abrahamov, benjamin (1992), ‘fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī on god’s knowledge of particulars’,...

8/2/2019 Abrahamov, Benjamin (1992), Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz on Gods Knowledge of Particulars, Oriens, 33 133-55

1/24

Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz on God's Knowledge of the Particulars

Author(s): Binyamin AbrahamovSource: Oriens, Vol. 33 (1992), pp. 133-155Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580602Accessed: 14/07/2010 04:29

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oriens.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580602?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1580602?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/24

FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI ON GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OFTHE PARTICULARS

byBinyaminAbrahamov

Tel Aviv

IntroductionOrthodoxIslam teachesthat God knows every existent in the temporalworld, be it an event or an entity, and that this knowledgeappliesto past,

present and future times. This idea is well attested in the Qur'an,1 accordingto which God even knows thoughts.2 Thus, nothing escapes His knowledge.As in other theological issues, the Muslim theologians did not content them-selves with Qur'an verses and tried to prove God's knowledge, especially Hisknowledge of the particulars in a logical way. Logical proofs were needed,since the philosophers denied God's knowledge of the particulars on theground that, e.g., His essential unity and simplicity contradict a knowledgewhich supposedly divides His essence.The theologians learned God's knowledge of the particulars through severalarguments. They inferred it from the notion that God creates everythingthrough His free will; God must know the objects He willed.3 They alsogathered this knowledge from the perfection observed in things; only whoeverknows the particulars can create such perfect, well designed and purposefulthings.4 According to al-Ghazali, God's will and His knowledge of this willentail His being living, and every living being is conscious of things other thanits own self, hence God knows Himself and other things.5 Al-Hilli and al-Ijideduced God's knowledge of the particulars from His power.6

sira 34,v. 2: "He knowswhatpenetratesnto theearth,and whatcomes orthfrom t, whatcomesdown romheaven,andwhatgoesupto it;He is theAll-compassionate,heAll-forgiving."Trans.A.J. Arberry,TheKoran nterpreted,Oxford1983.Cf. suira 5,v. 11,sura6, v. 59,sOra ,v. 166.2 sura50, v. 16. Leaman,p. 108.3 Bello,p. 111.MatQlib, ol. III, p. 117.4 Matalib,vol. III, p. 164.Mawaqif,vol. VIII, p. 65. Muhammadbn al-Hasanal-Tasi,al-IqtiSdftlm yata Cllaqu i l-ictiqad,Beirut1986,p. 54f. Schmidtke,p. 231.5 Bello,p. 117.6 Mawdqif,vol. VIII,p. 66, 1. 1 from the end - p. 67. Schmidtke,bid.


3/24

BinyaminAbrahamovThe philosophers, on the other hand, had different views. They were divid-ed, as reported by al-Amidi, on this issue, into three groups: a. Those who ab-

solutely denied God of knowledge, whether it is knowledge of Himself or ofother things. b. Those who affirmed only God's knowledge of Himself.c. Those who affirmed God's knowledge of things other than Himself, butlimited this knowledge to the universals.7 In al-Ghazali the first group are theNeoplatonic philosophers who held that the world necessarily emanates fromGod. This emanation implies depriving God of the attributes of will andknowledge, and hence of life. And whoever is not living cannot know himself.However, the Neoplatonic philosophers themselves thought that God knowsHimself.8 The second view is that of the Aristotelians.9 Most of the Muslimphilosophers belonged to the third group. They argued that in order to knowthe particularsone must have senses10and imagination which are inadmissiblewith regard to God."l Furthermore, on account of God's unity of essence,they assumedthat God's knowledge is one12 and immutable. Now, knowledgeof particulars involves knowledge of changes in the particulars, and if oneknows changes one's knowledge changes,13 for knowledge follows its objects.Or to put it in other words, that which is eternal, namely God, cannot be sub-ject to change.14 Moreover, the multiplicity of the objects of knowledgecauses the multiplicity of knowledge, and this is impossible where God is con-cerned.15 These considerations led the philosophers to the denial of God's

7 Al-Amidi, p. 76.8 Bello,p. 111.9 Metaphysics,XI, 9, 1074a.10Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, p. 276(457).Marmura, . 301.1 Leaman,pp. 108f., 112f.12 Marmura, p. 301.13 Al-Shahrastani,. 222.Themost famousexampleof thechange n knowledges theeclipseof the sun. "We shallexplain histhroughanexample,namely hat thesun,forexample, uffersan eclipse,afternot havingbeeneclipsed,andafterwardsecovers ts light.Therearethereforein aneclipse hreemoments:hemomentwhen herewas notyetaneclipsebut theeclipsewas ex-pected n the future,the time when the eclipsewasactually here-its being-and thirdly, hemoment heeclipsehad ceasedbuthad been.Now we havein regardo these threeconditionsathreefoldknowledge:we knowfirst that there is not yet an eclipse,but that therewillbe one;secondly hat it is nowthere;andthirdly, hat it hasbeenpresentbutis no longerpresent.Thisthreefoldknowledges numericallyistinguishablenddifferentiated,nd its sequencempliesachangentheknowing ssence, or if thisknowing ssencehoughtafter he cessation f theeclipsethat the eclipsewaspresentas before,thiswould be ignorance,not kowledge,and if it thoughtduringtspresencehat t wasabsent, hisagainwouldbeignorance, nd he oneknowledgeannottake the placeof the other."Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, p. 275 (455f.)14 Thenotion of God'simmutabilityan be tracedback at least to Plato. Seee.g., Republic,II, 379-382.Againstthosewho adhere o God'simmutableknowledge,al-Ghazaliargues hatwhoever ccepts hangesnthe eternalworldmustacceptchangesn the eternalGod.Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, p. 281 (464).15 Marmura, p. 301.

134


4/24

Fakhr al-Dfn al-Razi on God's knowledge of the particulars

knowledgeof the particulars ndto the conclusion hat since the knowledgeof generaandspeciesdoesnotimplychangenorpluralityn God'sknowledge,God knowsthe universals.16bnSina,however,went fartheranddevelopedatheoryaccordingo whichGod knows heparticularsn a universalway.17 bnRushd had a differentsolution to the problem.He differentiatedbetweenman's originated knowledgeand God's eternalknowledge.The former iscausedby the existenceof beings,while the latter is the causeof beings.18 nsetting orththisnotion,IbnRushdseems o stress hedifferencebetween hesetwo kindsof knowledge,but to dodgethequestion:a. He doesnot explain hedifferencebetweenGod's knowledgebeforethe thingsare createdand aftertheircreation;b. In hissystemeternalknowledgemay implyaneternalobjectof knowledgewhichcannot be explained n a worldof originationand de-struction.19Fromthe pointof view of religion,the theoryof the philosopherss irreli-gious, for according o it, Godcannotknowwhethera manobeysor disobeysHim, or whethera manbecomesa hereticor a true believer.That is becauseGodcanknowonlytheobedienceor thedisobedience,hebeliefortheunbeliefin general,not as a particularbehaviourof a certainman.20Fakhral-Dinal-Razi's(d. 1209)21 hapteron God's knowledgeof the par-ticularsis presentedhere in an annotated translation.I have preferred ochoosethischapternMatflibrather hanthechapternMabahitho introduceto the readeral-Razi'sview on this question,becausethe formerdeals morefullywiththe Kalamarguments f our issuethan thelatter.However,parallelsbetween he two workswillbe pointedout in the notes.I would now like to givea shortdescriptionof this chapter, ts frameworkandarguments.22 hestructure f the chaptercan be introduced hrough hefollowingoutlines: 1. The philosophers'stand that God knows neitherthechangeablehingsnorthe corporealonesand their firstargumento prove hisstand;2. The Mutakallimun's nswer o the philosophers'argument: . Thearguments f those who hold that God's firstknowledge emainsasit was;and

