a study on issuance of secure vehicle certificate for...
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A Study on Issuance of Secure Vehicle Certificate for
Vehicle to Vehicle Communications in Internet of
Vehicles*
Taekjung Kim1, Byungwook Jin1, Si-Ho Cha2†, and Moon-Seog Jun1
1 Department of Computer Science, Soongsil University
369, Sangdo-ro, Dong-Jak, Seoul, South Korea 2 Dept. of Multimedia Science, Chungwoon University
113, Sukgol-ro, Nam-gu, Incheon, South Korea
Abstract. This paper describes that the stability for vehicle to vehicle (V2V)
communication in Internet of Vehicles (IoV). The V2V communication is
important factors for intelligent transportation system that is fast becoming
commercialization. In this paper, we particularly focus on the vulnerabilities of
the authentication form used as an essential factor in communication between
vehicles. We propose the secure vehicle certificate method against the threat
posed by CA access by improving the authentication issue process of CA that
has been a week point.
Keywords: Secure Vehicle Certificate, Internet of Vehicles, Vehicle to Vehicle
1 Introduction
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) allows for direct
communication between vehicles traveling at high speed, thus providing safety as part
of the services. The existing ITS services provide static services when a car moves
through a certain spot or section. It was focused on after-incident management with
constraints on prompt response in case of traffic accidents. But the C-ITS currently in
pilot in Korea offers dynamic services where the road infrastructure and vehicles
constantly communicate with one another. This allows for prompt prevention and
response. The WAVE system technologically supports the communication amongst
the infrastructure, the vehicles or the user device, thus delivering the current status of
the roads to moving vehicles so that they can receive real-time information. As a
result, it is expected to be applicable to various areas such as preventing collisions or
accidents causing human lives. With the increase in applied wireless communication
technology, security risks are exposed to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks,
* This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National
Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education
(NRF2016R1D1A1A09917662). † Corresponding author
Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.142 (SIT 2016), pp.117-120
http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/astl.2016.142.21
ISSN: 2287-1233 ASTL Copyright © 2016 SERSC
resending attacks and other attacks. If the messages of a car collision accident are
exposed to a third party and this is disguised or changed, then nearby cars can become
victims of even more accidents. To prevent such scenarios, reliable authentication is
sought after in the vehicle communication systems. Given the characteristics of cars
moving at high speed, mutual authentication using authentication forms is the basis of
the system. While the authentication form is easy to access and to replicate, once it is
managed poorly or stored online such as in a cloud, there is the risk of being hacked
or attacked by a virus. In fact, there are many accidents related to the theft of
authentication forms. If such authentication form is stolen from a car moving at high
speed, this can lead to a dangerous situation that puts the driver’s life at risk. For such
reasons, this paper suggests an ensure for a safe issue of authentication forms in the
WAVE system.
2 Related Work
2.1 C2C-CC
The CSR authentication is issued by LTCA (Long Term CA), and the pseudonym
authentication by PCA (Pseudonym CA). If a vehicle requests an issue using the CSR
authentication to PCA, PCA through LTCA verifies the validity of the CSR
authentication form and a pseudonym authentication form. In the CAMP method,
even an insider who can access RA cannot discover the ID information that generates
the CSR authentication form and pseudonym authentication, while in the C2C-CC
(Car2Car-Communication Consortium) method, an insider with access to PCA can
find the CSR authentication form and the ID of the pseudonym authentication form.
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to conduct authority management and training
and to prevent insider information leakage by securing audit evidence [1][3].
2.2 WAVE Based V2X Communication
WAVE uses the IEEE technological standard to provide V2V/V2I automobile
networking technologies for public safety and ITS services. The process of how the
WAVE standard came to be shows how the existing vehicle communication
environment used DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications) to provide traffic
information or for charging toll fees. However, as needs changed in the ITS
environment that changes in real time, the existing standard of Wi-Fi communication,
IEEE 802.11a was used as a base to reflect the electric wave environment on the road
or within automobiles to designate WAVE as the IEEE 802.11p standard. IEEE
802.11p, in order to simplify the membership joining process, omitted the existing
method of authentication of IEEE 802.11and the assembly process which led to
security issues. To address such issues, the IEEE 1609.2 standard that provides
security services in the upper hierarchy of MAC was combined to give birth to the
Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.142 (SIT 2016)
118 Copyright © 2016 SERSC
WAVE standard. The structure of the WAVE is as seen in Fig. 1.
The WAVE can be categorized into three parts of WAVE Security Service, Data
Plane, and Management Plane. WAVE Security Service provides the services that can
complement the omitted authentication of IEEE 802.11p, while the Management
Plane requests or advertises services from the RSU (Road-Side Unit) or OBU (On-
Board Unit). Data Plane contains the data flow for actual data transmission and
reception [1][2].
Fig. 1. WAVE Architecture
3 Protocol Design
This chapter reviews the issues with C2C-CC where the PCA issues a pseudonym
authentication form at which point a pseudonym for the vehicle ID is generated and
issued to the vehicle. During this process, the vehicle ID information can be stored in
order to trace the vehicle ID. This poses the risk of anyone with access to PCA or a
malicious attacker stealing the vehicle ID. Therefore, by preventing the PCA from
knowing the ID that can generate the authentication form using RCA, leakage of
information on the vehicle ID can be prevented.
Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.142 (SIT 2016)
Copyright © 2016 SERSC 119
Fig. 1. A Design RCA Protocol of V2V Communication
4 Conclusion
This paper suggests a method issuing authentication forms that can improve security
by reducing the likelihood of hacking in the authentication process required for
communication between vehicles in the intelligent transport system. In addition, a
quantitative analysis will be conducted on the stability and efficiency of the suggested
protocol to conduct an evaluation on the functions. As a follow-up study, the direction
of security that can defend against new and evolving attacks in the intelligent
transport system environment will be reviewed.
References
1. Park, S.-S., Kim, K.: A Study on Minimalize V2V Communication Authentication
Procedure for Enhancing Privacy. Korea Institute of Communication Sciences. 2016.6,
117-118.
2. Lee, Y.S., Sim, S.G., Kim, D.S.: A Study on Security technology for V2X communication.
Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology. 2014.4, 28-34.
3. An, H., Kang, S., Kim, M., Jung, J.: A Study on the IEEE WAVE 1609.2 ECDSA
Performance based on Open Source. Korea Institute of Communication Sciences. 2015.1,
856-857.
Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.142 (SIT 2016)
120 Copyright © 2016 SERSC