A Peace to End All PeaceThis article describes how the British stole the world's largest supply of oil, how they set the Middle East on a course of permanent misery and suffering, how they invented the myth that Jews control the world, and how they blame the Jews for their own crooked behavior.Notes

The words Ottomans and Turks are, for the most part, used interchangeably throughout the article, as are the words Ottoman Empire and Turkey. The Turks were, after all, the ones who led the Ottoman Empire, for the most part. And after World War I, what was left of the Ottoman Empire became known as Turkey.

Throughout the article, whenever I included information from another source, I listed the source in parenthesis. Usually, the source is listed as a page number from a book. Page numbers which do not include a title are from the Kindle edition of the book A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin. Page numbers which include the title The Prize come from the Google Play version of the book The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power by Daniel Yergin. Page numbers which include the title The Young Turks in Opposition come from the Google Play version of the book The Young Turks in Opposition by M. Sukru Hanioglu. Page numbers which include the title Preparation for a Revolution come from the Google Play version of the book Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908 by M. Sukru Hanioglu. Kindle Locations which include the title A Brief History come from the Kindle edition of the book A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire by M. Sukru Hanioglu. References which include the phrase The Times come from the newspaper The Times of London. Page numbers which include the title OSS in China come from the book OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War by Maochun Yu. Page numbers which include the title Legacy of Ashes come from the book Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA by Tim Weiner.

As a final note, if anyone would translate this article into Arabic (or any other language) and post it all over the Internet I would be forever grateful.

Part 1: IntroductionA friend once asked David Fromkin to explain to him why the Middle East has, over the years, had to endure so many tragedies. The book A Peace to End All Peace is his answer to that question. The title of the book was derived from a quote by Field Marshal Earl Wavell, who once said, After the war to end war they seem to have been pretty successful in Paris at making a Peace to end Peace.

For centuries, the Ottomans ruled the Middle East. But after the war to end war, otherwise known as World War I, Europe dissolved the Ottoman Empire and fundamentally reshaped the region. In his book, Fromkin argues that those changes caused the misery and suffering that now engulf the people who live there. For him, the settlement which ended the war does not belong entirely or even mostly to the past; it is at the very heart of current wars, conflicts, and politics in the Middle East. (Page 565) The conflict between Israel and the Arabs, the civil war in Lebanon, the hijackings, the assassinations, the massacres throughout the region, all these atrocities can all be traced back to the end of World War I, according to Fromkin. (Page 9)The original war for oil

The event that triggered the start of World War I took place on June 28, 1914. Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated. But to understand the cause of World War I, a more important date would be August 12, 1908. On that day, Ford Motor Company finished producing their first Model T. The Model T was the worlds first affordable car. Over the next two decades, Ford would produce over 15 million of them. Those cars, and others like them, were powered by petroleum.

Britain recognized the importance of oil from very early on. They switched their Navy from coal to oil right before the war. (Page 52) Back then, although no one knew how much oil could be extracted from the Middle East, Britain suspected that the region contained large amounts of oil. (Page 141) They were right. The Middle East contains more than half of all the oil in the world.

Were Europe to allow the Ottoman Empire to survive, the Ottomans would become extremely wealthy and powerful because of all the oil buried beneath them. To prevent that from happening, Europe started the war and used it to seize their land.

Throughout the war, Britain repeatedly showed that oil was the primary motivation for every action they took. Right before the war ended, Britain ordered their forces to occupy as large a portion of the oil-bearing regions as possible. (Page 364) For only those regions where British troops controlled when the ceasefire took place could Britain lay claim to after the war. Once the war ended, Britain annexed Iraq, one of the most oil rich lands in the world. The Muslims who lived there began to riot. They refused to live under the thumb of the British Empire. Some Britons were exasperated by the riots and wanted their country to leave Iraq. But David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, was determined to stay.

If we leave we may find a year or two after we departed that we have handed over to the French and Americans some of the richest oilfields in the world, said Lloyd George. (Page 509)Many-headed monster

Towards the beginning of 2011, a few months after the Arab Spring began, the Financial Times published an editorial called The feeble monster. The newspaper urged Europe to implement a common foreign policy rather than allow individual European nations to act in contradictory ways.

Above all, [Europe] must start acting like a responsible force in world affairs, not a many-headed monster, said the Financial Times.

Unfortunately, to some extent, the Financial Times let Europe off the hook. They never explained their analogy. They never explained how Europe is like a many-headed monster. In my opinion, each individual country of Europe is one head of the monster. The different heads act in seemingly contradictory ways. But in fact, the heads are all working together. Their actions are all coordinated by a single heart, a monster's heart, a heart that belongs to Britain.

In World War I, by secretly controlling Europe, that allowed Britain to control both sides of the conflict. You may be wondering, if Britain could control Germany and Austria, then why fight at all? Britain suffered a tremendous number of casualties during the war. About a million British soldiers died. But because of the war, Britain added a million square miles to her empire. (Page 401) Britain gained about one square mile of territory for each fatality. For Britain, that was a price worth paying, especially when that territory contained the richest supply of oil in the world.

Part 2: A Trojan HorseWhoever won the war could annex territory from the countries who lost. That meant the British, after they won the war, could annex the Middle East, they could steal the world's largest supply of oil, if they could convince the Ottomans to become their enemy, if they could convince the Ottomans to form an alliance with their opponents, Germany and Austria. At the start of the war, they had Germany win a string of impressive victories against the Russians. The victories convinced the Ottomans that Germany would win the war, that they should ally themselves with the Germans as that would allow them to annex territory from Russia after the war ended. (Page 70)

Despite those victories, however, there were many Ottomans who were leery of joining the war at all. Some, like Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, argued his country could not afford to go to war. The country was bankrupt. (The Rupture With Turkey by The Times 12/11/14) The Ottomans had another reason for refusing to fight. Their recent history indicated they were not very good at it.

In the preceding years, the Ottomans had suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Europeans. In 1911, Italy declared war on the Ottomans in the hopes of extracting Libya from them, a goal which Italy achieved. In the First Balkan War, which began in 1912, the Ottomans lost nearly all of their territory in Europe. With their empire disappearing before their eyes, the Ottomans decided they had to ally themselves with one of the Great Powers in order to ensure their survival. (Page 48) They first asked Britain for an alliance, then France, they even asked Russia, their mortal enemy, the country which had been trying to destroy them for the past 150 years. (Page 66) None of those countries were willing to form an alliance with them. (Page 49) With seemingly no where else to turn, the Ottomans formed an alliance with Germany.

The information released, the documents which describe how the Germans and the Ottomans would come to embrace each other, those documents are filled with holes and inconsistencies. It is impossible, based on what I have read, to definitely describe how and when their alliance was formed. But that does not mean an examination of the evidence is not worthwhile. The evidence proves, conclusively, that the Ottomans were both pushed into the alliance by the actions of Britain and they were pulled into the alliance by the actions of the Germans themselves. Not only did Britain refuse to form an alliance with the Ottomans, Britain did everything in her power to provoke them, to push them away, into the hands of the Germans. The Germans, meanwhile, did everything they could to entice the Ottomans, to force the Ottomans to join the war on their side. The Germans and the English were two heads of the European monster, whose actions were meant to force the Ottomans into forming an alliance with Germany, an alliance which would destroy their empire.The Goeben

The principal theater of the war was in Europe. It was the battle between the armies of France and Germany. (Mr. Churchills Book by The Times 2/9/23) To succeed against the Germans, the French needed to transport their troops from North Africa to Europe. Those troops would have to rely on the French Navy to protect them as they made their journey across the Mediterranean.

But there was one ship in the Mediterranean which far outstripped in speed every vessel in the French Navy, said Winston Churchill. She was the Goeben.

The SMS Goeben, a German battlecruiser built in 1911, was by all accounts the most advanced ship of its kind in the Mediterranean. The Allies had only three ships in the Mediterranean which could compete with the Goeben in terms of size and speed the Indomitable, the Indefatigable, and the Inflexible.

The Indomitable and Inflexible each weighed 17,250 tons, had 41,000 horsepower, and could travel at 25 knots while the Goeben weighed 22,640 tons, had 70,000 horsepower, and could travel at 27 knots. (Goeben and Breslau by The Times 8/12/14) The Indefatigable was similar to the other two British warships, though slightly larger.

This comparison shows that, on paper at any rate, the Goeben is the larger, better protected, faster and as far as the lighter guns are concerned better armed ship, said the Times.

It seemed that the Goeben, being free to choose any point on a front of three or four hundred miles, would easily be able to avoid the French Battle Squadrons and, brushing aside or outstripping their cruisers, break in upon the transports and sink one after another of these vessels crammed with soldiers, said Churchill. It occurred to me at this time that perhaps that was the task she had been sent to the Mediterranean to perform.

