a1 digital learning kit

Learning Technologies Group

KNOWLEDGE

A1�

'dkYwm0efta&;oHk;yg;'dkYwm0efta&;oHk;yg;

'dkYwm0efta&;oHk;yg;'dkYwm0efta&;oHk;yg;'dkYwm0efta&;oHk;yg;

�jynfaxmifpk rNydKuGJa&; 'dkYta&;

�wdkif;&if;om;pnf;vHk;nDnTwfrI rNydKuGJa&; 'dkYta&;

�tcsKyftjcmtmPm wnfhwHhcdkifNrJa&; 'dkYta&;

jynfolYoabmxm;jynfolYoabmxm;

jynfolYoabmxm;jynfolYoabmxm;jynfolYoabmxm;

�jynfytm;udk; ykqdef½dk; tqdk;jrif0g'Drsm;tm;qefYusifMu/

�EdkifiHawmfwnfNidrfat;csrf;a&;ESifh EdkifiHawmfwdk;wufa&;udk

aESmuf,Suf zsufqD;olrsm;tm; qefYusifMu/

�EdkifiHawmf\jynfwGif;a&;udk 0ifa&mufpGufzufaESmifh,Sufaom

jynfy EdkifiHrsm;tm;qefYusifMu/

�jynfwGif;jynfy tzsuform;rsm;tm; bHk&efoltjzpfowfrSwf

acsrIef;Mu/

EdkifiHa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfEdkifiHa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

EdkifiHa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfEdkifiHa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfEdkifiHa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

�EdkifiHawmfwnfNidrfa&;? &yf&Gmat;csrf;om,ma&;ESifhw&m;

Oya'pdk;rdk;a&;/

�trsdK;om;jyefvnfpnfvHk;nDnGwfa&;/

�cdkifrmonfhzGJYpnf;yHktajccHOya'opfjzpfay:vma&;/

�jzpfay:vmonfhzGJYpnf;yHktajccHOya'opfESifhtnD acwfrDzGYHNzdK;

wdk;wufaom EdkifiHawmfopfwpf&yf wnfaqmufa&;/

pD;yGm;a&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfpD;yGm;a&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

pD;yGm;a&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfpD;yGm;a&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfpD;yGm;a&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

�pdkufysdK;a&;udktajccHí tjcm;pD;yGm;a&; u@rsm;udkvnf;

bufpHk zGYHNzdK;wdk;wufatmif wnfaqmufa&;/

�aps;uGufpD;yGm;a&;pepf yDjyifpGmjzpfay:vma&;/

�jynfwGif;jynfyrS twwfynmESifh t&if;tESD;rsm;zdwfac:í

pD;yGm;a&; zGYHNzdK;wdk;wufatmif wnfaqmufa&;/

�EdkifiHawmfpD;yGm;a&; wpf&yfvHk;udk zefwD;EdkifrIpGrf;tm;onf

EdkifiHawmfESifh wdkif;&if;om;jynfolwdkY\ vuf0,fwGif&Sda&;/

vlrIa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfvlrIa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

vlrIa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfvlrIa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yfvlrIa&;OD;wnfcsuf (4) &yf

�wpfrsdK;om;vHk;\ pdwf"mwfESifhtusifhpm&dwÅ jrifhrm;a&;/

�trsdK;*kPf? Zmwd*kPfjrifhrm;a&;ESifh ,Ofaus;rItarGtESpfrsm;?

trsdK;om;a&; vu©Pmrsm; raysmufysufatmifxdef;odrf;

apmifha&Smufa&;?

�rsdK;cspfpdwf"mwf &Sifoefxufjrufa&;/

�wpfrsdK;om;vHk;usef;rmBuHhcdkifa&;ESifh ynm&nfjrifhrm;a&;/

Learning Technologies Group

KNOWLEDGE

A1�

þ Investing , Business, Management & Personal Development

Digital Learning Kit ( DLK ) onf jrefrmEd ki fiH\ Human

Resource Development tm;wpfzufwpfvrf;rS axmufyHhay;vdkaom

&nf½G,fcsufjzifh pmzwfolrsm;xHodkU ]]tcr]]tcr

]]tcr]]tcr]]tcrJh}} jzefUa0jcif;jzpfygonf/

xdkUaMumifh rnfolrqdkþ ( DLK ) wGif yg0ifaom taMumif;t&m

rsm;tm; vufqifhurf;jzefUa0jcif;jzifh ukodkvf,lEdkifygonf/

]]vufqifhurf;jzefUa0ay;olrsm;tm;txl;yifaus;Zl;wif½Sdygonf/}} ]]vufqifhurf;jzefUa0ay;olrsm;tm;txl;yifaus;Zl;wif½Sdygonf/}}

]]vufqifhurf;jzefUa0ay;olrsm;tm;txl;yifaus;Zl;wif½Sdygonf/}} ]]vufqifhurf;jzefUa0ay;olrsm;tm;txl;yifaus;Zl;wif½Sdygonf/}} ]]vufqifhurf;jzefUa0ay;olrsm;tm;txl;yifaus;Zl;wif½Sdygonf/}}

odkUaomf rdrd\ukd,fusdK;pD;yGm;twGuf þ ( DLK ) tm;

vnf;aumif;? þ ( DLK ) wGifyg0ifaom taMumif;t&mrsm;tm;

vnf;aumif;? wdkuf½dkufjzpfap? oG,f0dkufíjzpfap? bmomjyefíjzpfap

a&mif;csjcif;rsm;udk rjyKMuyg&efav;pm;pGm arwÅm&yfcHtyfygonf/

KNOWLEDGE

Learning Technologies GroupA1�

Ethical Breakdowns

by Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel

The vast majority of managers mean to run ethical organizations, yet corporate corruption is widespread. Part ofthe problem, of course, is that some leaders are out-and-out crooks, and they direct the malfeasance from thetop. But that is rare. Much more often, we believe, employees bend or break ethics rules because those incharge are blind to unethical behavior and may even unknowingly encourage it.