16 Ibid.17 Thistheorywasthoroughly xplainedby Marmura.18IbnRushd,Damima,p. 74. Bello,p. 118.Cf. Maimonides,TheGuideof thePerplexed, II,ch. 21.19Cf. Marmura,p. 302f.20Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. I, pp. 277(457),222f. (376).21 G.C.Anawati,EI2,vol. II, pp.751-55.S.H. Nasr,"Fakhral-Dinal-Rzi", inA HistoryofMuslimPhilosophy,ed. M.M. Sharif,Wiesbaden1963,pp. 642-656.22 For thepurposeof creating ontinuityn thedescription f thechapter,I do not bring heargumentsn the order of theirappearancen the chapter; or example,al-Razi'sargumentsagainstthe notion of the durationof God's knowledge omes immediately fter this notion,whereasn the textit comes later.

135


5/24

Binyamin Abrahamov

b. The arguments of those who hold that God's knowledge changes; 3. Al-R&zi'srejoinder to 2a; 4. The reaction of some later Mutakallimun to 2b;5. The philosophers' second argument; 6. The philosophers' third argument;7. Al-Razi's own argumentswhich prove God's knowledge of the particulars.

According to al-Razi, the philosophers, whose hidden spokesman here is IbnSina, state that God does not know the particularsbecause of theirchangeabili-ty nor does he know the corporeal things. To prove their view they bring for-ward as an example a simple event, namely Zayd's changing his position fromsitting to standing. The continuation of God's knowledge of Zayd's sittingwhen he is standing means God's ignoranceof Zayd's standing, which is incon-ceivable. On the other hand, the discontinuation of this knowledge implieschange in God's knowledge, which is also inconceivable with regard to God.Some Mutakallimun accept the possibility of the continuation of God'sknowledge of the particulars, on the following grounds: a. Just as plurality ofthe objects of knowledge does not cause plurality of knowledge23, so thechange of the objects of knowledge does not cause change in knowledge. Godknows everything through one knowledge. Al-Razi absolutely rejects this no-tion, for according to him, knowledge does multiply due to the multiplicity ofthe objects of knowledge, whether knowledge is perceived as a form which cor-responds to its objects or as a special relationship between the knower and theobject of knowledge. Al-Razi's second objection to the theory of the continua-tion of knowledge consists in a defect occurringin the analogy which comparesmultiplicity of objects to multiplicity of changes: the analogy has no commonprinciple.The view of the duration of knowledge is also based on the argument thatknowledge is a quality through which the objects of knowledge are disclosed.Knowledge resembles a mirror in which forms are seen. Just as the formschange and the mirror does not, so objects of knowledge change andknowledge itself does not.24Admitting that knowledge is a disclosure, al-Razi,however, says that this disclosure means a special relationship between theknower and the object of knowledge. The disclosure is a cause of thisknowledge. Thus, when the cause disappears the effect too disappears.25

23 Thepremisewhichlies behindthis arguments that one pieceof knowledge an perceivemanyobjects.24 See note 43 below.25 In a chapterdealingwiththerealmeaning f knowledge ndperceptionMatalib,vol. III,

pp. 103ff.),al-Razibrings orward ourpossibilities f definingknowledge:a. Knowledge ndicatesonly a special relationshipbetween the knower and the object ofknowledge.This viewof knowledges preferred y al-Rzl.b. The notion of most of the philosophershatknowledges a realquality,whichmeansthatknowledges the occurrence f the form of theobjectof knowledgen the knower.This idea istotallyrejectedby al-Razi.

136


6/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God'sknowledge f the particularsThe third argument, or rather assertion, which advocates the continuationof knowledge, assumes that the knowledge of a futureevent continues until the

event occurs. This is easily refuted by al-Razi on the ground that objects ofknowledge are accidents which come into being successively. Hence, theknowledge which follows its object cannot endure; one cannot know throughone piece of knowledge what will occur in the next moment. Moreover, thecontention that knowledge continues ignores the element of time, which is anintegral part of the knowledge of every occurrence in the corporeal world.The last argument, which is put forth in defense of the duration ofknowledge, considers knowledge a real quality of the knower's essence. Thequality's connection to the object of knowledge is a relationship between theknowledge and its object.26 The change of the object of knowledge causes achange of relationship between the knowledge and its objects, but the essenceof knowledge does not change. The relationship is thus external; it does not in-fluence the essence of knowledge.27 Pointing at the previous arguments, inwhich he demonstrates that knowledge does change, al-Razi does not refutethis argument directly.Four arguments are adduced in support of the view, shared by Jahm ibnSafwan, Hisham ibn al-Hakam and Abu al-Husayn al-Ba$rl,that following thechange of the objects of knowledge, knowledge changes:a. There is a knowledge that something will happen tomorrow. If a man doesnot know that tomorrow will come, he will not know the occurrence of thisevent. Events are connected with time, hence ignorance of time prevents onefrom knowing the occurrence of an event. This proves that the knowledge thatan event will occur is not the same as the knowledge of its occurrence when itoccurs.b. Essences do not change. Since knowledge is an essence, it does not change.The knowledge that a thing will exist is an essence opposite to the knowledgeof the thing's present existence.c. The knowledge that a thing is existent now is conditioned on its actual exis-tence, whereas the knowledge of its future existence is not conditioned on itsactual existence. Thus these two pieces of knowledge are different from each

c. The view of most of theMutakallimuno the effectthatknowledges a realqualityexistingnthe knower's ssenceandhavingaspecial elationshipo theobjectof knowledge.Thisrealqualityis not a formidenticalwith the essenceof the objectof knowledge.d. Knowledges a real andspecificqualitywhichpertainso negation.Twogroupsare subsumedunder his definition:1. A groupof earlyMutakallimun, ho said thatknowledgemeansabsence(ornegation) f ignorance. . Philosopherswhoadhereo the view hatthemeaning f the intellect(= that whichperceives hings) s somethingwhich s deprived f matter.26See the precedingnote.27 Cf. al-Ghazali,Tahafut,vol. II, p. 153.

137


7/24

BinyaminAbrahamovother; furthermore, they are contraries, because they cannot coexist.d. This argument is based on the definition of knowledge as a form which ac-cords with its object. Now, since objects of knowledge are contraries, thosethings which accord with them must be contraries. This is a slightly differentformulation of the previous argument.

