PEOPLE V

Jessa, Candice, Jabie, Cels, Joni, Rai, Aldous, Pat, Russ, Mark, Celeni, Ros

PROHIBITION

CHUA HIONG V. DEPORTATION BOARD J. Labrador | March 19, 1955

Facts

Chua Hiong was alleged to have secured the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration with the Bureau of Immigration through fraud and misrepresentation (in claiming to be an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother named Tita Umandap when as a matter of fact he is the legitimate child of a Chinese woman by the name of Sy Mua) and to have maliciously and illegally exercised privileges and rights belonging to citizens of the Philippines.

Upon the institution of the proceedings by the Deportation Board, a warrant for his arrest was issued. He filed a bond for his release and thereafter petitioned said Deportation Board for the dismissal of the proceedings on the following grounds (1) the jurisdiction to deport aliens exists only with regard to aliens (2) claim of citizenship is supported by sufficient evidence to entitle him to a declaration of his citizenship (3) his Filipino citizenship has already been declared by the Secretary of Labor, in representation of the President, and the same is binding on the other executive branches of the government, the Deportation Board including. However, the motion to quash was denied by the Deportation Board.

Petitioner then filed a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his arrest was made without jurisdiction; that the Board be prohibited from continuing the deportation proceedings against him; and that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Deportation Board from hearing the case until after his petition is heard by this Court.

Issue

WoN Chua Hiongs citizenship should first be determined in a judicial proceeding.

RatioYES

Petitioner had obtained original entry as the son of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother, which fact entirely contradicts his claim of Filipino parentage on his mothers side, although this fact may perhaps be explained by the desire of his father to hide the illegitimate filiation of his son. This is therefore a case where the evidence is neither decisively conclusive in favor of petitioners Filipino citizenship, nor decisively conclusive against said claim.

The jurisdiction of the Deportation Board to deport exists only with regard to aliens who are admittedly so. Where, however, a resident is admittedly a citizen, or conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are null and void ab initio and may be summarily enjoined by the courts.

The Deportation Board has, in the first instance, power to determine the nationality of the deportee. Its jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of Filipino citizenship. But it must quash the proceedings if it is convinced that the evidence submitted by the deportee shows that he is a Filipino citizen.

A respondent who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

If the respondent is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. The legal basis of prohibition is the absence of the jurisdictional fact, alienage.

If the citizens right to his peace is to be protected, it must be protected preferably through the medium of the courts because these are independent of other branches of the government and only in their proceedings can we find guarantees of impartiality and correctness, within human limitations, in the ascertainment of the jurisdictional fact in issue, the respondents claim of citizenship. It must be also protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials.

A judicial determination should be granted only in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.

In cases where the evidence is neither decisively conclusive in favor of the deportees claim for Filipino citizenship, nor decisively conclusive against said claim, the question of alienage or citizenship should first be decided in a judicial proceeding, suspending the administrative proceedings in the meantime that the alienage or citizenship is being finally determined in the courts.

The evidence presented is of such substantial nature as to afford belief that only an impartial judicial investigation can evaluate it with fairness to the petitioner and with justice to all concerned.

Co vs. The Deportation Board Fernando; July 29, 1977

FACTS

- Petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano Co were born in Cagayan.

- Co Pengco, father of petitioners, was a Chinese merchant residing in Cagayan while their mothers nationality was disputed.

- Upon petitioners parents death in China, a Special Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed charges against them alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in the Philippines, who failed, neglected and refused to register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of Immigration, they violated the law.

- By representing themselves as Filipinos, they were able to enjoy rights and privileges only given to Filipino citizens such as suffrage, ownership of real property, Herculanos ownership of a coastwise vessel and Gregorios loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.

- They filed a motion to dismiss with the Deportation Board on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction since theyre Filipino citizens. DISMISSED

- Petitioners filed an action for prohibition and habeas corpus against the Board and this was held in their favor on the ground of their being Filipinos.

- The then Judge de Veyra of the Manila CFI sustained his jurisdiction, granted the relief sought, and restrained the Board from taking cognizance of the proceeding. Hence this appeal by the Board.

ISSUES

1. WoN judicial intervention prior to the final decision of the Board was justified? YES

2. WoN the facts show that petitioners were indeed Filipino citizens? YES

HELD

1. As held in Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board, when the evidence submittedis conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. Judicial determination is allowable in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. The remedy should be allowed only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.

Calacday vs Vivo reiterated the principle as to the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, precluding judicial intervention until deportation proceedings are completed. But an exception to this was set forth in Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board.

2. There was no substantial legal error in the test of evidence to justify such remedy based on the evidence of their citizenship. Even the brief for appellant could not assert that petitioners mother was an alien. Relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, the LC concluded that her illegitimate children were Filipino citizens (since her dad was Chinese and her mom, Filipino).

Other evidence also proved their being Filipinos such as the recognition of such status by several government agencies like the Commissioner of Immigration and the City Fiscal of QC, their exercise of the right to suffrage and the birth certificates showing they are Filipinos.

Simon v CHR supra

Paredes v CA supra

MANDAMUS

BLANCO, ET AL. V. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS | Malcolm, J.

