a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice - implications for psychological well-being and...

8/9/2019 A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice - Implications for Psychological Well-being and Prosocial Action

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:

Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology

by

Sabrina Joy Pagano

2007

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UMI Number: 3295730

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The dissertation of Sabrina Joy Pagano is approved.

^ A A [ A A A ^ Ia a \~Ij a /

Peter Bentler

Shelly Gable Nayak

Maia Young

W i Q,$


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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the authors grandparents, Mr. Vincent and Josephine

Pagano, to her father, Mr. John Pagano, and to her aunt, Ms. Anna Marie Pagano.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1

A. Emotions and their Relationship to Prosocial Action 6

B. Origins of Moral Emotions 9C. Moral Emotions as Mediators between Focus of Attention

and Prosocial Action 14

1. Guilt and Reparative Action 16

2. Empathy and Humanitarian Action 17

3. Moral Outrage and Preventative/Retributive Action 19

D. Psychological Consequences of Moral Emotions 21

1. Guilt: Directed at the Self 21

2. Empathy and Moral Outrage: Directed at the Other 23E. Potential Limits of Moral Emotions as Motivators of

Prosocial Action 24

F. Present Research 26

II. Study 1: Does Helping the Victims Harm the Observers? 27

A. Predictions 28

1. Prediction 1 28

2. Prediction 2 28

3. Prediction 3 294. Prediction 4 30

B. Method 30

1. Participants 30

2. Materials and Procedure 31

a. Manipulating Focus of Attention 32

b. Measuring Moral Emotional Reactions 34

c. Measuring Psychological Well-Being 35

d. Measuring Support for Prosocial Action 35

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e. Manipulation Checks for Responsibility,

Perceived Discrepancy, Identification, and Perceived

Injustice 36

f. Manipulation Check for Focus of Attention 37

C. Results 371. Factor Analyses on Emotion Items 38

a. Exploratory factor analysis on emotion items 38

b. Confirmatory factor model for emotions 38

2. Effectiveness of the Focus of Attention Manipulation 39

3. Does Changing Ones Focus of Attention Produce

Different Moral Emotions? 41

4. Moral Emotions and Support for Prosocial Action 42

a. Predicting Humanitarian Action 42b. Predicting Reparative Action 43

c. Predicting Preventative Action 43

d. Predicting Retributive Action 44

5. Moral Emotions and Observer Psychological Well-

Being 44

a. Predicting State Self-Esteem 47

b. Predicting State Anxiety 47

6. Structural Equation Model o f Moral EmotionalReactions to Injustice 48

a. Factor Model for Prosocial Actions 50

b. Factor Models for Measures of Psychological

Well-Being (Pre- and Post-) 51

7. Modeling Emotions and Prosocial Action 52

a. Do Perceptions o f Responsibility (Blame) Predict

Peoples Moral Emotional Reactions? 54

b. Predicting Guilt 55

c. Predicting Empathy 56

d. Predicting Moral Outrage 57

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D. Discussion 57

III. Study 2: Injustice and Emotions in the Laboratory 63

A. Predictions 64

1. Prediction 1 64

2. Prediction 2 64

B. Method 65

1. Participants 65

2. Materials and Procedure 65

a. Manipulation Check for Comprehension of

Allocations Made for the Cash Prize 68

b. Manipulating Focus of Attention 69

c. Measuring Emotional Reactions 71

d. Island Survival Task and Reactions Questionnaire 72

e. Measuring Support for Prosocial Action 73

f. Manipulation Checks for Perceived Injustice and

Focus of Attention / Demographic Items 74

C. Results 76

1. Perceptions of Injustice for Victim and Self 76

2. Reliability and Means of Moral Emotion Scales 77

3. Effectiveness of the Focus of Attention Manipulation 78

4. Does Changing Ones Focus of Attention Produce

Different Moral Emotions? 79

5. Effects of Emotions on Support for Prosocial Action 80

a. Predicting Humanitarian Action 81

b. Predicting Reparative Action and Preventative

Action 82

c. Predicting Retributive Action 82

6. Perceptions of Injustice and Support for Prosocial

Action 82

D. Discussion 83

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IV. General Discussion 85

V. Summary 95

VI. Appendix A 98

VII. Appendix B 109

VIII. Appendix C 117

IX. Appendix D 118

X. Appendix E 123

XI. References 124

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: A Model of Emotional Reactions to Injustice 6

Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships

between Three Types of Focus o f Attention and Corresponding

Moral Emotions 29

Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram o f the Hypothesized Relationships

between Three Types of Moral Emotion and Four Types o f

Prosocial Action 29

Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Modeled Relationships Between

Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action 54



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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis on Emotion Items 40

Table 2. Effect of Focus of Attention on Moral Emotion 45

Table 3. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between MoralEmotions and Prosocial Actions 46

Table 4. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between Moral

Emotions and Psychological Well-Being 49

Table 5: Summary of Findings from Structural Equation Model of

Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action 56

Table 6: Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations between

Attributions of Blame and Moral Emotions 58

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by the following: Oderberg Dissertation Year Fellowship.

The author would like to thank her advisor, David Sears, as well as the following

individuals for their comments, proofreading, and other input on this project at various

stages: Peter Bentler, Karen Cheng, Shelly Gable Nayak, Matthew Hays, and Maia

Young.

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February 2,1978

2000

2001-2002

2003

2004-2006

2005

2006

2006-2007

2006,2007

2007

VITA

Bom, Mount Vemon, New York

B.A., Psychology, highest honors

B.A., Political ScienceGraduated with University Distinction

University of North Carolina

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Political Psychology Fellowship

University of California, Los Angeles

M.A., Psychology

University of California

Los Angeles, California

PROPS Graduate Mentor

Department of Psychology


Shepherd Ivory Franz Distinguished Teaching Award



Teacher Training Award



Oderberg Dissertation Year Fellowship



Instructor of Record



Collegium of University Teaching Fellowship

Department of PsychologyUniversity of California, Los Angeles

produced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Pagano, S. J. (January, 2007). Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action: Does helping the

victims harm the observers?Poster presented at the annual meeting o f the Society

fo r Personality and Social Psychology.Memphis, TN.

Pagano, S. J. (February, 2003). Guilt and moral outrage: Distinct emotions with distinct

implications for helping behavior.Paper presented at the annual meeting o f the

Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Justice Pre-Conference.Universal

City, CA.

Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (2007). The role o f moral emotions in predicting political

attitudes about post-war Iraq.Political Psychology, 28 (2),227-255.

Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2007). The role of moral emotions in predicting

political attitudes about post-war Iraq.Paper presented at the annual meeting o f

the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Justice Pre-Conference.Memphis, TN.

Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2005). The role of moral emotions in predicting

policy attitudes about post-war Iraq.Poster presented at the annual meeting o f

the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology.New Orleans, LA.

Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2004). Moral outrage and guilt as predictors of

differential helping behavior on behalf of the disadvantaged.Poster presented at

the annual meeting o f the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology.Austin,

TX.

Pagano, S. J., & Montoya, R. M. (January, 2006). Emotional aspects of dignity: Toward a

preliminary understanding of self-worth.Poster presented at the annual meeting

o f the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Emotion Pre-Conference.

Palm Springs, CA.

Sears, D. O., Molina, L. E., & Pagano, S. J. (July, 2004). External attacks and internal

cohesion: Impact of September 11 on domestic interethnic relations.Paper

presented at the International Society o fPolitical Psychology.Lund, Sweden.

Sears, D. O., Molina, L. E, & Pagano, S. J. (April, 2003). External attacks and internal

cohesion: The effects of September 11 on domestic interethnic relations.Paperpresented at the annual meeting o f the Midwestern Political Science Association.

Chicago, IL.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:

Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action

by

Sabrina Joy Pagano

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2007

Professor David Sears, Chair

Two studies tested a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice. Three types of

focus of attention (self, victim, perpetrator) were examined as elicitors of guilt, empathy,

and moral outrage, respectively. These emotions were posited to give rise to support for

distinct forms of prosocial action (e.g., humanitarian and preventative action) and to have

distinct implications for observers psychological well-being (i.e., state anxiety and state

self-esteem). Results across both studies indicated weak support for the role of focus of

attention in eliciting distinct moral emotions. In Study 1, participants moral emotional

reactions to a written scenario about the working poor were shown to predict their

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support for different types of prosocial action and to have unique patterns of association

with psychological well-being, supporting several hypothesized relationships. Among

these were positive associations between guilt and reparative action, between empathy

and preventative action, and between moral outrage and both preventative action and

retributive action. Unexpected relationships included a positive association between guilt

and humanitarian action, a positive relationship between empathy and retributive action,

and positive associations between moral outrage and both humanitarian action and

reparative action. As hypothesized, participants who felt guilt reported lower state self

esteem prior to, but not after, endorsement of prosocial action. Interestingly, participants

feeling moral outrage (but not guilt, as hypothesized) reported higher state anxiety both

before and after endorsement of prosocial action. Study 2 was a laboratory study that

tested the effects of focus of attention on moral emotions and in turn the effects of moral

emotions on support for prosocial action. Study 2 did not produce support for these

relationships; the focus of attention manipulation was unsuccessful. Although Study 2

participants perceived injustice in the experimental situation, this perception did not

result in moral emotional reactions. Nevertheless, some of the overall results suggest that

distinguishing among different types of moral emotional reactions to injustice may be

important in predicting what kind o f prosocial actions people will support. Moreover,

observers psychological well-being may be impacted in different ways when people

experience different emotional reactions to injustice.

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Introduction

Whenever theys a fight so hungry people can eat, Ill be there. Whenever theys a cop

heatin up a guy, Ill be ther e. . . . Ill be in the way guys yell when theyre mad anIll

be in the way kids laugh when theyre hungry an they know suppers ready. An when

our folks eat the stuff they raise an live in the houses they buildwhy, Ill be there.

Tom Joad, Chapter 28, Grapes o f Wrath

As the experience of Tom Joad suggests, the recognition of injustice can promote

a powerful desire to be there and helpa desire so powerful that Tom believes it will

extend beyond his mortal life. Powerful reactions to injustice are not limited to the

characters in novels, however, but may occur in real life whenever injustice strikes a

chord in its observers. What chord is being struck? Imagine the anger you might feel, for

example, toward a boss unfairly chastising and humiliating his hardworking employee.

Or the guilt you may experience when confronted with someone who is starving as you

walk from the grocery store with your arms full of bags. While not everyone will live a

life like Tom Joads, few among us are unfamiliar with the emotionsso often resulting

when we confront injustice.

What our experience tells us also finds support in psychological research.

Emotional reactions to suffering and injustice (often in the form o f empathy) are a driving

force behind willingness to enact prosocial action aimed at assisting victims (for reviews,

see Batson, 1998, and Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). Emotions such as guilt and moral

outrage (i.e., anger on behalf of victims directed at perpetrators) also have come under

examination. Of course, emotional reactions to injustice are not limited to these. When

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injustice takes the form o f inequality, emotions like pride, disdain, pity, and moral

indignation (e.g., in response to reverse discrimination) all are potential reactions

(Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002).

In part because guilt, empathy, and moral outrage motivate support for actions

aimed at protecting the welfare and interest of other individuals or o f society as a whole,

they fall into a special class called moral emotions(Haidt, 2003). Haidt presents a

preliminary definition o f moral emotions as those that are linked to the interests or

welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent

(p. 853). Moral emotions have two defining features. First, they have disinterested

elicitors,meaning that they can be triggered even when the self (or those who are close

to, similar to, or otherwise valued by the self) has no involvement with the eliciting event.

Haidt proposes that the more an emotion can be prompted by a disinterested elicitor, the

more prototypical of a moral emotion it is. Second, moral emotions have associated

prosocial action tendencies,meaning that they motivate one to perform some goal-related

action in response to the eliciting event. Although the action may not in fact be taken,

experiencing a moral emotion should place one into a cognitive and motivational state

that readies one to perform actions related to the experienced emotion; these potentiated

actions can be described as prosocial action tendencies.

A set of examples may be instructive in clarifying what a moral emotion is and

what a moral emotion is not. Anger often is felt in response to direct insults or threats to

the self. This anger may in turn prompt actions designed to correct any wrongs that have

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been done. On other occasions, we may feel anger at someone because o f the harm she

has brought to another. This anger may in turn motivate us to take action on the wronged

persons behalf that also is intended at righting the wrong that has been done. Only in the

second example can we consider the anger being experienced to be moral. In part for

heuristic purposes, Haidt (2003) goes on to provide an alternative definition of moral

emotions as capturing the difference between the emotional life ofHomo Sapiensand

the emotional life ofHomo Economicus a fictitious and purely self-interested creature

largely resembling a psychopath (pg. 855).

Weiner (2006) instead defines moral emotions as a subset of social emotions

(whose antecedents are found at the social leveloutside the individual) that involve a

consideration of right or wrong, good and bad, and ought and should (p. 87). In

Weiners view, controllability, volition, and responsibility are central features o f whether

an experienced emotion is moral. Hence, an emotion such as sympathy may most likely

be experienced in response to someone if he could not control his situation, did not aim

for it to happen, and was not responsible for the situation coming about. Weiner identifies

an exhaustive list o f 12 emotions that he considers to be moral emotions. Among these

are emotions such as Schadenfreude (joy at the suffering of others). The inclusion o f such

an emotion on a list of moral emotions seems in opposition to Haidts (2003) definition;

even if the disinterested elicitor criterion were met, it is difficult to imagine that

Schadenfreude would prompt emotions that truly serve the interests of another individual

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or of society (although Weiner argues that Schadenfreude may serve as a signal to others

to discontinue what they are doingan action that may not always serve others).