Two days after the war began, the British Admiralty sent a message to their Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean.

Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army by covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, which may interfere with that transportation, said the Admiralty.

Except in combination with the French as part of a general battle do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces.

One would have expected the Germans to use the Goeben against the French Navy, in the manner envisioned by Churchill. But the Germans never used that strategy. Instead the Germans gave the Goeben to the Ottoman Empire. The Goeben was a Trojan Horse, a gift offered in malice, which once accepted, would lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

There are several accounts of what happened to the Goeben, including three published by the Times of London. One version consists of the articles published by the Times as the events happened. (Chase of the Goeben by The Times 8/7/14) Another version was based on the recollections of a German warrant officer who served aboard the Goeben. (Flight of Goeben and Breslau by The Times 4/5/15) A third version was based on the logbook of the Goeben and the words of Admiral Souchon, the German in charge of the ship. (The Goebens Escape by The Times 2/14/16) And we also have the account written by Fromkin in his book.

Now lets try to figure out what happened, based on all these sources. On August 3, Germany declared war on France. The following day, two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, shelled two cities in Algeria, Annaba and Skikda. Back then, Algeria was part of France and the two cities were known as Philippeville and Bone.

ViewNorthern Algeriain a larger map

After the attack, a fleet of French warships began chasing after the Goeben. (Chase of the Goeben by The Times 8/7/14) As the German ships sailed away, they encountered a fleet of English warships. Neither side fired a shot as Britain and Germany had not yet declared war on each other. A few days after this encounter, the Times reported that the English fleet contained two Inflexible class battlecruisers. This information nearly matches what the German warrant officer reported. By his recollection, the the two battlecruisers were the Indefatigable and the Inflexible and they were accompanied by two additional vessels, the Gloucester and the Weymouth.

And now our business was to clear out, as their superiority was altogether too much for us, he said.

Though the Goeben may have been the best ship in the Mediterranean, she wouldve had a hard time defeating two British battlecruisers by herself. The other German ship, the Breslau, was much smaller. She only weighed 4,500 tons, which was lighter than even the Gloucester, which weighed 4,800 tons. The Times didnt think much of the Breslau. While the Times referred to the Goeben as a great battle-cruiser, the Time denigrated the Breslau, calling her unimportant. (In Battle Array by The Times 8/7/14)

The British fleet followed the Goeben throughout the day. But the Goeben was faster and managed to outrun them. At the end of the day, Britain declared war on Germany.

On August 5, the German ships sailed into Messina Straits, a narrow strip of water located between Sicily and the Italian Peninsula.

ViewMessina Straitsin a larger map

The Allied warships could not attack them inside the straits, as the straits belonged to Italy and Italy was neutral. Nor could the German ships seek refuge inside Italian waters forever. To maintain her neutrality, Italy was required to either disarm the German ships or force them to leave within 24 hours of their arrival. (Italys Decision by The Times 8/7/14) The Germans loaded as much coal as they could, knowing that they had to leave the straits before the deadline.

According to a Times article published on the 7th, there was an English Fleet waiting for them at the south side of the straits and a French squadron guarding the north side. (Chase of the Goeben by The Times 8/7/14) The German ships, it seemed, were now facing imminent destruction.

There will be much gratification at the news that the two vessels have at last been cornered, said the Times.

The German vessels must now be disarmed or come out and fight. In any case they can hardly be a menace to the commerce and coast towns of the Mediterranean much longer.

The following day the Times reported that, on August 6 at 5 PM, the Goeben and the Breslau left the southern entrance of Messina. (The Goeben Chase by The Times 8/8/14) By all accounts except one, the Goeben managed to leave Messina without having to engage the British fleet. (The Fleets At Sea by The Times 8/8/14) The one exception was the account written by the German warrant officer, who claimed the Goeben and Breslau had to fight their way out. According to Admiral Souchon, instead of placing their ships at the southern entrance of Messina, the British placed them in the Straits of Otranto.

ViewStraits of Otrantoin a larger map

The English should have waited before the Straits of Messina and nowhere else, said Souchon. But so confident were they that the Goeben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adriatic in order to reach an Austrian port that they thought it safe to wait in the Straits of Otranto.

Fromkin agrees that the British blocked the entrance to the Adriatic, though in addition, he claims they placed their vessels west of Sicily to prevent the Germans from interfering with the French transports. (Page 63) Curiously, he also cites the following quote.

Who but an Admiral would not have put a battle-cruiser at both ends of the Messina Straits, instead of putting two at one end and none at the other? said the British Prime Ministers daughter. (Page 63)

The quote appears to contradict Fromkin. It implies the British blocked the north side of the straits but not the south whereas Fromkin implies they really didnt block either side of the straits.

After leaving Messina, the German warships sailed to the Dardanelles, which was their plan all along. The Dardanelles is a narrow strip of water, controlled by the Ottomans, which separates Europe from Asia.

ViewThe Dardanellesin a larger map

Once the ships arrived at the straits, the Ottomans faced a dilemma. They wanted to remain neutral. But they had signed several treaties which prohibited them from allowing foreign warships to pass through the Dardanelles. (The Goeben and the Dardanelles by The Times 8/14/14) If they allowed the ships to enter the straits, they were required to disarm them.

The Ottomans did not allow the ships to pass through the straits. Nor did they disarm them or refuse them entry. Instead they bought the Goeben and Breslau. The Times argued that the sale was illegal, that the ships were trying to evade capture, that the Ottoman Empire, as a neutral country, could not buy the ships under those circumstances. The sale saved the ships. Had the Ottomans forced them to sail back into the Mediterranean they would have faced a vastly superior Allied fleet.

Nevertheless, the Allies indicated they would accept the sale as long as the German officers and crew were removed from the ships. (Goeben as a Turkish Cruiser by The Times 8/15/14) The Ottomans assured the Allies they would meet their demands. (Turkeys Naval Coup by The Times 8/13/14) But they were lying. Their sailors did not know how to operate the German warships. Only the Germans knew how, which meant the Ottomans had to keep the German crew in order to operate the ships. (Page 65)

The Ottoman government declared they bought the ships to ensure their fleet would be as strong as the Greek fleet. (Purchase of the Goeben by The Times 8/16/14)

Greece has just added to her naval forces two battleships which were ceded to her by the United States, said Rifaat Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to France. The Balkan equilibrium was upset.

We know by the experience of the last Balkan war how fatal is naval inferiority and that the war might have taken another turn if we had been stronger on the sea.

To further bolster his case for buying the ships, the ambassador noted that, as the war started, Britain was building two battleships for the Ottomans - the Reshadieh and the Sultan Osman I. (Page 54) Although the Ottomans had already paid for the ships, Winston Churchill, then the First Lord of the Admiralty, decided that his navy needed the ships for the war and so he expropriated them, an act which for the Ottomans was a cruel disappointment, according to their ambassador. Britain told the Ottomans they would be compensated. That was a lie. The British never compensated the Ottomans. (www.canakkale.gen.tr/eng/closer/closer5.html) Britain stole the ships. Had Britain not stolen the ships, the Ottomans would not have had to buy the other two ships from the Germans, at least that was the implication made by their ambassador.

Not only could the Goeben help the Ottomans against the Greeks, the Goeben could also help them against the Russians, who had no vessels in the Black Sea comparable to the Goeben as regards age and power, and her battleships in commission, though powerful enough, are handicapped by the speed of the German battle cruiser, which could literally steam round any one of them, according to the Times. (The Fleets At Sea by The Times 9/9/14)

Despite their claims to the contrary, the Ottomans never paid the Germans for the ships. Instead the money flowed in the opposite direction. Less than a month after the Germans handed over the Goeben, they delivered sixty boxes of gold to the Ottomans. (The Goebens Crew by The Times 9/5/14) The Ottomans had said they would join the war if Germany gave them two million Turkish pounds. (Page 71) But after receiving the payment, they changed their minds and decided to maintain their neutrality.

The Germans were desperate. They made every promise they could think of, made every argument, plausible or not, all in the hopes of convincing the Ottomans to join the war on their side.

German success in the European war was said to be assured, said Louis Mallet, the former British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries represented as groaning under Christian rule might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one great Power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great Power of the West. Such was the substance of German misrepresentations. (The Rupture With Turkey by The Times 12/11/14)

But despite the gifts, despite the promises, much of the Ottoman government still opposed going to war with the Allies. Unfortunately for them, after the Goeben and Breslau arrived, their voices of opposition grew weaker and weaker whereas the voices calling for war grew stronger and stronger, in part because the German warships were not empty. They were filled with German soldiers who had their own agenda.

