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AUTHORITYAdjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd22 Oct 1974; Adjutant General's Office[Army] ltr dtd 22 Oct 1974

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31 Aug 1970 per DoDD 5200.10 documentmarking

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN Ra PtLY RFE1R TO

AGAM-P (M) (8 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-670728 14 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 5th Special Forces Group(Abn)

Ist Special Forces, Period Ending 31 July 1967

PTb15 docum.nt ooortoains rrOt a¢. :cting the atiorfl

TISEE IBUTION Defense of the U:• "C " '>-Y - . Ofth .TO: SEE DEspionage Laws, lit: . -

Its transliission or ti. r ,-* ......- ::' < j. a•

wanner to an nthriQfP3 -'LW.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation byUSACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC inaccordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and cor-rective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of re-ceipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insureS>= appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during currentr). operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material,

C-.') BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

E) NNETH G. WICKHAM

1 Incl Major General, USAas The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:Commanding Generals

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat Developments Command

CommandantsUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army War CollegeUS Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Armor School "US Army Artillery and Miesile School . .LUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical School iii.US Army Civil Affairs School .US Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence School REWDED UNCM.IsItD

Po R 0o- 9RO WHEN SPARATED FROM

-CL IFIED INCL..SURE

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Medical Field Service SchoolUS Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS ArTay Security A4ency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Transportation School

Copies Furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffChief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marahal GeneralResearch Analysis Corporation (Library)Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA)National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Defense AffairsJoint Action Control OfficeDocuments Control Officer, ATTN: W.M. Smith, Bell Aero Systems Co.Commanding Generals

US Army Weapons Command, ATTN: AHSWE-CPL101st Airborne Division C-)llth Infantry Brigade (Sep)

Commanding Officers5th Battalion, 46th Infantry5th Battalion, 12th Infantry6th Battalion, 31sL Infantry31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces

2

MIS

S.. ..... V .... IIf-.-

SECRET1))Sth SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

16t SPECIAL FORCES

MI.."

OPERAT0IOI~AL REPORTFUR QUARTERLY PERIODENDIMt 31 JULY 1967 DONT~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

SECREDOD DIR 5200. 10

TABLE OF' CONTENTS

PAGE

SECTION 1, Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. General ....... 12. Intelligence ....... 33. Operations and training .4

a, Plans 4b. Operations ...... 4c. Special Operations - -- 15d. Training - - - 16e. Aviation ...- 19f. Combat Developments -- - 19

4. Logistics ... 205. Revolutionary Development Support Activities - 226. Psychological Operations .--- 257. Personnel and Administration -- - 268. Medical ...... 289. Signal ....... 29

10. Engineer ....-. 3111. Comptroller ---... 33

SECTION' 2, Commanders' Observations and Recomendations

Part I, Observations (Lesions Learned)

1. Personnel ..... 35

2. Operations .... 353. Training and Organization -- - 454. Intelligence ..... 465. Logistics -.... 496. Other -... 50

Part II, Recommendations --- 54

INCLOSURES1. Troop Disposition Lists and CTZ Maps2. Statistical Data

* 4. Concept of Operations, CY 68* 5. 5th SFGA Reg, Camp Opening, Closing, Conversion* 6. Turnover of Camps to VNSF* 7. Camp Hardening Checklist

8. Combat Developments* 9. Recondo School POI

10. Special ReP.rt on the Action at Camp Trvng Dung, 8 Apr 6f11. After Actior Report, Attack on C-nr Thien

**12. After Action Report.. Operation 3lackjack 33***13. After Action Report, OperatLon Pikeseille, 6 Ju. - 3 Jul 67

**14. After Action Report, Operation Blackjack 34

Fof/ o7 ,Ci 0ONTw

470 7,;2 I'G. F 9

** 15. After Action Report, Blackjack 41 (Phase I and Phase II)** 16. After Action Report, Blackjack 41C (Opurati'cn Arrowhead)** 17. After A.ction Report, Blackjack 142

k 18. After Action Report, B-52, OPORD 5-67* 19. After Action Report, B-41, Le Dinh Dao ].0* 20. After Action Report, B-41, Le Dinh Dao 9* 21. Establishment of Rice Buying Association* 22. Report on Sawaill at Tra Bong

23. Refugee Resettlement in the Central HighLands24. Misaing Refugees at Ba To I25. Company D Flood Plan (Cys 1 - 8 Only)

* Denotes withdrawn at Hqs, DA** Denotes withdrawn at Hqs, DA, to be published as Combat After Actions Report

#67X080 J*** Denote: Withdrawn at Hqs, DA, to be published as Combat After Actions Report

#67X090 I

II

|I

CON I DE. I TIALL'DE", "..... OF.TH.AM.Y

{~HSPECXIAL FORCES &tUP (ATMCRB~~~ 15T SPECIAL F(]ECK;APO San Francisco-'2hO

^..oB•A?"1 Ausý 41P

SUDJiCXT / raon1 t oriaterly Xe,Priod/nding 31 Ju3P 41P7.

TRW: Ceounancing GeneralUnited Stat3s Army, Vietnam •_'

APO 96375

THRUI Commiader-in-Chief "-

tbited States Army PacUiiciAPO San Francisco,, %558 J -V 'L14

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentDepartment of the AxmyWashington, D. C. 20310

tI)

SECTION I SIONIFICANT (R1GA:,•,ATi,A CR UNIT ACTIVITES

1. (C) General• Throughout the country OIDG operations during thepast quarter were characterized by aggressive pursuit of enemy units in thefield, numerous large-scale contacts, and several determined attempts by" theenemy to inflict defeats mo friendly elements. Shortly after the beginningof the reporting period, on 4 May, Camp Lang Vai was attacked by an estiiatedoompany size force supported by mozrtars and aided frcm inside the camp by VCvho had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One platoon of VCsucceeded in gaining entry to the camp, but was quickly ejected. Four dayslater, cn 8 hy, Camp Con Thien was attacked by two battalions of tne oJ2tnh

NVA Regiment with sappers attached. Supported by mortars, rockets, and-flamthrowers, the attackers made brief penetrations into the perimeter.,which was defended jointly by USOC, WhASF, VNSF, aid CIDG personnels Al-though 14 CIDG and 44 Vto Marines were killed In the action, the NVA paida high price. A total of 212 enemy bodies were counted the following day.,and many others were estimated to have been killed by airstrikes and

Drt1iA3e1A ./7 DWGRADED AT 3 7R INTRiiV.AIS

DECLASSIFIED AFMTER 12 YEARS/ I' ')! )DOD D3R 5200,10

( ~~ CONFID~ENTI AL

AVWJ-6 CONJFIDEN'TIAL 15A at 197? IUJ]JW• OperatiOnal Report for Cirt~orly Period Ending 31 July 1967

VC and NVA forces have genorally shown increasing willingness toaoucpt. nvefre ]'----- In order- to- aocoxrqpliuh. l1W4+_-,i 6b-Ln qJ-vra.Oasos during the last three months the oenemy has massed his forces and madeoonoortod efforts to surround and ovuz-helm smaller C]DO units in the fioldd,dospite taling heavy casualties from airstrikes, artillery, and friendlydefeU1-ri flArs. PA% reaction by lff=-o Force units and sua-,porting fire-poer proved to be crucial factors nm extracting embattled CMG -units onthese occasions.

The increased tempo of fightixg: is mrlected in the statisticaldata for the reporting period. A total of 1,931 VC/NVA were klled, anincrease of 18% over the previous quarter. Also, there was a 26% increasein LW.SF Id.led, a 35% increase in CID0 killed, and a 7% increase in HFAF-killed. A significant number of the increased friendly casualties wore theresult of mines and booby traps.

Special operations continued to penetrat, enemy base areas and inter-dict routes of infiltration. Three operations were particularly noteworthyfor their taotical developments. Blackjack 33 was the first opu.-t!on inwhich a mobile guerrilla force was employed in conjunction with long rangereconnaissance elements (Project Sigma). On 13 May two Mike Force companiesfrom Nha Trang conducted a parachuto assault in the Seven Mountains region ofIV CTZ. A quick reaction operation, the Jump was made only 18 hours afterapproval was given. Blackjack 42 marked the first infiltraLion by sea ofSpecial Forces assets into an enemy base area.

In IV CTZ much effort was dovoted to preparations for the upcomingfMlod season. A training program with empbasis on boat tactics and operationewas implemented, and campa were improved and rebuilt to withstand the floodwaters. The airboat facility at Cao Lanh was completed in May, but sufferedsevere damage during the VC attack on 3-4 Jtly. The VC evidently realizethe tactical potential of the airboats in flooded areas and are attemptingto eliminate them before the season begins.

Two CIDG camps, Plei Mrong and Vinh Gia, were turned over to VNSFoontrol and the USASF detachments withdrawn. These are the first two campsto be turned over under a program desigred to conserve USASF irsnpower andtlhu facilitate the opewing of new cwnps in other locations.

Revolutionary Development support activities were highligbted bytwo highly successful refugee resettlement projects, one at Bmnard in 7!ICTZ and the other In the vicinity of Camps Due Co and PIVi X10 J eProvince. Other highlights were the building of a sawmill at Tm Bong andthe establishment of a riLe buying association in I CTZ. The handling ofrefugees in the vicinity of Ba To left much to be desired, but was significantin that many valuable lessons were learned from this experienoe,

The Group' a Concept of Employment for CY 1968 was completed this-quarter and was submitted to COMUSMACV for approval. Planning has beeninitiated on the implementation of the proposed concept.

2CONF IDENTI AL

CONFA DENTIAL2. (C) Intelligence:

a. During the reporting period th: orientation and s"bsequintdoployment of the M1 augmentation detachment, throughtout all Four Corps Tac-tical Zones, was accomplished. In consideration of the country-wide mission

of W-i .'pvý± rurcea G~roup "bI1n), was concluded the nl auguentation det-ichmept could most effective]y be employed usirg a field team conceyt. Fourfield teams and a headquarte.rs team were organized. The composition of eachfield team is as follows:

1. Counter Intelligence/Counter Espionage Section - 5 to 8personnel.

2. Collection Section - 3 to 6 personnel.

•.Analysis 5ectio

(a) 3. to 3 photo interpreters

(b) 2 interrogators

(c) 4 to 6 0B specialists

In addition to field teajrs and headquarters team, select persozmel were ass-igned in support of Group spo:cial operations.

b. The regulations, directives, reporting procedures, and guido-lizics outlining the scope, purpose, and objectives of the Group intelligenceprogram were published in final fona. These publications include M•ilitanfIntelligence Program, Intelligence Infoxmition Reporting Procedures, MilitaryIntelligence Opcratioral Planning Procedure, Source Ldministratien Procedure,and Intelligence Fvnd Expenditure and Reporting Procedure. A new program,subject: Effective Means of Combating the Viet Gong InfrastruCture, was coM-pleted in draft form. This program is being coordinated with ICEX (U) rep-resentatives for region I1 arid ',Lll be coordinated in all carp tattical zones-Aien completed in final form.

c. The emphesis of tha intelligence effort, since formulation of

basic programs has bar completcd, is shifting to the timely acquisition, add-lvrate reprorting; thorough and speedy analysis, and rapid dissemination of in-telli•-eire back down tv ihe "MA- dutschment. Produrti.n of tactical •B continuesto reeeive prio:itý, emphasis sinice this type intelligence is vital to survivalof the"fi' detachments. Production olf infrastructure intelligence is beingupgraded but will, of necessity, remain the secondary effort at prese•it.

3

C CONFI DENT I AL

CONF IDENT IAL 5 IAVGB-C 15 Auigst•u J§,u~r I_

SUJBJFET: Operational Report for Quareriy Perlod Ending 31 Ju]4 1967

3. (C) Operabioa6 and Training'

a. Plans

(1) During this quarter, the companies submitted inputfor the group CY 1968 Conceit of Operations. This input was incorporatedinto the Q.roup country plan end submitted to COWJSMACV. See Incl 4.

(2) Contingency plans ior employment at the 5th SFGAassets in a general war posture were published.

(3) Studies are presently being conducted to determinethe feasibility of utilization of the USkSF/VNSF/CIDG as Vietnamese borderpolice during the post hostilities period.

(4) Planning continues for the implementation of theremainder of the CY 1967 Group concept fcu deployment of CIDG camps.Dar:ng the second semester of CY 1967, six CIBM campt; will be convertedand six new camps established.

(5) Planning has been initiated for the implementationof the propozed CIY 1968 concept of operations.

b. Operations.

(1) Summa ry of significant operations by Corps TacticalZone-s.

(a) I CIZ: On 4 May at 0330 hours, Camp Lang Vei,A-101, Quang Tri Province, was subjected to an attack by an estimated com-pany size force supported by mortars. About one platoon of VC gained entryinto the cwmp. With the assistance of fire support from Khe Sanh, enemyelements were repelled from the camp by 0500. Two UASF were kill ed iudfive wouvded; 17 CIDG were killed, 35 woumded, and 38 missing. Enemy losseswere seven killed and five wounded. Subseouent intelligenue and PW inter-rogation hes indicated that the attackers w.es aided from inside the campVC who had infiltrated the CIDG units posing as recruits. One PW said thathe had been contacted by the VC prior to the attack rnd directed to jointhe CIDG at Lang Vei in order to obtain information on the camp. AfterJoining thý 0C DG, subject recruited four other CIDG to assist him. Onemar was to dtet•.dne the locations o9f all bunkers within the camp, thestcond was tV ronort on all the buard positions and how well the postswere nkuvned, the thirdwas to make a slei.ch of the camp, and the fourth wasto report on supp'lies brou•ht into the camp from Khe Sanh. The VC contactedsubject IW on four occasions prior to the 4 May attack to obtain the infor-mation tnat had been collected. On the night of the attack, subject FW andant,"i L CUIDG tv&bl t olo the camp guards and led the VW force thiough thewire and s:!ne fJ Ueld defei.>•<s into the camp' s perimeter.

CONF I I>)ENTIAL

U

SAVGB-C CONFIDENTIAL15 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Rep)rt for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

On T•ay at 0150 hours, RF OP #1 in Son Ila District, Quang Ngai Prcw-inco, was hit by mortar, recoilless rifle and small arm- fire from an est-imated two company force. RF forces manning the 01' returned fire, supportedby AG-47's and 4.2 inch mortar fire frcza Camp Ha Tlhanh, A-104. The enemyfinally broke -entact at 0735 hours while an airstrike was in progress. Anexploitation foree from Camp Ha Thanh confirmed the following enemy losses:30 VC killed, two wounded, and 14 individual weapons captured. Also, per-sonnel on the OP observed the enemy carrying dead and wounded as they with-drew. Friendly casualties were one RF killed end two wounded.

On 8 May Camp Con Thien, A-lie, Quang Tri Frovince, was attacked at0230 hours by two battalions of the 812th NVA Regiment with sappers attached.The assault was supported by mortars, rockets, and flame throwers. Artil-lery and air support were employed against the enemy throughout the attack.The perimeter, vhich was defended jointly by USMC, USAF, VNSF, and CIDGpersonnel, was penetrated at two positions. Of the 212 enemy confirmedkilled in the attack, 38 were credited to USASF/VNSF/CIDG forces. Friendlylosses were 14 CIDG killed, four USASF and 16 CIDG wounded, two CIDG mis-sing, in addition to 44 URIC killed, 110 USMC and five USNCB wounded.Enemy weapons captured included four flame throwers, four crew-servedweapons, 12 4Omm rockets, and over 100 individual weapons. Throughout themonth of May the camp was subjected to constant harassing fire by mortars,artillery, rockets, and recoilless rifles. The total number of roundsreceived was over 1,500; on one occasion some 250 rounds landed in a per-iod of four minutes,

On 13 May a combat patrol from ha To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province,consisting of two USASF and 30 CIDG working in conjunction with elementsfrom Task Force Oregon in Operation Malheur, made contact with an estim-ated platoon of VC, resulting in 21 enemy killed, six wounded, one rifle andtwo LMG's captured. One USASF was wounded. On 18 May another combat oper-aticn of the same composition, while at their night patrol base, made contactwith an estimated squad of VC attempting to penetrate the CIDG perimeter.The engagement resulted in 17 enemy killed, one 60mm mortar and three AK 50submachineguns captured. Friendly losses were two CIDG missing, one ofwhom later returned to the camp. On 25 May a patrol of 50 CIDG qnd twoUSASF from Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Frovinci, made contact with anestimated two squads of VC resulting in nine VC killed, one captured, andfive individual weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties in theencounter.

Operations from Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai i rovince, accounted for muchcf the action during June, -ith four significant contacts. On 12 J-ne acompany size combat patrol came under heavy automatic weapons and smallarms fire from a platoon size enemy force resulting in one CIDG killed; threeUSASF, 24 C1DG, and one interpreter wounded. A platoon size helibornecperation engaged an estimated company of VC on 19 June, resulting in twoVC killed, seven captured, 2D bunkers, 159 structures, and 1500 kilos ofrice destroyed. Seven secondary explosions were observed and 57 VC werekilled durirn airstrikes requested by the patrol. On 22 Jume another pla-toom sizs operation from Tra Bong made contact with an estimated company of

5COOF I DENT I AL

CONF I DENTA LAVGB-C 15 August 1967i•UOT'l': Operational Report for Quarterly lturiod Erzdit, 31V.Uy .L 7.v

VC in fortified positions resulting in two CIDG killed and two wounded.Encmy losses were one VC killed and four bunkers destroyed. Finally, on27 June a reconnai5sance patrol 4ade contact with one eneay squad, produ-cing five VC killed without incurring any friendly casualties. In otheractions during the month, a reconnaissance patrol from Ha Thanh, A-104,Quang Ngai Province, was ambushed on 12 June by two companies of VC. OneUSASF and two CIDG were killed, four CIDG wrunded, and two individualweapons lost. On 28 June a platoon size patrol from Minh Long, A-108,Quang Ngai Province, killed four VC and captured one along with oneweapon. No friendly casualties were sustained in this operation.

On 19 July a hleliborne operation from Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang NgaiProvince, received sniper fire from an unknown number of VC while beinginserted. During the remainder of the day/three more contacts were madewith elements up to company size. Total results were nine VC killed, eightVC wounded, one CIDG killed, and seven CIDG wounded. On 25 July a companysize heliborne operation with two USASF from Camp Tien I huoc, A-102, inQuang Tin Province, made contact with an estimated two companies of VC armedwith mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. The VC succeeded in sur-roundiin, the CIDG, who attempted to break out of the encirclement by adjust-ing airstrikes and artillery fire on the enemy positions but were forced tobreak up into small groups in order to evade the superior enemy force.Helibo- rae medevac, and extraction of small groups of CIDG were =complishedunder intensa enemy fire. A company size reaction force from .... camp wasunable to link up with the besieged friendly unit due to heavy enemy activity.On 28 July one CIDG company and two USASF from Camp Tien rhuoc and ane con-pany from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, in Quang Nam Irovince, were heliliftedinto the battle area. Supported by airstrikes and artillery, they conducteda -sweep operation in order to pick up stragglers and recover bodies ofpersonnel killed in the action on 25 July. Ten CIDG bodies were recovered,and one USASF who had been missing since 25 July was able to contact thefriendly unit. The totaI results were 16 CIDG killed, one USASF and sixCIDG wounded, one VNSF and 22 CIDG missing in action. Forty weapons andthree radios were lost. Confirmed enemy losses were 58 VC killed. On20 July a CIDG/RF/i-F operation, with four U-SASF, fram Camp Tra Bong, A-l'7,in Quang Ngai Province made contact with seven'VC while in a blocking posi-tion in support of a comoined ARVN/ROK Marine operation. Six VC werekilled, and two weapons, two grenades, and one improvised mine seized with-out incurring any friendly casualties.

(b) II CTZ: Between 8 and 14 May a search and de-stroy operation from Mang Buk, A-246, Kontum Province, made six separatecontacts resulting in a total of 16 VC killed, one captured, and six weaponscaptured. These results were achieved with no friendly losses. On 15 Mayat 0920 hours, four USASF, four VNSF and 230 0IDG from Dak To, A-244, KontumProvince, received 60mm mortar fire. At 0930 hours, the operation madeheavy contact with an NVA company. On the 16th at 1500 hours, one companyof CM)CG from Dak Seang, A-245, Kontum Province, had been helilifted in toreinforce the Dak To operation. On 17 May, one company of Mike Force and

6

CO NF !DENT I AL

CONF I DENTI 1A LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

ono company of CiDG from Dak To were helilifted to reinforce the operation.On the 20th they has returned to their respective locations. Results ofthe operation: two USASF and seven CIDG killed, two USASF and 14 CIDGwounded, eight hVA killed and one weapon captured.

T , -O 24 MVy at 0200, a combined operation, 'ith one C0iV company fromT; n Rai, A-223, and one CIDG company fram An Lac, A4.234, Darlac I rovir cc,was attacked. The multi-company assault came from two directions and wassupported by 50 to 60 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. The VC were armed withlight machinpguns and other assorted small arms. The Tan Rai company wasdriven from its position, but the An Lac ccmpany held. At approximately0245 hours, two gun ships and an AC-47 arrived, and the VC attack slowedto sporadic fire fights. At first light thu firing ceased. At 0700 hoursan ARVN Ranger battalion was air landed south of the battle area. The TanRai company suffered one USASF and seven CIDG killed, one USASF and nineCIDG wounded. The An Lac company had 10 CIDG killed, two USASF and 19CIDG wounded. VC losses were nine killed, one RYD LMG and two carbinescaptured.

On 30 May at 0940 hours, an operation frcm Cung Son, A-221 Phu YenProvince, made contact with an NVA company plus. Gun ships and fighterswere on station at approximately 1000 hours. The initial contact was brokenat 1145 hours whnen the NVA withdreu. The operation was reinforced by an-other search and destroy operation in the same area and gave pursuit.Sporadic contacts continued until 1340 hours. The results of the contactwere one USASF and three CIDG killed, seven CIDG wounded, 16 NVA killed and11 weapons captured. On 3 June at 0150 hours, Camp Cung Son received 11rounds of 120mm or 4.2 inch mortar fire. There was no damage since allrounds landed outside the camp's perimeter. This attack - the first timethe camp has ever been mortared - was probably in retaliation for lossessuffered on 29 and 30 May.