The later Mutakallimun do not accept the view that God's knowledgechanges. First they say that the coming of a knowledge into being entails itshaving someone who brings it into being who in turn must know the act hedoes. Thus the bringing of a knowledge into being is dependent upon anotherknowledge. Such an endless chain of pieces of knowledge is inconceivable. Al-Razi points out that this argument is based on the premise that the knowledgeis brought into being by a person who has ability and choice. However, ifknowledge is perceivedas obliged by the knower's essence on the condition thatthe object of knowledge exists the case is different.The second argument refutes the notion of the change of knowledge throughexamining the substrate of its taking place. This argument scans three possibili-ties of the place in which knowledge occurs, namely, in God's essence, inanother essence and in no substrate. All three possibilities are cancelled; henceit is proved that knowledge does not come into being.The third argument is also based on a triparitite division of which theMutakallimun were fond. God's essence is sufficient either for the causationof knowledge (knowledge being perceived here as a quality to which reasonpoints), or for its nullification28, or neither for one nor for the other. The firsttwo possibilities mean continuation of knowledge and its privation respective-ly. In both cases change is prevented. The third possibility, according to whichGod's essence is sufficient neither for causation nor for rejection, implies thatthe causation or rejection of this quality is dependent upon something otherthan this essence. And that which is dependent on another thing is possible byvirtue of itself, whereas God's essence is necessary by virtue of itself.The fourth argument shows a contradiction in God's knowledge of the worldin case His previous knowledge of the non-existence of the world continuesafter the creation of the world, which entails a knowledge of its existence. Thiscontradiction enjoins the author to examine another possibility, that is, the dis-appearance of the previous knowledge, which is assumed to be either eternalor temporal. Both possibilities are inconceivable. The two famous proponentsof the change in God's knowledge, Jahm ibn Safwan and Hisham ibn

28 Al-Raziusesheretwowordsdaf andsalb,butsalbseems o me the moreappropriate, e-causedafC (rejection) efersto somethingwhich exists and will exist-which is not the case-whereas alb(nullification r negation)means o prevent omething rombeingexistent-whichis the contrary f causation.

138


8/24

Fakhral-Din al-Razion God'sknowledgeof the particularsal-Hakam, rejoin by distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge: a. knowl-edge of the essences of things; and b. knowledge of the actual things. The firstknowledge is eternal, while the second is temporal.To recapitulate the course of our description until now, al-Razi begins hisdiscussion with setting forth the philosophers' first argument, which provesthat God cannot know the changeable and corporeal things. He adds to thisthe argumentsof those Mutakallimun who advocate the continuation of God'sknowledge, the argumentsof those who advocate change in God's knowledgeand the contra-argumentsto these two kind of arguments. Now al-Razi comesto deal with the philosophers' second and third arguments.The second argument is based on a sketch of a square winged by two othersquares. In the first phase the philosophers prove that the distinction betweenthe two squaresoccurs in the mental existence. In the second phase it is demon-stratedthat the two squareshave two substrates, not one. These two substratesdiffer from each other in state and place. Since the two squares have bodilyqualities (state and place), their perceiver must be a body29, and God is not abody so that he can have the squares inhere in Him. This proof, al-Raziresponds, is based on the notion, which was already refuted,30that the percep-tion of a thing is conditioned on the presence of the object of knowledge in theknower's mind.The third argument of the philosophers can be summarized as follows: a.Knowledge is the effect of the existence of its object; b. God's essence is basedon His knowledge; c. Consequently, God's essence is based on the object ofknowledge, which means that His essence needs a possible thing for its exis-tence, and hence God's essence is possible; d. Thus, the Necessary Existent byvirtue of Himself must be a possible existent by virtue of itself, which is absurd.The present argument denies God's knowledge of the particulars. However,God knows the essence of things, for this knowledge takes place whether thethings exist or not; it is not dependent upon their actual existence. This argu-ment incurs al-Razi's rejoinder. He deduces from the philosophers' argumentthat God cannot produce an effect on another thing, for this production needsanother thing. Thus, the conclusion implied is that just as this notion is incon-ceivable so too is the notion that God cannot know the particulars.The last part of the chapter consists of argumentsadduced by al-Razi in thename of those who adhere to the view that God knows the particulars. Al-Razihas already proved God's knowledge of His acts through the perfection ob-served in them. Now, perfection is seen only in the particulars, therefore Godknows them. Second, he shows that the element of individualization is either

29 In orderfor a thingto be a bodyit needs a state and a place.30 See note 25 above,the secondnotion.

139


9/24

BinyaminAbrahamovan integral part of the essence of a thing, or a possible essence (mahiyya mum-kina). Since God, according to the philosophers, knows the essences, he mustknow the particulars. Al-Razi also uses the philosophers' idea that theknowledge of the cause entails the knowledge of its effect in order to show thatGod's knowledge of His essence implies His knowledge of the individual thingswhich are the effect of His knowledge.The premise of the third argument is that knowledge of things is a qualityof praise and perfection. God is the greatest among all existents, therefore heis necessarily more entitled to be qualified by qualities of perfection.In the last argumental-Razi has recourse to man's deeds, which, in his opin-ion, show man's predisposition (fitra), whose evidence is more appropriatethan the divisions of the Mutakallimun to be accepted as true. That people be-seech God for mercy in time of distress even if they deny His knowledge of theparticulars serves as proof for His knowledge of the particulars. The use ofsuch an argument in the context of philosophical arguments seems odd eventhough we may regardthe predisposition as a necessary knowledge. However,it is not the first time that an argument like this occurs in Kalam texts. In achapter which treats "God's sitting Himself upon the Throne", al-AshCari,after interpreting some Qur'an verses in favor of the idea that God is on theThrone, brings as proof of God's existence in the heaven the fact that whenpraying all Muslims raise their hands towards the heaven.31The contents of the arguments put forth in defense of God's knowledge ofthe particulars deviate from the topics dealt with in the Mutakallimun's argu-ments which al-Razi introduces in this chapter. Due to al-Razi's criticismof theargumentswhich try to prove either the changeability of God's knowledge orits continuation, he seems to regard them as inconclusive.32 Notwithstanding,most of al-Razi's own arguments do not seem definitive; they can easily berefuted. The notion that a perfect act entails knowledge of the particulars canbe rejected on the ground that in nature we observe perfect acts of animals towhich we cannot ascribe knowledge.33 Referring to the third argument one

31 Al-AshCari,l-Ibanaanusalal-diyana,Daral-Tiba'aal-Muniriyya,Cairon.d., p. 32. Cf.Ibn Taymiyya,BayantalbTs l-Jahmiyyai ta'sis bidacihim l-kaldmiyya,d. MuhammadbnCAbd l-Rahmanbn Qasim,n.p., 1396H.,p. 446f. Al-AshCarilso usesman'sfeeling n distin-guishingbetweenappropriatedmovement harakatktisab)andinvoluntarymovementharakatiq(tirar).Mannecessarily nows he differencebetween hesetwokindsof movementhroughhisconsciousness; e knowsthathe cannotpreventnvoluntarymovementsshaking rompalsyorshiveringrom ever) romoccurring,while heopposite s truewithappropriated ovementsgo-ing and coming,approaching nd withdrawing).B. Abrahamov,"A Re-examinationf al-Ashcari'sTheoryof Kasbaccordingo Kitabal-lumac", RAS(1989),p. 211.32 The only exception s the thirdargumentwhich refutesthe notion of changein God'sknowledge.Al-Raziconsiders hisargument xcellent.33Matalib,vol. III, pp. 109ff.

