aaus rpas in australian skies...in july 2015, heron successfully operated from the class d airport...

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)

welcomes the opportunity to present at

AAUS RPAS in Australian Skies17 July 2019

Greg Hood Chief Commissioner and CEO

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

What happened 21 years ago in

August-September 1998?

In 1998, Global Hawk operated daily for a three week period from

RAAF Edinburgh, SA to Shoalwater Bay, QLD at flight levels

integrated with civil airline traffic

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

What happened 4 years ago in July 2015?

In July 2015, Heron successfully operated from the Class D Airport

at Rockhampton for a six week period to Shoalwater Bay

integrated with civil and other military traffic

RPAS today – ATSB overview

• ATSB governance

• Commissioners

• Aviation safety

• ATSB RPAS use

• What the ATSB is seeing

in RPAS Safety

• ATSB RPAS

investigations

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Australia’s national transport safety investigation agency

The ATSB’s purpose is to improve the safety of, and public

confidence in, aviation, rail and marine transport through:

• the independent investigation of transport accidents

• safety data recording, analysis and research

• fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.

Governance

• Established under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003

• Independent Commonwealth statutory agency

• Accountable to the Parliament through the Minister for

Infrastructure and Transport

• Operate under a “no-blame” philosophy

• Governed by a Commission

• We are a “doing” agency, not an agency involved in the

development of policy

Commissioners

Carolyn Walsh, Chris Manning, Greg Hood, Noel Hart

Aviation safety

CASA ATSB

Regulator

May investigate an

incident for

compliance and/or

prosecution

purposes

No-fault investigator

May investigate an

incident to improve

safety and public

confidence

Reports and notifications in 2018*

Aviation Marine Rail

Notifications 16,000 250 460

Transport

safety matters 6,000 180 -

REPCON

reports 100 2 35

* Estimated figures

Active investigations: 153*

* As of 1 March 2019

ATSB RPAS usemock accident site survey exercise

ATSB RPAS use

What is the ATSB seeing in

RPAS safety?

• We have investigated 11 RPAS occurrences (10 published)

involving RPAS in the past 7 years

• We have published 2 safety analysis RPAS research reports,

most recently in August 2017

• There have been no recorded collisions between RPA and

manned aircraft in Australia, but our research identifies the

growth in RPAS use as an emerging risk to transport safety

All RPAS-related occurrencesJanuary 2024 to May 2019

The ATSB data shows a jump in reported occurrences

from mid-2015

2014: 16

2015: 46

2016: 127

2017: 189

2018: 237Jan-May 2019: 121

Trend continues ~ 290

Aircraft-RPAS near encounters

Near encounters

• Comprise 68% of reported RPAS occurrences

• ATSB reviews RPAS collision research quarterly to

assess whether RPAS pose an acceptable risk to

manned aircraft

• If such a risk is determined, the ATSB will notify CASA

and the broader industry

Near encounters

• Near encounters levelling off (slightly increasing)

• Majority (over 70 per cent) occur above 1,000 ft

• 60 per cent are reported to the ATSB by RPT operators

• Half occur near Sydney

Near encounters

2014: 11

2015: 29

2016: 88

2017: 155 2018: 158

Near encounters are primarily located around the major

airports

RPAS terrain collisions

Terrain collisions

• Number of terrain collisions is increasing

• Two-thirds are associated with a loss of control, datalink

loss or engine failure/malfunction

Terrain collisions

Terrain collisions

2014: 3

2015: 11

2016: 35 2017: 33

2018: 68

Jan – May 2019: 32

Trend continues ~ 77

Terrain collisions: occurrence types

RPAS investigations

• 10 completed and one current RPAS investigation

• First investigation involved an unmanned airship

• Proactive safety action taken by the operator as a result

of that investigation included: “source an airship from

another manufacturer that will provide training and

documentation”!

Current RPAS investigation

• Current investigation is into the collision with terrain of an

Insitu Scan Eagle at Woleebee Creek, Qld

• At about 600ft above the ground, soon after launch, the

RPAS displayed airspeed abnormalities, stalled, and

collided with the ground

• Anticipated final report release this quarter

Completed RPAS investigations

• Yamaha RMAX collision with terrain during spraying near

Canberra in April 2017


• The ATSB found that the tail rotor drive shaft probably

failed due to imbalances caused by damaged tail rotors

• Investigation’s safety message “highlights the

importance of reporting all incidents and accidents,

particularly to ensure adequate inspection and

maintenance is conducted before returning the aircraft to

operations”

• Manufacturer committed to implementing an online form

“so that operators can send information and notification

of incidents directly”


• Lockheed Martin Stalker XE collided with terrain near

Mount Disappointment, Vic, October 2016


• Communication between the GCS and aircraft was lost

for about 5.5 minutes during the launch phase

• A return to launch command was issued by the autopilot,

but was not completed, because a spurious command

was issued due to a coding error

• After 11 minutes at vertical climb power, the high current

overheated the wiring

• The heat unsoldered the negative main power cable

resulting in a total loss of electrical power


• The total loss of power resulted in a loss of control and

the aircraft collided with the ground

• As a result of the investigation, the manufacturer advised

it was redesigning the RPAS’ software

• ATSB safety message from the investigation “highlights

the importance of UAS software testing to cover potential

non-normal scenarios prior to release into operation”


• Pulse Aerospace Vapor 55 loss of control, Lighthouse

Beach, Ballina NSW, September 2016


• The south-eastern point used to georeference the image

on the ground control station map was selected to a

northern hemisphere latitude. This resulted in incorrect

waypoints and home position for the mission.

• The data-link signal to the ground control station was

lost, so the RPAS commenced tracking to the

programmed home position, which was in the Coral Sea

about 1,200 km north of the start position.


• Investigation highlighted that RPAS design should

minimise the opportunity for reference data errors to

occur, and for detecting and correcting errors that do

occur.

• Robust operational controls and procedures, underpinned

by risk assessment, will become increasingly important as

new RPAS applications emerge.

• RPAS operators should expect, and prepare for, data loss

events.

Summary

• ATSB data shows the number of RPAS-related

occurrences in Australia is growing rapidly

• This presents an emerging and insufficiently understood

transport safety risk

• ATSB will continue to closely monitor RPAS-related

occurrences

• The ATSB uniquely understands the utility of RPAS, and

is positioning for the changing face of transport in

Australia with the rising use of remotely piloted aircraft

Questions?

aaus rpas in australian skies...in july 2015, heron successfully operated from the class d airport...

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