A patrol from Dong Tre, A-222, V'hu Yen Frovince, came under heavy au-tomatic fire on 5 June. One CIDG company was dispatched to reinforce, butalso came into heavy contact. Numer.ous airstrikes were called in, andone Mike Force Company from ileiku was sent to the Dong Tre camp to reinforcethe operation. The results of the contact were 28 CIDG killed, seven wounded,nine missing, 14 small arms and one 60mm mortar lost. There were seven VCkilled. A villager reported that he had helped bury 28 VC bodies on thenight of 5 June. An agent reported 43 VC had been killed in the contact.On the 4th of June a search and destroy operation from Trung Dung, A-502,Khanh Hoa Province, made a series of contacts, resulting in 12 VC killed,nine weapons and various documents captured. On 12 June a patrol fromPlateau Gi, A-234, Kontum Province, sighted an NVA company moving alonga trail. A hasty ambush was set up, and the ensuing fire fight lastedapproximately one hour. Results were one CIDG killed and two wounded, 23NVA killed, six enemy weapons and documents captured.

On 14 June a CIDG cnit from Camp Dak To, A-244, Kontum Province, brokeand fled from their night perimeter under attack by an estimated NVA company.T-w USASF and eight C)DG were left missing, six CIDG killed and Ul CIDGwounded. One NVA was confirmed killed and ten estimated killed. Later

7CONFItD ENTIAL

CONF DENTIAL

AVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly leriod Ending 31 July 1967

that morning a Mike Force company vdth four USASF was deployed to searchfor and recover the missing personnel. On 15 June the operation initiatedcontact with an estimated hVA campany. The Mike Force unit was overrun,resulting in two more USt.SF missing. The Mike Force Company Commanderrallied three squads and attempted to move forward but was beaten back bytheý intense fire. As the enemy fire continued, the companr fled leaving thetwo USASF with ten men. After resorting to E&E tactics, these individualsrejoined the main body and established a perimeter. On 16 June, when allstragglers had been gathered, the unit returned to Dak To. Results of thisaction were two USASF and eight Mike Force personnel killed, 14 Mike Forcepersonnel wounded. At 0430 hours the followirg morning, on 17 June, thecamp received a mortar attack lasting approximately on hour. Three USASF,three attached US, seven Mike Force, and five CIDG were wounded; two CIDGand one Mike Force killed. Additionally, five CIDG dependents were killedand seven..wounded.

A search and destroy operation from Van Canh, A-223, I hu Yen rrovince,made contact on 19 June uith an NVh company which was well entreched. Sixairstrikes were placed on the enemy positions, after which they withdrew.The CIDG then swept the area. The results were two CIDG killed, one USASFand four CIDG wounded. There were 17 NV. killed and two weapons captured.On 27 June a survýillance operation from iolei Kleng, A-241, Kontum rrovince,made contact with tuo NVA compaines. Two airstrikes were called in, res-ulting in nine NVA confirmed killed and another 155 estimated killed.

Elements of a screening operation from Plateau Gi, A-243, in KontumProvince, made contact with a reinforced NVIL company at 1500 hours on 11July. The operation received autonatic weapons and 82nm mortar fire until2030 hours. At this time contact was broken with the aid of artilleryfire. Results of the contact were six CIDG wounded, nine NVA killed, andtwo AK-47' s captured. On 8 July an ambush and search and destroy operationfrom Trang Phuc, A-233, Darlac Province, made contact with an NVA platoon.A ten minute firefight ensued after which the NVA broke contact. On the9th at 1200 hours, the operation ambushed ten INA moving along a trail.The NVA immediately broke contact and fled. Results of the two contactswere six NVA killed, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured.One CIDG was wounded. On 18 July a CIDG element from Cung Son, A-221, inIhu Yen Province ambushed one company of NVA carrying large quantities ofrice. The INA were armed with ^dK-47's and two M-16 rifles. Results of theambush were one CIDG killed, one CIDG wounded, nine NVA killed and one M-16rifl e captrued.

On the 23rd at 1600 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp DakSeam', A-245, Kontum Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF and 70tCDG, =ade contqct with an estimated company of IAVA preparing night def-ensiv posibioms. A firefight ensued, after which the friendly element•roki contact 7iAth t ho aid of artillery and airstrikes. One CIDG was kIlledcui.J dnie wounded, one VNSF and one CIDG were missing. At 1800 hours on the23rd a 70 man r-action force was dispatched to sweep the area of contact,and thv fulloving morning this element was reinforced by an addLitional 80CIDG. At 1100 hours the operation engaged in a brief firefight with an

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDEWT IALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

estimated company of NVA, resulting in tnree CIDG woundod. The nexi; day,25 July, the body of one VNSF that was previously carried as missing wasrecovered by the operation. Results of the two contacts were one CIDGkilled, 14 CIDG wounded, one ClDG missing and one VNSF killed. Equipment1ossev were two BAR's seven carbines and two HT-I radios.

During the reporting period CIDG operations have been conducted insupport of the following major operations in II CTZ: Francis Marion (4thInf Div), Greely (173rd Abn Bde), Stillwell (4th Inf Dive, Pershing (1stCay Div), and ROK operations conducted 9-31 July.

(c) III CTZ: Throughout the reporting periodnumeroUs casualties were caused by mines and booby traps, especially inHau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Camp Prek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Prov-ince, was constantly harassed by enemy mortar attacks. US coidhter-mortarradar at Prek Klok plotted enemy positions as close as 1000 meters from thecamp during these attacks.

On 9 May, a two company CIDG operation from Hiep Hca was in an advat-tageous position to react to a multi-company VC force which had made an attackon two River Assault Group boats which wore patrolling the Oriental River.The CIDG operation intercepted and pursued the withdrawing VC units. Closeair support and reinforcements deployed by both Hiep Hoa and Tra Cu, A-352,aided in the destruction of the enemy. Forty-nine enemy were killed duringthis action. Again on 16 1ay, a company operation from Hiep Hoa made contactwith a multi-company VC force. Elements of the 1/27 and 2/27 Infantry, 25thUS Infantry Division, were deployed by helicopter as reinforcements, and theoperation ended i'th 34 enemy killed.

On 6 May. Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long irovince, came under aheavy mortar attack by an estimated VC battalion rdinus, resulting in sixMike Force personnel killed, 39 wounded, one CIDG killed and three wounded.On 26 May at Camp Tong Le Chen, a Mike Force operation made contact witha large enemy force including a hospital staff, narses, and patients, approx-imately eight kilometers north of the camp. Heavy contact was maintainedfor appraximately three hours. The Mike Force assaulted the enemyts forti-tied nsitions. and artillery and airstrikes were called in. The operationreceived an ammunition resupply as well as reinforcements. The enmyfinally withdrew northwest towards Cambodia. Friendly losses in this actionwere one USASF killed, one wounded, four Mike Force killed and 22 wounded.Two VC were killed, and assorted medical supplies and documents were capt-ured.

On 14 May a CIDG company minus operation from Chi Linh, A-333, BinhLong Province, made contact with an estimated VC company armed with assortedsmall arms and automatic weapons includirg M-16 rifles. A 45 minute fire-fight resulted in one USASF killed, five CIDG killed, 13 CIDG wounded andthree weapons lost. An AC-47, airstrikes, and artillery were called in,which caused the VO to break contact and flee in all directions. Five VCwere confirmed killed with an unknown number killed or wounded by airstrikes.On 28 May, a CIDG operation from Chi Linh made contact with an estimatedplatoon. The friendly element called in artillery and airstrikes and engaged

9

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CoNFI DENT I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

the enemy with small arms fire. The enemy' broke contact immediately vwththe friendly element in close pursuit. Several minutes later, the friendlyelement was attacked by an estimated VC company. During the ensuing fire-fight, radio contact was lost with the ground force and a radio was droppedin. Friendly casualties from this action were one USASF killed, one wounded,three CIDG killed, eight wounded, ten weapons and one 1R0-25 radio lost.Five enemy were killed.

On 4 June a company size operation in the vicinity of Hiep Hoa, A-351,Hau Nghia Province, made several contacts accounting for a total of nineVC killed. Two USASF were wounded, one CIDG killed and four wounded; mostof the friandly casualties were caused bk booby traps. On 11 June a KikeForce operation it. the vicinity of Chi Linh, A-333, Binh Long I rovince,made contact with an estimated VC company. The enemy was deployed on lineand fired assorted small arms, automatic weapons, and 82•m mortars. Friendlyforces returned the fire and called in artillery, a FAC, and a light fireteam. Alter 45 minutes, the enemy broke contact and withdrew, leaving sevenkilled and assorted equipment. No friendly casualties were sustained.

A patrol conducted in the vicinity of Loc Ninh, A-331, Binh Long 1ro-vince, made contact on 22 June with five VC. After five minutes the VWbroke contact with friendly elements in pursuit. This contact resulted inone VC killed. Later that afternoon the element in pursuit rmade contactwith a VC battalion which opened fire from three sides using automaticweapons. The friendly element took a defensive position and called for alight fire team and air strikes which caused the enemy to withdraw. On23 June contact was made with the point elemnt of a VC company, but wasbroken with no casualties reported. At 1400 hours the 4th Mike rorceCompany arrived by helicopter and linked up with the operation. All elem-ents were placod in a deiensive positimn, and H&I fire was directed onsuspected VC locations. At 0837 hours on 24 June, the combined force dis-covered 10 VC killed by airstrikes and two enemy weapons. At 1058 hoursa MEDEVAC aircraft was fired on by two VC squads. After an exchange offire, the VC withdrew, with the combined force in pursuit. Contact wasagain made with two squads of VC firing automatic weapons, and broken at1202 hours. Still in-pursuit, the combined force made contact with anestimated VC company. The VC. broke contact and withdrew after -+4i1 -rand airstrikes had been called in. This entire operation resulted in 21VC killed and five enemy weapons captured. Friendly forces sustained oneUSASF, seven CIDG, two Mike Force personrel, and one interpreter killed;27 CIDG and four Mike Force personnel wounded; five rifles and tow radioslost.

On 28 June an estimated VC platoon initiated contact wi..h anotheroperation from Loc Ninh. Friendly elementp moved into defensive positionswith 105mm and 175mm artillery in support. A light fire team and tacticalaircraft were requested. At 1220 hours the enemy positions were reinforced,bringing the total estimated VC strength to a company or larger. One USASFwas killed, two USASF wounded, five CIDG killed and 24 CIDG wounded. Medicalevacuation could not be accomplished because of intense ensmy fire and adverseweather conditions in the operational area. At 1620 hours two Mike Forcecompanties were helilifted from Loc Ninh to reinforce the friendly elements.

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CONFID EtdTI ALAVG8-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Repor. for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

T'le two Miku Force Cmp .. ies linked up with fri.ndly _Arments i.ithout in-cident. The VC withdrew, and by 1900 hours ovacuation of the dead andwounded was completed. At dawn on 29 June the contact area was assessed,revealing one VC killed by airstrikes and four additional CIDG killed.At 0955 on 12 July a search and destroy operation consisting of 87 CIDGand two USASF from Tcng Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long 1'rovrnce, sighted anostimated VC regimemt moving along a trail. Friendly elements opendd firewith small arms and withdrew to a defensive perimeter, calling in 105mmand 175rm artillery on the enemy positions. Contact was broken at IOhours. No friendly casualties were sustained. At 1535 hours this operationmoved back to the contact area to assess the artillery damage and was am-bushed by an estimated two companies of VC. Friendly elements returned thefire, called 105Omm and 175mm artillery into the VC positions, and, under theprotection of an airstrike, withdrew again to defensive positions. Sporadicsmall arms fire was received until 1800 hours. Results of this operationwere three CIDG killed, three wounded and three missing; one USASF wounded,and ten VC killed. At 1140 hours on 19 July a local security element atCamp Irek Klok, A-322, Tay Ninh Frovince, made contact with a VC platoon.After a short.exchange of fire in which one CIDG was wounded, the VC plat-oon withdrew. At 1627 hours Camp 1 rek Klok received 12 rounds of 82mmmortar fire. Ten rounds landed on the inner perimeter and two rounds onthe perimeter wire. Counter-mortar fire was employed and artillery directedinto suspected VC firirn positions. One CIDG was killed; one USASF, 11CIDG and two civilian mechanics wounded. On 27 July a waterborne searchand destroy operation consisting of two companies of CIDG, four USASF andthree VNSF, made contact with an estimated company of VC ten kilometersnorthwest of Ben Sol, A-321, Tay Ninh Province. After a ten rinute firefi•htthe VC broke contact and withdrew; results of this contact were one':VC--.-killed and four wounded, two CIDO killed, 1i CIDG and one USASF wounded,nine boats and one .3D cal light machinegun slightly damageds

(d) IV CTZ: On 2 May,,two companies of CIDG fromMy Phuoc Tay initiated contact with two VC companies. After a two hourfirefight, 21 VC were confirmed killed, And three small arms, a large amountof documents, assorted equipment and ammunition were captured. (X& 14 hayOJAe Lp1.A.?Uat IO 11J 'Llu. Oil VI aUU%;%AA.LI.' C%%, 13,YJU .A h

platoon. A ten minute firefLight ensued during which the CIDG were supportedby 4.2 inch mortars and 105mm howitzers. Results of the contact were 16VC killed. Camp Ba Xoai, A-421, Chau Doe Province, was attacked by a rein-

forced VC company on 19 May. The enemy employed 57mm ana 75mm recoillessrifles, 6Omm and 81um, mortars, machine guns. and small arms in the attack.The camp was not physically assaulted; all firing was from approximately600 meters out. The camp was supported by artillery from Chi Lang TrainingCenter and by AC-47'aircraft. After a firefight lasting approximately twohours, the VC broke contact and withdrew west toward Cambodia. Frindlylosses were one CIDG killed, three CIDG and four USASF wounded; the teamhouse, vehicles and TR-20 radio were damaged. There were no confirmed VCcasualties, but three litters and bloody clothing were fowid, indicatingat least six VC casualties.

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COi'FI DENT IAL

ZVGB-C 15 hug-ust 1967SUBJECT: Operntion!nl Rewport f r Qux.rtvrl-y , ori Ed!cin ' 31 July 1967

A company of CIDG from i hu Quoc, A-441, Kien Giang Province, made con-tact on 4 June with an unknown number of VC approximately ten kilometerssoutheast of camp. After a short fire fight the VC broke contact and with-drew with the friendly element in pursuit. Friendly losses were on USASFand two CIDG killed, while the emezy suffered 11 killed and 11 weaponsaelzed. Operation Le Dinh Dao 10, 8-11 June, was the first major foot-mobile operation conducted by the CIDG over a sustained period of time inthe VC controlled area known as the "Pocket" in southeastern Kien TuongProvince. Eight hundred CIDG troops were employed initially, including troopsfrom Camps My An, Kinh Quan II, Tuyen Nhon, and My Phuoc Tay. On the firstday of the operation, 8 Juno, an additional 150 CIDG from Camp Binh ThanhThon were airlanded to reinforce units from My rhuoc Tay uhich had madeheavy contact as they moved into the operational area. Contact with theenemy, elements of the 261st Bn of the Dong Thap I Regiment, lasted approx-imately five hours. Sporadic contact continued for the next two days;however, no Ojor VC units wore encountered. Results of the operation in-cluded 32 VC killed, 13 captured (wounded also); five CIDG killed; 25 CIDG,one VNSF, two USASF, and one helicopter crewman wounded. In addition,72 rounds of 81ms mortar ammunition, four weapons, and 10 kg of documentswere captured, and numerous bunker, structures, and sampans destroyed.

On 28 June at 0955 hours, Operation Le Dinh Dao 9, a search and destroyoperation from Moc Hoa, B-41, Kien Tuong Province, consisting of ten com-mitted CIDG companies supported by tactical air and helicopters with threeCIDG companies in reserve, amade contact uith a reinforced VC company approx-imately 30 kilometers south of Moc Hoa. The VC used rockets, 6Omm mortars,.50 cal machine &no,, .30 cal machine guns, and assorted small arms in attack-ing a CIDG comyvny. After five minutes of close combat the VC withdrewsoutheast and deployed in a defensive position. The CIDG company was rein-forced by another CIDM company and air strikes and armed helicopters weredirected aga.not the VC. Sporadic contact was made throughout the day withcompany sizs elements of the VC 263rd Main Force Battalion. Friendly losseson 23 Jiune wer- three USASF, one VNSF and 19 CIDG killed; (= jUS, SF, One VN'SFand 20 GIDG woundedl 40 CIDG missing. 'Y losses were 50 killed, four woundedand two captured. On 29 June at approximately 0900 hours all the CIDGcompanies were pulled out, and a reaction force consisting of tito Mike Forceand six CIDG companies was committed in the contr.ct area to seal off anddestroy the VC. The Mike Force companies swept south through the contactarea making a total of six c¢ntacts which resulted in 24 VC killed and fourcaptured, with no friendly losses. Thirty-one bodies of the 40 CIDG reportedas missing were recovered. The CIDG companies made two contacts, resultingin one VC killed and no friordly casualties. The operatiom terminated on29 June at 1830 hours with tku following overall resultsi friendly losseswere three USASF, one VNSF, and 53 CMDG killed; one USASF, one VNSF and 21CIDG wounded; nine CIDG missing, VC losses were 75 killed, four wounded andsix captured. 12

CONFI DENTI AL

CONFI DENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly i'eriod Ending 31 July 1967

On 3 July At 2400 hours installations in thc town of Cao Lanh, Kienrhong Province, came under heavy VC mortar, rifle grenade, antitank rocketand small arms fire. The primary attack was against the USASF, airbuatfacility with secondary attacks on theB-43 compound, National Police Station,KiQi Phong Sector Headquarters and the CORDS compound. Friendly troopsobserved the muzzle fLashes of the VC weapons and returned fire with 4.2mortars, 105mm howitzers arid =all arms. A FAC and art AC-47 were on statilinat 0035 hours, at which time the VC broke contact. Oni USASF, one civilian(Filipino) tech rep, five CIDG, six security guards, and seven civilianswore wounded; one ARVN soldier and one civilian were killed. kinor damagewas sustained by the buildings in the B-43 compound. Extensive damage wasdone to the airboat site. The following major items of equipment weredestroyed; one 2i-ton truck, one air compressor, one airboat (complcte),six airboat engires and all spare parts for boat repairs to include specialtools. The maintenance shed was totally destroyed, and all buildings onboat site are in need of minor repairs. The VC losses are unknown.

On the 14th of July at 0245 hours Camp My Am, A-433, in Kien PhcngProvince; the town of My An, and two mobile OP's south of the camp, cameunder attack by an estimated VC battalion. The attack was concentratedon the two OP's withsuppressive fires on the camp and town so they could notgive sufficient fire support or reinforce the OPIs. Counter mortar wasfired from the camp and 105mm howitzer from the town. Tactical aircraft andAC-47 were on station at 0330, bringing the VC under fire. The VC broke contactat 0545 hours withdrawing to the sc-utheast taking their dead and wounded in13 sampans. Results of the attack were 12 CIDG killed; two USASF, two VNSFand 33 CIDG wounded; one .30 cal machine gun and two assault boats withmotors lost. VC losses wwre five confirmed VC killed with an estimated 50additional VC either killed or wounded. One AK-47 rifle and one claymoremine were seized.

On the 17th at 0900 hours, detachment A-441 on Phu Qaoc Island dispatchedtwo USASF, one combat reccn platoon and one company of CIDG on a searchand d~stroy operation in response to intelligence. At 1305 hours tacticalaircraft conducted 11 airstrikes in the target area. At 1430 hours theairstrikes lifted, and the friendly element, supported by 4.2 inch mortarfire, moved into the area. At 1500 hours the combat recon platoon made contactwith four VC, killing one and wounding another. At 1640 hours the companyof CIDG initiated contact with eight VC, who broke contact after an, eightminute fire fight wich resulted in one VC killed aid two CUIG wounded. By2000 hours a complete assessment of the target area had been made, revealingan additional six VC killed. A FAC reported seeing a number of VC bodiesbeing carried away. Total results of the operation were two CIDG wounded,eight VC killed, four VC suspects detained, one VC wounded, three structuresdestroyed, 600 kilos of rice, two kilos of documents and three kilos of med-ical supplies captured. On the 25th at 0645, a platoon 0-f Chieu Hois andtwo USASF from Kinh Quan II, A-412, Kien 1hong Province, ambushed a companyof VC approximately 15 kilometers southeast of camp. A 15 minute firefightensued resulting in six VC killed, two weapons and two kilos of documentscaptured, with no friendly casualties.

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CONFI DENTiA LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jiuly 1967

(2) CIDG camps: On 1 May Detachment A-252 was withdrawnfrori. lei Krong, Pleiku Province, leavirg the VNSF detachment to run the campwithout advisors. This was the first test of a now concept designed tocctsierve USASF assets and thru facilitate the deployment of additional campsin new locatiens. The second camo to be turned over to the VNSF under thisprogram was Vinh Gia in IV CTZ. Control of the camp was transferred to theVNSF detacment on 27 June, and USASF Detachment A-422 was with drawn on 30June. See Inclosure 6 for a progress report on this program. On 15 May,Detachment B-3] terminated its mission at Xuan Loc and Nui Thi, and allpersonnel and equipment were move to Company A at Bien Hoa. The buildingspreviously occupied by the detachment were turned over to Sector ýontrol.Personnel have been reassigned to other Special Forces detachments through-out the Corps Area. On 26 May three CIDG companies, one CRP, USASF Det-achment A-126 were airlifted to Luong Hoa in Long An Provincý to open anew CIDG camp. The 25th ARVN Division and tha 36th ARVN Ranger Battalionconducted Operation Victory Trail ip support of the camp opening. In IICTZ the closing of Bong Son and the opening of Ha Tay was completed on 12June. On 24 June Detachment A-225A at Le Hai officially turned their postat the Dong Xuan District Headquarters over to an element of MACV Team 28.The CIDG camp at Con Thien, just below the TIZ, was turned over to the USMCon 25 July for use as an outpost. Heavy pressure from NVA forces in thevicinity of the DMZ and the presence of large US4C units in the immediatearea of the camp precluded accomplishment of the CIDG mission.

(3) The designations for most of the "AA" detachmentsin IV CTZ were changed effective 1 June 1967. The purpose of the charge wasto more readily identify the '"A" detachments with their parent "B" detach-ments. The first two numbers of each detachment now correspond to thenumber of its "B" detachment. The five detachments that'report directlyto Company D have designations starting with the numbers "40". New dcsig--natians are as follows:

OLD N]EDon Phuc (Kike Force) A-430 A-401To Chau (lst MGF) A-431 A-402To Chau (9d MGF) A-432 A-403P4 11h Ming A-L÷]1 A-4O0

Ha Tien A-421 A-405My Phuoc Tay A-424 A-411Kinh Quan I1 A-416 A-412Ba Xoai A-429 A-ha21Cal Cal A-412 A-431Thuong Thoi A-425 A-432My An A-426 A-433"Phu Quoc k-427 A-441

Phu Quoc A-428 A-442

(4) l repoav'tion for the coming flo6i seas n was - _.sizedin the IV Corps Area. A training program was implemented with prime.,emphasis on boat tactics and operations to include the employment of sam-pans, assault boats, and airboats. Berms, draii age systems, and pumping

CO,!FI DENTIAL

CO F IDIENT IALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

facilities have been rebuilt and improved to withstand the flood waters.Supplies, aimunition and equipnent arc being pro-stocked in the camps topreclude some of the resupply problems when the floods came. The CompanyD Flood Plan was coordinated with the Senior Advisor, IV CiTZ; uompany A,5th SFGA; US 9th Inf Div; II&IForceV, and representatives from COA'1VF(RVto insure a unified effort (see inclosure 25, Company D Flood Plan). Theairboat site at Cao Lanh, Kien Ihuong Proviico was completed in May butsuffered severe daniiu dui-'r, t4. VC attl-k on 3-4 July (aue paragraph3b(l)(d) above).

c. Special Operations.