140


10/24

Fakhral-Din al-Razion God'sknowledgeof the particularscan ask: Does God's quality of praise necessitate knowledge of the particularsif it contradicts another quality of praise which is assigned to God, namely, in-corporeality? In the second argument, al-Razi tries to prove that individualiza-tion forms a part of the essence or that it is the essence itself. Here al-Razi ig-nores the definition of an essence and the conditions of individualization,namely, accidents, which cannot be a part of the essence or the essence itself.In sum, these three proofs which advocate the notion that God knows the par-ticulars appear questionable. This may explain why al-Rizi prefers at the endof the chapter to bring forth an argument rooted in man's predisposition andnot in his speculative ability. This argument cannot be refuted on speculativegrounds.

A Discussion of God's Knowledge of the Particulars (Matalib, vol. III)(p. 151) There are some people who, on the authority of the philosophers,relate the following statement: God does not know the particulars (juz'iyyat).This statement needs consideration. That is because God's peculiar essence(dhatuhu al-makhsusa) is a fixed essence (dhat muCayyana)34nd He knowsthis fixed essence.35The particularhas no meaning but this36,so that God canknow it. Furthermore, God's essence is the cause of the First Intellect.37What

clearly arises from their method is that they admit that God knows the FirstIntellect inasmuch as it is the First Intellect.38Moreover, it is right to say thatthey deny His knowledge of the changeable things (mutaghayyirat) inasmuchas they are changeable and His knowledge of the corporeal things accordingto their specific and fixed measures.

They (the philosophers) adduced some arguments to prove their method:a. They said: Let us assume God's knowledge that Zayd is sitting in thisplace, then if Zayd rises from this place His knowledge of Zayd's sitting, if itremains [as it is], will be ignorance, which is inconceivable (muhal) concerningGod, and if it does not remain it will be a change, and a change regarding

34 I.e. it does not change.35Cf. Nihayat, p. 215, 1. 8. Introduction . 134.36 Al-Raziascribes o thephilosophershe notionthat God's essencesa particular;enceGodknows tandnot otherparticulars.nhisMabdhithvol.II,p. 475f.)al-Razidividesheparticularsintofour classes:a. particularswhichneither hangenorarecomposedof form andmatter,e.g.God andtheintellects;b. particularswhichdo not changebutwhicharecomposedof form andmatter uchas the celestial pheres; . particularswhichchangebutwhicharenot composedofformandmatter,e.g., theaccidentswhichcome ntobeing,forms nthesublunaryworldandtherationalhumansouls;d. particularswhichchangeand whicharecomposedof formandmatter,such as the bodieswhich aregenerated ndcorrupted.Marmura, . 305.37 Veryprobably his refers o the theoryof Ibn Sinaaccordingo whichGod's act of self-knowledgenecessitateshe FirstIntellect.Marmura, . 305.Netton,p. 163.Bello,p. 121.38Cf. Mabahith,vol. II, p. 476, 11.5-6.

141


11/24

Binyamin Abrahamov

God is inconceivable. This is the wording38aon which the philosophersdepend.39Know that the Mutakallimun were divided into two parties concerning thisdoubtful opinion (shubha).40Some of them said: (p. 152) The first knowledgeremains.41Some others adhered to [the notion of] change, and said: The first

knowledge does not remain. As for the first party, they said: The knowledgethat a thing will come into being (sa-yahduthu) is the same knowledge of itscoming into being (hudath) when it comes into being, for the knowledge re-mains and the change takes place in the thing known (maclim).They adduced some arguments to prove the soundness of their opinion:a. God knows through one knowledge all the known things. Since the mul-tiplicity of the objects of knowledge does not result in the multiplicity ofknowledge, it is necessary that the change of the objects of knowledge will notresult in the change of knowledge.42b. Knowledge is a quality (sifa) through which the objects of knowledge arerevealed as they are. For this meaning we shall cite a parable: If we assume amirror fixed on a wall, the form of everyone who passes in front of the mirroris revealed in it. When people pass in front of this mirror, forms have notceased to be revealed, but the mirror does not change. The change, however,occurs in the people who pass in front of it.43 If you know this, we shall say:Knowledge is a quality ready for the perception of what is present in front ofit. This quality remains in its state, and the change occurs in the.objects ofknowledge.c. If we assume that a person thought that Zayd would enter the housetomorrow and if we assume this thought [to remain] until he entered the city,then [through]the fixation of this thought, he thinks the entrance of Zayd tothe city now; thus it is proved, through what we have mentioned, that theknowledge that a thing will exist is the same as the knowledge of its existencewhen it exists.44

38aThe text has harf (lit. letter).39 Cf. Mabfhith, vol. II, p. 476.40 For the translation of this term see van Ess, ifi, index. The Mutakallimun used to indicateby this term the argumentsof their adversaries. Peters, pp. 75, 364, renders this term "sophism".41 According to al-Shahrastani this is the Muctazila's stand. Nihayat, p. 221. Al-Iji adds thatmost of the Ash'arites agree with it. Mawaqif, vol. VIII, p. 75, 11.4-9. Cf. Nihayat, pp. 218, 219,1. 19. Al-Iji explains that this view is taken from the philosophers who hold that God's knowledgedoesnot takeplace ntimeandhasnoconnection otime.Mawaqif,bid.,p. 75,1.10- p. 76,1.15.42Cf. MabQhith,ol. II, p. 477, 11.6-7.43Thecomparison etweenGod'sknowledge nda mirrorhroughwhich hingsare revealedseemsunconvincing,or a mirrordoes not retain he form whichpassed n front of it, whereasGod'sknowledgedoes not lose the objectof knowledge.44Cf. Nihayat,p. 219,11.12-18.Mawaqif, bid., p. 75,1. 5. The basisof thisarguments thepremisehat God'sknowledges not connectedwith time.Ibid., 11.10-11.Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,p. 278(459).Note 41 above.

142


12/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God's knowledge f the particularsd. Knowledges a realqualityexisting n the knower's ssence,and the con-nection taealluq) f knowledge o its objectmeansa (p. 153)relationshipnis-

ba)between heknowledgeand its object.If theobjectof knowledge hanges,the relationship f this knowledge o its objectwillchangebutthe essenceofthe knowledgewill not. Do you not understandhat if a person(a) sits in hisownplaceandanotherperson b)comes and sits beside(a), (a)is on (b)'srightside;then, if (b)rises and moves from this side to the otherside, (a) is on hisleft side aftersittingon his rightside. Here a change n this relationshipbe-tween heknowledge nd itsobject)occurswhileclear perceptionf] senseandreasonproves hatno change ookplaceintheknowledgealtogether,andthatit remainsas it was.44aThis is the sum of the argumentsheld by whomeversays that the firstknowledgeremainsas it was.As for thosewho saythat it is necessary or knowledge o changewiththechangeof its object, theyadducesomeargumentso provethe soundnessoftheiropinion:a. If we assume hata manthought hatZaydwouldenter hecitytomorrow,thenwesuppose hat this man was seated n a darkhouse withoutdistinguish-ing betweennightandday and that his thoughtremainedas it hadbeenuntildawn came [and]Zaydentered he city, but this sittingpersondid not knowthat dawn had come. The thoughtthat Zaydwould enter the city tomorrowwouldnot cause his manto know thatZaydwasenteringhecitynow. [Now],if the knowledge hat a thingwill exist were identical o the knowledgeof theexistenceof the thing when it exists, this last knowledgewouldoccurin thesameformas the former,45 ndsinceit does not,46we knowthat the knowl-edgethata thingwillexist is not identical o theknowledgeof the existenceofthethingwhen t exists. Indeed, f he has a pieceof knowledge hatZaydwillenter hecitytomorrow henhe has a secondpieceof knowledgehat tomorrow