Consider an infamous case that, when it broke, had all the earmarks of conscious topdown corruption. TheFord Pinto, a compact car produced during the 1970s, became notorious for its tendency in rear-end collisionsto leak fuel and explode into flames. More than two dozen people were killed or injured in Pinto fires before thecompany issued a recall to correct the problem. Scrutiny of the decision process behind the model’s launchrevealed that under intense competition from Volkswagen and other small-car manufacturers, Ford had rushedthe Pinto into production. Engineers had discovered the potential danger of ruptured fuel tanks in preproductioncrash tests, but the assembly line was ready to go, and the company’s leaders decided to proceed. Many sawthe decision as evidence of the callousness, greed, and mendacity of Ford’s leaders—in short, their deepunethicality.

But looking at their decision through a modern lens—one that takes into account a growing understanding ofhow cognitive biases distort ethical decision making—we come to a different conclusion. We suspect that few ifany of the executives involved in the Pinto decision believed that they were making an unethical choice. Why?Apparently because they thought of it as purely a business decision rather than an ethical one.

Taking an approach heralded as rational in most business school curricula, they conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis—putting dollar amounts on a redesign, potential lawsuits, and even lives—and determined thatit would be cheaper to pay off lawsuits than to make the repair. That methodical process colored how theyviewed and made their choice. The moral dimension was not part of the equation. Such “ethical fading,” aphenomenon first described by Ann Tenbrunsel and her colleague David Messick, takes ethics out ofconsideration and even increases unconscious unethical behavior.

What about Lee Iacocca, then a Ford executive VP who was closely involved in the Pinto launch? When thepotentially dangerous design flaw was first discovered, did anyone tell him? “Hell no,” said one high companyofficial who worked on the Pinto, according to a 1977 article in Mother Jones. “That person would have beenfired. Safety wasn’t a popular subject around Ford in those days. With Lee it was taboo. Whenever a problemwas raised that meant a delay on the Pinto, Lee would chomp on his cigar, look out the window and say ‘Readthe product objectives and get back to work.’”

1

KNOWLEDGE


We don’t believe that either Iacocca or the executives in charge of the Pinto were consciously unethical or thatthey intentionally sanctioned unethical behavior by people further down the chain of command. The decadessince the Pinto case have allowed us to dissect Ford’s decision-making process and apply the latest behavioralethics theory to it. We believe that the patterns evident there continue to recur in organizations. A host ofpsychological and organizational factors diverted the Ford executives’ attention from the ethical dimensions ofthe problem, and executives today are swayed by similar forces. However, few grasp how their own cognitivebiases and the incentive systems they create can conspire to negatively skew behavior and obscure it fromview. Only by understanding these influences can leaders create the ethical organizations they aspire to run.

Five Barriers to an Ethical Organization (Located at the end of this article)

Ill-Conceived Goals

In our teaching we often deal with sales executives. By far the most common problem they report is that theirsales forces maximize sales rather than profits. We ask them what incentives they give their salespeople, andthey confess to actually rewarding sales rather than profits. The lesson is clear: When employees behave inundesirable ways, it’s a good idea to look at what you’re encouraging them to do. Consider what happened atSears, Roebuck in the 1990s, when management gave automotive mechanics a sales goal of $147 an hour—presumably to increase the speed of repairs. Rather than work faster, however, employees met the goal byovercharging for their services and “repairing” things that weren’t broken.

Sears is certainly not unique. The pressure at accounting, consulting, and law firms to maximize billable hourscreates similarly perverse incentives. Employees engage in unnecessary and expensive projects and creativebookkeeping to reach their goals. Many law firms, increasingly aware that goals are driving some unethicalbilling practices, have made billing more transparent to encourage honest reporting. Of course, this requires adetailed allotment of time spent, so some firms have assigned codes to hundreds of specific activities. What isthe effect? Deciding where in a multitude of categories an activity falls and assigning a precise number ofminutes to it involves some guesswork—which becomes a component of the billable hour. Research showsthat as the uncertainty involved in completing a task increases, the guesswork becomes more unconsciously

2

KNOWLEDGE


self-serving. Even without an intention to pad hours, overbilling is the outcome. A system designed to promoteethical behavior backfires.

Let’s look at another case in which a well-intentioned goal led to unethical behavior, this time helping to drive therecent financial crisis. At the heart of the problem was President Bill Clinton’s desire to increase homeownership.In 2008 the BusinessWeek editor Peter Coy wrote:

Add President Clinton to the long list of people who deserve a share of the blame for the housing bubble andbust. A recently re-exposed document shows that his administration went to ridiculous lengths to increase thenational homeownership rate. It promoted paper-thin down payments and pushed for ways to get lenders togive mortgage loans to first-time buyers with shaky financing and incomes. It’s clear now that the erosion oflending standards pushed prices up by increasing demand, and later led to waves of defaults by people whonever should have bought a home in the first place.