(1) Operation Buckner: Conducted by Detachment B-50(Project Omega), this operation took pl co in western Kontum 1rovince, IICTZ, from 15 April to 15 May. There were 13 reconr•aissance tean; .and twocompany operations in the AO. Nineteen contacts and seven air strikesresulted in 12 VC killed, four wounded, and four captured. One Mike Forcesoldier was wounded.

(2) Blackjack 41: This mobile guerrilla operation beganon 19 January, i.ith 1 hase I terminating on 23 March. 1 hase II began on17 May. The operational area was the Seven Mountai •s region of IV CTZ.See Inclosure 15 for after action report. In addition, operation Arrowhead,a Mike Force parachute assualt, was conducted in support of the mobileguerrilla force. See Inclosure 16.

(3) Blackjack 214: This operation was conducted in north-western Kcntum Province by the A-219 Mike Force, the A-217 mobile guerrillaforce, and CIDG elements from A-242 as a diversionary force. It began on

16 March and ended on 19 May, with 16 contacts made during the operation.Friendly casualties were one USASF killed and one wounded, one Mike Forceesldier killed and nine wounded. Enemy losses were 11 killed, six wounded,one captured, 152 buildings destroyed, 13 tons of food destroyed, and five

weapcn s seized.(4) Blackjack 25: During the period 15 April - 20 May

mobile guerrilla elements made 11 contacts in the area ot operation, whichwas located in central Kontum Province. Friendly casualties were sevenUSASF wounded, two Mike Force soldiers killed and 20 wv u red. EaenW losses

were 19 killed, seven wounded, 96 structures and 100 kIg of' food des~toyed,and nine weapons captured.

(5) Blackjack 33: This operation was conducted in cen-tral III CTZ from 27 April to 24 May. For the first time mobile guerrillaelements were employed in conjunction with long range reconnaissance teams(B-56; i reject Sigma), resulting in an impressive total of 320 enemy killed.See Inclosure 12 for after action report

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CONF ID ENT I AL

CONF DENTI!ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(6) OPORD 5-67: From 10 April t6 15 June reconnaissanceteams and Ranger companies from I roject Delta, Detachment B-52, operated inthe Ashau-Aloui Valley in I CTZ. See Inclosure 18 for after action report,-

(7) Blackjack 42: This was a mobile guerilla operationconducted in southeastern Vinh Binh Province, IV CTZ, from 3 June to 2 July.It marked the first amphibious infiltration conducted by Spe~ial Forcesadvised elements in Vietnam. See Inclosure 17 for after action report.

(8) Blackjack 26: Runring from 15 June to 14 July, thiswas a mobile guerrilla operati.'n conducted in northeastern Kontum and north-western Binh Dinh Provinces by the 23rd Mike Force Company (A-219). Onlyfour contacts were made, resulting in three USASF wounded, two Mike Forcesoldiers killed and three wounded. Although there were no confirmed enemycasualties, 27 strudtu-es and four tons of food were destroyed, and oneweapon was captured.

(9) Blackjack 34: Conducted during the period 16-21July, this was a mobile guerrilla operation in northeastern Binh Long andnorthwestern Phuoc Lcrg Provinces. The operation discovered a VC regimentand killed 126 of the enemy while suffering only three USASF -wounded, oneMike Force soldier killed and 33 wounded. See Inclosure 14 for after actionreport.

d. Training.

(1) Recondo School

(a) General

1. NR USA3F ASSD ATCH'DOFF EM OFF

May 5 27 1 ROKJun 5 29 1 ROK 1 AUST.Jul 5 30 2 ROK 1 AUST.

2. During this reporting period the MACVRecondo School received student classes R-13=.67 through R-2-64. The fol-lowing is a breakdown of students by units and Corps areas for thesm classes.

I CORPS IN DROP7D" -GRADUATED CCikLETED_ IN TRAINING

lst Mar Div 2 0 1 1 03rd MWF 2 1 1 0 0ROK Marines 2 0 2 0 0

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Reproduc~ ropy~_.,St ,- COPY.

SC QNF i D EHT I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operaticral Report for Quarterly i'eriod Ending 31 July 1967

II CORPS

lst Cav Div (AM) 72 24 39 2 74th Inf Div (-) 41 18 18 0 53/•5th Inf Div 12 1 10 1 01/101 Abn Div 10 2 8 0 0ROK Forces 43 5 26 6 6Hq Tng Div MACV 1 0 0 0 1

III CORPS

lst Inf Div 48 27 12 0 925th Inf Div(-) 17 7 10 0 0173rd Abn BdO (Sep) 26 2 19 0 5196th Lt Inf Bde 4 2 2 0 0199th Lt Inf Bde 21 4 9 0 89th Inf Div 45 17 15 2 11llth Arm Cav Reg 5 1 4 0 05th SFG 1 1 0 0 0lst Phil Cag 9 2 4 0 3

- The mission of the MACV Recondo School isto train selected persoimel fran US/F'MAF units in specialized teclniques andskilleLnecessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operationsin the Republic of South Vietnam.

(b) Operations and Training Activities.

1. P"lns - N/A2. Operations

a Nuiber/type operation conductedR Nigt Recondo CIDG

(1) Attacks 0 0 0 00) Blocking Actions 0 0 0 0() Escort Action 9 0 0 9(4) Combat Patrols 0 0 0 0G) Recon Patrols 40 0 40 0( l) i;nbushe3 0 80 80 0

b Number of friendly initiated c)ntacts

i ght Recondo

0 0 0

a VC Losses (Confirmed)

V) 'C Killed: 0

1.7CONFIDE9TI AL

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CONFIDENT I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(2) VC Captured: 0Q~) VC Wounded: 0(4) VC Suspicts; 15(•) VC Weapon: 0

d Friendly LossesUSASF RECONDO STD CIDG

(1) Killed 0 0 0(2) Wounded 0 0 0

Kissing 0 0 0(4) Weapons Lost 0 0 0

4. Training: Recondo classes now receive a282 houi POI. See Inclosure 9.

(c) Logistics. The MACV Recondo School is supported

logistically by USARV and the 1st. Logistical Command.

(2) Dong Ba Thin VNSF Training Center.

(a) Courses graduated or in progress during thereporting period:

CIDG #23 10 Apr - 15 May 102CIDG #24 15 May - 27 Jun 128CIDG #25 03 Jul - 11 Aug 121CRP #21 17 Apr - 21 May 248CwV? #/22 24 May - 28 jun 232CRP #23 03 Jul - 07 Aug 248CIDG Radio #11O Apr - 28 Aug 37LLDB RCT #6 31 Jul -

(b) The Basic,.Airborne Course was attended by MikeForce units from D & C Conpax0 , 5th Special Forces Group, during the monthsof May, June and July. Also attending were selected US personnel. A totalof 215 sutudents graduated from the basic airborne couse during the reportingperiod. The couse is tagght by USASF personnel assigned to DetachmentB-51. While the airborne course is in session, the Detachment's capabilityto monitor other training and conduct operations is decreased because ofpersonnel shortages.

(c) During the reporting period the followingcombat operations were conducted:

OPN SIZE DURATION CONTACTS

T-10 2 Platoons 3 Days NegT-11'2 Platoons 3 Days Neg

18CONFI DEWI t AL

CONFIDENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operatinnal Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 31 Jiily 1967

T-12 2 Platoons 3 Days NegT-13 8 Platoons 5 Days 1 VC KIAT-14 1 Platoons 4 Days NegT-15 8 Platoons 5 Days NegT;16 2 Platooni 2 Days NegT-18 2 Platoons 5 Days NegT-19 3 Platoons 5 Days NegT-20 2 Platoans 5 Days 1 Squad(2 CIDG-WIA)T-21 2 Platoons 5 Days NegT-22 2 Platoons 4 Days Neg

(d) The camp nightly deploys four to five squadambushes or security patrols. The CIDG leaders cause, the LLDB course andthe CRP course conclude vith field training exercises into areas which provideopportunity for eneny contact and thus add a degree of realism and serious-ness to field training.

(e) Aviation: The tactical airlift liason personnelprovided by the U.S. Air Force increased to three officers in May J.967. TheGroup is now suppo: %ed by the senior tactical airlift liason officer at NhaTrang and one assistant for C and B Company and a second assistant for A andD Company. A marked improvement in the efficiency of air movement operationsat the forward supply points has been noted.

(1) A p-c-.kret+_s,7Pe nc1ocse air mppnnord. giiide forground commanders was produced. The guide vill be distributed down to the"A" detachments and will provide the ground commander with a quick referencefor minimum safe distance for each type of air delivered munition and itspattern of effect.

(2) The C-7A caribou assets under the opera-tiorna control of the 5th Special Forces Group were increased to eleven air-craft daily. The redistribution of assets has enambled the Group to placetwo caribous at each forward supply point.

(3) Portable airfield lighting sets were dis-tributed to each "A" detachment, increasing the operational capability of allSpecial Forces airfields in the Reupulbic of Vietnam.

(f) Combat Developments: See Inclosure -8 for atwumary of all projects currently under evaluation.

19

CO F FILtINT IAL

4. (U) LOGISTICS

a. General. From 1 May through 30 4urne 67 the Logistic SupportCenter continued to provide the 5th SFGA' s far flung detac. hments and companieswith all classes of supplies and up to and including 5th echelon ordnance,signal and engineer maintenance. More than 10,000 tona of supplies weredelivered to subordinate units by all methods of transportation. Over 700tons of food, ammunition and general supplies were parachuted to isolatedcamps and in support of special operations.

b. Supply.

(1) Construction of facilities for a fifth forward supply pointwas initiated with an expected completion date of l• September 1967. Thisaction will complete the decentralization of the 5t- SFGA logistics systemand will provide a reduced order-ship time and further dispersal of supplies.

(2) Part of the LSC stockage level of critical supplies and equip-ment, such as weapons and radios, has been dispersed to the Logistical Annexat Detachment B-55 Saigon.

(3) A new ration warehouse has been completed, allowing the LSCto store rice in large quantities under optimum storage space. This allowsISC to purchase rice in large quantities when the market price is low. Arecent purchase of 25,000 bags was made at a saving of fifty piasters per bag.

(4) Ammunition stockage levels were reduced from a Bixty to awl.LLJ.A UJ L VVCy .L'V L. AllJ... , f -I, L .L.U I.11 q±u .%.Z LU. lam wLLIJ UdLs• Y ..L.-•O... ± •J.L

turned in to Cam Ranh Bay. A rehabilitation plan to construct new berms withinthe ammunition dumip has been implemented with an expected completion date of20 August 1967.

(5) The petroleum storage area has been bermed to reduce possiblefire hazards.

(6) POL and ammunition are ro longer placed on the ready lineswithin the LSC. These supplies are now moved directly from their respectivestorage areas to the aircraft loading ramp, thereby furtber reducing fireand explosion hazards.

(7) A significant movements achievement was accomplished duringthe month of June when sea shipment tonnage equaled the tonnage shipped by air.This was the first time in 5th SFGA history that sea shipments equalled airshipments, thereby significaztly reducing the drain on the in-country airliftsystems. Large quantities of bulk, low priority cargo can now be shipped moreeconomically to Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and Bien Hoa, keeping the high prioritycargo for aerial port shipment,

(8) A covered, elevated ramp has been constructed to allow moreand larger rigging lines for the preparaticn of loads for air land and airdrop. To decrease aircraft loading time, a direct access gate from the C7A

20

/

LOGISTICS (CONTD)

aircraft parking area to the rigging ramp has been made, and the area is nowin the process of being covered with PSP to provide an all-weather operatingsurface for forklifts.

(9) Direct shipment schedules have been made with the .CounterInsurgency Support Office to our forward supply points in Danang and Bien Hoa.These schedules are designed to reduce handling, reduce the order-ship timeand eliminate re-shipment from Ma Trang. A test delivery schedule is beingmade on rations, cement, and lumber.

(10) A logistical briefing has been given to Brig Gen Quang,LLDG Commander, his staff, and all LLDB "B" Detachment Commanders.

(11) LSC security has been improved by the addition of Americanguards and observation towers.

(12) All "A" camp generators in the II CTZ are being standardizedto reduce repair parts stockage and to help eliminate repair parts problems.

21

5. (U) Revolutionary Development Support Activities.

a. The most significant development in the field of RDSA resultedfrom initiating regular;y scheduled counterpart meetings during the reportingperiod. The mediumt of the joint meeting (i.e. LLDB Political Warfare Sectionand 5ht SFGA RDSA/PSYOPS) has effected a centralized communications channelfor coordinated planning, mutual exchange of ideas and eventually a singleprogram designed to accomplish bi-laterally developed objectives. A summaryof the joint conference is illustrative of the results achieved thus farfrom joint meetings.

(1) The meeting held on 12 May 67, resulted in:

(a) A joint USASF/LLDB field trip to Gia Vuc to analize thereasons for the deterioration in troop morale and lack of motivation toconduct combat operations. OPT Ho, LLDB POLWAR Section accompanied CPTDrollinger to Gia Vuc on 14 May 67. Joint problem analysis and correctiveaction provided the LLDB Det CO/USASF Det CO the program which ultimatelyresolved Gia Vuc's troop motivation problem.

(b) A reevaluation of the organization and capabilities ofthe CIDG CA/PSYOP squads. Subject on S-3 concurrence, the TOE strength ofthe squads will be increased frem twelve to sixteen members, with an addit-ional capability of expanding to eighteen members in order to provide flex-ibility as ,.fie TAOR situation may require. Further, the size and compositionof the squads would be dictated by the mission and TAOR requirements ratherthan by the VNSF/USASF detachment size (i.e. C, B, or A detachmentst). Therecommended basic squad size and composition is as follows:

1. Command ElEment: 1 Team Leader 1 Asst Team Leader

2. Political Indoctrination Cell: 1 Troop Education Spec.1 Troop Service Spec.1 Tioop Indoctrintion

Spec1 Athletic and Recreation

Spec

3. Psychological Warfare Cell: 1 Intelligence Spec1 Civil Motivaticn Spec1 Troop Motivation Spec

4. Audio Visual Cell; 2 Audio Visual Spec

5. Medical Troop SocialWelfare Cell: 2 Medical Spec

1 Social Welfare Spec

6. PX/Commissary(Camp Store) 2 Storekeeper

(2) The major objective of the first meeting was to identify LLDBPOLWAR missions as assigned by Joint General Staff RVNAF in order to determine

22

Revolutionary Development Support Activities (CONTD)

USASF advisory responsiblitiee so that the 5th SkMA could properly alineRDSA/PSYOP personnel with their counterparts at all levels. As a result ofthe ideas submitted, a joint staff study was initiated on 1 Jun 67, recommendinga combined RDSA/Y'SYOPS Section bc organized to advise the VNSF in conduct of theGVN POLWAR Program, RVNAF. This study will be completed by 15 Aug 67.

(3). The meeting held on 18 Jul 67 resulted in a mutual exchangeof job descriptions and delineation of duties in order to clarify bothLLDB/5th SFMA counterpart responsibilities. Each LLDB sub-section chief inthe POLWAR Section outlined his specific missions and program objectives.In addition, CPT Ky, Political Indoctrination Chief, presented the LLDB con-cept of Revolutionary Development supporting, accordance with comanarl guidance.The next meeting is scheduled to be conducted on 17 August 67 to finalizethe program of instruction for the CIDG CA/iSYOPS squads in all four tacticalzonles as well as to determine 'he employment of these squads (i.e. at selectedtraining centers or company level).

b. On 6 June 1967, the first CIDG rice buying association was or-ganized by the S-5, Co C, Da Nang. The rice buying association is a c3operativeestablished by the CIDG under the guidance of Vietnamese and US Special Forcesfor the purpose bf buying large quantities of rice in Da Nang for shipmentand sales to CIDG dependents. The purpose is to:

(1) Provide rice at a reasonable price for CIDG dependents liv-ing in remote areas, thus discouraging local rice purchases at exhorbitantprices.

(2) Protect the CIDG and their depcndcnts from unsUaulQus Me -chants.

(3) Discourage the CIDG from pilfering rice from the camps.

The experiment has proven highly successful and future implementation of thisconcept is scheduled for II, III and IV CTZ. (See Inclosure 21)

c. On 4 Jul 67, a joint memorandum was issued by the LLDB POLWR andUSASF 3-5 Section of Co A, Bien Hoa, designed to improve the standards ofliving for the CIDG and their dependents by providing subsistance annd mortlecommodities via an established commissary system for all CIDG camps. Thebi-lingual, memorandum outlined the 60 day trail concept as follows:

0() Camps selected to implement the commissar* concept wereTong Le Chon, Vrek Klok and Luong Hoa. All three of these camps haveexperienced a gradual decline in troop morale as a result of remote locat-ion and non-availability of such items as beer, cigarettes, and generalmorale commnodities.

(2) Supply of cmmrissary goods as well -w the managemant of allcuitAP exchangos are the food contraotor's responsibility, The food

23

I. .

Revolutiorary Development Support Activities (CONTD)

contractor supplies tho requested comodities on a weekly basis at the sametime the fresh food deliveries are made to the detachments, Fixed prices arepredetermined and ag•red upon by the LLDB POUTARAYASF S-5 section, Co A,Bien Hoa. Eistablished prices are designed to preclude profiteering activitieswithin the C]DG camps. The trial period terminates 4 Sep 67, and a projdc ,.will be included in the subsequent ORLL.

d. Field Evaluation: An extensive evaluation of the Group's nation-wide RD support and civic action programs was begun during June 67. Thecollection phase of this evaluation is now complete, and the findings andrecommendations are expected to be available early in, August. It is expec-vedthat this study .ii, among other things, result in closer integration ofcivic action aMd intelligence efforts, much tighter control on piaster spend.ng,and closer alignment of the USASF advis ory s~'iu•'iure with the VNSF POII'JARfunctions.

24

6. (U) Psychological Operations.

a. There has been a significant increase in coorC-Li ýon and jc.nteffort between the Group PSYOPSr Officer and appropriate counterparts in theVietnamese Special Forces Political Warfare Scction. A formal conference anda number of informal staff visits have contributed to a closer working rc:l&ationship, A number of projects are being jointly considered. They are:

(1) Equipment for CA/PSYOP teams

(2) Reorganization of CA/PSYOP teams

(3) Lessons (POI) for training of CA/PSYOP teams

(4) Introduction of training classes at Dong Ba Thin Traihg center

(5) Better integration of POLWAR activities into the CIDG program.

b. 5th Special Forces Group has received a marked increase in air-craft support of PSYOPS. The Group presently receives five times the numberof aizrcraft missions for the previous reporting period. Although 20% of thetotal missions requested are still not being floem, there are several reasons.They are:

(1) Failure of companies in the CTZ to follow through on missionsrequested to insure all requests have been forwarded to the US Air ForceD. A. S. C.

(2) Failure to USASF personnel to properly request aircraft support.

(3) Failure to USASF to insure that leaflets and tape recordingsare supplied to the US Air Force properly. Corrective action has been takenon probelms identified, and higher efficiency will be forthcoming.

c. An increase of junior officers in group has generally improvedthe manpower situation in SF detachments resulting in an increase in supportfor PSYOPS. The present manpower status remains far below the recogiiizedneeds of the Group for 1-SYOFS, however.

25

7. (U) Personnel & Admirxistration

a. Unit strength:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period:

OFF 518

27 1-

(2) At end of the reporting period:

OFF 465

Wo 11

ER P-1812T57

b. Supply of blank forms & publications: Supply publications hasbeen excellent. The supply of blank forms is marginal.

c. Assignment Instructions upon DEROS: The late receipt of assign-ment instructions for personnel departing this command upon DEROS continuesto be a problem. It is felt that the efforts txpended at all levels to improvethis situntion will reduce the administrative burden and improve morals.

d. Awards and Decorations:

[1) The following is the status of awards and decorations app-roved during the reporting .period.

(a) Medal of Honor 0

(b) DSC 4

(c) DSM 0

(d) DF 4

(e) Silver Star 48

(f) Legion of Merit 14

(g) Soldier's Medal 25

(h) Bronze Star (V) 1"

(i) Bronze Star 350

26

Personnel and Administration (CONTD)

(j) Air Medal (V) 4

(k) Air Medal 206

(1) ARCOM (V) 33

(m) ARCCO4 96

(n) Purple Heart 92

() CTB 545

(p) CMB 57

(2) There are two recommendations for the Medal of Honor curr-ently pending at Department of the Army: ULT Sisler, George K., OFlO0O68and SFC Hoskins, Gomer D., Jr., RA25351557.

e. A&R and Special Services:

(1) Athletic and Recreation Frogram: Fourteen additional weightlifting sets were obtained for use at the SFOB and various detachments. Otherathletic equipment has been ordered and will be distributed upon receipt.

12) Special Services: Magazines, paperback books and newspapersare walled directly to all detachments w.eekly. A reading rOa ras openedat the SFOB. There are magazines, newspapers and over 1,000 paperback and hardcover books available; facilities for studying and writing letters have beeninstalled. A tape library was opened in May, and personnel are able to dubtapes, record tapes to send home, and play tapes received from hcine.

f. Post Exchange Facilities: The SFOB 11X annex now stocks variousitems of electronic equipment, television sets, radios and numerous other items.

g. Labor/Civilian Personnel: In keeping with MACV objectives toreduce the amount of piasters expended, additional consolidatioxr of activi-ties is planned. All hiring and firing of civilian personnel for Group unitsin the Nha Trang area 'ill be centered at the SFOB Civilian Personnel Office.This will permit elimination of most CPO positions at the other four officesin the Nha Trang area.

27

8. (U) Medical

a. Hospital facilities: The CIDG hospital at Company At Bien Hoa,has been performing major surgical procedures orunCIG patients since mid-May67. This not only substantially increasce the level of medical care avail-able to III CTZ CIDG, but also decreases dependence upon U.S. military hosp-i+al f4a"'-' in thn" area.

b. Alvisory mission: An immeasurable improvcnent in the relation-ship between the Vietn-mose Special Forces Surgeon and the 5th Special ForcesGroup Surgeon was noted during thih, quarter. Tangiblc rcsults -nc-" de.

