activity 4 – operational safety report on extensive …...2 methodology on risks assessment at...

Activity 4 – Operational Safety

Report on Extensive Risk Assessment in Ports

Document No: MONALISA 2.0_ D.4.3.1

MONALISA 2.0 - REPORT ON EXTENSIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN PORTS 1

Document Information Project: MONALISA 2.0 Securing the chain by intelligence at sea Funded by: The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) of the European Union Activity: Operational Safety Sub-activity: 4.3 Risk Assessment Document No: D 4.3.1 Title: Report on Extensive Risk Assessment in Ports

History

Version Date Initials Description

01 New document

DISCLAIMER: Use of any knowledge, information or data contained in this document shall be at the user's sole risk. The authors of this report accept no liability or responsibility, in negligence or otherwise, for any loss, damage or expense whatever sustained by any person because of the use, in any manner or form, of any knowledge, information or data contained in this document, or due to any inaccuracy, omission or error therein contained. This document reflects the authors view and the European Commission is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.


Table of Contents

1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6 2 Methodology on Risks Assessment at Ports ......................................................... 8 2.1 Background .......................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Definition of Port-Maritime Interfaces .................................................................. 10 2.3 Risks Evaluation Methodology ............................................................................ 14 2.4 Analysis of the Results ....................................................................................... 19

3 Descriptive Taxonomy of Risks at Ports .............................................................. 20 3.1 Maritime and Port Operational Safety Background ............................................. 20 3.2 Port Safety Risks Classification .......................................................................... 22 3.2.1 SF-001 – Collisions ......................................................................................... 22 3.2.2 SF-002 – Environmental Issues ...................................................................... 25 3.2.3 SF-003 – Fire .................................................................................................. 27 3.2.4 SF-004 – Damage to the Vessel ..................................................................... 30 3.2.5 SF-005 – Cargo Damages .............................................................................. 32 3.2.6 SF-006 – Personal Injuries - Individual and Societal Risk ............................... 33 3.2.7 SF-007 – Port Machinery Accidents ................................................................ 34 3.2.8 SF-008 – Breakdowns ..................................................................................... 36 3.2.9 SF-009 - Explosions ........................................................................................ 38 3.2.10 SF-010 – Operative Setback ...................................................................... 39

3.3 Maritime and Port Security Background .............................................................. 40 3.4 Port Security Risks Classification ........................................................................ 41 3.4.1 SC-001 – Illegal Traffic .................................................................................... 41 3.4.2 SC-002 – Terrorism ........................................................................................ 42 3.4.3 SC-003 – Sabotage ........................................................................................ 43 3.4.4 SC-004 – Social Conflicts ............................................................................... 43

4 Extensive Port Risks Evaluation ........................................................................... 44 4.1 Maritime Interface ............................................................................................... 45 4.2 Maritime – Land Interface ................................................................................... 49 4.2.1 Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals .................................................................... 49 4.2.2 Container Terminals ........................................................................................ 55 4.2.3 Liquid Bulk Terminals (Oil and Chemical) ........................................................ 60 4.2.4 Solid Bulk Terminals ....................................................................................... 65 4.2.5 Port Services and other Activities: Piloting, Towage, Mooring and Bunkering . 68

4.3 Land Interface ..................................................................................................... 77 4.3.1 Road Infrastructures and Office Buildings ....................................................... 78 4.3.2 Railway Terminals and Tracks ........................................................................ 81 4.3.3 Waste Treatment Facilities .............................................................................. 82 4.3.4 Customs Warehouses ..................................................................................... 84

5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 86


List of Figures Figure 1. Port Interfaces Division 10 Figure 2. Example of Maritime Interface Activities 11 Figure 3. Example of Maritime – Land Interface Activities 12 Figure 4. Example of Land Interface Activities 13 Figure 5. Ship Collision with a Berth 22 Figure 6. Ship Collision with a Pleasure Boat 22 Figure 7. Ship Collisions in Open Sea 23 Figure 8. RTG Collisions 24 Figure 9. Machinery impact with container in stack 24 Figure 10. Leaking Oil from a Container Ship 25 Figure 11.Spillage of Cargo in Sheltered Waters 26 Figure 12. Oil Spill in Port Terminal 26 Figure 13. Tanker Truck Incident within a Port 27 Figure 14. Fire on Board 27 Figure 15. Fire Hose at Burning Cargo Containers aboard a Merchant Cargo Vessel 28 Figure 16. Customs Warehouse Fire 28 Figure 17. Firemen Extinguishing a Fire in a Container Yard 29 Figure 18. Container Adrift 30 Figure 19. Damaged Vessels Assisted by Multipurpose and Rescue Vessels 30 Figure 20. Grounding Vessels Close to the Beach 31 Figure 21. Slewing Crane Impacts with Berthed Vessel at Port 31 Figure 22. Cargo Dispersion on the Port Terminal Yard 32 Figure 23. Falling RTG on a Truck. 33 Figure 24. Cargo Hanged Up by a Spreader 34 Figure 25. STS Crane Hits Container Stack 34 Figure 26. Overturning of a Truck in Port Terminal 35 Figure 27. Forklift Accident in Cargo Warehouse 35 Figure 28. STS Crane Breakdown in the Yard 36 Figure 29. Straddle Carrier Check Over 36 Figure 30. Vehicle Stopped in a Ship Ramp 37 Figure 31.Poor Maintenance of a Train 37 Figure 33. Gibraltar Port Explosion 38 Figure 34. Container Stack Blocking Correct Operation in Yard 39 Figure 36. Intercepted Cistern Containing Cocaine within its Structure 41 Figure 37. USS Cole Terrorist Attack at the Port of Aden (Yemen) 42 Figure 38. Port Strikes and Riots 43 Figure 39. Example of Mooring Scheme 70 Figure 40. Potential Snack Back Areas 71 Figure 45. Customs warehouse facilities at Valenciaport 84


List of Tables Table 1. Attributes for the Parameter “Frequency” ............................................................ 17 Table 2. Attributes for the Parameter “Consequences” ................................................ 17 Table 3. Attributes for the Parameter “Probability” ....................................................... 18 Table 4. Signification of the Safety Impact ................................................................... 18 Table 5. Correlation between Safety Impact and Risk .................................................. 19 Table 6. Definition of Safety Risk ................................................................................. 19 Table 7. Maritime Interface Risk Evaluation ....................................................................... 46 Table 8. Maritime Interface Port Risk Evaluation (II) ........................................................... 47 Table 9. Maritime Interface Port Risk Evaluation (III) ................................................... 48 Table 10. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (I) .................................... 52 Table 11. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (II) ................................... 53 Table 12. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (III) .................................. 54 Table 13. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (I) ....................................................... 55 Table 14. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (II) ...................................................... 57 Table 15. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (III) ..................................................... 58 Table 16. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (IV) ..................................................... 59 Table 17. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (I) ................................................ 60 Table 18. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (II) ............................................... 61 Table 19. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (III) .............................................. 63 Table 20. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (IV) .............................................. 64 Table 21. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (I) ....................................................... 65 Table 22. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (II) ...................................................... 66 Table 23. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (III) ..................................................... 67 Table 24. Port Services Risk Evaluation (I) .................................................................. 71 Table 25. Port Services Risk Evaluation (II) ................................................................. 73 Table 26. Port Services Risk Evaluation (III) ................................................................ 74 Table 27. Port Services Risk Evaluation (IV) ................................................................ 75 Table 28. Port Services Risk Evaluation (V) ................................................................. 76 Table 29. Office Buildings and Road Infrastructures Risk Evaluation (I) ....................... 79 Table 30. Office Buildings and Road Infrastructures Risk Evaluation (II) ...................... 80 Table 31. Railway Terminals and Tracks Risk Evaluation ............................................ 81 Table 32. Waste Treatment Risk Evaluation (I) ............................................................ 83 Table 33. Customs Warehouses Risk Evaluation (I) .................................................... 84 Table 34. Customs Warehouses Risk Evaluation (II) ................................................... 85 Table 35. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (I) .................................... 86 Table 36. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (II) ................................... 87 Table 37. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (III) .................................. 88 Table 38. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (IV) .................................. 89


1 Introduction Operational Safety is a key factor in order to demonstrate the results of the MONALISA 2.0 Project. This activity serves an important purpose as it has merged and mixed technologies, skills and knowledge that has been developed in order to meet the project objectives. This activity has also applied different infrastructures; material, human and technological, and there have been a number of demonstrations of technical results of tasks related to risk assessment, information technologies, SAR resources, port facilities, risk management and training. Sub-activity 4.3 in particular will enable field-level risk analysis to support risk management decisions at all levels: ship, port and coast. The objective is to provide intelligent tools and decision-making systems for field use that will enable users to view the full spectrum of potential maritime safety risks. This deliverable is comprised of an extensive risk assessment evaluation that is focused on port-logistic scenarios and environments. Ports are considered strategic and critical infrastructures where huge amount of goods, including dangerous cargoes, are transferred from vessels to the hinterland and vice-versa using intermodal services in a complex, fast and non-stopping logistics chain. The European economy and competitiveness is strongly dependent on the efficiency and safety of the ports in the region. Risk management and evaluation has become a key area of innovation and improvement due to the fast and continuous transformation of ports and of the whole supply chain in Europe and around the world. The risk evaluation study has been developed according to a specific methodology that quantifies the potential risk impact of a wide taxonomy of undesired events that may result in significant incidents or accidents at ports. In this sense, a classification of three different interfaces, maritime, maritime-land and land interfaces, within the port area has been defined, taking into account the particular nature of the infrastructures, equipment, processes and activities that take place in each of these scenarios. This classification helps to segment and to provide a better understanding of the different risks typologies present in a complex port environment. It also makes their potential impact and consequences more clear. The conducted risk assessment has been documented and validated by means of interviews with safety-, environment- and security experts in areas of port installations and cargo terminals. These experts have provided the day-by-day vision of a wide variety of port activities, thus contributing to filling the gap between the theoretical study and the real management and control of port-logistic activities. Section 2 of this deliverable describes the methodology that was followed in order to conduct the extensive risk assessment evaluation, whereas Section 3 provides a detailed taxonomy of risks associated with port activities. Finally, Section 4 provides a


detailed risk evaluation based on the case of the Port of Valencia. This can be considered a reference on risk prevention at a European level.


2 Methodology on Risks Assessment at Ports

2.1 Background Port risks assessment covers a wide field of aspects, as modern ports have become large logistic facilities that perform a wide range of activities involving cargo handling and passenger traffic management. Today, modern ports are complex infrastructures that integrate a wide number of agents and users. They are interconnected by means of information technologies and communication systems, thus facilitating international trade with efficient, safe and sustainable operative models. In order to make shipping and port operations as safe as possible, different initiatives and regulations have been developed at an international and a national level. One of the most remarkable safety management procedures in the shipping industry is the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) promoted by IMO. FSA, which was originally developed in part as a response the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988, when an offshore platform exploded in the North Sea and 167 people lost their lives, is now being applied to the IMO rule making process. FSA is a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using risk analysis and cost benefit assessment. FSA can be used as a tool to help in the evaluation of new regulations for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment. It can also be used in making a comparison between existing and possibly improved regulations. The goal is to achieve a balance between the various technical and operational issues, including the human element, and between maritime safety or protection of the marine environment, and costs. The Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process were approved in 2002 (MSC/Circ.1023/MEPC/Circ.392). The Guidelines have since been amended by MSC/Circ.1180-MEPC/Circ.474 and MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.5. According to FSA Guidelines, a risk can be expressed in several complementary fashions. Concerning life safety, the most commonly used expressions are Individual Risk and Societal Risk. This is the risk of death, injuries and ill health experienced by an individual and/or a group of people. The notion of risk combines frequency and an identified level of harm. Commonly, the level of harm is narrowed down to the loss of life and risk is an expression of frequency and number of fatalities. In other words, life safety is usually taken to refer to the risk of loss of life, and usually expressed as fatalities per year. Risk should at least be judged from two viewpoints. The first point of view is that of the individual, which is dealt with by the Individual Risk. The second point of view is that of society, considering whether a risk is acceptable for large group of people.


The following sections describe the methodology used for evaluating risks derived from port activities taking as a reference the FSA Guidelines and other available methodologies.


2.2 Definition of Port-Maritime Interfaces The current study aims at providing a quantitative analysis of the existing safety and security risks in a multipurpose port, that is, a port-logistic facility that performs all kind of activities and operations related to the handling of several types of cargo as well as transport of passengers. A relevant aspect in this methodology is the classification or division of the whole port area into specific safety and security scenarios or interfaces. A certain interface is defined as the joint of infrastructures, equipment, processes and services dedicated to specific activities that can be studied separately from other areas of the port. With this approach it is possible to divide the scope of the analysis into three interfaces that help to better evaluate safety and security risks at port areas. The next figure shows and example of division in different interfaces: maritime, maritime-land and land interfaces.

Figure 1. Port Interfaces Division

Source: Valenciaport Foundation, 2014

Each one of the different interfaces defined present a specific typology of risks associated to the particular nature of the infrastructures, equipment, processes and activities performed. The risk evaluation should take into account these particularities in order to properly calculate risks impact and potential consequences of incidents and accidents. Following, a detailed description of each interface defined is provided.