The Sears executives seeking to boost repair rates, the partners devising billing policies at law firms, and theClinton administration officials intending to increase homeownership never meant to inspire unethical behavior.But by failing to consider the effects of the goals and reward systems they created, they did. Part of the managerialchallenge is that employees and organizations require goals in order to excel. Indeed, among the best-replicatedresults in research on managerial behavior is that providing specific, moderately difficult goals is more effectivethan vague exhortations to “do your best.” But research also shows that rewarding employees for achievingnarrow goals such as exact production quantities may encourage them to neglect other areas, take undesirable“ends justify the means” risks, or—most important from our perspective—engage in more unethical behaviorthan they would otherwise.

Leaders setting goals should take the perspective of those whose behavior they are trying to influence andthink through their potential responses. This will help head off unintended consequences and prevent employeesfrom overlooking alternative goals, such as honest reporting, that are just as important to reward if not more so.When leaders fail to meet this responsibility, they can be viewed as not only promoting unethical behavior butblindly engaging in it themselves.

Motivated Blindness

It’s well documented that people see what they want to see and easily miss contradictory information when it’s intheir interest to remain ignorant—a psychological phenomenon known as motivated blindness. This bias appliesdramatically with respect to unethical behavior. At Ford the senior-most executives involved in the decision torush the flawed Pinto into production not only seemed unable to clearly see the ethical dimensions of their owndecision but failed to recognize the unethical behavior of the subordinates who implemented it.

Let’s return to the 2008 financial collapse, in which motivated blindness contributed to some bad decisionmaking. The “independent” credit rating agencies that famously gave AAA ratings to collateralized mortgagesecurities of demonstrably low quality helped build a house of cards that ultimately came crashing down, drivinga wave of foreclosures that pushed thousands of people out of their homes. Why did the agencies vouch for

3

KNOWLEDGE


those risky securities?

Part of the answer lies in powerful conflicts of interest that helped blind them to their own unethical behavior andthat of the companies they rated. The agencies’ purpose is to provide stakeholders with an objective determinationof the creditworthiness of financial institutions and the debt instruments they sell. The largest agencies, Standard& Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, were—and still are—paid by the companies they rate. These agencies madetheir profits by staying in the good graces of rated companies, not by providing the most accurate assessmentsof them, and the agency that was perceived to have the laxest rating standards had the best shot at winningnew clients. Furthermore, the agencies provide consulting services to the same firms whose securities theyrate.

Research reveals that motivated blindness can be just as pernicious in other domains. It suggests, for instance,that a hiring manager is less likely to notice ethical infractions by a new employee than are people who have noneed to justify the hire—particularly when the infractions help the employee’s performance. (We’ve personallyheard many executives describe this phenomenon.) The manager may either not see the behavior at all orquickly explain away any hint of a problem.

Consider the world of sports. In 2007 Barry Bonds, an outfielder for the San Francisco Giants, surpassed HankAaron to become the all-time leader in career home runs—perhaps the most coveted status in Major LeagueBaseball. (Bonds racked up 762 versus Aaron’s 755.) Although it was well known that the use of performance-enhancing drugs was common in baseball, the Giants’ management, the players’ union, and other interestedMLB groups failed to fully investigate the rapid changes in Bonds’s physical appearance, enhanced strength,and dramatically increased power at the plate. Today Bonds stands accused of illegally using steroids and lyingto a grand jury about it; his perjury trial is set for this spring. If steroid use did help bring the home runs thatswelled ballpark attendance and profits, those with a stake in Bonds’s performance had a powerful motivationto look the other way: They all stood to benefit financially.

It does little good to simply note that conflicts of interest exist in an organization. A decade of research shows thatawareness of them doesn’t necessarily reduce their untoward impact on decision making. Nor will integrityalone prevent them from spurring unethical behavior, because honest people can suffer from motivated blindness.Executives should be mindful that conflicts of interest are often not readily visible and should work to removethem from the organization entirely, looking particularly at existing incentive systems.

Indirect Blindness

In August 2005 Merck sold off two cancer drugs, Mustargen and Cosmegen, to Ovation, a smaller pharmaceuticalfirm. The drugs were used by fewer than 5,000 patients and generated annual sales of only about $1 million, sothere appeared to be a clear logic to divesting them. But after selling the rights to manufacture and market thedrugs to Ovation, Merck continued to make Mustargen and Cosmegen on a contract basis. If small-marketdrugs weren’t worth the effort, why did Merck keep producing them?

Soon after the deal was completed, Ovation raised Mustargen’s wholesale price by about 1,000% andCosmegen’s even more. (In fact, Ovation had a history of buying and raising the prices on small-market drugs

4

KNOWLEDGE


from large firms that would have had public-relations problems with conspicuous price increases.) Why didn’tMerck retain ownership and raise the prices itself? We don’t know for sure, but we assume that the companypreferred a headline like “Merck Sells Two Products to Ovation” to one like “Merck Increases Cancer DrugPrices by 1,000%.”

We are not concerned here with whether pharmaceutical companies are entitled to gigantic profit margins.Rather, we want to know why managers and consumers tend not to hold people and organizations accountablefor unethical behavior carried out through third parties, even when the intent is clear. Assuming that Merck knewa tenfold price increase on a cancer drug would attract negative publicity, we believe most people would agreethat using an intermediary to hide the increase was unethical. At the same time, we believe that the strategyworked because people have a cognitive bias that blinds them to the unethicality of outsourcing dirty work.

Consider an experiment devised by Max Bazerman and his colleagues that shows how such indirectnesscolors our perception of unethical behavior. The study participants read a story, inspired by the Merck case, thatbegan this way: “A major pharmaceutical company, X, had a cancer drug that was minimally profitable. Thefixed costs were high and the market was limited. But the patients who used the drug really needed it. Thepharmaceutical was making the drug for $2.50/pill (all costs included), and was only selling it for $3/pill.”