Not only did these ships remain under effective German control, but a strong German element was imported into the remainder of the fleet, said Mallet.

Large numbers of Germans were imported from Germany as unostentatiously as possible, to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and at other crucial points.Another provocation from Churchill

While the Germans were exerting the greatest effort, pulling the Ottomans towards them, into the abyss, the British were pushing them in the same direction, closer and closer to the Germans. At the end of September, in accordance with the orders given to them by Churchill, the British navy prevented an Ottoman torpedo boat from leaving the Dardanelles after they discovered the boat contained German sailors. Enraged by what the British had done, the Ottomans sealed off the Dardanelles in retaliation. (Page 67)

Once again the Ottoman authorities were violating their obligations under international law, and once again they appeared to have been provoked to do so by the actions of Winston Churchill, said Fromkin.

The closure of the Dardanelles was a devastating blow for Russia who sent half of her exports through there. (Page 67)Entry into War

On October 29, the Goeben and Breslau shelled Odessa, a Russian city located on At the start of 1915,the northern shore of the Black Sea. (Flight of Goeben and Breslau by The Times 4/5/15) Mallet blamed the Germans for the attack. (The Rupture With Turkey by The Times 12/11/14)

Events have confirmed that so long as the German admiral and crews remained on board the German warships, the German Government were masters of the situation, and were in a position to force the hand of the Turkish Government if at any given moment it suited them to do so, he said.

After the attack, he met with the Grand Vizier.

His Highness convinced me of his sincerity in disclaiming all knowledge of or participation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable, said the ambassador. I replied that the time had passed for assurances.

The British demanded the Ottomans expel the German mission or else there would be war.

The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent, said the ambassador.

Later that evening, the Turkish Council held a meeting in which the Grand Vizier asked the members to support his efforts to avoid a war against the Allies. The ministers voted in favor of peace, though no one put forth a motion to remove the German mission.

Two days after the attack, on October 31, Winston Churchill ordered his navy to begin hostilities against the Ottomans immediately. (Page 72) Churchill had finally succeeded in dragging the Ottomans into the war. This was the outcome Churchill wanted. If you don't believe me, consider his words. After the Ottomans joined the war, he openly argued that having the Ottomans as an adversary had its advantages, as that would allow Britain to chop up and consume their empire after the war. (Page 74)The importance of the Goeben

No two warships have had such an important effect upon the war as the Goeben and the Breslau. They will always be remembered in naval history. The Times, from The Goeben and the Breslau, 1/22/18

The escape of the Goeben was the critical event which directly led to the Ottomans joining the war on the side of Germany. For the Ottomans, the Goeben was a pledge and proof of Germanys power. (Goeben Visited by The Times 11/15/18) The Ottoman public believed she was invincible. (The Goeben and the Breslau by The Times 1/22/18) Her acquisition enormously strengthened those who wanted to join the war on the side of the Germans against those who wanted to remain neutral. (The Turk Old And New by The Times 1/16/23) The German commitment to the Ottomans seemed real, seemed substantial. The Ottomans were compelled to reciprocate.

The arrival of the Goeben in the Dardanelles gave the war party in Turkey the upper hand, and thus led to the Turkish declaration of war, said the Times. (Looking Things in the Face by The Times 11/23/14)

From the moment she reached Constantinople Turkey moved steadily towards a rupture with the Allies. (The Goeben and the Breslau by The Times 1/22/18)

Edwin Montagu, the British Secretary of State for India, believed as I believe, that the Ottomans were driven into war by the actions of both Germany and Britain. (The Near East by The Times 10/14/22)

Turkey had entered the war against us, partly as the result of errors in British diplomacy which need not now be discussed, partly as the result of successful German efforts, partly as a direct consequence of the escape of the Goeben, said Montagu.An intentional mistake

Very rarely in war has a single error had more far-reaching consequences. The Times on the escape of the GoebenThe Goeben and the Breslau 1/22/18

The British Navy should have been able to sink the Goeben before she reached the Dardanelles. John Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the British Navy at the start of the war, said the Goeben escaped because the British battle-cruisers that were in the Mediterranean were not used. (Lord Fisher on the Navy by The Times 9/9/19) Later in the war, another British battlecruiser of the same type, the Invincible, sunk the the sister ships of the Goeben and Breslau which proves, in his mind, that his battlecruisers in the Mediterranean would have been able to sink the Goeben and Breslau, as those ships were the same as the Invincible.

The Germans too believed the British could have destroyed the Goeben if they wanted to. A few days after the Goeben escaped, the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, wrote, After thorough consideration I regard it as probable that England is holding back so as to prevent any decision which would lead to the prolongation of the war. (German Navy In the War by The Times 6/21/20)

This was the only way he could explain the escape of the Goeben. Were this explanation untrue, then the escape was, from his perspective, a gigantic mistake of the British Admiralty.

From the moment she arrived in Messina, the Allies had 24 hours to mass a fleet of ships on both sides of the straits to sink the Goeben upon her departure. Instead, by most accounts, when the Goeben finally left Messina, she faced no opposition whatsoever.

Instead of blocking the south entrance, the British stationed their fleet in the Adriatic Sea. This makes no sense. Even if you believe the Goeben was headed for the Adriatic, once she realized a British fleet was waiting for her there, she would chart another course, as going to the Adriatic would mean her certain destruction.

Though there was little to prevent the Goeben from leaving Messina, after the Goeben entered the Dardanelles, there was an overwhelming force outside the straits to prevent her escape. One wonders where these ships were when the Goeben left Messina. One wonders why the Allies were willing to let the Goeben leave Messina, but not the Dardanelles. Their actions indicate they wanted the Goeben to reach the Dardanelles, but not be able to leave. Their actions indicate they wanted to put the Ottomans in a bind. The Ottomans could not allow the Goeben to sail through the Dardanelles. That would have violated their treaty obligations. Nor could the Ottomans deny the Goeben entry, for then she would have faced certain destruction. The Germans would have been enraged and would have ended their relationship with the Ottomans. The Ottomans would have been completely isolated from all the major powers of Europe. Their only option was to buy the Goeben, an action, which though illegal, the Allies indicated they would accept because they wanted the Germans to expand their influence amongst the Ottomans. They wanted the Germans to take control of the Ottomans. The Goeben was a Trojan Horse, a gift offered in malice, which once accepted, would lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

Sergey Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, argued the Ottoman entry into the war was the result of German treachery towards the Ottoman Empire, which invited German instructors and the mission of General Liman von Sanders, hoping to perfect its army with the object of assuring its independence against the Russian danger insinuated by Berlin. Germany, however, took advantage of this penetration into the Turkish Army to make that army a weapon in realizing her political plans. (Indictment of Germany by The Times 2/11/15)

All the acts of the Turks since the appearance of the Goeben in the Dardanelles had been committed under the pressure of Germany, he said.The investigation

The British Admiralty court-martialed two of their admirals for allowing the Goeben to escape. One of those admirals was Ernest Troubridge, the man who led the First Cruiser Squadron. The proceeding was closed to the public and the press. He was honourably acquitted. (Admiral Troubridge Acquitted by The Times 11/13/14) The court-martial ruled that the Goeben was a superior force to the First Cruiser Squadron. (The Escape of the Goeben by The Times 4/16/19) As he was ordered not to engage a superior force, the Admiralty judged his decision to allow the Goeben to pass by was the right one. It is important to note that the warships included in his squadron were all smaller than the Goeben. It included none of the three battlecruisers which were capable of sinking her.

The other admiral who was court-martialed was Archibald Berkeley Milne, the man who led the British Navy in the Mediterranean. The Admiralty exonerated him too. They declared that the general dispositions and measures taken by him were fully approved. (Sir B. Milne and the Nore by The Times 2/20/19)

The Times was incredulous that both men were acquitted. They demanded an explanation.

The nation should be told quite frankly how these two blameless Admirals came to let the Goeben escape, and thus set in motion a series of events of great importance, the end of which no man can forsee, said the Times. (Looking Things in the Face by The Times 11/23/14)

When it came to the Goeben and Breslau, the Times detected a cover-up, a plot to conceal the truth from the public.