• Maritime Interface: The Maritime Interface comprises the activities and processes involving exclusively the operation of the vessels within the port: approaching and in-port navigation as well as piloting, towage and mooring. This interface defines a critical scenario from the point of view of safety due to the great impact and consequences derived from incidents and accidents that may happen when performing maritime interface operations. The vessel, as main piece of port-logistic activities is the critical asset that affects the rest of the maritime transport chain.

Figure 2. Example of Maritime Interface Activities


• Maritime – Land Interface: The Maritime-Land Interface is defined as the space which joints the land and maritime areas within cargo and passenger terminals, being the berth the physical border that connects both scenarios. In this interface, the loading/unloading, embarking/disembarking of passenger take place, being another important part of the whole maritime transport chain. Several risks associated to critical operations, especially those related to cargo loading or unloading have been identified within the Maritime-Land Interface. This interface also includes operations within cargo terminals.


• Although the vessel is not involved in such operations, activities like horizontal transport and storage of dangerous goods take place and must be observed.

• This interface is composed by the different port terminals that perform cargo-handling operations. A multipurpose port usually develops a wide variety of activities including the loading, unloading and storage of containerised cargo, liquid and solid bulk, ro-ro vehicles as well as passenger traffic management. Each of these facilities present a specific typology of safety risks directly related with the types of operations and equipment involved. For this reason, particular attention has been paid to the different cargo terminals that usually operate at European ports:

o Port container terminals

o Passenger terminals (cruises and ferry terminals)

o Liquid bulk terminals including fuel and chemical terminals

o Solid bulk terminals

o Ro-Ro and vehicle terminals

Figure 3. Example of Maritime – Land Interface Activities



The abovementioned classification considers that not all the cargo terminals present the same typology of risks and potential consequences. For example, a certain incident or accident in a fuel terminal involving dangerous goods may generate more significant consequences from the point of view of safety than a similar incident in a ro-ro or container terminal. These consequences as well have a greater impact in the case of proximity of passenger terminals for instance. These types of assumptions have to be considered when developing the risk assessment concerning direct and indirect consequences. For each one of the considered terminals, particular attentions have been paid over the following activities:

o Berthing operations

o Cargo loading and unloading

o Vessel fuel bunkering

o Internal transport of goods, especially dangerous goods

o Storage of goods, especially dangerous goods

• Land Interface: Finally, this interface is related to those operations and processes that take place outside the cargo terminals but within the port area. The Land Interface includes areas like port accesses, official buildings, offices and workshops as well as activities like internal road transport of goods trucks and private vehicles.

Figure 4. Example of Land Interface Activities



2.3 Risks Evaluation Methodology In order to evaluate the potential risks regarding port and maritime activities, a methodology developed to quantify port safety risks and associated impact has been developed. This methodology applies quantitative and objective criteria and gives value to the potential impacts produced by safety risks derived from the port and maritime activities. The method will be used as global evaluation of the port activities and their implications over safety aspects and an example of application will be presented in the next deliverable of this sub-activity of the project focused on the Port of Valencia. Some definitions can be pointed out at this stage:

• Hazard is defined as a situation, activity or combination of both with the potential to cause harm, loss or injury to people or assets.

• Risk is defined as a combination of frequency of occurrence, probability and consequences derived from the materialization of a certain hazard. Thus, it could be said that a risk is the impact quantification by means of numerical methods of potential hazards.

• ALARP Zone (As Low As Reasonably Practicable): refers to a level of risk that is neither negligibly low nor intolerable high. ALARP is actually the attribute of a risk, for which further investment of resources for risk reduction is not justifiable. The principle of ALARP is employed for the risk assessment procedure. Risks should be As Low As Reasonably Practicable.

The aim of a risk assessment is to define and minimise the risks that have to be managed. Risk assessment techniques are fundamentally the same for large and small ports, but the execution and detail will differ considerably. A risk assessment will typically involve five stages:

• Problem identification, scoping and risk assessment design (information gathering)

• Hazard Identification

• Risk Analysis

• Assessment of Existing Risk Control Measures

• Identification of new Risk Control Measures

A port’s risk assessment should aim to identify the hazards that may occur, the events that may cause them and the risk control measures used to mitigate them. In order to further refine the risk assessment it may be appropriate to identify high risk operations and locations (e.g. for collision or grounding) within the port area and key vessel types thereby allowing more detailed assessment of the risk associated with the hazard.


The review of hazards normally takes two forms: proactive and reactive. The proactive approach establishes a structured and regular review (frequency will be dependent upon the outcome of the risk assessment and whether hazards are deemed to fall within the ALARP band) of the identified hazards. This involves the re-assessment (review) of hazards, their potential frequency, outcomes and consequent risk and associated risk control measures. The reactive approach prompts a review and identifies new hazards (and/or changes to existing hazards) following a change in trade or the scope of marine operations in the port, or following an incident or near miss, where the hazard may or may not have been identified previously in the risk assessment. All risks need to be reviewed; higher ranked risks should be reviewed more frequently than those ranked lower and will require greater management time and attention. The application of environmental consequences to the safety management system (and appropriate risk control measures) is essential. The proposed evaluation system is an estimation based on the identification of events with certain safety risk derived from the port activities carried out in ports and their associated probability. The characterisation of the safety aspects that it should be taken into consideration during the port operations will be valued by means the SIxy variable, where:

• Safety Impact (SI): It is defined as the variable which measures the consequences (positive or negative) of certain event (incident or accident) involving people or assets and which may cause some damage degree.

• Safety Aspect (x): It is defined as any potential risk situation associated to a certain activity. For instance, a safety aspect related to the loading and unloading of containers from a vessel would be the circulation of people or vehicles within the area of operations.

• Activity (y): It is defined as the operative processes that usually take place in port areas, involving cargo terminals operations, passenger traffics, vessels in-port navigation, on-road traffic, etc.

Thus, the variable SIxy represents the safety impact of certain aspect x associated to certain activity y. The previous variable is affected by three parameters:

• Frequency (Fxy): Number of times that the activity takes place.

• Consequences (Cxy): Facts that could take place in case of risk situation while developing the activity.

• Probability (Pxy): Possibility of risk situation while developing the activity.


In order to determine the value of the previous variable, the degree of observance of the normative in force in each case will also be taken into account. In case of non-fulfilment of the corresponding legislation, the safety aspect associated to a certain port activity would be significant in any case. These concepts must be parameterized with a scale of values that measure the degree of significance of each one. The following tables show the different scale for frequency, consequences and probability.


Table 1. Attributes for the Parameter “Frequency”


Table 2. Attributes for the Parameter “Consequences”


Frequency Meaning Punctuation

Very High The activity takes place more than once every day 10

High The activity takes place once every day 7

Medium The activity takes place once or twice a week 4

Low The activity takes place once or twice a month 2

Very Low The activity takes place once or twice a year 1

Uncertain The activity has not taken place in years, but it cannot be ruled out 0.5

Consequences Meaning Punctuation

Catastrophe Safety damages totally unrecoverable or losses up to € 10M or life lossesabove 30 people

100

Disaster Safety damages totally unrecoverable although it is possible to applycompensatory measures or losses up to € 5M or life losses below 30people

70

Very Serious Safety damages partially recoverable or losses up to € 0.5M 40

Serious Safety damages partially recoverable immediately or losses up € 250,000 30

Important Safety damages recoverable in the medium term or losses up to € 100,000 10

Assumable Damages immediately recoverable or losses up to € 1,000 1


Table 3. Attributes for the Parameter “Probability”


The evaluation of the impact is defined as follows:

SIxy = Fxy x Cxy x Pxy

In order to determine the signification of the safety aspects, a first classification of such aspects have to be carried out, scaling the degree of impact as the following table shows:

Table 4. Signification of the Safety Impact


Summarising, every safety aspect identified has to be evaluated with the parameters “Frequency”, “Consequences” and “Probability”, and the result of the application of this method provides a quantification of the safety impact of each aspect considered.

Probability Meaning Punctuation

Must Happen It is the most probable result if the risk situation happens 10

May Happen It is completely possible, with a probability of 50% or more 7

Rare but Possible It would be a rare situation or a coincidence, with a probability of10%

4

Not much usual It would be very strange that it happened, It is known that thesituation has happened few occasions in other places. Probabilityof 1%

2

Conceivable but improbable The situation has not happened in years of operation, but itcannot be ruled out

1

Impossible It is practically impossible that the situation happens. Probabilityless than 1%

0.5

Absolute Value of the Safety Impact Classification of the Impact Signification

1,000 < SIxy < 10,000 EXTREME

400 < SIxy < 1,000 MEDIUM

0.25 < SIxy < 400 LOW


2.4 Analysis of the Results Once the impact signification has been got, the control measures for each safety aspect will be analysed and categorized (distinguishing between low, medium and high). Then, it is possible to combine both factors in order to estimate the potential safety risk for each aspect according to the following classification:

Table 5. Correlation between Safety Impact and Risk


In this way, every safety aspect will have an associated risk that is listed below. The previous classification allows the definition of five categories according to the degree of safety risk.

Table 6. Definition of Safety Risk


Safe

ty Im

pact Extreme CRITIC RISK IMPORTANT RISK MODERATE RISK

Medium IMPORTANT RISK MODERATE RISK TOLERABLE RISK

Low MODERATE RISK TOLERABLE RISK NEGLIGIBLE RISK

Established control

Low Control Medium Control High Control

ACTIONS TO BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE SAFETY RISK

RISK ACTION

NegligibleImplantation of control measures is not required

TolerableThe applied actions are sufficient in order to controlproperly the safety risk. The application of periodicmonitoring activities so that verify that the efficacy ofthe control measures is assured as required

ModerateThe application of monitoring activities over the currentcontrol measures as well as the evaluation of additionalactions will be carried out yearly. The additional actionsshould be implemented in the middle term (2-3 years)

ImportantThe establishment of additional actions so that reducethe safety risk is required. The additional actions shouldbe implemented in the short term (1 year)

CriticThe immediate implementation of corrective actions sothat reduce the safety risk is necessary


3 Descriptive Taxonomy of Risks at Ports This section describes the taxonomy of the risks defined within the scope of MONALISA 2.0 and related to port-maritime activities. The taxonomy considers two types of risks; those related to operational safety (SF) and those related to security (SC). A codification a system has been considered in order to distinguish between these two types of risks as each one is subject to very different considerations. Following, a description of the risk taxonomy is provided according to the risk assessment methodology described above.

3.1 Maritime and Port Operational Safety Background International Safety Management (ISM) Code provides a structured and documented system for safe management and operation of ships and pollution prevention. The ISM code is mandatory for all ships over 500 GT in international traffic. The objectives of the safety management of the ship-owner (or other organisation or person who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the ship-owner) is to:

• Provide safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment.

• Assess all identified risks to company’s ships, personnel and the environment and establish appropriate safeguards.

• Improve safety management skills of personnel and ashore and on board ships continuously.

• Including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environmental protection.

Safety management system (SMS) consists of identification and evaluation of the hazards, operational control, management of change and planning for emergencies. Every company should develop, implement and maintain a SMS that includes the following functional requirements:

• A safety and environmental protection policy.

• Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation.

• Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel.

• Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of this Code.

• Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations.


• Procedures for internal audits and management reviews.

ISM code requires proactive and reactive risk management measures. The company has to define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting safety and pollution prevention.


3.2 Port Safety Risks Classification

3.2.1 SF-001 – Collisions A collision can be defined as an incident in which two or more parts smash into each other. To consider this incident as a collision, at least one part must be a mobile part.

Figure 5. Ship Collision with a Berth

Source: www.gtresearchnews.gatech.edu/

This situation is relatively common in places where many moving parts come together and is enhanced by the mass of the element that hits. This is the case of ports where there are large movements of mobile elements in both sheltered waters as at port terminal and in the hinterland areas within the port.

Figure 6. Ship Collision with a Pleasure Boat

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk


http://www.gtresearchnews.gatech.edu/

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/10018342/Royal-Navy-officers-yacht-collided-with-oil-tanker-after-straying-into-shipping-lane.html

Collisions often occur between merchant ships and other vessels in the maritime interface. These vessels could be those that provide regular auxiliary services as pilotage, towing or mooring. In addition it should be stressed that these vessels also record incidents involving pleasure boats or fishing vessels in waters near the port. Submarine smashing are also considered but probability of occurrence is lower than collisions on surface due to the low frequency of sub-marine navigation at ports. Collisions can be produced by inappropriate operational procedures like bad communication protocols, misunderstandings or negligent actions. On the other hand, external factors like weather conditions (strong wind and tides) could also produce collisions within a port involving vessels.

Figure 7. Ship Collisions in Open Sea

Source: www.cargolaw.com/

All collisions that happen between mobile parts with fixed are picked up, for example collisions with berths, jetties or pontoons, etc. as well as collisions with the seabed in port waters caused by an incorrect draught.


http://www.cargolaw.com/

Figure 8. RTG Collisions

Source: blog.cavotec.com

The huge wheeled traffic within the port is a focal point of collisions, especially at yard terminals when load/unload cargo is carried out from vessels to horizontal transport vehicles (terminal tractors, reach stackers, etc.) or vice-versa. Machinery involved in this cargo management within the terminal also sustains this type of risks, for example collisions between Rubber Tyred Gantry cranes (RTG), Straddle Carriers (SC), reach stackers, etc. Not only collisions with other machinery but also with facilities of the port terminal as well are included in this section.