Both Haidts (2003) and Weiners (2006) definitions appear to have intuitive

appeal; the study o f moral emotions remains at a nascent enough stage that only time will

tell which of these definitions will hold in terms o f their explanatory value and overall

utility. For two reasons, Haidts definition is preferred for the purposes o f the present

paper. First, the present work aims to examine emotions in response to injustice that are

likely to prompt action intended to help the victim of this injustice in one of several

possible ways. This aim seems to resonate most closely with Haidts approach. Second,

although Haidts definition is not free of complications, its greater flexibility (e.g., for the

same emotion to be understood as moral or not depending on its specific instantiation) is

a desirable characteristic, given the labile nature of human interactions and emotional

experience in response to injustice.

The set o f moral emotions composed of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage have

the benefit of addressing the main actors in situations where injustice occurs: the

observer, victim, and perpetrator. Other emotions that lead observers to celebrate the self

(e.g., pride) or denigrate the victim (e.g., disdain) in the face of injustice are not

considered to be moral emotions; they are less likely than are guilt, empathy, or moral

outrage to give rise to a willingness to help the disadvantaged. The moral emotions of

guilt, empathy, and moral outrage perhaps can be understood best if we consider first the

more general relationship between emotion and prosocial action and then move on to

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consider the potential elicitors of these specific emotions. The present paper then will

give a more detailed description of these emotions and their proposed consequences,

wherein formal definitions will be given.

Among moral emotions, differences in the nature and experience of these

emotions may distinguish them from one another. For example, while prompting actions

that improve victims welfare, some emotions may come with costs to the well-being of

those witnessing the injustice. Emotional reactions to injustice characterized by a focus

on the self may be associated with powerful feelings of dysphoria. Imagine once again

our grocery store scene. I f you recognize the discrepancy between your own welfare and

that of the other, and feel that the situation is unjust, chances are that you will not only

feel guilty, but that your self-directed attention will lead you to feel uncomfortable in

other ways. Other emotional reactions that direct attention away from the self also may

be aversive to experience. Nonetheless, while you may be upset, the negativity o f your

experience likely will be directed not at yourself but instead outward (e.g., your anger

toward the patronizing boss). In sum, emotions that direct attention outward and away

from the observeremotions that focus instead on the victims or the perpetrators of

injusticemay be associated with less detrimental outcomes for observer well-being.

The goal of the present work is to examine these potential relationships by

presenting and testing a model o f moral emotional reactions to injustice (see Figure 1

below). In doing so, this paper will examine both the elicitors of distinct moral emotions

and their consequences both for observers and victims o f injustice. The present paper will

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begin with a brief discussion o f the historical and current view o f emotions and a succinct

overview of emotions and prosocial action. Next, the paper will move on to detail the

various parts of the proposed model. After presenting two studies designed to test this

model, results will be detailed and the implications o f these findings for the model, future

work, and possible applications will be discussed.

Figure 1: A Model o f Emotional Reactions to Injustice

Prosocial

Actions

Focus Of

Attention

Emotions

Psychological

Well-Being

Emotions and their Relationship to Prosocial Action

Philosophers and other scholars have long debated the merits and pitfalls of

emotions. Early analyses o f emotion appear to date back at least to Platonic times and

later received much attention from Platos student, Aristotle, in the context o f ethics.

Emotions or passions often were thought to arise from illogical and biological

precursors to thought and actiona view that finds continued representation in

psychological scholarship (for a discussion, see Zajonc, 1998). Bom from illogic,

emotions were seen as giving rise to bias and misjudgment, and thereby were controlled

best by reason and intellect. Emotions, then, were thought to play little role in prosocial

or moral behavior, which was instead engendered by rational processes (Kant,

1788/1949).

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In stark contrast to this view, David Hume famously claimed that, reason is, and

ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than

to serve and obey them (1739/1969, p.462). He later argued that emotional responses

such as sympathy and benevolence are in fact primary motives underlying prosocial

action (Hume, 1777/1966). Although it is the less historically popular position, this view

finds contemporary support in the work of scholars in both social and political

psychology (e.g., Batson, 1998; Haidt, 2003; Marcus, 2003).

Emotions gain force as impetuses for prosocial action in part because abstract

moral principles resulting only from cool cognitive reasoning lack the motivational force

necessary to promote action (De Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels, 2002; Hoffman, 2000).

Recent evidence from studies in neuroscience provides compelling support for this view.

In these studies, patients suffering from bilateral damage to their amygdala suffer an

impairment of their ability to experience emotional responses but retain complete

cognitive functioning. Of interest is the finding that these patients, lacking an emotional

impetus, are substantially less inclined to enact the behaviors that their reasoning tells

them are appropriate and desired (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Bechara

etal., 1995).

If emotion is in fact necessary for the promotion of prosocial action, then it should

form a core component of models that examine reactions to injustice. This premise gains

some support from the following: when allowed to report their open-ended reactions to

injustice, people often describe these reactions as being hot and emotionally laden (e.g.,

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Bies & Tripp, 2002). Some authors have even argued that justice itself can be thought of

as an affective event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). A large portion of the justice

literature nonetheless has emphasized attitudinal and behavioral, instead o f emotional,

reactions to injustice.

Nonetheless, when examining the vast literature on prosocial behavior and the

more recent justice literature, it is clear that emotion can and does promote prosocial

action aimed at alleviating injustice or other disadvantage. Emotion has been shown to

generate helping behavior for those in need (Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; for a

review, see Batson, 1998), is an important mediator of support for political actions

helping the disadvantaged (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano & Huo, 2007), and

can even prompt reallocation o f goods from the advantaged to the disadvantaged (e.g.,

Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2001). Emotion appears to be associated not only with

action, but also with the recognition of injustice and attitude change toward the person or

group in question that often precedes this prosocial action. Both early (e.g., Homans,

1961) and recent (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano,

1999) work indicates that emotions are powerfully associated with perceptions of

injustice and can help generate more positive attitudes toward the stigmatized (e.g.,

Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio et al.).

As Haidt (2003) argues, distinct moral emotions should have distinct

psychological bases and should prompt distinct action tendencies (i.e., motivations).

Rather than producing a diffuse willingness to help in any possible way, some emotions

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may be more strongly associated with certain forms of prosocial action than with others.

