered intocorrespondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile(now a subject of Persia, and invested with theproperty and government of a district in Mysia),to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of By-zantium, and the care of the valuable prisonerstaken in it. These prisoners were presently suf-fered to escape, or rather sent away underhand toXerxes ; together with a letter from the hand ofPausanias himself, to the following effect:—" Pau-sanias the Spartan commander, having taken thesecaptives, sends them back in his anxiety to obligethee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marrythy daughter, and to bring under thy dominionboth Sparta and the rest of Greece : with thy aid,I think myself competent to achieve this. If myproposition be acceptable, send some confidentialperson down to the seaboard, through whom wemay hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleasedwith the opening thus held out, immediately sent

1 In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated afterthe capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the riverEurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned(Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7 ; Diodor. xi. 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, againstsingling out the general particularly, to receive the honours of victory,appears in Euripid. Andromach. 694 :—striking verses, which are saidto have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxicationof the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii.4, 29 (viii. 4) ; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 51).


down Artabazus (the same who had been second incommand in Bceotia) to supersede Megabatfis inthe satrapy of Daskylium; the new satrap, fur-nished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal,was instructed to further actively the projects ofPausanias. The letter was to this purport: " Thussaith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name standsfor ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, onaccount of the men whom thou hast, saved for mebeyond sea at Byzantium ; and thy propositionsnow received are acceptable to me. Relax noteither night or day in accomplishing that whichthou promisest, nor let thyself be held back bycost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, ifthou standest in need of them ; but transact in con-fidence thy business and mine jointly with Artaba-zus, the good man whom Ihave now sent, in suchmanner as may be best for both of us1."

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausa-surancesSof nias had been insolent and domineering, degrading

e- the allies at quarters and watering-places in them o s t offensive manner as compared with the Spar-

in Ms beha- tans, and treating the whole armament in a man-viour. He

is recalled ner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, evenpara. .^ ^ Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general.

But when he received the letter from Xerxes, andfound himself in immediate communication withArtabazus, as well as supplied with funds for cor-

1 These letters are given by Thucydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): hehad seen them or obtained copies (mr vcrrepov dvevpedrj)—they weredoubtless communicated along with the final revelations of the confi-dential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated themliterally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to thefirst, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who trans-lates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity, and carries thethird person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. c. 2).


ruption1, his insane hopes knew no bounds, andhe already fancied himself son-in-law of the GreatKing as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately forGreece, his treasonable plans were not deliberatelylaid and veiled until ripe for execution, but mani-fested with childish impatience. He clothed him-self in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Ma-cedonian army, a century and a half afterwards,could not tolerate2 even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median andEgyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs bothin the luxury of his table and in his conduct to-wards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonike", aByzantine maiden of conspicuous family, havingbeen ravished from her parents by his order, wasbrought to his chamber at night: he happened tobe asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew notat first who was the person approaching his bed,but seized his sword and slew her8. Moreover hishaughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath,rendered him unapproachable; and the allies atlength came to regard him as a despot rather thana general. The news of such outrageous behaviour,and the manifest evidences of his alliance with thePersians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans,who recalled him to answer for his conduct, andseemingly the Spartan vessels along with him4.

1 Diodor. xi. 44.2 Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv. 7, 7 ; vii. 8, 4 ; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi.

21, 11).3 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6 ; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10,

p. 555. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard thestory of the death of Kleonike from the lips of a Byzantine citizen ofhis own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in anywritten work.

1 Thucyd. i. 95-131 : compare Duris and Nymphis apud Atheneeum,xii p. 535.


4764?7 ^n s P ^ e °^ e flagrant conduct of Pausanias, theLacedaemonians acquitted him on the allegations ofpositive and individual wrong ; yet mistrusting hisconduct in reference to collusion with the enemy,they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as com-mander. But a revolution, of immense importancefor Greece, had taken place in the minds of theallies. The headship, or hegemony, was in thehands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found theallies not disposed to recognise his authority.

The allies Even before the battle of Salamis, the questiontransfer the , .

headship had been raised , whether Athens was not entitledto°Athens!a to the command at sea, in consequence of the pre-

ponderance of her naval contingent. The repug-nance of the allies to any command except that ofSparta, either on land or water, had induced theAthenians to waive their pretensions at that criticalmoment. But the subsequent victories had mate-rially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece : whilethe armament now serving, differently composedfrom that which had fought at Salatois, containeda large proportion of the newly-enfranchised IonicGreeks, who not only had no preference for Spartancommand, but were attached to the Athenians onevery ground—as well from kindred race, as fromthe certainty that Athens with her superior fleetwas the only protector upon whom they could relyagainst the Persians. Moreover, it happened thatthe Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidesand Kimon, were personally just and conciliating,forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hencethe Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that

1 Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian envoy,as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155) addressed to Gelo.


the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressivetowards themselves but also revolting to Greciansentiment generally, addressed themselves to theAthenian commanders for protection and redress,on the plausible ground of kindred race1; entreat-ing to be allowed to serve under Athens as leaderinstead of Sparta. Plutarch tells us that Aristeidesnot only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, whorepelled him with arrogance—which is exceedinglyprobable—but that he also required, as a conditionof his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies,that they should personally insult Pausanias, so asto make reconciliation impracticable : upon whicha Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attackedand damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the har-bour of Byzantium2. The historians from whomPlutarch copied this latter statement must havepresumed in the Athenians a disposition to provokethat quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprungup as it were spontaneously : but the Athenians hadno interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydides.To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation,would have been glaring imprudence on the part ofAristeides: but he had every motive to entertainthe request of the allies, and he began to take hismeasures for acting as their protector and chief.And his proceedings were much facilitated by thecircumstance that the Spartan government aboutthis time recalled Pausanias to undergo an exami-

1 Thucyd . i. 95 . rj^lovv avrovs rjyefiovas <T<fi(dV yeve<r@ai Kara TO £vy~

yevis rat Xiava-avia /ii) imrpeirdv fjv wov (3ia{j]Tai..2 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 23.


nation, in consequence of the universal complaintsagainst him which had reached them. He seemsto have left no Spartan authority behind him—'eventhe small Spartan squadron accompanied him home:so that the Athenian generals had the best oppor-tunity for ensuring to themselves and exercising,that command which the allies besought them toundertake. So effectually did they improve themoment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pau-sanias, they were already in full supremacy ; whileDorkis, having only a small force and being in nocondition to employ constraint, found himselfobliged to return home1.

T m s incident, though not a declaration of wartherefa a g a m s t Sparta, was the first open renunciation oftionsofthe her authority as presiding state among the Greeks ;states. the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for

that dignity, with numerous and willing followers;the first separation of Greece (considered in herselfalone and apart from foreign solicitations such as thePersian invasion) into two distinct organized camps,each with collective interests and projects of its own.In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained,and even in some points of view not indisposed, topatient acquiescence : for she had no means offorcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while thewar with Persia altogether—having now become nolonger strictly defensive and being withal maritimeas well as distant from her own territory—had ceasedto be in harmony with her home-routine and strictdiscipline. Her grave senators, especially an an-

1 Thucyd. i. 95 ; Diodorus, xi. 44-47.


cient Herakleid named Hetcemaridas, reproved theimpatience of the younger citizens, and discounte-nanced the idea of permanent maritime commandas a dangerous innovation : they even treated it asan advantage, that Athens should take the lead incarrying on the Persian war, since it could not bealtogether dropped ; nor had the Athenians as yetmanifested any sentiments positively hostile to ex-cite their alarm1. Nay, they actually took credit inthe eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, forhaving themselves advised this separation of com-mand at sea from command on land2. Moreover,if the war continued under Spartan guidance, therewould be a continued necessity for sending outtheir kings or chief men to command : and theexample of Pausacias showed them the depravingeffect of such military power, remote as well as un-checked. The example of their king Leotychides,too, near about this time, was a second illustration

1 Thucyd. i. 95. Following Thucydides in his conception of theseevents, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistentwith it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucy-dide"s, but probably had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hetcema-ridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probableenough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire,which Diodorus seems to have had before him composed by Ephorus,would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year350 B.C., and not those of 476 B.C. The subject would have beentreated in the same manner as Isokratfis, the master of Ephorus, treatsit in his Orat. viii. De Pace, p. 179, 180.

- Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 5, 34. It was at the moment when theSpartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra.VTTOixip.vrio'KOVTes jLtev, <as TOV ftdpftapov Koivfj aneiJ,a^(€<ravTO—avafiifiifrjcKOV'

T€S Se, as 'A.6r)vaioi re viro TO>V 'EWYJVOIV rjpe0t](Tav ijyeyudfes rov vavnuov,

Kal Tav KOIV£>V xpt]/juiT<i>v (pvXaKfs, T£>V AaKe8aip.ovLav ravra

v* avTol re Kara yrjv onoXoyovfxevais v<p' airavrcdv T<OV

71poKptBeirjcTavr o~vp,(3ov\evop,evcoii av ravra TWV JA6rjuat<oy.


Tendencyof the Spar-tan kingsto becomecorruptedon foreignservice—Xeotychi-des.

of the same tendency. At the same time, appa-rently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carryon the war against the Persians, Leotychide's wassent with an army into Thessaly to put down theAleuadse and those Thessalian parties who hadsided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful inthis expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed,and was even detected with a large sum of moneyactually on his person: in consequence of whichthe Lacedaemonians condemned him to banishment,and razed his house to the ground: he died after-wards in exile at Tegea1. Two such instances were

1 Herodot. vi. 72; Diodor. xi. 48 ; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8 : comparePlutarch, De Herodoti Malign, c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychides died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B.C.: he had com-manded at Mykale in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must there-fore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology ofDiodorus were in this case thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton(Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown that Diodorusis contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archi-damus—and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clin-ton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leo-tychide"s (of course therefore the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B.C.I incline to believe that the expedition of Leotychides against theThessalian Aleuadae took place in the year or in the second year fol-lowing the battle of Platsea, because they had been the ardent andhearty allies of Mardonius in Bceotia, and because the war would seemnot to have been completed without putting them down and makingthe opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedaemonian chronologyof this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen inthe case of Leotychides from the difference between the date of hisbanishment and that of his death. King Pleistoanax afterwards, havingbeen banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychides,and having lived many years in banishment, was afterwards restored:and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as apart of his reign (Fast. Hellen. 1. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamusmay perhaps have been reckoned in one account from the banishmentof Leotychides—in another from his death; the rather, as Archidamusmust have been very young, since he reigned forty-two years even after


well calculated to make the Lacedsemonians distrustthe conduct of their Herakleid leaders when onforeign service, and this feeling weighed much ininducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship infavour of Athens. It appears that their Pelopon-nesian allies retired from this contest at the sametime as they did, so that the prosecution of thewar was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks1.

It was from these considerations that the Spar- Momentaryr Pan-hel-

tans were induced to submit to that loss of com- lenic unionmand which the misconduct of Pausanias hadbrought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated ^the immense change about to take place in Grecian Xerxes—f

politics. According to the tendencies in progress now brokenprior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become passingintogradually more and more the president of some- with twothing like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the parti°fandgreater part of the Grecian states. Such at least | h ^ and

was the point towards which things seemed to be Athens.tending ; and if many separate states stood alooffrom this union, none of them at least sought toform any counter-union, if we except the obsoleteand impotent pretensions of Argos. The precedingvolumes of this history have shown that Sparta hadrisen to such ascendency, not from her superiorcompetence in the management of collective inter-ests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious effortson her own part to acquire it—but from the con-verging tendencies of Grecian feeling, which re-469 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the deathof Leotychides, may really be only the date of his banishment, inwhich he lived until 469 B.C.

i Thucyd. i. 18.


quired some such presiding state, and from thecommanding military power, rigid discipline, andancient undisturbed constitution, which attractedthat feeling towards Sparta. The necessities ofcommon defence against Persia greatly strengthenedthese tendencies, and the success of the defence,whereby so many Greeks were emancipated whorequired protection against their former master,seemed destined to have the like effect still more.For an instant, after the battles of Platsea and My-kale1—when the town of Platsea was set apart as aconsecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacyagainst the Persian, with periodical solemnities andmeetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be thechief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens beingonly one of the principal members : and had Spartabeen capable either of comprehensive policy, ofself-directed and persevering efforts, or of the re-quisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distantGreeks as well as near,—her position was nowsuch, that her own ascendency, together with un-divided Pan-hellenic union, might long have beenmaintained. But she was lamentably deficient inall the requisite qualities, and the larger the unionbecame, the more her deficiency stood manifest.On the other hand, Athens, now entering into ri-valry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed allthose qualities in a remarkable degree, over andabove that actual maritime force which was thewant of the day ; so that the opening made bySpartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausa-nias was concerned) found her in every respect pre-pared. But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians

CHAP, XLIV.] GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 351

still clung to Sparta, while those of the IonianGreeks had turned to Athens: and thus not onlythe short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards itfrom this time disappear. There now stands out amanifest schism, with two pronounced parties, to-wards one of which nearly all the constituent atomsof the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states,newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens-—the land-states, which had formed most part of theconfederate army at Platsea, towards Sparta1. Along

1 Thucyd . i. 18 . Kai p,eyd\ov Kivhvvov imKpep.ao-6evTO€ oi re AaKC-

baijxovioi TS>V gvp.7ro\ep.ri(rdvTav 'EXXTJIXDV Tjyrj<ravro Svvdfiei npovôvT^s,

Kal oi ' AOrjvaioi, biavor)6evres e/cXtTreiv rrju noKiv Ka\ dvao~Kevao~dp.evoL, is

ras vavs ip.j3dvres VOVTIKOI iyevnvro. Koivfj Se aira>o-dp.evoi TOV fidpfiapov,

virrepov ov noWco hieKpidrjtrav npos Te 'Adrjvaiovs Kal Aaxedcufioviovs, oi

Te airooTavrts ftao~iKea>s "ÊXhrjves Kai ol £vp7ro\ep.rj(ravTes. Avvdfiei yap

ravra fxiyiara die<pdvrj' 'l<r)(vov yap ol fiiv Kara yy\v, ol 5e vavcl. Kal

oklyov ficv xpovov o-vvcficivcv J] 6p.aixp.la, emira He hieve)(8€VTes ol Aa-

K(8at,p.6vioi Kal ol 'Adrjvaioi iTro\ep.7]crav ptra T£>V £vp.p.dx<*>v irpbs d\Xrj\ovf

Kal Ttiiv aKKav *i£Wr]va>v e'lnves 7rov diao~Taieu> ivpos TOVTOVS rjbr) eâ>pow.

"iicrTe dno Tutv MTJSIKWZ/ is roySe act TOV 7r6\€p.ov, &c.This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Gre-

cian affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war.Thucydides goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisectionof the Grecian world into two great leagues—the growing improvementin military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on bothsides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war—he re-marks also upon the difference between Sparta and Athens in their wayof dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the strikingfact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and herallies on the one side, and by Sparta and her allies on the other, du-ring the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entireforce which had been employed by both together in the most powerfuljuncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders—Kai eyeveroavTols is rovhe TOV noXf/jiov r/ IBla TTapao-Kevr) p.ei£<ov r) as ra KpaTicndwore p.cTa aKpaKpvovs Trjs £vp.p,ax[as rjuOrjcrav (i. 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiastseems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison,than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Goller, and othercommentators in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret


Proceed-ings ofAthens inher capacityof leader—good con-duct of Ari-steides.

with this national schism and called into action byit, appears the internal political schism in eachseparate city between oligarchy and democracy. Ofcourse the germ of these parties had already pre-viously existed in the separate states, but the ener-getic democracy of Athens, and the pronouncedtendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchiesin each separate city as her chief support, nowbegan to bestow, on the conflict of internal political*parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravatedbitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left theAthenian generals at liberty ; and their situationimposed upon them the duty of organising the new

thus—avrolr to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedaemonians—fj I8ia 7rapaa-K€vf) to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself,apart from her allies—and aKpmcpvovs ^viM/ia^ias to refer " to the Athe-nian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirtyyears' treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands,and the Asiatic Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacyBoeotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself" (Dr. Arnold'snote). Now so far as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr.Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thn-cydides, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators con-ceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies—betweenthe Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, andthe same empire as it had stood before the thirty years' truce—is quiteforeign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydide's said one word to informthe reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Pelopon-nesian war had diminished in magnitude, and thus was no longerdxpaKpvrjs: without which previous notification, the comparison sup-posed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive thatthere are two periods, and two sets of circumstances, which throughoutall this passage ThucydidSs means to contrast:—first, confederate Greeceat the time of the Persian war ; next, bisected Greece in a state of war,under the double headship of Sparta and Athens.—Airois refers asmuch to Sparta as to Athens—aicpcucpvovs rr/s i-v/ifiaxlas means whathad been before expressed by 6^uu juia—and wore set against rovbe roi»n-dXe/jov, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used—dnb TWV M?JSIKG>P es rovbe ael TOV 7rokc[i.ov.

CHAP. XLIV.J GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 353

confederacy which they had been chosen to con-duct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merelywilling and unanimous, but acted as the forwardmovers in the enterprise ; for they stood in obviousneed of protection against the attacks of Persia,and had no farther kindness to expect from Spartaor the Peloponnesians. But even had they beenless under the pressure of necessity, the conductof Athens, and of Aristeides as the representa-tive of Athens, might have sufficed to bring theminto harmonious cooperation. The new leader wasno less equitable towards the confederates thanenergetic against the common enemy. The generalconditions of the confederacy were regulated in a Formationcommon synod of the members, appointed to meetperiodically for deliberative purposes, in the tern-pie of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the presidentr r . . . —generalvenerated spot for the religious festivals of the meetings ofx . . . , , . . allies held

Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient in thatcentre for the members. A definite obligation, islan 'either in equipped ships of war or in money, wasimposed upon every separate city, and the Athe-nians, as leaders, determined in which form contri-bution should be made by each: their assessmentmust of course have been reviewed by the synod,nor had they at this time power to enforce any re-gulation not approved by that body. It had beenthe good fortune of Athens to profit by the geniusof Themistokles on two recent critical occasions(the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of herwalls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were re-quired in extraordinary measure, and where pecu-niary probity was of less necessity : it was no less

VOL. v. 2 A


her good fortune now,—in the delicate business ofassessing a new tax and determining how mucheach state should bear, without precedents to guidethem, when unimpeachable honesty in the as-sessor was the first of all qualities—not to haveThemistokles ; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, pro-bity of Aristeide's. This must be accounted goodfortune, since at the moment when Aristeide's wassent out, the Athenians could not have anticipatedthat any such duty would devolve upon him. Hisassessment not only found favour at the time of itsoriginal proposition, when it must have been freelycanvassed by the assembled allies—but also main-tained its place in general esteem, as equitable andmoderate, after the once responsible headship ofAthens had degenerated into an unpopular empire1.

1 Thucyd. v. 18 ; Plutarch, Aristeide's, c. 24. Plutarch states thatthe allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeide's for the pur-pose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable : Aristeides,"as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at By-zantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred,and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As suchhe was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved uponAthens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially askedfor to perform it.

Plutarch farther states that a certain contribution had been leviedfrom the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship of Sparta.This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Spartacovers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the com-mand : the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would beheld sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations intomoney.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name ofAristeides was robbed of its due honour because he was the first per-son who fVa|e (j>opovs rots "EXAJ/O-I (Pausan. viii. 52, 2). Neither theassessment nor the name of Aristeides was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeide's as a 'symbol of unrivalledprobity (Rhetoric, ii. 24, 2).


Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know Assessmentxi • i r ,. J.I i • of the con-

more than one single fact—the aggregate in moneywas 460 talents ( = about £106,000 sterling). Ofthe items composing such aggregate—of the indi-vidual cities which paid it—of the distribution of —definite

1 . obligation

obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money— inshipsanwe are entirely ignorant: the little information moneywhich we possess on these points relates to a period ^considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesianwar, under the uncontrolled empire then exercisedby Athens. Thucydide's in his brief sketch makesus clearly understand the difference between pre-siding Athens with her autonomous and regularlyassembled allies in 476 B.C. and imperial Athens withiaer subject allies in 432 B.C.—the Greek wordequivalent to ally left either of these epithets to beunderstood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenientto the powerful states—and he indicates the generalcauses of the change : but he gives us few particu-lars as to the modifying circumstances, and noneat all as to the first start. He tells us only that theAthenians appointed a peculiar board of officers,called the Hellenotamise, to receive and administerthe common fund'—that Delos was constituted thegeneral treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called thephorus1 ; a name which appears then to have beenfirst put into circulation, though afterwards usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading im-port, though it afterwards became so odious as tobe exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the1 Thucyd. i. 95, 96.

2 A 2


Rapidgrowth,early mag-nitude, ofthe confe-deracy ofDelos will-ing adhe-sion of themembers.

Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struckwith the magnitude of the total sum contributed ;which will appear the more remarkable when wereflect that many of the contributing cities furnishedships besides. We may be certain that all whichwas done at first was done by general consent, andby a freely determining majority: for Athens, atthe time when the Ionic allies besought her pro-tection against Spartan arrogance, could have hadno power of constraining unwilling parties, espe-cially when the loss of supremacy, though quietlyborne, was yet fresh and rankling among thecountrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies,from the very first, a great number of contributingstates, and we learn from hence to appreciate thepowerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movementwhich then brought together the maritime and in-sular Greeks distributed throughout the iEgean seaand the Hellespont. The Phoenician fleet, and thePersian land-force, might at any moment re-appear,nor was there any hope of resisting either exceptby confederacy : so that confederacy under suchcircumstances became with these exposed Greeksnot merely a genuine feeling, but at that time thefirst of all their feelings. It was their common fear,rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth tothe alliance, and they were grateful to Athens fororganising it. The public import of the name Hel-l^notamise, coined for the occasion—the selectionof Delos as a centre—and the provision for regu-lar meetings of the members—demonstrate the pa-triotic and fraternal purpose which the league wasdestined to serve. In truth the protection of the

CHAP. XL1V.] GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 357

iEgean sea against foreign maritime force and law-less piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont andBosphorus against the transit of a Persian force,was a purpose essentially public, for which all theparties interested were bound in equity to provideby way of common contribution : any island, orseaport, which might refrain from contributing, wasa gainer at the cost of others : and we cannot doubtthat the general feeling of this common danger aswell as equitable obligation, at a moment when thefear of Persia was yet serious, was the real causewhich brought together so many contributing mem-bers, and enabled the forward parties to shame intoconcurrence such as were more backward. Howthe confederacy came to be turned afterwards tothe purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see atthe proper time : but in its origin it was an equalalliance, in so far as alliance between the strong andthe weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian em-pire : nay, it was an alliance in which every indi-vidual member was more exposed, more defenceless,and more essentially benefited in the way of pro-tection, than Athens. We have here in truth oneof the few moments in Grecian history wherein apurpose at once common, equal, useful, and in-nocent, brought together spontaneously many frag-ments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a timethat exclusive bent towards petty and isolated auto-nomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. Itwas a proceeding equitable and prudent, in princi-ple as well as in detail; promising at the time themost beneficent consequences—not merely protec-tion against the Persians, but a standing police of


the iEgean sea, regulated by a common superin-tending authority. And if such promise was notrealised, we shall find that the inherent defects ofthe allies, indisposing them to the hearty apprecia-tion and steady performance of their duties as equalconfederates, are at least as much chargeable withthe failure as the ambition of Athens. We mayadd that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionicallies were conciliated by a renovation of the solem-nities which their fathers, in the days-of formerfreedom, had crowded to witness in that sacredisland.

state and At the time when this alliance was formed, thePersia at Persians still held not only the important posts of

Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, buta^so several other posts in that country1 which aren o ' sP e c m e ( l to us. We may thus understand whythe Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic penin-sula—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skolus, Olyn-thus, Spartolus, &c.— which we know to havejoined under the first assessment of Aristeide"s, werenot less anxious2 to seek protection in the bosomof the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands ofRhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos andChios, the iEolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or conti-nental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium : byall of whom adhesion to this alliance must have

1 Herodot. vii. 106. vnap^oi iv rfj Gpijunj Kal TOU'EWTJO-WOVTOV irav-raxy- Oiroi &v ndvTes, oi TC IK OpTjiKrjs Kai TOO 'EWTJUWOVTOV, 7rKfjVTOV iv AopicrKa, xnrb 'TZXkrjvaiv vurepov Tavrr/s rrjs <TTpaTrjha(nr)s elgipi-dr/irav, &c.

' Thucyd. v. 18. Tar 8e woheis, (ptpovcras TOV (popov TOV in '8ov, avTovo/xovs ciVat eiVi Sf, "ApyiXos, Xrdyeipos, "KKavBos," #


been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C, as the solecondition of emancipation from Persia. Nothingmore was required, for the success of a foreignenemy against Greece generally, than complete au-tonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and triedto enforce ninety years afterwards, through theLacedaemonian Antalkidas, in the pacification whichbears the name of the latter: some sort of union, or-ganised and obligatory upon each city, was indispen-sable to the safety of all. Nor was it by any meanscertain, at the time when the confederacy of Deloswas first formed, that even with that aid, the Asiaticenemy would be effectually kept out; especially asthe Persians were strong not merely from their ownforce, but also from the aid of internal parties inmany of the Grecian states—traitors within, as wellas exiles without.

Among these, the first in rank as well as the conduct of„ . , , , i n n • i~t Pausanias

most formidable, was the Spartan rausamas. Sum- after beingmoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order from thethat the loud complaints against him might be ex-amined, he had been acquitted1 of the charges of £|^Jfblwrong and oppression against individuals ; yet the designs in

, . r , . , . , , conjunction

presumptions of medism (or treacherous correspond- with Persia.ence with the Persians) appeared so strong that,though not found guilty, he was still not re-appointedto the command. Such treatment seems to haveonly emboldened him in the prosecution of his de-signs against Greece, and he came out with this

1 Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), whichis neither noticed by Thucydides, nor at all probable, looking at thesubsequent circumstances connected with him.


view to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Her-mione, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer with-out any formal authority in the war. He there re-sumed his negotiations with Artabazus: his greatstation and celebrity still gave him a strong hold onmen's opinions, and he appears to have establisheda sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence theAthenians, already recognised heads of the con-federacy, were constrained to expel him by force1:and we may be very sure that the terror excited byhis presence as well as by his known designs tendedmaterially to accelerate the organization of the con-federacy under Athens. He then retired to Kol6nsein the Troad, where he continued for some timein the farther prosecution of his schemes, tryingto form a Persian party, despatching emissaries todistribute Persian gold among various cities ofGreece, and probably employing the name of Spartato impede the formation of the new confederacy2:

1 Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Km EK TOV Bvgavrlov |8t'o irwo TWV 'A&qvatwve<no\wpKrj6els, &c. : these words seem to imply that he had acquireda strong position in the town.

2 It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (anAsiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Pro-pontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold.In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: hispurpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee : while the Athe-nians, at the instance of Themistokle's, passed an indignant decree,declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies ofAthens—and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would beguiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks.This decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record inthe acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athene Protna-chos, even in the time of Demosthenes and his contemporary orators.See Demosthen. Philippic, iii. c. 9, p. 122, and De Fals. Legat. c. 76,p. 428; iEschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. "Arifios—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton. sect. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistokles, c. 6, and Aristeides, torn. ii. p. 218) tells us


until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised ofhis proceedings, sent a herald out to him, with per-emptory orders that he should come home imme-diately along with the herald : if he disobeyed," the Spartans would declare war against him," orconstitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frus- He is re-trated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he sParta—thought it prudent to obey ; the rather, as he felt lentire confidence of escaping all the charges againsthim at Sparta by the employment of bribes1, themeans for which were doubtless abundantly fur- revolt.nished to him through Artabazus. He accord-ingly returned along with the herald, and was, inthe first moments of indignation, imprisoned byorder of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legallycompetent to imprison him, even had he beenking instead of regent. But he was soon letout, on his own requisition and under a privatearrangement with friends and partisans, to takethat Themistokles proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused itto be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was onthe point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incidentcannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not rely uponbribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece:besides the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have beenpassed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos—for it pro-nounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies ofAthens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious perjalty to be ex-cluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens ; manyof them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to whichthe mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this—whenPausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, incontriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus en-gaged for some years—before the banishment of Themistokles.

1 Thucyd . i. 1 3 1 . 'O Be fiovXojievos cos rJKLaTa VTTOTTTOS etVcu teal

SiaKvtrfiv rr/v 8iaf3o\f)v, aef^mpei TO Sevrfpov es


his trial against all accusers1. Even to stand forthas accuser against so powerful a man was a seriousperil: to undertake the proof of specific matter oftreason against him, was yet more serious: nordoes it appear that any Spartan ventured to doeither. It was known that nothing short of themost manifest and invincible proof would be heldto justify his condemnation, and amidst a longchain of acts carrying conviction when taken in theaggregate, there was no single treason sufficientlydemonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pau-sanias remained not only at large but unaccused,still audaciously persisting both in his intriguesat home and his correspondence abroad with Arta-bazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded sideof Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots,and instigating them to revolt; promising themboth liberation and admission to political privi-lege2 ; with a view, first to destroy the board ofEphors and render himself despot in his own coun-try—next, to acquire through Persian help the su-premacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whomhe addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors,

1 Thucyd. i. 131. Kai h i*ev rqv elpKTrjv fWiVret TO nparov imb TS>Ve<popa>v' eTTCtra dianpa^dfievos vOTCpov e£rj\Be, Kai KaQifjTr^triv eavrbv esKpiaiv rots (3ov\op.evoi$ irep\ avrov cXey^ctv.

The word diairpa^d/ieuos indicates first, that Pausanias himself origi-nated the efforts to get free,—next, that he came to an underhandarrangement: very probably by a bribe, though the word does notnecessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so distinctly—xptj/xa<« nal\6yois 8iairpa£dfievos drjXovon SiaKpovordfievos TTJV narqyopiav. Dr. Ar-nold translates bimrpa^djievos "having settled the business."

2 Aristotel. Politic, iv. 13, 13 5 v. 1, 5 ; v. 6, 2 ; Herodot. v. 32.Aristotle calls Pausanias king, though he was only regent: the truthis, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more,if we compare his treatment with that of the Prokleid king Leotychidfe.


who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, didnot choose to take measures against Pausanias uponno better information—so imposing was still hisname and position. But though some few Helotsmight inform, probably many others both gladlyheard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret:we shall find, by what happened a few years after-wards, that there were a large number of them whohad their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspectedas Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and theconnivance of others, he was allowed to bring hisplans to the very brink of consummation; and hislast letters to Artabazus1, intimating that he wasready for action, and bespeaking immediate per-formance of the engagements concerted betweenthem, were actually in the hands of the messenger.Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the mostformidable kind, not by the prudence of her autho-rities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the factthat Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country,but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were He is de-entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a fa- thereveLvourite and faithful slave of Pausanias ; once con- slave—fn-nected with him by that intimate relation which credulity

J or fear of

Grecian manners tolerated, and admitted even tothe full confidence of his treasonable projects. Itwas by no means the intention of this Argilian tobetray his master ; but on receiving the letter tocarry, he recollected with some uneasiness thatnone of the previous messengers had ever come

1 Thucyd. i. 132. 6 fieWcov ras r(\evraias /3a<riXel eVitrToXar npbs'ApT<il3a£ov KOfutlv, durjft 'ApylXios, &c.


back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it,with the full view of carrying it forward to its des-tination if he found nothing inconsistent with hisown personal safety : he had farther taken the pre-caution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that hecould easily re-close the letter. On reading it,he found his suspicions, confirmed by an expressinjunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except todeliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates,who had before disbelieved the Helot informers,still refused to believe even the confidential slavewith his master's autograph and seal, and with thefull account besides, which doubtless he wouldcommunicate at the same time, of all that had pre-viously passed in the Persian correspondence, notomitting copies of those letters between Pausaniasand Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucy-dide"s—for in no other way can they have becomepublic. Partly from the suspicion which in anti-quity always attached to the testimony of slaves,except when it was obtained under the pretendedguarantee of torture—partly from the peril of deal-ing with so exalted a criminal—the Ephors wouldnot be satisfied with any evidence less than his ownspeech and their own ears. They directed the Ar-gilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in thesacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tsenarus,under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behindwhich two of them concealed themselves. Apprisedof this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias has-tened to the temple, and demanded the reason:upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of


the contents of the letter, and complained bitterlythat after long and faithful service,—with a secrecynever once betrayed, throughout this dangerouscorrespondence,—he was at length rewarded withnothing better than the same miserable fate whichhad befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias,admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave'sdisquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance ofsafety if he would quit the sanctuary ; urging himat the same time to proceed on the journey forth-with, in order that the schemes in progress mightnot be retarded

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed His arrestEphors ; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, de atone-termined to arrest Pausanias immediately on hisreturn to Sparta. They met him in the public saMtuary-street, not far from the temple of Athene" Chalkice-kus (or of the Brazen House) ; but as they camenear, either their menacing looks, or a significantnod from one of them, revealed to this guilty mantheir purpose ; and he fled for refuge to the temple,which was so near that he reached it before theycould overtake him. He planted himself as a sup-pliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slavewhom he had so recently talked over at Tsenarus,in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacredbuilding; where the Ephors, not warranted in touch-ing him, took off the roof, built up the doors, andkept watch until he was on the point of death bystarvation. According to a current story1—not re-cognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spar-tan manners—his own mother was the person who

1 Diodor. xi. 45 j Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5 ; Polysen. viii. 51.

36S HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II.

placed the first stone to build up the door, in deepabhorrence of his treason. His last moments beingcarefully observed, he was brought away just in timeto expire without, and thus to avoid the desecrationof the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors wasto cast his body into the ravine or hollow called theKseadas, the usual place of punishment for crimi-nals : probably his powerful friends averted thisdisgrace, and he was buried not far off, until sometime afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphianoracle, his body was exhumed and transported to theexact spot where he had died. Nor was the oraclesatisfied even with this re-interment: pronouncingthe whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanc-tity of Athene, it enjoined that two bodies shouldbe presented to her as an atonement for the onecarried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have producedthe slaughter of two human victims : on the pre-sent occasion, Athene1, or Hikesius the tutelary godof suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by twobrazen statues ; not however without some attemptsto make out that the expiation was inadequate1.

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacleof renown simply from the accidents of his loftydescent and of his being general at Plataea, whereit does not appear that he displayed any superiorqualities. His treasonable projects implicated andbrought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistokl&s.

The chronology of this important period is not1 Thucyd. i. 133, 134; Pausanias, iii. 17, 9.


so fully known as to enable us to make out the Themisto-precise dates of particular events; but we are obliged promised in(in consequence of the subsequent events connectedwith ThemistoklSs, whose flight to Persia is tolera- Pausanias-bly well-marked as to date) to admit an interval ofabout nine years between the retirement of Pausa-nias from his command at Byzantium, and his death.To suppose so long an interval engaged in treason-able correspondence, is perplexing; and we canonly explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by con-sidering that the Spartans were habitually slow intheir movements, and that the suspected regentmay perhaps have communicated with partisans,real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Amongthose whom he sought to enlist as accomplice wasThemistokle's, still in great power—though, as itwould seem, in declining power—at Athens : andthe charge of collusion with the Persians connectsitself with the previous movement of political par-ties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistokl£s and Aristeides had Position ofbeen greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, kiss™8 °"which had imposed upon both the peremptory ne- ndency of

y

cessity of cooperation against a common enemy. Athl?nian

. , parties and

Nor was it apparently resumed, during the times politics.which immediately succeeded the return of theAthenians to their country : at least we hear of bothin effective service and in prominent posts. The-mistokle's stands forward as the contriver of thecity walls and architect of Peirseus : Aristeides iscommander of the fleet and first organiser of theconfederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detecta change in the character of the latter : he had

368 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART If.

ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashionedlanded interest, against Themistokle*s as the origi-nator of the maritime innovations. Those innova-tions had now, since the battle of Salamis, becomean established fact; a fact of overwhelming in-fluence on the destinies and character, public aswell as private, of the Athenians. During theexile at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landedproprietor or artisan, had been for the time aseaman : and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedi-cated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as atoken that he was about to pass from the cavalryto service on shipboard ', is a type of that changeof feeling which must have been impressed moreor less upon every rich man in Athens. Fromhenceforward the fleet is endeared to every man asthe grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state,in which character all the political leaders agree inaccepting it : we ought to add, at the same time,that this change was attended with no detrimenteither to the land-force or to the landed cultivationof Attica, both of which will be found to acquireextraordinary development during the interval be-tween the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Stillthe triremes, and the men who manned them takencollectively, were now the determining element inthe state: moreover the men who manned themhad just returned from Salamis, fresh from a sceneof trial and danger and from a harvest of victory,which had equalised for the moment all Atheniansas sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Suchpredominance of the maritime impulse, having be-

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.


come pronounced immediately after the return fromSalamis, was farther greatly strengthened by theconstruction and fortification of the Peirseus—anew maritime Athens as large as the old inlandcity—as well as by the unexpected formation ofthe confederacy at Delos, with all its untried pro-spects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens Effect of

was not less important than the military. "The ofthePer-, . , , r . r, sian war

maritime multitude, authors 01 the victory of Sala- uponAthe-mis 1," and instruments of the new vocation of ^ 1

Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appearnow ascendant in the political constitution also; democracy.not in any way as a separate or privileged class,but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening thedemocratical sentiment, and protesting against allrecognised political inequalities. In fact duringthe struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athenshad been nothing else than " a maritime multi-tude," among which the proprietors and chief menhad been confounded, until, by the efforts of all,the common country had been reconquered : norwas it likely that this multitude, after a trying pe-riod of forced equality during which political privi-lege had been effaced, would patiently acquiescein the full restoration of such privilege at home.We see by the active political sentiment of theGerman people, after the great struggles of 1813and 1814, how much an energetic and successful

1 Aristotel. Politic, v. 3, 5. Km wa\iv 6 vavTKoe 6'^Xoy, yevo/xevosa'nos Trjs itepl SaXafiiva VIKTJS, Kal 8ia TO.VTT)S TI\S rjytjiovias Kal Sia Trjv

Kara 6aKau(rav hvvafxiv, rrju df]fX0Kpariav l(T)(ypoT€pav enoirj

'O vavriKos 6'xXor (Thucyd. viii. 72 and passim).

VOL. V. 2 B


military effort of the people at large, blended withendurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulatethe sense of political dignity and the demand fordeveloped citizenship : and if this be the tendencyeven among a people habitually passive on suchsubjects, much more was it to be expected in theAthenian population, who had gone through a pre-vious training of near thirty years under the demo-cracy of Kleisthenes. At the time when thatconstitution was first established1, it was perhapsthe most democratical in Greece: it had workedextremely well and had diffused among the peoplea sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and un-friendly to avowed privilege: so that the impres-sions made by the struggle at Salamis found thepopular mind prepared to receive them. Earlyafter the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean con-stitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the

Alteration magistracy. According to that constitution, thesthenean ' fourth or last class on the Solonian census, inclu-

f ding the considerable majority of the freemen, werep not admissible to offices of state, though they pos-

are sessed votes in common with the rest: no personrendered _ _ ~

politically was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belongedadmissible ,, , , , . , , m i • A • x-

to office: to one of the three higher classes. This restriction' g i - w a s now annulled, and eligibility extended to all

f

gyt h e citizens. We may appreciate the strength of

magistrates feeling with which such reform was demanded, when—next, °sortition or we find that it was proposed by Aristeides ; a mand r a w i n g b y . C I - T I I I Jlot. the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a

strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution.1 For the constitution of Kleisthenfis, see vol. iv. of this History,

ch. xxxi. p. 190 seqq.

C H A P . X L I V . ] GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER PERSIAN INVASION. 371

No political system would work, after the Persianwar, which formally excluded " the maritime mul-titude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine(as has been stated in the previous volume) thatelection of magistrates was still retained, and notexchanged for drawing lots until a certain time,though not a long time, afterwards. That whichthe public sentiment first demanded was the recog-nition of the equal and open principle : after a cer-tain length of experience it was found that poormen, though legally qualified to be chosen, were inpoint of fact rarely chosen : then came the lot, togive them an equal chance with the rich. Theprinciple of sortition or choice by lot, was neverapplied (as I have before remarked) to all offices atAthens—never for example to the Strategi or Ge-nerals, whose functions were more grave and re-sponsible than those of any other person in theservice of the state, and who always continued tobe elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now increase ofthrown, with so great an extension of what may be of "thewer

termed her foreign relations, and with a confede-racy which imposed the necessity of distant mili-tary service, the functions of the Strategi naturallv diminution

, , . J of the im-

tended to become both more absorbing and com- portance ofplicated; while the civil administration becamemore troublesome, if not more difficult, from theenlargement of the city and the still greater en-largement of Peiraus—leading to an increase oftown population, and especially to an increase ofthe metics or resident non-freemen. And it wasprobably about this period, during the years imme-

2 B 2


diately succeeding the battle of Salamis,—when theforce of old habit and tradition had been partiallyenfeebled by so many stirring novelties,—that theArchons were withdrawn altogether from politicaland military duties, and confined to civil or judicialadministration. At the battle of Marathon, thePolemarch is a military commander, president ofthe ten Strate'gi1: we know him afterwards only asa civil magistrate, administering justice to the me-tics or non-freemen, while the Strate"gi perform mi-litary duties without him. I conceive that this al-teration, indicating as it does a change in the cha-racter of the Archons generally, must have takenplace at the time which we have now reached2—atime when the Athenian establishments on all sidesrequired a more elaborate distribution of function-aries. The distribution of so many Athenianboards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city,and part in the Peirseus, cannot have commenceduntil after this period, when Peirseus had been raisedby Themistokle's to the dignity of town, fortress,and state-harbour. Such boards were the Astynomi

Athens en- and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streetsirewftmc- a n d markets—the Metronomi, who watched overanointed weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who car-—distritm- ried into effect various state regulations respectingtween the custody and sale of corn—with various others

° who acted not less in Peirseus than in the city3.

1 Herodot. vi. 109.2 Aristotel. IloXiTeiav Fragm. xlvii. ed. Neumann ; Harpokration,

v. HoW/japxos ; Pollux, viii. 91 : compare Meier und Schbmann, DerAttische Prozess, ch. ii. p. 50 seqq.

3 See Aristotel. HoXireicov Fragm. ii. v. xxiii. xxxviii. 1. ed. Neu-mann ; Schomann, Antiqq. Jur. Publ. Graec. c. xli. xlii. xliii.


We may presume that each of these boards wasoriginally created as the exigency appeared to callfor it, at a period later than that which we havenow reached, most of these duties of detail havingbeen at first discharged by the Archons, and after-wards (when these latter became too full of occu-pation) confided to separate administrators. Thespecial and important change which characterisedthe period immediately succeeding the battle ofSalamis, was, the more accurate line drawn betweenthe Archons and the Strat£gi; assigning the foreignand military department entirely to the Strat6gi,and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates,—administrative as well as judicial; while the firstcreation of the separate boards above-named wasprobably an ulterior enlargement, arising out ofincrease of population, power, and trade, betweenthe Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was bysome such steps that the Athenian administrationgradually attained that complete development whichit exhibits in practice during the century from thePeloponnesian war downward, to which nearly allour positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of deniocratical feeling Politicaland of military activity at Athens, Aristeides ap- precariouspears to have sympathized ; and the popularity thusensured to him, probably heightened by some re- ^ ^gret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to against Mm

—Kimon,

acquire permanence from his straightforward and Aikmseon,incorruptible character, now brought into strong liabiutytorelief from his function as assessor to the new De- corruption.lian confederacy. On the other hand, the ascend-ency of Themistokles, though so often exalted by


his unrivaled political genius and daring, as wellas by the signal value of his public recommenda-tions, was as often overthrown by his duplicity ofmeans and unprincipled thirst for money. Newpolitical opponents sprung up against him, mensympathising with Aristeide's and far more violentin their antipathy than Aristeide's himself. Of thesethe chief were Kimon (son of Miltiades) and Alk-mseon : moreover it seems that the Lacedaemonians,though full of esteem for Themistokles immediatelyafter the battle of Salamis, had now become ex-tremely hostile to him—a change which may besufficiently explained from his stratagem respectingthe fortifications of Athens, and his subsequentambitious projects in reference to the Peirseus.The Lacedaemonian influence, then not inconsider-able in Athens, was employed to second the politi-cal combinations against him1. He is said to havegiven offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to thestate, and by the erection of a private chapel, closeto his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobule1,or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausaniashad irritated the Lacedaemonians by inscribing hisown single name on the Delphian tripod, and asthe friends of Aristeide's had displeased the Athe-nians by endless encomiums upon his justice2. Butthe main cause of his discredit was, the prostitutionof his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt pur-poses. In the unsettled condition of so many dif-

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16 ; Scholion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84.2 Plutarch (Themistokles, c. 22; Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeides, c. 25);

Diodorus, xi. 54.


ferent Grecian communities, recently emancipatedfrom Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge,wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished,exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance andsuspicions accompanying so great a change of po-litical condition as well as of foreign policy—theinfluence of the leading men at Athens must havebeen great in determining the treatment of parti-cular individuals. Themistokles, placed at the headof an Athenian squadron and sailing among theislands, partly for the purposes of war against Per-sia, partly for organising the new confederacy—isaffirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple,for executing sentences just and unjust—restoringsome citizens, expelling others, and even puttingsome to death. We learn this from a friend andguest of Themistokles—the poet Timokreon of Ia-lysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own resto-ration from the Athenian commander, but foundthat it was thwarted by a bribe of three talentsfrom his opponents ; so that he was still kept inexile on the charge of medism. The assertions ofTimokreon, personally incensed on this groundagainst Themistokles, are doubtless to be consideredas passionate and exaggerated : nevertheless theyare a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time,and are far too much in harmony with the generalcharacter of this eminent man to allow of our dis-believing them entirely. Timokreon is as emphaticin his admiration of Aristeid£s as in his censure ofThemistokl^s, whom he denounces as " a lying andunjust traitor1."

1 Plutarch, Themist. c. 21.


Themisto- Such conduct as that described by this new Ar-chilochus, even making every allowance for exag-

p g geration, must have caused Themistokle's to be bothPersia—°m natecl and feared among the insular allies, whoseacquitted opinion was now of considerable importance to theat Athens. r , . . r

Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partiallyagainst him in Athens itself, and appears to havebeen connected with suspicions of treasonable in-clinations towards the Persians. As the Persianscould offer the highest bribes, a man open to cor-ruption might naturally be suspected of inclinationstowards their cause ; and if Themistokles had ren-dered pre-eminent service against them, so also hadPausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatala change for the worse. It was the treason of Pau-sanias—suspected and believed against him by theAthenians even when he was in command at By-zantium, though not proved against him at Spartauntil long afterwards—which first seems to haveraised the presumption of medism against Themi-stokles also, when combined with the corrupt pro-ceedings which stained his public conduct: wemust recollect also, that Themistokle's had givensome colour to these presumptions even by thestratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore adouble-faced aspect, capable of being construedeither in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The La-cedaemonians, hostile to Themistokle's since thetime when he had outwitted them respecting thewalls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a sup-posed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of medism to be preferredagainst him at Athens ; by secret instigations, and as


it is said by bribes, to his political opponents1. Butno satisfactory proof could be furnished of the ac-cusation, which Themistokles himself strenuouslydenied, not without emphatic appeals to his illus-trious services. In spite of violent invectives againsthim from Alkmseon and Kimon, tempered indeedby a generous moderation on the part of Aristeides2,his defence was successful. He carried the peoplewith him and was acquitted of the charge. Norwas he merely acquitted, but as might naturally beexpected, a re-action took place in his favour: hissplendid qualities and exploits were brought im-pressively before the public mind, and he seemed forthe time to acquire greater ascendency than ever3.

1 This accusation of treason brought against Themistokles at Athens,prior to his ostracism, and at the instigation of the Lacedaemonians—ismentioned by Diodorus (xi. 54). Thucydides and Plutarch take noticeonly of the second accusation, after his ostracism. But Diodorus hasmade his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferredat Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and expo-sure of his correspondence ; whereas these latter events, coming afterthe first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thusbrought on the second, after Themistokles had been ostracised. ButDiodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusa-tion at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorificationof Themistokles—and preceding his ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred againstThemistokles by Leobotas son of Alkmseon, at the instance of theSpartans, probably relates' to the first accusation at which Themisto-kles was acquitted. For when Themistokles was arraigned after thediscovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there anyactual trial: it is not therefore likely that the name of the accuserwould be preserved—'O be ypa^rifxevos avrbv npoSoaias Aecoj36rrjs r\v'KkKjxaiavos, a/ia a-vvfTTaiTiajiivtov T&V 27rapTiaTwv (Plutarch, Themist.c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Ari-steides, Orat. xlvi. 'Yirep ra>v Tfrrdpav (vol. ii. p. 318, ed. Dindorf,p. 243, Jebb).

2 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 25.3 Diodor. xi. 54. TOTE /zej/ airifyvye TT)V T?J? TrpoSofuar KpltjiV Sio xai.


increased Such a charge, and such a failure, must have ex-- asperated to the utmost the animosity between him

anc* kis chief opponents—Aristeide's. Kimon, Alk-meeon, and others ; nor can we wonder that they

rivals, after . • •, r * • i • T

this acquit- were anxious to get rid or him by ostracism. In ex-ostracised1.8 plaining this peculiar process, I have already stated

that it could never be raised against any one indi-vidual separately and ostensibly—and that it couldnever be brought into operation at all, unless itsnecessity were made clear, not merely to violentparty men, but also to the assembled senate andpeople, including of course a considerable propor-tion of the more moderate citizens. We may wellconceive that the conjuncture was deemed by manydispassionate Athenians well-suited for the tutelaryintervention of ostracism, the express benefit ofwhich consisted in its separating political opponentswhen the antipathy between them threatened topush one or the other into extra-constitutional pro-ceedings—especially when one of those parties wasThemistokle's, a man alike vast in his abilities andunscrupulous in his morality. Probably also therewere not a few who wished to revenge the previousostracism of Aristeide's : and lastly, the friends ofThemistokles himself, elate with his acquittal andhis seeming augmented popularity, might indulgehopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out inhis favour, and remove one or other of his chiefpolitical opponents. From all these circumstanceswe learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostra-TO fj.kv irpurov fiera TTJV cnrohvtnv fiiyas rjv napa rots 'AOrjvatois' rjycmasvyap avrov SuKpepovras of TroXiTar /uera 8e ravra, of fiiu, (poPrjBevTesavrov rrjv imfpPdkj]v, ol Se, <p8ovr)<ravTe$ Trj 86£rj, Tap fiee evepyt(Ti&v(7r(\ddoi>TO, rrjv Se Ivxyv KCU TO (ppovrj^ia Tawuuvovv


cism was soon after resorted to. It ended in thetemporary banishment of Themistokle"s.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, B.C 471.1 - . 1 1 • T -in x. «. While in

whither he earned a considerable property, yet oc- banishmentcasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus1—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, togetherwith the discovery of his correspondence, took place a charse of

-. r -i t r e a s o n

at Sparta. Among this correspondence were foundproofs, which Thucydides seems to have consideredas real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistokles.According to Ephorus and others, he is admitted tohave been solicited by Pausanias, and to haveknown his plans—but to have kept them secretwhile refusing to co-operate in them*—but probablyafter his exile he took a more decided share in themthan before; being well-placed for that purposeat Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, butstrongly believed to have been in collusion withXerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occa-sion the Lacedaemonians sent to Athens publicly to

1 Thucyd. i. 137- rj\8e yap avra v&rcpov ?K TC 'A0r)v£>v irapa TS>V(piXcov, Kal ig"Apyovs & vire^iKeiro, &c.

1 follow Mr. Fynes Clinton in considering the year 471 B.C. to be thedate of the ostracism of Themistokles. It may probably be so, nor isthere any evidence positively to contradict it: but I think Mr. Clintonstates it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chap-ters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happenedin several different years (see Fast. Hellen. B.C. 471).

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.C.,we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to thedeath of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Per-sian kings, B.C. 465. This last event determines by close approxima-tion and inference, the flight of Themistokles, the siege of Naxos, andthe death of Pausanias : for the other events of this period, we arereduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyondtheir order of succession.

2 Thucyd. i. 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch..de Malign. Herodoti, c, 5,p. 855 ; Diodor. xi. 54 ; Plutarch, Themist. c. 23.


prefer a formal charge of treason against him, andto urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-hel-lenic criminal before the synod of the allies as-sembled at Sparta1. Whether this latter requestwould have been granted, or whether Themistokle'swould have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell :

B.C. 466. for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys fromSparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest

night and him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra.adventures .

of Themi- 1 he inhabitants of that island, though owing grati-tude to him and favourably disposed, could notventure to protect him against the two most power-ful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbour-ing continent. Here however, being still trackedand followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seekprotection from a man whom he had formerlythwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had be-come his personal enemy—Admetus king of theMolossians. Fortunately for him, at the momentwhen he arrived, Admetus was not at home; andThernistokle's, becoming a suppliant to his wife,conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placedher child in his arms and planted him at the hearthin the full solemnity of supplication to soften herhusband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themi-stokle's revealed his name, his pursuers, and hisdanger—entreating protection as a helpless sup-pliant in the last extremity. He appealed to thegenerosity of the Epirotic prince not to take re-venge on a man now defenceless, for offence givenunder such very different circumstances ; and foran offence too, after all, not of capital moment,while the protection now entreated was to the sup-

1 Diodor. xi. 55.


pliant a matter of life or death. Admetus raisedhim up from the hearth with the child in his arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and en-gaged to protect him ; refusing to give him up tothe envoys, and at last only sending him away onthe expression of his own wish to visit the king ofPersia. Two Macedonian guides conducted himacross the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaicgulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to setsail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a pas-sage on board ; neither the master nor the crewknowing his name. An untoward storm drove thevessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment be-sieged by an Athenian armament: had he beenforced to land there, he would of course have beenrecognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety didnot desert him. Having communicated both hisname and the peril which awaited him, he conjuredthe master of the ship to assist in saving him, andnot to suffer any one of the crew to land ; menacingthat if by any accident he were discovered, he wouldbring the master to ruin along with himself, by re-presenting him as an accomplice induced by moneyto facilitate the escape of Themistokles: on theother hand, in case of safety, he promised a largereward. Such promises and threats weighed withthe master, who controlled his crew, and forcedthem to beat, about during a day and a night offthe coast, without seeking to land. After that dan-gerous interval, the storm abated, and the shipreached Ephesus in safety1.

1 Thucyd. i. 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most partfollows Thucydides, and professes to do so ; yet he is not very accurate,


kWsetT ^ u s ^ Themistokle's, after a series of perils,over to find himself safe on the Persian side of the iEgean.seeks refuge At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and hisPersian6 property confiscated : nevertheless (as it frequentlyking- happened in cases of confiscation), his friends se-

creted a considerable sum, and sent it over to himin Asia, together with the money which he had leftat Argos ; so that he was thus enabled liberally toreward the ship-captain who had preserved him.With all this deduction, the property which he pos-sessed of a character not susceptible of concealment,and which was therefore actually seized, was foundto amount to eighty talents, according to Theophras-tus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. Incontrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learnthat he had begun his political career with a propertynot greater than three talents1. The poverty ofAristeid&s at the end of his life presents an im-pressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

about the The e s c a P e of Themistokle's, and his adventuresrelations [n Persia, appear to have formed a favourite themebetween the r r

Persian for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a centuryThemi- afterwards: we have thus many anecdotes which

contradict either directly or by implication thesimple narrative of Thucydide's. Thus we are toldthat at the moment when he was running awayfrom the Greeks, the Persian king also had pro-

especially about the relations between Themistokles and Admetus.Diodorus (xi. 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides : also to a greatextent Plutarch (Themist. c. 24-26). There were evidently differentaccounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus,but the jEolic Kyme. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

1 Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. iElian. V. H. x. 17:compare Herodot. viii. 12.


claimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, andthat some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watch-ing to take him for this reward : that he was forcedto conceal himself strictly near the coast, untilmeans were found to send him up to Susa in aclosed litter, under pretence that it was a womanfor the king's harem: that Mandane1, sister ofXerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up toher as an expiation for the loss of her son at thebattle of Salamis : that he learnt Persian so well,and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procurefor himself an acquittal from the Persian judges,when put upon his trial through the importunityof Mandane" : that the officers of the king's house-hold at Susa, and the satraps in his way back,threatened him with still farther perils: that hewas admitted to see the king in person, after ha-ving received a lecture from the chamberlain onthe indispensable duty of falling down before himto do homage, &c, with several other uncertifieddetails1, which make us value more highly the nar-rative of Thucydides. Indeed Ephorus, Deino,Kleitarchus, and Herakleides, from whom theseanecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmedthat Themistokle's had found Xerxes himself aliveand seen him: whereas Thucydides and Charon, thetwo contemporary authors (for the former is nearlycontemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxesrecently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does Real treat-not seem to have been exposed to the least danger Themi0/in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from p°r

ks

s in

1 Diodor. xi. 56 ; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

384 HISTORY OF GREECK. [PART II.

Greece, and was accepted as such : moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he wasreceived as an actual benefactor of the Persianking, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account ofsuch dispositions—in consequence of his communi-cations made to Xerxes respecting the intendedretreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respectingthe contemplated destruction of the Hellespontinebridge. He was conducted by some Persians onthe coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter tothe king couched in the following terms, such asprobably no modern European king would tolerateexcept from a quaker: " I Themistokle's, am cometo thee, having done to thy house more mischiefthan any other Greek, as long as I was compelled inmy own defence to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, whenI could do so with safety to myself, and when hisretreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing tome for my past service: moreover, I am now here,chased away by the Greeks in consequence of myattachment to thee \ but able still to serve theewith great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then tocome before thee in person to explain my views."

influence Whether the Persian interpreters, who read thiswhich he .

acquires letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly renderedPersian* its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. Butking- it made a strong impression upon him, combined

1 " Proditionem ultra imputabant (says Tacitus; Hist. ii. 60, re-specting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho,when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bebriacum),spatium longi ante proelium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, per-mixtum vehiculis agmen, ac pleraque fortuita fraudi suce assignantes.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidia, et fraudem absolvit.''


with the previous reputation of the writer—and hewillingly granted the prayer for delay : though weshall not readily believe that he was so transportedas to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to thegods, by an unusual measure of convivial indul-gence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, " Ihave got Themistokle*s the Athenian "—as some ofPlutarch's authors informed him1. In the course ofthe year granted, Themistokle"s had learnt so muchof the Persian language and customs as to be ableto communicate personally with the king, and ac-quire his confidence: no Greek (says Thucydidds)had ever before attained such a commanding in-fluence and position at the Persian court. His in-genuity was now displayed in laying out schemesfor the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which wereeminently captivating to the monarch, who re-warded him with a Persian wife and large pre-sents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mse-ander not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenuesof the district round that town, amounting to thelarge sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned tohim for bread: those of the neighbouring sea-portof Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread,which was always accounted the main nourishment:those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine 2.

1 Plutarch, Themist. c. 28.2 Thucyd. i. 138 ; Diodor. xi. 57. Besides the three above-named

places, Neanthes and Phanias described the grant as being still fullerand more specific : they stated that Perk6te was granted to Themisto-kles for bedding, and Palseskepsis for clothing (,Plutarch, Themist. c. 29;Athenaeus, i. p. 29)•

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Per-sian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends—a grantnominally to supply some particular want or taste : see Dr. Arnold's

VOL. V. 2 C


Large re-d h i

he receives—Hisdeath atMagnesia.

Not knowing the amount of these two latter items,we cannot determine how much revenue Themisto-kl£s received altogether; but there can be no doubt,judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, thathe was a great pecuniary gainer by his change ofcountry. After having visited various parts ofAsia1, he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, inwhich place his family joined him from Athens.How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we donQ . kn o W ) but seemingly long enough to acquirelocal estimation and leave mementos behind him.He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five yearsold, without having taken any step towards the ac-complishment of those victorious campaigns whichhe had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness wasthe real cause of his death, we may believe on thedistinct statement of Thucydide"s2; who at the same

note on the passage of Thucydides. I doubt his statement however aboutthe land-tax or rent; I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of theproduce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistokles,but the portion of regal revenue or tribute levied in them. The Per-sian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute:they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sumtotal were duly paid.

1 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 31. wXavafievos irepl rr)V 'Amav: thisstatement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

2 T h u c y d . i. 138. Noo^ira? <Se reKevra rav ftiov' Xeyovvi Se rives, KCU

eKov&Lov <f>apfiaK<a airoBaveiv avTovt ddvvarov vofitcavra tivai eVweAetjat

/3a<ri\cl a wre'cr^eTO.

This current story, as old as Aristophanes (Equit. 83, compare theScholia), alleged that Themistokles had poisoned himself by drinkingbull's blood (see Diodor. xi. 58), who assigns to this act of takingpoison a still more sublime patriotic character by making it part of adesign on the part of Themistokles to restrain the Persian king fromwarring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both stateas an unquestionable fact, that ThemistoklSs died by poisoning him-self; omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydides that he died


time notices a rumour partially current in his owntime, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful con-sciousness on the part of Themistokle's himself thatthe promises made could never be performed—afarther proof of the general tendency to surroundthe last years of this distinguished man with im-pressive adventures, and to dignify his last momentswith a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlierpatriotism. The report may possibly have beendesignedly circulated by his friends and relatives,in order to conciliate some tenderness towards hismemory (his sons still continued citizens at Athens,and his daughters were married there). Thesefriends farther stated that they had brought backhis bones to Attica at his own express command,and buried them privately without the knowledgeof the Athenians ; no condemned traitor being per-mitted to be buried in Attic soil. If however weeven suppose that this statement was true, no onecould point out with certainty the spot whereinsuch interment had taken place : nor does it seem,when we mark the cautious expressions of Thu-cydides1, that he himself was satisfied of the fact:

of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows ThucydidSs. Ci-cero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitar-chus and Stratokles, recognising it as contrary to Thucydides. Heputs into the mouth of his fellow dialogist Atticus a just rebuke of thefacility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical pur-pose.

1 Thucyd. i. 138. TOL 8e OGTCI ^ a t r l Kop.KrOrjj'at avrov ol Trpo&r}-KOVT€S oiKade Kc\ev(TCLVTOS incivov, KCU rtdrjvai Kpvcpa 'Adrjvaiaviv Trj 'ATTIKJ)' OV yap efeflv BaitTEiv, 0)S £ir\ irpohoo'ia (pevyovros.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydides, gives this statementby mistake, as if Thucydides had himself affirmed it: " Idem (sc. Thu-cydides) ossa ejus clam in Attica ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibusnon concederetur, quod proditionis esset damnatus, memorise prodidit,"

2 c 2


moreover we may affirm with confidence that theinhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed thesplendid sepulchral monument erected in honourof Themistokle's in their own market-place, werepersuaded that his bones were really enclosedwithin it.

Death of Aristeide's died about three or four years after—Mspo- the ostracism of Themistokles1; but respecting the

7' place and manner of his death, there were severalcontradictions among the authors whom Plutarchhad before him. Some affirmed that he perished onforeign service in the Euxine sea; others, that hedied at home, amidst the universal esteem andgrief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confinedto the single statement of Kraterus, and strenu-ously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeide's ashaving been falsely accused before the Athenianjudicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minse,on the allegation of having taken bribes during theassessment of the tribute upon the allies—whichfine he was unable to pay, and was thereforeobliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismiss-ing this last story, we find nothing certain abouthis death except one fact—but that fact at thesame time the most honourable of all—that he diedvery poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave

This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these secondary authorsso often cite: Thucydides is certainly not a witness for the fact: ifanything, he may he said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place"of Themisto-klSs, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time :the guides of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had be-come more confident (Pausanias, i. 1, 3).

1 Respecting the probity of Aristeide's, see an interesting fragmentof Eupolis the comic writer (Arjfj.oi., Fragm. iv. p. 457, ed. Meineke).


enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchrewas provided for him at Phalerum at the publiccost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysi-machus and a dowry to each of his two daughters.In the two or three ensuing generations, however,his descendants still continued poor, and even atthat remote day, some of them received aid out ofthe public purse, from the recollection of their in-corruptible ancestor. Near a century and a halfafterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, de-scendant of the Just Aristeide's, was to be seen atAthens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying amysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee oftwo oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by : Demetrius the Phalerean procured from thepeople, for the mother and aunt of this poor man,a small daily allowance1. On all these points thecontrast is marked when we compare Aristeideswith Themistokl&s. The latter, having distinguish-ed himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia and bya choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple asto the means of acquisition—ended his life at Mag-nesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever,and left an enriched posterity both at that place andat Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, hisdescendant the Athenian Themistokles attended thelectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens,as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself2.

1 Plutarch, Arist. c. 26, 27 ; Cornelius Nepos, Arist. c. 3 : compareAristophan. Vesp. 53.

2 Plutarch, Themist. c. 5-32.

390

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENSAS HEAD.-FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSIONOF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

Conse- I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter,the forma- how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from theConfede- Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organise aC—°Biftir- n e w confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vbr-

o r*)—a n c^ n o w *^*s confederacy> framed not onlypolitics for common and pressing objects; but also on prin-sparta and ciples of equal rights and constant control on the

part of the members, attracted soon the spontane-ous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insu-lar or maritime, near the iEgean sea. I also no-ticed this event as giving commencement to a newsera in Grecian politics. For whereas there hadbeen before a tendency, not very powerful, yet onthe whole steady and increasing, towards somethinglike one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as presi-dent—from henceforward that tendency disappears,and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta di-vide the Grecian world between them, and bring amuch larger number of its members into coopera-tion, either with one or the other, than had everbeen so arranged before.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as generalwords can go, the character of the new confederacyduring the first years after its commencement: butunhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts,

CHAP. XLV.] GRECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. 391

—and in the absence of such controlling evidence, Distinction° between

a habit has grown up of describing loosely the en- the Con-tire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the lat- Deios, withter date is that of the battle of iEgos-potamos) as ^constituting " the Athenian empire." This worddenotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the empirelast forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated ; out of it.but it is misleading when applied to the first part:nor indeed can any single word be found whichfaithfully characterizes as well the one part as theother. A great and serious change had takenplace, and we disguise the fact of that change ifwe talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship asa portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydide"scarefully distinguishes the two, speaking of theSpartans as having lost, and of the Athenians ashaving acquired, not empire, but headship or hege-mony1. The transition from the Athenian hege-

1 Thucyd. i. 94. it-eTToXiopKrjaav (Bvâvriov) ev rfjbe rrj fjyepovia,1. e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited toassume the hegemony: compare fiyrjo-dpevoi, i. 77, and Herodot. viii.2, 3. Next we have (i. 95) (potTavres re (the Ionians, &c.) TT/SOS TOVS'Adrjvalovs rf^lovv avrovs rjyepovas cr<p5>v yevecrdcu Kara TO vyyeve'r.Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, theallies ovKen itf>Uo~av rt)v fjyepoviav. Then, as to the ensuing pro-ceedings of the Athenians (i. 96)—jrapaAa/3oWe£ 8e oi 'Adrjvaim TT/Vf/yepnviav TOVTW ra> rp&na CKOVTIOV TO>V ^Vfipaxaiv 8ia TO Havcravlov pi-'cros, &c. : compare i. 75—fjfuv 8e npoaeXOovTav TO>V ^vppaâiv Kal ai-TS>V he-qdivrav fiyep,6vas KaTacrTr/vat., and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the fiyep-opia to the dpîj (i. 97)—fiyoipevoi6"£ avTovofiav TO irp&Tov rav £vp.p.ax<i>v <a\ airb KOIV&V £vvodu>v ftovkevov-TCOV, rocraSe eirrj\0ov 7roXejLift) re Kal 8iax£iplo~ei TipaypATtav peratji)Tovbs TOC noXe/xov Kal TOV Mr/diKov.

Thucydides then goes on to say that he shall notice these " manystrides in advance " which Athens made, starting from her originalhegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire or dpxfjwas originally formed—apa 8e xal TT)S dpxris dnoheifyv i'êi TT/S T5>V'A6r}vai<ov, iv o'Lp rpoirM fcareO~TT\. Tlie same transition from the rjyt-povia to the dpxh ' s described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at


mony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gra-dual, so that no one could determine preciselywhere the former ends and the latter begins : butit had been consummated before the thirty years'truce, which was concluded fourteen years beforethe Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the sub-stantial cause of that war. Empire then came tobe held by Athens—partly as a fact established,Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75) : but as it wasrather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the differencebetween rjyefiovla and dpxfj, so after he has clearly stated what the rela-tion of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwardsbecame totally changed, Thucydides makes him slur over the distinc-tion, and say—ovras ovS" rjjieis Bavfiaarbv ovbtv TreTroirjua/iev el

dp%r]V Tf 8idofi.evr)v ede^dfieda Kal Tavrrjv pfj dveipev, &c. ; and hethen proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the groundof superior force and worth : which last plea is advanced a few yearsafterwards still more nakedly and offensively by the Athenian speakers.Read also the language of the Athenian Euphemus at Kamarina (vi.82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argu-ment.

It is to be recollected that the word hegemony or headship is ex-tremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedi-ence, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than hono-rary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towardsthe Boeotian confederated towns (fiyefioveveardai vtfi' fjiiav, Thuc. iii.61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction between thatverb and apxeiv, and holds language respecting the Athenian dp^r],more precise than his language in the note ad Thucyd. i. 94), and bythe Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra,which were really little more than honorary—eVi T<B fjyffioves rethai Kal ra e'UoTa 8avfLa£e<r6ai (Thucyd. i. 38) : compare vii. 55. In-deed it sometimes means simply a guide (iii. 98 ; vii. 50).

But the words dp^rj, ap%£iv, cipxtcrdcu, voc. pass., are much less ex-tensive in meaning, and imply both superior dignity and coerciveauthority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v. 69 ; ii- 8, &c'The woXir dp^rjv e^owa is analogous to dvrjp ripavvos (vi. 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of thesewords than Thucydides : see the discussion of the Lacedaemonian andAthenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be observedthat he makes Gelo ask for the rjy(p.ovia and not for the dpxv—puttingthe claim in the least offensive form : compare also the claim of theArgeians for r]yep.ovia (vii. 148).


resting on acquiescence rather than attachment orconsent on the minds of the subjects—partly as acorollary from necessity of union combined withher superior force : while this latter point, superi-ority of force as a legitimate title, stood more andmore forward both in the language of her speakersand in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, theAthenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesianwar venture to affirm that their empire had beenof this same character ever since the repulse of thePersians : an inaccuracy so manifest, that if wecould suppose the speech made by the AthenianEuphe'mus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have beenheard by Tbemistokles or Aristeide"s fifty years be-fore, it would have been alike offensive to the pru-dence of the one and to the justice of the other.The imperial state of Athens, that which she heldat the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, whenher allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributarysubjects, and when the iEgean sea was an Athe-nian lake,—was of course the period of her greatestsplendour and greatest action upon the Grecianworld. It was also the period most impressive tohistorians, orators, and philosophers—suggestingthe idea of some one state exercising dominionover the iEgean, as the natural condition of Greece,so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would betransferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersedmaritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the ag-gressive schemes of some new conqueror — andeven bringing up by association into men's fanciesthe mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as ha-


Tendencyto confusethese two,and to im-pute toAthenslong-sight-ed plans ofambition.

ving been rulers of the iEgean in times anterior toAthens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athe-nian empire had before them no good accounts ofthe incidents between 479-450 B.C. ; for we maygather from the intimation of Thucydid&s, as wellas from his barrenness of facts, that while therewere chroniclers both for the Persian invasion andfor the times before, no one cared for the times im-mediately succeeding1. Hence, the little light whichhas fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed(if we except the careful Thucydid6s) from a sub-sequent age ; and the Athenian hegemony has beentreated as a mere commencement of the Athenianempire : credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian wardownwards at results, which perhaps ThemistokleV

1 Thucyd. i. 97- TOIS irpo cîov anaciv €K\I7T€S fjv TOVTO T6 âtpiov, Kai

rj ra irpb TU>V M^StKwv £vveri6€0~av rj avra ret Mi/StKa" Tovrtcv 8e ooTrep

Kai jyiâro iv Tjj 'ATTIKTJ £vyy'pafpjj 'EWaVfcKO?, (Spa^tas T€ Kai rots

Xpovois OVK aKpifitoS lnf\i.vr\o-6r).