Figure 9. Machinery impact with container in stack

Source: www.stuff.co.nz


http://blog.cavotec.com/

http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9588659/Lyttelton-Port-told-to-cut-container-stacks

3.2.2 SF-002 – Environmental Issues

This risk comprises the potential occurrence of incidents or accidents that could trigger an environmental damage caused by accidental or deliberated acts as spills, leakages or discharges of pollutants substances. Issues as dust, vibrations or noise in routine both port or vessel operations have been compiled and studied. Oil and chemical marine spills are the environmental events with greater impact. They not only affect to the nearby marine ecosystem, but also to coastal areas due to the effect of tides, damaging the flora and fauna of large areas. Examples of big spill disasters like the Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) have produced deep damages on European coastal areas, taking more than a decade to recover from such disasters.

Figure 10. Leaking Oil from a Container Ship

Source: www.rnw.nl

The treatment or management of MARPOL substances from vessels in case of port operations have a significantly relevance. Some examples of this type of MARPOL management are bilges process from vessels and ballast water, etc. Incidents related to hydrocarbon products, bunkering or transfer of chemical products has been compiled. This type of loading/unloading dangerous cargo in bulk liquid/solid state is highly pollutant.


http://www.rnw.nl/

Figure 11.Spillage of Cargo in Sheltered Waters

Source: www.gba-gulf.com

These incidents are often a consequence of a fire or explosions. Other consequences could be operative issues caused by weather conditions, etc. In other cases they may be triggered by recklessness of the crew, workers or passengers.

Figure 12. Oil Spill in Port Terminal

Source: www.stuff.co.nz


http://www.gba-gulf.com/

http://www.stuff.co.nz/

Finally, some spills or leakages of highly pollutant substances could happen due to wheeled traffic during transfer of cargo between port terminal or transport outside the port to the final destination in hinterland port.

Figure 13. Tanker Truck Incident within a Port

Source: www.angelfire.com

3.2.3 SF-003 – Fire

Fire is a state, process or instance of light, heat and flame due to burning. Outbreak of fire is also compiled in this section.

Figure 14. Fire on Board

Source: www.bbc.co.uk


http://www.angelfire.com/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/

This risk is easily identifiable when it occurs. This type of risk is mainly usual in vessels such as passenger, cargo vessel, pleasure ships or auxiliary service vessels.

Figure 15. Fire Hose at Burning Cargo Containers aboard a Merchant Cargo Vessel

Source: www.defense.gov

The fire could happen in certain parts of a vessel or facilities or in general and could be as a result of electric hazards, spills, dangerous goods leakages and collisions. This type of hazard can damage facilities or even the cargo that is managed in the yard. Even more, these incidents are frequently in warehouses areas or storages.

Figure 16. Customs Warehouse Fire

Source: www.cbsnews.com


http://www.defense.gov/

http://www.cbsnews.com/

Figure 17. Firemen Extinguishing a Fire in a Container Yard

Source: www.cnn.com

Finally, fire could happen in hinterland within the port due to accidents or collisions. Fire in buildings, bonded warehouses, port authorities buildings or port facilities complete the range of places in where this type of hazard occurs.


http://www.cnn.com/

3.2.4 SF-004 – Damage to the Vessel

This section refers to risks that may occur in sheltered waters at port due to damages to the vessels during its operative. Damages to ships colliding with some residual drift (wood, container, etc.) are considered as well as by grounding of the ship in the seabed. Possible causes are related to poor planning or bad dredging conditions.

Figure 18. Container Adrift

Source: www.wdrep.com

On the other hand, risks may happen in vessels on board by a result of fire caused by an electrical failure or a flood tank or hold on a he damaged vessel such as a fire caused by an electrical fault or a flood tank or hold on a waterway in the hulk.

Figure 19. Damaged Vessels Assisted by Multipurpose and Rescue Vessels

Source: Google Images


http://www.google.es/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&docid=FrOGmWVVGAfseM&tbnid=jj0v1hqiwQJ7SM:&ved=0CAQQjB0&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wdrep.com%2F_wp%2Fenvironment%2Frena-breaking-up-in-heavy-weather&ei=E5iqU4ztAYz07AawoYCYBA&bvm=bv.69620078,d.d2k&psig=AFQjCNG1R98YEX0-duXzIZBsMYw51t7c8w&ust=1403775329080713

Weather conditions imply difficult manoeuvring of the vessel and could damage its structure and even the loss of its parts.

Figure 20. Grounding Vessels Close to the Beach

Source: nauticajonkepa.wordpress.com

Cranes impacts with vessels during its operative in the yard could be other risk contemplated in this section. There are several causes of this type of risk as weather conditions, negligence of the workers or a simple maintenance failure in port facilities or machinery. Overturned machinery during cargo operations can be also recorded due to an incorrect weight of the cargo.

Figure 21. Slewing Crane Impacts with Berthed Vessel at Port



http://nauticajonkepa.wordpress.com/2012/09/30/los-buques-varados-en-el-saler-podrian-tardar-meses-en-salir/

3.2.5 SF-005 – Cargo Damages

This group of risks are related to breakdown, loss of or damage to freight, in other words, it covers the potential impact on the product or equipment being shipped as well as the container. These types of risks are especially present in the maritime-inland interface, when cargo is loaded and unloaded of the vessels. The risk could be due to improper operations, machinery failure and so on. Nevertheless, it could also happen in the port area. For instance, cargo dispersion in the via and cargo damages during inspection process at Customs warehouses, are among others. Finally, it has also been considered in this group of risks the possibility of cargo capsizing within the ship when it is sailing in sheltered waters. The two following figures illustrate this kind of hazards and show the scope of its impact.

Figure 22. Cargo Dispersion on the Port Terminal Yard



Figure 23. Falling RTG on a Truck.


3.2.6 SF-006 – Personal Injuries - Individual and Societal Risk

This group includes any type of hazard in the port caused as a result of accident; damage, mistake or vandalism and that could result in injuries to an individual or a group of people (societal risks). Societal risk is defined as the relationship between frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards [Jones, 1985]. Societal risk evaluation is concerned with estimation of the chances of more than one individual being harmed simultaneously by an incident. Consequences are assessed in terms of level of harm and the numbers affected (severity), to provide an idea of the scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed. Port-maritime activities present a great risk of individual and societal risks involving injuries due to the types of heavy-duty operations and the nature of goods operated (hazardous materials such as radioactive substances, fuels, chemical products, etc.), the high weight of the cargo and the machinery necessary to operate it. For that reason, it is recognised that no matter how informed the risk assessment process and how effective the safety management regime is, accidents and incidents do and will occur in ports. Such accidents and incidents may involve death and serious injury.


3.2.7 SF-007 – Port Machinery Accidents

The definition is an unfortunate happening that occurs unintentionally or any event that happens unexpectedly. All types of accidents with port machinery involved has been compiled and studied as RTG cranes, straddle carriers, incidents with spreaders in STS cranes, etc.

Figure 24. Cargo Hanged Up by a Spreader

Source: www.conductix.de

When parts of a crane as crab buckets, etc. hits parts of a ship or damages the cargo also is considered as accidents.

Figure 25. STS Crane Hits Container Stack

Source: www.constructionweekonline.com


http://www.conductix.de/

http://www.constructionweekonline.com/

Accidents due to traffic issues are considered as overturning of vehicles in the yard or inland roads within the port and interactions with train too.

Figure 26. Overturning of a Truck in Port Terminal


Finally, all accidents in buildings or warehouses have been compiled as falling rubbles, accident with forklifts or electrical risks.

Figure 27. Forklift Accident in Cargo Warehouse



3.2.8 SF-008 – Breakdowns

This risk is defined as a failure to work or function properly. There are several causes that result on incorrect or malfunction of machinery, etc. such as poor maintenance or negligence.

Figure 28. STS Crane Breakdown in the Yard

Source: mbmalta.com

The failure in port machinery is usual because of its operative. This machinery is running all the time in 24 hours schedule and require a regular maintenance in order to an effective operation.

Figure 29. Straddle Carrier Check Over

Source: www.douglas-gillespie.co.uk


http://mbmalta.com/services/technical-services/port-crane-erection/

http://www.douglas-gillespie.co.uk/?p=829

Breakdowns affect port terminal management. For example, when a ship ramp or a crane is not working properly, scheduled time on berth has been disrupted.

Figure 30. Vehicle Stopped in a Ship Ramp


This disruption could be occur in hinterland areas such as train transport within the port that may delay the operative of movement of cargo among port terminals.

Figure 31.Poor Maintenance of a Train



3.2.9 SF-009 - Explosions

At port area because of the nature of the work, all employees have enforcement responsibility for all fire and explosions precautions. Special care must be taken when handling explosion risk goods, which are substances known to be capable of accidental explosion under certain conditions, such as fire or heat. They require special precautions when being unloaded or loaded at a berth. These risks have a low frequency, but nevertheless the consequences could be catastrophic. A good and recent case study can be considered with regards to the accident that took place at the Port of Gibraltar. In May 31, 2011 a waste tank exploded in the Nature Port Reception Facilities in Gibraltar while welding was being performed in one of the tanks on the north pier of the Port. At that moment, in the cruise dock "Independence of the Seas" with 338.94m in length and with a capacity for 3,634 passengers and 1,365 crews was berthed. In the accident one worker died and 13 cruise passengers presented serious injuries and burns of varying severity. According to the report on the investigation, the cause of the accident was directly attributed to the poor condition of the tanks materials, which had holes in the decks of oil waste due to corrosion, thus allowing the output of flammable gases and seized when a welding job for deposits began. The investigation carried out by the specialist firm Capita Symonds indicated that one of the tanks had over 20 holes, and the second over 40. Ignition accumulated vapours and reached the stored product and the tank top where two port workers were at the moment of the accident. The heat built up pressure and made a hole on the opposite side where the two workers were. The main blast occurred near where they were performing welding tasks. The heat was transmitted from one tank to another through a pipe located at the top of each tank.

Figure 32. Gibraltar Port Explosion

Source: www.molinary.com/gibraltar-port-explosion-sets-off-major-emergency/


http://www.molinary.com/gibraltar-port-explosion-sets-off-major-emergency/

The actions taken after the explosion were oriented to safeguard human life. The cruise ship "Independence of the Seas", which was moored alongside at the time of the explosion, set off at a safe distance away from danger. The captain contacted the ground staff and on-going support was provided to the passengers and crew. As a result 12 passengers were injured with burns of varying severity and were treated on board. On the other hand the Government of Gibraltar opened an investigation in which it was determined that there was a lack of professionalism of the contractors to manage welding and the researchers considered that the maintenance of this plant at the current location should be subject to a detailed review. In this type of accident it is important to consider the potential multiplicative effects of a single incident that occurs in a port facility, which may cause negative effects on nearby facilities or vessels.

3.2.10 SF-010 – Operative Setback It is defined as a stopping or delay in one´s progress, reverse or defeat.

Figure 33. Container Stack Blocking Correct Operation in Yard

Source: www.cargolaw.com

All those accidentally incidents that block the correct operative in vessels, port terminal and hinterland have been compiled. Earthquakes, electric blackouts, radiations or falling objects that obstruct or stop operations within the port are incidents considered under this type of risk.


3.3 Maritime and Port Security Background This section describes some security risks associated to port activities that may be derived in safety consequences. Although the present study is very much focused on the safety dimension, some guidelines regarding security risk evaluation are provided in order to complete the wide scope of risks that may take place at ports. Security risk management principles create the background to the security management system and security policy development. The general risk management ISO 31000 Standard (2009) provides principles and generic guidelines on risk management and it can be used by any organisation no matter what size it is or what it does. All forms of risk such as financial, security, safety, health and environment are included in this risk management standard. On the other hand, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is a mandatory in all ports involved in international marine transport. According to IMO the aim of the ISPS port security measures are to maintain an acceptable level of risk at all security levels. Security measures should be devised to reduce risks and should in the main revolve around procedures to establish and control access to restricted areas and other vulnerable or sensitive key points, locations, functions or operations at port. The security policy should address the member States’ measures to (ISPS code 2011):

• Promote regional and international cooperation.

• Encourage maximum stakeholder participation in policy development.

• Provide adequate resources to effectively implement and sustain security policy.

• Recognise the importance of the human element: safety and security awareness, training and skill development.

• Recognise the interdependence between security and public safety, economic development and protection of the environment.

• The security policy should be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect changing circumstances.

The port operates on security level defined by contracting government. If ship is on higher security level than the port facility, the port facility must support the ship’s security measures. On "Security level 1" the minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times. Preventive measures are identified and taken against security incidents, the performance of all port facility duties is ensured, access is controlled, the port facility and restricted areas are monitored, the handling of cargo and ship’s stores are supervised, and security communication is ensured. On "Security level 2" appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. On "Security level 3" further specific


protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.