Because of the specificity of these relationships, an emphasis on discrete emotions (rather

than overall affective valence) may increase the likelihood o f predicting specific

behaviors (Weiss et al., 1999). Recently, attempts have been made to specify how these

distinct emotional responses to injustice may determine in what way people will choose

to assist disadvantaged others (e.g., Gault & Sabini, 2000; Haidt; Iyer, Leach, &

Pedersen, 2004; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano & Huo, 2007). At the grocery store,

you may divert your eyes, rush away, or even distract yourself with other thoughts. But

perhaps you will give some money or food to the starving individual. Compare this

response with the one you may have when witnessing the employee being unfairly

castigated. Will you confront the boss? Report him to his own supervisor? Write the

company in charge, asking that they change the way their employees are treated?

The strength of an emphasis on studying discrete emotions is that it allows for

clear predictions both about the types of outcomes expected and about the specific

elicitors o f each emotion. Below, I present the proposed components of a model o f moral

emotional reactions to injustice, identifying several hypotheses regarding the elicitors and

outcomes of three moral emotions: guilt, empathy, and moral outrage.

Origins o fMoral Emotions

What might prompt these moral emotions? A preliminary suggestion is offered in

work by Stotland (1969). He was perhaps the first to discover that two different forms of

perspective-taking, one focused on imagining another persons experience with suffering

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and one focused on imagining how the self would experience the others situation,

produce distinct physiological reactions and self-reported emotion.

Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997) furthered

Stotlands insight by distinguishing the emotion produced by an other-focused

perspective (i.e., thinking of how another person feels) as empathy and the emotion

produced by a self-focused perspective (i.e., thinking of how one might feel i f one were

in the others situation) as personal distress. There is now much evidence that these

different emotions, following from different focuses of attention, motivate an observer to

perform different types of prosocial action. For example, while empathy leads to a

motivation to relieve the suffering of the other (i.e., an altruistic motivation), personal

distress leads to a motivation to relieve ones own distress (i.e., egoistic motivation; for a

review, see Batson, 1991). Personal distress therefore motivates and ultimately results in

helping only when situational escape is not possible. Outside of Batson and his

colleagues line of work, however, the role of perspective-taking as a causal determinant

of distinctmoral emotions and subsequent prosocial behavior has been underexplored.

Varying peoples focus of attention may differ somewhat from varying the type of

perspective-taking they use. In both cases, it appears that the kind of information made

most salient changes as a function o f the type of perspective or type of focus taken. For

example, both self-focused perspective-taking and self-focused attention should increase

availability of information relevant to the self. The precise nature of the difference

between focus of attention and perspective-taking has not yet been specified; nonetheless,

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both perspective-taking and focusing peoples attention may increase peoples likelihood

of helping (Batson, 1998).

When another persons suffering is brought about by injustice (i.e., when the

victims treatment or outcome are unfair), moral emotions may be elicited as a function

of ones focus o f attention. One can direct attention to the self as observer, to the victim,

or to the third-party perpetrator (i.e., the actor harming the victim). People that attend to

the same situation but focus on these different targets may experience distinct emotional

responses (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Some researchers (e.g.,

Haidt, 2003) even use focus o f attention to distinguish among moral emotion families

(i.e., variations on a common emotional theme). Based on Haidts (2003)

conceptualization, the emotions selected for the present studies fall into the following

categories: self-conscious family (guilt), other-suffering family (empathy), and other-

condemning family (moral outrage).

Work by Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) provides a preliminary experimental

demonstration of the relationship between moral emotions and focus of attention. In two

studies that examined support for different forms of affirmative action policy, Iyer et al.

found that guilt was elicited by a self-focused orientation to the problem of racial

inequality, while sympathy was elicited by an other-focused orientation toward racial

inequality. Work by Pagano and Huo (2007) corroborates this finding by demonstrating

that guilt, empathy, and moral outrage were associated with self-focused, other (or

victim)-focused, and perpetrator-focused attention, respectively.

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The general conception that consideration of different types o f information (as

when focus o f attention is varied) may result in different emotional reactions is supported

by cognitive appraisal theories o f emotion. Cognitive appraisal theories hold that it is

secondary appraisals o f context, such as attributions of agency (self versus others) that

form the basis of differentiation among different emotions (Smith & Pope, 1992, as cited

in Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). The idea that emotions can be elicited by

considering situation-relevant information also is consistent with the cognition-affect

sequence posited in Weiners model of attribution (Weiner, 1986).

Based on these findings, some arguments about the relationships between

different focuses of attention and the emotions of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage can

be made. First, a focus on the role played by oneself or ones ingroup regarding harm

done to the victim should elicit guilt. As discussed in the present paper, guilt can be

understood as a dysphoric feeling arising from a consideration of ones real or imagined

social or moral transgression. Interestingly, although guilt involves a belief that one has

caused harm, loss, or distress to another(Hoffman, 1982), its defining feature o f self

focus ultimately directs attention inward (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Salovey &

Rosenhan, 1989; Tangney, 2003; Weiner, 1982). In other words, guilts self-focus leads

those experiencing it to attend less to the other who has been wronged and more to their

own feelings about the transgression (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). This internal

focus brings about a state in which the self is seen as the object of experience, thereby

making environmental effects on the self of primary importance and consideration, and

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making self-preservation concerns most salient (Cohen, Dowling, Bishop, & Maney,

1985; Hoffman, 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Tobey-Klass, 1978; for a discussion relating self

focus to personal distress, see Batson, Early, et al., 1997).

Although feelings of guilt typically arise in recognition of personal responsibility

for a wrongdoing or inequity, they also can arise in the absence o f responsibility, based

on association with an ingroup (for a discussion o f guilt by association, see Doosje,

Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998), or even through virtual or existential means

(Montada & Schneider, 1989; for a discussion, see Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman, for

example, details how guilt may arise over achievement, affluence, or even relative

advantage. A unifying element among different experiences of guilt is the recognition

that the victim has been unjustly underbenefited, persecuted, or otherwise harmed,

particularly when compared to the status enjoyed by those experiencing guilt.

Focusing attention instead on the victims suffering should elicit empathy (e.g.,

Hoffman, 2000; Batson, 1991). The word empathy was first coined by Titchener in 1909

as a translation of the German Einfuhlung, which was used in perceptual contexts in

reference to the process whereby an event is seen from the inside (Batson). Hence, the

term empathy itself implies taking on the victims perspective when considering his or

her plight. This link has been well established in prior research, primarily by Batson and

his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Early, et al., 1997). The link between empathy and other-

focus also is suggested by evidence outside the context of the laboratory. For example,

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rescuers in Nazi Germany, for whom empathy was a principal motive, reported taking

others, rather than themselves, as their primary focus (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

Finally, focusing ones attention on the role of a third-party perpetrator should

elicit moral outrage. While moral outrage is similar to guilt in its recognition of and

attributions of blame for injustice, it differs from guilt in its assignment of blame to an

external or third-partyperpetratorresponsible for the victims harm (Iyer et al., 2004).

The perpetrator can be identified as a person or regime or can be symbolically

represented by the political or other system as a whole in which the perpetrator is acting.