Hellanikus therefore had done no more than touch upon the eventsof this period : and he found so little good information within his reach,as to fall into chronological blunders.

2 Thucyd. i. 93. rrjs yap 8TJ 6a\d<rcrr]s Ttparos iToK)n)<TfV cliretv i>s

dvdeKTea ecTt, Kai Tr)V dp%r}V €i>6vs £vyKaTe<TK€vafe.

Dr. Arnold says in his note, " cvdits signifies probably immediatelyafter the retreat of the Persians." I think it refers to an earlier period—that point of time when Themistokles first counselled the building ofthe fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city andrepose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition thatwe get a reasonable meaning for the words iroKfirjire dweiv, " he wasthe first who dared to say"—which implies a counsel of extraordinaryboldness. " For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp atthe sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish theirempire." The word £vyKa.Teo-Keva£e seems to denote a collateralconsequence, not directly contemplated, though perhaps divined, byThemistokles.


may have partially divined, but which only timeand successive accidents opened even to distantview. But such systematic anticipation of subse-quent results is fatal to any correct understanding,either of the real agents or of the real period ; bothof which are to be explained from the circumstancespreceding and actually present, with some help,though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintancewith that which was then an unknown future.When Aristeides and Kimon dismissed the Lace-daemonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausaniasaway from Byzantium on his second coming out,they had to deal with the problem immediatelybefore them: they had to complete the defeat ofthe Persian power, still formidable—and to createand organise a confederacy as yet only inchoate.This was quite enough to occupy their attention,without ascribing to them distant views of Athenianmaritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the The earlyPeloponnesian war, which Thucydides introduces theforma-as " the throwing off of his narrative1," he nei- confederacyther gives, nor professes to give, a complete enu- ^meration of all which actually occurred. Duringthe interval between the first desertion of theAsiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C. p—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C—he recites fedgeofW"three incidents only : first, the siege and capture of them-

Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation ofthe island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens,—

1 Thucyd. i. 97. typa^a de avra Ka\ TJ]V €KJ3O\TJV TOV \6yov iiroirj-(Tn[xr]i/ §ia rode, &c.


thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubcea, and re-duction of the place by capitulation. It has beentoo much the practice to reason as if these threeevents were the full history of ten or eleven years.Considering what Thucydides states respecting thedarkness of this period, we might perhaps suspectthat they were all which he could learn about it ongood authority : and they are all, in truth, eventshaving a near and special bearing on the subse-quent history of Athens herself—for Eion was thefirst stepping-stone to the important settlement ofAmphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydideswas the property of outlying Athenian citizens orkleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire igno-rance of the proceedings of Athens, as conductingthe newly-established confederate force : for it iscertain that the first ten years of the Athenian he-gemony must have been years of most active war-fare against the Persians. One positive testimonyto this effect has been accidentally preserved to usby Herodotus, who mentions that " before the in-vasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commandersand garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Helles-pont1, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks

1 Herodot. vii. 106, 107. Kare&Tcurav yap ert Trporepov raunjr rijsf'Xdcrior VTtapxot iv Trj OprjiKr) KCU row 'EAXijoTroVrov navTaxf). OVTOI &v

irdvres, o'i re i< Gpijueij? <a\ TOV 'HWrjtrwovTov, TTKT]V TOV iv Aopiovco),U7ro 'TZWrjvav vcrrepov TavrrjS rrjs <TTpaTTJ\a<rir]s it-yptQTjtrav' TOV 8e iv

Aopio-Kco MarrKajxr^v ovbap.oi KU> ibvva.(r6r)(Tav

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but he, too,acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in Thrace, by aidof the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon(Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd.


after that invasion, with the single exception ofMaskame"s governor of Doriskus, who could neverbe taken, though many different Grecian attemptswere made upon the fortress. Of those who werecaptured by the Greeks, not one made any defencesufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, ex-cept Boge"s governor of Eion." Boges, after bravelydefending himself, and refusing offers of capitula-tion, found his provisions exhausted, and fartherresistance impfacticable. He then kindled a vastfuneral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines,and family, and cast them into it—threw his pre-cious effects over the wall into the Strymon—andlastly, precipitated himself into the flames1. Hisbrave despair was the theme of warm encomiumamong the Persians, and his relatives in Persiawere liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This captureof Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned(as already stated) by Thucydide's ; but Herodotushere gives us to understand that it was only one ofa string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucy-dide's, against the Persians. Nay, it would seemfrom his language that Maskame's maintained him-

viii. 62, " that Sestus was almost the last place held by the Persians inEurope."

Weissenborn (Hellen oder Beitrage zur genaueren Erforschung deralt-griechischen Geschichte. Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has takennotice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that inPlutarch ; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts toframe a certain chronology for those two or three events which Thucy-didfis gives us between 476-466 B.C.

1 Kutzen (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis temporeconstitute Grimse, 1837. Commentatio, i. p. 8) has good reason to callin question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii. 8, 2)for the capture of Eion.


Necessity

tion againstthe Per-sians evenafter thebattles of

TMsitywasthecause bothof the wii-

deracynof"

time im-provementof Athens,

self in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes,and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecianassaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodo-tus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the firstyears of the Athenian hegemony were full of busyand successful hostility against the Persians. Andin truth this is what we should expect: the battlesof Salamis, Platsea, and Mykale1, drove the Persiansout of Greece and overpowered their main arma-ments, but did not remove them at once from all thevarious posts which they occupied throughout the

and Thrace. Without doubt the Atheniansclear the coasts and the islands of a great

number of different Persian detachments : an ope-ration never short nor easy, with the then imperfectmeans of siege, as we may see by the cases ofSestus and Eion ; nor indeed always practicable, asthe case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of thesePersians, yet remaining in the neighbourhood1, andeven the chance of a renewed Persian invading ar-mament, formed one pressing motive for Greciancities to join the new confederacy : while the ex-pulsion of the enemy added to it those places whichhe had occupied. It was by these years of activeoperations at sea against the common enemy, that

1 To these " remaining operations against the Persians " the Athenianenvoy at Lacedseraon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesianwar—ifiav p.iv (you Spartans) OVK iBekrjaavrav irapafieivm irpos ravnoXotna Toil fiapfiapov, rjfuv 8e npoo~e\Q6vTG>v TOJV ^vufjid^((i>u KCUavrav bzr}8tvTa>v r^yejxovas KaracrTrjuai, &c. (Thucyd. i. 75) : and again,iii. 11. TO vivokonra TO>U epymv.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. avros 8« rjyyeWeroOtavoe7(rdat a)S inL^eiprjo'cov TTOKIV £TT\ TOVS "EXkijvas, &c.


the Athenians first established1 that constant, sy-stematic, and laborious training, among their ownships' crews, which transmitted itself with continualimprovements down to the Peloponnesian war: itwas by these, combined with present fear, that theywere enabled to organise the largest and most effi-cient confederacy ever known among Greeks—tobring together deliberative deputies—to plant theirown ascendency as enforcers of the collective reso-lutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universalcontribution. Lastly, it was by these same opera-tions, prosecuted so successfully as to remove pre-sent alarm, that they at length fatigued the morelukewarm and passive members of the confederacy,and created in them a wish either to commute per-sonal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escapefrom the obligation of service in any way. TheAthenian nautical training would never have beenacquired—the confederacy would never have be-come a working reality—the fatigue and discontentsamong its members would never have arisen—un-less there had been a real fear of the Persians, anda pressing necessity for vigorous and organizedoperations against them, during the ten years be-tween 477 and 466 B.C.

As to the ten years from 477-466 B.C, there Confede-has been a tendency almost unconscious to assume Dek>°—that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucy-did6s about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos,

and per-1 The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of emptoryPi B f BXd i 8 i lpy

the Persians. To Be rfjs BaXdcrcrrjs imo-Trjfjiovas yeve<r8ai (says Perikles not allow-respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Pelo- m& r e t

ponnesian war; ov paoicos avrois Trpo<ryevr}tjeTcu' ouoe yap vpeis, /xe\e-TGIVTCS avro tvdvs dno rStv MTJSIKCOV, i^ipyacBe no) (Thucyd. i. 142).


constitute the sum total of events. To contradictthis assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient,though indirect, that they are only part of the stockof a very busy period—the remaining details ofwhich, indicated in outline by the large general lan-guage of Thucydide's, we are condemned not toknow. Nor are we admitted to be present at thesynod of Delos, which during all this time continuedits periodical meetings : though it would have beenhighly interesting to trace the steps whereby an in-stitution which at first promised to protect not lessthe separate rights of the members than the securityof the whole, so lamentably failed in its object.We must recollect that this confederacy, formedfor objects common to all, limited to a certain ex-tent the autonomy of each member ; both conferringdefinite rights and imposing definite obligations.Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeides onbehalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the mem-bers in perpetuity—marked even in the form of theoath, which was performed by casting heavy lumpsof iron into the sea never again to be seen1. Asthis confederacy was thus both perpetual and per-emptory, binding each member to the rest and notallowing either retirement or evasion, so it was es-sential that it should be sustained by some deter-mining authority and enforcing sanction. The de-t e r m i m n g authority was provided by the synod at

Athens, Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised bystrictly ex- • i »

d, in Athens as president. And there is every reason topresume that Athens, for a long time, performed

fy"odal this duty in a legitimate and honourable manner,1 Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 24.


acting in execution of the resolves of the synod,or at least in full harmony with its general pur-poses. She exacted from every member the regu-lated quota of men or money, employing coercionagainst recusants, and visiting neglect of militaryduty with penalties. In all these requirements sheonly discharged her appropriate functions as chosenleader of the confederacy, and there can be no rea-sonable doubt that the general synod went cordiallyalong with her1 in strictness of dealing towardsthose defaulters who obtained protection withoutbearing their share of the burthen.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, Gradual. J ' ^ _ alteration

becoming weary of personal military service, pre- mthereia-vailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men allies—sub!in their place, and imposed upon themselves in ex- *change a money-payment of suitable amount. Thiscommutation, at first probably introduced to meet service,de-

. , , . . j . j manded bysome special case of inconvenience, was found so the alliessuitable to the taste of all parties that it graduallyspread through the larger portion of the confede-racy. To unwarlike allies, hating: labour and priva- fee,linss of

J . . Athens.

tion, it was a welcome relief—while to the Athenians,full of ardour, and patient of labour as well as dis-cipline for the aggrandisement of their country, itafforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous thanthey could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plainfrom the statement of Thucydides that this altered

1 Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in thespeech put by Thucydides into the mouth of the Mitylensean envoys atOlympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war : a speech pro-nounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii. 11)—a/iafiiv yap fiaprvpla ixpavro (the Athenians) fir) av TOVS ye io-o\^ 17$ ouriiKovras, el /urj n ryhiKavp ols iirjiearav, ^varpareveiu.

VOL. V. 2 D


practice was introduced from the petition of theconfederates themselves, not from any pressure orstratagem on the part of Athens'. But though suchwas its real source, it did not the less fatally de-grade the allies in reference to Athens, and extin-guish the original feeling of equal rights and part-nership in the confederacy, with communion ofdanger as well as of glory, which had once boundthem together. The Athenians came to considerthemselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with abody of tribute-paying subjects, whom they wereentitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both asto foreign policy and internal government, to suchextent as they thought expedient—but whom theywere also bound to protect against foreign enemies.The military force of these subject-states was thus ina great degree transferred to Athens, by their ownact, just as that of so many of the native princesin India has been made over to the English. Butthe military efficiency of the confederacy againstthe Persians was much increased, in proportion asthe vigorous resolves of Athens2 were less and lessparalysed by the contentions and irregularity of a

Thucyd. i. 97—99. A'tTiai 8e aWai r)o~av rwv airooraa'etov, Kai /xe-yicrrai, al TO>V <popa>v icai vcwv eKSelai ical \ei7roo~Tpa,Tiov, ei r&> iyivero'oi yap 'Adrjvaioi aKpiflcos zirpacro-ou, Ka\ Xvirr/pol t}o-av, OVK tla>66<nv ovSifiovkop.€vms rakamoipuv TrpcxrayovTes ras avayicas. TH<rav 8e iras Ka\SXXas 01 'Adrjvaioi ovKeri dfiotios iv r)bovfi apxovres, Ka\ pvre £vvecrTpaTevova7ro roO 'MTOV, pqoiov re Trpou'ayto'Bai rjv avrois TOVS ddmrrauevovs' %>vavTo\ aiTLOL iyevovro oi ^vfifiaxot' 8(a yap TTJV anoKvrjcriv Tavi7)V•tav (TTpaTemv, oi irkfiovs avrav, Iva fir] cm' O'IKOV Sxri, xPVIxaTa *T&-^avroavri T5>V vtasv TO 'ucvovfievov avaka>p.a(pipuv, KOLTOXS ftzv'A0r)vaioi.srjC^ero TO vavTiKov dnb TT)S haKavqs rjv iicetvoi £vp.<f>epoiev, avrol he oiroTediroo-ratfv, dtrapdo-Kevoi /tai anupoi is T6V iroKefiov Kadio-ravro.

2 See the contemptuous remarks of Periklea upon the debates of theLacedemonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 141).


synod; so that the war was prosecuted with greatersuccess than ever, while those motives of alarm,which had served as the first pressing stimulus tothe formation of the confederacy, became everyyear farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances several of the confe-derate states grew tired even of paying their tribute j ^ t h ^—and averse to continuance as members. They feelings of

* i Athens.

made successive attempts to secede, but Athens,acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod,repressed their attempts one after the other—con-quering, fining, and disarming the revolters ; whichwas the more easily done, since in most cases theirnaval force had been in great part handed overto her.As these events took place, not all at once, butsuccessively in different years—the number of meretribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolterscontinually increasing—so there was never any onemoment of conspicuous change in the character ofthe confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously intosubjects, while Athens, without any predeterminedplan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictlyenforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwill-ing members, and by employing coercion againstrevolters, she had become unpopular in the sameproportion as she acquired new power—and thattoo without any guilt of her own. In this position,even if she had been inclined to relax her hold uponthe tributary subjects, considerations of her ownsafety would have deterred her from doing so ; forthere was reason to apprehend that they might placetheir strength at the disposal of her enemies. It isvery certain that she never was so inclined: it would

2 D 2


have required a more self-denying public moralitythan has ever been practised by any state, either an-cient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relin-quishing voluntarily an immense ascendency as wellas a lucrative revenue : least of all was such an idealikely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whoseambition increased with their power, and amongwhom the love of Athenian ascendency was bothpassion and patriotism. But though the Athenianswere both disposed, and qualified, to push all theadvantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of theirempire were laid in the most honourable causes : vo-luntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and suc-cessful against a common enemy—unpopularity in-curred in discharge of an imperative duty—andinability to break up the confederacy without en-dangering themselves as well as baying open theiEgean sea to the Persians1.

1 The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before thePeloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, inthe main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i. 75, 76). He admits andeven exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularitywas, to a great extent and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidableas well as undeserved. He of course, as might be supposed, omitsthose other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

Kai yap avrrjv rrjvde (rrjv dp^rjv) i\d(3ofiev ov /3iao"a iez>ofc i£ avrov

de Toil epyov KaTTjvayKairOrjfieu TO nparov Tvpoayaytiv avrrjv es rdfie,

fidXurra fxeu VTTQ deovs, eVetra $e Ka\ Tifirjs, vo~T€pov Kai &>0eXeias. Kat

OVK dcrcpakis i'n c'SoKet etvai TOIS noWois airrf}(6r])iivovs, Kai TIVODV Kai

rjdrj a7roo~TavTG3V Kexeipa>fieva>v, vp.wv re r)pxv OVKCTI Ofxoias <piKa>v dX\*

VTTOTTTav Kai bia(popa>v ovrasv, avivras KtvSvvevetv' Kai yap av ai ajroara-

<re<r irpos vfias iyiyvovTO. 7racrt Se avfjri(pdovou Ta £v/j.(pepovTa ray fie-

ylo-Tuiv 7repl Kivbvvmv ev TL8eo-0cu.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also thespeech of Perikles at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesianwar (Thucyd. ii. 63).


There were two other causes, besides that which Growingr unpopula-

has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity or fimperial Athens. First, the existence of the confede-racy, imposing permanent obligations, was in con-flict with the general instinct of the Greek mind,tending towards separate political autonomy of eachcity—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionicmind, incapable of that steady personal effort whichwas requisite for maintaining the synod of Deloson its first large and equal basis. Next—and thisis the great cause of all—Athens, having defeatedthe Persians and thrust them to a distance, beganto employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allieshad nothing to gain from success—everything toapprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for,offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head thesubject-allies had great reason to complain, through-out the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek forthe purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance :but on the point of practical grievances or oppres-sions, they had little ground for discontent, and littlefeeling of actual discontent, as I shall show morefully hereafter. Among the general body of citizensin the subject-allied cities, the feeling towardsAthens was rather indifference than hatred: themovement of revolt against her proceeded from smallparties of leading men, acting apart from the citi-zens, and generally with collateral views of ambitionfor themselves : and the positive hatred towards herwas felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to per-sonal effort, which prompted the confederates of


sym>d of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute forgradually military service, also induced them to neglect at-f tendance at the synod. But we do not know the

steps whereby this assembly, at first an effectiveSuperior reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form andqualities J ° J

and merit vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly ll-lustrate the difference of character between thep maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian

derates rf a l l i e s o f Sparta, than the fact— that while the formerDeios gene- shrank from personal service and thought it an ad-

vantage to tax themselves in place of it—the latterwere " ready enough with their bodies," but un-complying and impracticable as to contributionsl.The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen forthe military efficiency of the Ionians recurs fre-quently and appears even to have exceeded what thereality justified: but when we turn to the conduct ofthe latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade1

in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia2—we detect the same want of energy, the same inca-pacity of personal effort and labour, as that whichbroke up the confederacy of Delos with all its be-neficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefati-gable activity and daring, together with the patientendurance of laborious maritime training, whichcharacterised the Athenians of that day—we haveonly to contrast them with these confederates, soremarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaringinequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to main-

1 Thucyd. i. 141. a-a/iavi 8e iroifXQT.epoi ol airovpyol rav av&p&nravV XPWa)Tl TToXefiuv, &c.

2 See Herodot. vi. 12, and the preceding volume of this history,chap. xxxv. vol. iv. p. 407.


tain a confederacy of equal members was impos-sible : it was in the nature of things that the con-federacy should either break up, or be transmutedinto an Athenian empire.

It has already been mentioned that the first Tribute firstJ _ raised by

aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Ari- thesynodofsteide"s and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four Lhundred and sixty talents in money. At that time,many of the confederates paid their quota not inmoney but in ships; but this practice graduallydiminished, as the commutations above alluded to,of money in place of ships, were multiplied, whilethe aggregate tribute of course became larger. Itwas no more than six hundred talents* at the com-mencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-sixyears after the first formation of the confederacy;from whence we may infer that it was never at allincreased upon individual members during the in-terval. For the difference between four hundredand sixty talents and six hundred, admits of beingfully explained by the- numerous commutations ofservice for money, as well as by the acquisitions ofnew members, which doubtless Athens had more orless the opportunity of making. It is not to be ima-gined that the confederacy had attained its maxi-mum number, at the date of the first assessment oftribute : there must have been various cities, likeSinope and iEgina, subsequently added2.

Without some such preliminary statements as Events be-those just given, respecting the new state of Greece 476-466?'between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, be- skyros—ginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, Karys*os.

1 Thucyd. ii. 13. 2 Thucyd. i. 108 ; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.

408 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART I t

and ending with the Athenian empire, the readerwould hardly understand the bearing of those par-ticular events which our authorities enable us torecount; events unhappily few in number, thoughthe period must have been full of action—and notwell-authenticated as to dates. The first knownenterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity(whether the first absolutely or not, we cannot de-termine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was theconquest of the important post of Eion on theStrymon, where the Persian governor Boge"s, starvedout after a desperate resistance, destroyed himselfrather than capitulate, together with his family andprecious effects—as has already been stated. Thenext events named are their enterprises against theDolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seem-ingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the townand district of Karystus in Eubcea. To the latter,who were of a different kindred from the inhabit-ants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aidfrom them, they granted a capitulation : the formerwere more rigorously dealt with and expelled fromtheir island. Skyros was barren, and had little torecommend it except a good maritime positionand an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants,seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lem-nos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot,were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessaliantraders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them,had raised a complaint against them before theAmphiktyonic synod, which condemned the islandto make restitution: the mass of the islandersthrew the burden upon those who had committed

CHAP. XLV.] GEECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. 409

the crime; and these men, in order to evade pay-ment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament—who conquered the island, expelled the inhabit-ants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to Athe"s as

1 guardian of

the new character of Athens as guardian of the the geansea against

iiLgean sea against piracy: but it seems also con- piracy—nected with Athenian plans. The island lay very Theseus?convenient for the communication with Lemnos,which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied afterthe expulsion of the Persians \ and became, as wellas Lemnos, a recognised adjunct or outlying por-tion of Attica: moreover there were old legendswhich connected the Athenians with it, as the tombof their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythicalchampion of democracy, was in peculiar favour atthe period immediately following the return fromSalamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the ora-cle had directed them to bring home the bones ofTheseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that heroa splendid entombment and edifice in their newcity: they had tried to effect this, but the unsocialmanners of the Dolopians had prevented a search,and it was only after Kimon had taken the islandthat he found, or pretended to find, the body. Itwas brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.2, and

1 Xenophon, Hellenic, v. 1, 31.2 Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenic, ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the

conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C. He says, afterciting a passage from Thucyd. i. 98, and from Plutarch, Theseus, c. 36,as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects—" The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phsedon,B.c. 476. This we know from Thucyd. i. 98, and Diodor. xi. 41-48combined. Plutarch named the archon Phsedon with reference to theconquest of the island : then, by a negligence not unusual with him,


after being welcomed by the people in solemn andjoyous procession, as if the hero himself had come

connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction :although in truth the oracle was not procured till six or seven yearsafterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exact-ness ; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He statesthat the oracle was given in (476 B.C) the year of the archon Phsedon ;and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.)the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradicteither statement; nor do the passages of Thucydides and Diodorus,which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts. The twopassages of Diodorus have indeed no bearing upon the event: and in-sofar as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes againstMr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C.(Diodor. xi. 60). Thucydides only tells us that the operations againstEion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, andat some periods between 476 and 466 B.C. : but he does not enable usto determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr.Clinton states that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven yearsafterwards" (i. e. after the conquest), I do not know : the account ofPlutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven yearsbefore the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testi-mony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, wehave no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodo-rus, who assigns it to 470 B.C, but as he assigns both the conquest ofEion, and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia withthe victories of the Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot muchtrust his authority. Nevertheless I incline to believe him as to thedate of the conquest of Skyros : because it seems to me very probablethat this conquest took place in the year immediately before that inwhich the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter eventmay be referred with great confidence to 469 B.C., in consequence ofthe interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gainedby the poet Sophokles.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (No. vi.-viii. p. 248-253)two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the Per-sian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has ren-dered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wesselingand Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage inIsokrateis) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartanhegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athe-nian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned ascommencing in 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after the mutiny of theallies against Pausanias—whose command, however, need not be per-

CHAP. XLV.] GRECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. .411

back, was deposited in the interior of the city—the monument called the Theseiutn with its sacredprecinct being built on the spot, and invested withthe privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor con-dition who might feel ground for dreading the oppres-sions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of

eraptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252; and Dodwellmaintain: for the words of Thucydides, eV rijSe rfj fiyepoviq, imply no-thing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemonywhich preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish anygood positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B.C. Itwill not do to construe HpnTov jitv (Thuc. i. 98) in reference to theAthenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean " the yearafter" 477 B.C. If we could imagine that ThucydidSs had told us allthe military operations between 477-466 B.C., we should be compelledto admit plenty of that " interval of inaction" against which Mr. Clin-ton so strongly protests (p. 252). Unhappily, Thucydides has told usbut a small portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned byancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian " em-pire"—between 477-405 B.C. (pp. 248,249). I confess that I ratheragree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these au-thors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks tobring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only suc-cessful in regard to one of them—Demosthenes ; whose two statements(forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) areshown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just.But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykur-gus from ivvevrjKovTa to ej38ofir]Kovra, and then to say that " Lykurgusmay be added to the number of those who describe the period asseventy years" (p. 250). Neither are we to bring Andokides into har-mony with others, by supposing that " his calculation ascends to thebattle of Marathon, from the date of which (B.C. 490) to the battle ofjEgospotami, are just eighty-five years" (Ibid.). Nor ought we to jus-tify a computation by Demosthenes of sixty-five years, by saying " thatit terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily" (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy inall these passages, except those of Demosthenes—and historical inac-curacy in all of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that theAthenians fjp^av rrjs dakd<ro'7]s—fjp^av T<hv ^Wrjvcov—npocrTarai rjfrav

Ttov 'EXXijecoj/'—for seventy-three years. The historical language of De-mosthenes, Plato, Lysias, Isokrates, Andokides, Lykurgus, requires tobe carefully examined before v.'c rely upon it.

412 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART ir.

cruel usage1. Such were the protective functionsof the mythical hero of democracy, whose installa-tion is interesting as marking the growing intensityof democratical feeling in Athens since the Persianwar.

About 467- It was about two years or more after this iuci-466 B.C.

Krst revolt dent that the first breach of union in the confede-tef racy of Delos took place. The important island of

y N axos , the largest of the Cyclades—an island whichNaxosTe thirty years before had boasted a large marine forcevolts and is a n d 8000 hoplites — revolted ; on what specialrccon-

quered. ground, we do not know : but probably the greaterislands fancied themselves better able to dispensewith the protection of the confederacy than thesmaller—at the same time that they were more jea-lous of Athens. After a siege, of unknown dura-tion, by Athens and the confederate force, it wasforced to surrender, and reduced to the conditionof a tributary subject2; its armed ships being doubt-less taken away, and its fortifications razed: whetherany fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have noinformation.

B.C. 466- We cannot doubt that the reduction of this power-Operations ful island, however untoward in its effects upon the

n- equ a l a nd self-maintaining character of the confe-r deracy, strengthened its military force by placing

sia.—De- the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contri-feat of the . r J

Persians by butions in the hands of the chief: nor is it sur-Kimon atthe riverEuryme- l Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8 ; Theseus, c. 36). tori Se (pvgtov al/cerais

KOL Tract Tois TaneivoTepois Kai Se8(ocrt KpeiTTovas, o>s Kai TOV Qrj(rea)S

•irpocTTaTiKov TWOS Kal fioT]6r]TiKov yevofiivov Kai irpo(rhe-)(Ojxhov cptKav-

Bpoinas ras rav ranfivorepav 8er]<reis.2 Thucyd. i. 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter,

that Themistokles, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it wasunder siege, and incurred great clanger of being taken.


prising to hear that Athens sought both to employthis new force, and to obliterate the late act ofseverity, by increased exertions against the com-mon enemy. Though we know no particulars re-specting operations against Persia, since the attackon Eion, such operations must have been going on ;but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken notlong after the Naxian revolt, was attended withmemorable results. That commander, having un-der him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 fromthe various confederates, was despatched to attackthe Persians on the south-western and southerncoast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove outseveral of their garrisons from various Grecian set-tlements, both in Karia and Lykia : among others,the important trading city of Phaselis, though atfirst resisting and even standing a siege, was pre-vailed upon by the friendly suggestions of theChians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribu-tion of ten talents and join in the expedition. Fromthe length of time occupied in these various under-takings, the Persian satraps had been enabled toassemble a powerful force, both fleet and army,near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pam-phylia, under the command of Tithraust£s andPherendates, both of the regal blood. The fleet,chiefly Phoenician, seems to have consisted of 200ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phoeni-cian ships was expected, and was actually near athand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazarda battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for thesame reason to hasten on the combat, attackedthem vigorously: partly from their inferiority of

4H HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART U.

numbers, partly from discouragement at the ab-sence of the reinforcement, they seem to have madeno strenuous resistance. They were put to flightand driven ashore; so speedily, and with so littleloss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to dis-embark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protectthem. The battle on land was long and gallantlycontested, but Kimon at length gained a completevictory, dispersed the army with the capture ofmany prisoners, and either took or destroyed theentire fleet. As soon as his victory and his pri-soners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for thepurpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eightyPhoenician ships in their way, and was fortunateenough to attack them while yet they were igno-rant of the victories of the Eurymedon. Theseships too were all destroyed, though most of thecrews appear to have escaped ashore on the island.Two great victories, one at sea and the other onland, gained on the same day by the same armament,counted with reason among the most glorious of allGrecian exploits, and were extolled as such inthe inscription on the commemorative offering toApollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils1. The

1 For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i. 100 ; Diodor. xi.60-62 ; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from Ephorusand Kallisthenfe, authors of the following century ; and from Phano-demus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and onlyso far as consists with the brief statement of Thucyd idfis. The narra-tive of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundredships ; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus (following thelatter) gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expectedreinforcement of eighty Phoenician ships ; which appears to me a very


number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken bythe victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back thePersians to the region eastward of Phas&lis, doubt-less fortified materially the position of the Athenianconfederacy against them ; but it tended not less toexalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popu-larize her with the confederates generally, from thelarge amount of plunder divisible among them.Probably this increased power and popularity stoodher in stead throughout her approaching contestwith Thasos, at the same time that it explains theincreasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; R<=voit of. Thasos from

but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen theconfede-out of causes quite distinct from confederate rela- Deios3.—

Siege ofcredible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at theAthe-the Eurymedon. From Thucydides we know that the vanquished fleet mans underat the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships ; for so Kimon.—I venture to construe the words of Thucydides, in spite of the authority S?nes m

of Dr . Arno ld—Kai eTKov ('ABTJVCUOI) rpi-qpeis ^OIVIKWV KOX &u<p8eipav

rat Trda-as (s (rar) Sianocrlas. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes,—" Amounting in all to two hundred : that is, that the whole number ofships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleetconsisted of no more." Admitting the correctness of this construction(which may be defended by viii. 21), we may remark that the defeatedPhoenician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ranashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When there-fore this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would allnaturally fall into the power of the victors ; or if any escaped, it wouldbe merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this casemore likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory,in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offeringonly specifies "one hundred Phoenician ships with their crews" as havingbeen captured (Diodor. xi. 62). The other hundred ships were pro-bably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured threehundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription whichmentions only one hundred.

416 HISTORY OF GREECE-

tions. It has been already stated that the Athenianshad within the last few years expelled the Persiansfrom the important post of Eion on the Strymon,the most convenient post for the neighbouring re-gion of Thrace, which was not less distinguishedfor its fertility than for its mining wealth. In theoccupation of this post, the Athenians had had timeto become acquainted with the productive characterof the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edo-nian Thracians ; and it is extremely probable thatmany private settlers arrived from Athens, with theview of procuring grants, or making their fortunesby partnership with powerful Thracians in workingthe gold-mines round Mount Pangseus. In sodoing, they speedily found themselves in collisionwith the Greeks of the opposite island of MountThasos, who possessed a considerable strip of landwith various dependent towns on the continent ofThrace, and derived a large revenue from the minesof Skapte" Hyl6, as well as from others in the neigh-bourhood1. The condition of Thasos at this time(about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress whichthe Grecian states in the iEgean had made sincetheir liberation from Persia. It had been deprivedboth of its fortifications and of its maritime force,by order of Darius, about 491 B.C, and must haveremained in this condition until after the repulse of

1 About Thasos, see Herodot. vi. 46-48 ; vii. 118. The position ofRagusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosniain the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that ofAthens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. InEngel's History of Ragusa we find an account of the large gains madein that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belongingto these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36,p. 163. Wien, 1807).

CHAP XLV.] GRECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. 417

Xerxes ; but we now find it well-fortified and pos-sessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between theThasians and the Athenians of Eion manifesteditself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace,we are not informed ; but it reached such a heightthat the Athenians were induced to send a powerfularmament against the island, under the commandof Kimon'. Having vanquished the Thasian forceat sea, they disembarked, gained various battlesand blocked up the city by land as well as bysea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of thesame scheme—the establishment of a larger andmore powerful colony on Thracian ground not farfrom Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles First at-

. , _ . i i i • tempt of

higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river Athens tonarrows itself again out of a broad expanse of thenature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town ^sj rvor settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), monabov«

v J /' E1On. The

a little above the bridge, which here served as an attemptfails and

important communication for all the people of the the settlersinterior. Both Histiseus and Aristagoras, the twoMilesian despots, had been tempted by the ad-vantages of this place to commence a settlementthere: both of them had failed, and a third failureon a still grander scale was now about to be added.The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists,ten thousand in number, partly from their own citi-zens, partly collected from their allies: and thetemptations of the site probably rendered volunteersnumerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned,

1 Thucyd. i. 100, 101 ; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14 ; Diodor. xi. 70.

VOL. V. 2 E


they were successful in conquering it and drivingaway the Edonian possessors : but on trying toextend themselves farther to the eastward, to aspot called Drabe"skus convenient for the miningregion, they encountered a more formidable resist-ance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, whohad come to the aid of the Edonians in decisive hos-tility to the new colony—probably not without insti-gation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or mostof the ten thousand colonists were slain in this war-fare, and the new colony was for the time completelyabandoned : we shall find it resumed hereafter1.

464-463 Disappointed as the Athenians were in this en-Reduction terprise, they did not abandon the blockade of£ Thasos, which held out more than two years, and

y o n l v surrendered in the third year. Its fortifica-armed *nd tions were razed ; its ships of war, thirty-three indismantled, number, taken away2; its possessions and mining

establishments on the opposite continent relin-quished : moreover an immediate contribution inmoney was demanded from the inhabitants, over andabove the annual payment assessed upon them forthe future. The subjugation of this powerful islandwas another step in the growing dominion of Athensover her confederates.

1 Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than a cen-tury after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession ofAmphipolis, pretended that his ancestor Alexander had been the first toacquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians fromThrace (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.). If this pre-tence had been true, Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of theMacedonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was madeupon it: but the statement of Thucydides shows that it was then anEdonian township.

2 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Gal6psus and CEsyme were among theThasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 10s).


The year before the Thasians surrendered, how-ever, they had taken a step which deserves par-

. . . . . Sparta for

t icular notice, as indicating; the newly-gathering aid—grant-, , . , , ' . . . , . . , . J £,, , ^ ed, but not

clouds in the Grecian political horizon, l h e y had carried intomade secret application to the Lacedaemonians for laid, entreating them to draw off the attention ofAthens by invading Attica; and the Lacedaemo- Sparta and

J O ' _ Athens.

nians, without the knowledge of Athens, havingactually engaged to comply with this request, wereonly prevented from performing their promise by agrave and terrible misfortune at home1. Thoughaccidentally unperformed, however, this hostile pro-mise is a most significant event: it marks thegrowing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta andthe Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on ge-neral grounds of the magnitude of her power, andwithout any special provocation. Nay, not onlyhad Athens given no provocation, but she wasstill actually included as a member of the Lacedae-monian alliance, and we shall find her presentlyboth appealed to and acting as such. We shallhear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, aspushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just men-tioned becomes important to remark. The firstintent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—isconceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, Trial and- acquittal of

after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of Kimon atthe armament, had expected from Kimon some far-

1 Thucyd . i. 1 0 1 . oi Se vTri&xovro fikv <pv(pa rau 'A8r]va'iav KCU '4jxek-

Xov, SieKoKidrjaav 8e VTTO TOV yevofxevov (Tfurfiov.

2 E 2


Great in-crease ofthe Athe-nian power.

Proceed-ings in Cen-tral Greecebetween470-464B.C.Thebes andthe Boeo-tian towns.Discredit ofThebes.

ther conquests in Macedonia—and even that he hadactually entered upon that project with such pro-mise of success, that its farther consummation wascertain as well as easy. Having under these cir-cumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens,he was accused by Perikles and others of havingbeen bought off by bribes from the Macedonianking Alexander; but was acquitted after a publictrial1.