3.4 Port Security Risks Classification

3.4.1 SC-001 – Illegal Traffic Illegal traffic and smuggling are the most common security hazards from the point of view of port security. Smuggling is the illegal transportation of objects or people, such as out of a building, into a prison, or across an international border, in violation of applicable laws or other regulations. There are various motivations to smuggle. These include the participation in illegal trade, such as in the drug trade, in illegal immigration or illegal emigration, tax evasion, providing contraband to a prison inmate, or the theft of the items being smuggled. Examples of non-financial motivations include bringing banned items past a security checkpoint (such as airline or port security) or the removal of classified documents from a government or corporate office. Ports are extensively used worldwide to introduce goods illegally as well as illicit substances. Customs dedicate a great amount of technical and human resources in order to detect and intercept illegal traffic of goods or smuggling at ports. Despite all the efforts, illegal traffic of goods and drugs is still an important part of criminal actions in Europe, main the ports the main entrance to the continent from third party countries.

Figure 34. Intercepted Cistern Containing Cocaine within its Structure

Source: Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs


3.4.2 SC-002 – Terrorism

Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts that are intended to create fear or terror. These are perpetrated for a religious, political, or ideological goal; and deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants (e.g., neutral military personnel or civilians). Some definitions now include acts of unlawful violence and war. The use of similar tactics by criminal organisations for protection rackets or to enforce a code of silence is usually not labelled terrorism, though these same actions may be labelled terrorism when done by a politically motivated group. Contrary to other critical infrastructures like airports or railway stations, ports have not suffered terrorist attacks with the same intensity as the abovementioned facilities. Different reasons may be provided to justify this fact. On the one hand, ports are not hub attractors of people in the same way as the air or railway infrastructures, as ports are very focused on the transport of goods. In this manner, port terminals are industrial scenarios which involve very few people in comparison with airports or other transport facilities. Passenger terminals are the exception as these sensitive installations are those that concentrate the greatest number of people within a port and usually in specific seasons (for example Spring and Summer). On the other hand, it seems that terrorism has been focused on other means of transport due to the greater media impact generated by attacking airplanes and trains in the past years. However, some attempts of terrorist attacks over ports have taken place, especially focused on passenger terminals and ships. For this reason, especial attention must be paid on the security risk evaluation related to these facilities at European ports.

Figure 35. USS Cole Terrorist Attack at the Port of Aden (Yemen)

Source: Wikipedia Commons


3.4.3 SC-003 – Sabotage

Sabotage is a deliberate action aimed at weakening a polity or corporation through subversion, obstruction, disruption, or destruction. In a workplace setting, sabotage is the conscious withdrawal of efficiency generally directed at causing some change in workplace conditions. Like in any other industry or infrastructure, sabotages can take place due to different reasons, being necessary to consider this type of risk within the current study.

3.4.4 SC-004 – Social Conflicts

Ports are integrated by a wide variety of work collectivises which do not have to share the same interests necessarily. In this sense, ports have traditionally been work places with strong labour and social conflicts in many European countries, mainly originated by political and economic decisions based on national competitiveness (for example, the closure of iron and steel industries or shipyards within ports).

As ports are a critical part of the supply chain of nations, the economic impact derived from strikes or stopovers would generate strong negative impacts on national economies not only from the internal market perspective, but also from the point of view of external investment as one of the main criterion for shipping companies or port terminal operators to establish its operations in a port is the level of labour troubles.

Figure 36. Port Strikes and Riots



4 Extensive Port Risks Evaluation To be Completed


4.1 Maritime Interface Maritime Interface results have been validated with real information from the Port of Valencia and supervised by experts related to in-port maritime operations (pilots and maritime traffic controllers). Several interviews and meetings have been conducted by FVP staff in order to have the real and whole picture of incidents happening in ports or port approaches. The results obtained can be summarised as follows. From 32 potential risks identified, only 2 are considered as critical, 3 as important, 11 as moderate, 10 are tolerable and the rest represent a negligible risk for port operations. From the environmental perspective, impact of vessels when berthed at ports is significant in terms of pollutant, GHG emissions and noise, generating local and general pollution and affecting the populated nearby areas of European ports. Emission of pollutants and GHG caused by engines running on ports are regulated by Directive 1999/32/EC related to the Sulphur content of certain liquid fuels and on further pollutant emission reduction from maritime transport. In this manner, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) commissioned a study on the fuels used by passenger ships operating in the Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay. These are non SECA areas (Sulphur Emissions Control Areas) and passenger ships on regular service are obliged to use fuel with a maximum Sulphur content of 1.5%. The main results of the abovementioned study were:

• 1.5% SECA standard: 5-10% of tested samples exceeded the allowed Sulphur content.

• 0.1% "at berth" standard: 25% of the samples violated the maximum Sulphur limit.

• 1.5% standard for passenger ships outside SECA areas: With the exception of France and to some extent of Spain, the average Sulphur content of fuel was between 2.3% and 3.3%.

As a consequence, a recommendation of random sampling of fuels should be implemented to face this problem and reduce the number of environmental non-compliances. MARPOL Protocol referred to spills inside port approaches due to negligence of the Chief Engineer states that have to be avoided. Control measures currently include satellite identification, local search by means of aerial means, etc. In order to punish the shipping company is necessary to take a sample of the spill, which involves a substantial cost for Member States. This fact facilitates offenders get away without sanctions. This is a door open to innovative ideas for controlling this despicable behaviour. New environmental regulations have been in force during the last years. However, none of them have been taken into account the impact that noises and vibrations have in port areas and surroundings. The main source of these noises is caused for auxiliary engines and ventilations running on vessels berthed. Although the Port of Valencia and


other European ports have carried out assessments on the environmental impact produced by these phenomena, control measures have not been implemented waiting for new regulations to appear in this field. Important risks are resulting from unpredictable factors, overconfident behaviour or poor control measures. Weather forecasts are broadly available for every port area, including wind behaviour. Despite that mathematical models have been improved, there are special areas in which these predictions fail, (for instance the Gulf of Valencia) where conditions can vary from rough to calm weather in few hours. The probability of collisions due to damaged ropes, inappropriate anchoring, etc is important. Causes are associated to unforeseeable weather changes and over-confidence of seafarers. It would be strongly recommended to develop fair operational procedures in abnormal weather conditions, which include:

• Mooring recommendations.

• Limit conditions for allowing bunkering operation.

• Limit conditions for permitting port entrance, etc.

Table 7. Maritime Interface Risk Evaluation


Table 7 summarises the most critical risks associated to the maritime interface, where collisions (due to reckless behaviour) and environmental issues (noise and vibrations) appear as critical risks due to the combination of a high safety impact and low effectiveness of control measures. Collisions derived from manoeuvring operations are considered as an important risk as the level of control in this case is higher than the previous case. In the same manner, pollutant and GHG emissions appear as an important risk to be reduced with further efforts on regulatory and technological actions.

RISK REFERENCE TYPE OF RISK IMPACT DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE CAUSES

ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE

SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to reckless behaviour of

pleasure pilotage

Lack of suitable training of pleasure boat skipper 1,600 3 1 CRITICAL

SF-002 Environmental issues

Noises and vibrations in the ship

Caused by engines, ventilation, etc.

1,000 3 1 CRITICAL

SF-001 Collisions Manoeuvring within port waters Weather conditions, etc. 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Passenger/staff trip and fall at the same

level/different levelNegligence 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT

SF-002 Environmental issues Emission of pollutants

Emission of pollutants caused by engines running on port

1,000 3 2 IMPORTANT


Pilot overboard close to the port

The pilot fall into the water approaching to the

ship1,400 3 3 MODERATE

MARITIME INTERFACE


Table 8. Maritime Interface Port Risk Evaluation (II)


Concerning operational safety, ship collisions is a risk that deserves special attention. Causes of collisions inside ports usually are due to negligent or reckless sailing of vessels or pleasure ships caused by insufficient training. On the other hand, fatigue of masters and seafarers increases significantly the risk of accident. Masters’ fatigue is controlled by pilots on board for manoeuvring. Captains with pilot exemption deserves special attention, because they operate in short regular lines. Control measures such as random visits should be put in place, according to the number of manoeuvrings and timetable in the route. Pilot overboard during approaching to the ship deserves special consideration and measures of protection should be carefully analysed. Sometimes common dangerous practices have become part of the daily routine, thus accepting risky behaviours like normal conditions.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-004 Ship damages Crack or hole in the hull Rough weather conditions 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-002 Environmentalissues Spill of MARPOL Reckless of the chief

engineer 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to reckless behaviour of masters or seafarers.

Fatigue, negligence, etc 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in decks Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in holds Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in engine room Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in control room Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in bridge Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 Collisions Ship collision due to black-out Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to

breakdown in manoeuvring system

Electric or mechanical failures 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-004 Fire Ship with a breakdown in manoeuvring system

Mechanical or electrical failure 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-001 Collisions Ship collision with a tug Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

MARITIME INTERFACE


Table 9. Maritime Interface Port Risk Evaluation (III)


Terrorism is a constant threat in our society. Even through ports are not usual objectives of terrorist attacks; security controls and measures should be strengthened, especially in passenger traffics. A thorough study should be conducted in order to anticipate the impact of these measures in passenger traffics. Ship damages caused by rough weather or fire on board is mostly controlled. Substandard ships should be avoided in European waters. This risk has been described as moderate, however Maritime Authorities have recently put pressure on this type of vessels increasing the established control. In other cases, the applied actions are sufficient in order to control properly the safety risk. On the whole, risk associated to black-outs, breakdowns in manoeuvring systems, collisions with tug, cargo capsizing within the ship as a consequence of incorrect stowage, etc. are controlled, as well as security hazards like bomb threats. The rest of the risks associated to port activity are considered as negligible.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of the crew/passengers 350 1 1 MODERATE

SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to reckless behaviour of

fishing pilotage

Lack of suitable training of fishing skipper 200 1 1 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat 350 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-001 Collisions Ship collision with a submarine Detection error 350 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-001 Collisions Ship collision with pilot boat Several causes 300 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo capsizing within the ship

Due to incorrect cargo stowage or weather

conditions300 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-004 Ship damages Crack or hole in the hull Impact with a wood or a container adrift. 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-004 Ship damages Crack or hole in the hull Impact with a buoy 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-001 Collisions Due to incorrect dredging

Incorrect dredging planning 350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL

In case of risk of structural stability of the

ship350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Man overboard close to the port

Reckless, rough weather conditions 350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-004 Ship damages Ship capsizing or sunk Due to incorrect cargo stowage 350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Someone in Crew/passengers is

injured

Several causes. Epidemic. Infectious disease 150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

MARITIME INTERFACE


4.2 Maritime – Land Interface Maritime – Land Interface is a key scenario regarding risk assessment and evaluation at ports as it comprises the link between maritime and land operations related to cargo loading, unloading and handling as well as passenger management. In order to properly address the wide variety of risks associated to the different port activities taking place in this interface, a classification by type of terminal cargo has been considered as the nature of the cargo strongly determines the type of hazards and potential risks which may affect people and goods. The studied cargo and passenger terminals cover the following facilities:

• Passenger and Ro-Ro terminals

• Container terminals

• Liquid bulk terminals

• Solid bulk terminals

Additionally, nautical port services (piloting, towage and mooring) have been included in the risk evaluation due to the specific and sensible activities that involve in-port navigation, manoeuvring and berthing, being these critical actions that require a very accurate coordination among different operators. In fact, the great majority of incidents or accidents that take place during the maritime voyage take place during the manoeuvring and berthing stages.

4.2.1 Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Passenger and Ro-Ro terminals are very sensible facilities in terms of hazards and risks (both of safety and security) due to the great amount of people which can be concentrated in very short time periods, like for instance during the embarking or disembarking of ferries, cruises and Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessels. A great difference between cargo and passenger terminals is the fact that passenger facilities deal with passenger flows, whereas cargo terminals are mainly industrial facilities where a limited number of port workers develop cargo-handling operations. This is a differential factor that introduces in this type of port terminals significant hazards that may be derived into societal risks. Where the people exposed to incidents or accidents are members of the public, the term societal risk is often used. Where workers are isolated and members of the public are unlikely to be affected, the term group risk is often used. Here, the term societal risk is used to encompass both public and worker risk. Passenger and Ro-Ro terminals are transport infrastructures affected by the possibility of suffering societal risks. This implies not only consequences for the individuals or assets affected by a certain incident or accident, but also for wide societal groups not


directly involved. For instance, a fatal accident in a passenger terminal could influence in the decision of people about using maritime transport. Thus, it is critical for the maritime passenger shipping industry and for ports to properly address risk management as well as safety and security as key competitiveness instruments.