Moral outrage shares with empathy an outward-directed focus that moves the focus of

attention away from the self. Consistent with this conceptualization, Hoffman (2000)

notes that, if someone else is the cause of the victims plight, attention may be directed

away from the victim and toward the perpetrator. There also is some indication that Nazi

rescuers motivated by moral outrage reserved their strong emotions for those violating

justice and were less focused on victims, having relatively impersonal relationships with

them (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Although no experimental tests of the link between

perpetrator focus and moral outrage have been made to date, survey data provide some

preliminary support for the link between them (Pagano & Huo, 2007).

Moral Emotions as Mediators between Focus o fAttention and Prosocial Action

Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage are not solely the outcome o f different types of

focus, but may also serve as important mediators between focus of attention and support

for different forms of prosocial action.

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Nuremberg Trials are one famous example of bringing retribution to those that

perpetrated injustice. Despite the unique importance o f each of these four forms o f

prosocial action, the distinctions between and among them and their predictors have been

largely unexamined (for one exception, see Pagano & Huo, 2007).

Guilt and Reparative Action

Guilt can be defined as the dysphoric feeling resulting from the recognition that

one has violated a moral or social standard that is personally relevant (Kugler & Jones,

1992). Characteristic of guilt is an inward-focus, which incorporates internal attributions

of responsibility (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These attributions o f responsibility can be

directed at the self or at a group to which one belongs when this group is responsible for

an immoral act against another group (Iyer et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2002). This so-called

guilt by association(Doosje et al., 1998) can be contrasted with theguilt over relative

advantageoften felt when ones advantage over another seems unjustified or arbitrary

(Hoffman, 2000). Returning once again to our grocery store example: we might feel guilt

by association i f a close relative or friend mocked the starving individual. We instead

might feel guilt over relative advantage simply thinking o f the discrepancy between our

own situation and the situation of the other. What ties the two forms of guilt together is

their common focus on the self and on acknowledged transgression.

Because guilt arises from the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, it may assist in

the regulation of positive social relations between the self and others (e.g., De Rivera,

1984). Guilt thereby helps ensure that one fits in and does not draw the enmity of

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others. In part because of the potential damage to ones social standing that feelings of

guilt over ones real or imagined transgression imply, it is highly uncomfortable to view

oneself as responsible for an immoral act (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).

A motivation to engage in prosocial action may arise as one means of relieving

the aversive state associated with feelings of guilt. Because guilt is posited to follow from

a se lf focus and to produce a desire to eliminate negative feelings quickly, the prosocial

motivation is likely to involve action thatspecificallymakes reparation for one's real or

virtual transgression (Doosje et al., 1998; Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Iyer et al., 2004;

Pagano & Huo, 2007). Prosocial actions prompted by guilt therefore are designed to

restore the moral value of both the victim and the person in whom guilt has been

generated through the use of apology, confession, or other forms o f compensation (Iyer et

al.; Minow, 1998). For example, Doosje et al. found that Dutch students in whom guilt

was induced when they were reminded of their nations past colonial behavior were most

willing to support national compensation (i.e., reparative action) for the formerly

colonized country. Similar findings were obtained by Iyer et al. (2003) in a study

examining the role o f White guilt in promoting support for compensatory affirmative

action programs for African Americans. They also found that guilt did not predict support

for non-compensatory forms o f affirmative actioneven low-cost programs aimed solely

at providing equal opportunity.

Empathy and Humanitarian Action

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Empathy can be defined as an emotional response congruent with the perceived

welfareo f another person (but not necessarily congruent with how the other person feels).

The category of potential emotional responses therefore is quite broad, changing based on

the other persons situation. An empathic response to anothers suffering, for example,

may be characterized by feelings such as sympathy, compassion, and tenderness (Batson,

1991). Empathy (as an emotion) is distinct from the cognitive process of perspective-

taking that frequently gives rise to this congruent emotional response (Batson, 1991).

Although the sensitivity to others suffering that follows from empathy has been called a

basic feature of human nature (e.g., Smith, 1759/1956; Hume, 1739/1969; Piaget,

1932/1965, as cited in Haidt, 2003), feelings of empathy may be strongest when a

victims disadvantage is seen as illegitimate, stable, and uncontrollable (Leach et al.,

2002).

Because of these feelings of compassion and tenderness, empathy prompts an

altruistic motivation that has as its ultimate goal the relief of the others distress and the

provision o f comfort (for a review, see Batson, 1991). However, while empathy has been

associated with a wide array o f prosocial actions aimed at accomplishing this broad goal

(Batson, 1998), it may be particularly effective at motivating helping behaviors aimed at

relieving the specific need for which it is felt (Blader & Tyler, 2002; Dovidio et al.,

1990). For example, empathys focus on the victims plight is likely to prompt actions

designed to provide immediate and effective relief of this suffering, such as humanitarian

action (Pagano & Huo, 2007).

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Empathy may be less strongly associated with other forms of prosocial action,

such as support for the implementation of political and other reforms aimed at longer-

term and therefore less direct assistance (Pagano and Huo, 2007). Indeed, in both survey

(Montada & Schneider, 1989) and experimental (De Rivera et al., 2002) studies, empathy

was unassociated with support for political action aimed at aiding victims of injustice.

Empathys focus on the victim also should reduce the likelihood of support for retributive

actions, which instead are directed at external forces contributing to a victims plight

(e.g., third-party perpetrators) (e.g., Pagano & Huo, 2007; for a review o f empathys role

in aggression, see Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Despite its limitations, empathys strength

nonetheless lies in its other-directed focus, which frees it o f the accompanying personal

distress associated with a self-focused perspective o f the victims situation (Batson,

Early, et al., 1997).

Moral Outrage and Preventative/Retributive Action

Moral outrage can be defined as anger directed at a third-party perpetrator that is

felt on behalf of a victim who has experienced illegitimate harm or insult (Haidt, 2003;

Hoffman, 2000; Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Vidmar, 2000). For

example, moral outrage may be felt when a greedy CEO takes advantage of his or her

employees or a political tyrant brings about the suffering of his or her people (Pagano &

Huo, 2007). The insult or violation also can be an affront to community values (Miller,

2001). In situations that prompt people to experience moral outrage, attributions of

responsibility for injustice are made to an individual other than the self (Tangney &

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Dearing, 2002). For example, swastika graffiti left by neo-nazi groups may result in

moral outrage when its symbolism conflicts with a communitys belief in tolerance.

Moral outrage is perhaps the least understood of the moral emotions, as it often may be

linked incorrectly with more destructive and egoistically motivated forms of anger, such

as those resulting from frustration and goal blockage (Haidt, 2003). As Aristotle first

noted, moral outrage instead arises as an emotional response to a conspicuous slight

directed without justification''and can be felt either for oneself or on behalf of others

(Haidt, 2003).