During the period which had elapsed between thefirst formation of the confederacy of Delos and thecapture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years,B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have beenoccupied almost entirely in their maritime opera-tions, chiefly against the Persians—having been freefrom embarrassments immediately round Attica.But this freedom was not destined to last muchlonger ; and during the ensuing ten years, theirforeign relations near home become both activeand complicated; while their strength expands sowonderfully, that they are found competent at onceto obligations on both sides of the iEgean sea, thedistant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Cen-tral Greece during the twelve or fifteen years im-mediately succeeding the battle of Platsea, we havescarcely any information. The feelings of the time,between those Greeks who had supported and thosewho had resisted the Persian invader, must haveremained unfriendly even after the war was at anend, and the mere occupation of the Persian nume-rous host must have inflicted severe damage both

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.


upon Thessaly and Bceotia. At the meeting of theAmphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expul-sion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed forthe life of the Melian Ephialte"s, who had betrayedto Xerxes the mountain-path over CEta, and thuscaused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylae : more-over, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposedby Lacedaemon that all the medising Greeks shouldbe expelled from the synod1—a proposition whichthe more long-sighted views of Themistokle"s suc-cessfully resisted. Even the stronger measure ofrazing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponne-sian cities, from fear that they might be used to aidsome future invasion, had suggested itself to theLacedaemonians—as we see from their language onthe occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens ; andin regard to Bceotia, it appears that the headshipof Thebes as well as the coherence of the federationwas for the time almost suspended. The destroyedtowns of Platsea and Thespise were restored, andthe latter in part repeopled2, under Athenian in-fluence ; and the general sentiment of Peloponnesusas well as of Athens would have sustained thesetowns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at thattime to enforce her supremacy over them in thename of " ancient Boeotian right and usage3." The

1 Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.2 See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Tbemistokles

communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for whomhe afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introducedcitizens at Thespiae (Herodot. viii. 75).

3 Ta TWV Bo(&)T"o)p ndrpta — ro KOIVQ rav TvavTav BoicoTtov iraTpia

(Thucyd. iii. 61-65).


Theban government was then in discredit for itsprevious medism—even in the eyes of Thebansthemselves 1; while the party opposed to Thebes inthe other towns was so powerful, that many ofthem would probably have been severed from the fe-deration to become allies of Athens like Platsea, ifthe interference of Lacedsemon had not arrested sucha tendency. The latter was in every other part ofGreece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities,either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent

Sparta re- on keeping the little autonomous communities sepa-^ rate2; whence she sometimes became by accident

^ne Pr°tector of the weaker cities against compul-over the s o ry alliance imposed upon them by the stronger:Boeotian the interest of her own ascendency was in this re-

spect analogous to that of the Persians when theydictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romansin administering their extensive conquests—and ofthe kings of Mediaeval Europe in breaking the au-thority of the barons over their vassals. But thoughsuch was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fearof Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twentyyears, made her act differently in regard to Boeotia:she had no other means of maintaining that countryas her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, exceptby organising the federation effectively and strength-ening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolu-tion in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the reco-very of her ascendency3—a revolution so conspicu-

1 Thucyd. iii. 62.2 See among many other evidences, the remarkable case of the Olyn-

thian confederacy (Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2, 16).3 Diodor. xi. 81 ; Justin, iii. 6.


ously marked, that the Spartans even aided in en-larging her circuit and improving her fortifications:nor was it without difficulty that she maintainedthis position, even when recovered, against the dan-gerous neighbourhood of Athens—a circumstancewhich made her not only a vehement partisan ofSparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian thanSparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics Events intowards Bceotia, did not manifest itself until about neSus—Ar-twenty years after the commencement of the Athe-nian maritime confederacy. During the course ofthose twenty years, we know that Sparta had hadmore than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, againstthe towns and villages of that country, in whichshe came forth victorious : but we have no particu-culars respecting these incidents. We also knowthat a few years after the Persian invasion, the inha-bitants of Elis concentrated themselves from manydispersed townships into the one main city of Elis1:and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia,and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were eitherformed or enlarged by a similar process near aboutthe same time2. Such aggregation of towns out ofpre-existing separate villages was not conformableto the views, nor favourable to the ascendency ofLacedsemon: but there can be little doubt that herforeign policy after the Persian invasion was bothembarrassed and discredited by the misconduct ofher two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who thoughonly regent, was practically equivalent to a king)

1 Diodor. xi. 54 ; Strabo, viii. p. 337.2 Strabo, viii. pp. 33 / , 348, 356.


and Leotychide's—not to mention the rapid deve-lopment of Athens and Peirseus. But in the year

T<*rhible B.C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos

at Sparta— to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yetRevolt of more terrific moment befel Sparta. A violent earth-the Helots. ^na^e t o o k p i a c e j n fae immediate neighbourhood

of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of thetown, and a vast number of lives, many of themSpartan citizens. It was the judgement of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view ofthe Lacedaemonians themselves) for a recent viola-tion of his sanctuary at Tsenarus, from whence cer-tain suppliant Helots had been dragged away notlong before for punishment1—not improbably someof those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated torevolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all timesone of enmity towards their masters, appears atthis moment to have been unusually inflammable :so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earth-quake construed as divine vengeance for Helot bloodrecently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of themat once into revolt, together with some even of thePerioeki. The insurgents took arms and marcheddirectly upon Sparta, which they were on the pointof mastering during the first moments of consterna-tion, had not the bravery and presence of mind ofthe young king Archidamus re-animated the sur-viving citizens and repelled the attack. But thoughrepelled, the insurgents were not subdued : for sometime they maintained the field against the Spartanforce, and sometimes with considerable advantage,since Aeimnestus (the warrior by whose hand Mar-

1 Thucyd. i. 101-128 ; Diodor. xi. 62.


donius had fallen at Plataea) was defeated and slainwith 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklerus, over-powered by superior numbers1. When at length de-feated, they occupied and fortified the memorablehill of Ithome\ the ancient citadel of their Messe-nian forefathers. Here they made a long and obs-tinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless byincursions throughout Laconia: nor was defencedifficult, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were atthat time confessedly incapable of assailing eventhe most imperfect species of fortification. Afterthe siege had lasted some two or three years, with-out any prospect of success, the Lacedaemonians,beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for theundertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies,among whom we find specified the iEginetans, theAthenians, and the Plataeans2. The Athenian troopsare said to have consisted of 4000 men, under thecommand of Kimon ; Athens being still included inthe list of Lacedaemonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls The Lace-at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, fthat this increased force made no immediate im-pression on the fortified hill of Ith6me\ And when asainst the

r revoltedthe Lacedaemonians saw that their Athenian allies Helots.—

. . . . IT. March of

were not more successiul than they had been them- theAthe-selves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, Kimon"intomistrust and apprehension. The troops had givenno ground for such a feeling, and Kimon theirgenera] was notorious for his attachment to Sparta:yet the Lacedaemonians could not help calling tomind the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these

1 Herodot. ix. 64. r Thucyd. i 102; iii. 54; iv. 57.

426 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PAW II.

Ionic strangers whom they had introduced into theinterior of Laconia, together with their own pro-mise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invadeAttica not long before, for the benefit of the Tha-sians. They even began to fear that the Atheniansmight turn against them, and listen to solicitationsfor espousing the cause of the besieged. Under theinfluence of such apprehensions, they dismissedthe Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence ofhaving no farther occasion for them ; while all theother allies were retained, and the siege or blockadewent on as before1.

1 Thucyd. i. 102. TT)V /xtv imatyiav ov hrfkovvres, elwovres de on oldcvTrpoahiovrai avT&v en.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B.C) , following Plu-tarch, recognises two Lacedaemonian requests to Athens, and two Athe-nian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the firstin 464 B.C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and conse-quent revolt—the second in 461 B.C, after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgement, there is no ground for supposing more than oneapplication made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication hasarisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical realitythe comic exaggeration of Aristophanes (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138;Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishingto make peace between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and remind-ing each of the services which they had received from the other, mightpermit herself to say to the Lacedaemonians—" Your envoy Perikleidascame to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself a suppliant at thealtar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidonwas still shaking the earth and the Messenians were pressing you hard:then Kimon with 4000 hoplites went and achieved your complete salva-tion." This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristo-phanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of anapplication made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siegeof Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which preventedthe Lacedaemonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica.But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).accordingly he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at thetime when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydkles acknowledges only one expedition : nor indeed does


This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and Mistrustprobably rendered even more offensive by the ha- by thebitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited thestrongest exasperation both among the Atheniansoldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation Maries, who

' r *• are dis-

heightened by circumstances immediately prece- missedfrom, . _ . . . . . . . Laconia.

ding. for the resolution to send auxiliaries into DispleasureLaconia, when the Lacedaemonians first applied for of policy86

them, had not been taken without considerable de- atAthens-bate at Athens : the party of Perikles and Ephial-te"s, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and parti-sans of the forward democratical movement, hadstrongly discountenanced it, and conjured theircountrymen not to assist in renovating and strength-ening their most formidable rival. Perhaps theprevious engagement of the Lacedaemonians to in-vade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may haveDiodorus (xi. 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now meresilence on the part of Thucydides, in reference to the events of a periodwhich he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forciblenegative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of461 B.C., with its very important consequences, is such as to excludethe supposition that he knew of any prior expedition, two or three yearsearlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the ac-count which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the pro-longation of the war, and on the incapacity of the Lacedaemonians forattacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as wellas their other allies : he implies that their presence in Laconia was anew and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how muchthe Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal,he could not have omitted to notice as an aggravation of this feeling,that only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedsemon fromthe brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the firstmilitary power in Greece and distinguished for her unintermitting dis-cipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helpless-ness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention—is highly improbablein itself: inadmissible except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconiamentioned in Plutarch.


become known to them, though not so formally asto exclude denial; and even supposing this engage-ment to have remained unknown at that time toevery one, there were not wanting other grounds torender the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an eartnestness which even the philo-La-conian Kritias afterwards characterised as a sacri-fice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage ofLacedsemon1—employed all his credit and influencein seconding the application. The maintenance ofalliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace amongthe great powers of Greece and common war againstPersia—together with the prevention of all fartherdemocratical changes in Athens—were the leadingpoints of his political creed. As yet, both his per-sonal and political ascendency was predominantover his opponents : as yet, there was no manifestconflict, which had only just begun to show itselfin the case of Thasos, between the maritime powerof Athens and the union of land-force under Spar-ta : and Kimon could still treat both of these phse-nomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker,he carried with him the Athenian assembly by ap-pealing to a large and generous patriotism, whichforbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta." Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg andAthens drawing without her yoke-fellow2;"—suchwas his language, as we learn from his friend and

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.Plu ta rch , K imon , c. 16. ' 0 5* *\t&v a7ro^.pr]fxoi'ev€i Kai TOV \6yov, oi

fxaXtfrra TOVS 'A6rjvalovs eKivrjcre, napaKaKo>v fxrjTf TTJV 'KWdBct

t


companion the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips ofKimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almostmelancholy interest, since ninety years passed overbefore such an appeal was ever again addressed toan Athenian assembly1. The despatch of the auxi-liaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment,to the disregard of what might seem political pru-dence : and we may imagine the violent reactionwhich took place in Athenian feeling, when theLacedaemonians repaid them by singling out theirtroops from all the other allies as objects of insult-ing suspicion—we may imagine the triumph of Pe-rikles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who hadbrought it about—when Athens received againinto her public assembly the hoplites sent backfrom Ithome*.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of TheAthe-which more presently), and in the external policyof Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was preg-

pnant with results. The Athenians immediatelv contract

alliance

passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance withArgos.i 1 1 i - i Position of

between themselves and Lacedsemon against the Argos—Persians. They did more: they looked out for quest°of

Mland-enemies of Lacedsemon, with whom to allythemselves. Of these by far the first, both in Hel- towns-lenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city,neutral during the Persian invasion, had now reco-vered the effects of the destructive defeat sufferedabout thirty years before from the Spartan kingKleomenes : the sons of the ancient citizens had

1 See Xenophon, Hellenic, vi. 3 —about 372 B.C.—a little before thebattle of LeuUtra.


grown to manhood, and the temporary predomi-nance of the Periceki, acquired in consequence ofthe ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had beenagain put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos,and dependent upon it, were situated Mykense,Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance,but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the in-glorious example of Argos at the period of danger,these towns had furnished contingents both toThermopylae and Plataea, which their powerfulneighbour had been unable either to prevent at thetime or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the in-tervention of Lacedsemon. But so soon as the lat-ter was seen to be endangered and occupied athome, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Ar-geians availed themselves of the opportunity to at-tack not only Mykense and Tiryns, but also Ornese,Midea, and other semi-dependent towns aroundthem. Several of these were reduced; and the in-habitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incor-porated with the domain of Argos : but the Myke-nseans, partly from the superior gallantry of theirresistance, partly from jealousy of their mythicalrenown, were either sold as slaves or driven intobanishment1. Through these victories Argos wasnow more powerful than ever, and the propositionsof alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthen-ing both the two against Lacedsemon, opened to hera new chance of recovering her lost headship in

1 Diodor. xi. 65 ; Strabo, viii. p. 372 ; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 25. Dio-dorus places this incident in 468 B.C. : but as it undoubtedly comesafter the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happenedabout 463 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, 8.


Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became membersof this new alliance, which was a defensive allianceagainst Lacedsemon : and hopes were doubtless en-tertained of drawing in some of the habitual alliesof the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus as- About46i-460 B.C.

sumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less Megarathan for maritime ascendency, came opportunely allied withfor the protection of the neighbouring town of Me- Growinggara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated {^nth*like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedsemo- and the

u * neighbour-

nians, had been making border encroachments on ingPeio-the one side upon Kleonte—on the other side upon statesMegara1: on which ground the latter, probably de-spairing of protection from Lacedsemon, renouncedthe Lacedaemonian connection, and obtained per-mission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens2. Thiswas an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians,since it both opened to them the whole range ofterritory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to theinterior of the Krisssean Gulf, on which the Mega-rian port of Pegae was situated—and placed themin possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, sothat they could arrest the march of a Peloponne-sian army over the Isthmus, and protect Atticafrom invasion. It was moreover of great import-ance in its effects on Grecian politics : for it wascounted as a wrong by Lacedaemon, gave deadlyoffence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flamesof war between them and Athens ; their allies theEpidaurians and iEginetans taking their part.Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. 2 Thucyd. i. 103.


encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, herambition and energy had inspired universal awe ;while the maritime states in the neighbourhood,such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and iEgina, saw theseterror-striking qualities threatening them at theirown doors, through her alliance with Argos andMegara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancientfeud between the Athenians and iEginetans, thoughdormant since a little before the Persian invasion,had never been appeased or forgotten : so that the.iEginetans, dwelling within sight of Peirseus, wereat once best able to appreciate, and most likely todread, the enormous maritime power now possessedby Athens. Perikles was wont to call iEgina theeyesore of Peirseus1: but we may be very sure thatPeirseus, grown into a vast fortified port within theexisting generation, was in a much stronger degreethe eyesore of iEgina.

Athenians were at this time actively engagedac- in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a

tionofthe r ° ° '°

Athenians fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped bypru" Fhce- or from the confederacy collectively, now servingEgypt, and m Cyprus and on the Phoenician coast. MoreoverGreece— t n e revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros (aboutthey build OJ f *

the first 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of actionWall"from against the Great King; and their fleet, by invita-

S r ° tion of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Mem-phis, where there seemed at first a good prospectof throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spiteof so great an abstraction from their disposableforce, their military operations near home wereconducted with unabated vigour: and the inscrip-

1 Plutarch, Perikles, c. 8.


tion which remains—a commemoration of theircitizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain inone and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia,the Halieis, JEgina, and Megara,—brings forciblybefore us that energy which astonished and evenalarmed their contemporaries. Their first proceed-ings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel,in the existing condition of Greece. It was neces-sary for the Athenians to protect their new allyagainst the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force,and to ensure a constant communication with it bysea; but the city (like most of the ancient Hellenictowns) was situated on a hill at some distance fromthe sea, separated from its port Nisaea by a spaceof nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceed-ings of the Athenians was to build two lines ofwall, near and parallel to each other, connecting thecity with Nisaea, so that the two thus formed onecontinuous fortress, wherein a standing Atheniangarrison was maintained, with the constant meansof succour from Athens in case of need. These"Long Walls," though afterwards copied in otherplaces and on a larger scale, were at that juncturean ingenious invention, for the purpose of extendingthe maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not 459-458.B C

directed against Megara. The Athenians, having war ofundertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis against(the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, ^°rina\c

bordering on Trcezen and Hermione'), were defeated Total de-on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: g

possibly it may have been in this expedition thatthey acquired possession of Troezen, which we find

VOL. v. 2 F


afterwards in their dependence, without knowingwhen it became so. But in a sea-fight which tookplace off the island of Kekryphaleia (between iEgi-na and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gainedthe victory. After this victory and defeat,—neitherof them apparently very decisive,—the iEginetansbegan to take a more energetic part in the war,and brought out their full naval force together withthat of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, andother Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped afleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning herallies also; though we do not know the actualnumbers on either side. In the great naval battlewhich ensued off the island of iEgina, the superi-ority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twentyyears' practice of the Athenians since the Persianwar—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, asshown in those states where at the time of thebattle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greecehad resided—was demonstrated by a victory mostcomplete and decisive. The Peloponnesian andDorian seamen had as yet had no experience of theimproved seacraft of Athens, and when we findhow much they were disconcerted with it eventwenty- eight years afterwards at the beginning ofthe Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at itsdestructive effect upon them in this early battle.The maritime power of iEgina was irrecoverablyruined: the Athenians captured seventy ships ofwar, landed a large force upon the island, and com-menced the siege of the city by land as well as bysea1.

1 Thucyd. i. 105 ; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10; Diodor. xi. 78.


If the Lacedaemonians had not been occupied at The Athe-home by the blockade of Ithome1, they would havebeen probably induced to invade Attica as a diver-sion to the iEginetans; especially as the PersianMegabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part defeated!of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in the Atheni-

r r ans under

order that the Athenians might be constrained toretire from Egypt: this Persian brought with hima large sum of money, but was nevertheless obligedto return without effecting his mission1. The Co-rinthians and Epidaurians however, while they car-ried to iEgina a reinforcement of 300 hoplites, didtheir best to aid her farther by an attack uponMegara; which place, it was supposed, the Athe-nians could not possibly relieve without withdraw-ing their forces from iEgina, inasmuch as so manyof their men were at the same time serving inEgypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equalto all these three exigencies at one and the sametime—to the great disappointment of their enemies.Myronides marched from Athens to Megara at thehead of the citizens in the two extremes of militaryage, old and young; these being the only troops athome. He fought the Corinthians near the town,gaining a slight, but debateable advantage, whichhe commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Co-rinthians had returned home. But the latter, whenthey arrived at home, were so much reproached bytheir own old citizens, for not having vanquishedthe refuse of the Athenian military force2, that

1 Thucyd. i. 109.2 Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. ivmav fiaxofitvoi anacrav TTJV Svvafxiv

TTJV iiceivwv rois rjdrj afteipriKocn ical rots ovwto hvvajxivois, &c.The incident mentioned by Thucydides about the Corinthians, that

2 F 2


they returned back at the end of twelve days anderected a trophy on their side, laying claim toa victory in the past battle. The Athenians,marching out of Megara, attacked them a secondtime, and gained on this occasion a decisivevictory. The defeated Corinthians were still moreunfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them,missing their road, became entangled in a space ofprivate ground enclosed on every side by a deepditch and having only one narrow entrance. My-r6uid£s, detecting this fatal mistake, planted hishoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, andthen surrounded the enclosure with his light-armedtroops, who with their missile weapons slew all theCorinthian hoplites, without possibility either offlight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthianarmy effected their retreat, but the destruction ofthis detachment was a sad blow to the city1.

458-457. Splendid as the success of the Athenians had beenThe Long during this year, both on land and at sea, it wastween easy for them to foresee that the power of their

enemies would presently be augmented by the Lace-deemonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of

opposed by x J o rKimon— democracv, and the loner-sighted views of Perikies,political i • i * . .contentions which were now becoming ascendent in the city—importance the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking ofWalls.L°ng connecting Athens with the sea by means of long

walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been

the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on theirreturn, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners—Kwutfixevoi imbrav iv rrj 7roXei TrpecrfivTepaiv, &C.

1 Thucyd. i. 106. TVO.8OS fteya TOVTO Kopwdlois eyeVero. CompareDiodor. xi. 78, 79—whose chronology however is very misleading.


first suggested by the recent erection of long walls,though for so much smaller a distance, betweenMegara and Nissea : for without such an interme-diate stepping-stone, the idea of a wall forty stadialong (=4-^ miles) to join Athens with PeirBeus, andanother wall of thirty-five stadia (= about 4 miles)to join it with Phal£rum, would have appearedextravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athe-nians—as it certainly would have seemed a fewyears earlier to Themistokles himself. Comingas an immediate sequel of great recent victo-ries, and while iEgina, the great Dorian navalpower, was prostrate and under blockade, it excitedthe utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—beingregarded as the second great stride1, at once con-spicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition,next to the fortification of Peiraeus. But besides thisfeeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure wasalso interwoven with the formidable contention ofpolitical parties then going on at Athens. Kimonhad been recently ostracised ; and the democraticalmovement pressed by Perikles and Ephialtes (ofwhich more presently) was in its full tide of suc-cess, yet not without a violent and unprincipledopposition on the part of those who supported theexisting constitution. Now the long wralls formeda part of the foreign policy of Perikles, continuingon a gigantic scale the plans of Themistokles whenhe first schemed the Peirseus. They were framedto render Athens capable of carrying on war against

1 Kat rajpfie Vfiels CLLTLOI, TO re npcoTOv edaavres avrovs TTJV TTO\LV juerara MijSixa Kparvvai, KCU va-repov TO. jxaKpa crrr/crat reixi—is the languageaddressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, alittle before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 69).


any superiority of landed attack, and of biddingdefiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. Butthough thus calculated for contingences which along-sighted man might see gathering in the di-stance, the new walls were, almost on the samegrounds, obnoxious to a considerable number ofAthenians : to the party recently headed by Kimon,who were attached to the Lacedaemonian connec-tion, and desired above all things to maintain peaceat home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise : to many landed proprietors inAttica, whom they seemed to threaten with ap-proaching invasion and destruction of their territo-rial possessions : to the rich men and aristocrats ofAthens, averse to a still closer contact and amalga-mation with the maritime multitude in Peira?us :lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feel-ing, which might look upon the junction of Athenswith the separate demes of Peirseus and Phale'rumas effacing the special associations connected withthe holy rock of Athe"ne\ When to all these groundsof opposition, we add, the expense and trouble ofthe undertaking itself, the interference with privateproperty, the peculiar violence of party which hap-pened then to be raging, and the absence of a largeproportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shallhardly be surprised to find that the projected longwalls brought on a risk of the most serious cha-racter both for Athens and her democracy. If anyfarther proof were wanting of the vast importanceof these long walls, in the eyes both of friends andof enemies, we might find it in the fact, that theirdestruction was the prominent mark of Athenian


humiliation after the battle of iEgospotamos, andtheir restoration the immediate boon of Pharnaba-zus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by Expedition• oftheLace-

the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedaemonianswere prevailed upon to undertake an expedition outof Peloponnesus, although the Helots in MomSwere not yet reduced to surrender. Their force of Thebf5S-consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000of their various allies, under the regent NikomMes.The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for thismarch, was the protection of the little territory ofDoris against the Phocians, who had recently in-vaded it and taken one of its three towns. Themere approach of so large a force immediately com-pelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest,but it was soon seen that this was only a small partof the objects of Sparta, and that her main pur-poses, under instigation of the Corinthians, weredirected against the aggrandisement of Athens.It could not escape the penetration of Corinth,that the Athenians might presently either enlist orconstrain the towns of Bceotia into their alliance,as they had recently acquired Megara, in addi-tion to their previous ally Platcea: for the Boeo-tian federation was at this time much disorganised,and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered herascendency since the discredit of her support lent tothe Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes andto render her ascendency effective over the Boeotiancities, was the best way of providing a neighbourat once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, soas to prevent their farther aggrandisement by land :it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued


eighty years afterwards in organising Arcadia andMessene" against Sparta. Accordingly the Pelopon-nesian force was now employed partly in enlargingand strengthening the fortifications of Thebes her-self, partly in constraining the other Boeotian citiesinto effective obedience to her supremacy : probablyby placing their governments in the hands of citi-zens of known oligarchical politics1, and perhapsbanishing suspected opponents. To this scheme theThebans lent themselves with earnestness; promi-sing to keep down for the future their border neigh-bours, so as to spare the necessity of armies comingfrom Sparta2.

intention of But there was also a farther design, yet morearnVilT a" important, in contemplation by the Spartans andtoe°atent0 Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens

w e r e s o b i t t e r l y hostile to the Long Walls, toPerikles,Athenian and to the democratical movement, that several ofoligarchical

party, op- them opened a secret negotiation with the relopon-T nesian leaders, inviting them into Attica, and en-

treating their aid in an internal rising for the pur-pose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls,but also of subverting the democracy. And the Pelo-ponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations inBceotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian mal-contents in arms, encamping at Tanagra on the veryborders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The juncture was undoubt-

1 Diodor. xii. 81 ; Justin, iii. 6. 1% fiev TO>V &rjj3aiav iraXeas jieifopaTOI> weplfioXov Ka.TG(TKtva<jav, TOLS 5" iv Boieori'a TTOACIS rjvdyKCHrav VTTOTO.T-

TttfOai TOLS Qr)[5aLois.2 Diodor. I.e. It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bceotia,

somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension,that the dictum and simile of Perikles alludes—which Aristotle noticesin his Rhetoric, iii. 4, 2.


edly one of much hazard for Athens, especially asthe ostracised Kimon and his remaining friends inthe city were suspected of being implicated in theconspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware ofthe Lacedemonian operations in Bceotia, knew alsowhat was meant by the presence of the army ontheir immediate borders—and took decisive mea-sures tp avert the danger. Having obtained a re-inforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thessalianhorse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the fullAthenian force then at home ; which must of coursehave consisted chiefly of the old and the young, thesame who had fought under Myronidfis at Megara ;for the blockade of iEgina was still going on. Norwas it possible for the Lacedaemonian army to returninto Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athe-nians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession ofthe difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road ofmarch along the isthmus ; while the Athenian fleet, Battle ofby means of the harbour of Pegse, was prepared tointercept them if they tried to come by sea acrossthe Krisssean Gulf, by which way it would appearthat they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloodybattle took place between the two armies, whereinthe Lacedaemonians were victorious, chiefly fromthe desertion of the Thessalian horse, who passedover to them in the very heat of the engagement1.But though the advantage was on their side, it wasnot sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplatedrising in Attica: nor did the Peloponnesians gainanything by it except an undisturbed retreat overthe high lands of Geraneia, after having partiallyravaged the Megarid.

1 Thurvd. i. 107.

the Athe-nians.


Effects of Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yetthebat t le- . , & . 4. j - t u •* l.- u

generous there were circumstances connected with it whichrendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens.ostracised Kimon presented himself on the

ostracism, field, as soon as the army had passed over theboundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed taoccupy his station as a hopiite and fight in the ranksof his tribe—the CEn&is. But such was the belief,entertained by the members of the senate and byhis political enemies present, that he was an ac-complice in the conspiracy known to be on foot,that permission was refused and he was forced toretire. In departing he conjured his personal friends,Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, tobehave in such a manner as might wipe away thestain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upontheirs. His friends retained his panoply and as-signed to it the station in the ranks which he wouldhimself have occupied : they then entered the en-gagement with desperate resolution, and one hun-dred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Pe-rikles, on his part, who was present among thehoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware ofthis application and repulse of Kimon, thought itincumbent upon him to display not merely his or-dinary personal courage, but an unusual reckless-ness of life and safety, though it happened that heescaped unwounded. All these incidents broughtabout a generous sympathy and spirit of compro-mise among the contending parties at Athens, whilethe unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friendsdiscountenanced and disarmed those conspiratorswho had entered into correspondence with theenemy, at the same time that it roused a; repentant


admiration towards the ostracised leader himself.Such was the happy working of this new sentimentthat a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Perikl&s himself—to abridge the ten pr r J " miseand

years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his imme-diate return1. We may recollect that under cir- tweenthe^cumstances partly analogous, Themistokle's had p

himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristei- at Athens-des from ostracism, a little before the battle ofSalamis2: and in both cases, the suspension ofenmity between the two leaders was partly the sign,partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation andrenewed fraternity among the general body of citi-zens. It was a moment analogous to that salutaryimpulse of compromise, and harmony of parties,which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy ofFour Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and onwhich Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salva-tion of Athens in her distress—a moment rare infree communities generally, not less than amongthe jealous competitors for political ascendency atAthens3.

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Perikles, c. 10. Plutarch represents theAthenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedaemonianswho had just beaten them atTanagra, and for the purpose of procuringpeace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Boththese assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Boeotia,which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that theAthenians were under no impressions of fear at that juncture, and thatthe recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreoverthe peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

2 Plutarch, Themistokles, c. 10,3 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Perikles, c. 10; Thucyd. viii. 97. Plu-

tarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battleof Tanagra, after having mentioned that Perikles himself proposed therestoration of Kimon—

OuVco roVe TToKiTiKal fiev rj<rav al diacpopm, fierpioi 8e ru dvfioi Kal irpbs


So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotismand unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which

TO KOIVOU eiavaK\t)roi o-v/ifapov, f/ Se (piXon/iia Trdureov ejnKpaTov<ra Ta>v

Tta&asv rots Tr]S Trarpibos vire)(B>pei nalpois.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydides in recount-ing the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B.C., after the depositionof the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii. 97).

Km oix fJKiara Sir) TOV nparov xpovov iiri ye ip.ov 'Adrjvaioi (paivovnu€v no\iTevo~avres' fierpia yap fj Te es TOVS o\iyovs KOL TOVS noWovs£vy<pa(ns iytvero; Kal €K 7rovr)paiv rmv Trpayp-aTaiv yevofievav TOVTOirp&Tov dvtjveyice TT)V no\iv. I may remark that the explanatory note ofDr. Arnold on this passage is less instructive than his notes usually are,and even involves, in my judgement, an erroneous supposition as to themeaning. Dr. Arnold says, " It appears that the constitution as nowfixed was at first, in the opinion of Thucydides, the best that Athenshad ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the com-plete ascendency of the democracy effected under Pericles. But howlong a period is meant to be included by the words TOV irpaiTov xpovov,and when and how did the implied change take place ? Tov irpwrovXpovov can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as ifthis improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of theoligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration ofthe old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions nointermediate change in the government between the beginning of hishistory and the end of the war," &c.

Now I do not think that Dr. Arnold rightly interprets TOV irparovXpovov. The phrase appears to me equivalent to TOVTOV TOV xpovov wparrov:the words TOV irparov xpovov apply the comparison altogether to the periodpreceding this event here described, and not to the period following it." And it was during this period first, in my time at least, that the Athe-nians most of all behaved like good citizens : for the Many and the Fewmet each other in a spirit of moderation, and this first brought up thecity from its deep existing distress." No such comparison is intendedas Dr. Arnold supposes, between the first moments after this juncture,and the subsequent changes : the comparison is between the politicaltemper of the Athenians at this juncture, and their usual temper as farback as Thucydides could recollect.

Next, the words eu iroXnevo-avres are understood by Dr. Arnold in asense too special and limited—as denoting merely the new constitution,or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced.But it appears to me that the words are of wider import: meaning thegeneral temper of political partiesboth reciprocally towards each other andtowards the commonwealth : their inclination to relinquish antipathies,to accommodate points of difference, and to co-operate with each otherheartily against the enemy, suspending those ISias (ptXoTifiias, ISias 8ia-


produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have B.C.456.

overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athe- <Enophytanians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the f^lthe!stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second f'ans~

J they ac-

day after the battle that they undertook an aggres- q^e as-sive march under Myronide's into Bceotia : the over ailextreme precision of this date—being the single pS,°cu%ndcase throughout the summary of events between Lokns-the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thu-cydides is thus precise—marks how strong an im-pression it made upon the memory of the Athenians.At the battle of CEnophyta, engaged against theaggregate Theban and Boeotian forces—or, if Dio-dorus is to be trusted, in two battles of which thatof CEnophyta was the last—Myronide's was com-pletely victorious. The Athenians became mastersof Thebes as well as of the remaining Boeotiantowns; reversing all the arrangements recentlymade by Sparta—establishing democratical govern-ments—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, fa-vourable to Theban ascendency and Lacedaemonianconnection, to become exiles. Nor was it onlyBceotia which the Athenians thus acquired : Phocisand Lokris were both successively added to the listof their dependent allies—the former being in themain friendly to Athens and not disinclined to thechange, while the latter were so decidedly hostilethat one hundred of their chiefs were detained/SoXar jrepi rr/t TOV Si7/iou irpocrTao-las (ii. 65) noticed as having been somischievous before. Of course any constitutional arrangements intro-duced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmoniousspirit then prevalent, and would therefore form a part of what is com-mended by Thucydides : but his commendation is not confined to themspecially. Compare the phrase ii. 38. (\ev8epas dk ret re npos ro KOI-

ev, &c.


and sent to Athens as hostages. The Atheniansthus extended their influence—maintained throughinternal party-management, backed by the dread ofinterference from without in case of need—fromthe borders of the Corinthian territory, includingboth Megara and Pegse, to the strait of Thermo-pylae1.

B.C. 455. These important acquisitions were soon crownedof ae Long by the completion of the Long Walls and the con-^ <luest °f -^Egina. That island, doubtless starved

out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capi-tulate on condition of destroying its fortifications,

dismantled, i i

and render- surrendering all its ships or war, and submitting totary" U annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The

reduction of this once powerful maritime city mark-ed Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponne-sian coast not less than on the iEgean. Her admiralTolmides displayed her strength by sailing round

The Athe- Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burningsaa round the Lacedaemonian ports of Methon£ and of Gy-| ^ thium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Co-

rinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to theOzolianCorinth Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf—

disembarked troops near Sikyon with some advan-tage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained or forced into the Athenianalliance not only Zakynthus and Kephalle'nia, butalso some of the towns of Achaia; for we after-wards find these latter attached to Athens withoutknowing when the connection began2. During theensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack

1 Thucyd. i. 108 ; Diodor. xi. 81, 82.3 Thucyd. i. 108-115; Diodor. xi. 84.


upon Sikyon, with a force of 1000 hoplites underPerikle's himself, sailing from the Megarian har-bour of Pegse in the Krisssean Gulf. This eminentman, however, gained no greater advantage thanTolmide"s—defeating the Sikyonian forces in thefield and driving them within their walls : he after-wards made an expedition into Akarnania, takingthe Achaean allies in addition to his own forces, butmiscarried in his attack on CEniadse and accomplish-ed nothing. Nor were the Athenians more sue- »-c 454.cessful in a march undertaken this same yearagainst Thessaly, for the purpose of restoringOrestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles ofPharsalus. Though they took with them an im-posing force, including their Boeotian and Phocianallies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced themto keep in a compact body and confined them tothe ground actually occupied by their hoplites ;while all their attempts against the city failed, andtheir hopes of internal rising were disappointed1.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they • Defeat andwould have acquired to their alliance nearly the A S ^ 6

whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece: but even in Egypt"without Thessaly their power was prodigious, andhad now attained a maximum height from whichit never varied except to decline. As a counter-balancing loss against so many successes, we haveto reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a warof six years against the Persians (B.C. 460-455).At first, they had gained brilliant advantages, inconjunction with the insurgent prince Inar6s; ex-pelling the Persians from all Memphis except thestrongest part called the White Fortress : and such

1 Thucyd. i. I l l ; Diodor. xi. 85.


was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes atthe presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that hesent Megabazus with a large sum of money toSparta, in order to induce the Lacedaemonians toinvade Attica. This envoy however failed, and anaugmented Persian force being sent to Egypt underMegabyzus, son of Zopyrus1, drove the Atheniansand their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out ofMemphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopitis.Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, untilat length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river,laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land.A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyre"n6:the rest were either slain or made captive, andInaros himself was crucified. And the calamity ofAthens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fiftyfresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the de-feat, but without being aware of it, sailed into theMendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell un-awares into the power of the Persians and Phoeni-cians ; very few either of the ships or men escaping.The whole of Egypt became again subject to thePersians, except Amyrtseus, who contrived by re-tiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain hisindependence. One of the largest armaments eversent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thusutterly ruined2.

B.C. 455. It was about the time of the destruction of theThe revolt-ed Helotsin Laconia l Herodot. iii. 160.andleave6 * Thucyd. i. 104, iro, 110; Diodor. xi. 77; xii. 3. The story ofthecountry. Diodorus in the first of these two passages—that most of the Athenian

forces were allowed to come back under a favourable capitulation grant-ed by the Persian generals—is contradicted by the total ruin which hehimself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as byThucydides.


Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnaviga-tion of Peloponnesus by Tolmid&s, that the internalwar, carried on by the Lacedaemonians against theHelots or Messenians at Ithome1, ended. Thesebesieged men, no longer able to stand out againsta protracted blockade, were forced to abandon thislast fortress of ancient Messenian independence,stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus withtheir wives and families—with the proviso, that ifany one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, heshould become the slave of the first person whoseized him. They were established by Tolmide"s atNaupaktus, which had recently been taken by theAthenians from the Ozolian Lokrians1—where theywill be found rendering good service to Athens inthe following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedsemo- Truce forfive years

nians made no farther expeditions out of Pelopon- concludedr , ,. , between

nesus lor several succeeding years, not even topre- Athensandvent Bceotia and Phocis from being absorbed into ^the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remiss-ness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, inthe continuance of the siege of Ithome", which occu- ditions ofpied them at home ; but still more perhaps, in the againstfact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, Persia"were in occupation of the road over the high landsof Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the marchof any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after thesurrender of Ith6me, the Lacedaemonians remainedinactive for three years, after which time a formal BC-455-truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponne-sians generally, for five years longer2. This truce B.C.452-

1 Thucyd. i. 103 ; Diodor. xi. 84. 2 Thucyd. i. 112.

VOL. V. 2 G


was concluded in a greatdegree through the influenceof Kimon1, who was eager to resume effective ope-rations against the Persians ; while it was not lesssuitable to the political interests of Perikle's that hismost distinguished rival should be absent on foreignservice2, so as not to interfere with his influenceat home. Accordingly Kimon equipped a fleetof 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates,and set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatchedsixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insur-gent prince Amyrtseus, who was still maintaining

1 Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18 ; Dio-dor. xi. 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which ^Eschines (De Fals.Legat. c. 54. p. 300) and Andokides or the Pseudo-Andokides (De Pace,c. 1), state to have been made by Miltiades son of Kimon, proxenus ofthe Lacedaemonians j assuming that Miltiades son of Kimon is put bythem, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiades. But thepassages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chrono-logical inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amendthem except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix,8. p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there areothers besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to An-dokides. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognise onlytwo long walls, the northern and the southern wall; whereas in thetime of Thucydides there were three long walls : the two near and pa-rallel, connecting Athens with Peirseus, and a third connecting it withPhalerum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had beenpartially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war:and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of jEschines, whospeaks of the two walls as they existed in his time. I concur with thevarious critics who pronounce the oration ascribed to Andokides to bespurious.

2 Plutarch, Perikles, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Pracep. p. 812.An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural

that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement con-cluded between them through the mediation of Elpinike sister of Kimon,which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as theintrigues of ElpinikS appear to have figured conspicuously in the me-moirs of Athenian biographers : they were employed by one party as ameans of calumniating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Perikles.


himself against the Persians amidst the fens—whilewith the remaining armament he laid siege to Ki-tium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died £on^either of disease or of a wound. The armament, Cyprus—under his successor Anaxikrates, became so em- the Athe-barrassed for want of provisions that they aban- returns"doned the undertaking altogether, and went to home-fight the Phoenician and Kilikian fleet near Salamisin Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on seaand afterwards on land, though probably not onthe same day, as at the Eurymedon; after wThichthey returned home, followed by the sixty shipswhich had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aidingAmyrtteus l.

From this time forward no farther operations No fartherwere undertaken by Athens and her confederacy JrftheAthe-against the Persians. And it appears that a con- "'^stvention was concluded between them, whereby the Persia—

J convention

Great King on his part promised two things : To concludedleave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic them.maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a givendistance of the coast: To refrain from sending anyships of war either westward of Phase"lis (othersplace the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, ra-ther more to the westward) or within the Kyaneanrocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphoruswith the Euxine. On their side the Atheniansagreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of

1 Thucyd. i. 112 ; Diodorus, xii. 13. Diodorus mentions the nameof the general Anaxikrates. He affirms farther that Kimon lived notonly to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories.But the authority of Thucydides, superior on every ground to Diodorus,is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom hewas connected by relationship.

2 G 2


Mistakesand exag-gerationsrespectingthis con-vention—doubtsraised as toits histori-cal reality.Discussionof thosedoubts—confirma-tory hintsof Thucy-dides.

Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distin-guished family, with some others of his country-men, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention:and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance withAthens, took the opportunity of going thither at thesame time, to renew the friendly understandingwhich their city had established with Xerxes at theperiod of his invasion of Greece1.

As is generally the case with treaties after hosti-lity—this convention did little more than recog-nise the existing state of things, without intro-ducing any new advantage or disadvantage oneither side, or calling for any measures to be takenin consequence of it. We may hence assign a rea-sonable ground for the silence of Thucydide*s, whodoes not even notice the convention as havingbeen made : we are to recollect always that in theinterval between the Persian and Peloponnesianwars, he does not profess to do more than glance

1 Herodot. vii. 151 ; Diodor. xii. 3, 4. Demosthenes (De FalsaLegat. c. 77, p- 428 R: compare De Rhodior. Libert, c. 13, p. 199)speaks of this peace as rrp> viro navrav OpvXKovfievrju &.pi\vr\v. CompareLykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokrates, Panegyr. c. 33, 34,p. 244 ; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229; Panathenaic, c. 20, p. 360.

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determinewhat was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratesis careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demo-sthenes states it as " a day's course for a horse "—which is probablylarger than the truth.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are bothclear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire—the Kyaneanrocks at one end—Phaselis or the Chelidonian islands (there is no ma-terial distance between these two last-mentioned places) on the other.

Dahlmann at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimo-nian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is men-tioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeides (For-schungen, p. 140-148.


briefly at the main events. But the boastful andinaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators,rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exag-geration and untruth respecting this convention,both as to date and as to details—and extolled assomething so glorious the fact of having imposedsuch hard conditions on the Great King—that theyhave raised a suspicion against themselves. Espe-cially, they have occasioned critics to ask the verynatural question, how this splendid achievement ofAthens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydide's ?Now the answer to such question is, that the treatyitself was really of no great moment: it is the state offacts and relations implied in the treaty, and exist-ing substantially before it was concluded, whichconstitutes the real glory of Athens. But to thelater writers, the treaty stood forth as the legibleevidence of facts which in their time were past andgone—while Thucydides and his contemporaries,living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire,would certainly not appeal' to the treaty as an evi-dence, and might well pass it over even as an event,when studying to condense the narrative. ThoughThucydide's has not mentioned the treaty, he saysnothing which disproves its reality and much whichis in full harmony with it. For we may show, evenfrom him,—1. That all open and direct hostilitiesbetween Athens and Persia ceased, after the last-mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus :that this island is renounced by Athens, not beingincluded by Thucydide's in his catalogue of Athe-nian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war'; and that

1 Thucvd. ii. 14,


no farther aid is given by Athens to the revoltedAmyrtseus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time whenthe Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinousfailure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by thePersian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek citieson the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowedto appear in the waters of the JEgean1, nor was

1 Thucyd. viii. 5,6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous re-presentations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahl-mannand Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note, p. 457),I transcribe the passage of Thucydides. He is speaking of the winterof B.C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army atSyracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making (even somemonths before that ruin actually took place) to excite active hostile pro-ceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii. 25) : it beingseen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blowat the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged theChians and Erythrseans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them toSparta with persuasions and promises of aid—eu-qyeTO xai 6 Tio-a-a-(pepvtjs TOVS He\o7rovvr](Tiovs Ka\ wrurxyciro Tpo(pfjv Trape^eiv. 'YTTO /3acr(-Xecos yap veaxrrX eriyxave neirpayfievos TOVS e< TTJS iavrov apx^js<j>6povs, oils fit' 'A.8r)valovs dwb ra>v 'EXkr/vidav nokecvv ov bvva.fi.evos irpdcr-<r£o-0ai iTraXpftXrjo-e. Tovs re ovv <j>6povs jiaXKov ev6fii£e KOfiMurOat,KaKaxras TOVS 'KBr/valovs, Ka\ ajia /3a<rtXei fiyt/xdxovs AaKeSai/ioviovsiroiTjo-eiv, &c. In the next chapter, Thucydides tells us that the satrapPharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedaemonian aid in the same manneras Tissaphernes, for his satrapy also, in order that he might detach theGreek cities from Athens and be able to levy the tribute upon them.Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, anas vavs KOfilo-ecav hTOV 'EW-qo-irovTov, Ka\ avTos, el divaiTo anep 6 Tiowacpepuris irpoiSvfietTO,Tas Te iv TTJ iavTov apxfj TToKets'h8r)valavdTrooTr/o-eie Sia TOVS (popovs,Kal d<p' iavTov /3<«r«Xei rr/v gvfifutxtav rav AaKedaifiovicov notr/oreie.

These passages (strange to say) are considered by Manso and Dahl-mann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, thoughsubject to the Athenian empire, continued nevertheless to pay their tributeregularly to Susa. To me the passages appear to disprove this very sup-position : they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach thesecities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute fromthem to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, preventedhim from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso andDahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb oftime vccooTi—" lately." By that word Thucydides expressly intimates


the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of thecountry down to the coast. Granting, therefore,

that the court of Susa had only recently demanded from Tissaphernesand Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their sa-trapies : and he implies that until recently no such demand had beenmade upon them. The court of Susa, apprised doubtless by Grecianexiles and agents of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen,conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes, to which doubt-less it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athenshad compelled it to forego them. Accordingly the demand wasnow for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he " became adebtor for them" to the court OVax/ie/Xi/o-e), until he could collectthem : which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athenswas—and which, it fortiori, he could not have done before, whenAthens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the mari-time Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute toSusa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confede-racy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. Thatnevertheless these cities always continued, throughout this period, tostand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute—the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, whenit should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing toAthens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persiancourt under the Athenian empire, authenticated by ThucydidSs, enablesus to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso andDahlmann have dwelt (p. 94) with rather more apparent plausibility,as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the re-arrangement and re-measurement of the territories of the Ionic citiesby the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B.C. after the suppression of theIonic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each withreference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remainedunchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time—Ka\ ras x<a/>ay cr<f>eavp.fTpr}<ras Kara Trapao-dyyas (popovs e r o | f fKacrTOKTi, cl Kara X^PVSmTeXeowrt c^oires en TOVTOV TOV xpovov ale\ en Kai is i/ie, as ird)(6r)o-avif- ' Kpraxpepveos' erd)(0ri<rav Se <rf(c86v Kara ra aira ra Kai irportpovu%ov (vi. 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotushere affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to Persia to have been con-tinuously and regularly paid down to his own time. But in my judge-ment this is a mistake : Herodotus speaks not about the payment, butabout the assessment: and these were two very different things, asThucydides clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above.The assessment of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books re-mained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the payment


that we were even bound, from the silence of Thu-cydide"s, to infer that no treaty was concluded, weshould still be obliged also to infer, from his posi-tive averments, that a state of historical fact, suchas the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, becameactually realized. But when we reflect farther,that Herodotus1 certifies the visit of Kallias andother Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, wecan assign no other explanation of such visit soprobable as the reality of this treaty: certainly noenvoys would have gone thither during a state ofrecognised war; and though it may be advancedas possible that they may have gone with the view

was not enforced until immediately before 412 B.C, when the Athenianswere supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the ac-count of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies,which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access toofficial accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretarieswho knew those accounts. He would be told that these assessmentsremained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward : whetherthey were realised or not was another question, which the "books "would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydides appear to me to affordpositive proof that the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast (not those inthe interior, as we may see by the case of Magnesia given to Themi-stoklSs) paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athe-nian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should stillmaintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tri-bute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having " revolted fromPersia," of their " having been liberated from the king " (pi dnoo-ravresfiaaikeats "EXkrjves—01 airb 'Icovias Kai 'EXXrjOTrdvrou rjdr) afaorqKOTes

OTTO /3a<xiXe'<os—ocroi OTTO (3ao-iXei»r veaurri rjXevdepavTo, Thucyd. i. 18,89, 95) ?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point—that between 477 and 412 B.C., no Persian ships were tolerated alongthe coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king,was not recognised by the Greeks as belonging to him—proof will befound in Thucyd. viii. 56 : compare Diodor. iv. 26.

1 Herodot. vii. 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was con-cluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii. 4).


to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility be-yond what is reasonable1.

1 I conclude, on the whole, in favour of this treaty as an historicalfact — though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it arenot without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii. p. 474), aswell as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned thereality of the treaty: and the last-mentioned author particularly hasexamined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection;urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to meweak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. iii. Beylage x. p. 471; Dahl-mann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i. Ueber denKimonischen Frieden, p. 1-148). Boeckh admits the treaty as an his-torical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we mustadopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40) :—" The di-stinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formallyconcluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetorsat Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratoricalantithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons musthave taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved ona pillar, and placed either in the Metroon or somewhere else in Athensamong the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engravedon a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. 'ATTIKOISypafifiaa-i). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded onthe fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but inIonic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens afterthe archonship of Eukleides), that this treaty was a subsequent inven-tion and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much.Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up andengraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities ofAsia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it :or it might even have been re-engraved, seeing that nearly a centurymust have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the timewhen Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis ofDahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical realityof the treaty. I think it more likely that there was a treaty, and thatthe orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it—ratherthan that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a delibe-rate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly (an easy task indeed) the loose,inconsistent, and vain-glorious statements of the orators respecting thistreaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been

458 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART- II.

Thucydi-des, son ofMelesias,succeedsKimon asleading op-ponent ofPerikles.

We may therefore believe in the reality of thistreaty between Athens and Persia, improperlycalled the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since notonly was it concluded after the death of Kimon,

made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedon (and was thus con-nected with the name of Kimon), is one of the circumstances whichhave most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses : but we must notforget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Epho-rus, which is highly probable—xii. 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake,but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenianexpedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B.C.Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consum-mated, as we know from Thucydide's : on this point Diodorus speaksequivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived tocomplete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokrates, that the treaty bound the Per-sian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been veryproperly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations(Areopagitic. p. 150 ; Panathenaic. p. 462).

But though Dahlmann succeeds in discrediting the orators, he triesin vain to show that the treaty is in itself improbable, or inconsistentwith any known historical facts. A large portion of his dissertation isemployed in this part of the case, and I think quite unsuccessfully. Thefact that the Persian satraps are seen at various periods after the treatylending aid (underhand, yet without taking much pains to disguise it)to Athenian revolted subjects, does not prove that no treaty had beenconcluded. These satraps would doubtless be very glad to infringe thetreaty, whenever they thought they could do so with advantage: ifany misfortune had happened to Athens from the hands of the Pelopon-nesians (for example, if the Athenians had been unwise enough tomarch their aggregate land-force out of the city to repel the invadingPeloponnesians from Attica, and had been totally defeated), the Persianswould doubtless have tried to regain Ionia forthwith. So the Lace-dEemonians,. at a time when they were actually in alliance with Athens,listened to the persuasions of the revolted Thasians and promisedsecretly to invade Attica, in order to aid their revolt (Thucyd. i. 103).Because a treaty is very imperfectly observed—or rather because theparties, without coming to open war, avail themselves of opportunitiesto evade it and encroach upon its prescriptions—we are not entitled todeny that it has ever been made (Dahlmann, p. 116).

It seems to me that the objections which have been taken by Dahl-mann and others against the historical reality of this treaty, tell forthe most part only against the exaggerated importance assigned to itby subsequent orators.


but the Athenian victories by which it was imme-diately brought on were gained after his death.Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon hadlived, it would not have been concluded at all; forhis interest as well as his glory led him to prose-cute the war against Persia, since he was no matchfor his rival Perikles either as a statesman or as anorator, and could only maintain his popularity bythe same means whereby he had earned it—victo-ries and plunder at the cost of the Persians. Hisdeath ensured more complete ascendency to Peri-kle"s, whose policy and character were of a cast al-together opposite1: while even Thucydides, son ofMelesias, who succeeded Kimon his relation asleader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a manof the senate and public assembly rather than ofcampaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enter-prises and precarious acquisitions, Perikles wasonly anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenicascendency of Athens, now at its very maximum:he was well-aware that the undivided force andvigilance of Athens would not be too much for thisobject—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as weshall presently see. With such dispositions he wasnaturally glad to conclude a peace, which excludedthe Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor west-ward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all thewaters of the iEgean, under the simple conditionof renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggres-sions against Cyprus, Phoenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt.The Great King on his side had had sufficient expe-rience of Athenian energy to fear the consequencesof such aggressions, if prosecuted ; nor did he lose

1 Plutarch, PeriklSs, c. 21-28.


much by relinquishing formally a tribute which atthe time he could have little hope of realizing, andwhich of course he intended to resume on the firstfavourable opportunity. Weighing all these circum-stances, we shall find that the peace, improperlycalled Kimonian, results naturally from the posi-tion and feelings of the contracting parties.

B.C. 449. Athens was now at peace both abroad and athome, under the administration of Pedicle's, with a

confede-he great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumu-treasure. The common fund collected from

Athens.— the contributions of the confederates, and originallyGradual J

passage of deposited at Delos, had before this time been trans-i ferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise

y

emp£e?man time this transfer took place, we cannot state: norare we enabled to assign the successive stageswhere-by the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of itsown members, became transformed from a body ofarmed and active warriors under the guidance ofAthens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payersdefended by the military force of Athens—fromallies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining,into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute,and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appearthat the change had been made before this time :some of the more resolute of the allies had tried tosecede, but Athens had coerced them by force, andreduced them to the condition of tribute-payerswithout ships or defence ; and Chios, Lesbos, andSamos were now the only allies free and armed onthe original footing. Every successive change ofan armed ally into a tributary—every subjugationof a seceder—tended of course to cut down thenumbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian


synod ; and what was still worse, it altered the re-ciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens andher allies—exalting the former into something likea despot, and degrading the latter into mere passivesubjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of thechange must have been the transfer of the confe-derate fund from Delos to Athens. The only cir- Transfer ofcumstance which we know respecting this transfer Was pro-is, that it was proposed by the Samians1—the tsecond power in the confederacy, inferior only toAthens, and least of all likely to favour any job orsinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farthersaid, that when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidescharacterized it as a motion unjust, but useful: wemay well doubt however whether it was made du-ring his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceasedto be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, butwith iEgina and Peloponnesus—the Samians mightnot unnaturally feel that the large accumulatedfund, with its constant annual accessions, would besafer at Athens than at Delos, which latter islandwould require a permanent garrison and squadronto ensure it against attack. But whatever mayhave been the grounds on which the Samians pro-ceeded, when we find them coming forward to pro-pose the transfer, we may reasonably infer that itwas not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, tothe larger members of the confederacy—and that itwas no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power,as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with iEgina, and1 Plutarch, AristeidSs, c. 25.


Position of the consequences of the battle of GEnophyta, thewith a mi- position of Athens became altered more and more.anceboth She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly

tributary, like iEgina—partly in the same relationtime states. a s Chios, Lesbos, and Samos ; that is, obliged only

to a conformity of foreign policy and to militaryservice. In this last category were Megara, theBoeotian cities, the Phocians, Lokrians, &c. Allthese, though allies of Athens, were strangers toDelos and the confederacy against Persia ; and ac-cordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into amatter of history, giving place to the new concep-tion of imperial Athens with her extensive list ofallies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition,arising spontaneously out of the character and cir-cumstances of the confederates themselves, was thusmaterially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athensextraneous to the confederacy. She was now notmerely the first maritime state of Greece, but per-haps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possess-ing in her alliance Megara, Boeotia, Phocis, Lokris,together with Achsea and Trcezen in Peloponnesus.Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea andon land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, andstill more the character of the Athenians themselves,superior to all Greeks in that combination of energyand discipline which is the grand cause of progress,threatened still farther increase. Occupying theMegarian harbour of P^gse, the Athenians had fullmeans of naval action on both sides of the CorinthianIsthmus : but what was of still greater importance tothem, by their possession of the Megarid and of thehigh lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were


thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) com-pletely unassailable in Attica. Ever since the re-pulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in anuninterrupted course of power and prosperity athome, as well as of victory and ascendency abroad—to which there was no exception except theruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the posi-tion of Greece therefore about 448 B.C,—after theconclusion of the five years' truce between thePeloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-calledKimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—adiscerning Greek might well calculate upon fartheraggrandisement of this imperial state as the ten-dency of the age ; and accustomed as every Greekwas to the conception of separate town-autonomyas essential to a freeman and a citizen, such pro-spect could not but inspire terror and aversion. Thesympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islandersand ultra-maritime states, who constituted theoriginal confederacy of Athens, was not consider-able ; but when the Dorian island of iEgina wassubjugated also and passed into the condition of adefenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely onevery ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminentservice rendered at the battle of Salamis, of thismemorable island, had not been able to protect i t ;while those great JEginetan families, whose victoriesat the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in alarge proportion of his odes, would spread the lan-guage of complaint and indignation throughout theirnumerous " guests " in every Hellenic city. Ofcourse, the same anti-Athenian feelingwouldpervadethose Peloponnesian states who had been engaged inactual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epi-


daurus, &c, as well as Sparta, the once-recognisedhead of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from herpre-eminence, baffled in her projects respectingBoeotia, and exposed to the burning of her port atGythium without being able even to retaliate uponAttica. Putting all those circumstances together,we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislikeand apprehension now diffused so widely over Greeceagainst the upstart despot-city; whose ascendency,newly acquired, maintained by superior force, andnot recognised as legitimate—threatened neverthe-less still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, thissame sentiment will be found exploding into thePeloponnesian war; but it became rooted in theGreek mind during the period which we have nowreached, when Athens was much more formidablethan she had come to be at the commencement ofthat war: nor shall we thoroughly appreciate theideas of that later period, unless we take them ashanded down from the earlier date of the five years'truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

Commence- Formidable as the Athenian empire both reallyverses°and" was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spreadp feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so thatAthens. instead of the threatened increase, the empire under-

went a most material diminution. This did not arisefrom the attack of open enemies ; for during thefive years' truce, Sparta undertook only one move-ment, and that not against Attica: she sent troopsto Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the nameof the Sacred War—expelled the Phocians, whohad assumed to themselves the management of thetemple—and restored it to the native Delphians.To this the Athenians made no direct opposition:

CHAP. XLV-1 GRECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. 4C5

but as soon as the Lacedaemonians were gone, theythemselves marched thither and placed the templeagain in the hands of the Phocians, who were thentheir allies1. The Delphians were members of thePhocian league, and there was a dispute of oldstanding as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to thePhocians collectively. The favour of those whoadministered it counted as an element of consider-able moment in Grecian politics; the sympathiesof the leading Delphians led them to embrace theside of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped tocounteract this tendency by means of their prepon-derance in Phocis. We are not told that the Lace-daemonians took any ulterior step in consequenceof their views being frustrated by Athens—a sig-nificant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian em- E.C. 447.pire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by Bceotiathe subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendency Athens—over Bceotia, Phocis, Lokris, and Euboea, was main- ^fl'thetained, not by means of garrisons, but through do- nians at

' J » Koroneia-

mestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable they eva-form of government—just in the same way as Spartamaintained her influence over her Peloponnesianallies2. After the victory of CEnophyta, the Athe-nians had broken up the governments in the Boeo-tian cities established by Sparta before the battle ofTanagra, and converted them into democracies atThebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous lead-

1 Thucyd. i. 112 : compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.2 T h u c y d . i. 19 . AaKeSaijj.6vwi, ot>x im-OTeXeis €)(opres (j>6pov roiis

^VfXfjid^ovSt KCIT* oKiyap^tav Se (rfy'uriv avrols \i6vov (ntTrjdfiOi OTT(OS TTO-

\tT€v<rovcri Btpanevovres—the same also i. 76—144.

VOL. V. 2 H

466 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II .

ing men had thus been sent into exile : and as thesame process had taken place in Phocis and Lokris,there was at this time a considerable aggregatebody of exiles, Boeotian, Phocian, Lokrian, Eubce-an, iEginetan, &c, all bitterly hostile to Athens,and ready to join in any attack upon her power.We learn farther that the democracy1 establishedat Thebes after the battle of CEnophyta was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstance laidopen Bceotia still farther to the schemes of assail-ants on the watch for every weak point. Thesevarious exiles, all joining their forces and concert-ing measures with their partisans in the interior,succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chseroneia,and some other less important places in Boeotia.The Athenian general Tolmides marched to expelthem, with 1000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliarybody of allies. It appears that this march was un-dertaken in haste and rashness: the hoplites ofTolmide's, principally youthful volunteers and be-longing to the best families of Athens, disdainedthe enemy too much to await a larger and morecommanding force: nor would the people listeneven to Perikle's, when he admonished them thatthe march would be full of hazard, and adjuredthem not to attempt it without greater numbers aswell as greater caution2. Fatally indeed were his

1 Aristotel. Politic, v. 2, 6. Km iv Brjficus /uera rfjv iv Olvocpvroisfia^rfv, KdKcos Tro\iT€VO)ieva>v, f] drffioKparla 8i((j>6dpr].

2 Plutarch, Perikles, c. 18 ; also his comparison between Perikle'sand Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiades, was slain in this bat-tle : he had served thirty-three years before at the sea-fight of Artemi-sium : he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors,though a person of the first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).


predictions justified. Though Tolmide's was suc-cessful in his first enterprise—the re-capture ofChseroneia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet inhis march, probably incautious and disorderly,when departing from that place, he was surprisedand attacked unawares, near Koroneia, by theunited body of exiles and their partisans. No de-feat in Grecian history was ever more complete orruinous. Tolmide's himself was slain, together withmany of the Athenian hoplites, while a large num-ber of them were taken prisoners. In order to re-cover these prisoners, who belonged to the bestfamilies in the city, the Athenians submitted to aconvention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bceotiaaltogether: in all the cities of that country theexiles were restored, the democratical governmentoverthrown, and Boeotia was transformed from anally of Athens into her bitter enemy1. Long in-deed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in thememory of the Athenians3, and inspire them withan apprehension of Boeotian superiority in heavyarmour on land : but if the hoplites under Tolmide'shad been all slain on the field, their death wouldprobably have been avenged and Bceotia would nothave been lost—whereas in the case of living citi-zens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too greatto redeem them. We shall discover hereafter inthe Lacedaemonians a feeling very similar, respect-ing their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

1 Thucyd. i. 113 ; Diodor. xii. 6. Platsea appears to have been con-sidered as quite dissevered from Boeotia : it remained in connection withAthens as intimately as before.

2 Xenophon, Memorabil. iii. 5, 4.2 H 2


B.C. 445. The calamitous consequences of this defeat camePhocu,°f upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. TheEubaa and united exiles, having carried their point in Bceotia,Megara: proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian governmentinvasion of r *• in

Attica by both from Phocis and Lokns, and to carry the flameponn/sians of revolt into Eubcea. To this important island

Perikles himself proceeded forthwith, at the head°f a Po w e rful force ; but before he had time to com-plete the reconquest, he was summoned home bynews of a still more formidable character. TheMegarians had revolted from Athens : by a conspi-racy previously planned, a division of hoplites fromCorinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already ad-mitted as garrison into their city: the Atheniansoldiers who kept watch over the long walls hadbeen overpowered and slain, except a few whoescaped into the fortified port of Niseea. As if tomake the Athenians at once sensible how seriouslythis disaster affected them, by throwing open theroad over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Spartawas announced as already on his march for an in-vasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army,of mixed Lacedsemonians and Peloponnesian allies,into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusisand the Thriasian plain. He was a very youngman, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandri-des, had been attached to him by the Ephors asadjutant and counsellor. Perikles (it is said) per-suaded both the one and the other, by means oflarge bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancingto Athens. We may well doubt whether they hadforce enough to adventure so far into the interior,and we shall hereafter observe the great precau-

CHAP. XLV-1 GRECIAN CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS. 469

tions with which Archidamus thought it necessaryto conduct his invasion, during the first year of thePeloponnesian war, though at the head of a morecommanding force. Nevertheless, on their return,the Lacedaemonians, believing that they might haveachieved it, found both of them guilty of corrup-tion. Both were banished : Kleandrides never cameback, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long timein sanctuary near the temple of Athene1 at Tegea,until at length he procured his restoration by tam-pering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringingher bought admonitions to act upon the authoritiesat Sparta1.

So soon as the Lacedaemonians had retired from Eubcea re-Attica, Perikle's returned with his forces to Eubcea,and reconquered the island completely. With thatcaution which always distinguished him as a mili-tary man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tol-rnide's, he took with him an overwhelming force offifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admittedmost of the Euboean towns to surrender, alteringthe government of Chalkis by the expulsion of thewealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotse ; but theinhabitants of Histisea at the north of the island,who had taken an Athenian merchantman andmassacred all the crew, were more severely dealtwith—the free population being all or in great partexpelled, and the land distributed among Atheniankleruchs or out-settled citizens"2.

But the reconquest of Eubcea was far from resto-ring Athens to the position which she had occupied

1 Thucyd. i. 114; v. 16; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 22.s Thucyd. i. 114 ; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 23 ; Diodor. xii. 7.


before ^ e fatal engagement of Koroneia. Her land-p y empire was irretrievably gone, together with her

—Conciu- recently acquired influence over the Delphian ora-tMrtyyears' d e '> and she reverted to her former condition of anml'nutoifof exclusively maritime potentate. For though sheAthenian still continued to hold Nissea and Pegae, yet herpower. ° J

communication with the latter harbour was nowcut off by the loss of Megara and its appertainingterritory, so that she thus lost her means of actingin the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well asof constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was theport of Nissea of much value to her disconnectedfrom the city to which it belonged, except as apost for annoying that city. Moreover, the preca-rious hold which she possessed over unwilling allieshad been demonstrated in a manner likely to en-courage similar attempts among her maritime sub-jects—attempts which would now be seconded byPeloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear ofsuch a combination of embarrassments, and espe-cially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin overthe flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens,was at this moment predominant in the Athenianmind. We shall find Perikle's, at the beginning ofthe Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards,exhausting all his persuasive force, and not suc-ceeding without great difficulty, in prevailing uponhis countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and whenevents had been gradually so ripening as to renderthe prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. Butthe late series of misfortunes had burst upon themso rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even


Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect ofcontinued war full of gloom and danger. Theprudence of Periklls would doubtless counsel thesurrender of their remaining landed possessions oralliances, which had now become unprofitable, inorder to purchase peace ; but we may be sure thatnothing short of extreme temporary despondencycould have induced the Athenian assembly to listento such advice, and to accept the inglorious peacewhich followed. A truce for thirty years was con-cluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginningof 445 B.C, whereby Athens surrendered Nisaea,Pegee, Achaia, and Troezen—thus abandoning Pe-loponnesus altogether1, and leaving the Megarians

1 Thucyd. i. 114,115; ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 5. I do not at all doubtthat the word Achaia here used means the country in the north part ofPeloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of GSllerand others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town,appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydides had never noticed the exacttime when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, thoughhe notices the Achseans (i. I l l ) in that capacity. This is one argument,among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from thesilence of Thucydides against the reality of an event—in reference tothis period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where hiswhole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton re-marks, " The disasters in Boeotia produced the revolt of Eubcea andMegara about eighteen months after, in Anthesterion 445 B.C. : andthe Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the fiveyears' truce" (ad ann. 447 B.C) .

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable :I incline to think that the revolt of Eubosa and Megara followed moreclosely upon the disasters in Bceotia, in spite of the statement of ar-chons given by Diodorus :—oi vok\a> va-repov, the expression of Thu-cydides, means probably no more than three or four months j and thewhole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. Thetruce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems rea-sonable to place the revolt of Euboea and Megara, as well as the inva-sion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.—and the disasters in Bceotiaeither in the beginning of 446 B.C, or the close of 447 B.C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does ad ann.

m HISTORY OF GREECE. [PAKTII.

(with their full territory and their two ports) to beincluded among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

Feud be- It was to the Megarians, especially, that the al-Athensand tered position of Athens after this truce was owing :Megara. | t w a g ^ie[r secession from Attica and junction with

the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to in-vasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the partof the Athenians towards Megara, manifested du-ring the ensuing years—a sentiment the morenatural, as Megara had spontaneously sought thealliance of Athens a few years before as a protec-tion against the Corinthians, and had then after-wards, without any known ill-usage on the part ofAthens, broken off from the alliance and becomeher enemy, with the fatal consequence of renderingher vulnerable on the land-side. Under such cir-cumstances we shall not be surprised to find theantipathy of the Athenians against Megara stronglypronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusionwhich they adopted against her was among themost prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign re-lations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce,we must notice the important internal and consti-tutional changes which she had experienced duringthe same interval.

450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii. p. 478), that the fiveyears' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax andthe Lacedemonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwardsconcluded, did not run out its full time.

473

CHAPTER XLVi.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENSUNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appearsto have been that in which the democratical castof Athenian public life was first brought into itsfullest play and development, as to judicature, le-gislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the me-thodical distribution of a large proportion of the ofthede-

, . . . , . . , , 7 . . , •, mocratical

citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great judicialextension of their direct agency in that department, Athens."and by the assignment of a constant pay to everycitizen so engaged. It has been already mentionedthat even under the democracy of Kleisthen&s, anduntil the time succeeding the battle of Platsea, largepowers still remained vested both in the individualarchons and in the senate of Areopagus; whichlatter was composed exclusively of the past archonsafter their year of office, sitting in it for life—though Union inthe check exercised by the general body of citizens,assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and forjudging in the Helisea, was at the same time ma-J ° o and judicial

terially increased. We must farther recollect, that in early, - , . . . , . . . . . . Athens—

the distinction between powers administrative and greatjudicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate !governments of modern Europe, since the politicalspeculations of the last century, was in the early the senatehistory of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman gus.


kings1, and the Roman consuls before the appoint-ment of the Praetor, the Athenian archons not onlyadministered, but also exercised jurisdiction, volun-tary as well as contentious—decided disputes, in-quired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Ofthe same mixed nature were the functions of thesenate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senateof Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthene's. TheStratlgi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtlessthe double competence, in reference to military,naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and ofpunishing by their own authority disobedient par-

1 See K. F. Herrmann, Griechische Staatsalterthiimer, sect. 53-107,and his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratuum ap. Athen.p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829) ; also Rein, Romisches Privatreuht, pp. 26,408.Leips. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confu-sion of administrative and judiciary functions among the Romans(Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, pp. 23, 79, 107. &c.) :and compare Mr. G. C. Lewis, Essay on the Government of Dependen-cies, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, Geschichte des RomischenRechts, p. 42. Mr. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks uponthe goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, andupon the extent to which the separation of them either has been, or canbe, carried in practice: see also Note E in the same work, p. 347-

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears un-known in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicialinstitutions of modern Europe, " Anciennement les fonctions admini-stratives et judiciaires n'etoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberte"des Germains et meme long temps apres, les plaids de la nation ouceux du comte rendoient la justice et administroient les interets na-tionaux ou locaux dans une seule et me'me assemblee : sous le regimefeodal, le roi ou l'empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlementcompose des hauts barons ecclesiastiques et la'ies, exercait tous lesdroits de souverainet£ comme de justice: dans la commune, le bailli,mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nomine par le prince, administraientles interets communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l'avis de la com-munaute entiere, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autoriteset conseils qui la representoient: on n'avoit pas encore soupconnS quele jugement d'une cause entre particuliers pu.t etre etranger a la causecommune."—Meyer, Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires, book v. chap.11. vol. iii. p. 239; also chap. 18. p. 383.

CHAP. XLVI.] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 475

ties: the imperium of the magistrates, generally,enabled them to enforce their own mandates aswell as to decide in cases of doubt whether any pri-vate citizen had or had not been guilty of infringe-ment. Nor was there any appeal from these ma-gisterial judgements ; though the magistrates weresubject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, topersonal responsibility for their general behaviour,before the people judicially assembled, at the ex-piration of their year of office—and to the fartheranimadversion of the Ekklesia (or public delibe-rative assembly) meeting periodically during thecourse of that year: in some of which Ekklesise,the question might formally be raised for deposingany magistrate even before his year was expired'.Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accu-mulation, in the same hand, of powers to admi-nister, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes,without any other canon than the few laws thenexisting, and without any appeal—must have beenpainfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt,arbitrary, and oppressive dealing: and if this betrue of individual magistrates, exposed to annualaccountability, it is not likely to have been lesstrue of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting col-lectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, andin which the members sat for life2.