The story of their escape from Messina represents one of the greatest of our blunders, said the Times. It is also the first of a long series of unfortunate episodes about which the public have been told that no one was to blame, while the suppression of the facts has prevented any opportunity of forming an independent judgment. A blunder, a pail of whitewash, and rigid secrecy-these are the three main factors in the Goeben case. (The Goeben and the Breslau by The Times 1/22/18)

A few months after the escape, Churchill declared that, at the present time, all the information related to their escape could not be released without prejudice to vital interests, and that a partial explanation of their escape would have no value. (The Goeben and Breslau by The Times 11/27/14)

Carlyon Bellairs, a British Conservative Parliamentarian, who had access to the finding from the Troubridge court-martial, said the Admiralty was concealing the finding because they wanted to cover up the bad arrangements they made at the start of the war. In response to the allegation, Walter Long, the First Lord of the Admiralty, made the following reply.

The action of the Board at the time in regard to the Court-martial on Admiral Troubridge was taken in what they believed to be the highest interests of the State, he said.

To publish the report or anything like it without also publishing a great deal more that was not at present available for publication would be to run the gravest risk of doing injury to gallant men who ought not to be injured and would not be injured if the other vital information were made known.

The facts would be released to the public at the right time, he insisted, which begs the question, what time is the right time? Apparently, not two and a half decades after the war, in 1933, when someone asked the British government if they would publish the proceedings of the Troubridge court-martial.

The full proceedings of the Court-martial are much too voluminous for publication, and a large part of them is confidential, was the reply given. (House of Commons by The Times 3/23/33)

Nor was the right time in 1966, nearly sixty years after the war. The Troubridge court-martial proceedings, the documents about the inquiry into the escape of the Goeben, those documents were still closed to the public. The British government decided that they should remain classified for 100 years. (Access To Documents by The Times 1/6/66) Next year is the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I. It will be very interesting to see if the British government declassifies the documents, and if they do, if they release the actual documents, or if they release forgeries.

As neither Milne nor Troubridge were punished for allowing the Goeben to escape, we can conclude that they were adhering to the wishes of the British Admiralty. But by all accounts, they did allow the Goeben to escape, which means that the British Admiralty wanted the Goeben to escape. The British are telling the truth when they say that releasing all the facts would prejudice their vital interests. The facts would prove to the world that Britain allowed the Goeben to escape so that she could destroy the Ottoman Empire.Where were the French?

Many have questioned the conduct of the British Navy for allowing the Goeben to escape. Much less attention has been directed towards the French Navy, which seems odd. The Goeben was the biggest threat to the transportation of French soldiers across the Mediterranean. One would think France would have been determined to sink her.

The Times mentioned the French had their fleet stationed at the north end of Messina, which makes sense. From that position, they could prevent the Goeben from returning to Algeria, from interfering with their transportation operations. And after dealing with the Goeben, the ships could have returned to Algeria faster than had they been stationed on the south side, which would have forced them to sail a longer distance.

Two years after the incident, out of the clear blue sky, Ronald McNeill, a British Conservative Parliamentarian, asked the foreign secretary if he had any official information which indicated that a French Admiral notified the British government that he was pursuing the Goeben, that he intended to sink her before she reached the Dardanelles. But before he could do so, the French government ordered him to stop his pursuit based on a request from the British government. (House of Commons by The Times 1/21/16) The foreign secretary denied that such information existed. However, in my opinion, it is the most likely explanation for why, when the Goeben emerged from Messina, the French were nowhere to be seen.The Ottomans should have known better

We know, in retrospect, that for the Ottomans, their alliance with Germany was a Faustian bargain. The alliance led to the destruction of their empire. One might be tempted to excuse the Ottoman leadership, to argue that they simply could not have refused the Germans, to argue that they had no idea, at the time, how badly things would go for them in the future. A thorough examination of the facts, however, indicates the Ottomans should have known the Germans did not have their best interests at heart.

The Ottomans shouldve had this epiphany when the Goeben shelled Odessa. That was not how the Ottomans should have joined the war. The bombardment made the Ottomans look like the aggressors. If the Ottomans wanted to join the war, they should have made it look like the Russians were the aggressors. That would not have been difficult.

By the end of October, the British and the Russians had declared that the sale of the Goeben was not valid, that they would attack the Goeben if she entered the Black Sea. (Goeben and Breslau by The Times 10/27/14) To make the Allies look like the aggressors then, the Ottomans could have ordered the Goeben sail into the Black Sea and wait for her to be attacked. Or the Ottomans could have sent the Goeben into the Black Sea, had her sink an Allied warship, and declare that she was acting in self defense. In fact this second option was, according to Fromkin, the plan the Ottomans ordered the Germans to implement. Two Ottoman leaders, Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha, secretly ordered the Germans to move the Goeben and Breslau to the Black Sea, have her attack Russian warships, and claim that the Russians attacked them first. (Page 72) But the Germans ignored these orders and instead fired on the Russian coast. In doing so, they prevented the Ottomans from credibly arguing that they were acting in self defense. When the Ottomans found out what the Germans had done, they ordered the ships to stop firing and sent the Russians an apology.

After this incident, the Ottomans should have known that the Germans had little concern for their fate, or even for the fate of the German Empire. The Germans attacked Odessa because they wanted the Ottomans to look like the aggressors. They gave the Allies a justification for carving up the Ottoman Empire after the war.

The narrative for the start of the war could have been: the Allies steals two battlecruisers from the Ottomans and then fire on the two warships the Ottomans got from Germany to compensate for the ships Britain stole. Instead the narrative is: the Ottomans fired on the Russian coast for no apparent reason.

The incident shows that the Germans were controlled by the British. Their actions discredited the Ottomans in the eyes of the rest of the world. The Ottomans were supposed to be their allies. It makes no sense to discredit your allies. It does make sense to discredit your enemies, which is what the Germans did. If the Germans were the enemies of the Ottomans, that means, in reality, they were on the same side as the British. The incident also showed that the Ottoman leadership were controlled by the British. Once the Goeben fired on Odessa, the Ottomans should have realized that the Germans never really gave them the Goeben. They should have realized that the Germans were trying to discredit them. They should have expelled the German mission as requested. But they didn't, which means they too were controlled by Britain.

Part 3: The Young TurksThe rapid advances made by Europe during the Industrial Revolution had, by the late 19th century, left the Ottomans in a precarious position. They were far behind their European competitors. They were in danger of losing their empire, of being swallowed up by Europe. The Ottomans realized they needed to learn how to modernize their country from the Europeans. They sent their students to Paris to study. (Page 6 of The Young Turks in Opposition) The Ottomans wanted their students to learn how to reproduce European technologies and nothing more. But the French taught them something else. Once in Paris, some of the students formed oppositions groups dedicated to overthrowing the Ottoman government. The most prominent of these groups was the Young Turks, otherwise known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In 1908, they managed to seize power and overthrow the Ottoman sultan.

It is ironic, and perhaps not even a coincidence, that the Young Turks executed their revolution in 1908, the same year in which Ford produced its first Model T. Perhaps Britain knew how revolutionary that car was, knew that the Middle East had an ocean of oil buried beneath it, and forced the Young Turks into action, knowing that the Young Turks would destroy what they vowed to save.

William Morton Fullerton, an American journalist in Paris who had watched the Young Turks for a decade prior to the revolution, predicted that they would wreck their country in three years time after assuming power. (Page 24 of Preparation for a Revolution) The Young Turks did indeed destroy their country, though it took them a bit longer than Fullerton thought.European support

The Europeans, both the French and the British, provided shelter for the Young Turks during their time in opposition. The British allowed the Young Turks to live in London. At one point, the Young Turks had their headquarters there. (Page 146 of The Young Turks in Opposition) During this period, the British press provided them with favorable coverage. Britain also allowed the Young Turks to live in countries which they controlled, including Egypt and Cyprus. (Page 99 and 106 of The Young Turks in Opposition) In the case of Cyprus, the British even encouraged the Young Turks to become active there.

The sultan asked the British to crack down on the Young Turks in Egypt, but the British refused, arguing, apparently with a straight face, that they could not interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt, a country which they controlled. (Page 80 of The Young Turks in Opposition)Split personality

The Young Turks were not a monolithic movement. They had a diversity of opinion which, for the most part, was divided into two groups - those who wanted Europe to intervene in Ottoman affairs and those who did not.

The group that supported European intervention wanted Europe to help them overthrow the Ottoman sultan. The interventionists took a more accommodating view towards the ethnic minorities who inhabited the Ottoman Empire.

The interventionists often conspired with the British government to overthrow the sultan. (Page 60 of The Young Turks in Opposition) However, although the British were willing to talk to the Young Turks about staging a coup, when it came time to act, the British were never willing to follow through. (Page 125 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Privately, the British had a condescending attitude towards the Young Turks, in particular towards Murad Bey, one of the movements leaders.