Facts

Blanco, et al. took and apparently passed the examination for a physicians certificate.

The Board of Medical Examiners submitted the final results to the Department Head for confirmation but the Secretary of the Interior held the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of the Interior.

The special investigator found that the questions had leaked out.

Following the recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the examinations.

Blanco, et al. filed a complaint for mandamus for the court to order the Secretary of the Interior to confirm the final results of the examinations.

Issue/Held

WoN the offical duty of the Secretary of Interior to confirm the results of the medical examinations is ministerial in nature.NO. Such duty is DISCRETIONARY and there was NO ABUSE in the exercise of such duty, thus, mandamus will not lie.

Ratio

Section 10 of Act No. 3111: The results of all examinations (medical), including the average and grades obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for confirmation to the Department Head (the Secretary of the Interior) and made known to the respective candidates within one month after the date of the examination.

The writ of mandamus will NOT issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer.

Where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

Under the Medical law, it is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or not to confirm the report of the medical examiners.

To hold that the Secretary of the Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert him into an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting the requisite approval.

HOWEVER, mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion.

In this case, the record discloses that the Secretary of the Interior did not exercise the power granted to him with manifest injustice, or with gross abuse.

NG GIOC LIU V. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS J. Reyes | March 31, 1950

Facts

Ng Gioc Liu, alias Vicente Uy, presented to the DFA a letter from the Commissioner of Immigration, requesting that the Philippine Consulate at Amoy, China be authorized to issue a returning resident visa to Mariano Uy as an unemancipated minor son of Ng, the Commissioner being satisfied that this minor was born in Manila in 1928, but that, having gone to China in 1930 to study and having stayed there since then, he has to have a visa to return to the Philippines.

As the Commissioners request was not granted, Ng filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to authorize the issuance of the visa in question.

Issue

WoN the giving of a visa is a ministerial act that may be compelled by mandamus. NO

Ratio

From the Immigration Act of 1940, a visa is not issued as a matter of course to any one applying for it.

In the case of a non-immigrant, he must first establish satisfactorily his status as such and the consular officer, on his part, has to satisfy himself that the applicants entry into the Philippines would not be contrary to the public safety. The matter obviously requires an investigation by the consular officer issuing the visa.

Although the foreign service has been placed under the over-all direction and supervision of the DFA, this does not necessarily mean that the Department Secretary takes the place of the consular officers abroad in the matter of the issuance of passport visas, for the Secretary cannot relieve those officers of their responsibility under the law.

Reason of the law: the applicant for a visa is in a foreign country and the Philippine consular officer there is naturally in a better position than the home office to determine through investigation conducted on the spot whether or not the said applicant is qualified to enter the Philippines.

The determination of WoN an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status and WoN his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety, is not a simple ministerial function. It involves the exercise of discretion and cannot therefore be controlled by mandamus.

The fact that the Commissioner of Immigration has made his own investigation and is himself satisfied that the applicant is entitled to his claim is immaterial. For the consular officers are not bound by the findings and conclusions of the immigration office.

Policarpio vs. Phil. Veterans Board Reyes, JBL, J.|Aug 23, 1956

FACTS:

Policarpio was the widow of a member of the Armed Forces killed in action.

She applied, and was granted a monthly pension by the Philippine Veterans Board (Board).

The pension was stopped, however, in 1948 because the widow received a similar pension from US Veterans Adminitration (USVA). However, the latter certified that Policarpio had ceased receiving her pension from USVA since 1951.

Thereafter, Policarpio applied for the resumption of her former pension from the Board. The Secretary of the Board issued a memorandum that Policarpios pension was resumed and ordered the preparation of treasury warrants in her favor.

Initially, treasury warrants were delivered to Policarpio, but were later stopped for the reason that the Board had not yet granted the restoration of her pension.

Policarpio filed for a writ of mandamus to be issued to compel the Board to release the warrants.

The Board claimed that the preparation of the warrants was ordered by mistake, because Policarpios petition had not yet been acted upon by the Board.

The lower court decreed the issuance of the writ complained of.

ISSUE:

WON the lower court erred in issuing the writ of mandamus? Yes

RATIO:

The resumption of the pension had not yet been approved by the Veterans Board. The memorandum od the Secretary an the preparation of the warrants were obviously unauthorized, and the taking of such action procves nothing but that the error or lack of authority was not discovered until later, as shown by the subsequent withholding of the warrant.

It was improper to compel delivery of the warrants because the Board migt, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to restore Policarpios pension; and even if its refusal should be erroneous, the court could not properly intervene until Plocarpio should have exhausted her administrative remedies.

Mandamus does not lie to review or control the action or decision of a pension board where the action or decision is one resting in the discretion of such board or officer, or where it involves the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto.

Vda. de Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission Reyes, J.B.L., J. | March 30, 1959

FACTS

Respondent Veterans Backpay Commission (Commission) is the government agency vested with authority to implement the provisions of the Backpay Law (R.A. 304 amended by R.A. 897).

Petitioner Maria Natividad vda. de Tan is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee, a Chinese national and a bonafide member of the U.S.-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines.