1 A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the public as-sembly, even before the year of office was expired, occurs in Demo-sthenes, cont. Theokrin. c. 7 : another, the deposition of a strategus, inDemosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 3.

2 ^Eschines (cont. Ktesiphont, c. 9. p. 373) speaks of the senate ofAreopagus as vireidvvos, and so it was doubtless understood to be :but it is difficult to see how accountability could be practically enforced


g j n a v e a l r e ady mentioned that shortly after thegenerally J

wealthy return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis,i Aristeides had been impelled by the strong demo-

cratical sentiment which he found among his coun-pg trymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary

—increase qualification for magistracies, so as to render every«cai semi- citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however,among the was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an indexcitizens.* e of the predominant sentiment: notwithstanding the

enlarged promise of eligibility, little change proba-bly took place in the fact, and rich men were stillmost commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates,possessing the large powers administrative andjudicial above described—and still more the senateof Areopagus, which sat for life—still belongingalmost entirely to the wealthier class, remainedanimated more or less with the same oligarchicalinterest and sympathies, which manifested them-selves in the abuse of authority. At the sametime the democratical sentiment among the massof Athenians went on steadily increasing from thetime of Aristeides to that of Perikle"s : Athens be-came more and more maritime, the population ofPeirseus augmented in number as well as in import-ance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen wasstimulated by that collective aggrandisement of hiscity to which he himself individually contributed.Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning fromthe battle of Platsea, this new fervour of democra-against such a body. They could only be responsible in this sense—that if any one of their number could be proved to have received a bribe^he would be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteriesthemselves would also be responsible : though it is always affirmed ofthem that they were not responsible.

C H A P . X L V I . ] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 477

tical sentiment made itself felt in the political con-tests of Athens, and found able champions in Pe-rikles and Ephialtes, rivals of what may be calledthe conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Peri- Politicali • i i i i • i r i • parties in

kles who introduced the lot, in place of election, Athens.

for the choice of archons and various other magian™Ephi-

strates : bu t the change must have been introduced ^ocraticai-nearly at this t ime, and with a view of equalising Kimon, oiu

J •• ° garchicalor

the chances of office to every candidate, poor as conserve-tivc

well as rich, who chose to give in his name and whofulfilled certain personal and family conditions as-certained in the dokimasy or preliminary examina-tion. But it was certainly to.Perikles and Ephialtes Democrati-

T . . ,. calDikaste-

that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of herpopular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, swhich exercised so important an influence upon the

p

character of the citizens. These two eminent men a^s- _J?°wthese Dika-

deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of steneswereAreopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence r "5

which they had hitherto possessed, save and exceptthe power of imposing a small fine. This judicialpower, civil as well as criminal, was transferred tonumerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected fromthe citizens ; 6000 of whom were annually drawn bylot and sworn, and then distributed into ten panelsof 500 each, the remainder forming a supplementin case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead ofdeciding causes or inflicting punishment by his ownauthority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, whichmight call for a penalty greater than the small fineto which he was competent, to the judgement ofone or other among these numerous popular dikaste-


ries. Which of the ten he should take, was deter-mined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand whatdikastery would try any particular cause: he him-self presided over it during the trial and submittedto it the question at issue, with the results of hisown preliminary examination, in addition to thespeeches of accuser and accused with the state-ments of their witnesses. So also the civil judica-ture, which had before been exercised in contro-versies between man and man by the archons, waswithdrawn from them and transferred to these di-kasteries under the presidence of an archon. It isto be remarked, that the system of reference to arbi-tration for private causes1 was extensively applied

1 Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the publicas well as private arbitrators, see the instructive treatise of Hudtwalc-ker, Uber die Sffentlichen und Privat Schieds-richter (Diaeteten) zuAthen : Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decidedisputes : he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties :also an additional fee when application was made for delay (p. 16).Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbi-trator : but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, electedor drawn by lot from the citizens every year: and a plaintiff mightbring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be pu-nished under svdvvai, at the end of their year of office, if accused andconvicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public Diaetetae or arbitrators was unknownwhen Hudtwalcker's book was published. An inscription since disco-vered by Professor Ross and published in his work, Uber die Demenvon Attika, p. 22, records the names of all the Disetetse for the year ofthe archon Antikles, B.C. 325, with the name of the tribe to whicheach belonged.

The total number is 104 : the number in each tribe is unequal: thelargest number is in Kekropis, which furnishes sixteen : the smallest inPandionis, which sends only three. They must have been either electedor drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any referenceto tribes. The inscription records the names of the Dizetetae for thisyear B.C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a voteof thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for theyear B.C. 337, also exists.


at Athens : a certain number of public arbitratorswere annually appointed, to one of whom (or tosome other citizen adopted by mutual consent ofthe parties), all private disputes were submitted inthe first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision,either party might afterwards carry the matterbefore the dikastery: but it appears that in manycases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiescedin without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there neverwas any trial by the people before the time ofPerikles and Ephialtes: I doubt not that beforetheir time the numerous judicial assembly calledHelisea pronounced upon charges against account-able magistrates as well as upon various other ac-cusations of public importance ; and perhaps insome cases, separate bodies of them may have beendrawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the Payto theless true, that the systematic distribution and con- troducecT~stant employment of the numerous dikasts of d

Athens cannot have begun before the age of thesetwo statesmen, since it was only then that the prac-tice of paying them began : for so large a sacrificeof time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckhstates1 (doubtless in very exaggerated language) that"nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges everyday," cannot be conceived without an assured re-

1 Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii. chap. xiv. p. 227. Engl.transl. '

M. Boeckh must mean that the whole 6000, or nearly the whole,were employed every day. It appears to me that this suppositiongreatly overstates both the number of days, and the number of men,actually employed. For the inference in the text, however, a muchsmaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Schbmann, Antiquit. Juris Public.Grsecor., sect. lxxi. p. 310.


numeration. From and after the time of Perikle's,these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies fortrial of all causes civil as well as criminal, withsome special exceptions, such as cases of homicideand a few others: but before his time, the greaternumber of these causes had been adjudged either byindividual magistrates or by the senate of Areopa-gus. We may therefore conceive how great andimportant was the revolution wrought by thatstatesman, when he first organised these dikasticassemblies into systematic action, and transferredto them nearly all the judicial power which had be-

gi- fOre been exercised by magistrates and senate. Thedeprived of position and influence of these latter became radi-cal? and'" cally-altered: the most commanding functions ofad nisdtra°. t n e archon were abrogated, and he retained onlyt!onsfunC" • *ne P o w e r °f receiving complaints, inquiring into

them, exercising some small preliminary interfe-rence with the parties for the furtherance of thecause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, andpresiding over the dikastic assembly by whom per-emptory verdict was pronounced. His admini-strative functions remained unaltered, but hispowers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge,passed away1.

1 Aristotel. Politic, ii. 9< 3. Kal TTJV p.ev iv 'Apeico iraya

'¥,<piaKrr)s CKoXovae Kal Heptitkrjs' Ta be hiKao-rqpia p.io-0o<f)6pa Kaxi<rrq<TE

UeptKkr/s' Kai TOVTOV drj T6V rponov e/caaro? ra>v BrjfAayGty&v'TrpoTjyayev,

av^tov fls TTJV vvv brnioKpanav. <J>aiWrai 8' oi Kara rf/p ^oKavos yeve<r6ai

TOVTO irpoaipt<Tiv, aWa. p,a\\ov ano avfxiTTOip.aTOS. Trjs vavap~)(lus yap iv

TOIS MrjdiKois 6 drj/jws a'irios yevojxtvos i^povrjuariaQr), Kai drjfiayayovs

e\a/3e (f>av\ovs, avrnroXLTtvofjii'vav ri>v ijntiKaW eVei 2dX<ov y eotKe

TT\V avayKaioTO.TT)v aTrodidovai T<5 drjp.a dvvap.iv, TO ras dpxas alpeurOai

Kal evBvveiV p-r/Se yap TOVTOV Kvpws &v 6 Sfjpos, SoOXos av fir] Kal trokf-

p.ios.

T h e words r a 8e SiKao-rrjpia pioSocpopa KaTea-rrjo-f nepiKkrjs are com-

monly translated " Perikles first gave pay to the dikasteries/' wherein

C H A P . X L V I . ] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. -181

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, Senate ofthe changes introduced were not less considerable. —it°Panti-That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of sdate and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life- r—tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined a

. . . fined con-

and extensive control which long continuance had trollinggradually consecrated. It was invested with a power'kind of religious respect, and believed to possessmysterious traditions emanating from a divinesource1: especially, the cognizance which it tookof intentional homicide was a part of old Attic re-ligion not less than of judicature. Though put inthe background for a time after the expulsion ofthe Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itselfwhen recruited by the new archons under the Klei-sthenean constitution; and during the calamitoussufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardnessit is assumed that these bodies had before judged gratuitously. But itappears to me that the words ought to be translated " Perikles firstconstituted the paid dikasteries : " that is, the dikasteries as well as thepay were of his introduction.

It is evident from this whole passage that Aristotle did not supposethe dikasteries, either gratuitous or paid, to have been constituted bySolon, but to have been foreign to the purpose of that lawgiver, and tohave been novelties emanating from PeriklSs and Ephialtes, at the sametime that the judicial functions of the senate of Areopagus were cutdown.

1 Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i. p. 91. (pvkdrrfi ras airoppfj-rovs 8ia8rjKas, iv ah Ta rr/s jro'Xefflf <Tcorrjpia Kfirat, &c. So also Ms-chines calls this senate rfjv <TKv8pambv Kai TS>V fieyiarrav Kvpiav fiovkrjv(cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373 : compare also cont. Timarchum, c. 16,p. 41 ; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, Solon,C. 19- TTJV ava> j3ovXiji> irrl<TKcmov •navrtnv Kai (pv\aKa TS>V V6JXO>V, &c.

'EbiKa£ov ovv ol 'Apeo7rayn-ai Trepi iravrav (TX^OV TS>V (T(pa\p,aTa>v Ka\

napavofiiaiv, as arravrd (prjcrw 'AvdpoTtav iv wpdirr] KCU &CK6x<>pos iv 8ev-

repa Kai TpiTT] TSIV 'Ar&Lbaiv (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19]ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schomann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi.;K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalterthiimer, sect. 109.

VOL. V. 2 I


and patriotism had been so highly appreciated asto procure for it an increased sphere of ascendency.Trials for homicide were only a small part of itsattributions : it exercised judicial competence inmany other cases besides, and what was of stillgreater moment, it maintained a sort of censorialpolice over the lives and habits of the citizens—itprofessed to enforce a tutelary and paternal disci-pline, beyond that which the strict letter of thelaw could mark out, over the indolent, the prodi-gal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old riteand custom. To crown all, the senate of Areo-pagus also exercised a supervision over the publicassembly, taking care that none of the proceedingsof those meetings should be such as to infringe theestablished laws of the country. These were powersimmense as well as undefined, not derived fromany formal grant of the people, but having theirsource in immemorial antiquity and sustained bygeneral awe and reverence: when we read theserious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths,of the later orators—Demosthenes, iEschine"s, orDeinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong itmust have been a century and a half before them,at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokrate"s, inhis Discourse usually called Areopagiticus, writtena century and a quarter after that invasion, drawsa picture of what the senate of Areopagus had beenwhile its competence was yet undiminished, andascribes to it a power of interference little short ofpaternal despotism, which he asserts to have beenmost salutary and improving in its effect. That'the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate—and to a

CHAP. XLVL] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERISLES. 483

great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own re-commendations under the colour of past realities—is sufficiently obvious : but it enables us to presumegenerally the extensive regulating power of thesenate of Areopagus, in affairs both public andprivate, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused, andwhen we learn that the Spartan senate1 was la-mentably open to bribery, we can hardly presumemuch better of the life-sitting elders at Athens.But even if their powers had been guided by all thatbeneficence of intention which Isokrat&s affirms,they were in their nature such as could only beexercised over a passive and stationary people: andthe course of events at Athens, at that time pecu-liarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse.During the pressure of the Persian invasion, in- Largedeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armedwith more than ordinary authority, which it had u S ^ t

employed so creditably as to strengthen its influ- abused, be-. . . . . . carae m-

ence and tighten its supervision during the period consistentimmediately following: but that same trial had also feelings ofcalled forth in the general body of the citizens a after'thee

fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an aug-mented consciousness of force, both individual and New inter-

ests andnational. Here then were two forces, not only di- tendencies

n . . , , . then grow-

stinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into ingupatincreased action at the same time2. Nor was this

1 Aristotel. Politic, ii. 6, 18.2 Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in

Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable pas-sage of his Politics (v. 3, 5).

M.eraj3d\\ovin 8e Kal (Is 6\iyap^lav Ka\ els hrjjiov KCU els iroKimav e'<TOV evbotujirjaai TI rj av^rjOfjvai. rj dp^elov rj fxopiov rrjs 7rdXcs)r" olov, 17 in

2 1 2


all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenianlife and public habits by many different circum-stances—the enlargement of the city, the creationof the fortified port and new town of Peirseus, theintroduction of an increased nautical population,the active duties of Athens as head of the Delianconfederacy, &c. All these circumstances tendedto open new veins of hope and feeling, and newlines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460B.C., and by consequence to render the interferenceof the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashion-ed and conservative as it was, more and more diffi-cult. But at the very time when prudence wouldhave counselled that it should have been relaxedor modified, the senate appear to have rendered itstricter, or at least to have tried to do so: whichcould not fail to raise against them a considerablebody of enemies. Not merely the democratical in-novators, but also the representatives of new inter-ests generally at Athens, became opposed to thesenate as an organ of vexatious repression, em-ployed for oligarchical purposes1.

Senate of From the character of the senate of Areopagus,—a°cPenStre and the ancient reverence with which it was sur-of actionfor the con-

rtv j 'Apelco Trdya j3ov\rj evboKip.rjcra(Ta cv rots WlrjbiKois eSo£e (rvvrovcoTepavKimon. irotrjirat. rr/v noXirelav. Kai iraXiv 6 VCLVTIKOS O^KOS yevofievos a"cnos TTJS

irepi Hakafuva VIKT)S Kai dia ravrrjs rrjs riyepovlas Ka\ 8ia TT)V Kara 8a-\arrav dvvajj.iv, TTJV 8r))ioKpaTiav itr^V/Oorc'paj' inoirjirev.

The word a-vvrovarepav (" stricter, more rigid " ) stands opposed inanother passage to avcifievas (iv. 3, 5).

1 Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Prsecept. p. 805. OVK ayvoa be, on I$OV\T]Vrives £ira](8r) Kai 6\iyapxiKrjV KokovcravTes, &crnep 'Ecpiakrrjs 'A8rjvrjcri Kai

&opfjLia>v -nap 'HAeiois, bvvafxiv ap.a Ka\ 86£av ecr^ov.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see Deinarchuscont. Demosthen. pp. 46, 98.


rounded, it served naturally as a centre of action tothe oligarchical or conservative party—that partywhich desired to preserve the Kleisthenean consti-tution unaltered, with undiminished authority, ad-ministrative as well as judicial, both to individualmagistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Ofthis sentiment, at the time of which we are nowspeaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader,and his brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, aswell as his exploits in other warlike enterprises,doubtless strengthened very much his political in-fluence at home. The same party also probablyincluded the large majority of rich and old familiesat Athens; who, so long as the magistracies wereelected and not chosen by lot, usually got them-selves chosen, and had every interest in keepingthe power of such offices as high as they could.Moreover the party was farther strengthened bythe pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chieflythrough Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Ofcourse such aid could only have been indirect, yetit appears to have been of no inconsiderable mo-ment—for when we consider that iEgina had beenin ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a tem-per more hostile than friendly, the good feeling ofthe Lacedaemonians might well appear to Atheniancitizens eminently desirable to preserve: and thephilo-Laconian character of the leading men atAthens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Spartaduring that critical period while the Athenian mari-time ascendency was in progress1.

The political opposition between Perikles and1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16 ; Themistokles, c. 20.


bePtw°Sition Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus the fatherKimon and of the former had been the accuser of Miltiades theinherited father of the latter. Both were of the first familiesfitters—r in the city, and this, combined with the militaryand work t a l e n t s °f Kimon and the great statesmanlike supe-ingofPeri- riority of Perikle"s, placed both the one and the

other at the head of the two political parties whichdivided Athens. Perikle"s must have begun hispolitical career very young, since he maintained aposition first of great influence, and afterwards ofunparalleled moral and political ascendency, for thelong period of forty years, against distinguishedrivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers(about 467-428 B.C) . His public life began aboutthe time when Themistokl£s was ostracised, andwhen Aristeides was passing off the stage, and hesoon displayed a character which combined thepecuniary probity of the one with the resource andlarge views of the other; superadding to both adiscretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent musical and lettered education re-ceived from Pythokleide's—an eloquence such as noone before had either heard or conceived—and thebest philosophy which the age afforded. His mili-tary duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully andstrenuously performed, but he was timid in his firstpolitical approaches to the people—a fact perfectlyin unison with the caution of his temperament, butwhich some of his biographers1 explained by sayingthat he was afraid of being ostracised, and that hiscountenance resembled that,of the despot Peisi-stratus. We may be pretty sure however that this

1 Plutarch, Perikles, c. 4-7 seq.


personal resemblance (like the wonderful dreamascribed to his mother1 when pregnant of him) wasan after-thought of enemies when his ascendency wasalready established—and that young beginners werein little danger of ostracism. The complexion ofpolitical parties in Athens had greatly changed sincethe days of Themistokl&s and Aristeid^s ; for theKleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by thelatter after the return from Salamis to the extent ofmaking all citizens without exception eligible formagistracy, had become unpopular with the poorercitizens and to the keener democratical feelingwhich now ran through Athens and Peirseus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of Reserved,movement against that of resistance, or of reformers ?ai,3 ""against conservatives, if we are to employ modern u^ habitsphraseology—that Perikl£s devoted his great rank,character, and abilities. From the low arts, which Pains to

court popu-

it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the larity—lesspolitical interests of the poor against the rich, he magogue"was remarkably exempt: he was indefatigable in hisattention to public business, but he went little intosociety, and disregarded almost to excess the airs ofpopularity: his eloquence was irresistibly impress-ive, yet he was by no means prodigal of it, takingcare to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme,for solemn occasions, and preferring for the mostpart to employ the agency of friends and partisans2:moreover he imbibed from his friend and teacherAnaxagoras a tinge of physical philosophy which

1 Herodot. vi. 131.• Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Prsecept. p. 812 ; Perikles, c. 5, 6, 7.

488 HISTORY OF GREECE. [PART II-

greatly strengthened his mind1 and armed himagainst many of the reigning superstitions—butwhich at the same time tended to rob him of thesympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. Thearts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivatedby the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-heartedfamiliarity of manner was extolled, by his personalfriend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reservedand stately demeanour of his rival Perikle's. Kimonemployed the rich plunder, procured by his mari-time expeditions, in public decorations as well asin largesses to the poorer citizens—throwing openhis fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of hisdeme, and causing himself to be attended in publicby well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warmtunics in exchange for the threadbare garments ofthose who seemed in want; while the property ofPerikle"s was administered with a strict, thoughbenevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evan-gelus—the produce of his lands being all sold, andthe consumption of his house supplied by purchasein the market2. It was by such regularity that hisperfect and manifest independence of all pecuniaryseduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and incharacter, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles—a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distri-butor, a man of convivial and amorous habits, butincapable of sustained attention to business, un-taught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian

1 Plato, Phsedrus, c. 54, p. 270 ; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 8 ; Xenoph.Memor. i. 2, 46.

5 Plutarch, Perikles, c. 9, 16; Kimon, c. 10 j Reipubl. Gerend. Pne-cept. p. 818.


aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the as-cendency of Perikl6s was founded on his admirablecombination of civil qualities—probity, firmness,diligence, judgement, eloquence, and power of gui-ding partisans. As a military commander, thoughnoway deficient in personal courage, he rarelycourted distinction, and was principally famous forhis care of the lives of the citizens, discountenan-cing all rash or distant enterprises: his private habitswere sober and recluse—his chief conversation waswith Anaxagoras, Protagoras1, Zeno, the musicianDamon, and other philosophers—while the tender-est domestic attachment bound him to the engagingand cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at thistime as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest—the expanding democracy against the stationary m

a°fat

a^[democracy of the past generation, which now passed originallyby the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talka- Penkies intive energy, spread even among the poor population, E Twhich was now forming more and more the cha- gracteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and g'stenal

uninquiring valour of the conquerors of Marathon2.Ephialt&s, son of Sophonide's, was at this time theleading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal ofPevikles, and noway inferior to him in personal pro-bity, though he was a poor man3: as to aggressivepolitical warfare, he was even more active than Peri-kles, who appears throughout his long public life to

1 The personal intercourse between Perikles and Protagoras is at-tested by the interesting fragment of the latter which we find in Plu-tarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium, c. 33, p. 119.

2 Aristophan. Nubes, 972, 1000 seg. and Ramc, 1071.3 riutarch, Kimon, c. 10; JEVi&n, V. H. ii. 4 3 ; xi. 9.


have manifested but little bitterness against politicalenemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowl edge of thehistory of Athens brings before us only some generalcauses and a few marked facts : the details and theparticular persons concerned are not within oursight: yet the actual course of political events de-pends everywhere mainly upon these details, as wellas upon the general causes. Before Ephialt£s ad-vanced his main proposition for abridging the com-petence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears tohave been strenuous in repressing the practicalabuse of magisterial authority, by accusationsbrought against the magistrates at the period oftheir regular accountability. After repeated efforts,to check the practical abuse of these magisterialpowers1, Ephialt£s and Perikl£s were at last con-ducted to the proposition of cutting them downpermanently, and introducing an altered system.

We are not surprised to find that such proceed-ings provoked extreme bitterness of party-feeling,and it is probable that this temper may have partlydictated the accusation preferred against Kimon(about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, foralleged reception of bribes from the Macedonianprince Alexander—an accusation of which he wasacquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimo-n i a n Pai"ty was decidedly the most powerful: andwhen the question was proposed for sending troops

kigs Puntii *° a '^ ^ e Lacedaemonians in reducing the revoltedthe time Helo ts on Ithome1, K imon carried the people alongwhen the r r otroopswere ' P'utarch, PeriklSs, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim, iii. 8, 4. 'E0e-dismissed dXn/v p,iv ovv, (pofiepov ovra rois oXiyap^iKois <ai nepl ras evBvvas <alfrom Laco- SiaSiis rwv rbv Srjaov dSiKovvTiav awapaiTriTOV, (TriBovXeicravTCs ol iv6oo\ma. Ostra- ;>>.. v - _ - . , . ~. „ A r

cism of ApifTTooiKou Tnv lavaypinov Kpv<paias aveiKov, &c.Kimon.


with him to comply, by an appeal to their generousfeelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition ofEphialtes1. But when Kimon and the Athenianhoplites returned home, having been dismissed bySparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion(as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter),the indignation of the citizens was extreme : theyrenounced their alliance with Sparta, and enteredinto amity with Argos. Of course the influence ofKimon, and the position of the oligarchical party,was materially changed by this incident: and inthe existing bitterness of political parties, it is notsurprising that his opponents should take the op-portunity for proposing soon afterwards a vote ofostracism2—a challenge, indeed, which may perhapshave been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon andhis party, since they might still fancy themselvesthe strongest, and suppose that the sentence ofbanishment would fall upon Ephialtes or Perikleis.However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon,a sure proof that his opponents were now in the as-cendent. On this occasion, as on the preceding, wesee the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intensepolitical conflict, the violence of which it would atleast abate, by removing for the time one of thecontending leaders.

1 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.3 Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. Oi §e jrpos opyrjv ane\96vTes fjSr] rots Xa-

KavL^ovcn (pavepas i)(a\eiraivov, Kal Toy Kifimna fiiKpas iirtXafiofLevoi7rpo<fia<T€<os i^wTpaKurav els €Trj Sem.

I transcribe this passage as 'a specimen of the inaccurate manner inwhich the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says—"The Athe-nians took advantage of a slight pretence to ostracise Kimon :" but itwas the peculiar characteristic of ostracism that it had no pretence : itwas a judgement passed without specific or assigned cause.


Measures ft w a s n o w t n a t perikle"s and Ephialtes carriedEphiaitgs their important scheme of judicial reform. Thekies to senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretion-powefofhC a ry censorial power, as well as of all its judicialofeArenate comPetence except that which related to homicide.gusasweii The individual magistrates, as well as the senatedual magi, of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judi-

l cial attributes (except the power of imposing asmaN fine1), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in tendivisions from the aggregate Helisea. Ephialtes2

first brought down the laws of Solon from the acro-polis to the neighbourhood of the market-place,where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that thejudicature was now popularised.

In the representations of many authors, the fullbearing of this great constitutional change is veryinadequately conceived. What we are commonlytold, is, that Perikles was the first to assign a sa-lary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens; hebribed the people with the public money (says Plu-tarch), in order to make head against Kimon, whobribed them out of his own private purse : as if thepay were the main feature in the case, and as if allwhich Perikles did was, to make himself popular bypaying the dikasts for judicial service which theyhad before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, thatthis numerous army of dikasts, distributed into tenregiments and summoned to act systematicallythroughout the year, was now for the first timeorganised : the commencement of their pay is also

1 Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 12.2 Harpokration—'O Karcodev vopas—Pollux, viii. 128.


the commencement of their regular judicial action.What Pedicle's really did was to sever for the first P ^ ? !

J of judicial

time from the administrative competence of the fromadmi-. , . , . • i • i i l • nistrative

magistrates that judicial authority which had on- functions,ginally gone along with it. The great men whohad been accustomed to hold these offices werelowered both in influence and authority1: while onthe other hand a new life, habit, and sense ofpower, sprung up among the poorer citizens. Aplaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuserinvoking punishment against citizens guilty of in-jury either to himself or to the state, had still toaddress himself to one or other of the archons, butit was only with a view of ultimately arriving be-fore the dikastery by whom the cause was to betried. While the magistrates acting individuallywere thus restricted to simple administration andpreliminary police, they experienced a still moreserious loss of power in their capacity of membersof the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was

1 Aristot. Polit. iv. 5, 6. en 8' oi rats apxais dyKakovvres TOV Sij/zdv(pa(Tt 8«v KpiveiV 6 8' d<Tfi.cva>s Sexfral TVV irpoKki)(riV acrre KaraXvovrai

naa-ai al dp^ai, &c. : compare vi. 1, 8.The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected

by Perikles, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates,not to the people, but to certain specially constituted, though nume-rous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with knownand written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence fromadministrative, to be characterised as " dissolving or extinguishing ma-gisterial authority." On the contrary, it is conformable to the bestmodern notions. Perikles cannot be censured for having effected thisseparation, however persons may think that the judicature which heconstituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essen-tially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi. p. 767)—ndvra ap^ovra avay-Kaiov <ai biKaa-rrjv elvcu rivav—ajn opinion doubtless perfectly just, upto a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts ofpowers cannot be rendered absolutely complete.


expired. Instead of their previous unmeasuredrange of supervision and interference, they werenow deprived of all judicial sanction beyond thatsmall power of fining which was still left both toindividual magistrates, and to the senate of FiveHundred. But the cognizance of homicide wasstill expressly reserved to them—for the procedure,in this latter case religious hot less than judicial,was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feel-ing, that no reformer could venture to disturb orremove it1. It was upon this same ground proba-

1 Demosthen. cont. Neser. p. 1372 ; cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 143) thinks that the senate of Areopagus

was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well as of its otherfunctions, and that this was only restored after the expulsion of theThirty. He supposes this to be proved by a passage of Lysias whichhe produces (De Casde Eratosthenis, p. 31-33).

M. Boeckh and O. Miiller adopt the same opinion as Meier, andseemingly on the authority of the same passage (see the Dissertation ofO. Miiller on the Eumenides of iEschyhis, p. 113, Eng. transl.). Butin the first place, this opinion is contradicted by an express statementin the anonymous biographer of Thucydides, who mentions the trial ofPyrilampfis for murder before the Areopagus ; and contradicted also,seemingly, by Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 20) ; in the next place, thepassage of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says,m Kai Trarpiov icrn Kai i(p' vjiaw awodedorai TOV (frovov ras 8[<as diKa-\iiv: now (even if we admit the conjectural reading e<py vy.a>v in place ofi(p' ifiiv to be correct) still this restoration of functions to the Areopagusrefers naturally to the restored democracy after the violent interruptionoccasioned by the oligarchy of Thirty. Considering how many personsthe Thirty caused to be violently put to death, and the complete sub-version of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible tosuppose that the Areopagus could have continued to hold its sittingsand try accusations for intentional homicide, under their government.On the return of the democracy after the Thirty were expelled, thefunctions of the senate of Areopagus would return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above werecorrect—if it were true that the Areopagus was deprived not only ofits supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance of homi-cide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between the motion ofEphialtes and the expulsion of the Thirty—this senate must have beenwithout any functions at all during that long interval; it must have


bly that the stationary party defended all the pre-rogatives of the senate of Areopagus—denouncingthe curtailments proposed by Ephialt£s as impiousand guilty innovations1. How extreme their re-been for all practical purposes non-existent. But during so long a pe-riod of total suspension, the citizens would have lost all their respectfor it; it could not have retained so much influence as we know that itactually possessed immediately before the Thirty (Lysias c. Eratosth. c.] 1, p. 126) ; and it would hardly have been revived after the expulsionof the Thirty. Whereas by preserving during that period its jurisdictionin cases of homicide, apart from those more extended privileges whichhad formerly rendered it obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect forit was kept alive, and it was revived after the fall of the Thirty as a ve-nerable part of the old democracy; even apparently with some exten-sion of privileges.

The inferences which O. Miiller wishes to draw, as to the facts ofthese times, from the Eumenides of iEschylus, appear to me ill-sup-ported. In order to sustain his view that by virtue of the propositionof Ephialtes " the Areopagus almost entirely ceased to be a high Courtof Judicature" (sect. 36, p. 109), he is forced to alter the chronology ofthe events, and to affirm that the motion of Ephialtes must have beencarried subsequently to the representation of the Eumenides, thoughDiodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there is nothingto contradict him. All that we can safely infer from the very indistinctallusions in JSschylus, is, that he himself was full of reverence for theAreopagus, and that the season was one in which party bitterness ranso high as to render something like civil war {i^vkiov "Aprj, v. 804)within the scope of reasonable apprehension. Probably he may havebeen averse to the diminution of the privileges of the Areopagus byEphialtes : yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch ashe puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for homicide,exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription, and confirmed init by the Eumenides themselves. Now when we consider that suchjurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed and left by Ephialtes tothe Areopagus, we might plausibly argue that iEschylus, by enhancingthe solemnity and predicting the perpetuity of the remaining privilege,intended to conciliate those who resented the recent innovations, and tosoften the hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Boeckh, O. Miiller, and Meier,—respecting the with-drawal from the senate of Areopagus of the judgements on homicide,by the proposition of Ephialttis—has been discussed and (in my judge-ment) refuted by Forchhammer—in a valuable Dissertation—De Areo-pago non privato per Ephialten Homicidii Judiciis. Kiel, 1828.

1 This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied


sentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political par-ties at this moment—we may judge, by the result.The enemies of Ephialtes caused him to be privately

Ephiait&s assassinated, by the hand of a Boeotian of Tanagraby the con- , A . . . . „ . . ,1

servative named Anstodikus. Such a crime—rare in thepar y- political annals of Athens, for we come to no known

instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of theFour Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once thegravity of the change now introduced, the fierce-ness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulouscharacter of the conservative party : Kimon was inexile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless theassassination of Ephialtes produced an effect unfa-vourable in every way to the party who procuredit: the popular party in their resentment must havebecome still more attached to the judicial reformsjust assured to them, while the hands of Perikles,the superior leader left behind and now acting sin-gly, must have been materially strengthened.

Commence- It is from this point that the administration ofthTgreat that great man may be said to date: he was nowofCperikieT *ne lading adviser (we might almost say Primeafter the Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years

were marked by a series of brilliant successes—pCompro-mise be- (Diodor. xi. 77)—ov firjv dBpoas ye Stecpvye rrjXiKovTois avofirj-and Kimon. f"10'"' eVt/3a\djuei>os (Ephialte's), dX\a rrjs VVKTOS avmpedeis, a8rj\ovBrilliant eVx* rfjv TOV /3I'OU reXeimjv. Compare Pausanias, i. 29, 15.successes of Plutarch (Perikle"s, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned thesera'oftne a s s a s s m a t i ° n °f Ephialte's. Antipho, however, states that the assassinmaximum w a s never formally known or convicted (De Cade Hero. c. 68).of her The enemies of Perikles circulated a report, (mentioned by Idome-power. neus,) that it was he who had procured the assassination of Ephialtes,

from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 10).We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtes

CHAP. XLVI.J CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 497

already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara asan ally, and the victorious war against Corinth andiEgina. But when he proposed the great and va-luable improvement of the Long Walls, thus makingone city of Athens and Peirseus, the same oligar-chical party, which had opposed his judicial changesand assassinated Ephialte"s, again stood forward invehement resistance. Finding direct opposition un-availing, they did not scruple to enter into treason-able correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aidof a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy:so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recentinnovations. How serious was the hazard incurredby Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra,has been already recounted ; together with the ra-pid and unexpected reconciliation of parties afterthat battle, principally owing to the generous pa-triotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. Hewas restored from ostracism on this occasion, be-fore his full time had expired, and the rivalry be-tween him and Perikle's henceforward becomesmitigated, or even converted into a compromise1,whereby the internal affairs of the city were left tothe one and the conduct of foreign expeditions tothe other. The successes of Athens during theensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever,and she attained the maximum of her power:which doubtless had a material effect in imparting

1 The intervention of Elpinikl, the sister of Kimon, in bringing aboutthis compromise between her brothe'r and Perikles, is probable enough(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 10, and Kimon, c. 14). Clever and engaging,she seeras to have played an active part in the political intrigues of theday: but we are not at all called upon to credit the scandals insinuatedby Bupolis and Stesimbrotus.

VOL. V. 2 K

c


stability to the democracy, as well as to the admi-nistration of Perikle"s—and enabled both the oneand the other to stand the shock of those greatpublic reverses, which deprived the Athenians oftheir dependent landed alliances, during the inter-val between the defeat of Kor6neia and the thirtyyears' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolutionbrought about by Perikle's, were introduced otherchanges belonging to the same scheme and sy-stem.

other con- Thus a general power of supervision, both overstitutional , . . . . . . , ,

the magistrates and over the public assembly, wasvested in seven magistrates, now named for thefirst time, called Nomophylakes or Law-Guardians,and doubtless changed every year. These Nomo-phylakes sat alongside of the Proedri or presidentsboth in the senate and in the public assembly, andwere charged with the duty of interposing when-ever any step was taken or any proposition madecontrary to the existing laws : they were also em-powered to constrain the magistrates to act accord-ing to law1. We do not know whether they pos-

1 We hear about these Nomophylakes in a distinct statement citedfrom Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson. NopcxpiXaKes'erepoi elan TO>V 6e(Tfio6eTa>v, i>s $t\6)(opos iv £'• oi p.ev yap apy(0VT€S ave-

j3aivov els' Apetov irdyov io-re(pava>iJ.evoi, oi 8e vop.o(pvkaKes xpucria trrpo-

<pia ayovTts' xal rals Seals ivavTiov dpôvTcav eKa6e£ovro' KCU TTJV Tro/wri}!/

iirepnTOV rrj IlaXXadc ras 8e apâs rjvdyica£ou roil vofiois ^pi)o-âj" (cat iv

rfi iKKkr)a-iq Kai iv Trj (iovXrj jxera TWV npoibpav iKaBrjVTO, KaXvovres ra

do-vp.<popa Trj 7r6Xei irparTeiv' cirra de rj<raV Ka\ KaTe'arqo-av, as $tXoô-

pos, ore 'E(piaXrrjs p.6vrj KareXme rfj i£ 'Apeiov rrayov fiovXrj TO. imep TOV

o~a>[/.a.Tos.

