a snapshot of current practice of occupational radiation ... · iaea international atomic energy...

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

A Snapshot of Current Practice of

Occupational Radiation Protection in

Industrial Radiography

WGIR – ISEMIR Richard VAN SONSBEEK1, John C. LE HERON2, Gonzague ABELA3 ,

Francisco C.A. DA SILVA4 , Razak HAMZAH5 , Thomas A. LEVEY6 ,

Matthias PURSCHKE7 , Kamal SAHAIMI8 , Christian LEFAURE9

1Applus RTD; e-mail: [email protected]

2International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria; e-mail: [email protected] 3EDF; Saint Denis, France; e-mail: [email protected]

4Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; e-mail: [email protected] 5Malaysia Nuclear Agency; Kajang, Malaysia; e-mail: [email protected]

6Acuren Group Inc.; Edmonton, Canada; e-mail: [email protected] 7German Society for Non-Destructive Testing (DGZfP); Berlin, Germany; e-mail: [email protected]

8CNESTEN, Rabat, Morocco, [email protected] 9IAEA consultant; Paris, France; [email protected]

IAEA

Background to ISEMIR

• Information System on Occupational

Exposure in Medicine, Industry & Research

• There are some areas in medicine, industry

and research where radiation uses can lead

to significant occupational exposures

• Both in normal operations and in accident

situations

• But detailed information at the operational

level is lacking

WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012 2

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ISEMIR – the launch

• January 2009, for an initial 3 year period, to

help improve occupational radiation protection

in targeted areas

• 2 Working Groups, initially

• Interventional Cardiology, commenced Feb 2009

• Industrial Radiography, commenced Jan 2010


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Working Group Industrial Radiography

(WGIR)

From left to right: Christian Lefaure, Francisco Da Silva, Kamal Sahaimi, Gonzague Abela,

Richard van Sonsbeek, Matthias Purschke, A. Razak Hamzah, John Le Heron

(Thomas Levey is not on the picture)

WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

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WGIR working together

5 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

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Composition of WGIR

Name Region Stakeholder

G. Abela Europe Client

M. Purschke Europe NDT Society

T. Levey North America Operating Company

A. Razak Hamzah Asia Technical Service Organization

K. Sahaimi Africa Training provider

F. Da Silva Latin America Technical Service Organization

R. Van Sonsbeek Europe Operating Company

J. Le Heron Scientific Secretary IAEA

C. Lefaure Consultant IAEA


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Objectives of our effort

Keeping ALARA:

1. the dose due to normal exposure • if normal exposure is justified!

2. the risk of exposure due to accidents • (risk= chance X consequence of accident)


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Agreed Mandate

• To draw an overview picture of the situation concerning

occupational exposures and radiation protection of staff in

Industrial Radiography (radiographers and other industry and

client staff members) all over the world.

• To identify both good practices and shortcomings and define all

types of actions (training, managerial, behavioural…) to be

implemented for assisting the industry, clients, and regulatory

bodies in avoiding exposures to accidents, and implementing

the ALARA principle.

• To propose recommendations for harmonising monitoring

procedures.

• To set up a system for regularly collecting occupational doses

for these individuals and for dissemination of this information.


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WGIR conducted a world-wide survey

• to gain insight into the current practice of

occupational radiation protection in industrial

radiography

• respectively addressed to −Regulatory Bodies (Licensing bodies for radiation

protection)

−Operating Companies (Licensees)

− Industrial Radiographers (“Operators”)


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Subjects of questionnaires

1. qualifications and training of radiographers in radiation

protection,

2. learning from incidents (accidents, near misses, deviations

from normal operations),

3. systems and procedures in place for safe operation,

4. emergency preparedness and response, and

5. individual monitoring.

The IAEA Specific Safety Guide on Radiation Safety in Industrial

Radiography (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-11) was used to

develop questions


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Distribution of questionnaires

Operator Company Regulatory

Body

English X X X

German X X

French X X

Portuguese X X

Spanish X X

Dutch X

Russian X X

Chinese X X

• Questionnaires were translated

in various languages

• Operator and Company

questionnaires were distributed

via the networks of the WGIR

members

• NDT companies

• (Inter)national NDT societies

• Regulatory Body questionnaire

was distributed by IAEA


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Responses to the questionnaires

Operator

Questionnaire

Company

Questionnaire

Regulatory Body (RB)

Questionnaire

Number of

operators

Number of

companies

Number of

countries

Number of

Companies

Number of

Countries

Countries

contacted

Countries

responded

RBs

contacted

RBs

responded

Africa 17 7 3 7 4 35 8 35 8

Asia-

Pacific 49 34 7 33 6 27 13 35 16

Europe 166 60 16 28 13 49 27 49 27

Latin

America 72 17 3 19 4 20 5 20 5

North

America 128 33 2 8 2 2 2 3 3

Global 432 151 31 95 29 133 55 142 59


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Results and discussion

• For each questionnaire the responses to

each item were consolidated in an Excel

workbook

• Responses were statistically analyzed

• Various hypotheses on correlations between

items were tested

• The following slides contain the main

findings from the three questionnaires.