hadcome;from these twopiecesof knowledgea thirdpieceof knowledgewillderive o the effect thatZayd s entering hecitynow. This(thethird) s a newpieceof knowledgewhichderives romthe two preceding nesand it does notinfringeon the firstpieceof knowledge.47(p. 154)b. The second argumentwith regard o the explanation hat the44aBello, p. 119at the bottom.Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,p. 277f. (458). Ibn Rushd, )amima,p. 74. Thecounter-argumentf the philosopherss that therelationship etween heknowledgeand its objectenters the knower's essence.Al-Ghazali,Tahafut,p. 278 (459). (This schemedescribes he root of the argument: l [a]b2).45 I.e. it would be the sameknowledge.46Sincethe knowledge f whatwillhappen s not identical o the knowledge f whatreallyhappened.Cf. IbnRushd,JpamTma,. 73.47Cf. Nihayat,p. 217,1.18 - p. 218, 1. 2. Mawaqif,vol. VIII,p. 74. Theexamplegivenattheheadof theparagraphs brought orwardby al-IjiasAbual-Husayn l-Basri'saying.Ibid.,p. 77, 11.7-8.

143


13/24

BinyaminAbrahamovknowledge hat a thingwillexist is not identical o the knowledgeof its exis-tence when it exists is this: It is intuitively fi badihatal-caql)48learthattheessencesof things (haqa'iqal-ashy7')49 o not change;blacknessdoes notchange ntowhitenessandknowledgedoesnotchange nto itsopposite.If youknowthis, we shallsay:Theknowledge hat a thingwill exist is an essence50opposite o theessence of theknowledge]hat thethingexistsnow. Theproofof this is that it is impossible or one of them to replaceanother,for if onethought hat a thinghad existedbefore its existence t would be ignorance onhispart],andif onethought,when thethingexists,thatthe thinghad not ex-isted and would exist it would [also]be ignorance[on his part]. Thus it isproved hat the essenceof each of these two piecesof knowledge s oppositeto the essenceof the other.If this is proved,we shallsay:We haveexplainedthat the essences al-mahiyyatwa'l-haqa'iq) reunchangeable.As a result, tis necessarilympossible hat one of the two piecesof knowledge houldbe-come dentical o theother,andthus t isproved hattheknowledgehatathingwill existcannotbe the same as the knowledgeof its existencewhen it exists.c. The thirdarguments to saythat it is intuitively learthata thingwhichis conditionedby a condition(mashratbi-shart)differsfroma thingwhich snot conditionedbythis condition.Moreover,a thingwhichexistsnow differsfrom a thingwhich does not existnow but will exist after that. If you knowthis, we shallsay:The knowledge hat a thingwillexist is not conditionedbythe existence of the thing now, but its condition [if it exists]opposes thisknowledge.As for the knowledge hat the thingexistsnow, it is conditionedbythe existenceof thisthingnow. Therefore,onenecessarily udgesthat eachof the two piecesof knowledgediffers from one another.Furthermore,heknowledgehat athingwillexistoccursnowandwillnot remainwhen hethingdoes exist.And the knowledge hat a thingdoesnot existdoesnot occurnowandwillexistwhenthe thingdoes [not]exist. These two piecesof knowledgeare like two opposingcontraries al-mutanafiyayni l-mutaddadayni); encethestatement hatone of them s thesameas the other(p. 155) s likethe state-mentthat each of two contraries s the same as the other.Thisis an absurditywhich reason does not accept.d. Knowledges a formwhichaccordswith its object.Now, it is necessarilyknownthat the essenceof our statement"it willhappen" (sa-yahduthu) p-posesthe essenceof ourstatement"it isnowhappening"hadith,hasil).Since

48 Al-Jurjani,K. al-tacrifat, . 44,11.16-20.49 Ibid., p. 95, 11.1-4.50 The two terms which occur here, mahiyya and haqiqa, indicate that through which a thingis what it is (ma bihi al-shay' huwa huwa). Each of the two terms refers to a different aspect.Haqiqa refers to that through which a thing is what it is considering its actuality, and mahiyyarefers to it without considering its actuality. Ibid., pp. 95, 205.

144


14/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God'sknowledgeof the particularsthese two essences oppose each other, the forms which accord with them neces-sarily oppose each other, because that which accords with the opposing thingmust be opposing. And if one form of the two opposes the other it is impossibleto statethat one of them is the same as the other. These areclearnearly intuitivearguments considering the explanation that it is impossible for the knowledgethat a thing will exist to be identical to the knowledge of its existence when itexists.

Now we come to answer the arguments to which they adhered for the pur-pose of elucidation of their opinion.51The answer to the first argument, which states that since knowledge does notmultiply on account of the multiplicity of its objects, it does not necessarilychange on account of the change of its objects, is based on two arguments:a. We do not admit that knowledge does not multiply with the multiplicityof its objects. The proof of this [runsas follows]: Knowledge is either a formwhich accordswith its object or a specific relationship between the knower andthe object of knowledge.52 The first [possibility] necessitates the multiplicityof the pieces of knowledge when the objects of knowledge multiply, sincethings which accord with different essences must be different. The second [pos-sibility] necessitates the same [conclusion], for we have explained that a rela-tionship [of one thing] to "a" (lit. to a thing ila 'I-shay')is different form [its]relationship to "b" (lit. to another). The proof of this is that it is admissibleto conceive that one of these two relationships overlooks the existence of theother.53b. let us suppose that we admit that knowledge does not necessarily multiplywhen its objects multiply; why then did you say that it must not change whenits objects change? For this is an analogy without a common principle.54Theforcible proof which we have mentioned demonstrates that knowledge neces-sarily changes with the change of its objects.The answer to the second wrong argument, which states that knowledge isa peculiar quality (p. 156) through which the essences of knowledge are re-vealed,55is to say that we have mentioned in the book of knowledge (kitab al-cilm) that there is no meaning to knowledge except for this revelation and

51 Seep. 152,1. 5ff. of the Arabictext,p. 136 of the translation.52Cf. Mab.hith,vol. I, p. 331.Note 25 of the introduction.53I.e. the tworelationshipsre different rom each otherand therefore herearetwopiecesofknowledgewhichsometimeshave no connectionwitheach other.54 Qiyasminghayrdmi meansan analogywithouta commonprinciplewhichcorrespondsomajor erm n syllogism.Horten,p. 145. FormajortermseeMaimonides,Maqola ti indat al-mantiq,ed. andtrans. ntoFrenchby M. Ventura,Paris1935,ch. 6. Al-Razimeans o saythatthere s nocommonprinciple etween hangenpiecesof knowledge ndtheirmultiplicityo thatone candrawan analogy.55Seep. 152,1. 8ff. of the Arabic ext, p. 136 of the introduction.