(1) Joint M1CAP operations in thu Nha Trang area.

(2) Combining the USASF and WISF medical facilities at Detach-ment B-51 and VNSF Training Center At Dong Ba Thin. This combination precludesduplication of efforL a.-d of resources and serves as one example of resultsobtainable from excellent advisor-counterpart relations. It is planned thatthe combined facilities ill form a nucleus for a pmrojected training coursein advanced medical procedures to be conducted for VNSF aidmen.

(3) A data file system on all medical and paramedical personnelwas made available to the VNSF Chief Surgeon. This syste-mwill.enable him tounderstand the personnel resources controlled by him and will assist him inmaking and rotating assignments and in deciding which personnel require addi-tibnal training in certtin fields.

c. Medical civic action- Medical civic action programs continued.Civilian outpatients treated between 1 Jan 67 through 31 Jun 67 totalled505,461.

d. Plague prevention: In an attempt to curtail] the perennial in-creasesin the incidence of bubonic plague in "A" detachment areas. 5thSpecial Forces Group (Abn) approved the expeniditure of funds for the purchaseof sufficiet plague vaccine from the Institut 'asteur to immunize 143,000persons. This number includes all CIDG, thtir dependents, and civilians livingin the immediate vicinity of "A" detachments in I and II CTZ. Immunizationswill begin in late September or early October, 1967.

e. Emergency Medical Reaction Team: The EART, consisting of onemedical officer and two aidmen, with sufficient supplies, deployed frcm theSFO- tu DetaculuenL A-li0, Con 'ihien, in mid-Hay to provide medical support.This was the first time the team ie-,s utilized, and it was successful inits mission.

28

9. (U) Signal:

a. Airboat communications: The high noise level associated withairboat operations has made use of radios with issue-type handsets impos.-aible. The Electronic Maintenance section of the Signal Company resolvedýhe problan by developing a completely different earphone-mizrcphone-intercomsystem. Earmuff headsets, such as those used by personnel -'orking near jetengines, reduced outside noise to an acceptable level, These headsets weremodified .with receiver diaphrams removed from old headsets. The minrophoneproblem was resolved through the use of the Air Force oxygen mask with abuilt-in microphone. An intercom set between the ginrer and driver allowsfree coversation, and both individuals can operate the AN/iRC-25. Thicequipment was constructed by using two modules from the AN/PRC-25, poweredby the AN/IRC-.25 battery and packaged with the nexcssary switches in a .30cal ammunition can. The problem of the whip antenna in overhanging vegetationwas eliminated by attaching a wire doublet to the boat.

b. Communications from small outbaard craft and LCVP's.

(1) The following pertains to commiunications using AN/1-RD-25'sfrom small outboard craft and LCVIP's with normal operating vanges 8-12 KM.arnd frequently up to 25 Kit.

(2) Extra precautions must be taken to waterproof radios andhandsets. Additional batteries have to be carried and kept waterproofeduntil put into operation.

(3) To achieve extended ranges, long antennas and RC-292 exped-ient antennas are frequently required.

(4) Inter-communication within a single boat is not required.Each boat should have a means of communication from boait to boat, All comm-uhication equipment should be located either against the bulkhead or inrecessed areas so as not to inturfer with personnel movement and so thatequipment will be protected from the elements as much as possible.

(5) ifreferred operating frequency is from 53-75 MHz (highband). Marny older helicopters cannot net wIth the low band (30-52 IIHz)on a PRC-25. The frequency selected should fall on a hundred KHz channelsince many fixed wing aricraft cannot net with a 50 KHz channel.

(6) Conmand and Control (C&C) Boats.

(a) The GRC-125 or an AN/VRC-46 or 47 is preferred asthe main C&C radio since it has a greater range and the antenna system ispreferable to mounting a 292-type antenna in a boat. The LCWi has a 24volt power source.

29

4

(b) The C&C boat must also have a back-pack radio so thatthe command group can, iU necessary, disembark and control ground operations.

(c) The C&C clement. shoud have the ability to monitor twonets aimultar-cusly. This facilitates control of such a-tion as medicalevacuations, resupply missians, or administrativo traffic with maneuverelemenets and also allows commuriPcation vith rear base control statior on afrequency othenr than the tactical command frequency.

(d) Distanceas and dispersion of maneuver elements mayrequire that a forward control boat and an intermiediate control boat beused. In all cases the rear overall control ehould be either land! based in"a relatively secure area which affoeCt sophisticated communications, or on"a large vessel which affords the same capabilities.

(7) All radio operators, must have headsets ii order to monitortransmissions while the boat engine is rvnning. Headsets arc a necessity.

30

CONF iDENT IAL

1.0. (C) Engineer.

1. Organization: During this reporting period, two significantactivities took place with respect to organization. First, the cntire eng.-.neeringeffort of the Group was placed under the supervisinn of the StaffEngineer. The advantages of this move are:

a. Simplicity and more continuity for f-unding pugposes.

b. A centralized engineer organizatin within the Group toeliminate duplication of effort

The second organizational change has been the official notification receivedby this organization that the 31st Engineer Detachment will be assigned toreplace the 539th Engineer Detachment o/a 22 Sept 67. The 539th Engr Det,which is now in country on TDY from the 1st Special Forces Group (Abn), willthen return to their home station in.Okinawa.

2. CONEX Bunker Desigrn: During the last monsoon season in the deltaregion, many bunkers were flooded resulting in amnunition becoming wet andthus malfunctioning. Design has now been completed for bunkers in this region.Basically the design consists of placing the CONEX on its back, doors up, andwaterproofing the interior. A protected entrance is provided at the top ofthe container. This design will keep the bunker dry at all times when thewater in the camp is six feet or less.

3. Airfield Surveys: A continuing problem in the Special Forcescamps, ,js•ecially the net. ones, has been timely surveys and classification ofthe airfields so that the fields can be placed in operation shortly afterconstruction, Due to the shortage of personnel, the USAF has not been able togo to these fields as rapidly as desired. Arrangements were completed withthe USAF in May that wi.ll allow the Group to classify the airfields locatedin the vicinity of the Special Forces camps. The survey, which is made inaccordance with published USAF standards, is conducted by a team from theGroup consisting of the Staff Engineer, the TAIO and a representative fromthe Engineer Section, IFFV.

4. Prestocked CIDG Camps: As reported in the last ORLL, two com-plete CIDG cxaps wrere being stocked in the LSO. During May and J-te, twocamps were shipped, one to Camp Wang Buk and one to Camp Ha Tay. The conceptof prestocking the camps in the ISC and then shipment directly to the campsite has proved successful, and plans are being made to continua this methodof camp construction.

5. Camp Construction: The following is a progress report for con-struction program during this quarter.

31.ONFI OENTUAL

CONFIDE ENT I AL

Engineer (CONTD)

T fV, '. ,ITA TflP. CONS UINTT AIRFIELD STATUS

Con Thien Subsurface MCB-4 (Seebees) C7A Completed

Ian g Vei Subsurface MCB-II C-130 Under Cons

Ha Tay Surface Staff Engr C7A Under Cons

Mang Buk Surface 539th Engrs C7A Under Cone

Bunard Surface 539th Engrs C-130 Completed

Luong Hoa Surface 539th Engrs None Under Cons

Airboat Fac. N.A Contract None Completed

Cao Lanh

kirboat fac. N/A 539th Engrs None Under Cons

Moc Hoa

32CONFI DEtTIAL

IISEC:RE T

11. (S) Comptroller.

a. iJNO~i: (U) in view that the Cauu Finance is basically partof the 5th SFGJ, Comptroller Section, beginning %ith this reporting period allCIDG Finance activities will be reported under the Comptroller Section toprevent any duplicaticos.

b. CIDG Fundings: (3) During the reportirg period the FY 1968Command Operating Budget was submitted thru proper channels to Departmentof the Army on 24 May 1967 and the FY 1969 Command Budget Estimate wassubmitted to USARiAC 22 June 1967 for disposition. F6116wing is the generalbreakdown and comparison of funds for FY 1967, 1968 and 1969. For 1967the Anrual Funding Frogram (AFP) and the actual costs incurred are listed.

TITLE 1967 1968 1969AFT ACTUAL AFK APP

In-Country OMA. 45,498 42,000 51,209 56,056

Out-of-Country OMA 21,125 22,600 24,835 25,467

PEMA .31,210 26.000 29,196 2,0

TOTAL $97,835 $90,600 $105,240 $109,932(a) (b) (c)

(1) Excess funds of 7.2 million dollars were generated by:

a. Over-budget in IEL - primarily in ammunition whichdecreased from $24.0 to $11.1 million. Increasing of 'thOr bucdJct projectscaused a net decrease in i FN of only '5.2 million.

b. Short fall in the number of troops recruited was dueto slippagein the conversion of DIE, troops to the RF/I F program.

(2) The budget for FY 1968 is based upon a gradual increasein company equivalents from 336 at. year--end 1967 to 337 at year-end 1968.The FY 68 budget is a $4.7 million decrua:.e frcmr the approved 4 68 budgetestimate of 109.9 million dollars.

(3) Budget for Ff 1969 is based upon 337 eonmpany equivalentsfor the entire year.

(4) Approximately 72% of the in-country OMA is used to paysalaries and subsistence of the CIDG troops. A 10% increase has beenincluded in FY 1968 and FY 1960 budget, in anticipation of an expectedpay increase.

c. CIDG Fund Audits: (U) Unannounced on-site audits of 26detachments were completed by CIDG Finance auditors. Findings of theseaudits indicated improvement in all areas of reporting Mnd th-t properaccountability of funds is being maintained. ai.n shortcomings note'

33

SECRET

Comptroller (CONTD)

in some detachments were the purchase of non-expendzble items without theprior approval of the Group 3-4.

d. iroject Numbers: (U) Effective 1 July 1967, a project numuvrsystem was established for approved construlction projects. The project numberwill provide a better means of identifying and conpilihg cost data for theComptroller Section. Thus far in FY 1968, $73,883.75 has b1,en approved for19 construction projuxts.

e. Non-Appropriated Fund: (U) A comparative, BalanCL Sheet andComparative I rofit and Loss Stateiments based on monthly input fram the unitsconcerned has been established for each "B" ana "C" detachment operating amess association. As monthly financial reports are posted and trends areduveloped, anall'sis of these trends can now be made, and units concerned arenotified to take corrective iaction.

f. .•ivilian Personnel TD: (U) A review of the indigenous civi-lian persormel at the SFOB was conpleted2 June 1967. As a result of thissurvey, the civilian TD was revisqd and updated. The new TD of 505 posi-tions eliminated 54 old positions, added 48 new positions with a net reductionof 6 positions. This reduction of 6 positions will save approximately$7,319 annually. Thirty-one of the new positions were used to exannd thecarpe ter shop, R&U and electrical sections. In -ddition to the TD strength,a 63-nan temporary lbor force was organized to support SFOB constructionprojects. A saving of $50,000 to $60,000 will be realized by employing thisconstruction section to reduce the number of construction projects contractedout to local contractors.

34

CONF I DE TiALAVUB-C 15 August 19675tUBJECTI Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS, OBSERVATIONS AND REXIMMENDATIONS

PAUT I - Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (U) Personnel: None

2. (C) Operations:

a. n_%M: Attack on Lang Vei, h 4May 1967. (Source Co C)

(1) DTSCUSSIONT: Enemy initiated tUn attack at 0315.The enemy is increas.-777-n7tacking between the hours of 0200 and 0400. In-creased vigilance and alertness are required during this period.

(2) D3COiSSION: The attack was preceded by smail arms and rocketfire. Observation -The enemy realizes the advantages of employing direct fireiritially due to greater accuracy. The security screen must be in sufficientdepth from the carm•p to keep the enemy out of direct fire range.

(3) DISC1SSION: The assault force consisted of relatively fewpeople. Observation Theassault will not necessarily be executed by a largefcrca. A snmAll, woll-r3hearsed assault against a camp's weak point can be justas dangerous.

(4) DISCUSSION: The attack was aided from inside the camp by VC"V.-o had infiltrated EF3 0IDG units posing as recruits. The attackers had adatailed knowledge of specific targets inside the camp and were oriented towardthose targets. Observation: Effective counterintelligence is essential. Theloyalties of all personnel in the camp must be determined and frequently re-

s-,-aed 0 See also item ha below.

(5) W]SCUASSION- The detacIment commander and XO were killed andthe team sergeant wounacd simultarnously in the some bunker. Observation: Keyiarsonnel must be dispersed throughout the camp at all times. -Alternate' Fmandposts must be established .nd manned.

(6) D3SGUSSION: Radar bombing missions were not called intediatelyIn support of the cam,' p. .Lrvation- Plan wiitt the Air Force to provide support.Estuabolish primary and alter.at-e nears for reque .ting suppvrt. Rebearuts t plainto insure it will work., The 7th Air Force has tasked specific units to supporteach camp. Find out who they are, how you can use then and procedur, s for re-questing inmediate support. !Isurn all US,.SF and VNSF personnel know procedures.Post procedures in TOCo,

(7) DJ-7Cý;,7: No artillery was employed during the first hourof the enemy attac•- o--c-iT derab•e amount of time elapsed before on-callartillery at Camp Ihe Sanh was registered accurately enough to provide anystpporb:ing fires. Observation: The art2'.ery fire plan is an integral part

CONFiDENT AL

SOW"- I D E Ni ALAVGB-C 15 Aigust 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967.

of the camp reaction plan, and it must be axerc.ized occasionally to insureeffectiveness. Commanders should take the time to plan and coordinate care-fully with their supporting units. In order to be timely and effective theartillery must have a current fire plan for the camp and be afforded anopportunity to conduct registrations periodically in the target area. !-Thnalerts are called and there is preplanned artillery within range, the supportartillery FDC should be alerted as well as the camp personnel, and where possiblethe camp should call for some concentration fires or at least illuminating flares.

(8) DISCUSSION: The communications bunker with all radio equipmentexcept a PRC-25 wa-sdestroyed in the initial mortar barrage. With the primarymeans k communications lost, the detachment members had to relay all radiotraffic through CIC elements in Khe Sanh. Observation: An alternate means fornotifying support eloments of attack should be available. This means should bechecked out frequently to insure its reliability. A possible method is frequent,planned comuxnications checks with the artillery unit in support of the SpecialForces camp.

(9) DISCUSSION: Both the LIASF detachment communder and WYSFcamp commander in Mhe CIDO camp exercise a relatively limited span of control.When critical control positions are neutralized, commnd control is all buteliminated and leaves the CIDG completely without leadership and fire support.f.berpatisj. Commanders in the camp should assign certain VIMF and or U5ASFpersonnel to man key positions on the defensive wall. Preferably they shouldbe near automatic weapons positions and in such a location as to facilitateassumption of local command in the event certain key dlefensive positions areknocked out. 0)DG forces should know that when a crew served weapon, such asa machine gun in a bunker, is knocked out, other CIDG personnel shouild auto-matically man the weapon, if it is still operable.

(10) DISCIBSION- Most of the CIDG personnel killed and wounded werethe result of mortart -diring the 4 May attack on Lang Vei. All thesecasualties were !n their fighting positions. Most of the casualties occim-edbecause fighting positions were not capable of providing camplete protectionfor the individual sol&f.'r. They were oriented to protect the firer from flattrajectory fire fran outside the wire, not indirect fire or direct fire from in-side the camp. Observation: CIDG personnel at Lang Vei were in their fightingpositions when the mortar attack occurred. Had the positions provided overhead,side and rear Protection as well as forward protection, casualties as a resultof this mortar attack would hav3 been minilnizei.

(11) DISCU3SION: A practice alert was conducted each night for thetwo nights preceding the mortar attack on Camp Lang Vei. The CODG camp personnelwere intimately familiar with their individual responsibilities. This undoubtedlysaved a large number of lives and probably saved the camp. Observation: Thedefensive force must become thoroughly filtiar with required actio once anattack has begun. This can be accomplished by frequent practice alerts stressingthose points of known weaknesses; i.e., suspected attack points, bands of fire

36C0O4F I OENT I AL

COINF I D01 I I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly PerJn d Ehding 31 July 1967

not intorl-cking, personnel not cognizant of required actions, DS artillerynot having fire support plans, etc. The practice alert should be unannounced

S..... 1 ..... tho day an nigt, . f the ca.mp has an alertor reaction force their actions 3hould be integrated into the overall .of camp reaction and actually rehcarsed by creating simulated conditions.

" "Mt rTT QTnnT: Tln rc!-+ti inaccessib!!hl ,y nt the caches to

the eastern portion ~oTCip'L.Yang Vei caused camp personnel to genoe ..,j dis-count tho possibility of aGttack on this sector. Becauve of the steepness ufthe hill camp pei-sonnel ncgl.ccted proper security measures and failed to clearand provide adequate fields of fire for automatic weapons, Observation-Difficult terrain is dafinritel- an advan'tage in bolstering camp defenses, butthe advantagos must be posle-ively exploited, not used as a crutch. The campcommander must mala pointed efforts at impressing upon his personnel the Im-portance of maintaining vigilance on unliimly us well as likely avenuse ofapproach. He must insur3 that warning devices, barriers, and firing positionsare adequate throughout,. evazp

b. flEM: Attack on Con Tb.en, 8 May 1967. (Source Gp S3)

(1) LUCW3TOi.: Enemy initiated attack at 0230 hours. (T-:ervaticnta-.r- is conducting m"sC' ; •;Jor assaults between the hours of 0200 and 04M.

(2) DIMCUJSTON: The attack was not preceded by enesn preparatoryf'*-es - The enemy riv&" iTd"o f onia-x assault positions undetected. No fore-;arnuig of the attack cccuroed until the enexrmr opened up with automatic aadrocket fire against local secarity elements. rboservation: The attacks againstCpccizrl Forces camps arc no longer signalled by -mortar/preparatory fires. Theenemy nmy attempb to move large forces undetected into close proximity of friendlyinstallations and overrun tVac camp through surprise and mass, supported bypreplanned rocket and autcmatic firo. Local security elermnts must be at asufficient distance out from camp to provide adequate time for the defendersto come to a full alert sta:cUr3 in the event contact is mude.

(3) DTSCUSS TCN The enemy was able to move forces undetectedacross a 200 meter open-g adjacent to the camp. Observations An effectivesecurity screen is esscntialo llluniiation rmut be emplaoad periodicallyduring the hours of darkuness. o aery moans must be employed to detect eieomamovement.

(4) DIBCSSION: Once contact was made a heavy volume of well-aimed direct rxid in'droc-f.iie was placed on the camp. This included smallarms, aubomatic weapons, flame thrower, grenades, 4omm rocrets and mortar fire.Observation: The enemy has the capability of close fire coordination andc•ntro---- can and does develop a detailed fire support plan.

(5) D-ICUSSION: The enemy employed bangalore torpedoes andsatchel charges to brotach defensive wire,

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COI4F I DENf I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECTs Operaticnal Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

Observations Defensive wire must be employed in depth with much more emphasison--a-fi t,, and, where possible, coordinated-with other barriers which arenot as susceptible to explosive breaching, i.e,, moats. All barriers must beunder continuous observation and covered by automatic weapons. Harriers musbe protected.

(6) DISMCSIONs The enemy att~sok was directed at a point wheretne Marine defenses were tied into the .IW deifenses * Observationt Tne enemyrecognizes the fact that boundaries are inherently weakl C0iticaT portions ofthe perimeter should not be split between two units. Defensive boundaries mustbe reinforced through the increased use of barriers. The importance of closecoordination between adjacent units cannot be overstressed.

(7) D]•OCBSIONs Once the perimeter was breached, the defendersfell back to previoM prepared defensive positions within the perimeter.Observations In view of the fact that any position can be penetrated, all campsmust have successive and mutually supporting defensive positions. Barriersand forward positions must be constructed so as to minimize their value if theenemy were to overrun them. The fact that this camp had successive and mutuallysupporting defense positions contributed directly and in the main to their abilityto repulse the attack,

(8) DISCUISI(N: Once the perimeter was penetrated, the enemyconcentrated the aEFog "he comaand burker, comno bunlers and US team house.Observation: The enemy continues to concentrate on vital targets within theobjective area. Counterintelligence is most important in order to deny theenemy target Information. Alternate positions for key installations areessential.

(9) DISCUE8IONs Caimuicctions wTere lost imediately with higherand supporting hea35E•-9. Observations Alternate communications facilitiesare essential, Provision must be made Vo place FM radios where they are readilyavailable to predesignated individuals. When attack can be anticipated, pLu-positioning of FM radios on the perimeter is advisable.

(10) DICU1SIONt During the attack several sandbag herdened CONEXbunkers sustained 3ire1I from mortar rounds and direct fire rockets. Otherthan a temporary imnairmant of hearing to personnel in the bunkers, no damae, norcasualties resulted from these hits. Observations These bunkers when constructedwith care are extremely effective defensive posltns.

(11) DJOCKSI: Because of the immediate loss of continications,notice of thu attack to supporting units was delayed. Observation: A system ofcontinuous oommunications with higher headquarters must- be '-ErOe'et, and mustinclude a provision for frequent contacts. Ary loes of contact must immediatelybe investigated by the supporting unit, to include sending a FAC or VR aircraftaloft.

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CONFIDENTI~ALAV0B-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Opera-Lional Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(12) DISCMSIC, The enemz continued the attack wel. into thelate afternoon. OFMv ons The enemy evidently anticipated a rapid victory.When this was not& adTleved, they continued the attack scorning the inevitableoonsequenoese

c. 32._s Small Unit Tactics in The Delta Region. (Source A.-4.I)

D33WSSIONt Tn the area surrounding My Phuoo Toy any viiLaguerrilla tea--,-c-nsting of between 20 to 30 own, were l•oated throughoutthe area of operations. Upon seeing a o/Aipny size force of CMhO on a dylightsearch and doetroy operation, the VGC eslent would vithdrui, The terrain trou&*-out the operational area o•amisted of rioe padd-oax and nwrouxw oanla, borderedby heavy vegetation, This enabled the enovW to *ueren the size of the CIDGelements while they wevr atill 2C00 to 3000 mters away from the enemy positions,allowing ample tim to deoide whekther to engge or withd'•w,.