Moral outrage is not simply a response to wounded pride, but instead is a specific

response to injustice that results in a desire to punish the third-party perpetrator (Haidt,

2003; Vidmar 2000). When a perpetrator violates moral codes o f conduct, prosocial

actions such as victim compensation may be insufficient to restore a sense o f justice;

additional punishment may be necessary in order to re-establish shared social norms and

values (Averill, 1982; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo,

1997; Weiner, 1985). Retributive action therefore may be sought in order to rectify

injustice and to uphold desired social norms (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Pagano & Huo, 2007;

Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). It is perhaps for this reason that philosopher John Stuart

Mill described moral outrage as the guardian of justice (as cited in Hoffman, 2000, p.

96).

Moral outrage also may be associated with support for actions designed to prevent

perpetrators possiblefuture offenses. Because moral outrage does not involve a focus on

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the sel f s role in the injustice, those experiencing moral outrage can more easily call for a

change in the existing societal or political structure causing harm (Iyer et al., 2004). One

way of calling for change is through support for preventative action or politic or societal

reformation. Findings from at least three separate studies (Montada & Schneider, 1989;

Pagano & Huo, 2007; Pedersen, Iyer, & Leach, 2002) provide support for the association

between moral outrage and political action.

Given their lack of focus on righting moral wrongs perpetrated by a third-party,

humanitarian and reparative actions aimed at direct assistance to the victims should be

unrelated to moral outrage (Pagano & Huo, 2007). It should also be noted that moral

outrage is conceptually different from other forms of anger (e.g., self-reproachful anger)

that are based on assuming personal responsibility for injustice, which would arguably

have different consequences for prosocial action.

Psychological Consequences o fMoral Emotions

Guilt: Directed at the Sel f

Despite the considerable benefits to those disadvantaged by injustice, some moral

emotional reactions to injustice may come with consequences for the psychological well

being of the person experiencing the moral emotion. For example, a rich research

tradition in self-awareness (which can be conceptualized as self-focused attention)

supports the idea that attentional focus on the self can be aversive, particularly when the

self is subject to negative evaluation. This discomfort may be increased further when

ones attention is directed at the self not as a relatively benign actor, but instead as a party

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responsible for an immoral act, thereby resulting in guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, &

Heatherton, 1994). Like other states characterized by self-awareness, feelings of guilt

(and the concomitant cognition that one has caused injustice to befall another) can in

some cases create a painful sense of dysphoria or unease. This dysphoria has been

described as a sinking feeling (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Roseman, Wiest, &

Schwartz, 1994). Dysphoria, which is in fact considered by some researchers to be a core

component of guilt, has been described as a subclinical form of psychological distress;

feelings of dysphoria ultimately may become manifest in high scores on depression and

anxiety measures (Bibb, 1996).

Other work also supports the idea that guilt should be associated with decrements

in psychological well-being. For example, Derakshan and Eysenck (2001) found that

self-focused attention (a large component o f guilt) led to increased feelings o f anxiety,

which is widely considered to be detrimental to psychological well-being in the long

term. Guilt also has been associated more directly with decreased well-being in a number

of different contexts (e.g., Atkins, Martin, & Poon, 1996; Joseph, Hodgkinson, Yule, &

Williams, 1993; O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; Saravanan, 2002). In other work,

subjectively negative states such as regret, concern about misdeeds, and even

dissatisfaction with one's self also have been associated with feelings of guilt (Institute

for Personality & Ability Testing, 1974, as cited in Atkins, Martin, & Poon, 1996). It

seems clear, then, that guilt is associated with a wide range of arguably undesirable

psychological outcomes.

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This discussion of the possible effects of guilt on psychological well-being is

limited to two different measures of well-being: state anxiety (on which the effects of

guilt are more general) and state self-esteem (on which the effects of guilt are more

specific). First, state anxiety is predicated on an appraisal of threatening demands or

dangers, such as the threats to self-worth inherent in guilts attributions of personal

responsibility (Lazarus, 1991). At the most general level, guilt should be associated with

unpleasant emotional arousal, such as that experienced in state anxiety. While frequently

examined as dependent variables in the same study, however, the direct relationship

between state anxiety and guilt has been surprisingly unexplored.

The other measure of well-being that should be negatively influenced (at a more

specific level) by guilt is state self-esteem; the self-focused attention associated with guilt

may intensify attributions o f personal responsibility for harm committed (Federoff &

Harvey, 1976). Findings from a recent study provide support for this claim,

demonstrating that self-focused attention affected multiple indicators of state self-esteem

(Jimenez, 2001), although the direct relationship between state self-esteem and guilt in

response to injustice has not been examined.

Empathy and Moral Outrage: Directed at the Other

Empathy, which results in feelings of warmth and tenderness toward another (and

directs attention away from the self; e.g., Worthington & Scherer, 2004), may in some

cases and in some ways even be pleasant to experience. Even if the actual experience of

empathy is unpleasant, however, people nonetheless may be pleased that they are

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experiencing it (Batson, 1991). Moral outrage also is considered an outward-focused

emotion (Barclay et al., 2005). Moral outrage, like other forms o f anger, typically may be

aversive to experience. In contrast to guilts focus on the self, the outward-directed (i.e.,

on the victim or third-party perpetrator) focus o f other emotions, such as empathy and

moral outrage, should insulate the observer from dysphoria. In the case o f empathy, this

insulation may be complete. Moral outrage instead may be associated with levels of

psychological well-being intermediate between guilt and empathy.

Potential Limits o fMoral Emotions as Motivators o f Prosocial Action

Of course, the ultimate judgments about when and how to act do not exist in a

vacuum. The potential costs associated with the experience of moral emotions may

inhibit prosocial action. For example, aware of the costs that sometimes result from

feeling empathy for others, people may try to avoid situations (and a focus on the victim)

that would elicit this emotion even before encountering appeals for helping and explicit

considerations of cost (Batson, 1998; Hodges & Wegner, 1997). The pedestrian averting

her eyes from a homeless person on the street or the woman who looks at her newspaper

rather than attend to the suffering of the employee being berated by his boss both may be

demonstrating an implicit understanding that the experience of empathy comes with the

cost of prosocial acts such as humanitarian action. People may (not infrequently) expose

themselves to empathy-eliciting information (e.g., immersing themselves in news

broadcasts after an atrocity), enjoying the experience o f this emotion. Eventually,

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however, when the costs o f their empathy (e.g., a compunction to act) become clearer,

they may discontinue their viewing.

As a form o f anger, moral outrage should be associated with a high degree of

arousal (e.g., Ramirez & Andreu, 2006), and is theorized to prompt seemingly high-cost

forms of helping (e.g., preventative action). People aware of the association between their

feelings of moral outrage and their resulting desire to provide high-cost help also may

limit their exposure to situations or people eliciting this emotion. Despite these limits,

however, the outward-focused nature o f both empathy and moral outrage should insulate

those experiencing these emotions from the more direct costs to self that are incurred by

self-focused emotions such as guilt.