According to the following tables, the results of the risk evaluation associated to passenger and Ro-Ro port terminals studied are following provided according to the methodology applied in the project. Environmental issues appear as the most critical safety risks associated to vessels berthed at passenger and Ro-Ro terminals. Particularly, noises and pollutant emissions are of particular importance due to the proximity of high-populated areas close to most of European ports. Noises produced by vessels’ engines are classified as critical due to the lack of proper countermeasures implemented on board. This factor takes special relevance when considering cruise vessels that are often berthed near urban areas. Moreover, cruises usually stay at ports during day hours in order to allow cruise passenger to visit the different cities of the voyage, thus affecting with a continuous noise level increase the nearby urban areas. Pollutant emissions are another major environmental and safety risk as well as vessels are responsible for the 40% of the total pollutant emissions generated at ports according to different studies conducted by the Port of Valencia. Emissions can be divided in Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) like CO2 and CH4, which have direct impact on climate change and the increase of the global temperature, and pollutant emissions like sulphur compounds, particles and NOX compounds which may affect population in terms of respiratory illness. At present major concerns about pollutant emissions are being addressed by international bodies like IMO as well as the European Commission in order to reduce the environmental and health impacts of the shipping industry, especially at ports. The use of alternative fuels like liquefied natural gas (LNG) and technologies like scrubbers may help to reduce the amount of GHG and pollutant emissions generated by the shipping industry.


Table 10. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (I)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION



Due to ventilation, auxiliary engines, etc. 4,000 3 1 CRITICAL

SF-002 Environmental issues Emission of pollutants Caused by engines

running at port 4,000 3 2 IMPORTANT

SC-001 Illegal traffic Smuggling of tobacco and drugs

Caused by illegal behaviours 1,200 3 2 IMPORTANT

SF-008 Breakdowns Incorrect running of the ramp

Lack of maintenance or breakdown 1,400 3 3 MODERATE

SF-008 Breakdowns Incorrect running of the manoeuvring winch

Lack of maintenance or breakdown 1,400 3 3 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of the crew/passengers 1,000 3 3 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat 1,000 3 3 MODERATE

WHEELED CARGO AND PASSENGER PORT TERMINAL


Security risks are important within passenger and Ro-Ro terminals due to the high concentration of people at these facilities. Terrorism is probably the most remarkable hazard to be considered in terms of societal risks due to the deep negative consequences of a terrorist attack in a port involving hundreds or thousands of people. Since the 11th September attack several security actions have taken place in ports at international level, including the scanning of cargo to detect radioactive illicit cargo (Container Security and Megaports Initiatives). In passenger terminals improvements on documentation control and scanning of personal belongings have taken place. Fortunately, terrorism threats at international level seem to have decreased in general but continuous surveillance, deployment of new technologies and security protocols are needed.

Table 11. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-008 Breakdowns Vehicle stopped in the ship ramp Electrical breakdown 800 2 1 IMPORTANT

SF-005 Cargo damages Several causes Bad operation with the cargo 600 2 2 MODERATE


Vehicle hits a passenger or staff

Negligence in both cargo loading/unloading and

passengers disembarking at the same time

600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Reckless of the chief

engineer 400 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 Collisions Ship collision with a berth, pontoon or jetty

Failure in manoeuvring system 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Incorrect running of the gangway

Lack of maintenance or breakdown 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in decks Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in holds Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in engine room Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in control room Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in bridge Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-004 Ship damages Flooding the cargo hold Negligence 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-007 AccidentAccident due to contact with mobile parts in the

yardAccident 600 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Discharge of pollutants 400 2 3 TOLERABLE


Someone in Crew/passengers is

injured

Several causes. Epidemic. Infectious disease 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SC-004 Social conflict Passenger conflict Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-004 Ship damages Gangway drop in the yard Several causes (weather, negligence, etc.) 400 2 3 TOLERABLE



Smuggling is another remarkable security risk especially in regular ferry lines connecting different countries. In the case of Spain, connections with Northern Africa register high level of tobacco and alcohol smuggling. Consequences derived from smuggling are more related to economic impact than to safety, so in this case the role of competent authorities like Customs and Port Authorities are essential to reduce or mitigate it.

Table 12. Passenger and Ro-Ro Terminals Risk Evaluation (III)


Operational safety risks like breakdowns, collisions, fires or inappropriate cargo handling may cause serious incidents or accidents. The level of control measures in this field are defined and regulated by the internal auto-protection plan of each facility and for quality operational procedures. Operational procedures are usually well addressed and training of personnel in charge helps to maintain an acceptable level of safety (ALARP zone). Nevertheless, it is important to keep operational rules and training under continuous improvement and revision in order to detect the remaining safety gaps that may start an incident or accident that may affect passengers or workers.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in yardCaused by

unloading/loading operations

300 1 1 MODERATE

SF-005 Cargo damages Vehicle dropped into the water

Negligence of the stevedoring or drivers 200 1 1 MODERATE


Vehicle leakage of oil or fuel

Maintenance of the vehicle 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Stowaway onboard Illegal person on board 200 1 2 TOLERABLE


Man overboard within the port Reckless 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-007 Accident Falling objects or material hanged up

Several causes in the crane, etc. 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



level/different levelSeveral causes 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Vehicle stolen in the yard Delinquency 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Attack people Delinquency 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



4.2.2 Container Terminals

Container terminals are the most advanced and sophisticated cargo terminals in the port sector due to the wide variety of machinery and operations involved. The rising need of increasing the levels of productivity and mobility of cargo inside and outside the ports is pushing container terminals to increase their efficiency and reliability at all levels (operational, energy, environmental, etc.) The level of software control and automation is growing up and currently there are some fully and semi-automated container terminals operating in Europe. This fact can increase the safety and security levels as the human factor, which most of the times is responsible of incidents and accidents, is significantly reduced. On the other hand, the great majority of container terminals still present a high level of human intervention at operational level, thus increasing the risk of incidents or accidents which may cause important damages on people and assets. Container terminals operate heavy cargo using heavy-duty machinery, being training one of the key instruments to assure an appropriate operational performance.

Table 13. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (I)


From the point of view of environmental risks, the impact of the berthed vessels associated to noise and vibrations as well as the noise of port machinery strongly affects the nearby populated areas. Control measures in this sense currently are not properly addressed due to lack of planning of port spaces and effective noise mitigation plans. Pollutant emissions is another major environmental risk due to the extensive use of fuels in a continuous operational cycle of 365/24. Average container terminals moving



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION





Noises and vibrations motivated by cranes Due to crane operations 1,000 3 1 CRITICAL

SF-001 Collisions RTG collisions with vehicles, mafis and lorries Negligence 1,600 3 2 IMPORTANT

SF-001 CollisionsCrane collisions with trucks running in the

yardNegligence 1,200 3 2 IMPORTANT

SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict / strike Several causes 1,120 3 2 IMPORTANT



CONTAINER TERMINAL


around 600,000 TEUs per year can consume more than 4 million litres of fuel, thus generating a great amount of CO2, NOX compounds and particulate matter which affect nearby populated areas.


Operational risks are significant due to the complexity of cargo handling operations at port container terminals. A wide typology of machinery including vehicles and cranes operate simultaneously loading, unloading and transporting containers at the terminal. Interactions among them are very frequent and can generate collisions, fire and personal injuries. The most common collisions involve yard cranes like Rubber Tyred Gantry cranes and vehicles as they share the same space of circulation. Collisions between vehicles and Ship-to-Shore cranes, although less frequent, also can take place with the additional risk of falling from the berth to the water.

Table 14. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-005 Cargo damages Loading/unloading cargo Twistlocks failure with the spreader 700 2 1 IMPORTANT

SF-001 Collisions Truck collisions Careless driving 400 2 1 IMPORTANT


Staff trip and fall at the same level/different level Several causes 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 CollisionsCrane collisions in loading/unloading

operations

Due to Negligence of the stevedoring 800 2 2 MODERATE


Crane runs over staff or trucks Negligence 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 Collisions Crane crash with the bridge wing of the ship Negligence 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire of the cargo in the yard Several causes 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-001 Collisions RTG collisions Negligence 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-007 Accident Spreader jumping Incorrect operation 800 2 2 MODERATE


RTG runs over staff or trucks Negligence 800 2 2 MODERATE


Vehicle hits staff in the yard

Negligence in both cargo loading/unloading 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in terminal facilities Electrical failure, reckless, etc 800 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in decks Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in holds Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in engine room Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in control room Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-003 Fire Fire in bridge Electrical breakdown 700 2 2 MODERATE

SF-007 Accident Overturning of crane Extreme winds, bad weather conditions 700 2 2 MODERATE

CONTAINER TERMINAL


Table 15. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (III)


Security risks are also of particular importance as containers can be used to introduce undeclared cargo in a European Member State (for example, a declared empty container which contains illegal cargo) or illicit substances (drugs, etc.). Security control measures like the Container Security Initiative and the Megaports project promoted by the United States are operative since 2004 at the most important European ports.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dropped into the water

Negligence of the crane stevedoring 600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dropped towards the ship, yard, crane, etc

Negligence of the stevedoring in

loading/unloading operations

600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo damages in a traffic crash

Bad operation with the cargo 600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-005 Cargo damages Loading/unloading cargo Bad operation with the cargo 600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-007 Accident Overturning of truck with or without cargo Bad driving 600 2 2 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Cargo stolen in the yard Delinquency 420 2 2 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Attack people or facilities Delinquency 420 2 2 MODERATE


Blow with a sling during cargo operations Accident 400 2 2 MODERATE


Failure in manoeuvring system 800 2 3 TOLERABLE


Trucks hits the staff under the crane Accident 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Step on a sharp object negligence due to lack of

cleaning of the work area 600 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Oil Leakage of the crane over the cargo and ship

Poor maintenance of the crane 600 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion of a container carrying HAZID Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE


Worker trapped with spreader

Security distance in cargo operations 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Crane breakdown Crane breakdown due to poor maintenance 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Electrical failure of the crane Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-007 Accident Overturning of Straddle Carrier Bad driving 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

CONTAINER TERMINAL


Table 16. Container Terminals Risk Evaluation (IV)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-007 AccidentStevedore/dockworker

falls due to vessel ladder inclination

Excessive ladder inclination 200 1 1 MODERATE

SF-002 Environmental issues Ballast water

Bad operation with the treatment of this type of

cargo160 1 1 MODERATE

SF-002 Environmental issues Leakages from trucks Poor maintenance 40 1 1 MODERATE


Man overboard within the port Reckless 320 1 2 TOLERABLE


Someone in Crew/terminal operators

is injured


SF-005 Cargo damages Container lost Several causes 300 1 2 TOLERABLE


Spill of the cargo towards ship, yard, crane, sea, etc

Bad operation with the cargo 300 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dropped in a stack Several causes 300 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dispersion in the yard

Due to container breakage 300 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities Malicious 280 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions terrorism Attack Terrorism 280 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat 245 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat - Diving driver 245 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Airplane impact in container terminal Terrorism 245 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Oil Leakage of the crane Use (vibrations), poor

maintenance 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of the crew 140 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the cargo Malicious 140 1 2 TOLERABLE


Caused by illegal behaviours 14 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Stowaway onboard Illegal person onboard 14 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Stowaway within the container

Illegal person within the cargo 14 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-010 Operative Setback

Falling objects or material hanged up

avoiding correct movement of the crane

Several causes 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


engineer 80 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Discharge of pollutants 17.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

CONTAINER TERMINAL


4.2.3 Liquid Bulk Terminals (Oil and Chemical)

Liquid bulk terminals are characterised for loading, unloading and storing dangerous goods cargoes, especially liquid fuels and chemical products. Contrary to container terminals where operational safety risks present a significant improvement margin, operational safety in this type of terminals is very well addressed. The preparatory step in drafting the risk evaluation consisted in identifying and all the major operations and activities associated with the storage and handling of dangerous goods in ports areas and the storage and handling of fuels and hazardous substances. The main hazards for ports or terminals handling dangerous goods located close to densely populated areas are increased numbers of lives lost, persons injured or property damaged if an emergency arises. Emergency response plans must take into account the possibility that local communities will need to be evacuated, extra manpower necessary and more difficult access to the premises for emergency services. Increased frequency of trucks carrying dangerous goods on and off the premises increases the risk of those trucks getting involved in a road accident. As liquid bulk terminals deal with dangerous goods with high potential to cause environmental and safety impacts both inside and outside the facility, established control measures are able to minimise the potential consequences of incidents and accidents.

Table 17. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (I)


Environmental risks like leakages and spills could cause severe marine pollution with high recovery costs for ports and nearby areas like urban beaches or natural ecosystems. These risks are usually minimised by the implementation of effective countermeasures both preventative and reactive. On the other hand security risks, although classified as moderate, have to be considered due to the high sensitivity of liquid bulk terminals. One of the main hazard investigated in the risk evaluation is the possibility of having uncontrolled access to port and terminal facilities. Uncontrolled access means there is a risk that members of the



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Hijack of the terminal 1,000 3 3 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat, Bomb threat - Diving driver 1,000 3 3 MODERATE

SC-002 Criminal actions Airplane impact in container terminal Terrorism 1,000 3 3 MODERATE

LIQUID BULK TERMINALS


public could damage equipment, steal liquid bulk products, damage packaged dangerous goods or cause fires or explosions either deliberately or unintentionally.

Table 18. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (II)


The risk evaluation studied hazards associated to the storage of liquids and gases at ports and terminals. The main hazards related to the condition and structure of the tanks were considered. A tank collapsing or leaking can result in the spillage of flammable liquids and release explosive or toxic vapours. Cargo pumps together with cargo pipes and hoses are the core of oil terminals. As cargo pumps are used on a daily basis, they should be regularly inspected and well



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict / strike Several causes 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Leakage from cargo tank

Structural damage, collision damage if this identified as a credible

risk in the HAZID

700 2 3 TOLERABLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the cargo Malicious 700 2 3 TOLERABLE


Releases during transfer truck

Rupture of transfer hoses, truck or piping.