Then a subgroup of study participants was asked to assess the ethicality of “A: The major pharmaceutical firmraised the price of the drug from $3/pill to $9/pill,” and another subgroup was asked to assess the ethicality of “B:The major pharmaceutical X sold the rights to a smaller pharmaceutical. In order to recoup costs, company Yincreased the price of the drug to $15/pill.”

Participants who read version A, in which company X itself raised the price, judged the company more harshlythan did those who read version B, even though the patients in that version ended up paying more. We askeda third subgroup to read both versions and judge which scenario was more unethical. Those people sawcompany X’s behavior as less ethical in version B than in version A. Further experiments using different storiesfrom inside and outside business revealed the same general pattern: Participants judging on the basis of justone scenario rated actors more harshly when they carried out an ethically questionable action themselves(directly) than when they used an intermediary (indirectly). But participants who compared a direct and anindirect action based their assessment on the outcome.

These experiments suggest that we are instinctively more lenient in our judgment of a person or an organizationwhen an unethical action has been delegated to a third party—particularly when we have incomplete informationabout the effects of the outsourcing. But the results also reveal that when we’re presented with complete informationand reflect on it, we can overcome such “indirect blindness” and see unethical actions—and actors—for whatthey are.

Managers routinely delegate unethical behaviors to others, and not always consciously. They may tellsubordinates, or agents such as lawyers and accountants, to “do whatever it takes” to achieve some goal, allbut inviting questionable tactics. For example, many organizations outsource production to countries with lowercosts, often by hiring another company to do the manufacturing. But the offshore manufacturer frequently haslower labor, environmental, and safety standards. When an executive hands off work to anyone else, it is that

5

KNOWLEDGE


executive’s responsibility to take ownership of the assignment’s ethical implications and be alert to the indirectblindness that can obscure unethical behavior. Executives should ask, “When other people or organizationsdo work for me, am I creating an environment that increases the likelihood of unethical actions?”

The Slippery Slope

You’ve probably heard that if you place a frog in a pot of boiling water, the frog will jump out. But if you put it in apot of warm water and raise the temperature gradually, the frog will not react to the slow change and will cook todeath. Neither scenario is correct, but they make a fine analogy for our failure to notice the gradual erosion ofothers’ ethical standards. If we find minor infractions acceptable, research suggests, we are likely to acceptincreasingly major infractions as long as each violation is only incrementally more serious than the precedingone.

Bazerman and the Harvard Business School professor Francesca Gino explored this in an experiment inwhich the participants—“auditors”—were asked to decide whether to approve guesses provided by “estimators”of the amount of money in jars. The auditors could earn a percentage of a jar’s contents each time they approvedan estimator’s guess—and thus had an incentive to approve high estimates—but if they were caught approvingan exaggerated estimate, they’d be fined $5. Over the course of 16 rounds, the estimates rose to suspiciouslyhigh levels either incrementally or abruptly; all of them finished at the same high level. The researchers foundthat auditors were twice as likely to approve the high final estimates if they’d been arrived at through smallincremental increases. The slippery-slope change blinded them to the estimators’ dishonesty.

Now imagine an accountant who is in charge of auditing a large company. For many years the client’s financialstatements are clean. In the first of two scenarios, the company then commits some clear transgressions in itsfinancial statements, even breaking the law in certain areas. In the second scenario, the auditor notices that thecompany stretched but did not appear to break the law in a few areas. The next year the company’s accountingis worse and includes a minor violation of federal accounting standards. By the third year the violation hasbecome more severe. In the fourth year the client commits the same clear transgressions as in the first scenario.

The auditors-and-estimators experiment, along with numerous similar ones by other researchers, suggest thatthe accountant above would be more likely to reject the financial statements in the first scenario. Bazerman andcolleagues explored this effect in depth in “Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits” (HBR November 2002).

To avoid the slow emergence of unethical behavior, managers should be on heightened alert for even trivial-seeming infractions and address them immediately. They should investigate whether there has been a changein behavior over time. And if something seems amiss, they should consider inviting a colleague to take a look atall the relevant data and evidence together— in effect creating an “abrupt” experience, and therefore a cleareranalysis, of the ethics infraction.

6

KNOWLEDGE


Overvaluing Outcomes

Many managers are guilty of rewarding results rather than high-quality decisions. An employee may make apoor decision that turns out well and be rewarded for it, or a good decision that turns out poorly and be punished.Rewarding unethical decisions because they have good outcomes is a recipe for disaster over the long term.

The Harvard psychologist Fiery Cushman and his colleagues tell the story of two quicktempered brothers, Jonand Mark, neither of whom has a criminal record. A man insults their family. Jon wants to kill the guy: He pulls outand fires a gun but misses, and the target is unharmed. Matt wants only to scare the man but accidentallyshoots and kills him. In the United States and many other countries, Matt can expect a far more serious penaltythan Jon. It is clear that laws often punish bad outcomes more aggressively than bad intentions.

Bazerman’s research with Francesca Gino and Don Moore, of Carnegie Mellon University, highlights people’sinclination to judge actions on the basis of whether harm follows rather than on their actual ethicality. We presentedthe following stories to two groups of participants.

Both stories begin: “A pharmaceutical researcher defines a clear protocol for determining whether or not toinclude clinical patients as data points in a study. He is running short of time to collect sufficient data points for hisstudy within an important budgetary cycle in his firm.”