Because o f the inherent aversiveness in the experience of guilt, the effectiveness

of appeals based on guilt may be limited even without considerations of cost.

Experiencing guilt or other self-focused emotions often may be avoided (for reviews, see

Carver & Scheier, 1981, and Wicklund, 1975) and feelings of guilt therefore are rare

(Iyer et al., 2004). One way in which guilt can be evaded is through cognitive

justification (e.g., hes probably not really starving anyway). Another form of cognitive

justification is victim derogation, whereby victims are dehumanized (Baumeister et al.,

1994) or blamed for their plight (Branscombe, Owen, Garstka, & Coleman, 1996). People

of course also may avoid guilt by distancing themselves physically or psychologically

from the victims (Batson, 1998). For example, in a study by Iyer et al., participants in a

self-focus (i.e., guilt-inducing) condition were more likely than those in an other-focus

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(i.e., empathy-inducing) condition to refuse responsibility for and deny the presence of

racial discrimination, thereby avoiding guilt.

When feelings o f guilt cannot be avoided, people will be motivated to provide

help in the form o f reparative action to those harmed as a way o f alleviating guilt-related

distress (e.g., Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow,

1996). When this negative state or dysphoria can otherwise be relieved, helping should

no longer occur (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). Hence, even guilts limited effects in

the promotion of reparative action also may dissipate in the face of easier and more

attractive alternatives to making one feel better.

Present Research

Two studies sought to add to our knowledge of the elicitors of three moral

emotional reactions to injustice (guilt, empathy, and moral outrage) and o f their

consequences for prosocial action and observer psychological well-being by testing a

model of moral emotional reactions to injustice. The first study, a web-based experiment,

examined the effects o f a focus-of-attention manipulation on moral emotional reactions to

a member of a disadvantaged group. Study 1 also examined the relationships between

different moral emotional reactions and two forms of psychological well-being, both

before and after participants endorsement of several forms of prosocial action. The

second study was intended to be a high-impact laboratory experiment designed to

examine more directly the causal mechanisms behind these moral emotions through the

use of an alternative manipulation of focus of attention. Study 2 also aimed to provide a

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reactions to the working poor and several distinct types of prosocial action (e.g.,

humanitarian aid) aimed at assisting this group. The third study goal was to offer a

preliminary examination o f the relationship between these moral emotions and the

psychological well-being o f observers both before and after ratings o f support for various

forms of prosocial action. The final study goal was to examine whether participants

feeling guilt will report decreases in psychological well-being before, but not after,

endorsement of prosocial action. The relationship between specific focuses of attention

and specific moral emotions, and in turn between specific moral emotions and specific

prosocial action are represented in the conceptual diagrams below.

Predictions

Prediction 1

The first prediction for this study was that varying the type o f information on

which participants were focused would produce different moral emotional reactions to

injustice. Specifically, a self-focus would produce guilt, a victim-focus would produce

empathy, and a perpetrator-focus would produce moral outrage.

Prediction 2

The second prediction concerned the relationship between each of the moral

emotions and support for four distinct types of prosocial action. Specifically, guilt would

be associated with support for prosocial action aimed only at reparative action. Moreover,

empathy would be associated with support for humanitarian, reparative, and preventative

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Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships between Three

Types of Focus o f Attention and Corresponding Moral Emotions

Self-Focus Guilt

Victim-Focus Empathy

Perpetrator- Moral

Focus Outrage

Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships between Three

Types of Moral Emotion and Four Types of Prosocial Action

Reparative Action

Humanitarian Action

Reparative Action

Preventative Action

Retributive Action

+ + + and

Moral Outrage

Guilt

Empathy

Moral

Outrage

forms of prosocial action, and with opposition to retributive action (i.e., punishment).

Finally, moral outrage would be associated with support for both preventative and

retributive action.

Prediction 3

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The third prediction for this study was that different moral emotional reactions to

injustice would have different effects on observer psychological well-being. Compared

with empathy and moral outrage, guilt would result in greater detriment to observers

psychological well-being. Specifically, guilt would produce increased scores on state-

anxiety and decreased scores on state self-esteem. In contrast, empathy would not

produce changes in peoples scores on either state anxiety or state self-esteem. Finally,

moral outrage (an emotion more aversive than empathy but less aversive than guilt)

would result in scores on the two measures of psychological well-being that would be

located somewhere in between the effects produced by experiences of empathy and guilt.

Prediction 4

The fourth and final prediction for this study was that participants experiencing

guilt as a result of induced self-focus would be motivated to alleviate any associated

reductions in their psychological well-being by endorsing a prosocial action. Once they

had the opportunity to endorse prosocial action, they would no longer experience reduced

psychological well-being. Participants experiencing guilt would not report increased

scores on state-anxiety and decreased scores on state self-esteem after they had the

opportunity to endorse prosocial action.

Method

Participants

Participants were 200 introductory psychology students at the University of

California, Los Angeles (125 women, 74 men; 1 did not report) who received partial

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credit toward the fulfillment o f an optional course requirement. Participants were

recruited via email based on their responses to a family income question during mass

testing at the beginning o f the academic term. Participants indicating a family income of

$80,000 or higher were selected for the study in order to increase the likelihood that the

discrepancy between the students own situation and the situation o f the disadvantaged

person about whom they read was a salient one. The sample o f participants reflected the

ethnic diversity of the general student body, with 1.5% African Americans, 35% Asians,

4.5% Latinos, 48.5% Whites, and 10% who indicated their ethnicity as other. The

sample tended to be liberal, with a mean o f 3.08 (SD=1.33) on a 7-point scale of

ideology, with lower scores representing greater liberalism. Using a randomized block

procedure, participants were assigned to a control condition or one o f three experimental

conditions: self-focus, victim-focus, or perpetrator-focus.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed the study online, which helped ensure participant

anonymity and reduce social desirability concerns and on average did not appear to

negatively impact participants conscientiousness (e.g., in terms o f number o f items or

response consistency). After reading an informed consent that presented this study as a

study concerned with peoples emotional reactions to a group of people presented in a

written passage and with their opinions about several ways of assisting the people

described, and with how peoples self-perceptions may relate to these emotional

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reactions and opinions on assistance, participants read the study introduction (modified

from Batsons work; e.g., Batson, Sager, et al., 1997):

Today, you will read one of several test articles written for a new column

called News from the Personal Side, which is designed to capture human-interest stories.

The goal of this series of articles is to go beyond the facts of news events

to report how these events affect the lives of the individuals involved,

thereby taking a more personal approach to news reporting. In todays

article, you will read about a group of people called the working poor. By

working poor, we mean that these people are regularly employed, but

are nonetheless living below the poverty line.