Operational errors, mechanical errors

600 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Electric failure of the facilities Several causes 600 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Inflammable cloud in terminal

Leakage due to poor maintenance or damaged

facilities, tools.500 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-009 Explosions Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

Fire impact on pressurized hydrocarbon liquid containers. BLEVE

is only considered as a potential threat for

pressurised storage tank, where the loadbearing structure is exposed to

fire loads

400 2 3 TOLERABLE


Inadvertent disconnection of hoses

Improper hose connection, hose failure, excessive movement of

the loading arm or transfer system,

Inadequate mooring or mooring line failure, etc.

400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-010 Operative Setback Electric hazards Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities or machinery Malicious 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Heat radiation Caused by wind, fire or

gas 400 2 3 TOLERABLE



maintained. Inspection and maintenance records should be kept and procedures developed for safe operations.


Table 19. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (III)


Cargo transfer hoses and pipes are often the cause of cargo spillage. They should be visually inspected for deterioration and damage at regular intervals. Records of these inspections should be kept during the service of the hose. Hoses. The main hazards associated with the use of cargo hoses and pipes include leaking, not being properly rigged and specifications not being followed.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Man overboard within the port Reckless 70 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-009 Explosions Tank explosion Several causes 350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision with facilities

Caused by negligence or terrorism, sabotage, etc. 350 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Tank PSV release Tank overfilling, tank

overpressure, rollover 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Leakage of toxic gases Pipe breakdown or

cracked 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-001 Collisions Passing ship adrift Negligence 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion caused by vehicles

Several causes as traffic issues among others 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in decks Electrical breakdown 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in holds Electrical breakdown 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in engine room Electrical breakdown 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in control room Electrical breakdown 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in bridge Electrical breakdown 280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of FAME oil

Reckless or poor maintenance in truck

zones240 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Overfilling & Overpressuring vessel

fuel tanks

Operator and level controller fail to stop flow

when tank is full200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of liquid cargo Reckless of the chief

engineer, other causes 160 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Discharge of pollutants 160 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Tank leakage in the ship or yard

Dropped in tank pump, internal or external leak

in tank bottom, earthquake, etc.

150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Leak full bore rupture

Mechanical failure mode, loss of mooring, drift off, passing ship adrift, etc.

140 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Table 20. Petrochemical Terminals Risk Evaluation (IV)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Staff drop at the same level/different level Several causes 140 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Overflow tray during the transfer of cargo Poor maintenance 120 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Accidental release from equipment and piping

Lack of flange tightness, defective gasket, weld

defects, corrosion, impact, supporting structure damage,

external fire, overpressure,

embrittlement, earthquake, floods and

weather conditions

100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Ship pressure relief valve Overpressure, rollover 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Attack people Delinquency 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Freeze of part of the body Caused by manipulating

LNG 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Tank overflow during the transfer of cargo

Negligence. Error in measurement tool 80 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-007 Accident Overturning of truck with or without cargo Bad driving 80 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Leaks from piping and manifold

Several Causes, maintenance, corrosion, erosion, fatigue failure, hose failure, improper

maintenance, piping not cooled down prior to transfer, seal failure, vibration, improper

installation or handling, etc.

40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Stowaway onboard Illegal person in the ship 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Vehicle hits staff in the yard Accident 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Illegal traffic of substances 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Someone in crew/ terminal operator is

injuredSeveral causes 35 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire pool or jet fire Poor maintenance or damaged facilities 25 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire of the cargo in the yard

Caused by staff negligence 25 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion in the yardDue to accumulation of

explosive gases in concrete points

20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-010 Operative Setback Earthquake movements Caused by natural hazards 20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-010 Operative Setback Unbalanced tanks Poor maintenance, training of the worker 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Burn of staff

Contact with heat parts or heat sources. Thermal

contact2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



4.2.4 Solid Bulk Terminals

Solid bulk terminals usually present strong environmental risks due to the nature of the cargo handled, although the overall risk can be considered lower than oil and chemical liquid bulk terminals. Solid bulk terminals are usually dedicated to import and export alimentary bulk products like cereals, seeds, etc. or construction raw materials like clinker, gypsum, etc.

Table 21. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (I)


The most significant risks associated to bulk terminals are related to environmental aspects and operational safety. Individual and societal injuries are considered as a significant risk, especially those caused by incidents and accidents in terminal operations. Collisions and accidents involving heavy-duty machinery could result in serious incidents or accidents that may cause even loss of life. Environmental aspects like particulate matter suspension have to be taken into account due the potential impact on populated nearby areas. Storage conditions of big amounts of building raw materials (clinker or gypsum) should be properly addressed within the operational and emergency plans of bulk terminals. Health and labour safety protocols need to be continuously reviewed in order to keep a proper control of operational risks at bulk terminals.



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Machinery hits staff within the hold

Negligence in both cargo loading/unloading 2,100 3 3 MODERATE

SF-010 Operative Setback

Falling objects or material hanged up in the

crab bucket within the hold

Several causes 700 2 2 MODERATE


Noises and vibrations caused by cranes During normal operation 700 1 1 MODERATE

SF-007 Accident Hit with crab bucket to parts of the ship Negligence, others… 400 2 2 MODERATE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Dust inhalation

Particles in the air due to cargo operations or bad

air circulation within the hold

400 2 3 TOLERABLE


Particle emissions during cargo

Due to cargo composition, wind, etc 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo collapse during cargo operations

Due to accidental issues or bad practices. Bad stowing of the cargo

400 2 3 TOLERABLE


Someone in Crew/terminal operator is

injuredSeveral causes 400 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SOLID BULK TERMINALS


Table 22. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Breakdown, negligence, etc 280 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-007 Accident Hit with crab bucket to machinery within a hold Negligence 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo damages in a traffic crash

Bad operation with the cargo 10 1 2 TOLERABLE


Emission of toxic pollutants Due to cargo composition 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Crane runs over staff or trucks Negligence 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Liquefaction of the cargoweather conditions and

cargo operations temperature

280 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire of the cargo in the hold

Caused by fermentation of the cargo 210 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict / strike Several causes 160 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Vehicle hits staff in the yard

Negligence in both cargo loading/unloading 150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in terminal facilities Electrical failure, reckless, etc 140 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Worker trapped with crab bucket

Security distance in cargo operations 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in yard with facilities or ship Caused by port traffic 70 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Table 23. Solid Bulk Terminals Risk Evaluation (III)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-005 Cargo damages Throwing cargo during operations Due to accidental issues 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Spill of oil from the crane on the cargo

Due to connection tube breaking 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Staff trip and fall at the same level/different level Several causes 20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries asphalt inhalation

Gases in the air due to cargo operations or bad

air circulation within the hold

20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Stowaway onboard Ilegal person in the ship 14 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Hijack of the terminal 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the cargo Malicious 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Cargo stolen in the yard Delinquency 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Burn of staff Contact with caustic or

corrosive particles 2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities or machinery Malicious 2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Man overboard within the port Reckless 0.3 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



4.2.5 Port Services and other Activities: Piloting, Towage, Mooring and Bunkering

Piloting aims to provide safety and traffic management of vessels navigating within port waters. Pilots with local knowledge have been employed on board ships to guide vessels into or out of port safely (or wherever navigation may be considered hazardous) particularly when a shipmaster is unfamiliar with the area. In addition to local knowledge and expertise, pilots are able to provide effective communication with the shore and with tugs, often in the local language. The importance of employing qualified pilots in approaches to ports and other areas where specialised local knowledge is required was formally recognised by IMO in 1968, when the Organisation adopted Assembly resolution A.159(ES.IV). The most important risk associated to pilot activities is to fall off boat when the pilot is getting on board the ship (particularly when the weather is bad or the ship is very large). In spite of the fact that IMO is committed to make marine pilots transfer safer, the traditional method of transferring via a pilot ladder has resulted in fatalities and serious injuries. Results indicate that the safety of the current transfer arrangement would be increased through alternative strategies including ladder design improvements, use of fall protection systems and/or the use of mechanical personnel elevation systems. Risk has been described as important and recommendations from IMO should be implemented by owners in a short period of time. Requirements to make this process feasible are reflected in Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention, and have also formed the subject of IMO resolutions covering performance standards for mechanical pilot hoists (A.275(VIII)), arrangements for embarking and disembarking pilots in very large ships (A.426(XI)) and pilot transfer arrangements (A.667(16)). IMO has also adopted the Recommendation on Pilot Transfer Arrangements (Resolution A.889(21)) and approved MSC/Circ.568/Rev.1: Required Boarding Arrangement for Pilots. Towage is the action of providing assistance to incoming and outgoing ships into ports, such as Ro-Ro vessels, oil and chemical tankers, container ships, refrigerated cargo ships and general cargo carriers. Towage is largely split into three main groups of exposure:

• Harbour – berthing assistance & repositioning within harbour limits

• Dead-ship – ocean tow of a disabled or salvaged vessel

• Tug and ship operations – ocean & coastal towage as the principal commercial activity


Towing is a complicated procedure that requires particular focus on the stresses exerted on the tug, ship and the tow cable connecting the two vessels. The breakdown of a tow cable at sea can lead to a difficult and dangerous re-connection process or lead to the loss of the towed vessel (ship & cargo). In addition, the towed vessel will usually be un-manned and has no motive power. This means that it will be very susceptible to ocean and weather conditions (wind, tide and sea state). Stability can also be a significant consideration where the vessel is loaded with cargo. The most likely harbour towage operations safety event is collision caused by incidents during towing manoeuvre, such as wire rope break or black-out. Collisions are in consequence of the reduced manoeuvring space, abnormal speed, human factors, low visibility at night or due to weather conditions. The most likely consequence is ship damage followed by injury caused by falls and wire ropes handling. There is also evidence of a prominent risk of loss of life. Qualified seafarers are aware of the fact that a snap-back zone exists when a towing line is under tension. If these areas are painted on the deck then crew will be alerted to the danger when they notice they are standing in a highlighted zone. Owners should provide towing plans in order to minimise the risk. One of the most frequent risk factors is the lack in training, which is not specific to harbour towage operations. In addition, training is linked with other risk factors such as tug handling, crew qualities or inadequate level of communications in foreign languages. Furthermore, towing hook emergency-quick release mechanisms that were not well maintained, have been the cause of several accidents. Mooring is often accomplished using thick ropes called mooring lines. The lines are fixed to deck fittings on the vessel at one end, and fittings on the shore, such as bollards, rings, or cleats, on the other end. Mooring requires cooperation among people on the pier and on board the vessel. For larger vessels, heavy mooring lines are often passed to the people on the shore by means of smaller, weighted heaving lines. Once the mooring line is attached to the bollard, it is pulled tight. On large ships, this tightening can be accomplished with the help of heavy machinery called mooring winches or capstans.


Figure 37. Example of Mooring Scheme

Number Name Purpose

1 Head line Keep forward part of the ship against the dock

2 Forward Breast Line Keep close to pier

3 Forward Spring Prevent from advancing

4 Aft Spring Prevent from moving back

5 Aft Breast line Keep close to pier

6 Stern line Prevent forwards movement Risks associated to mooring activities vary from critical to important. As a consequence, appropriate control measures should be put into place to protect people and parts of the ships affected. Based on the findings of risk assessment, several areas deserve special attention. First and foremost, during mooring and un-mooring operations a sufficient number of personnel should always be available at each end of the vessel to ensure a safe operation. Areas where mooring operations are to be undertaken should be free as far as possible and all equipment used in mooring operations should be regularly inspected. However, most of the accidents related to mooring occur during the ropes handling operations, where ropes have broken or where ropes have jumped/slipped off drum ends. Injuries from non-broken ropes or wires normally occur due to crew being caught up in those ropes/wires or due to slipping off on drum ends during normal mooring operation. It is recommended that personnel are not in any circumstances stand in a bight of rope or wire. Operation of winches should preferably be undertaken by competent personnel to ensure that excessive loads do not arise on moorings.


Figure 38. Potential Snack Back Areas

Source: MCA

Next Figure shows the Critical and Important risks associated to port services and bunkering operations.

Table 24. Port Services Risk Evaluation (I)


SERVICE RISK REFERENCE TYPE OF RISK IMPACT DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE CAUSES

ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

MOORING SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict/ strike Several causes 2,800 3 1 CRITICAL

TUG SERVICES SF-004 Ship damages Wire rope break during towing manoeuvre Strength 1,600 3 1 CRITICAL

MOORING SF-004 Ship damagesRope break when the

ship is mooring manoeuvre

Strength, wind, inadequate mooring,

etc.1,600 3 1 CRITICAL

TUG SERVICES SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict/ strike Several causes 2,800 3 2 IMPORTANT

BUNKERING SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict / strike Several causes 2,800 3 2 IMPORTANT

TUG SERVICES SF-001 Collisions Ship collision due towing manoeuvre Several causes 2,800 3 3 MODERATE

TUG SERVICES SF-001 Collisions Tug collision due to black-out Electrical breakdown 2,800 3 3 MODERATE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues


During bunkering operations due to bad weather conditions,

etc.