145


15/24

Binyamin Abrahamov

except for this peculiar exposition.56 As for the affirmation of a quality be-yond this peculiar relationship and apartfrom this peculiar ascription, we havementioned in Kitdb al-Cilm hat there is no proof which demonstrates its affir-mation. If this is affirmed, we shall say: Since it is proved that this peculiarrela-tionship (i.e. the relationship between the knowledge and its object) changed,this adjudicatesthat the knowledge had changed. Then we say: We admit thatthe knowledge is something different from this peculiar relationship, but weask (lit. say) whether this peculiar knowledge (lit. thing) necessitates a peculiarrelationship to the peculiar object of knowledge or not? If it necessitates (thisrelationship), then it is not knowledge, for knowledge means revelation(inkishdf, tajallT),and there is no doubt that revelation is a state of relationshipbetween the knowledge and its object. If we assume a quality which is not thisvery revelation and which does not necessitate this revelation, it will not beknowledge. However, if we say that this peculiar quality necessitates thispeculiar relationship and this peculiar ascription, then when this peculiar rela-tionship disappears the result (ldzima)57of this knowledge disappears. Thedisappearance of the result proves the disappearance of its cause (malzum).Here we must also definitely state that this knowledge disappears.The answer to the third wrong argument58,which states that if we supposethat the thought that Zayd will enter the city tomorrow continues until heenters then the knowledge (that he will enter) is the same as the knowledge ofthe occurrence of this entrance, is as follows: Most of the Mutakallimun say:The continuation of the object of knowledge is impossible (al-baqdl Caldal-maclum mumtanic), since it is59an accident which takes place successively.60If this continuation is impossible how do they know that if this impossible thingoccurred the case would be such and such. Who is the one who informs themthat the matteris as they say? Then (p. 157) we say: We have already explainedthat if this thought continued but the thinker did not know that the day hadcome, then he would not know, on account of this thought that someone wasnow entering the city. Therefore it is proved that the form which they havementioned is the best proof of the soundness of our statement.The answer to the fourth wrong argument,61which states that knowledge isa qualitywhich has a peculiar relationship [to its object] and that what changes

56 Al-Razi may refer here to the chapter on 'ilm in Mablhith, vol. I, p. 319. Cf. note 25 of theintroduction.57 Ldzima seems to be an equivalent to lazim which means a result, a consequence. Van Ess,Iji, index.58 See p. 152, 1. 15ff. of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation.59 The text has bal innahu.60 Hence there are pieces of knowledge which follow the objects of knowledge.61 See p. 152, the last line of the Arabic text, p. 137 of the translation.

146


16/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God's knowledge f theparticularsis the relationship, not the quality, is the previous discussion, which exposesthe problems involved in this view. And God knows best.

The second partyof the Mutakallimun adhered to the notion that change oc-curs in the knowledge, and said: When the object of knowledge disappears, theknowledge of it disappears, and another knowledge comes into being. The ex-planation of this statement is as follows: This peculiar essence (al-dhat al-makh!f4a)62 necessitates the knowledge of the object on the condition thatthis object takes place; if this object takes place according to this aspect, thena necessary condition occurs and the knowledge of this thing necessarilyoccursin this peculiar essence. If this object disappears, the necessary condition disap-pears and a condition of another knowledge occurs. Thus the first knowledgecertainly disappears and another knowledge occurs. This is the opinion of Abual-Husayn al-Basri63,who is counted among the Muctazilite scholars, and ofJahm ibn Safwan64and Hisham ibn al-Hakam65,who are counted among theancient scholars.

As for the later Mutakallimun, they proved the unsoundness of this viewthrough several arguments:a. Since this knowledge comes into being after its nonexistence, it must havesomething which brings it into existence and makes it, and the bringerinto exis-tence and the maker of this knowledge must know it, because we have ex-plained that the coming of a perfect action out of the maker is conditioned bythe latter's being a knower. Hence, the bringing of this knowledge into exis-tence is conditioned on the occurrence of another knowledge preceding theformer. And the statement with regard to that previous knowledge is like thestatementconcerning this knowledge. This necessitates an endless chain (tasal-sul) [of pieces of knowledge], which is absurd.

[However], one has a right to say: This argument is weak, for you arrangeyour statement so that knowledge (p. 158) comes into being only because thechoosing free maker (al-facil al-mukhtar) brings this knowledge into existencethrough ability and choice. We do not adhere to this opinion, but we say that

62 I.e. man.63 One of the mastersof 'Abd al-Jabbard. 1025).Ibnal-Murta


17/24

BinyaminAbrahamovthis peculiar essence necessitates the knowledge of the thing on the conditionthat this object [of knowledge] takes place according to this aspect.66If thething takes place according to the special aspect, the necessary condition oc-curs, and the peculiar essence necessitates this peculiar knowledge, and if thisobject disappears, then the necessary condition disappears and this knowledge[also] disappears. According to this assumption this argument is false andrefuted.

b. If this knowledge came into being [there would be three possibilities]: itwould come into being either in God's essence (fi dhat allah), or in another es-sence, or not in a substrate (mahall). The tripartite division is false; hence theopinion concerning the coming of the knowledge into being is [also] false. Wesay that it is impossible that the knowledge should come into being in God'sessence only because this forces God's essence to be a substrate of things whichcome into being, and this is false. We say that the two remaining possibilities(lit. parts) are [also] false only on account of the [notion] that the knowledgeof such and such a thing by a [certain]essence is a quality of this essence,67and the occurrence of the quality of essence not in this essence68 is incon-ceivable.

However, one has a right to say: Why it is not conceivable to say that thesepieces of knowledge comes into being in God's essence? [Concerning] his say-ing: "This forces God's essence to be a substrate of things which come into be-ing", we say: If you mean by his being a substrate of things which come intobeing the coming into being of these pieces of knowledge in His essence, thismeans forcing the conclusion to be a proof (lit. forcing the thing on itself ilzamIPl-shay"cala nafsihi),69 and this is false.c. [There exist three possibilities concerning] every quality which reasonpoints at: God's essence is sufficient for its causation (istilzrm), or is sufficientfor its rejection, or is sufficient neither for its causation nor for its rejection.If the first [possibility]exists, the continuation (dawarm) f this quality is neces-sary due to the continuation of this essence. This prevents change in God'sessence. If the second [possibility] exists, the continuation of the negation ofthis quality is necessary due to the continuation of this essence. And this also

66 This aspectmeansthat the peculiaressence necessitates he knowledgeas is mentionedabove.67 It is not a qualityof God. For the wholeargument f. Nihayat, p. 216, 11.1-4.68 I.e. neithern anothersubstrate nd norin any substrate.69 Theopponentof the view thatGod'sknowledge hanges = comes ntobeing)saysthatitis impossiblehat sucha knowledgehouldcome ntobeing nGod'sessence,becausen thiscaseGod's essence houldbe a substrate f thingswhichcomeintobeing.However,f God'sbeingasubstrate f thingswhichcome ntobeing s identical o thecomingof thesepiecesof knowledgeintobeing n Hisessence, here s noproofhere,for theargueruses he conclusiondesired sproofwhichmeans hathe forces(alzama) he conclusion o be a proof.