Mourad is an impecunious scamp, said Lord Cromer. I dare to say that he will do what I tell him. (Page 80 of The Young Turks in Opposition)

For the British, the interventionists were nothing more than a tool which they used to pressure the sultan.

Using the Young Turks as a wild card in order to obtain concessions from the sultan was a more common form of political pressure, said M. Sukri Hanioglu. (Page 22 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Whenever the British wanted something from the sultan, they would pretend to support the interventionists and their efforts to stage a coup. The British hoped that this routine would scare the sultan into giving them whatever they wanted. But regardless of how the sultan responded, in the end, the British would never support a coup led by the interventionists. Over time, the interventionists lost credibility. The Young Turks who opposed European intervention took over the movement.

One would think that Britain would have supported the interventionists, as the interventionists admired Britain and wanted to work with them. But they didn't. Instead they allowed the anti-British faction to seize power. The British view of the Young Turks was similar to the way Colin Powell viewed invading Iraq.

When America was thinking about invading Iraq, Colin Powell recommended against it, arguing that if America broke Iraq, America would have to fix it. Britain thought the same thing about the Ottoman Empire. If Britain decided to overthrow the sultan, the world would expect Britain to fix the Ottoman Empire. But Britain did not want to fix the Ottoman Empire. Britain wanted to destroy and partition the empire, to annex the parts of the empire that contained oil. In order to do so, Britain needed Ottoman rulers who hated Britain. If the empire was ruled by people who loved Britain, they would never go to war with Britain. Then the only way to destroy the empire would be to unilaterally declare war against the Ottomans, an act which would be perceived by the rest of the world as evil and unjustified.Anti-Imperialism

Though the Young Turks were foolish for going to war with Europe, their opinions about Europe, about how Europe was evil, about how Europe was trying to destroy their country, those opinions were completely justified. They accused Britain of provoking and prodding the Armenians, Bulgarians, and Arabs into revolting against the Ottoman government. (Page 178 of Preparation for a Revolution)

The provinces of Salonica, Ioannina, Edirne, and Monastir have been filled with foreign schools and Catholic and Slavic churches, said the Young Turks. These schools are not content with teaching arts and sciences, they also teach Christian children that they should strive hard to separate themselves from the Turks, and work for the extinction of the Ottoman government. (Page 43 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Using minority groups to destabilize other countries is the job of the British external intelligence agency. When most people think of British intelligence, they think of James Bond and the organization he belongs to, MI6. Although many people refer to the British external intelligence agency as MI6, its official name is the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

Until recently, I never knew that the phrase secret intelligence refers to a specific category of intelligence activities. I learned its definition after reading a book about an offspring of British intelligence - the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The book is called OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War.

In December 1940, fifteen months after Britain entered World War II and a year before America joined the war, the British government paid William Donovan, an American, to take a tour of the Mediterranean. Accompanying him was William Stephenson, the chief of British intelligence for the Western Hemisphere.

While on this trip, Donovan decided that America needed to centralize its intelligence operations, that America needed to create a new agency which would control the countrys intelligence apparatus. Roosevelt accepted this proposal and put Donovan in charge of the new organization. Originally the agency was called the Coordinator of Information. It was later renamed the Office of Strategic Services.

OSS was essentially an arm of British intelligence. British officials trained all the OSS agents, first at a British training camp in Ontario called Camp X, later at training camps in Virginia and Maryland. (Page 19 of OSS in China) Britain knew the identities of virtually every OSS agent. The converse was not true, however, as OSS knew little about British secret intelligence activities. A few months before the end of the war, a U.S. military officer, Colonel Richard Park Jr., wrote a blistering report about OSS. (chroniclesoftheendofhistory.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-park-report.html)

O.S.S. is hopelessly compromised to foreign governments, particularly the British," said Colonel Park. Further questioning of British intelligence authorities will evince nothing but praise because the O.S.S. is like putty in their hands and they would be reluctant to forfeit a good tool.

Like its British counterpart, secret intelligence was one of the duties of OSS, as was special operations. While reading the book OSS in China, I kept wondering what was involved in secret intelligence and special operations. The author kept using those terms but he never defined them. I tried to find a definition for these terms on the Internet but I couldnt find a satisfactory answer there either. I eventually found a definition for those terms in Appendix III of the Park report. That appendix contains an outline of the activities performed by OSS. Section 1 and 2 of the outline list the activities that fall under the categories of secret intelligence and secret operations. I assume secret operations is the same thing as special operations. The following is a copy of sections 1 and 2 of the outline:1. Secret Intelligencea. Liaison with undergrounds, minority groups, and subversive groups in various countries throughout the world.b. Espionage.c. Interception (radio, telegraph, telephone, etc.).d. Dark chamber (cryptanalysis).2. Secret Operationsa. Sabotage.b. Subversive activities.c. Subversive propaganda.3. Research and Analysis4. Counterintelligence5. Propaganda, counterpropaganda and miscellaneous activitiesAfter reading this outline, I came to the conclusion that I had a hard time finding a proper definition for these terms because the government does not want the public to know what these terms mean. The government, I presume, rarely if ever has defined those terms publicly. That is why it is hard to find an accurate definition for those terms on the Internet. Why the government was willing to declassify this document is something of a mystery to me.

From section 1a and section 2, we can deduce that secret intelligence and special operations involves using subversive groups, including minorities, to destabilize other governments. For the Ottoman Empire, the most infamous case of Europe using minority groups to destabilize their country involved the Armenians.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Armenians began revolting against the Ottoman government. In 1895, they escalated their attacks, hoping the violence would cause Europe to intervene. (Kindle Locations 3275-3276 from A Brief History)

Britain denounced the Ottomans for suppressing the revolts. They used the revolts as a pretext to to turn against the Ottomans.

[British] sympathies with Turkey have completely changed and she would never again make great sacrifices for a government which she so thoroughly distrusts, said the Marquis of Salisbury. (Kindle Locations 3278-3279 from A Brief History)

The Young Turks knew what Britain was doing and they hated them for it.

Wherever a shameful act or outbreak of disorder occurs in the Ottoman dominions, [the European statesmen] immediately put all the blame on the Turks and their religious fanaticism, thereby intervening in our domestic affairs on the pretext of safeguarding the Christians-as if the non-Christians were not human beings! exclaimed Ahmed Riza, a prominent Young Turk. They bombard towns with the cry of Turks are not capable of progress and reform, and the Ottoman state cannot be put into any kind of order, and attempt to turn European public opinion against us. (Page 301 of Preparation for a Revolution)

In many cases, after a revolt broke out in the Ottoman Empire, the Europeans used the revolt as a pretext to intervene, ostensibly to fix the problem, in reality to destroy the Ottoman Empire.

Whenever the Great Powers intervened in our domestic affairs they concluded their intervention by separating an element [of the empire] from us, or obtained new privileges for profiteers and missionaries; to sum up, they always diminished the strength of the Turk, said the Young Turks. (Page 32 of Preparation for a Revolution)

This was why they opposed European intervention. Were Europe allowed to intervene again, they suspected that Europe would chop off a part of their empire.

If Europe came to rescue us by accepting our invitation she would at first try to separate the Armenians and Macedonians from us, they said. (Page 32 of Preparation for a Revolution)

By the way, after World War II, OSS would undergo several name changes. After the last name change, the organization became known as the Central Intelligence Agency.Turkish Nationalism

The Young Turks were nationalists. They believed the Turkish people should enjoy a dominant, elevated position above the other ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire. (Page 171 of Preparation for a Revolution) They argued that their language, Turkish, was the most superior and advanced Oriental language. (Page 66 of Preparation for a Revolution) They often looked down on the other races of the empire.

Why should we bow before these Armenians, who make us a laughingstock though we never deserve it? said the Young Turks. The fortunes that they have made, the arts that they have mastered all arise from the fact that they have lived at our expense. (Page 67 of Preparation for a Revolution)

The Young Turks took a hard-line on the issue of autonomy. They argued that granting others autonomy would lead to their secession.

To give a little bit of power and credit to the separatists encourages them to detach themselves completely, said the Young Turks. (Page 291 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Their opposition to autonomy, their hard-line views on Turkish nationalism alienated the ethnic minorities and prevented the Young Turks from forming alliances with them. (Page 179 of Preparation for a Revolution)Positivism

The Young Turks were positivists. Positivists believe that scientific truth is the only truth, that religious beliefs are invalid. This ideology was inconsistent with the views of the Ottoman people, many of whom were Muslims. Despite their beliefs, the Young Turks often spoke in religious, Islamic terms in the hope that such rhetoric would boost their popularity. They saw Islam as a tool which they could use to unite the worlds Muslims. Such a unification would be a powerful force which they could use against Europe.