Story A continues: “As the deadline approaches, he notices that four subjects were withdrawn from the analysisdue to technicalities. He believes that the data in fact are appropriate to use, and when he adds those datapoints, the results move from not quite statistically significant to significant. He adds these data points, and soonthe drug goes to market. This drug is later withdrawn from the market after it kills six patients and injures hundredsof others.”

Story B continues: “He believes that the product is safe and effective. As the deadline approaches, he noticesthat if he had four more data points for how subjects are likely to behave, the analysis would be significant. Hemakes up these data points, and soon the drug goes to market. This drug is a profitable and effective drug, andyears later shows no significant side effects.”

After participants read one or the other story, we asked them, “How unethical do you view the researcher to be?”Those who read story A were much more critical of the researcher than were those who read story B, and feltthat he should be punished more harshly. Yet as we see it, the researcher’s behavior was more unethical instory B than in story A. And that is how other study participants saw it when we removed the last sentence—theoutcome—from each story.

Managers can make the same kind of judgment mistake, overlooking unethical behaviors when outcomes aregood and unconsciously helping to undermine the ethicality of their organizations. They should beware thisbias, examine the behaviors that drive good outcomes, and reward quality decisions, not just results.

7

KNOWLEDGE


The Managerial Challenge

Companies are putting a great deal of energy into efforts to improve their ethicality—installing codes of ethics,ethics training, compliance programs, and in-house watchdogs. Initiatives like these don’t come cheap. A recentsurvey of 217 large companies indicated that for every billion dollars of revenue, a company spends, onaverage, $1 million on compliance initiatives. If these efforts worked, one might argue that the money—a drop in the bucket for many organizations—was well spent. But that’s a big if. Despite all the time andmoney that have gone toward these efforts, and all the laws and regulations that have been enacted,observed unethical behavior is on the rise.

This is disappointing but unsurprising. Even the best-intentioned ethics programs will fail if they don’t take intoaccount the biases that can blind us to unethical behavior, whether ours or that of others. What can you do tohead off rather than exacerbate unethical behavior in your organization? Avoid “forcing” ethics through surveillanceand sanctioning systems. Instead ensure that managers and employees are aware of the biases that can leadto unethical behavior. (This simple step might have headed off the disastrous decisions Ford managers made—and employees obeyed—in the Pinto case.) And encourage your staff to ask this important question whenconsidering various options: “What ethical implications might arise from this decision?”

Above all, be aware as a leader of your own blind spots, which may permit, or even encourage, the unethicalbehaviors you are trying to extinguish.

Five Barriers to an Ethical Organization

Even the best-intentioned executives are often unaware of their own or their employees’ unethical behavior.Here are some of the reasons—and what to do about them.

8

KNOWLEDGE


Max H. Bazerman is the Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School.

Ann E. Tenbrunsel is the Rex and Alice A. Martin Professor of Business Ethics and the Research Director ofthe Institute for Ethical Business Worldwide at the University of Notre Dame. They are the authors of BlindSpots: Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do about It (Princeton University Press, 2011), fromwhich this article was developed.

9

KNOWLEDGE


Corporate Boards That Create Value E-book (tydkif; - 6) (tydkif; - 6)

(tydkif; - 6) (tydkif; - 6) (tydkif; - 6)

10

KNOWLEDGE


11

KNOWLEDGE


12

KNOWLEDGE


13

KNOWLEDGE


14

KNOWLEDGE


15

KNOWLEDGE


16

KNOWLEDGE


17

KNOWLEDGE


18

KNOWLEDGE


19

KNOWLEDGE


20

KNOWLEDGE


21

KNOWLEDGE


22

KNOWLEDGE


23

KNOWLEDGE


24

KNOWLEDGE


25

KNOWLEDGE


26

KNOWLEDGE


27

KNOWLEDGE


28

KNOWLEDGE


29

KNOWLEDGE


30

KNOWLEDGE


31

KNOWLEDGE


32

KNOWLEDGE


33

KNOWLEDGE


34

KNOWLEDGE


35

KNOWLEDGE


36

KNOWLEDGE


37

KNOWLEDGE


38

KNOWLEDGE


39

KNOWLEDGE


40

KNOWLEDGE


41

KNOWLEDGE


42

KNOWLEDGE


Next issue wGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

wGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

43

KNOWLEDGE


bJef*srif *&JrfbJef*srif *&Jrf

bJef*srif *&JrfbJef*srif *&JrfbJef*srif *&Jrf

Benjamin Graham

tar&duef pD;yGm;a&;ynm½SifESifh 0g&ifhaiGaMu;qdkif&m &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHol

'' Benjamin Graham" ]bJef*srif *&Jrf} rSm Value investing ac: &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIyHkpHudk

1928 c kE Sp fw Gi f Columbia Business School ü pwifazm fx kwf

oifMum;cJholjzpf\/ ,if;udk aemufydkif;wGif ]a';Apfa'gh('f)} (David Dodd) ESifhwGJí Security Analysis [laom trnfjzifh tMudrfMudrfwnf;jzwf xkwfa0cJh&m

vlodrsm;aompmtkyfjzpfcJ honf/ Value investing udk vufcHusif hoH k;

vdkufemcJholrsm;½Sd&m urÇmausmftar&duef bDvsHem ( Warren Buffett )]a0g&ifbwfzpf} tygt0ifjzpf\/ ''Graham'' rSm ol\zcifjyD;vQif olUtay:

'kwd,MoZmoufa&mufrI t½SdqHk;yk*¾dKvfjzpfonf[k "Buffett"0efcHajymMum;cJhonf/

ol\om;jzpfoludk ]a[mif;0yf *&Jrf bwfzpf} " Howard Graham Buffett " [k

rSnfhac:cJhonf txdjzpf\/

"Graham" udk 1894 arv 8&ufaeUwGif t*FvefEdkifiH vef'efjrdKU

]*a&mhabmif;(rf)} "Grossbaum" t&yfwGif *sL;rdbESpfyg;rS arG;zGm;cJhonf/

wpfESpft&G,fwGif rdbrsm;ESifh tar&duefEkdifiH e,l;a,m(cf)odkU ajymif;a&TUaexkdifcJhMuonf/ zcifuG,fvGefjyD;aemuf

qif;&Jjcif;'Pfudk cHpm;cJ&aom "Graham" rSm ausmif;pmbufwGif xl;cRefcJhjyD; touf20wGif "Columbia" ausmif;rS

twef;wGif; 'kwd,trSwftrsm;qHk;jzifh ausmif;rSbGJU&cJh\/ t*Fvdyfpm? ocFsmESifh 'óedu bmom&yfrsm;udk

oifMum;&efq&mtjzpf ausmif;rSurf;vSrf;cJhaomfvJ Stock, Share aps;uGuf Wall street wGif tvkyf0ifvkyfcJhjyD; aemifwGif

"Graham - Newman Partnership " tpkpyfvkyfief;udk wnfaxmifcJhonf/

1934 ckESpfwGif yHkESdyfxkwfa0aom ol\" Security Analysis " rSm &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHolrsm;Mum;wGif or®musrf;pmtkyfyrm

jzpfcJhonfrSm ,ckwdkifyifjzpf\/ tjcm;pmtkyfrSm 1949 ckESpfxkwf "The Intelligent Investor" ]OmPf½Sdaom &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHol}

jzpfjyD; ESpftkyfvHk;rSm awmfawmfMobmay;cH&aom pmtkyfrsm;jzpfcJh\/ "The Intelligent Investor" rSm aiGaMu;aps;uGufqdkif&m

xGufcJhorQ pmtkyfrsm;xJwGif taumif;qHk;jzpfonf[k "Warren Buffett" udk,fwkdif xkwfazmfcsD;rGrf;cJhonf/

&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIqdkonfrSm aocsmpGmcGJjcrf;pdwfjzm oHk;oyfí tajccHtm;jzifh cdkifrmvHkjcHKrI½Sdum vHkavmufaom0ifaiG

tjrwftpGef;udk &½Sdapjcif;jzpfjyD;? ,if;tcsufrsm;ESifh rudkufnDaom&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIrSm &rf;orf;rSef;qvkyfaqmifjcif; jzpfonf/

qHk;½IH;rIESifhawGU&rnf[k a&;om;azmfjycJhonf/

44

KNOWLEDGE


Stock Owner wpfOD;taejzifh yHkrSefwufusjcif;r[kwfaom

Stock aps;twuftusudk *½kpdkufp&mrvdk/ taMumif;rSm Stockaps;uGufonf tcsdefumvwdkwGif rJay;pufESifhwljyD;? a&&SnfwGif

aygifcsdefpufESifhwlonf[k"Graham" ua&;om;cJhonf/ a&&SnfwGif

Stock \ wefzdk;rSm ajymif;vJwwfaom oabm½Sdí ,if;rSm

rSefuefavonf/ "Graham" u xdk;ppftvm; &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHolESifh

cHppfozG,fa&mif;0,fol ESpfrsdK;" The Active Investor" ESifh "The Pas-sive Investor"udkvJ cGJjcm;jycJhonf/ "Passive Investor" udk "Defen-sive Invesor" [kvnf;ac:a0:jyD;? 4if;wdkUrSm owdMuD;pGmESifh Stockaps;rsm;udk a&&SnfapmifhMunfh0,f,lavh½Sdonf/ Active Investor rsm;rSmrltcsdefvnf;ay;EdkifjyD; ydkrdktodynmvnf;½Sdum xl;xl;jcm;jcm; xkdk;azmuf0,f,l&ef Munfhwwfolrsm;jzpf\/

&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHolrsm;taejzifh ukrÜPDrsm;\ b@ma&;tajctaeudk tcsdef,lavhvmMu&efvnf; "Graham" u

wdkufwGef;onf/

aps;uGufwGif;½Sd ukrÜPDwpfcktaeESifh rl&if;aygufaps;xuf avsmhaomaps;EIef;ESifha&mif;vQif t½HI;r½SdEkdifaom

taetxm; "margin of safety" ½SdjyD; &if;ESD;jr§KyfESH&ef oifhawmfonf[k

oHk;oyfjycJhonf/ &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIonf tvkyfoabmtqefqHk; tajctaewGif

txufjrufqHk;jzpfonf[laom "Graham"\ azmfjycsufudk "Buffet" u

&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIqdkif&me,fy,f\ azmfjycsufrsm;teuf ta&;MuD;qHk;pum;rsm;

tjzpf rSwf,lcJhonf/ "Stock Investor" wpfOD;taejzifh ol\oHk;oyfcsufESifh

tcsuftvufrsm; rSefuefaeorQ tjcm;olrsm;ESifh oabmcsif;wlonf

rwlonfudk *½kpdkufp&mr½Sd? rSefonf rSm;onfr½Sd[kqdkonf/ "Graham"\ vufqGJZmwfaumifrSm "Mr Market" jzpfjyD; aeUpOf"Stock" ydkif½Sif\wHcg;udk vmacgufjyD; aps;trsdK;rsdK;ac:um a&mif;rnfvm;? 0,frnfvm;

urf;vSrf;avh½Sd\/ "Mr Market" ac:aomaps;rsm;rSm [kwfoa,mifa,mif

½Sdaomfvnf; rjzpfEdkifaomaps;rsm;jzpf\/

olac:aomaps;EIef;rsm;udk vufcHíta&mif;t0,fvkyfrnf? odkUr[kwf vHk;0vspfvsL½Ixm;rnfqdkonfrSm