148


18/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God'sknowledgeof the particularspreventsa change n [God's essence].If the third[possibility] xists,wherebythis essence s sufficientneither or the affirmationof this qualitynor for itsnegation, henit follows that the affirmationof thisqualityas well as itsnega-tion arebased on a thingdifferentfrom this essence.(p. 159)Butit is knownthat this essencehas not ceased o affirm thisqualityand to negate t. And ifit is proved hatthe affirmation of thisquality)andits negationare based ona thing different(from this essence),70 nd everythingwhich is based on adifferentthingis possibleby virtue of itself (mumkinbi-dhatihi).It followsthat thatwhich s necessaryby virtueof itself (wajibbi-dhatihi)7oas possiblebyvirtueof itself. This is a wrongand false [statement].Here endsthe discus-sion concerning he explanationof this argument.And it is excellent.d. Let us suppose hat Godhas knownfrometernity hat the world is nownonexistent macdtimt 'l-hal)71, henhe brought t into existenceand knewthat it is nowexistent,did thefirstknowledgedisappear r notandwas the sec-ond cancelled? If the firstknowledgedid not disappear]here is knowledgethatthe world sboth nonexistent ndexistentnow,and this necessitatesgnor-ance and combination f twocontradictory pinions-which is inconceivable.As for the firstpossibility,namely,the disappearancef the firstknowledge,wesay:Thisknowledges saidto havebeeneternalortemporal.Thefirstpossi-bility is false, for the Mutakallimun greethat it is impossible hat what isprovedas eternal houldbenonexistent,and therearealsomanyproofswhichspeaksin favor of this [notion].Concerning he secondpossibility,namely,that thisknowledges temporal,we ask whether hisknowledges precededbyanotherknowledge r not?If it isprecededbyanotherknowledgehe referenceto this precedingknowledge s as the reference o this knowledge,and thiscauses each temporal knowledge to be preceded by another temporalknowledge.This necessitates he notionof temporalswhichhaveno beginning(hawaditha awwala aha).According o the Mutakallimunhis view is false.If we saythat thesepiecesof knowledgeendin temporalknowledgewhich isnotprecededbyanotherknowledge,hiswillattributegnoranceo God,whichis inconceivable.72Jahm bn SafwanandHisham bnal-Hakamrespondedo thiscontention,

70 Cf. Mab.hith,vol. II, p. 478. Whatfollows s a parentheticalentence f the text which somitted n one of themanuscriptsndwhich s not needed or understandinghepassage.It ap-pearsafternote 70: "While hatwhich s basedon athingwhich s inturnbasedon athing sbasedon a different hing, it follows that thispeculiarquality s based on a different hing."70a I.e. God.71 Lit. at once, immediately.72 That is because God has not alwaysknown that the world is not existentin a certainmoment.For the notion of tasalsul eeNihoyat,p. 220.

149


19/24

Binyamin Abrahamov

saying: The knowledge which occurs in eternity is knowledge of essences(mahiyyat, haqadiq)73nd of conceptions (tasawwurat).74Then when God hasnot ceased to bring things into existence, judgements (tavdiqat) have takenplace. Tasdiq means the judgement that a certainthing exists and that a certainthing does not exist.75According to this assumption the difficulty disappears.Know that we have mentioned in the beginning of this argument theirsaying76 hat if God knew that (p. 160) Zayd was sitting in that place and whenZayd stood up, if this knowledge still remained, it would have been ignorance(on the part of God), and if it did not remain it would have been change. Thenwe have mentioned the methods of the people with regardto each of these twoparts.Here ends the discussion on this argument. And God knows best.The second argument of the philosophers in this chapter: If we supposed asquare winged by two equal squares according to this sketch:

and if we assumedGod's knowledge of it (the square), there would be no doubtthat each of these two squares, which are placed on these two sides, is distin-guished from the other. This is known. If this is proved we shall say: The dis-tinction of each of these two squares from the other is conditioned on their be-ing existent, for the occurrence of distinction and difference regarding shape,measure and form with their being absolutely nonexistent is inconceivable.Thus one must assert that this distinction does not occur unless these [twosquares] are existent. Now, we say: This existence is either external or intellec-tual. The first possibility is false, for we can imagine a form like this with rightimagination in case of its actual nonexistence. Moreover, the knowledge [ofthese two squares] is temporal, since the whole form is temporal, and itsbringer into existence (muhdith) is God. Whoever does not know it cannotbring it into existence. Hence it is proved that the knowledge of forms andshapes like these precedes their existence and it is also proved that this distinc-

73 See note 50 above.74 Ta,awwur means the consideration of a thing inasmuch as it is without referring to its exis-tence or nonexistence. Al-Razi, Muhagal, p. 16. Al-Amidi, al-Mubin, p. 69.75 Cf. Ibid.76 P. 141f. above.

150


20/24

Fakhral-Din al-Razion God'sknowledge f the particularstion occurs in the intellectual existence. (p. 161) We say: The substrate of thesetwo squares, which are placed in the two sides, is either one thing or two differ-ent things according to space (hayyiz) and state (wa


21/24

BinyaminAbrahamovthe knowledge refers to its existence and that it does not exist only because theknowledge refers to its nonexistence. That is since (p. 162) the knowledge ofa thing is a form which fits this thing in itself.80The fact that this form fits it(the object) depends on the essential actuality of the thing (tahaqquqihifinafsi-hi). It is impossible to say that its essential actuality depends on the fitness ofthis form to it (to the object).If we prove this principle we shall say: If it were necessary to qualify God'sessence through these pieces of knowledge (culum), while we have alreadyproved that the occurrence of these pieces of knowledge is based on the occur-rence of these objects of knowledge themselves according to these peculiaraspects, then His peculiar essence would need the occurrence of these pieces ofknowledge. You know that that which is based (God's essence) on a thing(God's knowledge) which is based on a thing (the object of knowledge) mustbe based on the latter thing. Hence it follows necessarily that the actuality(tahaqquq) of God's essence is based on the actuality of these possible things(mumkinat) and that that which needs the existence of the possible things ismore entitled to being possible (awla bi'l-imkan). Consequently, that which isa Necessary Existent by virtue of Himself must be a possible existent by virtueof Himself, which is inconceivable.81

This is contrary to His knowledge of the essences (al-mahiyyat wa'l-haqa)iq).82For this knowledge occurs no matter whether these essences occuror not. In such a case His peculiar essence is sufficient for the establishmentof these pieces of knowledge in Him, and His essence must not be based on theoccurrence of something else. As for the knowledge that Zayd is sitting in thisplace, for it is impossible for such knowledge to occur but when Zayd is sittingin this place, God's peculiaressence is not sufficient for the occurrenceof thesepieces of knowledge. Moreover, one must consider the occurrence of these ob-jects of knowledge according to these peculiar aspects [without God's knowl-edge]. If God's essence is not sufficient for the occurrence of these pieces ofknowledge, then the difficulty mentioned above is not necessary.83(p. 163)One has a right to say: This statement preventsHim from producingan effect on another thing (mu'aththirfi 'l-ghayr), for the production of aneffect on another thing is a peculiar relationship between Him and anotherthing, which is not established but through another thing. If He produced an

80 Note 25 above.81 Cf. Mabahith, vol. II, p. 478.82 Cf. note50 above.83 If we say thatGod'sknowledgedoes not perceivehe particulars,hen His essence s notdependent n them(seethe lastparagraph). he word "not" mustbeplacedhere,otherwisehesentencedoes not make sense.