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Qualifications and training of

radiographers in radiation protection

• Initial radiation protection training appears to

be well accepted and established • 98% of operators had received RP training

• Refresher training was less well established • 70% of RBs required refresher training

• 80% (60%) of companies offered refresher (practical) RP training

• Emergency response training is also less

established • 87% of operators had received emergency response training

• only 65% of operators had been involved in practical exercises


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Learning from incidents

• Rate of occurrence of incidents in IR:

• Level of dissemination of lessons learned

appears to be low • 40% of NDT companies do not share learning with other organizations

15

Operator responses Company responses

# per operator

per 5 year

# per company

per 5 year

# per operator

per 5 year

# per company

per 5 year

Accidents 0.04 4.0 0.03 1.1

Near Misses 0.1 6.2 0.05 1.8

Deviations 0.6 29.3 0.05 1.8


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Systems and procedures in place for

safe operations

• Systems and procedures should be in place

for protecting the operator and the public

• Results of compliance inspection are

perhaps the best indication of whether such

systems and procedures are in place

• Compliance inspections are performed by

NDT companies and regulatory bodies


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Subjects of compliance inspections

Subject Company Regulatory Body

Proper wearing of passive individual dosimeters 95% 98%

Proper wearing and use of active individual dosimeters 93% 90%

Proper use of survey meters 95% 96%

Proper use of collimators 90% 88%

Proper warning system at the work site 93% 98%

Dose rate at the boundary of the work site within the limits set 92% 90%

Proper use of alarm systems 86% 96%

Proper training and qualifications of radiographers 91% 100%

Operator knowledge of procedures 88% 96%

Pre-operation specific equipment checks 82% 86%

Equipment condition 85% 98%

Emergency preparedness 74% 96%


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Most common shortcomings

Company compliance inspections RB compliance inspections

1. No proper use of collimators

2. Dose rate at the boundary of the

work site above limits set

3. No proper use of survey meters

4. No pre-operation specific

equipment checks being

performed

5. Poor operator knowledge of

procedures

1. No proper use of survey meters

2. No proper warning system to

prevent entry to the work site

3. Poor emergency preparedness

4. No proper use of alarm systems

5. Dose rate at the boundary for the

work site not within limits set

18

• Results of the shortcomings perhaps reflect a different focus • Company perhaps focusing on company procedures

• Regulatory body may have a focus on public protection


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Emergency preparedness and response

19

• Radiation sources used for industrial

radiography purposes have high radiation

outputs and are potentially very hazardous

• It is essential that systems are in place for

emergency preparedness and response

• in particular an emergency plan for incidents

with gamma radiography sources


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Implementation of emergency plans

• Almost all regulatory bodies (98%) stated

that they require NDT companies to have an

emergency plan;

• 95% of NDT companies stated that they had

an emergency plan; and

• over 90% of radiographers stated that their

NDT company had an emergency plan for

site radiography


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Emergency response equipment

• Only three-quarters of regulatory bodies

required NDT companies to have

emergency equipment

• However 90% of NDT companies stated that

they had emergency equipment for site

radiography

• primarily long tongs, shielding material, and an

emergency or rescue container.


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Individual monitoring

• All RBs required personal monitoring with

passive dosimeters

• 80% of RBs also required active dosimeters

• With at least audible alarms

• All Companies provided passive dosimeters

• 94% provided active dosimeters

• Almost all with at least audible alarms

• About two thirds also with visual alarms


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Dose distribution

• The radiographer data are for

234 radiographers, the NDT

company data are for nearly

3500 radiographers, and the

regulatory body data are for

over 16,000 radiographers

• Average dose

• Radiographer data: 3.4 mSv

• RB data: 2.9 mSv


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Dose versus workload

• No correlation found • Radiation protection in industrial

radiography is not being effectively

optimized

• Mean occupational dose per

radiographic exposure • 4.8 ± 2.3 μSv for all operators

• 2.9 ± 1.2 μSv for operators with

workload > 100 exposures

• No effect on dose per exposure

found with: • level of NDT training

• type of sources being used,

• activity of sources,

• use of collimation, or

• incidence of events

• But limited data numbers 24 WCNDT Durban 20 April 2012

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Conclusions (1 of 3)

• Initial radiation protection training for radiographers is

reasonably well established, but there is room for

improvement especially with respect to refresher training

and practical emergency response training

• The frequency of occurrence of incidents (accidents, near

missed and deviations) is not trivial, and methods such as

better incident reporting, analysis, feedback and sharing

lessons learned need to be better utilized


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• Collimators and diaphragms are not being used as often as

they should be

• Survey meters are not as widely available as they should be

• Individual monitoring, as reported, is well established, with

passive and, usually, active dosimeters. The establishment

and use of investigation levels needs to be improve

• Warning systems to prevent entry to the work area during

site radiography were not always as effective as desired.

Better communication at the site is indicated


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• Emergency plans were widely prevalent, but there seemed

to be some issues regarding specific training for

radiographers with respect to emergencies

• Occupational doses received by radiographers varied

considerably, with no correlation with radiographic workload

27

There is considerable scope for

improvement in radiation protection


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Thank you!


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