The Europe Christian governments are very much afraid of even the term Union of Muslims, said the Young Turks. Our enemies fear is convincing proof of the necessity of a union for the Muslims. (Page 157 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Unfortunately for them, it was not a secret that they were positivists. Their opponents labeled them as such in order to discredit them.

This hostile propaganda was very damaging to the CUP, said M. Sukri Hanioglu. (Page 305 of Preparation for a Revolution)Whose ideology?

The three pillars of Young Turk ideology - nationalism, anti-imperialism, and positivism - rather than forming the foundation which allowed the Young Turks to rule the empire, formed the foundation which Europe used to destroy it. Positivism alienated the empires Muslims. Nationalism turned the minorities against the Young Turks. Anti-imperialism led the Young Turks to fight against the Europeans instead of trying to reach an accommodation with them.

The Young Turks got each of these pillars from Europe. Yusuf Akcura, a Turkish nationalist who was involved in the movement, was heavily influenced by Albert Sorel and Emile Boutmy, two of his professors at Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, one of the most prestigious universities in France. (Page 293 of Preparation for a Revolution)

The Europeans taught the three pillars to the Young Turks knowing full well that such an ideology would destroy the Ottoman Empire. With such a ridiculous ideology, the Young Turks could not seize power unless they had help. The help came in the form of the humiliations imposed on the sultan by the Europeans.

The Muslim elite, extremely disheartened by the Ottoman governments inability to thwart foreign intervention, viewed the Young Turk movement as a last chance to save itself from Greek domination, said M. Sukri Hanioglu. (Page 152 of Preparation for a Revolution)

By humiliating the sultan, the Europeans were paving the way for the Young Turks to seize power.Macedonia

In 1903, a group of ethnic Bulgarians launched an insurrection against the Ottoman government in Macedonia. The Murzsteg program, a series of reforms concocted by Europe, was implemented in reaction to the violence, but it failed to resolve the problem. Instead the program created an enormous amount of resentment amongst the Muslim population. (Page 208 of Preparation for a Revolution) To protect themselves against the insurgents, the local Muslims formed groups of vigilantes.

In the past, when it came to Macedonia, the British had sat on the sidelines and let other countries take the lead. But all that changed at the end of 1907. (Page 231 of Preparation for a Revolution) The British declared that the situation in Macedonia was unacceptable. Things needed to change.

The Ottoman authorities have displayed an utter incapacity to maintain public tranquility, said Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary. (Page 231 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Britain suddenly began cooperating with Russia on this issue. (Page 232 of Preparation for a Revolution) To solve the problem, Britain put forth a proposal that they knew the Ottomans would refuse.

If a Turkish Governor were appointed for a fixed term of years-a man whose character and capacity were accepted and recognized by the Powers-and if he had a free and willing hand and his position were secure, I believe that the whole Macedonian question might be solved, said Grey.

Britain made this same proposal three decades ago, during the Constantinople Conference. The Ottomans refused their proposal. The failure of the conference led to the Russo-Turkish War. (Page 232 to 233 of Preparation for a Revolution) The British knew that this proposal would still be unacceptable to the Ottomans thirty years later, but they made it anyways.

Sir Edwards proposal was one that obviously would be found entirely unacceptable by any Ottoman government in office, said M. Sukri Hanioglu. (Page 232 to 233 of Preparation for a Revolution)

The Young Turks proclaimed that the proposal was aimed at the partition and extinction of the Ottoman state and expulsion of Turks from Europe. (Page 234 of Preparation for a Revolution) This propaganda, which denounced Europe and warned of their impending intervention, struck a chord with the Ottoman soldiers in Macedonia. For unlike other areas of the empire, in Macedonia, foreign intervention was a fact of life. Due to the Murzsteg program, there were foreign officials in the area who were interacting with the local Christians, who were listening to their complaints. The Ottoman soldiers were deeply resentful of their presence. The soldiers viewed those officials as arrogant. Those officials were bossing them around in their own land. (Page 236 of Preparation for a Revolution) Angry at Europe and afraid for their future, many of the soldiers allied themselves with the Young Turks.

The Ottoman soldiers stationed in Macedonia enjoyed a freedom that their counterparts located elsewhere lacked. The chaos throughout the area meant those soldiers were free to move wherever they wanted to chase after the insurgents. This meant they could distribute Young Turk propaganda throughout the province while claiming they were trying to find the enemy. Such activities were not possible in other parts of the empire. (Page 236 of Preparation for a Revolution)

Rumors of an outrageous agreement between Russia and Britain to partition Macedonia caused the Young Turks to launch their revolution early and provided them with yet another piece of propaganda which they used to rally support to their side. (Page 235, 260, and 264 of Preparation for a Revolution)

The Young Turks had the Ottoman soldiers in Macedonia mutiny. When the sultan sent troops to Macedonia to restore order, the Young Turks had the leader of those troops assassinated. Many of the troops sent to restore order joined the rebellion, as they were secretly connected to the Young Turks to begin with. Rather than start a civil war, the sultan ceded power to the Young Turks.Ethnic support

Since the purpose of the revolution was to thwart foreign intervention, the Young Turks had to convince the other ethnic groups that the situation would improve after they assumed power, otherwise the revolts would continue and the Europeans would still intervene. To convince the minorities to support them, the Young Turks told those minorities whatever they wanted to hear. (Page 175 of Preparation for a Revolution) Although some ethnic groups supported the Young Turks, most did not. (Page 241 of Preparation for a Revolution) Those minorities knew that, although the Young Turks were saying the right things, in their hearts, the Young Turks were nationalists who had an agenda that was the exact opposite of what those minorities wanted.

Nevertheless the leading insurgent group in Macedonia, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), halted their attacks temporarily at the request of Bulgaria. Bulgaria, in turn, made this request to show their support for the British reform proposals. (Page 243 of Preparation for a Revolution) This implies that it was Britain who wanted IMRO to temporarily halt their attacks. The ceasefire allowed the Young Turks to seize power. Once again, the British had paved the way for them.

Before the revolution, the Ottoman elites were loyal to the sultan. (Page 313 of Preparation for a Revolution) After the revolution, they were swept away and replaced by hard-line nationalists who clamored for autonomy. (Page 313 of Preparation for a Revolution) These nationalists seized control of the various ethnic groups.

Instead of trying to reach an accommodation with these nationalists, the Young Turks cancelled the privileges given to non-Turkish Muslims. Instead of granting autonomy to the various ethnic groups, the Young Turks centralized power. Instead of recognizing that minorities had their own ethnic identities, the Young Turks demanded that they view themselves as Ottomans first. (Kindle Locations 4173-4175 from A Brief History)

Between a center predisposed to view all demands for the recognition of difference as evidence of separatism, and a periphery decreasingly inclined to compromise, all-out war was inevitable, said M. Sukru Hanioglu. (Kindle Locations 4180-4181)

The First Balkan War began in October 1912. The Ottomans lost almost all their territory in Europe.Enver Pasha

The Ottomans lost the rest of their empire during World War I. Most of the blame for this debacle has been directed towards one man, Enver Pasha, the Supreme Commander of the Ottoman military. His critics blame him for a litany of disasters, including the decision to attack a heavily fortified Russian position in the middle of winter. (Page 120)

The obstacles which impeded the attack were overwhelming. Between Enver and the Russians stood the Caucasus Mountains, rivers that had no bridges, land that had no railroads, and snow, lots and lots of snow. The snow prevented his artillery from ever reaching the battlefield. A sane person, realizing they had no artillery, would have called off the attack. But not Enver. He sent 100,000 soldiers to attack Russia. Eighty six thousand of them died. (Page 121) One German officer said the Ottomans had suffered a disaster which for rapidity and completeness is without parallel in military history.

Towards the end of the war, as Britain was attacking the Ottoman Empire, instead of defending their territory, inexplicably, the Ottomans began attacking Russia in Azerbaijan and Turkestan. (Page 313) Britain was free to seize whatever parts of the Ottoman Empire they wanted. Enver was blamed for this fiasco too.