Prior research has shown that an important factor affecting peoples

reactions to news media is the way in which they approach this media.Along those lines, we ask that you give your complete attention to reading

the news article, really immersing yourself in the story presented to you.

This will help us to understand better your reactions to it and to the people

being described in this case, the working poor. When you are ready to

read the article, move on to the next page.

Manipulatingfocu s o fattention. In fact, all participants read a similar fictitious

article on the plight o f the working poor in the United States that differed only on the

manipulation of focus of attention. Each version of the article (see Appendix A)

contained general information about the working poor and about the plight o f one

woman, Lynn Townsend, in particular. This basic information comprised the victim-

focus condition, and thereby contributed to feelings of empathy.

The other two conditions additionally included information designed to focus

participants attention on information relevant to the self (self-focus) or to a third-party

perpetrator (perpetrator-focus). Specifically, the self-focus condition contained

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information about how the relatively well-off (with whom the participants ostensibly

would identify) had contributed to the plight of the working poor. For example,

participants were provided with information about the percentage o f income typically

taken up by rent among the working poor, thereby allowing participants to make a

comparison with their own situation and in turn to experience guilt. A manipulation

check verified the accuracy of the assumption that participants would perceive a

discrepancy between their own situation and the situation o f the working poor.

Finally, information regarding the role of corporate abusers was included in the

perpetrator-focus condition in order to provide an identifiable third-party perpetrator of

the victims suffering, thereby contributing to feelings of moral outrage. For example,

participants read about indignities imposed on the working poor by the corporations that

employ them. ..including constant surveillance, random searches o f personal belongings

and random drug tests possibly including protocols requiring workers to strip down to

their undergarments and void their bladders in front of aides or technicians.

The control condition was designed to disperse participants attention across the

various types o f information and thereby result in a more diffuse emotional response to

which the other conditions could be compared. This objective was accomplished by

adding to the basic information all o f the additional information provided in the guilt and

moral outrage versions of the article.

The different types of information (self, victim, third-party perpetrator) presented

in the different versions o f the stimulus article thereby established the basis for the

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Measuring psychological well-being.At two points during the study (both before

and after the measure of support for prosocial action), participants rated the degree to

which they agreed with several statements assessing their state psychological well-being.

This was one o f two major dependent measures. A modified version o f the state anxiety

subscale of the well-validated State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,

Gorsuch, & Luschene, 1983) was used to measure state anxiety. Participants were asked

to indicate the extent to which 20 different emotional states described how they are

feeling right now on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). Self-esteem was

measured on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) with ten items

from the well-validated Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1979). This scale was

adapted to reflect state self-esteem by asking participants to think about their responses to

each of the statements right now. Both scales were split into subscales comprising

equal numbers of items, which then were used in analyses as pre- and post-measures of

each construct (for a list of pre- and post- items, see Appendix B). The full-scale alpha

for state self-esteem was .90, while the alpha for the pre-measure was .82, and the alpha

for the post-measure was .84. The full-scale alpha for state anxiety was .93, while the

alpha for the pre-measure was .89 and the alpha for the post-measure was .88.

Measuring support fo r prosocial action.Next, participants read, We are

interested in your honest opinions about the experiences of the working poor about whom

you have just read, and your views about the appropriateness of different types of actions

aimed at helping to improve their situation. Please share your opinion by selecting for

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each question a number based on the scale given below. Participants then completed

items assessing their willingness to endorse each o f four types of prosocial action (all

measured on a 9-point labeled scale with anchors at 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly

agree). This scale, which was modeled on work by Pagano and Huo (2007), comprised

the second major dependent measure. Humanitarian action(5 items) assessed

participants willingness to provide basic support (e.g., we should offer basic aid when

possible to alleviate the immediate suffering o f the working poor), while reparative

action(7 items) assessed participants willingness to compensate the working poor (e.g.,

the well-off should support the replenishment of programs aimed at helping the working

poor).Preventative action(7 items) assessed participants willingness to support system

change (e.g., Laws against unfair labor practices should be developed in order to help

the working poor), while the six items on retributive actionassessed participants

willingness to punish the victims third-party perpetrator (e.g., We should blow the

whistle on corporate leaders placing monetary gain over human welfare"). Alphas were

computed for each prosocial action: a) humanitarian action (a = .86); b) reparative action

(a =.84); c) preventative action (a = .83), and d) retributive action (a = .86). (For a list of

prosocial action items, see Appendix B.)

Manipulation checks fo r responsibility, perceived discrepancy, identification, and

perceived injustice.After completing the dependent measures, participants completed

several manipulation checks before being debriefed and thanked for their participation.

The first of the dependent measures was a question assessing the degree to which

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participants thought distinct actors (the well-off, the working poor, and corporations)

were responsible for the plight of the working poor. Participants also completed questions

assessing the salience o f the discrepancy between their situation and that o f the working

poor, their degree of identification with the well-off and with corporations, and their

perception o f injustice.

Manipulation checkfo r focus o f attention. Finally, four items were designed to

assess the degree to which participants took each of three focuses of attention or

concentrated about equally on all possible actors. Participants were asked to indicate the

extent to which they concentrated on themselves, corporations, the working poor, or

about equally on all actors when reading the passage about the working poor.

Results

Prior to computing any o f the internal or substantive analyses, frequency analyses

first were computed on several items in order to determine whether data from some

participants should be excluded from analysis. Participants were excluded under the

following conditions: 1) they did not perceive the situation of the working poor to be

unfair (9 participants); 2) they did not identify with the well-off (5 participants); 3) they

identified strongly with corporations (2 participants), or 4) they felt that they were

disadvantaged compared to the working poor (1 participant). It is noteworthy that over

50% of the sample believed that the working poor were at least partially to blame for

their situation. In light o f this finding, no participants were excluded based on their

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used as indicators of latent variables of the same names. The conceptually and

empirically related emotion factors were allowed to correlate since they should all

motivate prosocial action. The results were consistent with the EFA, demonstrating that

the three emotions represent three distinct constructs. Although the Chi-square value was

significant,^2 (167, N = 171) = 283.64,p


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participants experienced more guilt in the self-focus condition than in the other

conditions (M= 2.80 vs.Ms= 2.19,2.30, and 2.57 for the victim-focus, perpetrator-

focus, and control conditions, respectively; /(179) = 2.20,p


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action. Surprisingly, empathy did not emerge as a significant predictor o f humanitarian

action (fi= .10, ns).Also contrary to predictions, increases in guilt were associated with

corresponding increases in support for humanitarian action (ft= .18,p< .05). Finally,

moral outrage surprisingly also was the strongest predictor of humanitarian action (fi =

a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice - implications for psychological well-being and...

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