OBBSTVATIWM Tocaounter this, thu following imthod wa swed* Whileoonducting d and destroy opeoratiwrw, the lead platoon aIweys movedat least one terrain f- ture in front of the main body, Thio mant that it wasone tree and a canal line in front of thri main for•e at all ties. Beoauie ofthis, the VO wvre only able to oaberva a force of beWet n 20 to 30 •mn at armtime, Th-U- would -lire the appeataoe of. a platoon also operatio, &-.A the

enemy would choose to spage rather thin floe. The special Ilntrustionl givento the lead platoon wore to always stay in oontaot once it wes initiated i4d tomove in as close as posoLble to the oneuw positions, An soon aa a firm contaotwas rodep artillory fire from the 155ma howitzers loated at My Phoae Tay wouldsoal off the enovms *esape routes. 1%ile this was being donm the main 01D0force was still concealed in the next wood line way from the firefight. The Iability to flank a fixed eneo position in this kind of teorrin wee the layto success on this typ of operation, "hila the load platoon kept the eawqforce in oontacmt artillery sealed off the *esape routes# % iwokep theenemy in their bunkers or killing many of them as they triad to oeepme. Themain CIDM elemente were thus able to atteok suooesmful•y ftm Whe eneiq s flmnkand overrun his positiont. As basic am this taetto seem it was oueestlu anninny operations. This ability to deceive 6he enemj as to yew' Lru strangth andthereby tempting him to hit wat he belives to be a e'LI unit has aseuntadfor many VC kilI IIn IV Phouo Tay area. -.

d, 1TWIs NVA Use of Wounidd Mersawl an W , C ' (1. II)

DISCMBSONs On the mornif of 6 M4ay 4wrin• * NU n jGel 9%operation, the-M --7"uerrilla foroe was in a del~eilv .. -4 r afltse huvlrsbeen in a series of moderate to heavy contacto w• elw aa e . Io l4h IWADivision on the afternoon of the peneiov do Thsuwiwt the ,i tJAW Winhad unsuooessuflly probed and attempted to tWrtltIsU tMo prmia .v, At (S"#troops on one end of the perimnter reported that aw WA, "po!•yr , wo•wmbd# yamncrawling ten moters outside of their pouitions Three WAX nmow We tkm aawith the intention .3f taklig a prisoner. beame they eouli got t, khe wounded

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AV~m-C15 August 1%7?SJET, L:zrational Report fo Quaiterly Period Ending 31 Ju.v 1967

soldier# however the F recon platoon leader shot at him. Mmledlately afterthe fit shot, eneny troops who were diplayed approximately twenty metersoutside of the perimeter opened fire with seven or eight automaici weapunOsObviosly., the wounded NVA had been used a8 bait for a trap, am the firstshot was the signal to open fire. The next day, during the withdrawal of anoutpost which was about 100 meters outside of the penr ster, an •C soldierwas wounded and oaptured. The NVA then held the priouner aUrcmcin-tely •--tymeters outside of the friendly positions and baycneted him periodically duringthe next six hours In an at-tempt to lure friendly troops out of their positions.

OBSERVATI(NM The enery has no scruples against tne use of crueltyAid humun sUfaer~r•z accoplsh his objectives. U3 personnel should be con-|

stantly iawe of this fact and resist the imopulse to rush to the aid of woundedwithout first giving oareful consideration to security.

as ZU(s Escape and Evasions (Source Ca C)

DJSOCM31: On 25 July 1967, a 150 man force from Camp Tien Phuocbeosma engageM h =aestimated reinforoed company of Viet Cong. As a resultof this encounter, the Camp's Executive Officer, ULT Eckhardt, was reported missingin action. A search force was dispatched to the battle area, but had no success.Cn 28 July# a civilian discovered LT Eckhardt walking toward camp. He concealedhim In his hut and returned to inform the camp of his location. The camp thendspatched a helioopter to return LT Eckhardt to safety.

CUSERVAT IOES

(1) That the "A" carnp fire illmdnation at regular intervals (15 mrin)during the niht in order to assist missing persons in reorienting themmelves, ifneessasy" (it was in LT Eckhardt's case).

(2) That the small 11htweight, red and orange panel be carried byall UBL5F.

(3) That at least one radio rerain under UMSF control at all times,

f. 3 omat Operations. (ource Co A)

DVICS :s During thw past qu&rter, coribat operations have been in-crosased by al•' cp•, with the exception of Prek Klok and Lumg Hoa, PrekK1oks beset with internal problems, had virtually no operations employed, andthus was the target of Innumrable VC mortar attacks. LWong Hoe, a newlyestablished camp, initially had an ARVN ranger battalion perfcirming operations" security. In many instances, these operations were inadequate, because theyrm not deployed iu great distances throughout the TAM. As a result, the VC

vere able to penetrate the area and attack the camp with mortars, rooetes, andmmmli arce fire. Fortunately, these situations have been corrected to swdi x-tent that has resulted in a decrease in enei sneak mortar attacks.

CONF I&EN 1I AL

C04F I DENT I ALAVOBC ý5 &ugust 1967SUBJBIC Opera-ila.l ROport fA- 4arterly Period Ending 31 Ju3. 1967

OWERVATIMs 1V th rare exception, it has been proved that C03Gca0ps having RflMRt appopt between UMSBF ooumerparte were camqv that hadwell dinncipli__d tropsm awd canduted .izorous overations continuoua-Y. Thesecanpa also had the hif ien. degree of suocesses - and the VC usually gave theirTARC's a wide berth, t prime ezample - though not during this reporting period-was Camp Th Dop from Jan to Mar 67. Bu Dop had strong leadership, highly tra-ieda-W dlsoilpllxmd troops.- nd conducted continuous well planned operationr. Duringthis period 3u ,op aoooiuntoi for more eneny dead than all other camps in ITICorps. Aggressives c( ntinuoma operation with unlimited strategems will keepthe enoq off balance and reduce his capebilitiss to mass main forcA echelonsfor ground attaoksj sneak mortar attacks1 or to infiltrate assete within camps.

g, flE1. Night Observiation from O-13J ~.. Ircraft, (source B-52)

DISCUSSIM: An oxperiment was oonduc od with an aerial observerutilizing the. MW Scope from at. C-IE aircraet during late evening fliats.Flying at an altitude of 1000 feet to 1500 feet abo%'e the ground, objects werevery diotinguishab~e. The aucoess of this experivent culMinated in the sightingand eventual destruation of one enevq truck by TAC air. The only limitationnoted was the inadequazy of light necessary to fly by at low altitudeas.

rCISERIATICs The Starlight Scope has great potential for niqht

aerial obaerv- --T---

ho ITM Proper Selection of RON's. (Source B-33)

S)MCUSSIgQI 0ThG operations often juvt stop anywbere alonG theirgeneral route of advance and establish a PON. If V0 ua trailing the operatic,as they frequenty do, the friendly position is fi~t:• by the VC. The VC could'han elect to attack the friendly operation at a tixA of their ow ohoosirq orformulate plans to ambush the friendly operation e ong their route of marchl

OBU ATION: Select RON's at lea•t I000 meters from the operation'sgeneral route ma•rc- In addition to the bcurity provided, it will not yieldthe next dayls initial direction of march. The ami,, result could be obtained byciroling back to RtON on the route of march, moving cut in a now direction the

nfx moring.

i. Irm= VILgnL.lng Airarait at Night. (Source B-52)

flTIESSIONt Colored smoke can.ot be suen at ni~ht, and the use offlaxen gides 1ia74mn-wtls position.

CtSVATION: During a night extraotion under the light of aircraftflares it 17overe•,d -that a signal mirror could be utilized to signal friendlyaircraft. PIlotJ s reported that the eAmssion of reflected 1.ght was strong arAmore than adequate for saignalling purposes, kn Iportwt advantage over otherligbts is that the signal is direnticnal and liaht is not cast in all directions.

IaLI

CONF IDr-J-T I A

C0N10-IDEN I A LAVOT3-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 JM 1967

J. ITEHi Poultion Check for Combat Patrols. (Rouro. B-33)

DIUSSIONs Combat patrols requiring posittm check frem the PAOcan greatly assist the pilot with the use of the survival or signal mirrore Inabust all instances the person on the ground can see the airoraft after oneorbit when it arrives in the general area, hbLvar; it nmy al semiuAl orbItabefore the pilot can sight a panel through the 3ungu.. With a little practlethe survival mirror In adequate sunlight can attract the piloti' attention tothe position more quickly then any other means. This ir not only an expeditiousmeans but also precludes the FPC from having to circle .he area continuously andthtreby unnecssarily compromising the friendly position.

QBSERVATICIs Obtain an adequate nwuber of signal mirrors so thateach "All team' Laalat one available for their operations.

k. ITM4: Search & Destroy Methods and Ambush Techniques. (;ouroe B-35)

DTSCUSSICK: On 29 May, a search and destroy operation consiutingof one CIDO OompSXy, one CRP, one LLDB, and two UShSFP, was conducted in the areato the south of Tra Cu CIDO camp. Infantry battalions from the US 25th Divisionwere then conducting large scale operations in known VC basa areas along the Vam.Co Dong River. Mam•liarlty with the VC base areas and resupply routes allowedthe CIDG force to accurately predict the resupply routes which would probablybe used to support the VC in the areas then being cleared by the M elements.Through a series of aggressive and well disciplined night ambushes, the enemysustained losses of eight VC KIA, two US carbines, two Chicom carbinesp threesets of web Sear, mJecellaneous Ioivaes spoars, olothing and cooklng pots, fivehand grenades# 3,O pounds of fresh fiLh, •iscoeaneous food supplies and documntsCA., and ten sampwAs1 two sampan motors, kerosene and cooking oil, unknownnumber of 57mi RR or 81ms mortar rounds, miscollaneous small arms rounds, andfour structures destroyed. This was accomplished with no friendly casualties.

OBSR .iTIONS%

(1) O1DO units can effectively support larger scale W operationsby saturation patrolling or ambushing of likely resupply routes into the US area

(2) A successful night ambush is one of the most effectivepeyobologioal operations that can be conducted.

(3) In swampy terrain during the dry season, VC resupply routesare extremely limited and by cactinued through patrolling, these resupply routescan be detected and neutralized.

(4) Night ambush fire discipline is difficult to maintain and mostbe thoroughly rehearsed and explained prior to operations departing.

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CON, F I EN T I 4LAVOB-C 15 &W t3, 1967SUJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(5) In swampy areas, very seldom does a ground security elementaccompany VC boat resuppl•y movements. This males these sapans very susceptible

(6) Claymore mines could be used for these ambushes and small aremfire should be avoided unless absolutely nortessary. The sound of the Claymores

diction firesp thereby allowing multiple ambusha on the same canal during on(7) Tracing of kno.n resupply routes can provide reliable

intelligence for probable locattons of base areas and cache sites. (NCTEstracing of this resupply route resulted In capture of a battalion reeupplycache by a suseoquont operation).

le nEM_. NVA Tactics. (Sourae A-2h4)

DrXMSIONt In the act ictn near Dak To•, f,-*1Jue, two WA taoticsbecam apparen-t-, the YVA vero quite sure that arthr .kxration would re-turn to recover the ftiindly bodlea that were left atr the inii4Al contact.Cmsequently they had set up a re!nforced cmpapr in a U-sbapri ambush at thecontact site. The ambrh was well planned mid eutrr wely effective. Seooi,when a bomb strike was being delivered, tv, ari1i" spontAmieo(sly rushed the friendlyelement in order to escape the killing zorn,.

OBSMVATICK: Utmost caution shoil.d be exurcise! wh•r coziuctingbo4y reoovean 4d s r missions which are dictated by social uid mo-al, prin.".ciples, ard thus may be obvious to the enerV. The 'hug:Lng4 tactic can bx sympiLaby inwreasing the volum of fire immediately bofore the sstrika pinrdwe the "ntmydown and preoludilg an oppertunity for his rush.

me IEM: Defense Against Snipers. (Saixr,,e 130,K,,

DISCUSSION: During operations in the viclnity of Hiep No%casualties werEM---E by VC snipers positioned in trees.

ES!RVATICI, When moving through heavily wooded areas while incontact with en'W fr~ friendly forces must be oriented to cover not onlytheir firnm.t fri an ani rear, but also xworxui mAw be tpoute& tj vuu.,all tree tops and overbead foliage for possible enesy snipers.

n. 3THDi VC Tactics. (Source B-32)

DM(SSICHt In Ta Ninh Province a pattern of VC initiated squadand platoon sTize amr hea on trail elements of C3DG compeny size operations: habeen noted.

OBMVI-TIOK: Stay-behind, clayaore type ahubshes should be amployedduring all haIU-, 7bre1, eto., in order to disocurage VC from following CInXoperations. 43

CONF I DEN f I AL

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AVCB C 15 August 1967SUBJCTt Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 33 Ju3,v 1967

o. ZE4s VC Early Warni.g Nets. (Source A-411)

DISCUSSIO: After Dwiy surprise attacks by CIDG forces from CampXV Phuoc Tay,$t ei VCelements in the area established various types of earlywarning nets, AU trails, rice paddy dikes, canals, and roads leading out ofthe camp ware mined, booby trapped, and/or under surveillance by one or two manoutposts. Upon the approadc of CIDG troops the VC would fire a few warning shotswhich would be relsqed to the main forces. Other early warning o',hods used byVC sympathizers in the area Uicluded releasing doves, gathering water buffalo,and signalling with lights.

BSERVATION. These early warning techniques were countered by theuse of deceptio fie moving out of camp on operations. Operations always de-parted at night, thereby causing visual signalling devices to be ineffective. Toavoid mines. booby traps, and outposts the CJBG troops would movz- at a 90 degreeangle from the desired direction of movement for a distance of three to fisDkilometerse At this point an azimuth would be followed across the rice paddlesto the desired objective. Moving cross-country without following the rice padc%dikou or trails was usually quite slow and tiring, but by using this method, allminew, booby traps, and early wvuming devices were avoided, and continued successwas achieved in locating and iri )rising VC elements.

p. ITEM: Employment of .-arstrikes. (Source A-342)

DISCUSSION: Camp Dong Xoai suggests the following technique beused when puttL rM_ arstrikss in fairly open terrain where the enemy can seethe fighters coming in. After the fighters have made a few Pwet" runs and do-livered a sufficient amount of ordnance on target, instruct the FAC to ma1 thenext three passes of each fighter I'dryc, i.e., without delivering ordnance, Assoon as the fighters begin their passes and the enemy gets his head dcn, friendlyelements can maneuver in toward the enemy lpoStions.

WERVATION: Don't lose track of the Nfwet" and the "dry" passes.

qv flEM: Elimination of VC Coast Watchers. (Source B-44)

DISCUSSICt: The VC have an elaborate network of coact watchers andsa-- ml - anQ On the Tsland cnant. These watchers and un3 ýs have thefollerwi:g missions: observing GVN vand U movements along the coast, $.emuringsupplies brought in by small sampans frc the mainland and conluct harassingattacks on WASF small boats moving along the coast.

CUSERV:TION: To combat tLis situation a new tactic has been do-vised. A -ller ear consisting of two or three IJSASF and a squad of heavilyarmed CUDG are hiAden on a large fishing sampan. The sampan travels the coastdrwing little or no attention from the VO, thus allowing the killer team to getvery close to the enemy before opening fire. This raw tactic has already beentried once reaultng in one VC coast watcher killed.

CONVt I T1 AL

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CON F I EN I ~AAVGB-C 15 August 1967SltJECTs Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

r. 1%EMs Marking Targets for AC-j7 Aircraft. (Source A-4421)

DICUSSION: During the attack on Camp Ba Xoai in the early morninghours of 19 Gay, it was found that the use of tracer strear- from ground positionsto mark targets for AC-47 airoraft was somewhat lees than satisfactory. Althoughthe left and right boundaries of thedauinmd beat;en sane ooulu be iaiar•.• murlwd,there was no way to indicate the range frcii the weapons firing the tracers.

CBSERVATION: A solution which proved to be quite effeetiver was theuse of 57am reco~leas rifle WP rounds fired at the desired rango to mark theleft and right boundaries of the desired beaten smoe.

3. (C) Training and Organizatlun

a. I=E&: Sand Table Critique. (Source B-33)

DIC!.•S1ON: When planning for and issuing orders before operations,a great deal of possIb mismiderstanding is eliminated by the use of sand tables.While zmi cmmaders utilize the aboae, few commanders use it for debriefing.

OBSERVATION: Improved evaluation, critique, and lessons learaedresults could be- geied by use of a debriefing/critique technique using a sandtable.

b. 1=EM3 Punitive Measures Taken against Cf)G. (Source B-33)

DiSCUSICK: One of the most effective me-ns of reaching the heartanid mind of t- MM Triker is the fear of losing a portion of his salar,However, fines must be deducted in the proper mauner so that the agent officermay be protected against possible repercussions.

OBSERVATION: The use of a "fine" is a legal way to enact pmuishmnton a aWO Strer. Once' it is determined that the Striker warrants some punish-ment for an ill deed. the LDB and the MEASF must agree on the amount deductedfrom his pay. When this is determined, the Striler's name is red-lined, and hisname entered on a supplemental payro1l bearing the adjusted amount. A remark isalsu entad an the- Stikr's pay c ird indicating the daduction,

o. 1TEMz Realistic Targets for Field Firing Ranges (Sovrce A-4W2)

DTSOLUSIOIs Reallstic, movLig targets add to the effectiveness ofmarsmanship Tm .:

OB8ER7V.TIO An excellent target for use on field firing ranges manbe ¢coatruoteT =Fngtvo type "En silhouettes and a short length of ND-i w'.i.re.The target is prepared by cutting a F inch slit down the center of one targetfor half itq length starting at the head. The seoond target is slit dawn thecenter for half its length starting at the bottom. The two targets are thenslipped togeher resulting in a tthee dimemsional target. When h-aV from a.overhead branoh, this target will move with tho slight•st breeze. A black

CCINFI iTiAL

CONF IDENT IALAVOt-C 15 Augst 19673BJECT i Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

ptjama or other salvage uniform can be placed over Ihe target for added realism.

1. frý *1 _+ 11 4 _ -.0 I

a. 2l•Efl Viet Cong Emphasis on Infiltration of MASFInstallations and Security Elements. (Souroe Co 0)

DISCU3B ION:

(1) On 4 may 1967, the tBASF at Lang Voi (ame wider VC attack withthe result that the USASF team leader and Executive officer were among thosekilled and the majority of the above-ground structures destroyed. Subsequentinvestigation and. interrogations revealed that CIDG personnel inside the campassisted in the attack by the outside force. One subject r ired Nhom was con-tacted by the VC prior to the attack and was directed to join the CIDG at IangVea. in order to obtain information on the camp. After joining the C33)G, subjectrecarulte four other C0DO to assist him in reporting information concerning thecamp to the VW. One man was to determine the locations of all the guard positionsand how well the posts were manned, the third was to make a sketch of the camp#mid the fourth was to report on supplies brought into the camp from Khe Sanh. TheVCo ontactrd Nhan on four separate occasions prior to the 4 May attack to obtaintho information that had been collected. On the fourth occasion, the five VCwithin the camp were told about the impending attack and were given instructionsas to what to do during the attack. They were told to leave their shirts offin order for the VC to recognize them durxng the attack. On the night of theattack$ subject Nhon and another CMG killed two of the camp guards and led theVC forco through the wire and mine field defenses into the camp perimeter.

(2) In addition, a JTAD agent report, dated 18 July 1967, dis-closed a VC propaganda iweting held on 17 July, 1967 in ruang Tri Province.At this meeting the district cadre of Ba Long and Huong Districts reportedlypraised an individual who worked at the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, for beinginstrumntal in the 4 May attack on the camp and a subsequent mortar attack afew weeks later. At this same meeting,, priority of effort was reportedly directedtoward infiltration of CIDG units and the security elements of Special Forces andothur installaticnse

tzhVA,1uMJ) aIni•tratiao by the VW of 0DU vnits ax.d indigenouselemrnts provT,1Ang _secuTtV for installations is unquestionably an effectivemethod of reducing the defensive capability of frierA4l units. It is logicalto assume that the VC will continue to place great ermphasis on this tactic. Itis essential that Special Forces detahmernts enact the necessary counter-intelligone-, measures, to include the establishment of an effective informantnet within ,he installation, to detect VC infiltration.

b. 1.8 Screening of CIDO Personnel. (Souree Gp Sz)

46"';OF I DENT 1 4

t¢I

CC NF I OLiL 'T I ALAVGB-C 15 Augiut 1967SUBJECTs Operational Report for Quarterly Period Enaing 31 July 1967

DJSCUSSIONs Since the CIDG p irsonnel are reoruiteu from amongthose indigenous to specific localities -6 -th, according to Ut standards,, in-sufficient background investigation, there is no positive meanri oi insuringthat VC are not inadvertently recruited. Cleexanct performed amounts tolocal agency hecks con',ucted by the LIDB and MS, in conjxivction with localofficialso Sournes testifying to the reliabil-ity of CGDG aic tLemselves ofunkiown reiiabiiity. it is lunown that the VC are capable of applying presaureand persuasion in special localities, sufficient to cause concealment of VCassociation of membur-i of the CIDG. Once rec.rut'.tod into the CflGJ, thl- menibrhas plaorment and access to further VC intentions concerning espionage,,sabotage and subversion.

OBMERVATIOBts To counter this potential, counterintelt1gence ),easuresbeing taken are:

(1) Increased emphasis on makdn•- thc clearance program mere adequate.

(2) Establishment of CI informant nets within the ranks of the CIDG,to identify, neutralize and exploit VC in thw ranl .

(3) Development of ueable infrastructure information to idontifyVC sympathizers, to insuzr reliab.lity of subjects and sources.

(4) Development of Blacklists.

(5) Planned use of the poly(iraph in a personnel reliabilitypý'grm to check interpreter/translators, so-tuves, and principle azent's innets, as well as to verify infor~mtion proffered by interrogees,

(6) Interrogation or' prisoners and detaineis for informationof CI interest as well as (1 information. Predeteimined questiona wjill begiven to RVN interrogators.

c. ITEM: Installations are Vulnerable to Sabotage. SroLen suppliesare Channeled to the VC. (Source G. 32)

D]SCUSSIOH: Insufficieut physic.l security allows access orpotential access-IB-M WC. Such access increases the possibility of sucoessfuLIsabotage. The VO are knim to be targeted agabist US iL3Lallatiorw. The etwi•Waof the Vietnamese are such that theft is riot considered to be morally orlegally wrong. The VN ,Ilosec. face" not by stealii•, but rather by being stuyUenough to be caught stealing or not having" taken sufficient precautions to securehis own IToperr'y,

OBSERVATION: The following oouriterintelligenu,. measures shouldbe talon:

(1) Surveys ard irspections should be conducted with a viewtoward i ntifyine weaknesses and making recovaendations concerning theircorructiov. Particular emphasis is placed on fencing, lightIng, gnard andreaction foros systems, visitor contrel, pass procedure, stourity of mriticalard restricted areas. and proper logistic proowdureos.