The criticism leveled against him came not just from outsiders, but from his colleagues as well. The Grand Vizier blamed him for the war. (Page 369) The other Young Turks claim that at end of the war, only Enver knew that Germany was losing, that Enver misled them into into believing the Germans were actually winning. (Page 367)

Enver Pashas greatest guilt is that he never kept his friends informed of the situation, said the Ottoman finance minister. If he had said five or six months ago that we were in so difficult a situation, naturally we would havemade a favourable separate peace at that time. But he concealed everything, andhe deluded himself and brought the country to this state. (Page 368)

His decisions were so incomprehensible one wonders why the other Young Turks allowed him to remain in his position throughout the war. According to one theory, offered by the Times of London, the other Young Turks were afraid of him. The Grand Vizier was fully alive to the precarious nature of his own position and to the fact that any real attempt on his part to run counter to the policy of Enver Pasha and the military authorities would have meant his elimination. (The Rupture With Turkey by The Times 12/11/14)

Though there is evidence which implicates Enver for the failures of the Ottoman government, there is also evidence which distributes the blame more broadly. Perhaps other people were blaming Enver for their own lapses in judgement. Enver was an easy target. He died in August 1922, right as the war between the Turks and the Allies was drawing to a close. Blaming him was easy, as he was no longer alive to defend himself. Indeed Fromkin suggests that Enver was not solely responsible. Although most historians claim that the Ottoman Empire was run by a dictatorial triumvirate of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal, ... in fact, as the German archives now show, power was wielded by the C.U.P.s Central Committee of about forty members, and especially by its general directorate of about twelve members who functioned as a sort of politburo, in which personal rivalries abounded. Decisions of the Central Committee were reflected in the positions taken by party members in the Cabinet and in the Chamber of Deputies. (Page 44)

Unfortunately, this is the only time Fromkin mentions the Central Committee. He never mentions its members, who they were or what they stood for. Instead, ironically, he focuses mostly on the actions of Enver and to a lesser extent Talaat and Djemal.

To be fair to Fromkin, the committee was very secretive, which makes it a hard target to decipher. The identity of its members were kept secret. (Kindle Locations 4013-4014 from A Brief History) Still, some of its members and activities are known.

Historians believe that Bahaeddin Sakir played a pivotal role in the emergence of the Young Turks.

Bahaeddin Sakir was undoubtedly the individual most responsible for reshaping the coalition and transforming it into a well-organized activist committee, said M. Sukru Hanioglu. His foes accused him of converting the Young Turk movement into a nationalist activity. (Page 129 of Preparation for a Revolution)

I personally believe that historians are overstating the importance of Sakir. He was a doctor. Doctors are not known for their ability to organize opposition movements, conduct assassination campaigns, and overthrow governments. Those skills fall within the domain of intelligence agencies.

The Young Turks did have a prominent intelligence official working for them. Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha, once the head of Ottoman intelligence, defected to the Young Turks in 1904. (Page 78 of Preparation for a Revolution) He was close to Bahaeddin Sakir. (Page 128 of Preparation for a Revolution) I believe he had a powerful influence on the Young Turks behind the scenes and that he hid the true extent of his involvement and responsibility.

Regardless of which official had the most power, odds are that Enver played an important role in the decision making process. He was, after all, a member of the Central Committee himself. The British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire once said that Enver Pasha was entirely in German hands. (The Rupture With Turkey by The Times 12/11/14) But the Germans were in the hands of the British, which meant the Ottomans too were under their control. You could see this control reflected in the decisions Enver made. His decisions were not in the best interest of the Ottoman Empire, but in the best interests of the British.

The British had the Young Turks implement a somewhat convoluted plan to cede the Ottoman Empire to them. The plan had to be convoluted. The Young Turks could not simply hand over the Ottoman Empire to the British. That would have generated an outcry from the Ottoman people. The Young Turks would have been labeled as traitors, their decisions declared invalid. They needed to fight a war against the British, a war that would give the British a pretext for stealing their land.

Europe had to work together to convince the Ottoman public to allow the Young Turks to lead them down that path. The Europeans had to bolster the Young Turks. The Germans gave them gold. They gave them the Goeben. The Europeans allowed the Young Turks to end the Capitulations, which were contracts that gave certain privileges to Europeans. The Ottomans hated the Capitulations and were overjoyed when they were terminated. The Goeben, the end of the Capitulations, and the gold gave the Young Turks a tremendous amount of political capital. The Ottoman people thought the Young Turks knew what they were doing. The Young Turks, having gained the confidence of their people, were now ready to lead their country into war against the Allies.

Part 4: The WarAt the start of 1915, the British attacked the Dardanelles. At that time, the Ottoman forces there were dangerously low on ammunition. Some of their gunboats only had enough ammo to fire for a single minute. (Page 134) The British began their attack on February 19. (Page 134) The Ottomans ran out of ammo a month later. (Page 151) But right as that happened, the British commanders at the Dardanelles decided to halt their attack and wait for the army to arrive. (Page 153) Winston Churchill was in disbelief. He knew the Ottomans had run out of ammo. Everyone knew that. He wanted to force the navy to resume their attack. But the decision was not his to make. The decision belonged to the prime minister, who sided with those who wanted to wait. (Page 153) And so they waited.

The British army was unable to begin their attack until April 25. (Page 157) By that time, the Ottomans had replenished their supply of ammunition. Before the attack began, the British army commander was given an inaccurate map of the terrain. (Page 156) His army landed on the north side of the straits, on the Gallipoli peninsula. The attack was a fiasco. Britain suffered 250,000 casualties in the ensuing fight. (Page 166)

The British had several reasons for bungling their attack on the Dardanelles. The high number of casualties gave them an excuse to steal the world's largest supply of oil.

"The sheer magnitude of Britain's commitment and loss at Gallipoli made it seem vital years later that she should play a major role in the postwar Middle East to give some sort of meaning to so great a sacrifice," said Fromkin. (Page 166)

Britain had another reason to bungle the attack. Britain had promised to give Constantinople to the Russians after the war. (Page 138) Had Britain won the war in 1915, when Russia was still their ally, Britain wouldve had to fulfill that promise. For Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, that was unacceptable. The only acceptable outcome was for both Germany and Russia to lose the war. (Page 98) And for that, Russia had to switch sides. Only then could Britain break her promise. Only then could Britain prevent the Russians from annexing Constantinople.

For Britain to achieve her goal, for Russia to switch sides, the Russian government had to be replaced with, ironically, a government that tilted away from Britain and towards Germany. It would take some time, but eventually Russia would collapse under the weight of a mismanaged war. Millions of casualties, inflation, and food shortages, those were the necessary ingredients for the collapse. In 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in what became known as the Russian Revolution.

Russia could have avoided the collapse had her leadership performed better. There was no excuse for the food shortages that Russia suffered from in 1916 and 1917. Russia produced more than enough food to feed her population. The shortages were caused by speculation, profiteering, and hoarding, (Page 241) problems that the Russian government should have been able to handle.

Russias failure was a failure of leadership, said Fromkin. (Page 240)

Amongst the Russian leadership, there was, according to Fromkin, a lack of patriotism in some cases and a lack of competence in others. Let me be more explicit. They were British stooges. Russia was one head of Britains many-headed monster and an expendable one at that.

The Russian Revolution was a fraud. It was not about ideology. The revolution was supposed to be about the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the working class. Such a dictatorship should have allowed the Muslims of Central Asia to choose whether to become independent of Russia. Indeed Lenin had declared that non-Russians deserved the right of self-determination. (Page 475) But Lenin was a hypocrite. He declared that non-Russians lacked a proletariat and until one was formed they were not ready for independence. (Page 476) This is almost identical to what Britain told its Muslims. We'll give you guys independence...some day. For the Muslims of Central Asia, the dictatorship of the proletariat looked no different than the previous dictatorship. They hated Russia. They hated Russia just like the Muslims under British rule hated Britain. (Page 477) To keep them under control, Lenin had to subdue them by employing 250,000 secret policemen.

Britain had another reason for prolonging the war. They had to wait for the 1918 Congressional midterm elections in America. Due to the elections, President Wilson lost control of the Senate, which meant that any peace agreement he made in Europe would have to be ratified by his political enemies. The election was fixed, I believe, to make sure that America would not be able to seize any land in the Middle East. France and Britain wanted the Middle East for themselves. The elections took place right when the armistice agreement was completed. (Page 390) This was not a coincidence. The Europeans were waiting for the election.

Many experts believe the Allies could have won the war much earlier had they simply attacked through the Balkans. But they waited until the summer of 1918 before making their attack. At that point, the French invaded Bulgaria, which collapsed quickly. (Page 363) From there, the French moved north and opened a new front against Germany and Austria. Germany didnt have the troops to fight on another front and decided to negotiate for peace.

The Germans wondered why the British did not employ this strategy earlier.

If ever there was a prospect of a brilliant strategic feat, it was here, said the chief of the German General Staff. Why did England never make use of her opportunity?Some day history will perhaps clear up this question. (Page 265)Change administrations to change policies

Britain formed their alliance with Russia in 1907, ostensibly in fear of a rising Germany, in reality to make sure the Ottomans would be their enemy. The Ottomans were forced to ally themselves with Germany, as the Ottomans could never join an alliance which contained Russia, their unyielding adversary. But once the war began, to prevent Russia from annexing Constantinople, Britain orchestrated a coup in Russia, a coup that would end the alliance.