&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHol (Investor) \ oabmjzpf\/ þonfudk "Mr Market" u rnfodkUrS oabmrxm;yg/ aemufwpfaeUusvQif

xyfrHa&mufvmOD;rnfjzpfjyD; aemufwpfaps;xyfac:OD;rnf jzpfonf/ t"duqdkvdkonfrSm Investor taejzifh rdrdvuf0,f½Sd

"Share" rsm;\wefzdk;udk "Mr Market" rS trsdK;rsdK;ajymif;vJowfrSwfaeonfudk *½kpdkufp&mrvdk[laomtcsufjzpf\/

olUtaeESifh usefaps;uGuf\ra&&mrwnfjidrfaom tajctaeudk tjrwfxkwfEdkif&rnfjzpfjyD; udk,fwdkifyg0ifp&mrvdkay/

&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHol Stock ydkif½Siftaejzifh "Mr Market" aps;upm;onfudk *½kpdkuf&efxuf olUukrÜPD\ trSefwu,f

vkyfaqmifcsufrsm;udkom tm½HkpdkufjyD; ay;vmaomtpk½S,f,m tjrwftpGef;rsm;udk vufcH&,l&efomjzpf\/

ol\yHkrSefr[kwfaom uG,fuG,f0Suf0SufaiGaMu; owif;xkwfjyefcsufrsm;aMumif h "Graham" rSm

olUacwfolUtcsdefu aumfydka&;½Sif;rsm;\ a0zefcH&oljzpf\/ 4if;wdkUrSm &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHolrsm;taeESifh vkyfief;\b@maiGaMu;

tajcaeudk cefUrSef;&efcufcJíjzpf\/ tjrwf½S,f,mrsm;udk xkwfray;bJ vkyfief;xJwGifqufvufxnfh0if

vnfywfxm;jcif;xuf ½S,f,m½Sifrsm;okdU xkwfay;&efudk "Graham" jywfjywfom;om; &yfwnfonf/ vkyfief;wpfck\

yuwdb@ma&;tajctaeudk ravhvmroHk;oyfbJ tcsdKUStock rsm;udk &onfhaps;ESifh 0,fí&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHxm;jyD;

45

KNOWLEDGE


tjrwf½S,f,mrsm;udkvnf; rxkwfbJqufvufxnfh0ifxm;jcif;jzifh Stock rsm;\aps;EIef;rsm;wufvmrnf[laom

tMuH jy Kc sufr sm;ud k "Graham" a0ze fuef UuGufonf/ ol\oH k ;oy fc sufr sm;r Sm

,aeUwdkifypfy,fír&onfudk awGU&\/

vGefcJhaomESpf tenf;i,fwGifrl ol\ "Mr Market" tjrifrSm

]0DvsHa*sbef;pwdkif;} "William J.Bernstein" \ Modern Portfolio TheoryrS jydKifqdkifvmonfudk MuHK&onf/ "Bernstein" \ The IntelligentAsset Allocator pmtkyfwGif "Graham" \ a&&SnftjrifESifhaps;uGufudk

vG,fulpGmjrifawGU em;vnfEdkifjcif;r½SdrIudk axmufjyonf/ a,bk,s

tm;jzifh vlyk*¾dKvfwpfa,muftaeESifh aps;uGufudktEdkif,l tjrwfxkwfí

rjzpfEdkifonfudk Modern Portfolio Theory vufcH,HkMunfonf/ 4if;udk

,cktcg tar&duESifh t*Fvef½Sd Business School rsm;wGif us,fus,fjyefUjyefU ydkUcsvQuf½Sdonf/ rnfodkUjzpfap "Graham"\ csOf;uyfyHkESifh ydkUcscsufrsm;rSmvnf; qufvuf&yfwnfjyefUESHqJjzpf\/

"Buffett" \ tajymt& aeUwdkif;rdkufrJaom tjyKtrlwpfck? wDxGifzefwD;rIwpfck? &ufa&maomtjyKtrlwpfckpD

jyKvkyfvdkonf[k "Graham" u ajymcJhzl;aMumif;ESifh aemufqHk;awmh "Graham" uom ae&mawmfawmfrsm;rsm;rSm

omvGefausmfjzwfEdkifcJhonf[k qdkavonf/

"Graham" \ vlrIb0 \ vlrIb0

\ vlrIb0 \ vlrIb0 \ vlrIb0

"Buffett" \ tw¬KyÜwÅd "Buffett's Biographies" "Snowball" t& "Graham" rSm uG,fvGefoGm;aom

om;jzpfol\cspfol ]rm&DvltD trif;*uf(pf)} " Marie Louise Amingues" ESifhh Zmwfvrf; ½SdcJhonf[kqdk\/ "Marie" rSm

jyifopfoljzpfí "Graham" rSm jyifopfodkU Mudrfzefrsm;pGmoGm;a&mufí awGUcJhonf/ ZeD;jzpfol ]tufpwD} "Estey" ESifh

c G Jae&onftxd jzpfcJ h\/ ,if;rSm ol\pdwful;jzpfaom ]e,l;a,m(cf)} wGif 6v ]jyifopf}wGif 6v

wpfvSnfhpDaeMurnf[laom ol\tqdkudk ZeD;jzpfolu vufrcHaomaMumifhjzpf\/ "Marie"rSm "Graham"ESifh vufrxyfbJ

auseyfpGmtwlaexdkifcJhovdk "Graham" rSvnf; "Estey" ESifh w&m;0ifuGm½Sif;cJhjcif; r½Sday/