CON F 113-CMI IA L

CONF I DNT I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(2) Investigation of thefts should be conducted to determineidentity of cuIprits and ultimnto disposition of stolen material. Emphasisis placed on whether or not theft is for prifit cr resupply of VC.

d. ITIEs Interrogation of W's. (Source B-33)

DISCIBSION: Hard core Viet Cong are reluctant to speak wan theyare first cap de." Ater- a period of tie•, when they have had their wourdscared for and after they have boon fed and treated well, they begin to "open up".A Chieu Hoi female admitted voluntarily she had "Chieu Hoild" to blow up theChieu Hoi Center, but only after she had been subject to treatment at the centerfor a few days. A Main Force officer refuse& to talk when captured on the battle-field, as did his captured comrades. After being fed and having their woundstended, they began talking and finally answered all questions presented, as vellas offering new information not specifically requested by the interrorator. Thecaptives related that they are all told by their supervisors that they will bemaltreated and killed when captured by allies.

CBSERVATIOcs By treating PRI4s kindly imediately upon 6apture andby not resorting ro coercion, interrogations will be more successful#

e. IM: Interrogation of Montagnards. (Source B-33)

.SBUSSICt: In interrogation of Montagnards, it was found thatsu wtimes the7-tainee appeared to be contradicting himself and not verifyinghis previous statements, though the detainee appeared to be coopern-tive arAtruthful. It was later found that these Mortagnards either didn't understandVietnamese wallU, or spoke Vietnamese so poorly that the Vietnamese interpreterhad to paraphrase, thus losing the exact rnining the detainee was trying to convey.

OBSERVATIONt Far better interrogations of Montagnards, a Moritagnard

dialct-speak g-INerrogator should be used.

f. MO}a, Payment to Montagnard Sources. (Source B-33)

D_ TSlI••. _ontagr~.rds do not seem to have many mundane possessions,inclixiing money. ossessions such as radios would imrediately mak the Monardstand cuts ard perhaps draw suspicion, as other people in the hamlet would knowhow much he crdirarily makes and whether he could afford an expensive item.Mcntagnards are known to smoke and gratefully accept cigarettes.

COBSERVATION: Montagnard sources should be paid in a reasonablequantity of Viatn~ D5re cigarettes when the situation makes the excessivepossession o? re expensiva goods awkward or wnreasonable.

CG~i~tEN48 A

CONF t1)EN T I A'LAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for wuarter.y Period EndirM 31 July 1967

g. )EX2: Planning H & I Fire. (Source B-33)

DMCOSSION: The enemy likes to enter hamlets at night to avoidH & I fire. The enemy knows H & i fire wiUl be planned no cluve or tha__ 60^

meters to an inhabited area. They will leave these hamlets between 0-00-0600.The enemy will tend to move in rubber lots during the day, if possible, andwhere friendly. troope are absent, because of the fact that H & I flre will notbe placed in the rubber without contact. The u -nw tednds to -- gest- careass . ntLb rubber and waes trails.

OBSFRVATION: For effective artillery H & I fire on the enemy thatare known to Ge villages at night, the enemy's routes of withdrawal should benoted and H & I's placed there between 0500-060U. Paths leaving rubber plan-tations should be targets to catch departing Viet Cong.

he ITEM. Use of Way-Stations. (Source B-33)

DJSCUSSION: Communist way-etations or temporary bases, used by theenemy in traNSit, have poor overhead cover and other protection from indirectfire weapons, These bases are used as stopovers, usually one night,, for theenemy in transit between larger base areas or objectives.

CBSERV ITIO•: Way stations should not be touched in any way to givethe i,•ressiOW T iiyce other than the enemy was there . The target shouldbe well plotted, and then a unit detected movin3 toward this way statiton can bethe subject of a fire mission during the ridht.

5. (U) Logistics

a. IT2(I: Resupply of fresh water. (Source: A-344)

DISCUSSIO-4: Fresh water cannot be found in some areas and mustbe brought in by resupply aircraft.

OBSERVATION: An excellent way to drop water to operations inremote areas is by the use of the metal contair ers for 81ram mortar ammAnition(new round, charge 8).

b. HEM-: Identificatioii of aw-,itiono (Source A-.)

DISCUSSION: The man who is sent to fetch more ammunition oftencannot read the Lnglish on the boxes.

OBSERVATION;- The use of color codes on ammunition boxes can bea significant time saver, especially in. critical situations. A simnpln colorcode indentifyig the caliber and ty-e of ammunition prevents confusion. Thekey to the color code whould be posted in Fnglish and Victnimese in the bunkers.Lolors can be easily applied with a few canis of spray paint.

CONF &N A L

/I

AVGB-C 15 August 1967SUPJECT: Oper-tional Report for Qunrterly Period Ending 31 July 1967.

6. (C) Other

a. ITE.i flandlini- of It fPjpv.on. (Source: Co C)

DISCUSSIONi Having bean fo(rced fr w their homes once, faced withanother compuisory move to An imf'kmillnr area, and subject to Viet Cong prop-oganda imploring Land threatoning them to, l]ave Bf To to return to their homes,2300 refugees were rersuaded to bcatt.er, mfking the nlanned airiift. nf refi.-gees to Nghia Hanh impossible. Approximately 350 have already returned tothe Son Ve valley, which they were previously force(' to leave by the 101stkirhorre Division. Late intelligence reports indicete that others are wait-ing in small groups to infiltrate back into their home territory. Themajority, however, are probably still in the Bi To area afraid of showing upto be airlifted to N',hia Hanh and afraid as well of returning to their pre-vious homeland where they are subject to Viet Cong dr1miki.ionas well asartiller~y fire and bombs from FWMAF units.

OBSERVATIONS! The greatest deficiency in handling the refugeesat Ba To was the lack of any intelligence network waong the refugees. In-telligence nersoi nel should make an i-wiediate effort to establish nets amongnew rafugees. The distribution, of commodities and HMCAi offer opportunitiesfor collecting intelligence as well as contracting agents. The refugees cangive valuable information not only about the area they recently came from,

but also alnut thu Dresence of Viet Ccng agents among the refugees, VietCong atter ,s to disrunt GVN and FW-•iF civic action programs, tr.d the attitudeof the refugees toward various government plans such as the resettlement atNghia Hanh. Not knowing why the refugees refused to go to Nghia Ranh pre-vents us from t;%king any effective counter-measures. The lack of knowledgeof populatiri resources control measures is a deficiency which must be cor-rected. Simply, what are the techniques for controlling large numbers ofcivilians? In areas where government authority is tentative or contested,the Army must assume the role of policeman as well as soldier, but trainingfor this Is inadequate and information on the subject not available. (SeeInclosure 24).

b. ;Lj. Discharge from CIDG Forces because of physical dis-ability or illness. (Source: B-33)

nTT.Rr~cTC01, PV% C 4.lneS a-_ p.,A 4-~,.1 2-L

often occurs in CIDO Strtkers, posing setio .us problems, both in the presentfor duty strength of the camp and in the morale and effectivenes of thosepersonnel which perforw day to day tasks, including ccabat operations.Malingering is common among CIDG troops as a means of avoiding both combatoperations and camp construction and maintenance activities.

OBSERVATfON When it is suspected that a Striker is chron-ically ill or pertanently disabled, postive steps must be taken to dischargethat particular individual. A certificate is in use b,- all detachnents of

CONF ENT I AL

fi

CONF I DEN7 I ALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

B-33. It is submitted through the "B" Detachment to the LLDB "C" Detachment,which makes the final ,ecision as to discharge.

c. ITE4M: Payment of DuAth Gratuity for CIDG KIA. (Source: Co A)

DISCUSSION: On several occai~ons n, .t of kin or other relativesof CMnG KIA have co1lented gratuity payments at A Det sites and later maderequests for paymunt at B Data, or Company A. By requiring the paycard ofan individual bursement voucher, doublo payment is prevented.

OBSERVATION: This may require one or two days delay in makingpayment to next of kin, hut is is necessary to prevent double payment.

d. ITEM: Prevention of fungus iAfection. (Source: A-413)

DISCUSSION: Personnel returning from operations where theirfeet have been "iuuersed in water for long periods of time have experiencedproblems v.ith fungus infections.

OBSERVATIOn: If these individuals wear shower shoes for two orthree days (situation permitting, of course) after the operations so thait 4the feet can dry thorou#Uy, fungus infections will be greatly reduced.

e. ITEM: Preventive medecine in remote rural areas. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: One problem experienceu in conducting public healthprograms at the Provincial and District level has been in reaching remoterural villages and hamlets. The problem is mainly one of security and en-couraging Vietnamese involvement, and, too, the traditional MEDCAP has comeinto same disfavor. Aside from the initial and favorable (?) psychologicalimpact, medically speaking there is much to b desired. Only local diseasescan be treated with any degree of certainty, there is often no recourse toa hospital facility where more extensive diagnostic and treatment can be '

performed, and too often the MEDCAI is a one-time-: ly affair. The crucialpoint is that little of lasting medical value is accomplished.

The (WLPHAP Team has devised one solution to this problem. Althoughadmittedly it is not unique, it is a local solution. The Team has providedar or.ga. zational U--brc.-ll umder tiich it ns trIed to c'nliect the variousVietnamese sociUl and medical agencies operating at the Provincial anc Di-s-trict level. It has provided logistical support; ie, transportation, ;en-crator power, and some equipment. It has provided liaison with the essentialsecurity force. The Team fuund that as long as adequate security was provided,the Vietnamese would go out into the villages remote from the safety of thetown perimeter. Moreover, they would participate witia enthusiasm.

Thus, to date, the MILXKAP Team has been able to mount operations whichinclude Vietnamese Rural Health Workers dispensing medications and perform-ing dental extractions, an immunizing team carrying on the country's immuniz-ation program, a malaria control team which sprays houses and takes bloodsmears for analysis, Vietnamese Information Service to carry on crucial public

CON IbUNTIAL

CONF IDENT I ALAGVB-C 15 August 1.967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

relations work, Chieu Hoi Cadre to perform public relations work as well astheir own role, Vietnemese Social Service represetatives to supervise thedistribution of OCO and USSF commodities, and representatives of the refugeeor Montagnard Affairs offices.

Typically, the whole te.am aisembles in a caravan with its securityforce and proceeds to the village. Once there, various stations are orga.-

nized with the villagers proceeding to each. Coavodlities are not distributeduntil all other work has been done.

The keys to the success of these operations which the MILPHAP Team haschosen to call MAPHORA operations (MILPHAP Assisted Public Health Operationsinto Rural Areas) are:

(a) Attention to the details of obtaining an adequate security force,coordination with S3 (Operation s) officers, and radio communications.

(b) Attention to the details of getting all equipment needed in cor-rect working order: It does no good to take an automatid injection gun with-out a working generator. A myriad of supplies must be assembled.

(c) Attention to advising the Vietnamese as to the nature of work,P-surixg that adequate manpower will be present at the right time. For se-cudtff reasons, often they are not informed of destinations.

(d) Attention to advising US advisors as to the nature of the acti-vities and the role they should play; ie, Chieu Hoi advisor, JUSPAO Rep, etc.

(e) Gradually allowing and makirgthe Vietnamese carry the burden ofthe work and the organization of the actual operation.

(f) Security arrangements must be scrupulously analyzed, if Viet-namese-plJmed, b:- the S3 officer before the team will participate. The teamusually insists that a US advisor from this section accompany the operatic:-..US planned operations need no such coordination.

(g) The policy of the MILPHAP Tew. has been to disassociate M4APHORAoperations with other types of activities; iv,, search and seal.

(h) The creation of as much drawaa as possible whdive at the villagesadds to the success -- speeches, culturil dramas, posters, and leaflets at-tract people as well as allow expl-nations to he given, propaganda to bedisseminated, and educational activities to be conducted.

(i) The role of the health facilities in the Frovince is emphasized- the fact that a Provincial Hospital where the people may be treated isavailable to all citizens, that so much can be done in the hospital, thatexpectant mothers can have their children in the maternity secticn of thehospital, etc.

CC 2CONF I C( iIAL

cONRiDC NII AL

AVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

(j) The frequent programmed return to the village must be assured --

at least on a bi-monthly basis, if nor monthly. This not only allows follow-up on patients, but also negates some bad aspects of the MEDCAP. I f the unitis not prepared for "continuality" (at least to some degree), then theseoperations will be of no value.

OBSERVATION: Given thorough US advisory organizational support,an operation providing extensive medical, social and political services, rnaprincipally by the Vietnamese, can be mounted into remote, often insecurerural areas, on a programmed basis.

f. ITEM: Malnutrition in children. (Source: B-33)

DISCUSSION: This pathetic sight is often observed at the Pro-vincal Hospital: an emciated, pot-bellied, mottled skin, light haired,edematous Montagnard child with morms, diarrhea, and dehydration. That theseclassic malnutrition cases provide 95% of the cases on the pediatric wardcan only intimate what is going on in the villages. The principal causesseem to be: poverty, lack of knowledge of simple dietary principles, andsocial custom to feed children on the brast somtimes to the third year (themother believes that this will prevent pregnanacy).

The 1MILPHIAP Team has long sought some way to deal with this on a localbasis. A solution is opening up in the use of a Fish Proteln Concentrate.This product, recently approved by a federal agency for use in the US ismade from fish, processed to the point that only a white powder is left; 75to 90% pure, concentrated, animal protein. It has no taste and only a veryslight fish odor.

The team feels that this product will be the answer to the malnutritionproblem since byanfd large it is principally due to protein deficiency. Byadding 15 grams of this product to supplement the food of the child, thedaily protein requirement will be achieved. The product c.osts approximately25* per pound when ordered in bulk amounts. This is the cheapest sourceof protein concentrate of this quality known to the team. The team hasstarted the MILDIP program (MILPHAP Dietary Improvement Program) to deal withmalnutrition. With a dorntion fran an interested physician, 400 pounds ofFPC have been purchased. At first, it will be given to children on thepediatric wards. It can be directly added to their regular diet, or tubefed with milk. The team is also increasing the use of milk products at thehospital.

The ýeam hopes that it cam promote FKC use throughout Vietnam,- at leastas a way for treating protein deficient malnutrition and at the very mostas a generally accepted dietary supplement for adults and children.

OBSERVATION: The MILPHAP Team is exploring the use of FPC (FishProtein Concentrate) in the treatment of protein deficient malnutrition commonin Vietnam in the hospital at first, but with an eye toward introducing it asan acceptable source of high grade protein for the general population.

53C ONF I DEN T i AL

CONFf ENTIALAVGB-C 15 -Aujust 1967SUBJPUT: Operational Report fur Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

PART II - Ruconunendations.

I. (C) Languagc study for interrogators.

a. in April 1967 the 633rd MI interrogation Field Teama was assignedas part of the 5th SG Intelligence Augmentation. This unit is composed ofeight interrogation personnel, none of whom are Vietnamese lingutists. Con-sequently, interrogation must be conducted through interpreters. In usingihe,'•vtv'i f-r thii, purpose, tlxi following problems have arisen:

(1) General shortage of interpreters.

(2) Limited ability of many interpreters.

(3) Difficulty of establishing personal communication betwecý,the subject wxt the interrogator when working through in interpreter.

(4) Inaccuracy incurred when the interpreter raphraseG or impartsadditional meaning to the interrogator's query.

b. At present the Group's ability to produce timely and accurate

intelligence from interrogation is tholly contingent on the availability andability of the interpreter. In-country language training is being conductedto develop some elementary linguistic ability, but this program, because ofoperational exigencies, is of limited effectiveness. The logical solution isintensive language study for interrogators prior to deployment to Vietnaam.

c. It. is recommended that interrogation personnel be programmed forintensive Vietnamese language study prior to deployment to Vietnam.

2. (C) Training of Collection Personnel.

a. Because of the itaique nature of its operations, the 5th SFGhas great potential for an extensive and nighly productive collection effort.In April 1967 the 613th MY Detachment, a designated collection unit, wasassigned as intelliger~e augmentation to the 5th SFG for exploiTation ofthis potential. This detachment underwent PO{M/POR training at Fort Bragg,N. C., during the period 27 March to 25 April 1967. Although a designetedcollection unit, the 613th MI Detachment is, in fact, almost exclusivelymanned by personnel with a coureterintelligence MOS. During the trainingperiod no attempt was made to conduct any sort of cross training, nor wasany training presented which was specifically oriented toward enabling the613th to better perform its mission in Vietnam.. There was no languagetraining or area familiarization; the 61'3th had no assigned personnel witha Vietnamese language capability. The entire training program was conductedmore to "neet requirements" than to actually prepare the 613th for itsassigned mission in Vietnam.

b. It is recemnended that collection units not be assigned counter-Intelligence personnel unless extensive cross training has first been aocc~ pli ,

C F I t)E4T I A L

CONFIDENTIALAVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT; Opuratiena) Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31. July 1967

POWi<POR traimnjg for intelligcnce personnel should be given by intclligencepersonnel who h'ive rýcently retu7ned from Vietnam and who are able to instructin the varioun problcms, capabilities, limitations, and particular situaLiutisconcer'ning the -intelligencc effort in Vietnam. Trained area specialists WithVietnamesue language capability should be provided for collection ele(ientspresently deployed or scheduled for deployment in Vietnam.

3. (0) inadequacy ,i VNAF aeromedical evacuation for CIDG casualties.

a. Rt fusa) t( fly air evacuation missions and delays in flying suchmissions on th pirt of VXAF has led to loss of life and limb of CIDG casualties.

b. It is rec.,-oicnded tlhat CiDG casualties be permitted evacuationby US aircraft without khaving to go through Vietnxflmese channels.

4. (C) Hospitalization of CiDG.

a. A literal interpretation of USARV Regulation 40-11 would preventor delay the admission of COGD personnel to US Army hospitals. Although (UDGhospitals do exist, they can not fully support all CIDG ferces. Care of CIDGpersonnel through Vietnamese channels is inadequate. Insufficient medicalsuppo-t is detrimental to the mission of Special Forecs in Vietnam.

b. It is recomna'ded that USARV Regulation 40-21 be interpretedthroughout th theater of operations as excluding CIDG personMel from itspnrvisions.

5. (U) EZtrsction of captured rice. Ia. On numerous occasions CIDG units in the field have discovered ,

large enemy rice caches. Stated 5th SFG policy is that whenever possiblerice caches will be safeguarded until a means of extraction is availatIc,and then the rice will be brought back for friendly consumption. More oftenthan not, however, a means of extracti on is not readily available, and CIDGunits can seldom remain in a static position without seriously jeopardizingtheir security. Ccnsequently, the rice is too often destroyed. During tholast week in July, for example, CIDG units in III CTZ destroyed ove;r 5) tonsiof rice. ironically, the 5th SFG is purchasing increasirg qun.tVribss of JS$grown rice to support the CIDG prograw. Furthermore, the genera] shonrte aof rice throughout the country is forcing the costs higher and higher, whidchis detrimental to civic action programs in general and especially to refugeeprojects. In view of the growing scarcity of rice, it would seem appropriateto place a higher priority on the allocation of helicopters, the only feasiblemeans of transportation in nearly all cases, to rice extraction missions

b. *Recommendations:

(1) A nationrl policy should be formulated with regard to thepriority of extracting captured rice.

55

CONFAOi ENT IA L

AVGB-C 15 August 1967SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly P'eriod Ending 31 July 1967

(2) A more operationally responsive system should bedeveloped to extract rice in those situations where a unit cannot safelyremain in position to secure the cache.

(3) All aviation assets (Air America, US Army, eta) shouldbe coordinated so that in areas where operations are being conducted at leastone helicopter can be on stand-by for rice extraction missions.

6. (U) Support for research and development.

a. Reference: paragraph 9 (page 29).

b. In late 1966 QRP action was requested for the development ofan airbool communications system. Several months ago a follow-up on thisrequest revealed that a system is in the developmental stage but will not beoperational in time for the 1967 flood season. As a result, the 5th SFGSignal Maintenance Facility went ahead and developed its own system. Althoughmost of the airboat communications problems have now been resolved, placingthe extra burden of rosearch and development on the Group Maintenance Facilitywas not a satisfactory situation. Key personnel had to be taken from otherduties to accomplish the job. Moreover, standard repair parts for organicradios were used to construct the intercom System. Use of the parts for thispurpose had not been planned in the stockage level, resulting in an unforcasteddecrease in the authorized stockage level. This has not affected operationsso far; however, serious shortages may exist during -the next 90 days pendingthek arrival of supplementary repair parts..

c. It is rec fnended- that whenever a new item such tns the airboatis intr-.iiicd, a team should. be.provided by. 14C .or CDC which. has assets to-fully support and develop all aspects-of the project including communicationsand maintenance.

FCR TIM COMMANDER:

-i'D. E. BROCKMajor, InfantryAdjutant

25 INCLOSURESSee Table of Contents

56

SECRETAVHGC-DST (15 Aug 67) 1st IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Pcriod Ending

31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOI.-65) (U)

HM, DQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AR1.1Y, VIETL1,79, APO San Francisco 96375 1 4 Sn 196;7

T Z Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,APO 9655(8

Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff forForce Development, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonsLearned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 5th SpecialForces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces (WA4X).

2. (3) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning language trained interrogators,

section 2, part II, paragraph 1 page 54: Concur with recomrendationsof 5th SFG (A). The shortage of linguists within this command is fully

realized by all headquarters concerned with this problem and is a matterunder continuous analysis. The 5th SFG (A) had an established requirementof 97 linguists for FY 69. DA validated only"2 of the 97 linguists. The

5th SFG (A) will requisition the two validated linguists at the propertime for FY 69 requisitions. The latest OPO 22 has been received from the5th SFG (A), with a requirement for 339 linguists, and was forwarded to DA

for validation on 28 August 1967. After requirements are validated a re-quisition must be submitted by the unit.

b. Reference item concerning training of collection personnel,part II, paragraph 2, page 54: Concur with reco;mendation0 RecommendCONUS training be reevaluated in this area to insure that requirements ofthe com.imand are met.

c. Reference item concerning evacuation of CIDG casualties, para-graph 3b, page 55: Nonconcur. RVNAF has the primary mission of providing

medical evacuation for Vietnamese casualties and should retain the preroga-tive of performing it. However, present policy allows for US aircraftparticipation upon saturation of RVNAF capability. No action by higherheadquarters is recommended.

d, Reference item Qoncerning hospitalization of CIDG, paragraph

4b, page 55: Concur with recommendation. This action has been accomplish-

ed through coordination with the 44th Medical Brigade.