What happened in Russia was a tactic commonly used in international politics. Often whenever a country has to change one of its policies, rather than simply changing that policy, a coup will take place, or an election will take place, the existing government will be removed, a new government will assume power and adopt the new policy line.

There are several reasons for using this tactic. Sometimes the existing administration is genuinely committed to the existing policy line. The only way to change the policy then, is to change the administration. In other cases, the tactic is used to prevent suspicion. Even if certain leaders are amenable to switching the policy, if those officials had, in the past, firmly backed the existing policy, they cannot simply change their position without arousing suspicion, without looking hypocritical.

Britain used this tactic three times in 1917, in three different countries, Russia, Britain, and France. In all three countries, the new leadership held strong views about the Middle East which were totally at variance with those of their predecessors, according to Fromkin. (Page 231)

In Britain, Herbert Asquith, the man who became prime minister six years before the war began, was replaced by David Lloyd George. During his tenure, Asquith argued that Britain could not afford to administer any new colonies. (Page 141) He seemed less than fully committed to winning the war, as he refused to force young British men to join the military.

His views were meant to bait the Ottomans into joining the war. His views were meant to make the Ottomans believe that they had a good chance of winning the war, and believe that even if they lost the war, they wouldnt lose much of their territory. Having fooled the Ottomans into joining the war, Britain then switched their government.

His successor, David Lloyd George, on the other hand, was willing to reduce the freedoms of his people in order to win the war. Lloyd George viewed the Middle East as a prize that Britain should seize. (Page 235)

Where the Asquith Cabinet eventually came to see hegemony over portions of the Middle East as something that Britain merely wanted, the Lloyd George government came to see it as territory that Britain needed, said Fromkin. (Page 302)

In France, Georges Clemenceau became the new prime minister. Clemenceau focused all his energies on defeating Germany. (Page 236) He believed that France should not waste her time trying to colonize other countries. For him, colonies were a financial and military burden. (Page 237) His opinions provided a great boost for British imperialism. With Clemenceau in charge, Britain was able to seize more of the Middle East for herself. Originally, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain agreed to give the oil rich land of Mosul to France. But after the war ended, Lloyd George persuaded Clemenceau to allow Britain to have Mosul. (Page 375)

The fortunes of war and politics had brought into power in their respective countries the first British Prime Minister who wanted to acquire territory in the Middle East and the only French politician who did not want to do so, said Fromkin.

This was not a coincidence. This was a conspiracy, by Britain, to monopolize the worlds largest supply of oil. Although Lloyd George may have been the only British politician to openly display his imperial ambitions, other British politicians secretly agreed with his ideology, even if they refused to voice their agreement publicly.

Britain, more than any other country, is determined to maintain its reputation and conceal its true, evil nature. British politicians will say honorable words, but when it comes time to act, they will reveal their true nature. To maintain their reputations, and to prevent other countries from adding to their empires, British politicians will denounce imperialism, until their country has a chance to annex territory, at which point they will promote their one politician who supports annexation. And after he has seized all the land available, he will be replaced by someone who opposes imperialism.

In Persia, after the war, Britain secretly orchestrated a coup (Page 460) to extricate themselves from a prior commitment. Before the coup, Britain agreed to construct a nationwide rail system throughout Persia. (Page 456) The system would have been very expensive to build and it would have improved the lives of Muslims. There is nothing that Britain opposes more than spending a lot of money to improve the lives of Muslims. And so Britain organized a coup to abrogate the agreement. After the coup, the new government abandoned the rail agreement and signed a treaty with Russia. And Britain reacted in mock horror to the coup they had engineered.Armenia

During the war, the British Secret Intelligence Service incited the Armenians to revolt against the Ottomans. To suppress the revolt, the Ottomans began killing and deporting the Armenians in what became known as the Armenian Genocide.

Britain used the incident as a pretext to carve up and consume the Ottoman Empire. They launched a media campaign to discredit the Turks. They argued that the Turks were not fit to rule other races. Many people bought into their propaganda campaign. The U.S. in particular disliked what the Turks were doing. (Page 213)

While the Armenians were being killed, Djemal secretly approached the Allies about seizing power to end the massacre. (Page 214) He was willing to give Constantinople to Russia as long as he could retain Syria, Iraq, Armenia, Cilicia, and Kurdistan. This offer was made in December 1915, when the Allies were evacuating Gallipoli. After what happened there, one might have expected the Allies to accept the offer. But they didnt.

Djemal appears to have acted on the mistaken assumption that saving the Armeniansas distinct from merely exploiting their plight for propaganda purposeswas an important Allied objective, said Fromkin.

Russia wanted to accept the offer. But France turned it down because they insisted on seizing Syria. (Page 214). Britain rejected the offer for the same reasons. They were determined to take control of the Middle East and steal her oil. Their loss at Gallipoli, apparently, was not particularly serious after all.

For evidence that Britain incited the Armenians to rebel against the Ottomans, consider this document (discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=D7651980), which shows that the British government wanted Russia to deploy 120,000 Armenian soldiers against the Ottomans. The document does not explain why Britain wanted to deploy Armenian soldiers against the Ottomans. But logically, Britain must have wanted those soldiers to pose as regular Armenians knowing that would cause the Ottomans to crack down on them. Once that happened, Britain could claim the Ottomans were trying to exterminate the Armenian people.

Three years ago, John Sawers, the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, gave a speech about the organization he leads. (www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/28/sir-john-sawers-speech-full-text) He disclosed that SIS worked with foreign nationals. He referred to those people as secret agents.

Our agents are the true heroes of our work, said Sawers. They have their own motivations and hopes. Many of them show extraordinary courage and idealism, striving in their own countries for the freedoms that we in Britain take for granted.

Those agents take serious risks and make sacrifices to help Britain.

The purpose of the speech was to persuade the public that SIS needed to keep its activities secret.

Secret organisations need to stay secret, said Sawers. If our operations and methods become public, they wont work.

Lets think about why SIS needs to keep its activities secret. In World War I, their secret agents were the Armenians. SIS had them revolt against the Ottomans. The Armenians thought they were fighting for their freedom. But SIS has an ulterior motive for inciting them to revolt. They wanted the Ottomans to massacre the Armenians. The massacre gave the British a talking point, an argument, which says, The Ottomans cant rule other people. Their empire must be split up. This argument allowed the British to annex the largest supply of oil in the world. If the Armenians knew the British wanted them to revolt so the Ottomans could massacre them, a massacre which allowed the British to seize the worlds largest supply of oil, I doubt the Armenians would have revolted in the first place. Now you know why the British are so intent on keeping the activities of their intelligence agencies secret.Germany and America: two heads of the monster

Had Germany wanted to win the war, they would have done everything in their power to make sure the U.S. military stayed out of the war. That should have been an easy task to accomplish, as the American people opposed joining the war. (Page 255) But instead of keeping the Americans on the sidelines, the Germans did everything in their power to provoke America into joining the war against them, which is exactly what Britain wanted.

In their first blunder, the Germans tried to form an alliance with Mexico. They offered to give Mexico a large chunk of U.S. territory if Mexico joined the war on their side. The U.S. government found out about the plan. They released the details of the plan to the public. The American people were outraged. For their second blunder, the Germans sank three U.S. merchant vessels. (Page 255) That was the last straw. America declared war on Germany.

But America did not declare war on the Ottoman Empire. America only declared war on Germany. (Page 256) America did not become a full-fledged member of the Allies. That meant America would not get a piece of the Ottoman Empire after the war.

We have no selfish ends to serve, said President Wilson. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. (Page 256)

Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned. (Page 259)

Lloyd George, meanwhile, had other ideas.

Wilson proclaimed that the enormity of the war required peace without annexations, said Fromkin. Lloyd George took the other view: the enormity of the war required indemnities and annexations on an enormous scale. (Page 263)

After failing to convince the leaders of Europe to settle the war in an honorable fashion, Wilson took his case to the European public, in the hopes that he could persuade them to adopt his ideals, in the hopes that they would force their leaders to act decently. (Page 259) Boy was he mistaken. The people of Europe were just as bad as their leaders.

It is, perhaps, unfair to single out Europe for condemnation. There were signs that Wilson did not sincerely believe in his ideals. Had he wanted to, Wilson could have forced the British into accepting an honorable settlement for the war. During the war, Britain relied on America for financing and supplies