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same ac-jcount of these magistrates, though none except Photius mentions theexact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground for the


sessed the presidency of a dikastery—that is, whe-ther they could themselves cause one of the panelsof jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged de-linquent on his trial before it, under their presi-dency—or whether they were restricted to enteringa formal protest, laying the alleged illegality beforethe public assembly. To appoint magistrates how-ever, invested with this special trust of watchingand informing, was not an unimportant step ; for itwould probably enable Ephialt^s to satisfy manyobjectors who feared to abolish the superintendingpower of the Areopagus without introducing anysubstitute. The Nomophylakes were honouredwith a distinguished place at the public processionsand festivals, and were even allowed (like the Ar-chons) to enter the senate of Areopagus after theiryear of office had expired : but they never acquiredany considerable power such as that senate haditself exercised. Their interference must have beengreatly superseded by the introduction, and in-creasing application of the Graphe Paranomon,presently to be explained; nor are they even no-ticed in the description of that misguided assemblywhich condemned the six generals after the battleof Arginusse, by a gross violation of legal form notless than of substantial justice1. After the expul-sion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus wasagain invested with a supervision over magistrates,though without anything like its ancient ascend-ency.

doubt which M. Boeckh expresses about the accuracy of this state-ment : see Schbmann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Grac. sect. lxvi.; and Cicero,Legg. iii. 20.

1 See Xenophon, Hellenic, i. 1; Andokides de Mysteriis, p. 40.2 K 2


TheNomo- Another important change, which we may withi^ probability refer to Perikle's, is, the institution of

t n e Nomothetae. These men were in point of factorsJcM dikasts, members of the 6000 citizens annuallydecrees— sworn in that capacity : but they were not, like theprocess by J. . T - I I -

which laws dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panelsor regiments known by a particular letter and act-

peaied, -ng together throughout the entire year : they werelotted off to sit together only on special occasionand as the necessity arose. According to the re-form now introduced, the Ekklesia or public as-sembly, even with the sanction of the senate of FiveHundred, became incompetent either to pass a newlaw or to repeal a law already in existence ; it couldonly enact a psephism—that is, properly speaking,a decree applicable only to a particular case; thoughthe word was used at Athens in a very large sense,sometimes comprehending decrees of general aswell as permanent application. In reference tolaws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established.The Thesmothetie were directed annually to exa-mine the existing laws, noting any contradictionsor double laws on the same matter ; and in the firstprytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on theeleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which thefirst business was to go through the laws seriatim,and submit them for approval or rejection: firstbeginning with the laws relating to the senate, nextthose of more general import, especially such as de-termined the functions and competence of the ma-gistrates. If any law was condemned by the voteof the public assembly, or if any citizen had a newlaw to propose, :he third assembly of the Prytany


was employed, previous to any other business, inthe appointment of Nomothetse and in the provi-sion of means to pay their salary. Previous noticewas required to be given publicly by every citizenwho had new propositions of the sort to make, inorder that the time necessary for the sitting of theNomothetse might be measured according to thenumber of matters to be submitted to their cogni-zance. Public advocates were farther named toundertake the formal defence of all the laws at-tacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal themhad to make out his case against this defence, to thesatisfaction of the assembled Nomothetae. Theselatter were taken from the 6000 sworn dikasts, andwere of different numbers according to circum-stances : sometimes we hear of them as 500, some-times as 1000—and we may be certain that thenumber was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the Proceduremaking or repealing of laws under the same solem-nities and guarantees as the trying of causes oraccusations in judicature. We must recollect that to the pro.

cedurein

the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public judicialassembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor hadthey the same solemnity of procedure, nor the samecertainty of hearing both sides of the question setforth, nor the same full preliminary notice. Howmuch the oath sworn was brought to act uponthe minds of the dikasts, we may see by the fre-quent appeals to it in the orators, who contrastthem with the unsworn public assembly1. And

1 Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 20, pp. 725, 726. *Ap' ovv TW Soxel

o-vp,rpepeiv rfj TrdXet TOIOVTOS vofios, 6s diKarrrripiov yv&aeas airos nvpi-

oyrepos ca ra t , KCU ras \mo TO>V O^KOJLIOKOTG)!' yvtoireis TOLS avwfjLOTOis 7rpoo"-

rd£ei \v(w;—'Ey0vp.(lu6e, dwb rou StKaariypiow xai T^S KarayvaKTcais ol


there can be no doubt that the Nomothetse affordedmuch greater security than the public assembly, fora proper decision. That security depended uponthe same principle as we see to pervade all the con-stitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a frac-tion of the people casually taken, but sufficientlynumerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent but delegated for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction,—and furnishedwith a full exposition of both sides of the case.The power of passing psephisms or special decrees,still remained with the public assembly, which wasdoubtless much more liable to be surprised intohasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Di-kastery or the Nomothetse—in spite of the neces-sity of previous authority from the senate of FiveHundred, before any proposition could be sub-mitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public as-

(Timokrate's) eVi TOV brjjiov, eKKKcnTav rbv jjSifo/Kora! Com-pare Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 15.

See, about the Nomothete, Schomann, De Comitiis, ch. vii. p. 248seqq., and Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, Abschn. ii.3, 3, p. 33 seqq.

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the Nomo-thetse are an institution of Solon. Demosthenes indeed ascribes it toSolon (Schomann, p. 268) : but this counts in my view for nothing,when I see that all the laws which he cites for governing the proceed-ings of the Nomothetse, bear unequivocal evidence of a time much later.Schomann admits this to a certain extent, and in reference to the styleof these laws—" Illorum quidem fragmentorum, quse in Timokrateaextant, recentiorem Solonis estate formam atque orationem apertum est."But it is not merely the style which, proves them to be of post-Soloniandate: it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the tenprytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of the Epo-nymi—all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by Kleisthenes.On the careless employment of the name of Solon by the orators when-ever they desire to make a strong impression on the dikasts, I havealready remarked.

CHAP XLVJ.J CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 503

sembly and the Nomothetse against being entrapped Graphs. . , . . • • , i Paranomoninto decisions contrary to existing law, another re- —inmarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—aprovision probably introduced by Perikles at the gsame time as the formalities of law-making by ™™nsti-means of specially delegated Nomothetse. This proposi-was the Graphe" Paranom6n—indictment for infor-mality or illegality—which might be brought oncertain grounds against the proposer of any law orany psephism, and rendered him liable to punish-ment by the dikastery. He was required in bring-ing forward his new measure to take care that itshould not be in contradiction with any pre-existinglaw—or if there were any such contradiction, to giveformal notice of it, to propose the repeal of thatwhich existed, and to write up publicly beforehandwhat his proposition was—in order that there mightnever be two contradictory laws at the same timein operation, nor any illegal decree passed eitherby the senate or by the public assembly. If heneglected this precaution, he was liable to prose-cution under the Graphe1 Paranomon, which anyAthenian citizen might bring against him beforethe dikastery, through the intervention and underthe presidency of the Thesmothetae.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it wasoriginally confined to the special ground of formalcontradiction between the new and the old. But ithad a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizenaccusing would strengthen his case by showing thatthe measure which he attacked contradicted notmerely the letter, but the spirit and purpose ofexisting laws—and he would proceed from hence


to denounce it as generally mischievous and dis-graceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitudewe find the Graphe" Paranom6n at the time ofDemosthenes: the mover of a new law or pse-phism, even after it had been regularly discussedand passed, was liable to be indicted, and had todefend himself not only against alleged informalitiesin his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefsin the substance of his measure. If found guiltyby the dikastery, the punishment inflicted uponhim by them was not fixed, but variable accordingto circumstances; for the indictment belonged tothat class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, firsta given amount of punishment was proposed by theaccuser, next another and lighter amount was namedby the accused party against himself—the dikasterybeing bound to make their option between one andthe other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused partyto name against himself a measure of punishmentsufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, inorder that they might not prefer the more severeproposition of the accuser. At the same time, theaccuser himself (as in other public indictments)was fined in the sum of 1000 drachms, unless theverdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of thesuffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsi-bility of the mover, however, continued only oneyear after the introduction of his new law: if theaccusation was brought at a greater distance oftime than one year, the accuser could invoke nopunishment against the mover, and the sentence ofthe dikasts neither absolved nor condemned any-


thing but the law. Their condemnation of the law,with or without the author, amounted ipso facto toa repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of Working of° the Graphe

a decree might be preferred either at some stage Parano-°

prior to its final enac tment—as after its acceptance

simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its

approval by the public assembly, and prior to its g^antT

going before the Nomothetse, if it was a law—or upon new

after it had reached full completion by the verdict tions, and

of the Nomothetse. In the former case, the indict- unlimited

ment staid its farther progress unti l sentence had {j o* fg

been pronounced by the dikasts . to every. . . citizen.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly con-servative spirit,'to guard the existing laws againstbeing wholly or partially nullified by a new propo-sition. As, in the procedure of the Nomotheta?,whenever any proposition was made for distinctlyrepealing any existing law, it was thought unsafeto entrust the defence of the law so assailed to thechance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it,and paid advocates were appointed for the purpose ;so also, when any citizen made a new positive pro-position, sufficient security was not supposed to beafforded by the chance of opponents rising up at thetime; and a farther guarantee was provided in thepersonal responsibility of the mover. That thelatter, before he proposed a new decree or a newlaWjshould take care that there was nothing in it in-consistent with existing laws—or, if there were, thathe should first formally bring forward a direct pro-position for the repeal of such pre-existent law—was in no way unreasonable: it imposed upon


him an obligation such as he might perfectly wellfulfil—it served as a check upon the use of thatright, of free speech and initiative in the publicassembly, which belonged to every Athenian with-out exception', and which was cherished by the de-mocracy as much as it was condemned by oligar-chical thinkers—it was a security to the dikasts,who were called upon to apply the law to particularcases, against the perplexity of having conflictinglaws quoted before them, and being obliged in theirverdict to set aside either one or the other. Inmodern European governments, even the most freeand constitutional, laws have been both made andapplied either by select persons or select assemblies,under an organisation so different as to put out ofsight the idea of personal responsibility on the pro-poser of a new law. Moreover, even in such as-semblies, private initiative has either not existed atall, or has been of comparatively little effect, inlaw-making ; while in the application of laws whenmade, there has always been a permanent judicialbody exercising an action of its own, more or lessindependent of the legislature, and generally inter-preting away the text of contradictory laws so as tokeep up a tolerably consistent course of forensictradition. But at Athens, the fact that the pro-poser of a new decree, or of a new law, had inducedthe senate or the public assembly to pass it, wasby no means supposed to cancel his personal re-

1 The privation of this right of public speech {Trappr/a-ia) followed onthe condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called anpia, dis-franchisement, entire or partial (Demosthen. cont. Neaer. p. 1352, c. 9 ;cont. Meidiam, p. 545, c. 27). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment,Xenophon, Republ. Athen. i. 9.


sponsibility, if the proposition was illegal: he haddeceived the senate or the people, in deliberatelykeeping back from them a fact which he knew, orat least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urgedon behalf of the Graphe Paranom6n as originally the vconceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that afterwards.indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary andabusive latitude. Thus iEschines indicts Ktesiphonunder it for having under certain circumstancesproposed a crown to Demosthenes. He begins byshowing that the proposition was illegal—for thiswas the essential foundation of the indictment: hethen goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendidharangue, that Demosthenes was a vile man and amischievous politician : accordingly (assuming theargument to be just) Ktesiphon had deceived thepeople in an aggravated way—first by proposing areward under circumstances contrary to law, nextby proposing it in favour of an unworthy man.The first part of the argument only is of the essenceof the Graphe Paranomon: the second part is inthe nature of an abuse growing out of it,—spring-ing from that venom of personal and party enmitywhich is inseparable, in a greater or less degree,from free political action, and which manifesteditself with virulence at Athens, though within thelimits of legality. That this indictment, as one ofth'e most direct vents for such enmity, was largelyapplied and abused at Athens, is certain; butthough it probably deterred unpractised citizensfrom originating new propositions, it did not pro-


duce the same effect upon those orators who madepolitics a regular business, and who could there-fore both calculate the temper of the people, andreckon upon support from a certain knot of friends.Aristophon, towards the close of his political life,made it a boast that he had been thus indicted andacquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worsteffect which it produced was that of encouragingthe vein of personality and bitterness which per-vades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, evenin its most illustrious manifestations ; turning deli-berative into judicial eloquence, and interweavingthe discussion of a law or decree along with a de-clamatory harangue against the character of itsmover. We may at the same time add that the

it was often Graphe" Paranomon was often the most convenientused as a

simple way way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, sothat it was used even when the annual period had

g ^ * " passed over, and when the mover was therefore outWers°nai °^ danger—the indictment being then brought onlyaim against against the law or decree, as in the case whichof the law. forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenes

against Leptine's. If the speaker of this harangueobtained a verdict, he procured at once the repealof the law or decree, without proposing any newprovision in its place ; which he would be requiredto do—if not peremptorily, at least by commonusage,—if he had carried the law for repeal beforethe Nomothetse.

Numbers The dikasteries provided under the system ofthe dTkasts, Perikles varied in number of members: we neverbyPPeriki&. n e a r °f l ess t n a n 2 0 ° members—most generally of

CHAP. XLVL] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 509

500—and sometimes also of 1000, 1500, 2000members, on important trials1. Each man receivedpay from the treasurers called Kolakretse, after hisday's business was over, of three oboli or half adrachm: at least this was the amount paid duringthe early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckhsupposes that the original pay proposed by Perikleswas one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon; buthis opinion is open to much doubt. It was in-dispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficientto induce citizens to come, and come frequently, ifnot regularly : now one obolus seems to have provedafterwards an inadequate temptation even to theekklesiasts, or citizens who attended the public as-sembly, who were less frequently wanted, and musthave had easier sittings, than the dikasts: muchless therefore would it be sufficient in the case ofthe latter. I incline to the belief that the pay ori-ginally awarded was three oboli2: the rather, as

1 See Meier, Attisch. Proz^ss, p. 13y. Andokides mentions a trialunder the indictment of ypacpfi napavofiav, brought by his father Leogo-ras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein 6000 dikasts sat—that is, the entire body of Heliasts. However, the loose speech so habi-tual with Andokides renders this statement very uncertain (Andokidesde Mysteriis, p. 3, § 29).

See Matthiae, De Judiciis Atheniensiura, in his Miscellanea Philolo-gica, vol. i. p. 252. Matthiae questions the reading of that passage inDemosthenes (cont. Meideam, p. 585), wherein 200 dikasts are spoken ofas sitting in judgement: he thinks it ought to be irevraicocrlovs instead ofbmKon-lovs—but this alteration would be rash.

2 See on this question, Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ch. xv.p. 233; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalt. § 134.

The proof which M. Boeckh brings to show, first, that the originalpay was one obolus—next that Kleon was the first to introduce the tri-obolus—is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the di-kasts fluctuated (oi< etrrrjKev—oAXore oXAajs eS/SoTo) do not so naturallyindicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and


these new institutions seem to have nearly coincidedin point of time with the transportation of the con-federate treasure from Delos to Athens—so that theExchequer would then appear abundantly provided.As to the number of dikasts actually present oneach day of sitting, or the minimum number requi-site to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly in-formed. Though each of the ten panels or divi-sions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldomprobably did all of them attend : but it also seldomhappened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat onthe same day : there was therefore an opportunityof making up deficiencies in division A, when itslot was called and when its dikasts did not appearin sufficient numbers, from those who belonged todivision B or A, besides the supplementary dikastswho were not comprised in any of the ten divisions:though on all these points we cannot go beyondconjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dika-steries were always numerous, and that none of thedikasts could know in what causes they would beemployed, so that it was impossible to tamper withthem beforehand1.

forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there weresome occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubt-ful whether the dikasts could be paid : see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1 ;cont. Nikomach. c. 22 ; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amountof pay may therefore have been sometimes affected by this cause.

1 There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise of Xeno-phon, De Republic. Athen. iii. 6. He says,—

<&e'pe 8^, dWa (prjtri TIS xPVval ^LKa^etv JXEV, iXdrrovs 8e fiicdfeiv.Ky TO'IWV, iav jj.kv iroXKa. (both Weiske and Schneider substitute

a here in place of oktya, which latter makes no sense) irornvrai Suea-a, okiyoi iv eicaoTO) taovrai TG> biKacmqpla' more Kai &ia<TKfvd<ra<r8ai.

pqbiov CCTTCU npos oKiyovs SiKaaras, Ka\ crvvdeicacrai (so Schneider andMatthise in place of (TvvdtKtia'ai) 7roXu rjrTov diKalas hucct^etv.

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals

CHAP. XLVI.] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERTKLES. 511

Such were the great constitutional innovations TheAthe-° man demo-

of Penkles and Ephialt&s—changes full of practical cracy, asresults—the transformation, as well as the comple- byment, of that democratical system which Kleistheneshad begun and to which the tide of Athenian feelinghad been gradually mounting up during the pre- war£s down

ceding twenty years. The entire force of these of Athenianchanges is generally not perceived, because the po- aw—"ex-pular dikasteries and the Nomothetse are so often temporary6

represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely j ^ o f thesupplied with pay by Perikies. This erroneous FourHund-

r r r J j red and the

supposition prevents all clear view of the growth Thirty.of the Athenian democracy by throwing back itslast elaborations to the period of its early and im-perfect start. To strip the magistrates of all theirjudicial power, except that of imposing a small fine,and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except incases of homicide—providing popular, numerous,and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial busi-ness at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian de-mocracy : no serious constitutional alteration (I ex-cept the temporary interruptions of the Four Hun-dred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until thedays of Macedonian interference. As Perikllsmade it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes—though with a sensible change in the character,could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see Xenoph. deRepub. Ath. iii. 3) : and we may well believe that there were also par-ticular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some- ofwhom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (iEschinescont. Timarch. c. 17-22, p. 12-15). But the passage above quotedfrom Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautionstaken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised andsuccessful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

512 HISTORY OF GREECE: [PART II:

and abatement in the energies, of the people, richas well as poor.

Working of In appreciating the practical working of theserouS

n<iLka- numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparisonw i t n s u c n justice as might have been expected from

gnumbers individual magistrates, we have to consider, first,essential O >

to exclude that personal and pecuniary corruption seems tocorruption * . . . , .

or intimi- have been a common vice among the leading menfiabiiitTof °f Athens and Sparta, when acting individually ormagistrates m boards of a few members, and not uncommontionOrrup e v e n w* l n t a e kings of Sparta,—next, that in the

Grecian cities generally, as we know even from theoligarchical Xenophon (he particularly exceptsSparta), the rich and great men were not only in-subordinate to the magistrates, but made a paradeof showing that they cared nothing about them1. Weknow also from the same unsuspected source2, thatwhile the poorer Athenian citizens who served onshipboard were distinguished for the strictest disci-pline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formedthe infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens

1 Xenophon, De Republ. Laced, c. 8, 2. TeKfiaipofiai 8t ravra, on ivpzv rats aXXms TroXeinv oi SwaTarepoi O0TE fHoiXovrai Soiceiv Tas dp-\(is (poftelo'Oai, dWa vofxt^ovtrL TOVTO dveXei/Oepov elvai' iv 5eTTJ ^Trdprrj oi KpaTKTTOi Ka\ invepxpvrai /iaXiora ras apyas, &C.

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men atThebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice againstthem for fear of being put to death, see Dikaearchus, Vit. Grsec. Fragm.ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx. 4. 6. ; xxiii. 2.

2 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 18. Mi;8a/iSr, ?0?j 6 SwKpaTijr, &Uepi-Kkeis, ovras rjyov dv7]Kt<TTa novrjpla vocrelv 'ASrjValovs' Oi)( Spas, £>s f #-raKToi ji€v elviv ev rots vavTiKols, cvraKrats 6' eVTOISyvfj.viKoisdyaxriTTeL8ovrai rots imararais, ovbevav 8« KaraSee&repov iv rois x°P0^ virrfpe-Tovtri rols StSacrKaXotff ; TOVTO ydp TOI, %<pf]* Ka\ 6avfiao~Tov eVrt' TO TOVSpev TOIOVTOVS Trct&apxeiv rots i<f>e<rT5>o-L, TOVS de onXiras, (caiTOVS iTTTrcts, o\ boKovo-i Ka\oKaya6lq, TrpoKeKpiaBai TWV no\i-T£>V, dweiOarTaTovs eivai navrcov.


who served on horseback the most disobedient of all.To make rich and powerful criminals effectivelyamenable to justice has indeed been found so difficulteverywhere, until a recent period of history, that weshould be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece.When we follow the reckless demeanour of richmen like Kritias, Alkibiades1, and Meidias, evenunder the full-grown democracy of Athens, we maybe very sure that their predecessors under the Klei-sthenean constitution would have been often too for-midable to be punished or kept down by an indivi-dual archon of ordinary firmness2, even assuming

1 SeeXenophon, Memorab. i. 2. 12-25; Thucyd. vi. 15, and the speechwhich he gives as spoken by Alkibiades in the assembly, vi. 17 ; Plu-tarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8—16, and the Oration of Demosthenes againstMeidias throughout: also Fragm. V. of the HeXapyoi of Aristophanes,Meineke, ii. p. 1128.

2 Sir Thomas Smith, in his Treatise on the Commonwealth of En-gland, explains the Court of Star-chamber as originally constituted inorder " to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of jus-tice." The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a singleword exactly describing this same class of offenders—'Yfipio-ToSiKcu—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis : see Meineke, HistoriaCritica Comicorum Graecorum, vol. i. p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his Treatise on Civil Government, " Therewas hardly a session of parliament from the time of Henry III. toHenry VIII., but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberiesand oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side—and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal pur-veyors on the other ; these being the two capital evils then felt. Re-specting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well asothers were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and toglory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to beretained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in theirquarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times,together with the statutes of the realm, inform us that they associated(or as they called it, confederated together) in great bodies, parading onhorseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armour, to the great terrorof peaceable subjects ; nay, that they attended their lords to parliament,equipped in the same military dress,'and even dared sometimes to pre-sent themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts ofjustice in a hostile manner—while their principals sat with the judges.

VOL. V. 2 L


him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now thedikasteries established by Perikl&s were inaccessible

on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries bylooks, nods, signs and signals." (Treatise concerning Civil Government,p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D.D. London, 1781.)

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and muchother matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful men inthose days over the course of justice.

A passage among the Fragmenta of Sallust, gives a striking pictureof the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (Fragm.lib. i. p. 158, ed. Delph.)

"At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et csetera secundis rebus oririsueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maxime aucta sunt. Nam in-jurise validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis a, Patribus, aliaeque dissen-siones domi fuere jam inde a. principio : neque amplius, quam regibusexactis, dum metus a Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruria positumest, sequo et modesto jure agitatum : dein, servili imperio patres ple-bem exercere : de vita atque tergo, regio more consulere : agro pellere,et a cseteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus servitiis, etmaxime fcenoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduis bellis tributumsimul et militiam toleraret, armata Montem Sacrum et Aventinuminsedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit. Discordi-arura et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum."

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughoutEurope in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hiill-mann's Stadte-Wesen des Mittelalters, especially vol. iii. pp. 196-199seqq.

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Ita-lian cities during these centuries, of naming as Podesta or suprememagistrate a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for ashort time—was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping theextreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out ofpowerful family connections. The restrictions which were thoughtnecessary to guard against either favour or antipathies on the part of thePodesta, are extremely singular (Hullmann, vol. iii. pp. 252-261 seq.).

"The proceedings of the patrician families in these cities (observesHullmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was among theworst of the many oppressions to which the trading classes were ex-posed at their hands—one of the greatest abuses which they practisedby means of their superior position. How often did they even maltreattheir creditors, who came to demand merely what was due to them!"(Stadte-Wesen, vol. ii. p. 229.)

MachiaveFs History of Florence illustrates, throughout, the invete-rate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws andjudicial authority. Indeed he seems to regard this as an incorrigiblechronic malady in society, necessitating ever-recurring disputes between


both to corruption and intimidation : their number,their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of know-ing beforehand what individuals would sit in anyparticular cause, prevented both the one and theother. And besides that the magnitude of their num-ber, extravagant according to our ideas of judicialbusiness, was essential to this tutelary effect1—itserved farther to render the trial solemn and theverdict imposing on the minds of parties and spec-tators, as we may see by the fact, that in import-

powerful men and the body of the people. " The people (he says) de-sire to live according to the laws ; the great men desire to overrule thelaws : it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony."" Volendo il popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare aquelle, non e possibile che capino insieme " (Macciavelli, Istorie Fio-rentine, liv. ii. p. 79, ad ann. 1282).

The first book of the interesting tale, called the Promessi Sposi, ofManzoni,—itself full of historical matter, and since published with il-lustrative notes by the historian Cantu—exhibits a state of judicialadministration, very similar to that above described, in the Milanese,during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; demonstrated by re-peated edicts, all ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real con-trol of the laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments ofmodern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws, themodern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural state of things.It is therefore not unimportant to produce some references (whichmight be indefinitely multiplied) reminding him of the very differentphenomena which past history exhibits almost everywhere.

1 The number of Roman judices employed to try a criminal causeunder the quastiones perpetuee in the last century and a half of the Re-public, seems to have varied between 100, 75, 70, 56, 51, 32, &c. (Labou-laye, Essai surles Loix Criminelles des Romains, p. 336. Paris, 1845.)

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of 4000 judices at Rome,distributed into four decuries (Pliny, H. N. xxxiii. 1, 31).

The venality as well as the party corruption of these Roman judicesor jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian orders, the twohighest and richest orders in the state,—was well-known and flagrant(Appian, Bell. Civ. i. 22, 35, 37; Laboulaye, ibid. p. 217-227; Walter,Geschichte des Romischen Rechts, ch. xxviii. sect. 237, 238 ; Asconiusin Ciceron. Verrin. pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in theremarkable letter to Atticus, Ep. ad Attic, i. 16).

2 L 2

51« HISTORY OF GREECE. [.PART II .

ant causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled.Nor was it possible by any other means than num-bers1 to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, ofwhom many were poor, some old, and all were de-spised individually by rich accused persons whowere brought before them — as Aristophanes andXenophon give us plainly to understand3. If we

1 Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been establishedin later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities (though Rhodes wasnot democratically constituted) and to have worked satisfactorily. Sal-lust says (in his Oratio II. ad Csesarem de Republica ordinanda, p. 561,ed. Cort.) " Judices a paucis probari regnum est; ex pecunia legi, in-honestum. Quare omnes primae classis judicare placet; sed numeroplures quam judicant. Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquamsuorum judiciorum pcenituit ; ubi promiscue dives et pauper, ut cuiquesors tulit, de maximis rebus juxta ac de minimis disceptat."

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there isno standing army or official force professionally constituted, as the onlymeans of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals,is insisted upon by Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, lib. i. c. 7.

" Potrebbesi ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta con-clusione, 1'accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero Soderini: ilquale al tutto segui per non essere in quella republica alcuno modo diaccuse contro alia ambizione dei potenti cittadini : perche lo accusareun potente a otto giudici in una republica, non basta: bisogna che igiudici siano assai, perchS pochi sempre fanno a modo de' pochi," &c:compare the whole of the same chapter.

2 Aristophan. Vesp. 570; Xenophon, Rep. Ath. i. 18. We are notto suppose that all the dikasts who tried a cause were very poor:Demosthenes would not talk to very poor men as to " the slave whomeach of them might have left at home " (Demosthenes cont. Stephan.A. c. 26. p. 1127).

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the exer-cise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to give money to them(Demosth, cont. Steph. B. c. 13. p. 1137). And it seems perfectly safeto affirm that in practice the dikasts were never tampered with before-hand : had the fact been otherwise, we must have seen copious allu-sions to it in the many free-spoken pleadings which remain to us (justas there are in the Roman orators): whereas in point of fact there arehardly any such allusions. The word Sem^sc (in Isokrates de Pac. Or.viii. p. 169. sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt meansverdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to obtaining by such meansvotes for offices in the public assembly, where the election took placeby show of hands. Isokrate's says that this was often done in his time,

CKAP. XLVI.] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 517

except the strict and peculiar educational disciplineof Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded theonly organ which Grecian politics could devise, forgetting redress against powerful criminals, publicas well as private, and for obtaining a sincere anduncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, TheAthe-we shall find that they are nothing but Jury-trial Juries are*"applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and puncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience the br°ad-

' •> L est scale—

—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated exhibitingproportions both the excellences and the defects ceiiencescharacteristic of the jury-system, as compared with fe

nctsi

Sn an~

decision by trained and professional judges. Allthe encomiums, which it is customary to pronounceand so perhaps it may have been: but in the case of the dikasteries,much better security was taken against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his Yloknelai, Fragm. xi. p. 69,ed. Neumann; compare Harpokration v. Aexafew; Plutarch, Coriolan.c. 14 ; and Pollux, viii. 121) intimates that Anytus was the first per-son who taught the art TOV 8eKa£ew TO. diKaarfipia, a short time beforethe battle of jEgospotamos. But besides that the information on thispoint is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between thedefeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and the battle of iEgospo-tamos, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceed-ingly embarrassed, thatit may well be doubted whether she could main-tain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personalservice of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been putin requisition at that time for defence against the enemy, without leavingany surplus for other purposes : there was not enough even to affordconstant pay to the soldiers and sailors (compare Thucyd. vi. 91 ; viii.69. 71, 76, 86). If therefore in this time of distress, the dikasterieswere rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful ac.cused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand,than it had been before or than it came to be afterwards when the sy-stem was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safetytherefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of yEgospotamos,either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that whichfollowed the subversion of the Thirty.


upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of theAthenian dikasteries in a still greater degree: allthe reproaches, which can be addressed on goodground to the dikasteries, will apply to modernjuries also, though in a less degree. Nor is theparallel less just, though the dikasteries, as themost democratical feature of democracy itself, havebeen usually criticised with marked disfavour—every censure or sneer or joke against them whichcan be found in ancient authors, comic as well asserious, being accepted as true almost to the letter;while juries are so popular an institution, that theirmerits have been over-stated (in England at least)and their defects kept out of sight. The theory ofthe Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the Revo-lution of 1688, are one and the same : recourse toa certain number of private citizens, taken bychance or without possibility of knowing before-hand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly andimpartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and ac-cused, and to find a true verdict according to theirconsciences upon a distinct issue before them.But in Athens this theory was worked out to itsnatural consequences ; while English practice, inthis respect as in so many others, is at variancewith English theory : the jury, though an ancientand a constant portion of the judicial system, hasnever been more than a portion—kept in subordi-nation, trammels, and pupillage, by a powerfulcrown and by judges presiding over an artificialsystem of law. In the English state trials, downto a period not long before the Revolution of 1688,


any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dic-tation of the judge were liable to fine, and at anearlier period (if a second jury on being summonedfound an opposite verdict) even to the terriblepunishment of attaint l. And though, for the lastcentury and a half, the verdict of the jury has beenfree as to matters of fact, new trials having takenthe place of the old attaint—yet the ascendency ofthe presiding judge over their minds, and his in-fluence over the procedure as the authority onmatters of law, has always been such as to overrule

1 Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication, CriminalTrials, vol. i. p. 115, after giving an account of the trial of Sir NicholasThrockmorton in 1553, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes—"There is one circumstance in this trial, which ought not to bepassed over without an observation. It appears that after the trialwas over, the jury were required to give recognisances to answer fortheir verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight monthsand heavily fined by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was thesecurity which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in those times :and such were the perils to which juries were then exposed, who ven-tured to act upon their conscientious opinions in state prosecutions!But even these proceedings against the jury, monstrous as they appearto our improved notions of the administration of justice, must not beconsidered as a wanton exercise of unlawful power on this particularoccasion. The fact is that the judges of England had for centuriesbefore exercised a similar authority, though not without some mur-muring against it; and it was not until more than a century after it, inthe reign of Charles II., that a solemn decision was pronounced againstits legality."

" I n the reign of James I. it was held by the Lord ChancellorEgerton, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, thatwhen a party indicted is found guilty on the trial, the jury shall not bequestioned ; but on the other side, when a jury hath acquitted a felonor a traitor against manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty.After the abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances inthe reign of Charles II., in which it was resolved, that both grand andpetit juries might be fined for giving verdicts against plain evidenceand the directions of the court." Compare Mr. Amos's Notes on For-tescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglise, c. 27.


the natural play of their feelings and judgement asmen and citizens l— sometimes to the detriment,much oftener to the benefit, (always excepting poli-tical trials) of substantial justice. But in Athensthe dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact;the laws were not numerous, and were couched infew, for the most part familiar, words : to determinehow the facts stood, and whether, if the facts wereundisputed, the law invoked was properly applica-ble to them, were parts of the integral questionsubmitted to them, and comprehended in their ver-dict : moreover, each dikastery construed the lawfor itself without being bound to follow the deci-sions of those which had preceded it, except in sofar as such analogy might really influence the con-

1 Respecting the French juries, M. Cottu (Reflexions sur la JusticeCriminate, p. 79) remarks,—

" Le desir ardent de bien faire dont les jures sont generalementaniraes, et la crainte de s'egarer, les jette dans une obeissance passive al'impulsion qui leur est donne'e par le president de la Cour d'Assise, etsi ce magistrat sait s'emparer de leur estime, alors leur confiance enlui ne connoit plus de bornes. Us le considerent comme l'etoile quidoit les guider dans Fobscurite qui les environne, et pleins d'un respectaveugle pour son opinion, ils n'attendent que la manifestation qu'il leuren fait pour la sanctionner par leur declaration. Ainsi au lieu de deuxjuges que l'accuse devoit avoir, il n'en a bien souvent qu'un seul, quiest le president de la Cour d'Assise."

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, Ueber die Oeffent-lichkeit und Miindlichkeit der Gerechtigkeitspflege, which contains hisreview of the French judicial system, Ueber die GerichtsverfassungFrankreichs, Abt. iii. H. v. p. 477) confirms this statement from alarge observation of the French courts of justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to pro-nounce a verdict of guilty by a majority of seven against five, (in whichcase the law threw the actual condemnation upon the judges presentin court, directing their votes to be counted along with those of thejury) is a remarkable proof of this aversion of the jury to the responsi-bility of decision: see Feuerbach, ibid. p. 481 seg. Compare also thetreatise of the same author, Betrachtungen iiber das GeschwornenGericht. p. 186-198.

CHAP. XLVI.] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. S21

victions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, butat the same time untrammeled by the awe-strikingascendency, of a professional judge—obeying thespontaneous inspirations of their own consciences,and recognising no authority except the laws of thecity, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since Theenco-1688, has been politically most valuable, as a se- usually pro-curity against the encroachments of an anti-popu- Tlar executive: partly for this reason, partly for ^others not necessary to state here, it has had greater ™0ljld et

credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and morehas been supposed to produce much more of what the Athe-is good in English administration of justice, thanreally belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified enco-miums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty,the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the prac-tical instinct for detecting falsehood and resistingsophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard andput into a jury-box—comparatively little accountis taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, orof the corrections in the shape of new trials, underwhich they act, or of the artificial forensic mediuminto which they are plunged for the time of theirservice : so that the theory of the case presumesthem to be more of spontaneous agents, and moreanalogous to the Athenian dikasts, than the prac-tice confirms. Accordingly, when we read theseencomiums in modern authors, we shall find thatboth the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in en-suring pure and even-handed justice, and still moreits indirect benefits in improving and educating the


citizens generally-—might have been set forth yetmore emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Peri-kl6s about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be truethat an Englishman or an American counts morecertainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict froma jury of his country than from a permanent profes-sional judge, much more would this be the feelingof an ordinary Athenian, when he compared thedikasteries with the archon. The juror hears andjudges under full persuasion that he himself indi-vidually stands in need of the same protection orredress invoked by others: so also did the dikast.As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respectto the laws and constitution—in giving to everycitizen a personal interest in enforcing the formerand maintaining the latter—in imparting a senti-ment of dignity to small and poor men through thedischarge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exer-cising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher de-gree by the dikasteries at Athens ; from their greaterfrequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental ac-tion, without any professional judge, upon whomthey could throw the responsibility of deciding forthem \

1 I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States—Mr.Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana (Preface,p. 12-16), an eloquent panegyric on Trial by Jury. It contains littlemore than the topics commonly insisted on, but it is expressed withpeculiar warmth, and with the greater fulness, inasmuch as the peopleof Louisiana, for whom the author was writing, had no familiarity withthe institution and its working. The reader will observe that almosteverything here said in recommendation of the jury might have beenurged by Perikles with much truer and wider application, in enforcing


On the other hand, the imperfections inherent j | ^in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exagge- jury-triai

•—exagge-his transfer of judicial power from individual magistrates to the dikas- r a t e d ' n e

teries. ofthe" By our constitution (i. e. in Louisiana), the right of a trial by jury dikasteries.

is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively established. Thishowever may be done by law, and there are so many strong reasonsin its favour, that it has been thought proper to insert in the code a pre-cise declaration that in all criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is aprivilege which cannot be renounced. Were it left entirely at theoption ofthe accused, a desire to propitiate the favour of the judge, igno-rance of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation, mightinduce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thusby degrees accustom the people to a spectacle which they ought neverto behold—a single man determining the fact, applying the law, anddisposing at his will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen.......Those who advocate the present disposition of our law say—admittingthe trial by jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it givesthe accused the option to avail himself of its benefits : he is the bestjudge whether it will be useful to him : and it would be unjust to di-rect him in so important a choice. This argument is specious, but not.solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to showthat this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is moreover anotherinterest, besides that of the culprit, to be considered. If he be guilty,the state has an interest in his conviction : and whether guilty or inno-cent, it has a higher interest,—that the fact should be fairly canvassedbefore judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiassed by any falseviews of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its admi-nistration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in rendering it"free from suspicion. It is not true therefore to say, that the laws doenough when they give the choice between a fair and impartial trial, andone that is liable to the greatest objections. They must do more—theymust restrict that choice, so as not to suffer an ill-advised individual todegrade them into instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarilyinflicted; or of death, though that death should be suicide."

" Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory, is,that it diffuses the most valuable information among every rank of citi-zens : it is a school, of which every jury that is impanelled is a sepa-rate class, where the dictates of the laws and the consequences of dis-obedience to them, are practically taught. The frequent exercise ofthese important functions moreover gives a sense of dignity and selfrespect, not only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but whichadds to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue, norpower, can deprive him of this share in the administration of justice,though they can humble the pride of every other office and vacate everyother place. Every time he is called on to act in this capacity, he


rated form under the Athenian system. Both ju-ror and dikast represent the average man of the

must feel that though placed in perhaps the humblest station, he is yetthe guardian of the life, the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against injustice and oppression ; and that while his plain under-standing has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptibleintegrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not escape. A statewhose most obscure citizens are thus individuallj' elevated to performthese august functions ; who are alternately, the defenders of the in-jured, the dread of the guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution ;without whose consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgraceincurred; who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, anddirect the hand of justice where to strike—-such a state can never sinkinto slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers may per-vert the constitution: ambitious demagogues may violate its precepts :foreign influence may control its operations : but while the peopleenjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from among themselves, they can-not cease to be free. The information it spreads, the sense of dignityand independence it inspires, the courage it creates—will always givethem an energy of resistance that can grapple with encroachments,and a renovating spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. Theenemies of freedom know this : they know how admirable a vehicle itis, to convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack thevitals of their power, and they therefore guard against its introduc-tion with more care than they would take to avoid pestilential disease.In countries where it already exists, they insidiously endeavour to inno-vate, because they dare not openly destroy : changes inconsistent withthe spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretextof improvement: the common class of citizens are too ill-informed toperform the functions of jurors—a selection is necessary. This choicemust be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be madeamong the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability : sothat after several successive operations of political chemistry, a shiningresult may be obtained, freed indeed from all republican dross, butwithout any of the intrinsic value that is found in the rugged, but in-flexible integrity, and incorruptible worth, of the original composition.Men impanelled by this process bear no resemblance but in name tothe sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from theperformance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of whose func-tions gives no time for the work of corruption or the influence of fear.By innovations such as these the institution is so changed as to leavenothing to attach the affections or awaken the interest of the people,and it is neglected as an useless, or abandoned as a mischievous, con-trivance."

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr. Living-ston, by the provisions of his code, limits very materially the inter-


time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed frompecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding ac-cording to what he thinks justice or to some genu-ine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism,which in reference to the case before him he thinksas good as justice—but not exempt from sympa-thies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which actthe more powerfully because there is often no con-sciousness of their presence, and because they evenappear essential to his idea of plain and straight-forward good sense. According as a jury are com-posed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or En-glishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of aference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the jurors morenearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts (p. 85) : " I restrictthe charge of the judge to an opinion of the law and to the repetitionof the evidence, only when required by any one of the jury. The practiceof repeating all the testimony from notes,—always (from the nature ofthings) imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelesslytaken,—has a double disadvantage : it makes the jurors, who rely moreon the judge's notes than on their own memory, inattentive to the evi-dence : and it gives them an imperfect copy of that which the natureof the trial by jury requires that they should record in their own minds.Forced to rely upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their atten-tion, and it will be only when they disagree in their recollection thatrecourse will be had to the notes of the judge." Mr. Livingston goeson to add, that the judges, from their old habits acquired as practisingadvocates, are scarcely ever neutral—almost always take a side—andgenerally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here setsforth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted upon byM. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard Phillips's Treatiseon Juries, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the differentshape which the jury-system has assumed in England and France (DesPouvoirs et des Obligations des Jury, traduit de l'Anglois, par CharlesComte, 2d ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary Considerations sur lePouvoir Judiciaire, pp. 100 seqq.).

The length of this note forbids my citing anything farther either fromthe eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from those of M.Comte: but they would be found (like those of Mr. Livingston) evenmore applicable to the dikasteries of Athens than to the juries of En-gland and America.

526 HISTORY OF GREECE. [ P * B T H.

frontier on which smuggling prevails,—there is aptto prevail among them a corresponding bias: atthe time of any great national delusion, such asthe Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excite-ment, such as that of the Church and King mobsat Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley andthe Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate whata calmer age recognises to have been gross injus-tice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction ofcapital punishment for a particular crime will ac-quit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence ofguilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indictedfor any state offence before the dikastery at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against,with equal power of speaking in his own defence, ofsummoning witnesses and of procuring friends tospeak for him—would have better chance of a fairtrial than he would now have anywhere except inEngland and the United States of America; andbetter than he would have had in England down tothe seventeenth century1. Juries bring the com-

1 Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introduct. p. 8) observes, that the"proceedings against persons accused of state offences in the earlierperiods of our history, do not deserve the name of trials : they were amere mockery of justice," &c.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse thefollowing remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on theStatutes, p. 409. In remarking on a statute of Henry VII. A.D. 1494,he says—

"The 21st chapter recites—'That perjury is much and customarilyused within the city of London, among such persons as passen andbeen impannelled in issue, joined between party and party.'

" This offence hath been before this statute complained of in pre-ambles to several laws, being always the perjury of a juror, who findsa verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we hear too muchof at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

" In the Dance of Death, written originally in French by Macharel,and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with some additions to


mon feeling as well as the common reason of thepublic—or often indeed only the separate feeling ofparticular fractions of the public—to dictate theapplication of the law to particular cases : they area protection against anything worse — especially

adapt it to English characters—a juryman is mentioned, who had oftenbeen bribed for giving a false verdict, which shews the offence to havebeen very common. The sheriff, who summoned the jury, was likewisegreatly accessory to this crime, by summoning those who were mostpartial and prejudiced. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informsus that it was a common article in an attorney's bill, to charge proamicitid vicecomitis.

" It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors ofthe city of London is more particularly complained of than in otherparts of England, by the preamble of this and other statutes. Stowinforms us that in 1468, many jurors of this city were punished byhaving papers fixed on their heads, stating their offence of having beentampered with by the parties to the suit. He likewise complains thatthis crying offence continued in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when hewrote his account of London: and Fuller, in his English Worthies,mentions it as a proverbial saying, that London juries hang half andsave half. Grafton also, in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chan-cellor of the diocese of London was indicted for a murder, and that thebishop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolse}% in behalf of his officer, tostop the prosecution, ' because London juries were so prejudiced, thatthey would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.'

" The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ ofattaint: and the statute directs, that half of the grand jury, when thetrial is per medietatem linguce, shall be strangers, not Londoners.

" And there 's no London jury, but are ledIn evidence as far by common fame,As they are by present deposition."

(Ben Jonson's Magnetic Lady, Act. III. Sc. 3.)

" It appears by 15 Henry VI. c. 5 (which likewise recites the greatincrease of perjury in jurors and in the strongest terms), that in everyattaint there were thirteen defendants—the twelve jurors who gave theverdict and the plaintiff or defendant who had obtained it, who there-fore was supposed to have used corrupt means to procure it. For thisreason, if the verdict was given in favour of the crown, no attaint couldbe brought, because the king could not be joined as a defendant withthe jury who were prosecuted."

Compare also the same work, p. 394-457, and Mr. Amos's Noteson Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliee, c. 27'.


against such corruption or servility as are liable totaint permanent official persons—but they cannotpossibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trialat Athens effected the same object, and had in it onlythe same ingredients of error and misdecision, asthe English jury : but it had them in stronger dose1,

1 In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first time by theConstituent Assembly in 1790; and then only for criminal procedure :I transcribe the following remarks on the working of it from the in-structive article in Merlin's ' Repertoire de Jurisprudence,' article Jure,Though written in a spirit very favourable to the jury, it proclaims thereflections of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of thejurymen whom he had seen in action, and on their disposition to pro-nounce the verdict according to the feeling which the case before theminspired.

" Pourquoi faut il qu'une institution qui rassure les citoyens contrel'endurcissement et la prevention si funeste a, l'innocence, que peut pro-duire l'habitude de juger les crimes . . . . qu'une institution qui donnepour juges a un accuse, des citoyens independans de toute espece d'in-fluence, ses pairs, ses egaux . . . . pourquoi faut il que cette institution,dont les formes sont simples, touchantes, patriarchales, dont la theorieflatte et entraine l'esprit par une seduction irresistible, ait ete si sou-vent meconnue, trompee par Tignorance et la pusillanimite, prostitueepeut-etre par une vile et coupable corruption?

" Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, meme a la prevarication, desjures : ils ont trop de fois acquitte les coupahles, mais il n'a pas encore6te prouve qu'ils eussent jamais fait couler une goutte de sang inno-cent : et si l'on pouvoit supposer qu'ils eussent vu quelquefois le crimela oil il n'y en avoit qu'une apparence trompeuse et fausse, ce ne seroitpas leur conscience qu'il faudroit accuser: ce seroit la fatalite malheur-euse des circonstances qui auroient accompagne l'accusation, et quiauroit trompe de meme les juges les plus penetrans et les plus exercesa rechercher la verite et a la deme'ler du mensonge.

" Mais les reproches qu'ont souvent me'rites les jures, c'est d'avoirce"de a une fausse commiseration, ou a. l'interet qu'etoient parvenus aleur inspirer les families d'accuses qui avaient un rang dans la society :c'est souvent d'etre sortis de leurs attributions, qui se bornent a appre"-cier les faits, et les juger d'une maniere differente de la loi. J'ai vucent exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des fare's.Trop souvent ils ont voulu voir une action innocente, la oil la loi avoitdit qu'il y avait un crime, et alors ils n'ont pas craint de se jouer de laverite pour tromper et £luder la loi."" Serat-il possible d'ameliorer l'institution des jures, et d'en prevenir


without the counteracting authority of a judge, andwithout the benefit of a procedure such as has now

les hearts souvent trop scandaleux ? Gardons nous d'en douter. QueTon commence par composer le jury de propri^taires interesses a punirle crime pour le rendre plus rare: que surtout on en eloigne les arti-sans, les petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probite' estheureusement fort commune, mais dont l'esprit est peu exerce, et qui,accoutumes aux deferences, aux egards, cedent toujours a, l'opinion deceux de leurs collegues dont. le rang est plus distingue : ou qui, fami-liarises seulement avec les idees relatives a leur profession, n'ont jamaiseu, dans tout le reste, que des idees d'emprunt ou d'inspiration. Onsait qu'aujourdhui ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la Franceforment toujours la majorite des jures: mettez au milieu d'eux unhomme d'un etat plus eleve, d'un esprit delie, d'une elocution facile, ilentrainera ses collegues, il decidera la deliberation : et si cet homme ale jugement faux ou le coeur corrompu, cette deliberation sera neces-sairement mauvaise.

" Mais pourra-t on parvenir a vaincre l'insouciance des proprietairesriches et eclaires, a leur faire abandonner leurs affaires, leurs families,leurs habitudes, pour les entrainer dans les villes, et leur y faire rem-plir des fonctions qui tourmentent quelquefois la probite, et donnentdes inquietudes d'autant plus vives que la conscience est plus delicate ?Pourquoi non ? Pourquoi les memes classes de citoyens qui dans leshuit ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zele al'exercice de ces fonctions, les fuiroient elles aujourdhui? surtout si,pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux grands ressorts qui sontdans sa main, si elle s'engage a recompenser 1'exactitude, et & punir lanegligence V (Merlin, Repertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jures, p. 970

In these passages, it deserves notice, that what is particularly re-marked about juries, both English and French, is, their reluctance toconvict accused persons brought before them. Now the character ofthe Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr. Mitford and by many otherauthors, is the precise reverse of this : an extreme severity and cruelty,and a disposition to convict all accused persons brought before them,upon little or no evidence—especially rich accused persons. I ventureto affirm that to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not lessimprobable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence. In thespeeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed find complaintsmade of the severity of the dikasteries : but in those speeches whichcome from accusers, there are abundance of complaints to the contrary—of over-indulgence on the part of the dikasteries, and consequent im-punity of criminals. Nor does Aristophanes—by whom most modernauthors are guided even when they do not quote him—when fairly stu-died, bear out the temper ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts; evenif we admitted Aristophanes to be a faithful and trustworthy witness,

VOL. V. 2 M


been obtained in England, The feelings of the di-kasts counted for more, and their reason for less:not merely because of their greater numbers, whichnaturally heightened the pitch of feeling in eachindividual—but also because the addresses of ora-tors or parties formed the prominent part of theprocedure, and the depositions of witnesses only avery subordinate part: the dikast1 therefore heard

which no man who knows his picture of Sokrates will be disposed todo. Aristophanes takes hold of every quality which will raise a laughagainst the dikasts, and his portrait of them as Wasps was well-calcu-lated for this purpose—to describe them as boiling over with acrimony,irritation, impatience to find some one whom they could convict andpunish. But even he, when he comes to describe these dikasts in ac-tion, represents them as obeying the appeals to their pity, as well asthose to their anger—as being yielding and impressionable when theirfeelings are approached on either side, and unable, when they hear theexculpatory appeal of the accused, to maintain the anger which hadbeen raised by the speech of the accuser. (See Aristophan. Vesp. 574,713, 727, 974.) Moreover, if from the Vespae we turn to the Nubes,where the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are theretold that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and subterfugeswhich would enable him to procure acquittal from the dikasts, whatevermight be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impressibility of the feelingson all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears, invectives, &c, is thetrue character of the Athenian dikasts. And I also believe that theywere, as a general rule, more open to commiseration than to any otherfeeling—like what is above said respecting the French jurymen : evKi-vrjTOs npos opyfjv (6 'Adrjvaiav ftrjfios), evfierad^Tos Trpbs cXeov—this ex-pression of Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true aboutthe dikasts : compare also the description given by Pliny (H. N. xxxv.10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian Demos by the painterParrhasius.

1 That the difference between the dikast and the juryman, in thisrespect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark. M. Merlin ob-serves, " Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que pour etre propreaux fonctions de jure, il suffise d'avoir une intelligence ordinaire et dela probite. Si l'accuse paroissoit seul aux debats avec les temoins, ilne faudroit sans doute que du bon sens pour reconnoitre la verite dansdes declarations faites avec simpliciteet d£gagees de tout raisonnement:mais il y paroit assiste presque toujours d'un ou de plusieurs defenseurs


little of the naked facts, the appropriate subjectsfor his reason—but he was abundantly suppliedwith the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevantstatements and suggestions, &c. of the parties, andthat too in a manner skilfully adapted to bis tem-per. To keep the facts of the case before the jury,apart from the falsehood and colouring of parties, isthe most useful function of the modern judge, whoseinfluence is also considerable as a restraint upon thepleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were

qui par des interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou egarent les te-moins ; et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique, quelquefoiseloquente, enveloppent la verite des nuages, et rendent l'evidence memeproblematique. Certes, il faut plus que de bonnes intentions, il fautplus que du bon sens, pour ne pas se Iaisser entrainer a ces fausseslueurs, pour se garantir des ecarts de la sensibilite, et pour se maintenirimmuablement dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions don-ne"es en meme temps a l'esprit et au cosur" (Merlin, Repertoire de Ju-risprudence, art. Jures, p. 98).

At Athens, there were no professional advocates : the accuser andthe accused (or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause was civil), eachappeared in person with their witnesses, or sometimes with depositionswhich the witnesses had sworn to before the Archon : each might come•with a speech prepared by Antipho (Thuc}'d. viii. 68) or some otherrhetor : each might have one or more ^vvryyopovs to speak on his behalfafter himself, but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to himby the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been per-fectly acquainted with the plaintiff's case, since besides the Anakrisis orpreliminary examination before the archon, the cause had been for themost part already before an arbitrator. In a criminal case the accusedparty had only the Anakrisis to guide him, as to the matter of whichhe was to be accused : but it appears from the prepared speeches of ac-cused parties which we now possess, that this Anakrisis must have beensufficiently copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to re-but. The accuser was condemned to a fine of 1000 drachms, if he didnot obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the dikasts engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the dikastery,but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the manner of con-ducting their case, &c, though he did not himself speak before thedikasts : so also Ktesikles the Xoyoypaipos (Demosthenes cont. Theo-krin. c. 5) acted as general adviser or attorney.

2 M 2


thus materially diminished, while the action uponhis feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, wassharpened, as compared with the modern juror1.We see in the remaining productions of the Atticorators how much there is of plausible deception,departure from the true issue, and appeals to sym-pathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind,addressed to the dikasteries2. Of course such arti-

1 Aristotle in the first and second chapters of his Treatise de Rheto-rica, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric who precededhim, treated almost entirely of the different means of working on thefeelings of the dikasts, and of matters "extraneous to the real questionwhich the dikasts ought to t r y " (nepi T5>V e£a> TOV Trpa.yp.aTos ra TTKH-<rra npayfiarevovrai' Sm/3oXi7 yap Kai eXfor Kai opyfj, oi Trepl TOV npdy-fiaTos i<rriv, aWa wpbs TOV 8IKCIO~T7]V, & C , i. 1, 1 ' compare, i. 2, 3 andiii. 1, 2).

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the feelingsof the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice, even if we did not knowit from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives andchildren before the dikasts as suppliants for them to obtain mercy or ac-quittal, see Aristophan. Vesp. 5G7-976; Andokides de Mysteriis (adfinem), and Lysias, Orat. iv. de Vulnere (ad finem).

3 To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, con-ducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professionalmen (judges, advocates, attorneys, &c), and viewed by the general pub-lic as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought toact for himself—nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judi-cial orations (to a certain extent also the Roman) than the entire absenceof this professional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invokedand administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogyto this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the Courts ofRequests and other courts for trying causes limited to small sums ofproperty—too small to be worth the notice of judges and lawyers.

These Courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on thewelfare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation.The History of the Birmingham Court of Requests, by Mr. WilliamHutton (lately republished by Messrs. Chambers), forms an exceptionto this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, theconduct, and the sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, theclosest approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts andpleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hut-

CHAP. XLVI.J CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 533

fices were resorted to by opposite speakers in eachparticular trial, nor have we any means of knowingto what extent they actually perverted the judge-ment of the hearers1. Probably the frequent habitof sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration indetecting sophistry not often possessed by non-pro-fessional citizens : nevertheless it cannot be doubted

ton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a Commis-sioner, and took warm interest in the honourable working of the Court.His remarks upon the position, the duties, and the difficulties of theCommissioners, illustrated by numerous cases given in detail, are ex-tremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often sug-gested themselves to intelligent dikasts at Athens.

" Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the Commissionerscannot decide against law, they can decide without it. Their oath bindsthem to proceed according to good conscience (mpl STOV OVK elo-i vofioi,yvaiA-r) rrj SiKtuoTaTT)—was the oath of the Athenian dikast). A manonly needs information to be able to decide."

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgement. " Mis-information is another source of evil: both parties equally treat theCommissioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light uponthe subject will not.

" It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries theair of mildness and is master of his tale ; or not to be biassed in favourof infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we aremuch inclined to assist.

" Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness,they are powerful advocates, which instantly disarm, particularly thosewhich the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and willreach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inse-parable.

" Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to' seventy, whocould look with indifference upon beauty in distress ; if he could, he wasunfit to be a judge. He should be a stranger to decision who is astranger to compassion. All these matters influence the man, andwarp his judgement."

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and unprofessionaljudge, of his own feelings when on the bench. It will be found illus-trated by frequent passages in the Attic pleaders, where they addressthemselves to the feelings here described in the bosom of the dikasts.

1 Demosthenes (cont. Phormio. p. 913, c. 2) emphatically remarkshow much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony be-fore the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.


that in a considerable proportion of cases, successdepended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case,than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-tell-ing, dexterity of statement, and good general cha-racter, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friendswho addressed the court on their behalf. The ac-cusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punish-ment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, areexpressed with a bitterness which is now banishedfrom English criminal judicature, though it wascommon in the state trials of two centuries ago.Against them may be set the impassioned and em-phatic appeals made by defendants and their friendsto the commiseration of the dikasts ; appeals themore often successful, because they came last, im-mediately before decision was pronounced. This istrue of Rome as well as of Athens1.

Powerful As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenianthedikaste- dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary mani-dsingand festation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellencestheinteiiect a n d defects both brought out in exaggerated relief:offn

fdfvi°gS t n e y e n s u r e d a decision at once uncorrupt, public-dual citi-zens. Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the

judices at Rome, when sentence was about to be pronounced uponScaurus, whom Cicero defended (ad Ciceron. Orat. pro Scauro, p. 28,ed. Orelli) : " Laudaverunt Scaurum consulares novem—Horum magnapars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui aberant : inter quos Pompeius quo-que. Unus prseterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius,Syllae filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locutusnon minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Adgenua judicum, cum sententise ferrentur, bifariam se diviserunt qui proeo rogabant: ab uno latere Scaurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororis filius, etPaulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. ^Emilius Buca, et C. Memmius, supplica-verunt: ex altera. parte Sylla Faustus, frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo,et T. Peducseus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Leenas."

Compare also Cicero, Biutus, c. 23, about the defence of SergiusGalba ; Quintilian, I. O. ii. 15.


minded, and imposing—together with the bestsecurity which the case admitted against illegalviolences on the part of the rich and great1. Theirextreme publicity—as well as their simple andoral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremo-nial technicality which marked the law of Romeeven at its outset, was no small benefit: and asthe verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, de-pended upon causes of misjudgement common tothem with the general body of the citizens, sothey never appeared to pronounce unjustly, norlost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally.But whatever may have been their defects as judi-cial instruments, as a stimulus both to thoughtand speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in thecircumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless theywould not have produced the same effect if esta-blished at Thebes or Argos : the susceptibilities ofthe Athenian mind, as well as the previous practiceand expansive tendencies of democratical citizen-ship, were also essential conditions—and thatgenuine taste for sitting in judgement and hear-ing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanesmay caricature and deride it, was alike honour-able and useful to the people. The first establish-ment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident withthe great improvement of Attic tragedy in pass-ing from iEschylus to Sophokles. The same deve-lopment of the national genius, now preparing

1 Plato, in his Treatise de Legibus (vi. p. 768) adopts all the distin-guishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists,that the citizen, who does not take his share in the exercise of thisfunction, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the com-monwealth—TO irapaftav rrjs noXacos ov ficroxos eiVot.


Necessity

to speak—growth ofprofessionalteachers of

o?™pPeechesfor others,

splendid manifestations both in tragic and comicpoetry, was called with redoubled force into thepath of oratory, by the new judicial system. Acertain power of speech now became necessary, notmerely for those who intended to take a prominentpart in politics, but also for private citizens to vin-dicate their rights or repel accusations, in a courtof justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatestpractical utility, even apart from ambitious pur-poses; hardly less so than the use of arms or thepractice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, theteachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the com-posers of written speeches to be delivered by others,now began to multiply and to acquire an unprece-dented importance—as well at Athens as under thecontemporary democracy of Syracuse1, in whichalso some form of popular judicature was establish-ed. Style and speech began to be reduced to asystem, and so communicated: not always happily,for several of the early rhetors2 adopted an artifi-cial, ornate, and conceited manner, from whichAttic good taste afterwards liberated itself—but thevery character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts and putting himself forwardin show-lectures as a model for others, is a featurefirst belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates

1 Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. " Itaque cum sublatis in Siciliatyrannis res private longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, turn primumquod esset acuta ea gens et controversa natui a, artem et prsecepta Si-culos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," &c. Compare Diodor. xi. 87 ;Pausan. vi. 17, 8.

2 Especially Gorgias : see Aristotel. Rhetor, iii. 1, 26 ; Timseus, Fr.;Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysia Judicium, c. 3 : also Foss, Dissertatio deGorgia Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828) ; and Westermann, Geschichte derEeredsamkeit in Gricchenland ur.d Rom., sect. 30, 31.


a new demand in the minds of the citizens. Webegin to hear, in the generation now growing up,of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence Rhetors'and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of sophists.similar moral and intellectual endowments, or oftenindeed the same person, consideredin different pointsof view1; either as professing to improve the moralcharacter—or as communicating power and facilityof expression—or as suggesting premises for per-suasion, illustrations on the common-places of moralsand politics, argumentative abundance on matters ofordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confutingan opponent, &c.2 Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in

1 Plato (Gorgias, c. 20—75 ; Pythagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimesdesignated as a sophist (Demosth. cont. Neaer. c. 7- P- 1351 ; Athene,xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for supposing with Taylor(Vit. Lysise, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there were two persons namedLysias, and that the person here named is a different man from the au-thor of the speeches which remain to us : see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast.H. p. 360, Appendix, c. 20.

2 See the first book of Aristotle's Rhetoric (alluded to in a formernote) for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before histime. He remarks (and Plato had remarked before him) (i. 1 and 2) thattheir teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical,bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikas-tery (irepl TOV 8iKa£c(rdcu irdvres TreipUvrai rexyoXoyeiv) : see also a re-markable passage in his Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, c. 32 ad finem.And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehen-sive theory of rhetoric and all matters appertaining to it (in a treatisewhich has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis), yetwhen he is recommending his speculations to notice, he appeals to thegreat practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to " helphimself" and fight his own battles in case of need—"KTOTTOV d T<5 cra>-jxaTi fikval(T)(pov fifj §vvacr8ai{ior)6eiv £a.VTa,\6ya>ht OVK aio-^pw (i. 1, 3 :compare iii. 1,2; Plato, Gorgias, c. 41-55 ; Protagoras, c. 9; Phse-drus, c. 43-50; Euthydem. c. 1-31 ; and Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 12,2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the Anabasis of Xenophon, ii.6, 16; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 307; Aristoph. Nubes, 1108; Xeno-phon, Memorab. i. 2, 48 ; Plato, AlkibiadSs, i. c. 31, p. 119 ; and astriking passage in Plutarch's life of Cato the elder, c. 1.


Attica, Tbrasymachus of ChaJkMon, Tisias of Syra-cuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of AbdeTa, Pro-dikus of Ke6s, Theodoras of Byzantium, Hippias ofElis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distin-guished themselves in these departments of teach-ing. Antipho was the author of the earliest com-posed speech really spoken in a dikastery and pre-served down to the later critics1. These men weremostly not citizens of Athens, though many of thembelonged to towns comprehended in the Athenianempire, at a time when important judicial causes be-longing to these towns were often carried up to betried at Athens—while all of them looked to that cityas a central point of action and distinction. The termSophist, which Herodotus2 applies with sincere re-spect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon,Anacharsis, Pythagoras, &c, now came to be ap-plied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conver-sation, and disputation; many of whom professed ac-quaintance with the whole circle of human science,physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), sofar as was necessary to talk about any portion of itplausibly and effectively, and to answer any ques-tion which might be proposed to them. Thoughthese men passed from one Grecian town to an-other, partly in the capacity of envoys from theirfellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents tonumerous hearers, with much renown and large

1 Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 832 ; Quintilian, iii. 1, 10. CompareVan Spaan (or Ruhnken), Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore Attico,pp. 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson's edition of Antipho and Andokides. An-tipho is said to have been the teacher of the historian Thucydides. Thestatement of Plutarch that the father of Antipho was also a sophist, canhardly be true.

5 Herodot. i. 29 ; iv. 95.


gain1,—they appear to have been viewed with jea-lousy and dislike by a large portion of the public2:for at a time when every citizen pleaded his owncause before the dikastery, they imparted, to thosewho were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiarskill in the common weapons, which made themseem like fencing-masters or professional swords-men amidst a society of untrained duellists3.Moreover Sokrat&s,—himself a product of the same Polemics

' r . ofSokrates,

age, and a disputant on the same subjects,—and himself abearing the same name of a Sophist4, but despising against'the

sophists"• Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2 ; Menon, p. 95 ; and Gorgias, c. 1, generally,

with Stallbaum's note) ; Diodor. xii. 53 ; Pausan. vi. 17, 8.2 Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech

was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers andlettered men—TO KOIV§ TOIS <pi\ocr6(j>ois viro TWV noXKav eninfiwuevov(Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31). Compare jEschine's cont. Timar. aboutDemosthenes, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the curious fragment ofSophokles, 865. Oi yap yvvavdpoi KCU Af'yew â-Ki/Korer.

3 Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in whichThucydides describes the Athenian rhetor Antipho (viii. 68) : 'AvrKpav,dvrjp 'Adrjvaltov dpeTrj re oiidevbs vo~T€pos, Kal Kparujros iv6vp,r]Brjvai yevo-

[tevos Kal a av yvoirj elTreiv' Kal eV jxev hrjj&ov ov Trapiasv ov& es' aXKov ayatva

cKovtrios ovdiva, dXX' virOTrrws TG> ir\r]6ei dia S6£av 8eivoTt)ros

SiaKeificvos, TOVS fievroi dya>vi£ofMvovs Kal iv hiKatTTr)pia> Kal iv SIJJUOJ,

7rXeiOT-a els dvfjp, OCTTIS ^VfifiovXevcraiTO TL, bvvafievos axfxXew. " I nde

ilia circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio," observes Quintilian, Inst.Or. iv. ], 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Phsedrus, c. 86), Isokrates cont.Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 295, where he complains of the teachers—oinvesvvea-xovro, SiKafccrdai hihacTKeiv, iKkeâjxevm TO SiKTêpeWaTOi' TG&V

dvofiaTav, 6 rav <$>6OVOVVTO>V epyov f'irj Xtyctv, d\X' ov rdv irpoeiTT&Taiv

rfji Toiavrrjs 7rai8svTea>s, Demosthen. De Fals. Legat. c. 70, 71, p. 417-420; and JEschin. cont. Ktesiphon. c. 9, p. 371—KaKovpyov o-orjuo-Trjv,ol6fx£vov p7][iao~i roiis Popovs dvatprjcreiv.

1 iEschines cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. 'Yfiels pev, a> 'Adrjvalot, Sa>-KpaTriv fiev TOV (rocpicrTrjV dweKTeivaTe, on KpiTiav efpdvr] w(7rai8ev-

Ka>s, eva rtov TpiaKOVTa TWV TOV dr)p,ov KaTaXvo"dvr(ov.

Among the sophists whom Isokrates severely criticises, he evidentlyseems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between togaand cwio-Tr)firj, which he particularly notes, and which is so conspicu-


political and judicial practice, and looking to theproduction of intellectual stimulus and moral im-pressions upon his hearers—Sokrates carried onthroughout his life a constant polemical warfareagainst the sophists and rhetors, in that negativevein in which he was unrivalled. And as the worksof these latter have not remained, it is chiefly fromthe observations of their opponents that we knowthem ; so that they are in a situation such as thatin which Sokrates himself would have been, if wehad been compelled to judge of him only from theClouds of Aristophanes, or from those unfavourableimpressions respecting his character which weknow, even from the Apologies of Plato andXenophon, to have been generally .prevalent atAthens. This is not the opportunity however fortrying to distinguish the good from the evil in theworking of the sophists and rhetors : at present itis enough that they were the natural product'ofthe age—supplying those wants, and answering tothat stimulus, which arose partly from the delibe-rations of the Ekklesia, but still more from thecontentions before the dikastery,—in which lattera far greater number of citizens took active part,

ously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokrates cont. Sophistas, Or.xiii. p. 293 ; also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Platoand iEschines the disciple of SokratSs, by the name of Sophists (Ari-steides, Orat. Platonic.xlvi.'Y7repravreTrapow',p.407,vol.ii.ed.Dindorf).Aristeides remarks justly that the name Sophist was a general name,including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name, Sophists, in fact, included good, bad, and indif-ferent, like " the philosophers, the political economists, the metaphysi-cians," &c. I shall take a future opportunity of examining the indis-criminate censures against them as a class, which most modern writershave copied implicitly from the polemics of ancient times.

CHAP. XLVI.] CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKXES. 541

with or without their own consent. The public Sophistsand rhetors

and frequent dikasteries constituted by Penkles were theopened to the Athenian mind precisely that career duet of theof improvement which was best suited to its natural ^ f

aptitude : they were essential to the development cracy-of that demand out of which grew not only Grecianoratory, but also, as secondary products, the spe-culative moral and political philosophy, and thedidactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, whichlong survived after Grecian creative genius hadpassed away1. And it was one of the first measuresof the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid by an expresslaw, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristo-phanes derides the Athenians for their love of talkand controversy, as if it had enfeebled their militaryenergy ; but in his time, most undoubtedly, thatreproach was not true—nor did it become true,even in part, until the crushing misfortunes whichmarked the close of the Peloponnesian war. Du-ring the course of that war, restless and energeticaction was the characteristic of Athens even in agreater degree than oratory or political discussion,though before the time of Demosthenes a materialalteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries atAthens was thus one of the most important and composed!5

prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay " ei of1"poor men,

, but of mid-1 Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. \6ya>v rcxvrjv fir] didao-Ketu. Xenophon dling and

ascribes the passing of this law to a personal hatred of Kritias against poorer citi-Sokrates, and connects it with an anecdote exceedingly puerile, when zens "idis-^considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the conse-quent law. But it is evident that the law had a far deeper meaning,and was aimed directly at one of the prominent democratical habits.


helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens,past the age of military service. Elderly men werethe best persons for such a service, and were pre-ferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and, asit seems, in heroic Greece : nevertheless, we neednot suppose that all the dikasts were either old orpoor, though a considerable proportion of themwere so, and though Aristophanes selects thesequalities as among the most suitable subjects forhis ridicule. Perikles has been often censured forthis institution, as if he had been the first to ensurepay to dikasts who before served for nothing, andhad thus introduced poor citizens into courtspreviously composed of citizens above poverty.But in the first place, this supposition is not cor-rect in point of fact, inasmuch as there were nosuch constant dikasteries previously acting withoutpay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclu-sion of the poor citizens would have nullified thepopular working of these bodies, and would haveprevented them from answering any longer to thereigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it bedeemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay tothose who thus rendered regular service: it wasindeed an essential item in the whole scheme1 andpurpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itselfseems to have suspended the dikasteries, while theoligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and itcan only be discussed in that light. As the fact

1 Thucyd. viii. 67. Compare a curious passage, even in reference tothe time of Demosthenes, in the speech of that orator contra Bceotumde Nomine, c. 5. <ai el fuo-dos cVopt'crft; TOIJ biKaarrjpiois, el<rrjyov av pedrfkov on, &c.


stands, we may suppose that the 6000 Heliasts whofilled the dikasteries were composed of the middlingand poorer citizens indiscriminately : though therewas nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose toserve.

END OF VOL. V.

PRINTED BY RICHARD AND JOHN E. TAYLOR,

RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

Grote's History of Greece, vol. v. p. 96-97.

MALIC GULFAND

THERMOPYUE.t.—m.OLYM. STADIA.

Plan taken from Kiepest's Atlas, with some alteration in respect to position No. II., and thesituation of Gargraphia.

OF P L A T 7 6 . A (FORGROTEVSREECEv (yoL.V.p.221

ATHENIANS

LACEDEMONIANS

VARIOUS GREEK ALLIES

I. First position occupied by the opposing armies.II. Second position.

III. Third position.

a history of greece

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