SG-2, H'JSARFAC

Do.,,ngraded at 3 year lnteiVG". .G-2, IA'," SEA

S DenAqifi~ d aft 1t ii"M 57 1917

DOD DIR 5200.10 -:1;.2

__SECRETG3S~7)J4~ ~C4-Sj-u/- 2 n

SECRETAVHGC-DST (15 Aug 67) let IndSUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

3). July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference item concerning extraction of captured rice, paragraph5b (3), page-56: Nonconcur. The extraction of rice is not considered of suf-ficient criticality in relation to the performance of other combat supportmissions to accept the non-productivity associated with missioning aircraftto standby for that specific purpose.

f. Reference item concerning development of airboat communicationsystem, paragraph 6b and c, page 56: Concur with recommendation contained inparagraph 6c, page 56. The original ENSURE request did not provide for com-munication support. It did, however, include spare parts, spe'cial tools andnew equipment training teams (DETT) to train operators and maintenance person-nel. In the future, if communication support is desired, the request shouldbe included in the original ENSURE request as a part of the overall require-ment.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorse-ment which returns this report.

FOR THE COMAMNDR:

25 Incl L. KENNEDYnc CPT AGC

58

SECRET

GPOP-DT (15 Aug 67) 2d Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967

from HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (UIC: WA4X)(RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ2 US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 19 OCTI%97

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Devielopment, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwardingindorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. P. OSBOURN25 Incl VAJ, AGC

nc Asst A5

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--- PROVININE SOIJDANY-DISTINCT 0DOKARY

*CLOURE I. TO OPERATIONAL REPORT

POM WAWMR LY PERIOD ENDIN 31 JULY 1lOS7 1 -6CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSCORPS

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VOR~~~~~~~C TUREL EIDEDN 1JL 07 -19-C4)FADMNTIIAL

-OMIDENT IAL IST•ATIS9TICAL DATM

I. Operations I i Im IVCTZ CTZ CTZ CTZ __ýý

a. Squad 5278 iO458 8730 13770 41836

b. Platoon 817 10990 1476 5"36 19C19

n. Ccmipny or Lar,,Yer 148 3053 1060 628 4889

S. contacts t

k, Contacta resulting fra'frinecfl offensitv actions 69 289 189 247 7

b. VC ettaclo .- lrntallation=and convoyst 165 1J3 188 97 633

o. Imidenta (booby trape,mnes, aasasinations, ato): 18 44 81 191 3314

3. Confirmed VC Losses:

a KA 339 473 741 378 1931

b. WIA 67 IV 143 149 2•7

C. am 72 62 76 1551 361 -

d. Quarteriy ccmparison of oonfcimd VC losses country-widDelk3 Crm

14th Quarter 66 M514 1414lot Quarteri 67 2632 501I2nc Quarter 67 1931 361

4. USASF Loesses

a. KIA 4 6 7 7 24

b* WMh 35 141 36 29 Axs

0. MIA 0 2 0 0 2

d. Q- u-ter4• cuxparison of TASF casualties cnurtry-wide s

XrA WIA MIA TOTAL

14th Cuarter 66 9 %1 614lst Quarter 67 19 80 3 10e2nd Quarter 67 24 25 2 51

M]cl 2 to 5-th SML (ELL, I MRy - 31 Jul 67

CONF I DENT I A.

CONF I DENTI AL,\ 3 TAT]BTTCAL DATA (COrlrI,

nu v=DTA-o . I 11 I:1I IV

5~. VM~F Los3sest CTZ CT!Z CTZ CTZ TOM!A

a. KTA 1 4 0 1 6

b. WIA 2 3 6 25

c. KEA 1 0 0 1 2

6. CID Losses

a. KM 86 1ID 103 13 436

b. WTA 273 365 472 309 31419

a. MIA 60 13 31 27 131

d& Quarterly comparifon of CIDG casualties omuntry-wideI WIA mA TOTAL

4th quartr 66 59 202 6 267lot quarter 6 7 322 920 80 13222nd quarter 67 436 1419 131 1986

7. RP/PP Losses:

a. LTA 7 20 68 6 101

b4 WIA, 10V __ 214 -1

a. Nl 0 18 7 1 26

do Quarterly oomparison of RF/PF casualties cu'tmry-wide:

KIA WIA MXA TOTAL

hth quarter 66 81 136 18 2351st quarter 67 94 164 29 2872nd qiarter 67 101 178 26 305

8. Weapolw:

a. Friendly weaponn loat, 50 Jil, 1h5 109 418

b, nwmy wapown losts 100 191 95 L28

2-2

CONF W0 ENTI AL

CONW-I OE N T I A LHtEADQUA RTE 112

5TH SPEC.AL FOR)CE GROUP (ATRBORNE), IST SPECIAL FkMCE5APO 962h0

AVGB-C 8 August 1967

SUBJECT: QOuA.rtorly Combat Doveloruent Report

TO: SEE DISTRI13UTION

1. Inclosed is a suamary of the highlights of the 5th SFGA Combat Devel-opments Program for the period 1 May 67 - 31 July 67.

2. All personnel are encourpged t') submit ideas or requirements ford&alopnent , weapons, ... 4 ". , or armnltucn,, they feel would bE of valueto personnel of the 5th SFUA in accmplishing their combat mission. Reccm-mendations should be forwarded to CO 5th SF'GA ATTN. S-3CD (C1r PETERS)

FC THE COCAANDER:

I Incl -1-D. Eo BROaCT.1t otf Cfl•r Pr eoK ,jor, TinfonIi",

Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION s"All

Incl 8 to 5th FGA ORLL, l May 31 Jul 67 RGRADE UNCLAS 1I-4EN

SEPARATED FROM CLASSIKIEDINCLOSURES

CON4 F DENT IAL

AI

C(I1AT I)EVELOIT%'rM3

A. Comibat Development Projoct.t, currultly undor evaluation:

1. (C) Manpack Porsonnol Detoctor (MPD). The MUD is a device intondodto alert the oporator to the presence of concealed hiumas by dotectivg co-.tainhuman chemical offluvin. The results of the tests indicatod that in tim mmn-packed role the rI-D would be of vory limited use. }Iow(;vor the MPD's arecurrently undargoirg modification to permit installation on helicopters.This method was tested by the lst Air Cay Division rith excellent results,The modified MPD's will, be reevaluated in this now mode.

2. (C) Parabundle Markeor, VNAIMT-13. The parabundlo marker is a sitemarking radio transmitter set which is used in conjunction with organic FMradio equipment to form an electronic homing system. The marke~r is attachedto air dropped supply bundles prior to delivery, thereby providing a means torecover lost bundles air dropped into t•luckly vegetated terrain. Eight systemswere evaluated, -xA die to the non-Oxpendability of the item and high weight(25 ibs), were dotermined to be unacceptable for Special Forces operations.

3. (U) Lightweight Load Carrying System (M-56). The lightwoight loadcarrying system woighs approximately 3.3 ibs, and consists of the followingitems made of nylon material:

Individual Equipment Belt, suspenders, small armsAmmunition case (2 each), first aid packet or campassCase, intrenching tool carrier, combat field packCmateen cover, sleeping gear carrier.

Forty sets of the new equipment are presently in the field with a high degr-eeof enthusiasm for the system being expressed by the evaluating individuals.

h. (C) Lightwel-iPht. lPet.er't-inr M, k (yv-?~,>RI T.qn +t~ a "P t-plightweight protective mask which is made of silicone rubber and packagcdin a waterproof carrier was completed Li July. The total weight is 14 ouncesand fits in a pocket of the standard field uniform, however it protects againstriot control type agents only. It was determined that the mask fills a def-inite need in the CIDG program and a basis of issue is recommended as oneper CIDX striker.

5. (C) Hand Held Position Marker (FM-i). The marker is an expendablesmoke signal for use in areas having a dense jungle canopy. When the signalis fired the signal assembly penotrates the canopy and travels to an art.'::ud3of 3PO foot. A parachute stabilizes its fall back Into the canopy wheretwo grapnels •ected luring flight snag, suspending the signal so the smokeis visible to aircraft. 72 systems wore tested znd the smoke yield of thesignal was found to be insufficient. However a new signal (U1-3) has beendesigned to produce more smoke. The system, if so improved, will be a greatimprovement over existing signal devices.

DOWNGkADED AT 3 YR INTERVAISDECLASSIFJED AFTMR 12 YEARSDOD DIR 52OOo10

COr1F I 1Fi* ,

CONF DENT ICO[ZIAT DEVELOFMENTS (CCiNTD)

6. (C) Linear Power Amplifier for /?PRC-74 Radio. The power amplifieris designed to increase the wattage output of the AN/FRC-74 radio from 30 to100 watts, thereby providing a much greater range. 13 sets were distributedto the field in late July and no results have been received to date.

7. (C) Evaluation of Sniper Activities and Operations. ACTIV continuesto conduct an evaluation of the sniper program presently existing in RVN, Theevaluation period has been extended one month and will now end on 31 Aug 67.The purpose of this evaluation is to:

a. Determine if a need exists to re-institute an Army-wide programof sniper training,

b. Evaluate new sniper equipment and effictiveness of existing equip-

ment,

c. Evaluate the effectiveness of )resent sniper activities in RVN.

To date the 5th SFGA has scored its sfiiper Icills utilizing the starlight scopeand M-16 rifle. This has been in contrast to what hai been expected throughuse of M-ID rifle with M-84 scope and M-16 rifle with the Realist scope.

8. (C) Airboat Communications Systems.- Due to the extremely high noiselevel on an airboat, standard radio transmitters and receivers w, :e impossibleto use. 1n ESURE request was submitted for a suitable airboat communicationssystem which USAIWL is presently developing. However, the 5th SFGA SignalMaintenance Facility has developed an interim system utilizing availablecomponents. The AN/ PRC-25 radio widll be used for FM commications and theinboat intercom between the driver and the gunner will consist of two add-itional PRC-25 modules mounted in a waterproof ammunition box ruth a BA-386for its power supply. The headsets are modified sound suppressing earmuffswith built in receiver diaphram. The microphone is an exygen mask tyDe withbuilt in microphone. This system is presently being installed in the airboatswith the evaluation to take place during Sept through Oct.

B. Items Due In For Zest And Evaluation By 5th SFGA.

1. (0) Position Marker IM-3

This Marker is a modification of the 11-1, with all the ssmecharacteristics and functioning, however the smoke payload is supposed tohave been greatly increased. Item is due in for testing during Sept.

2' (C) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector.

The detector is a sensor system small and light enough (eachdetector weighs 8 ounses and is the size of a paper back book) to be carriedby a patrol. Each system contains 4 detectnrn and one monitor, Detector is

CONF iDE i A L8-3

COWFr I UL N I't 4CCDMAT DEVEWOWIFMENT (cnWDM)

sensitive onough to detect footsteps at 3P motors ind capable of giving alortto monitor unit over distance of one mile. 5th SFGA is due to reelove 10-15systems for evaluation between Aug and Jct.

3. (C) Trace Metal Detection Kit.

The Detection Kit contains two battery powered ultra-violetlight sources, a batt3ry charger, and 10 plastic 3pray cans containing aehumical solution. The Detection Kit workes on the principle of makingtraces of metals visible by means of ultra-violet light in conjunctionwith a chemical solution. Metal leaves a characteristic residue on skinand clothing in patterns aid intonsities due t weight, friction, andduration of exposure to the metal. By using the kit it can be determinedif a suspect has been in contact witl- a weapon, each of which leaved acharacteristic pattern. 5th SFGA was due to recievo this item for evaluat-ion in Juno, howevcr as of yet none have arrived6

4. (C) Mine Firing Switch, MFS-Xl.

Seven Mine Firing Switches were duo in mid-July for evaluation,based on a request put in by 5th SFGA to the limited warfare laboratoriesLiaison Officer. The switch provides a light weight battery powered (BA-30)device that will detonate MlHl Claymor- , or similar anti-personnel mines,or any explosive devices that employ the M-6 or similar electric blastingcap., The switch consists of a waterproof case with connaotors to acccaodatethe firing leads to 10 explosivo devices, which may be fired individuallyor in salvo.

5. (0) 4C2M Rapid fire Grenade Launcher System,.

Evaluation of three systems of rapid fire grenade launchers isdue to begin in Aug-Oct 67. The systems to be evaluated are: (a) Handcranked, low velocity grenade launcher; (b) Automatic, low velocity grenadelauncher; and (c) Automatic, high velocity grenade laumcher. The 5th S3FAis schedulod to rociove two of each systems for evaluation.

C. Recently evaluated items that were of interest to 5th SFGA

1. (V) Battery Oporated Flunrosant Lamp (Safari Nrht.)

This 9 pound laIp has an 11 inch miniature fluorescent tube poweredby a 310 volt external AC source or by two 69 volt batteries. It Is designedto be hand carried or suspended by eyelets. Battery life is between 40 and 80hours depending on high or low intensity use. The lamp is ideal for emergencylighting of TOC's, medical rd com•o bunkers, helipod marking, etc. Since thelight is an off-thesholf item,prccurema t should not take long. The recommendedbasis for issue is: A-Det-4, B-Dot-4, c-Dot-3,

C I I IY T IIIIIII

C()NFIDU" ALCaMAT DMLODUTS (CCKTD)

2. (C) Battle Fiek Miulumanation System.

The Battle Field llumanation System is a support weapon 'hich willg rovide illumination over a target area 600 meters in diameter at a distance of

o to 670 meters from the launch site. The system is a lightweight, portable,one use launchevrcontaining 12 projectiles. Each projectile burns for 30 seconds,with the entire system, onee 'flrdd, programmed to discharge the projectiles atpredetermined intervals therely providing a total of 6 minutes of illumination.An interrupter built into the launcher allows firing of only one minute or ofthree minutes of illumination as desired. No operator is necessary after thefuse is ignited. The battle illumination systmm will not only provide for anadditional in-camp illumination capability, but also free the mortoirs from.f.ring-illumlnation riiu.sions, perml2ting mor HE missions tiz"'. fired. Thesesystems are being requested on an ENSURE basis for distribution to all A andB Detachments in country.

3. (C) Linear Anti-Personnel Mine (F-agmacord)

The mine oonisiste of a 25 foot~ length of waterproof tlmdblODexplosive, 1/2 inch diameter cord, beaded with coiled fragmentation ringscrimped to the cord. The cord is capable of being cut into smaller lengthsor several mines may be connected by small metal couplings for longer lengths.This new munition can be used to mine ditches, mine outer perimeter wire aroundcamps, mine trails, or as the main charge in booby traps. Fragmacord is nota standard item, however 5th SFGA has urged its rapid development and pro-curement as a standard item. There is no indication as to when it mightbecome available.

4. (U) Lightweight Jungle Hammocks.

The hwmock is constructed from water repellant treated nylonfabric, 3 feet by 8 feet in size, with two 15 foot, 1/4) inch thick, polyesterdrawcords. The evaluation of the hammocks has been completed and the Sth 3OAhas requeotod a basis of Issue of-one per USASF.

5. (U) Lightweight Nylon Rucksack.

Thirty-one lightweight rucksacks were tested by 5th SFGA. A highdegree of enthusiasm was expressed by indivdual s conducting the testing. ThenotewortlW features of the rucksacks are: Lightweight nylon cmnstruction, quick-release buckles on shoulder straps, plastic holding device on the drawstringsfor the large compartment, fie sections of webbing with eyelets for mountingadditional equipment, and a pocket with velcro fastener in the cover of thelarge compartment. The requested basis of issue is one per USASF. No infor.mation is presently available as to when the item will be available for issue.

CoONFID ENTIALSPECIAL REPOMR ON TiH ACTION AT CAMP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967.

The following special report was prepared by the 21st Military HistoryDetachment. It describes the small unit actions that took place on 8 April1967 within the TAOR of CIDG Camp Trung Dung (coord BP 932551), which isadvised by US Special Forces Detachment A-502; 5th SFG (Abn), and cmrwnn-:-..:by Captain Ngoc, Vietnamese Special ForcesI. Anvr Republic of Vietnam.

Prior to 8 April 1967, CIDO operations from Camp Trung Dung had radenumerous contacts with local Viet Cong throughout the camp's Tactical A.reaof Responsibility, (TAOR) but at no tire sinco the camp's irneption (1 J 66)had any NVA contact been made until 22-23 Mir 1967. On ±those datesý one CMGOcompany (555) was out on a search and ast~rcy operation about three kilcmetorwest of ýr LThc (locale ior 8 April 67 acticii) at coord BP 857513P whon eant•A-cwas made with an NVA company (+)b The 11VA unit attemptod to surromun the CMlGcompany, but was unsuccessful.

This contact uas the first NVA contact nmdo within this TAOR. %n tn-usual aspect of this action was the fact that this contact and nuboquonntattempt at encirclement occurred in daylight hours, which indioatodI , vnryaggressive and confidont enemy force was np-; oonfrontirn-, the rTDO of 'iumnTrung Dung.

The CO of Det A-502, Captain Doason, wanx aware of thu 7th; Oth t' WBattalions of the 183B NVA Regiment being in LTh Province, but nrot uutil22-23 March did he knIew that at least one Battalion wan n hIn MA TA,

This appearance of an NVA unit within the TAOR created no ieal tirpi tnato Captain Deason xnd Captain Ngoo because rany intolligence m|ports hIAd 1,der,comizn in indicating, that the VC were crititcAlly shnrirt of f•..i and would r• mmncome looking for rice.

Within the TAOt are ofu. rice storage ar.-an or warehurotin. [y fftt ro] '.-ithe rice from planting to lhaz-esting to ntornge, C1T l' .t-iv •1 ifmul •,n-trol the VC activities to the point that large mn.sni•t of I roteo v.• p-nt•l.•,, ;1yimpossible CLue to tho lack of ava~labla foodnLuffs to ait]. ( tftet r'trnes

One of the four rice storago aroas incicatod nbovye to Inento In n h.ii acalled Hoi Phuoc, about four kilometers somthwest of Camp T1,1lMI f atcoordinates BP903537. It was against thii fitorarro ara tint the NVA Itnmo,!, dan early morning attack hoping to capture the much needed rioe storeo. At0135 hours 8 April 1967, CPT Ngoc was infuormod by the Dion Khanrh P~t)iaotChief that one of his Popular Force (PF) units Lt Hoi Phuoc had Ji, nvt(iurner an attack by an estinated cmpany of VC. (See sketch #l).

CPT Nr-oc .midiately conferred with his SF advisorp CPT Deavan, Th,.plan of action that cvolved iB described belm,o nnd is portrayed mn theattached skatcheac

'When the enewJ attacked the PP outpost at Hoi Phuoc, they apparentlywere unm,,are of three separate platoon size night ambush sites that had beenset up as routine night security for the area.

These three platoons were out of C TOG Compayr 556 from Camp Trung Dung.(See sketch ;,42).

Using a TR-20 radios MPT Ngoo called these three platoon leaders (eachrad HT-1 radios ) ,a-nd gave then quick and complete instructions to move

DaNG:T1DE AT 3 YEAR IN=EVAIS

nciO 0-Lo 5th SFW, OPEL,1 M Jul 67 DECLSS FlD AFTER 12. YEARSn 0 5h=y-3 u6 D M 5200o10CONF) IDENT I AL

StproduIed o

•" •el %%;ble copy;-" B~~~~est/•m="...

CONF IDENTI ALACTION AT CUP TM DUNG, 8 April 1967 (COJ_)

tvo units to blocking positions to their east along the W Loc roads ,nd,to move one pla.toon to the south, blocking the VC route of w"thdrawal,(See sketch #2 and !#3)o These three platoons were in their assigned areaswithin 30 minutes.

ILarwhile, OPT Deason had hoped to reinforce the platoon in the southernblocking position with a CIDG company from Camp Trung Dung. His plan -as tomove this compny south from camp on Hi-ihway jr (See sketch #l) to the inter-section of the Ny Loc road, move east and north uritil reaehing the hUUlet ofDai Hu-., then move over into the rice fields just east of Dai 1hu where thesouthern blocking platoon was located. (See sketch #! and #3).

Unforturately, the execution of this plan required coordination andapproval from the District Chief of Cam La (see sketch #1), since almost allmovement would be throughi his district. Since tim-e was of the essence in orderto trap the enem- force, this plan was discarded when word was received around0200 that all three platoorn of Company 556 had arrived in position, were nowin contact with the enemy force, and were receiving heavy fire. CIDG Company558 was immediately loaded onto three 2- ton trucks (40 men to a truck) andsent west on Figay 420.421 (kno-.rn locally as HT-2) to the intersection ofHigriay 420/421 and the northern end of My Loc road. (See sketch #' and #1).

It was beginning to appear to CPT_ Deason and CPT Ngoc that either twoc-mpsnica of local VC were being engaged or an NVA or "'hard core" .unit hadarrived in the area. This thesis was further strengthened when the 00 ofC-mpanw 558 called at 0230 hours to announce that as soon as his unit de-trucked (south of the bridge), they too came ujnder heavy fire. (See sketch#4). An enemy automatic weapon position was just southwvqest of the bridge,on the eastern side of the My Loc road and was preventing Company 558 plusthe platoons from Corpany 556 from advancing. (See sketch 7%). The strength,identification, and composition of the enLy force had not become known as

yet, and CPT Deason reconmended all renminin§ reserte forces within the camphe mobilized aend moved tc the area of contact. CPT Deason felt that if theCO of Company 558, who had the best unit in the camp, vas ha.ving difficultywith the enemy force, then he'd better get all the troops he could muster into the area as well as himself. He also felt that tuhe• were up against a welltrained and organized N VA force.

After CPT Ngoc agreed, the reserve forces (one platoon each from Companies-556, 557, and 558) were quickly loaded into trucks and moved out. At 0245-O250Othey arrived to the rear of Company 558, which had just overcome the enenyblocokng elemnt., (See sketch #5). The enemy blocking force was composed ofat least six NVA soldiers, Five NVA were dead at their positions, along withthe M24G and four AK- 47's which were immediately secured. One heavy blood trailindicated that a 6th man was dragged or had crawled away from the position.

OPT Deason immediately realized that if troops could be moved furthersouth along the My Loc road, they could then box the NVA force into a pocketformed by Company 558 and one platoon to the north and northwest, two platoonsto the west and sout1-est, and one platoon to the south. Additioncily, a Callwent out to the District Chief requesting that a PF =nit be moved south of HoiPhnu to seal off the east. (See sketch #6).

10-2

C OWFI DE NT IAL

CONFIDENTI AL* ACTION AT CAIP TRUNG DUNG, 8 April 1967 (O0N-)

Action and contacts were sporadic throughout the remainirng hours ofdarkness as the CMlG continued to advance -zd encircle the NVA forces

The 1, 2 inch mortar at Canmp Truig Durn had continucusly illuminatedthe area and fired apprccimately 350 illuminating rounds before daylight.In addition, a "Moonshine" aircraft (C-47 anrad with flares only) arrivedin answer to OPT Deascn's reqiest, but departed the area after droppingthree flares. (The pilot said he was recaivinr 37nm AA fire, but no oneelse saw or heard any AA fire). The "Moonshinei? aircraft pilot -w-s askedto serd a "Spoo1y"1 flare ship (AC-47 araed with 7.62r "Gatling gune" plusflares) as a replacemnt. SpooiV was on site from 0515 untilday-ight,•

As morning approached, the CIDG forces had continued their sweep ofthe area to the south and southeast until their disposition was as depictedin sketch #f8 .