152


22/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God'sknowledgeof the particularseffect on another hing,He wouldnecessarilyneedanother hing.83at is pos-sible to pointout thedifferencebetweenboth of them(i.e. theproducerof aneffect andanother hing).AndGodknowsbest. Here endsthe accountof theviewof those who deniedthe knowledgeof the particulars.As for those whoadhered o the viewthat God knows theparticulars,heyadducedsomeproofs of this view:a. Theysaid:We haveproved hatGodmakesperfectactions,andwehaveexplained hatwhoevermakes suchactionsmust knowthem, thereforeGodnecessarilyknows the actions He makes.84 t is also knownthatperfection sseenonly in the particularsal-ashkhasal-juz'iyya)which werebrought ntoexistence.Hence it is demonstrated hatwhatprovesHis beingknowing tselfprovesHis beingknowingof the particulars.85b. Theindividual ndparticularhing(al-shay'al-shakhv! l-juz'l)has anes-sence and [anelementof] individualization nddistinction.86 hiselement seitheran integralpart(cayn)of this essenceor somethingaddedto it. If thiselement s an cayn, he knowledgeof theessence s the knowledgeof the cayn.This[elementof] individualization,romthepointof view of its beingthis in-tegralpart, will be known, evenif the individualization f this individual sdifferent romthisessence,sincethisindividualizations also anessenceof thepossibleessences.87Thephilosophers dmitted hattheknowledge f thecause cilla)necessitatesthe knowledgeof the effect (maclul). p. 164)ThusGod's knowledgeof HispeculiaressencenecessitatesHis knowledgeof the thingsthroughwhichthisindividualization nd this distinction(tacayyun) ake place. ThereforeHenecessarilyknowsthis individualizationnasmuchas it is individualization.Thus it is provedthat their view that the knowledgeof the causenecessitatesthe knowledgeof the effect obligesthemto admitthat God knowsthe indi-vidualthingsinasmuchas they are theseindividualand distinct hings.88c. The thirdargument oncerningHisbeingknowingof thedistinctparticu-lars is: The knowledgeof thingsis a qualityof praiseand perfectionandtheignorance f them s a qualityof imperfection.Now, sinceGodis themostper-fect andthe most sublimeof all the existents,He is necessarilymoreentitledto be qualifiedby qualitiesof perfectionandsublimity hanto be qualifiedbyqualitiesof imperfection.89

83a Thephilosopherswouldanswer hat Godreallydoesnot producean effect on anything.84 Cf. Mabdhith,vol. II, p. 479f.85 Cf. Muhassal,p. 165f.Mawdqif,p. 69f.86 I.e. it hassomethingwhichparticularizest anddistinguishest fromothers.87 God knows he essences.Now, if individualizations anessenceGodknows t andhence heparticulars.88 Cf. Mabahith,vol. II, p. 484.89 Cf. ibid., p. 485.

153


23/24

BinyaminAbrahamovd. We observe that if the people of this world, the righteous and the wicked

(zindiq), the Muslim and the unbeliever (mulhid), are afflicted by suffering,they beseech God for mercy and ask Him to save them from this suffering evenif they are the most extreme deniers of His being knowing of the particulars.If this happens to someone he will necessarily set about praying, beseechingmercy from God and submitting to Him. This proves that the basic disposition(al-fitra al-asliyya)90attests that the Lord of the world (ilah al-calam)has pow-er over the things (lit. objects of His power) and knows the secret and the hid-den things. It is known that the testimony of the fitra is more acceptable thanthese hidden disjunctions (taqsimat khafiyya) and obscure proofs, which areto be sought;91therefore one must definitely assert that the Lord of the worldknows the particulars and is capable of supplying [man's] needs. I think thatIbrahim said to his father: "O my father, why do you worship that whichneither hears nor sees, nor benefits you in anything?"92 only because hisfatherbelonged to the religion of the philosophers and denied God's power andknowledge of the particulars.93 Certainly Ibrahim said to his father thesewords [on account of his father's religion]. This is my opinion on this subject.And God knows best.

Abbreviationsal-Amidi,al-MubinBellovanEss, ijial-Ghazali,Tahafut

HortenIbnRushd,DamTmaal-Jurjani,K. al-taCrifatLeamanMabd.hith

Sayfal-Dinal-Amidi,al-MubinSharh macantlfazal-hukama'wal-mutakallimTn,airo 1983.I.A. Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between PhilosophyandOrthodoxy,Leiden 1989.J. vanEss, Die Erkenntnislehrees CAcludaddinl-AcT,Wiesbaden1966.S. van den Bergh, TheIncoherenceof the Incoherence,London1954. This work includes he translationof both al-Ghazali'sTa-hafutal-falasifa nd IbnRushd' Tahafut l-tahafut.Thepagenum-bersof theArabic extas editedbyM.BouygesinBibliotheca rabi-ca Scholasticorum,ol. III, Beirut1930)aregivenin parentheses.M. Horten,Die Spekulative ndPositiveTheologiedesIslam,Hil-desheim1967(rep.of the Bonn ed. 1912).IbnRushd,Damimatal-Cilml-ilahi,tr. by G.F. Hourani n Aver-roes on theHarmonyof ReligionandPhilosophy,London 1961.CAli l-Jurjani,Kitabal-tacrifat,d. G. Flugel,Leipzig1847.0. Leaman,An Introductiono Medieval slamicPhilosophy,Cam-bridge1985.Fakhr l-Dinal-Razi,al-Mabahithl-mashriqiyyafiilmal-ilahiyyatwal-tabiciyyat,Haydarabad 343H.

90Orprimordial ature.91That is because itra is a necessaryknowledge.92 Siura19, v. 42.93Forthisargumenteeintroduction . 140.

154


24/24

Fakhral-Dinal-Razion God'sknowledge f the particulars 155Marmura M.E. Marmura,"Some Aspectsof Avicenna'sTheoryof God'sKnowledge f Particulars", AOS82 (1962),pp. 299-312.Ma!tlib Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,al-Ma#flibal-'dliyamin al-Cilml-ilahi,ed.AhmadHijazial-Saqa,Beirut1987.Mawaqif CAdudl-Dinal-Iji,KitOb l-mawaqif,Cairo1907.Muha.sal Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Muhassal afkar al-mutaqaddiminwa'l-muta'akhkhirTninal-culamaPa'l-hukamdl a'l-mutakallimTn,d.Taha cAbdal-Ra'fifSaCd,Cairon.d.Netton I.R.Netton,AllahTranscendent,tudiesn theStructure ndSemio-ticsof IslamicPhilosophy,TheologyandCosmology,LondonandNew York1989.Nihayat al-Shahrastani,Nihayatal-aqdam i Cilmal-kalam,ed. A. Guil-laume,Oxford 1934.Peters J.R.T.M.Peters,God's CreatedSpeech,A studyin thespeculativetheologyof the Mu'taziliQadflal-QulaQtba l-Hasan CAbdal-Jabbar bnAhmadal-Hamadani,Leiden1976.Schmidtke S. Schmidtke,TheTheology f al-CAllamaal-HillYd. 726/1325),un-publishedPh.D thesis,St. John'sCollege,Oxford 1990.

abrahamov, benjamin (1992), ‘fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī on god’s knowledge of particulars’,...

Documents