1976 ckESpf pufwifbmv 21&ufwGif "Graham" uG,fvGefcJhonf/ uG,fvGefcsdefwGif ol\toufrSm 82 jzpf\/

The End

46

KNOWLEDGE


International Prospectus - Queen Mary, University of London tydkif;(1) tydkif;(1)

tydkif;(1) tydkif;(1) tydkif;(1)

47

KNOWLEDGE


48

KNOWLEDGE


49

KNOWLEDGE


50

KNOWLEDGE


51

KNOWLEDGE


52

KNOWLEDGE


53

KNOWLEDGE


54

KNOWLEDGE


55

KNOWLEDGE


56

KNOWLEDGE


57

KNOWLEDGE


58

KNOWLEDGE


59

KNOWLEDGE


60

KNOWLEDGE


61

KNOWLEDGE


62

KNOWLEDGE


63

KNOWLEDGE


64

KNOWLEDGE


65

KNOWLEDGE


66

KNOWLEDGE


67

KNOWLEDGE


68

KNOWLEDGE


69

KNOWLEDGE


70

KNOWLEDGE


71

KNOWLEDGE


72

KNOWLEDGE


73

KNOWLEDGE


74

KNOWLEDGE


75

KNOWLEDGE


76

KNOWLEDGE


77

KNOWLEDGE


78

KNOWLEDGE


79

KNOWLEDGE


80

KNOWLEDGE


Next issue wGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

wGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGif qufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

81

KNOWLEDGE


TOP 10 NEW YORK tydkif; (2) tydkif; (2)

tydkif; (2) tydkif; (2) tydkif; (2)

82

KNOWLEDGE


83

KNOWLEDGE


84

KNOWLEDGE


85

KNOWLEDGE


86

KNOWLEDGE


87

KNOWLEDGE


88

KNOWLEDGE


89

KNOWLEDGE


90

KNOWLEDGE


91

KNOWLEDGE


92

KNOWLEDGE


93

KNOWLEDGE


94

KNOWLEDGE


95

KNOWLEDGE


96

KNOWLEDGE


97

KNOWLEDGE


98

KNOWLEDGE


99

KNOWLEDGE


100

KNOWLEDGE


101

KNOWLEDGE


102

KNOWLEDGE


103

KNOWLEDGE


104

KNOWLEDGE


105

KNOWLEDGE


106

KNOWLEDGE


107

KNOWLEDGE


108

KNOWLEDGE


109

KNOWLEDGE


110

KNOWLEDGE


111

KNOWLEDGE


112

KNOWLEDGE


113

KNOWLEDGE


114

KNOWLEDGE


115

KNOWLEDGE


116

KNOWLEDGE


117

KNOWLEDGE


118

KNOWLEDGE


119

KNOWLEDGE


120

KNOWLEDGE


121

KNOWLEDGE


Next issue wGifqufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGifqufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

wGifqufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGifqufvufzwf½Iyg&efwGifqufvufzwf½Iyg&ef

122

KNOWLEDGE


Solidarités International (SI) is a French humanitarian organisation operating inMyanmar since May2008. SI is starting a new Shelter Recovery project for GIRI cyclone affectedhouseholds inMyebon Township, Rakhine State. SI is therefore looking for a motivated andexperienced candidatefor the position of Cash Grant Expert.

Tasks & Responsibilities

Under the supervision of the Shelter Programme Manager, the Shelter Expert will havethe followingresponsibilities and undertake the main following tasks:��Design and implement cash grant activities within the project timeframe andaccording to theproposal and the target population’s needs��Manage a team of 8 to 10 field officers��Oversee the beneficiary selection for cash grants��Organise basic training to beneficiaries on how to prepare grant requests and repairproposals, andon cash grant management��Identify suitable payment procedures for beneficiaries, and be accountable for allconstructionrelated disbursements��Supervise assessments and project monitoring at field level, and contribute to dataanalysis��Coordinate with other teams to ensure a comprehensive and relevant intervention��Create technical guidelines and draft lessons learning reports in coordination withmanagement team

123

KNOWLEDGE


Profile Required

��Social sciences or other relevant university degree and at least 4 years of professionalexperience ina similar position��Demonstrated team management and planning abilities��Previous experience in managing cash grant or micro-finance activities is a must;previousexperience on a shelter project is a strong asset��Knowledge of the Rakhine State and the project area is considered as an advantage��Very good reporting skills��Good level in both written and spoken English; Rakhine language is a strong asset��Good computer skillsDuty station will be Kan Haunt Gyi and the position will require regular field tripsto the projectareas.The tasks and responsibilities as well as the position title may vary upon the qualificationand theexperience of the selected candidate.

Please submit your application (CV, cover letter, references) to theattention of:

Jonche Manevski, Administrative Coordinator – Solidarités International office - N°1-B,Saw Maha Lane,Bogyoke Pyatike Road, Bahan Tsp, Yangon or per email:[email protected] (thanks touse basic excel, word or pdf format)Final date for applications: 20/05/2011 at 05:00 PM

Only short listed candidates will be contacted by phone or by email for aninterview.

124

a1 digital learning kit

Documents