1,600 3 3 MODERATE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire pool or jet fire Poor maintenance or damaged facilities 1,600 3 3 MODERATE

BUNKERING SF-010 Operative Setback Electric hazards Several causes 1,200 3 3 MODERATE

PORT SERVICES


Bunkering is the terminology used in the shipping industry to describe the selling of fuel, from specialised vessels (barges) designed for that particular task, transferring fuel from one ship to another (i.e. ship to ship transfer of fuel). All bunkering operations should be carefully planned and executed in accordance with MARPOL regulations. Pollution caused when heavy fuel oil is split is particularly damaging and difficult to clean up. Spillages and leakages during bunkering operations are a primary source of oil pollution from ships. Experience has shown that many of the bunker overflows and spillages that occur can be attributed to human error. Personnel involved in bunkering operations on board should have no other tasks and should remain at their workstations during the bunkering process. This is particularly important when bunkers are being loaded concurrent with cargo operations in order to avoid conflicts of interest for operational personnel. Spillages often occur when staff is distracted by another task. Most bunkering operations are conducted and completed without any incident. This is mainly due to the successful implementation of careful risk assessment and effective control measures. For this reason, the solely important risk found affecting bunkering operations is associated to staff conflict or strike. The accidental release/leakage from equipment or hoses presents a moderate risk. The rest of spillages and leakages caused by inadequate maintenance of hoses or equipment, tank overfilling, reckless, etc. are described as tolerable or negligible. The successful result is a direct consequence of deterrent fines. Criminal actions, such as kidnapping or bomb threat show a moderate risk, which is caused by poor control measures. In general terms, security measures need to be reviewed because this risk is not particular of bunker operations. The application of suitable control measures makes possible to keep fire pool or fire jet risk under control (moderate). The main potential cause of explosion is due to traffic accident. Personal injuries deserve special attention. On one hand, it is necessary to increase the awareness of seafarer regarding risk prevention on board. On the other hand, experienced staff is becoming more and more to find. Training courses dealing the special requirements of this sector should have to be delivered to involved personnel.


Next Figure shows Important, Moderate and Tolerable risks associated to port services and bunkering activities.

Table 25. Port Services Risk Evaluation (II)



ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

PILOTAGE SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Pilot overboard within the seawater Reckless 400 2 1 IMPORTANT

MOORING SF-007 Accident Accident with wire rope Several causes 400 2 1 IMPORTANT

MOORING SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Hand worker trapped during mooring

The hand is trapped between the rope and

noray400 2 1 IMPORTANT

BUNKERING SF-009 Explosions Explosion caused by vehicles

Several causes as traffic issues among others 800 2 2 MODERATE

BUNKERING SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of the terminal 700 2 2 MODERATE

BUNKERING SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat, Bomb threat - Diving driver 700 2 2 MODERATE

TUG SERVICES SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Staff trip and fall at the same level/different level Several causes 400 2 2 MODERATE

BUNKERING SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Man overboard within the port Reckless 400 2 2 MODERATE


Staff drop at the same level/different level Several causes 400 2 2 MODERATE


Someone in Crew/terminal operator is

injuredAccident 400 2 2 MODERATE

TUG SERVICES SF-003 Fire Fire in pilot tug

Fire in engine room due to leakages of fuel, electrical failure. Fire

in bridge.

800 2 3 TOLERABLE



Lack of flange tightness, defective

gasket, weld defects, corrosion, impact,

supporting structure damage, external fire,

overpressure, embrittlement,

earthquake, floods and weather conditions

800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-009 Explosions boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

Fire impact on pressurized

hydrocarbon liquid containers. BLEVE is only considered as a potential threat for pressurised storage

tank, where the load-bearing structure is exposed to fire loads

800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-009 Explosions Explosion in the yardDue to accumulation of explosive gases in

specific points800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SC-003 sabotage Sabotage of the cargo Malicious 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

PORT SERVICES


Next tables show the risks with low probability of generating serious impact on bulk terminals due to the low probability of occurrence joined with the appropriate establishment of control measures.

Table 26. Port Services Risk Evaluation (III)



ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

BUNKERING SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities or machinery Malicious 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Reckless of the chief

engineer 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire of the bunkering truck

Caused by staff negligence 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire in decks Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire in holds Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire in engine room Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire in control room Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-003 Fire Fire in bridge Electrical breakdown 700 2 3 TOLERABLE


Staff trip and fall at the same level/different level Several causes 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

PILOTAGE SF-003 Fire Fire in pilot boatFire in engine room

due to leakages of fuel, electrical failure

400 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-001 Collisions Passing ship adrift Negligence 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision with facilities

Caused by negligence or terrorism, sabotage,

etc.400 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-007 Accident Overturning of truck with or without cargo Bad driving 400 2 3 TOLERABLE

BUNKERING SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Burn of staff

Contact with heat parts or heat sources. Thermal contact

400 2 3 TOLERABLE

PORT SERVICES


Table 27. Port Services Risk Evaluation (IV)



ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

BUNKERING SC-002 Criminal actions Airplane impact in bunkering barge Terrorism 350 1 2 TOLERABLE


Leaks from piping/hoses during bunkering

Several Causes, maintenance,

corrosion, erosion, fatigue failure, hose

failure, improper maintenance, piping

not cooled down prior to transfer, seal failure,

vibration, improper installation or handling, etc.

200 1 2 TOLERABLE


Overboard within worker the port Reckless 40 1 2 TOLERABLE


Pilot trapped during disembarking from the

ship to the pilot boat

Rough weather conditions, bad

practices from the skipper

300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

WORKSHOP MAINTENANCE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Lack of oxygen During welding, toxic

gas concentration, etc 240 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

TUG SERVICES SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of tug machinery

Sabotage of towing machinery 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Leakage from cargo tank (only for bunkering services by trucks)


risk in the HAZID

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Improper hose connection, hose failure, excessive movement of the

loading arm or transfer system, Inadequate

mooring or mooring line failure, etc.

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Tank leakage in the ship or yard

Dropped in tank pump, internal or

external leak in tank bottom, earthquake,

etc.

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Tank PSV release (trucks) Tank overfilling, tank

overpressure, rollover 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Leakage of toxic gases Pipe breakdown or

cracked 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Leak full bore rupture

Mechanical failure mode, loss of mooring, drift off, passing ship

adrift, etc.

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

PORT SERVICES


Table 28. Port Services Risk Evaluation (V)



ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Releases during transfer

Rupture of transfer hoses, truck or piping.

Operational errors, mechanical errors

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of liquid cargo Reckless of the chief

engineer, other causes 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-010 Operative Setback Heat radiation Caused by wind, fire or gas 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Spill of MARPOL Legal discharge of

pollutants 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

WORKSHOP MAINTENANCE


The worker is injured by a heat stroke Weather 160 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-010 Operative Setback Earthquake Caused by natural hazards 150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

PILOTAGE SF-001 Collisions Pilot boat collision with a berth, pontoon or jetty

Failure in manoeuvring system 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

TUG SERVICES SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Tug skipper overboard within the port Reckless 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SC-002 Criminal actions Attack people Delinquency 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-008 Breakdowns Electric failure of the facilities Several causes 100 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-002 Environmental issues Ship pressure relief valve Overpressure, rollover 20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

BUNKERING SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Freeze of part of the body Caused by

manipulating LNG 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

PORT SERVICES


4.3 Land Interface Ports have historically provided the link between maritime and inland transport, being the natural interface where goods exchange modes of transport and infrastructures. However, nowadays the role of the port exceeds the simple function of basic transhipment of goods. Apart from their role as the traditional sea/land interface, ports provide added value services that increase efficiency of the global supply chains worldwide. The land interface represents the area where different stakeholders of different channels in the supply chain can meet and interact. As with previous interfaces, the port area faces several challenges and hazards in order to ensure safety and security. Among these dares are the detection and prevention of crime, safeguarding of shipping containers and property, tackling smuggling and illegal traffics, safeguarding lives, controlling human access to ports and dealing with the new and unpredictable threat of terrorism. The reduction of some of these risks call for efficient controls. Nevertheless, sometimes the implemented solutions tend to result in interruptions and delays in the normal functioning of transport chains, thus reducing their agility and competitiveness. The key point is maximising safety and security without causing economic disturbance; it then becomes a balance between security and fluent transport and logistics. Four areas have been considered for this risk assessment regarding the land interface:

• Office buildings and road infrastructure

• Railway terminals and tracks

• Waste treatment facilities

• Customs Warehouses

Land interface risks have been studied following the same methodology explained above. Until four interviews and meetings have been conducted by FVP staff with experts responsible for the safety and security of each area. The risk assessment results for these four areas are explained in detail below.


4.3.1 Road Infrastructures and Office Buildings

A large number of entities have office buildings at the port area in order to be near the place where they provide services, such as stevedores, Customs, the Port Authority itself, pilots, Maritime Authority, etc. These entities should adopt the necessary measures to ensure office work safety according the Safety and Health Legislation1. However, there are safety risks even implementing these measures, like spreading diseases or cutting with sharp objects. In addition, these facilities are exposed to security risks such as bomb threat, terrorism and delinquency (theft of furniture, office material, computers or cyber attacks and stealing sensitive information). Furthermore, the potential incidents/accidents at the port road infrastructure have been included in this area of study. Some of the risk included were cargo dispersion on the road, vehicle stopped on the road causing a traffic jam and vehicle collisions among others. In total, 21 potential risks were considered regarding both office work safety and circulation of vehicles at the port area. But of them all only three have a medium impact signification. These are trucks collision, cargo dispersion on the road and electrical failure in buildings. Regarding the first two risk, it has been considered that the established control measures at the port area regarding vehicles circulation are medium according the predefined scale. In that sense, sometimes trucks exceed the speed limit at the port area and some crossing are potentially dangerous. For that reason, trucks collision and cargo dispersion on the road are important risks. Whereas an electrical failure in building is a moderate risk. The rest of them have a low impact signification. On the one hand, 12 risks have high control measures implemented and therefore they are negligible (fire in buildings, sabotage of the buildings, staff conflict, etc.). On the other hand, 6 risks are moderate due to the fact that the established control is medium (vehicle collision, spreading diseases, etc. (see the table below)).

1 A wide variety of Community measures in the field of safety and health at work have been adopted on the basis of Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.


Table 29. Office Buildings and Road Infrastructures Risk Evaluation (I)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-005 Cargo damages Truck collision in roads Bad operation driving within the port 600 2 2 MODERATE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dispersion in the roads Accident 400 2 2 MODERATE

SF-008 Breakdowns Electrical failure in the building Several causes 600 2 3 TOLERABLE

OFFICE BUILDINGS & ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE


Table 30. Office Buildings and Road Infrastructures Risk Evaluation (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Vehicle hits a passenger or staff Negligence 280 1 2 TOLERABLE


Workers contracting illness and/or

transmitting it to other workers

(illnesses/diseases)


SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in roads Several causes . Negligence 200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-008 BreakdownsVehicle stopped in the road causing a traffic jam/road congestion

Electrical/mechanical breakdown of the vehicle's engine.

200 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Airplane impact in container terminal Terrorism 10 1 2 TOLERABLE

SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries Step on a sharp object Negligence due to lack of

cleaning of the work area 0.5 1 2 TOLERABLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of the crew/staff 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-004 Social conflict Staff conflict / strike Several causes 160 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actionsStealing of theft of

furniture or computers or information

Delinquency 60 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Maintenance of the vehicle 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE





SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the building or facilities Malicious 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion in buildings Several issues 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire in buildings Several causes 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Attack people or facilities Delinquency 2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Contact with caustic or corrosive particles.

Electrical issues2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-007 Accident Falling rubbles or materials from buildings

Several causes such as repairing services and

regular maintenance, etc. 2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

OFFICE BUILDINGS & ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE


4.3.2 Railway Terminals and Tracks

A total of 19 potential risks were identified concerning railway operations at the port area, both for safety and security aspects. In the first case, some risks evaluated were operations involving personal injuries as a consequence of cargo loading and unloading, derailment of the train as well as the emission of pollutant gases caused by the locomotive engines running at the port area. In the second case, the security risks are related with malicious and criminal actions, such as sabotage of the cargo and/or the facilities and terrorism attacks. The impact signification for all these risks was considered as low according to the experts’ opinion at Valenciaport.

Table 31. Railway Terminals and Tracks Risk Evaluation




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SF-007 Accident Derailment of train Speed or obstructed objects in the via 140 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Caused by illegal behaviours 120 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Convoy hits a passenger or staff Negligence 80 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-001 Collisions Convoy collision with trucks or machinery

several Causes. Negligence 80 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Worker is trapped by the train

Due to overturning of the convoy 60 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-007 AccidentAccident due to contact with mobile parts in the

yardAccident 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Only applied when train is driven by diesel

engines40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


SF-008 Breakdowns Train stopped in the via Electrical/mechanical failure. 20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Traffic accident with special cargo

Bad operation with the cargo 15 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dispersion in the via

Due to container/wagon breakage 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Airplane impact in train terminal Terrorism 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Convoy leakage of oil or fuel

From train engine, grease, etc. 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire of the cargo in the convoy Caused by several issues 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Vehicle stopped in the via during train movement

Electrical breakdown. Several causes 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities Malicious 7.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Pantograph hooked up during train movement

Maintenance or mechanical failure.