Since a FAC and fighter aircraft were overhead at first light, CET Deasonrequested a ne-paIn strike on a small hill to the front. Automatic weapons firewas being received from the hill, and OPT Deason had personally observed twoNVA sol•iers running onto the hill. (See sketch M7).

While the ClOJG forces held their positions, the hill was entirely burnedoff with napalm. After the strike, the sep continued ard tL-ee charrdweapons were found on the hill,

All contact had ceased by 0700, ard the CIDG forces reorganized and sweptback through the area, finding 22 NVA bodies and taking one W. (See sketch :,r8 ) .

At 0800, one additional airstrike was plraced on the suspected NVA assemblyarea (coord BP 8525:1).

During this period, the CIDG forces had suffered only one kldled and sixwounded. (One of the wounded ClDG died later in the 8th Field Hospital),

All forces cleared the area by. 0830 and returned truimphantly to CampTrung Dung. The 22 NVA bodies and the 21 captured weapons were disp3,yed forall to see and photographed for psychological purposes.

The Cl0G forces had come up against the best of one NVA Battalicn (seenote 1 below) and lhd come out the -ictor due to the following:

1o Excellent camunications.

2, Quick and aggressive response to orders,

3, Familiarity of terrain and area of operations.

4. Continuous illumination which afforded good maneuver and precludedNVA from mass exodus from the area undetected.

5a 'Mell trained leader in advisor role.

6. Mutual respect between advised ard the advisor.

7* Ti-meliness in receiving report of initial contact.

8 Preseleted and occupied security positions throughout the area ofmepormiX2i1ty as opposed to "close in" positions,

9. F1lt, open terrain ý7hich afforded ellent •eurability,

10 -3

i ?- 'TiA

CONFI [)ENTIALACTION AT CPMPi TRUIJ 3, UNG, 8 April 1967 (CO1VrD)

NOTEM 1 - Tho NVA PT. lator explained that thu ecrsonnol of his batt•lionwev-e ±iuk and hungcry. 105 personnel wore selocted, based on theirgood health condition, to attack Vx! rice warohouse for the muchnooded foodstuffs.

NOTE: 2 On. IT Ap ,1l% J-.7 • oule week later) a'nother search and desr-,j rporation from Canp Trng Dung found fresh graves contain ing, 20

: dditionil bodies vicinity of coord BP852511, w-here the Last air-itrilo hud been cinducted on 8 Auril. SUice no other action 'hadoccurred since 8 q•mril 1967 in this TAOR, the bodies can safelybe crelit d to tho 8 April contact. (Either wounded NVA who latercdad and/or casumlties sufferod during thr. airstrL-a which wasplaced against the suspectel assembly arm:.).

TOTAL E•-Y WSSES - 42 NVA KCA

21 Weapons captured.

TOTAL _.-NDLY LOSSES - 2 CIDG KIA

5 CIDfG 14TA

No equi,,ment losses

-Iformation contained in this report is based upon a taped interview with W0,Detacbment A-502., Captain Deason. Interview conducted ot Camp Tr-ig Dung byLTC Me H. Jenkins, CO, 21st Military History Detactment (Airborne), 5thSpecial Forces Group (Aixborne), 1st Special Forces.

CONF ib ENIT I AL

AOTTON AT CAIIP1 THRJNG DUNG, (CONTD)

Sketeh"3 1 thru 8 OmittedFromi Copies 9 35

CONFiFENTIALAFTER ACTION REPOPTt ATTACK ON cON THIh. THE FOLL1CdLZG CHRONOLOGICAL SUM-

MARY OF THE ACr'TON OF P MAY 1967 IWA:. EXTRACTFh FRR( T99,

MOWTPIY OPERATIONAL S)IT¶MARY OF DETACHMENT A-1O10

0210 hrs. - Six to eight round burst or small arms fire was heard east of c~mp.No other sounds were hoard. No particiular significance wai gdven tothis fact at the time because the enemy ?ad fired weapons ar sundthe poistion on previous occasions apparuntly to draw fire in orderto better determine the AW positions.

0230 hrs. - Attack commenced- 1.CPT Chamberlain-/ was sitting in the entranceto the command bunker when mortar anJ recoilles rifle fire of greatintensity started landing throughout the IUSSF position and alongthe perimeter. Although some minutes must have past, it seemedthat small arms fire broke out along the perimeter almost immed-iately.

0245 hrs. - SSG Gibson, radio supv, and Kiet, camp interpreter, joined me atthe CP bunker. Throughout this time a constant monitor was madeof the USMC Bn Tac net. Situation at this time was still notclear anx! scope of enemy attack not fully appreciated.

0255 hrs.- SSG Brillante and SMT Zicaro joined the group at the CP bunker.Enemy by this time had penetrated Co 146 position and sapperswere moving into USSF/LLDB area. Some confusion existed at thistime because of the difficulty of determining if the moving per-sonnel were NVA or CIDG, who, having been pushed off the per-imeter, were looking for a place to regroup. Within a few mommentswe were able to determine who the enemy were and the NCO's at myposition took them under fire with small arms and grerades.

0300-0320 Fighting continued around the bunker with exchange of grenades anismall arms fire. At least 6 homemade grenades exploded outside theCP bunker but did no dairiage. One AT round from a B-4 0 hit the northside of the bunker and penetrated through the sandbags into theconnex box that formed the base for the bunker. Throughout thisperiod we were able to hold the CP bunker and had suffered onlyminor wounds to USSF personnel.

0320 hrs.- Enemy moved a flame thrower to a position on the right front of theCP bunker, firing from about 10 to 15 meters range. They put thefirst shot right in the front of the CP bunker, but for some reasonignition of the fuel was not complete. There was a flash and roarand it was immediately deci ied to abandon the position.

0330 hrs.- Relocated OP group into the Sea Bee's area. Until our arrival theSee Bees had not realized the situation and were still deep in theirbunkers. They were immediately informed of the situation andmoved into the trenches, and a secondary strong point was created.At this time cooridination and communieation was reastablished withCamp Commander and the LLDB Det. By using one of their radios,communication Was reestablished on the Bn Tac Net.

DO(YNGRADE AT 3 YR INTERVALSincl U1 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 May - 31 Jul 67 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEAh

DOD DIR 520q.10CONF IDENTIAL

CON iC I A'NT 1,A1,d~l•"R ACTION REtP:RT ATTACK ON CON THIV. (2''(.T.)

CY15 hrs. - 7emalwder --if the U1S3F Put (CPT' King, SKZ Loff, SW.] [ansberry, ,•F,Gomez) joined us at. the ",ea 'ponhi on. They had been locatodon top of hill t5• in posit.,i',r, within the arra of constru.ctiorlfor the new camp. Thtny too had been confused as to the situationand it was not until they observed the flame thrower being usedthat they realized the woriousness of the situation. NOTE! (Til-i1mination throughout the action was very sporadic. The supply ofhand held flares was rapidly exhausted, and the USSF l1mm mortarpotii-iion was untenable for a!-[ pract~ical. purposes cluring th~sphase of the action. A fLarc ship was on station a good portion(if the time but was having di fficulty in getting orientod ov rthe position. This, coupled with low cieUng and smoke, made itseffectiveness very ]'mited. The importance of illuminations wereobvious. When there was sufficent light definate lulls in thefighting, particularly along the perimeter, would occur, only tobe follo, d by intense action as soon as the flares burned out).

0400-0500 USSF and Sea Pees remained in position, and we satisfied ourselveshrs with keeT4np the enemky out of our position. Fighting continued to

be very heavy ilong the Marine perimeter. Some di!'ficultv wasencountered in keeping abreast of the U14C situation. During thisperiod amno was resupplied to them. by using amtracks. The BnComnmander utilized the Marine Engineers to reinforce and strengthentheir position. Some confusion and shooting "took place as theamtracks passed in front of the CJDG positions. No confussionexisted regarding whose tracks they were, but rather in regardsto the ground elemeit moving with them. The camp commander wasable to get things under control very rapidly once he was madeaware of the situation. NOTE: (During the period there were un-doubtedly times when we could have brought enemy fcrceunder firefrom our position but due to the confussion I directed all USSFand Sea Bee personnel to hold their fire until I was absolutelysure of the target. This occured mainly in the Marine positionin the east just north of where the airstrip bisected the per-imr ter).

0500-0630 The situation at this time had clarified itself enough so that wehrs were able to take steps to push the enemy elements out of our

immediate area. During this time the ,50 cal MG position wasrpoemnienul~t ami PffPr-.tjvP fiv-n inn n nn,~r rhw, ? p-mir t~nores, oC-~vr "M

part of the Marine perimeter as well as a portion of the CTDGperimeter. This weapon was kept going until mechanical failurecoupled with personnel bemnp wounded forced us to leave the gunand return to a secure position where we were able to place fireon the enemyv.

0630 hrs..- At this time it became obvious that: (1) the enemy was trying f t'effect a withdrawl, and (2) he had waited too long and had a largenumber of men trapped inside the oerimeter. As the light condit-ions improved the action took on the characteristics of a turkeyshoot. I believe without a doubt the enemy took his greatestcasualtius during this period. He simplv waited to long.

C04F I 10 IfZ2 I tAL

SO F IOLN IA!^L

AFT!,, ACTION REP(,Rt- ATTACK ON CON TE i-I - (CONrMn)

0730 hirs. - Action t r-mlnatcd excet for :omie imall pockets of resistoanco.1iSMC ale.- unt inmodiatelv -itarted sweeping the area outside theperimeter. Mcd,-a, operal i ons cormnenced and conti.inuEd t.hrooh-out the remainder of the morning.

NUI'ES AN OBSERVATIONS:

1. The enemy placed his weighted ntqin attack force against theeast perimeter where the USMC/CIDG lines ,joined. A secorndary attack was madefrom the west, also hitting the Junction of TTSMC/C]DG lines.

2. Because of the .mount of explo- Lves used during the attack andthe amount left behind as well as the large number of rocket launchers, it isevident that the destruction of bunkers and engineer equipment was a secondarymission of the attacking force.

3. The enemy made two mistakes that robbed him of a possible victory.

a. If the attack had been set for midnight he would have quiteoossiblyrhad time to accomplish his mission and withdraw under-coverof darkness.

b. If the troops making the secondary attack from the west wouldhave moved straight thru the Sea Bee's position,,which initially would havebeen quite easy to reduce, they could have pinched off Delta 1/4 and effectivelyisolated them from the other elements. One Delta had been destroyed, I believethe rest of the defenoes would have collapsed fairly rapidly. The enemy in-telli~ence and rehearsal failed to realize this.

4. The enemy's use of homemade concussion grenades in the SF areawas not effective. -ad he used fragmentation grenades the 'Umber of casualtieswould have been much hipher.

5. When working i.n close harmony with ITS Forces the selectionof. radio fre. iencies is quite critical. The HT-l radios used by CIDGALDBfor their conmand not have a tendency to completely override any frequencesthat come anywhere near their fixed frequency.

6. Overall control and fir( discipline has to Ue closely monitoredduring actions involving joint US and Vietnamese troops to avoid the developmentof internal fire fights. During the action I had the company commander completelycease fire until the situation was clear.

7. The overall performance of CIDG troops was quite commendable.They responded well to orders issued by the company conmander. The camp co-mmander's attitude had a great helD on stabilizing the men with his calm,don't-get-excited attitude.

CRAIG R. CHAMBERLAINerT INFCOWT1ANDTNG

C ON FI fNTIA

'IMCCEIS STO'Y REJU)CATTON (I' RFFUGEES IN "1' . C,;•2ttAL HIGMMIANI).

The following irticlo, which was reb'nsod for publication by the 5th'Fn Public ufformanion Office, describos rofuger resettlement operation.3 thattook place during the Ixirlod 25 March - 7 April 1967.

IIEAl (0,S, Arnw) - A recent operation conducted by Vietnamese and AmoricanSpecial Forces (Grcin P•,rets) succeeded in free-ingt 750 villagers and 36,000 polrndsof rice from Vi4't Cong control. ThŽ villagers wore unmovod-at- their own requost-to) a secur-e• ,overunent-controlled area, whore they can live in xaco. fro fmrom

"I, teu17-oUtm. Their household goods, rice stocks. and animals wore moved with them,so thvat they will be able to make a good start in their now homes,

The story bogmn whon a combat patrol from the Special Forces camp at PleiNe, in the central highlands, made contact with approximately 450 Jarai villagersliving a few ki-lometers northeast of the camp (the Jarai are members of the ethnicaid cultural minority known as "Montagnards", who inhabit the remote mountainareas of central Vietnam). The people told tho patrol members that the Viet Conghad forced them to build a bunker system in the area, had token away Many youngmen for conscripts, and had "taxed" much rice frcm them. They asked if theSpecial Forc 3s could move them to the district headquarters at Phu Nhon, wherethey could liveu without ftuther VC harassment. Capatin Lcwell M. Scott, thesenior American advisor with the patrol, said that he woul( -, to arrange themove. Captain Scott then secured the area with his three companies oL CivilianIrregular Defense Group (CODG) soldiers, and requested assistance in moving the

people and their belongings.

When the request for help was received at the Special Forces Company Headquarters in Ploiku, the staff immediately coordinated with the 4th InfantryDivision to obtain helicopters, and with the Office of Civil Operations andthe Pleiku Province Headquarters to arrange the resettlement. The govermen'tof Vietnam agreed to provide vacant land in the Phu Nhon area for the peopleto settle on.

Within 36 hours a2tei the people asked to be moved, the first helicopterload was moving from the olc village site to Phu Yhon. The move was superv-.sed aby Captain Scott and by Mr. Frank Pavich, the Assistant Province Representative

of the Office of Civil O'--rations in Pleiku. Arrangements at Phu Mhon werehandled by the District Chief, assisted by the Revolutionary Development Teamworking in the area, and by the MACV 9ub-sector advisory team.

L f- th-e aflernoon of the second day, all the people, with their householdgoods, animals, and rice, had been mrved from tbo old area. The VC bunker systemwas destroyed, and the deserted villages were burned so that the VC could makeno use of them.

At the same time the move in Plei Me's area was taking place, a patrol frcmCamp Duc Co, ancrther Ypecial Forces camp thirty kllozmeters nort.est of Puol Me,had contacted another 300 Jarai who were similarly anxious to be removed fromVC control. These people showed the patrol where a larg,. rice cache, part of

e-1l 23 to 5th TMA ORLL, 1 May - 31 Jul 67

SUCCESS STOUW: IZEIICATION OF REF1UE&S IN T'IF CENTRAL HIOHLAJ4DS (COrI))

the VC supply sys3tm, was located. They asked that they be moved as soon asposeible, in order to avoid VC roprisals. Carptain Lwnrence R. -Amon, ecnnnxderof thu A dokichment at Duo Co and oonior advisor to the patrol•rncluestedassistance in moving the people and the captured rice, Again helicopters wore~~~~~~~~a I'--..... s .. .... . Ok:~ I- 1h:[e6 L e peoplews'pjrnvtdnd by ýh )I th T-f4o4-wy, fl4n-t-4. G .d a l~t- WI are¶errelocated to a Vietntmonse Government settlemennt area near Thsnh An D)istricthbadquarters. Land and housing materials were provided for them, axi• thebuilding of new homes comnenced.

All in all, the operation resulted in the Jiteration of 750 Jara-, whohad pr-irlously been subjected to taxation, conscription, and forced labor bythe Viet Cong; and in depriving the VC of a great amo•mt of rice--enough, infact, to feed two VO combat battalions for a monthl It was a major setbackfor Charlie, and an accomplishment of which tVe Green Berets are justly proud,

I

I

23-2

I ! I I !I I! l , •I

MISSING1P,?'IUF1EES AT PA TO

I. Paving been forced froyn their homes once, faced with another com-pulsorv move to an unfamliar ares, and 3ubject to Vi ci Coin pror acrandaimploring and treatening them to leave Pha To to return to their homes. 2,300refugees were persuaded to scatter, maki.n the planned airlift of refugeesto Nqhia Ilan Impossible. Approximatc Jgv 310 have already returned to the SongVa Vallev wi(di theyr were rereviousty forced to leave by the 101st AirborneDlvison. Late intelligence reports indicate that others ire waiting in smallgroups to Infiltrate: back into their home territory. The majority, however,are probably still i n the Ba To safe area, afraid of showr ng up tcf be air-ifted t. N.h.a . h anid alo afraid of returning to theii previous homeland

where they are subject to Viet Cong domination as sell as artillory fire andbombs from from ,*-AF units. The basic problem is tot

a. Prevent the return of the refugees to the Viet Cong controlled

area.

b. Assemble them in Ba To.

c. Move them tr the new refugee camp being built at Nghia Ranh, or

d. Find an alternate location where they would be secure and willingto accent as their home.

2. The refugees were originally brought to Ba To by the 101st AirborneDivision i n an attempt to clear the Song Ve Valley northeast of Ba To. With-in one month, 2,8P4 refugees were assembled in the Ba To safe area. Commoditysupport was adequate, but housing was not nor was there sufficient land toconsider resettling all of the refugees in Ba To. T% eliminate the housingproblem, the Special Forces camp at Ba To initipted a housing project. Onehundred dwellings were completed by rmid-July. The original plan was L_ :i-tinue construction in hundred-house lots until all of the refugees had homes.Me'dical attention for hhe refugees was oro-vded by the Special Forces medicsas well as the doctor from Company C who spent sevaral davs at Ba To. Add-itional medical attention was provided by a four-man team from the MalteserAid Service, but the team did not arrive in Ba To until after the refugeeshad dispersed. Thus, commodity supoert and medical attention were adequate,visible progress was being made to construct new homes, land for farming wasnot available.

3. Province's plan was to airlift the refugees that had been collectedatt var tus ceatlufis.............n- T -r a new refugece complex uo±Lla ULL.Ltb

at Nghia Hanh, Nghia Hanh, which is in the lowlands of Quang Ngai Provincewould be easier to sunplv especially during the monsoon when aircraft are pr--vented from making regular rins in the highlands. Ba To had two local supnlyproblems. One was a lack of storage facilities and the other was that therefugee camp is across the fiver from the airstrip where the commodities wouldnornmallv be unloaded. During the monsoon, the river is unfordable.

4. The only detracting feature of the new location at Nghia Hanh wasthe fact that it is in glands which may have boen odious to the Mon-

ncl 24 to 5th SFGA OPLL, _ May - 31 Jul 67

MISS ING ,FUCGEFS AT BA TO (r•,Nn)

taf~nards whf, made up the majority of the refugees. To overcomr any precon- -. s

c ived pre~judices apaainst the new ].ocation, Lieutenant "Walter Peardslee, t heCAAPSiY OPS officer at Ra To, escorted six Montarnard chiefs of the refugeesfor a two-dav tour of the new camp. The chiefs appoared to be impressed ai,,iWhen asked what they thought, replied favorably, however, it is not known iftoey were merely being polite as is often the custom or if they were reallyin apreement with the move.

5. The airlift to Nghia 14anh was set to begin .wo daws after LieutenantBeardsiee and the six chiefs returned to Ba To. On the morning of the 24th,some refugees did indeed begin assemblinp on the .irfield and the first. hel-icupter loads ,ere taken as planned. By the fourth trip, however, there wereno more refugees standing by and the airlift. was suspended. A total of 359people had bern moved. Lieutenant Beardslee and the LLDU camp commanderimmediately went to the district chief who commented that '"vesterdav -nd lastnight, they all disappeared." Later that day, the LLDB were requestea tosend their agents out to discover the whereabouts of the missing refugees.They reported that approximatelv 350 had returned to the Song Ve Valley, butthat the rest remained in the 3afe area. A subsequent agent report statedthat eighty-f ye refugees were %aiting to infiltrate back into thbir home-,.and. On 26 July, another 150 were rounded up and sent to Nghia HanM.

6. The attitudes of the Ba To District Chief throughout the periodirior to the airlift was outwardly one of disinterest. Some reports indic-ated that the Distric Chief was making no effort to prevent the return ofthe refugees to the Viet Cong territorv. He issued passes ostensiblv forthem to go to recover their livestock, but actually knowing it was unlikelythat once they were out of Ba To, they would try or be alle to return. TheUSSF commander, as subsector advisor, discouraged him from continuing thepractice, and it was halted. Another opinion held bv the LLDB is that theDistrict Chief does not want the refugees to leave Ba To since this will meanloss of potential recruiting for Popular Forces, and the flow of commoditiesWLll be cut off. If the refugees are in the safe area, then the districchief must be able to round them up or at least communicate with them.

7. Lessons Learned: The following lessons were learned from the ex-perience at Ba To and should b.- heeded in any similar situations in thefuture:

a. The~ grats deficiecv ill h1imtJling UI e± ugi I L a1the lack of anv intelligence network among the refugees. Intelligence per-sonnel should make an immedipte effort to establish nets among new refugees.The distrbution o? commodities and MEDCAP offer opportunities for collectingintelligence as well as contr-cting agents. The refugees can give v[L.uab.eInformation not only about the area they recently came from, but also aboutthe presence of Viet Cong agents among the refugees, Viet Cong attemnts todisrupt GVN and FWMAF civic action programs, and the attitude of the refugeestoward various GVN plans such as the resettlement at Nghia Hanh. Not know-ing why the refugees refused to go to Nghia Hanh prevents us from takingany effective countermeasures.

24 -2

MISSING REFUGEES AT BA TO (CONTD)

b. Following a large inflex of refugees, the Viet Cong can be ex-Dected to attempt to persuade and threaten the people to return to the -:ztCong area. The Viet Cong can also be expected to infiltrate among the ref-ugees if not already there and ridicule any efforts to assist them. Ultimately,the Viet Cong may be expected to carry out their threats even to the point ofdeliberately motaring refugee camps with the objective of terrorizing thepeople into returning or at least prove that (-VN is incapable of Providingthem with security.

c. The ultimate value of large clearing operations should be examinedcarefully and thought be given to what will happen to large numbers of ref-ugees after the tactical phase of the operation ends and the problems ofresettlement begins. It is easier to burn a house that build one.

d. The lack of knowleoge of population resources control measures isa deficiency which must be corrected. Simply, what are the techniques forcontrolling lprpe numb-rs of civilians? In areas where government is tentativeor contested, the armv must assvtme the role of policeman as well as soldier,but training for this is inadequate and information on the subject is notavailable.

24 3