Sabotage, hit2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE




RAILWAY TERMINALS AND TRACKS


4.3.3 Waste Treatment Facilities

Waste treatment facilities are associated with collecting and subsequent treatment of waste produced by ships. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the main international agreement covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes, and currently includes six technical Annexes. ValenciaPort provides collecting services for the following annexes:

• Annex I: Covers prevention of pollution by oil from operational measures as well as from accidental discharges.

• Annex IV: Contains requirements to control pollution of the sea by sewage; the discharge of sewage into the sea is prohibited, except when the ship has in operation an approved sewage treatment plant or when the ship is discharging comminuted and disinfected sewage using an approved system at a distance of more than three nautical miles from the nearest land; sewage which is not comminuted or disinfected has to be discharged at a distance of more than 12 nautical miles from the nearest land.

• Annex V: Deals with different types of garbage and specifies the distances from land and the manner in which they may be disposed of; the most important feature of the Annex is the complete ban imposed on the disposal into the sea of all forms of plastics.

No significant risks have been found associated with these activities. Most dangerous operations are related to collecting Annex I and IV substances. A total number of potential risks analysed is 14, and only one has been described as Important, which is the vehicle collision in roads. A thorough analysis of the current situation should be conducted in less than one year. The leakage of MARPOL sewage due to an accidental squashing (by cranes, other trucks, etc.) shows a moderate risk. The evaluation of additional actions so that reducing the safety risk is required. It should be analysed the possibility of defining safety areas compatible with loading operations These measure should be implemented in the short-medium term. In other cases, the applied actions are sufficient in order to control properly the safety risk. On the whole, risk associated to fire and explosions are controlled, as well as security hazards like sabotage of facilities. The rest of the risks associated to port activity are considered as negligible.


Table 32. Waste Treatment Risk Evaluation (I)

Fuente: Valenciaport Foundation, 2014



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION


Leaks from piping during transfer

Several Causes, maintenance, corrosion, erosion, fatigue failure, hose failure, improper

maintenance, piping not cooled down prior to transfer, seal failure, vibration, improper

installation or handling, etc.

1,200 3 3 MODERATE

SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in roads Several causes . Negligence 800 2 1 IMPORTANT

SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities Malicious 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-003 Fire Fire while working with pollutants Several causes 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion Explosion of MARPOL garbage 800 2 3 TOLERABLE

WASTE TREATMENT ENTERPRISES



SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION





Maintenance of the vehicle carrying residues 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Emission of pollutants Caused by several issues 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dispersion in the work area

Due to container breakage 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Contact with heat parts or heat sources. Thermal

contact200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



During bunkering operations due to bad

weather conditions, etc.200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-002 Environmental issues Leakage from cargo tank


risk in the HAZID

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE



Improper hose connection, hose failure, excessive movement of

the loading arm or transfer system,

Inadequate mooring or mooring line failure, etc.

200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-003 sabotage Sabotage of the cargo Malicious 50 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

WASTE TREATMENT ENTERPRISES


4.3.4 Customs Warehouses

Customs warehousing enables the suspension of Import Duty and/or VAT for imported non-EU goods by storing them in premises under an inventory system authorised by Customs. Customs assigns goods to different circuits (green, orange and red) depending on the level of risk of the cargo declared. This level of risk is calculated attending to different criteria (origin of the cargo, intermediate ports used by the shipping company, nature of the declared goods, etc.) A red circuit means that a physical and documentary inspection of goods is required, being necessary to move the container to the Customs Warehouses Facilities for freight control. Upon completion of the inspection, the container has to be sealed again in the presence of the agent who represents the consignor (this role is normally played by the customs agents).

Figure 39. Customs warehouse facilities at Valenciaport

Source: www.diariodelpuerto.com

A total of 20 possible risk situations have been identified regarding the work that is done at Customs Warehouses. In only two of them high value of the impact were obtained, resulting in a moderate risk (see table below). Both are related to illegal traffic, either at smuggling of tobacco and drugs or importing illegal copies.

Table 33. Customs Warehouses Risk Evaluation (I)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SC-001 Illegal trafficSmuggling of tobacco and

drugs and other substances

Caused by illegal behaviours 1,600 3 3 MODERATE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Illegal copies Delinquency 1,200 3 3 MODERATE

WAREHOUSES


The remaining 18 potential risks are negligible in the case studied. For instance, personal injuries, cargo damages, sabotage and criminal actions at Customs Warehouses were considered low-risk.

Table 34. Customs Warehouses Risk Evaluation (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

SC-002 Criminal actions Cargo stolen in the warehouse Delinquency 300 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-001 Illegal traffic Illegal trafic of protected species Delinquency 240 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo damage during operation in warehouse

Accident, cargo dropped, incorrect operation 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-005 Cargo damages Cargo dispersion in the warehouse Bad operation 200 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Personal injuries Step on a sharp object Negligence due to lack of cleaning of the work area 150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Personal injuries Hit with machinery and others Negligence 150 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-003 Fire Fire of the cargo in the WAREHOUSE Several causes 120 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-007 Accident Traffic accidents of forklift Speed, cargo exceded 50 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-008 Breakdowns Electric hazards or electrical interruptions Several causes 40 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-009 Explosions Explosion caused by cargo Several causes 25 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Personal injuries Staff drop at the same level/different level Negligence 20 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Kidnapping of staff 17.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SC-002 Criminal actions Terrorism Bomb threat 17.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Spill of the cargo in the warehouse Several causes 16 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


Particle emissions during cargo Due to cargo operations 16 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

SF-006 Personal injuries Burn of staff Contact with caustic or corrosive particules 10 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE


SC-003 Sabotage Sabotage of the facilities within warehouse Malicious 2.5 1 3 NEGLIGIBLE

WAREHOUSES


5 Conclusions This section provides the main conclusions derived from the extensive risk assessment in ports. The study has considered a wide range of the activities, processes and services deployed at European ports. The business model of the Valencia port, that manages all kind of traffic and goods (passengers, container, Ro-Ro, liquid and solid bulks, etc.) is used as a reference. The methodology that is applied evaluates the level of risk of the processes and activities, taking into account their Safety Impact and the level of control is established. Thereby a qualitative measure of the risk is obtained, and classified into Critical, Important, Moderate, Tolerable and Negligible. As ports are strategic infrastructures, with a significant impact on national economies, society and the environment, important advances have taken place in the last few years in order to minimise hazards and risks associated with port activities. Important efforts have been promoted by the European Commission and Member States in order to protect life and improve the labour quality. This improves safety of port users, including passengers and workers. In the same manner, specific procedures for the handling of dangerous goods have been implemented at international and European Level (IMDG Code, Directive 2008/68/EC). The following tables show the most relevant risks identified, classified as Critical or Important, that should be addressed by regulatory institutions and European ports. The aim should be to reduce the potential impact of these hazards, taking into account the safety of port users (passengers and workers) the environment (nearby coastal and inland areas) and the society.

Table 35. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (I)


AREA RISK REFERENCE TYPE OF RISK IMPACT DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE CAUSES


SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION





MARITIME SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to reckless behaviour of

pleasure pilotage







MARITIME SF-002 Environmental issues



1,000 3 1 CRITICAL

CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-002 Environmental

issuesNoises and vibrations in

the shipDue to ventilation,

auxiliary engines, etc. 1,000 3 1 CRITICAL


issuesNoises and vibrations motivated by cranes Due to crane operations 1,000 3 1 CRITICAL


Table 36. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (II)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION





MARITIME SF-001 CollisionsShip collision due to reckless behaviour of

pleasure pilotage







MARITIME SF-002 Environmental issues



1,000 3 1 CRITICAL


issuesNoises and vibrations in

the shipDue to ventilation,

auxiliary engines, etc. 1,000 3 1 CRITICAL


issuesNoises and vibrations motivated by cranes Due to crane operations 1,000 3 1 CRITICAL




CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-001 Collisions

RTG collisions with vehicles, mafis and

lorriesNegligence 1,600 3 2 IMPORTANT

MARITIME SF-001 Collisions Manoeuvring within port waters Weather conditions, etc. 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT

MARITIME SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries


level/different levelNegligence 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT





Crane collisions with trucks running in the


MARITIME SF-002 Environmental issues Emission of pollutants


1,000 3 2 IMPORTANT


issues Emission of pollutants Caused by engines running at port 1,000 3 2 IMPORTANT

WASTE TREATMENT FACITILIES

SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in roads

Several causes . Negligence 800 2 1 IMPORTANT



CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-005 Cargo damages Loading/unloading

cargo Twistlocks failure with

the spreader 700 2 1 IMPORTANT

CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-001 Collisions Truck collisions Careless driving 400 2 1 IMPORTANT









The previous tables show that the most critical risks in ports are associated with operations involving vessels in their final approach, in-port navigation and berthing operations. Risks evaluated consider both operational and environmental aspects. Noise generation and vibrations are the most significant environmental and societal risks. Although this type of hazard may not cause loss of life, the lack of appropriate control measures can introduce serious negative effects on port workers, passengers and citizens that live close to the port. As the biggest European ports operate in a non-stop continuous cycle, the absence of proper countermeasures to control noise and vibrations can be considered an important societal and environmental risk. The second category of critical risks is concerned with collisions associated with vessel operations. This can cause a wide variety of incidents or accidents affecting people, individual and collective injuries, as well as the environment, spills, pollutant emissions, etc.). Some security risks, such as smuggling, are also important due to the economic impact of these illicit actions. Although terrorism is considered a major societal threat, it is not perceived as a critical risk in the port sector today given the low number of attacks focused on ports. However, continuous surveillance and development of actions against terrorism should be kept.

Table 37. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (III)


Port services like piloting, towage and mooring present important operational risks associated with the interaction of small ships (pilots and towage) with larger vessels. Towage and berthing operations require quick and precise reactions that can easily be affected by external factors such as bad weather conditions. Deviations of planned operations can generate risk situations where the service ship will be the weak link.

AREA RISK REFERENCE TYPE OF RISK IMPACT

DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE CAUSES

ABSOLUTE VALUE OF

THE SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION





RTG collisions with vehicles, mafis and

lorriesNegligence 1,600 3 2 IMPORTANT

MARITIME SF-001 Collisions Manoeuvring within port waters

Weather conditions, etc. 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT

MARITIME SF-006 Individual & Societal injuries

Passenger/staff tripand fall at the same level/different level

Negligence 1,400 3 2 IMPORTANT





Crane collisions with trucks running in the


MARITIME SF-002 Environmental issues Emission of pollutants


1,000 3 2 IMPORTANT


issues Emission of pollutants Caused by engines running at port 1,000 3 2 IMPORTANT


Another notable source of operational incidents is related to collisions within port terminals. Although these types of incidents or accidents usually do not produce severe consequences, it is important to deploy appropriate measures (preventative and reactive actions) in order to minimise the impact on port workers as much as possible.

Table 38. Summary of Critical and Important Risks at Ports (IV)




SAFETY IMPACT

SAFETY IMPACT

ESTABLISHED CONTROL

RISKEVALUATION

WASTE TREATMENT FACITILIES SF-001 Collisions Vehicle collision in

roadsSeveral causes .

Negligence 800 2 1 IMPORTANT



CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-005 Cargo damages Loading/unloading

cargo Twistlocks failure with

the spreader 700 2 1 IMPORTANT

CONTAINERTERMINAL SF-001 Collisions Truck collisions Careless driving 400 2 1 IMPORTANT









39 partners from 10 countries taking maritime transport into the digital age

By designing and demonstrating innovative use of ICT solutions MONALISA 2.0 will provide the route to improved

SAFETY - ENVIRONMENT - EFFICIENCY

Swedish Maritime Administration ◦ LFV - Air Navigation Services of Sweden ◦ SSPA ◦ Viktoria Swedish ICT ◦ Transas ◦ Carmenta ◦ Chalmers University of Technology ◦

World Maritime University ◦ The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute ◦ Danish Maritime Authority ◦ Danish Meteorological Institute ◦ GateHouse ◦ Navicon ◦ Novia University of Applied Sciences ◦ DLR ◦ Fraunhofer ◦ Jeppesen ◦ Rheinmetall ◦ Carnival Corp. ◦ Italian Ministry of Transport ◦ RINA Services ◦ D’Appolonia ◦ Port of

Livorno ◦ IB SRL ◦ Martec SPA ◦ Ergoproject ◦ University of Genua ◦ VEMARS ◦ SASEMAR ◦ Ferri Industries ◦ Valencia Port Authority ◦ Valencia Port Foundation ◦

CIMNE ◦ Corporacion Maritima ◦ Technical University of Madrid ◦ University of Catalonia ◦ Technical University of Athens ◦ MARSEC-XL ◦ Norwegian Coastal Administration

www.monalisaproject.eu


http://www.monalisaproject.eu/

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