The U.S.-Chinese Volunteers is duly recognized by the US Army and forms part of the Philippine Army.

Lt. Tan died in the service and was duly recognized as a guerilla veteran having rendered meritorious military services during the Japanese occupation.

Vda. de Tan filed an application for backpay.

The Commission issued a resolution granting backpay to alien members. The Adjutant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) verified that Lt. Tan has rendered service as a recognized guerilla.

The Chief of Finance Service of Camp Murphy computed the backpay due to Lt. Tan. This was passed in audit by the Auditor General.

However, the Commission revoked its previous stand and ruled that aliens are not entitled to backpay. The Commission denied Vda. de Tans request.

Vda. de Tan filed a petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the Commission to (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan entitled to backpay right under the Backpay Law; and (2) to issue to her the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness.

Lower Court granted the petition and ordered the Commission to issue the backpay Lt. Tan was entitled to.

Commission appealed.

ISSUES & HELD

(1) WON mandamus is the proper remedy. YES.

(2) WON aliens are included within the purview of the Backpay Law. YES.

(3) WON Vda. de Tan should have first exhausted available administrative remedies by appealing to the Office of the President. NO.

RATIONALE

Issue #1

The Commisison contends that mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of a discretionary function.

SC held that the Commissions discretion is limited to the facts of the case, i.e. merely evaluating the evidence WON the claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the US Army. The Commission does not have the power to adjudicate rights after such facts are established.

Having been satisfied that Lt. Tan was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the AFP, having served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers, a guerrilla unit recognized by the US Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to Vda. de Tans application.

Issue #2

RA Nos. 304 and 897 extend its benefits to members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States. There is no indication that its operation should be limited to citizens of the Philippines only. All the law requires is that the guerrilla unit be duly recognized by the US Army.

Issue #3

Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule as in its resolution it refused to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. The Commission declared that such opinion are only advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse.

Vde. De Tan was led to conclude that only a final judicial ruling would be accepted in her favor.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN v REPARATIONS COMMISSION Concepcion, J. (1977)

FACTS:

The Province of Pangasinan applied with the Reparations Commission for reparation of goods worth US$1.5 million to be used for its non-revenue projects (equipment and machinery for road building, improvement of existing irrigation systems, garbage collection).

The Reparations Commission, through the National Economic Council, forwarded the application to the President for approval. In the revised schedule, the road building equipment applied for by Pangasinan was not recommended as a non-revenue producing project.

The reparation good and equipment arrived in Manila, and was released to Pangasinan.

The Reparations Adviser, Atty Panfil Manguera, submitted copies of the Contract of Transfer of Reparation Goods that cover the road-building equipment to the Chairman of the Reparations Commission for his signature. This contract, however, was not acted upon.

The Commission required the equipment to be held in the custody of the Highway District Engineer awaiting the clearance of the Secretary of Finance, Auditor General, Budget Commissioner and Office of the President.

Ultimately, the Reparations Commission ordered the deletion and removal from the reparations goods all the inscriptions indicating the proprietary rights of Pangasinan over the said goods.

The Court issued a temporary restraining order against the Commission from acts of interference, use, control and disposition of roadbuilding equipment.

ISSUE:

Is mandamus the proper remedy to enforce contractual rights transferring the reparations equipment and machinery to Pangasinan?

HELD/RULING:

NO. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duty, but it does not lie to require anyone to fulfil contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct.

In this case, it was an attempt for Pangasinan to settle contractual rights and obligations and to regulate a course of conduct on the part of the Commission. Therefore, mandamus is not the proper remedy.

Another essential element of mandamus is the plaintiffs clear legal right to the thing demanded and the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required.

The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

Here, it was not established by evidence that the Commission had the duty to perform the acts asked for by Pangasinan.

Pangasinans basis of the complaint is that it is not liable to pay the procurement costs because it was awarded the reparation goods in question, and that it is the duty of the Commission to execute in their favour the formal documents of transfer.

However, there was a change that was cognizable to Pangasinan that the representation that the equipment is for a non-revenue producing project has been changed to a revenue-proceeding one. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the Commission to execute the formal transfer documents until payment of procurement costs.

Because Pangasinan has NOT yet paid the said costs (in short, they have not complied with their obligations), the Commission does not have a ministerial duty to perform and therefore, mandamus does not lie.

MERALCO SECURITIES CORP VS SAVELLANO Oct 23, 1982 | Teehankee, J.

Facts:

Maniago submitted to CIR confidential denunciation against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion

CIR caused the investigation of the denunciation after which he found and held that no deficiency corporate income tax was due from the Meralco under the law then prevailing (section 24[a] of the National Internal Revenue Code)

Commissioner informed Maniago of his findings and denied Maniago's claim for informer's reward on a non-existent deficiency ( sustained by the Secretary of Finance

Maniago filed a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Meralco to compel the Commissioner to impose the alleged deficiency tax assessment on Meralco and to award to him the corresponding informer's reward under the provisions of R.A. 2338

Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that:

since in matters of issuance and non-issuance of assessments, he is clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code and existing rules and regulations with discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case.

since mandamus cannot compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency assessment against the Meralco

mandamus may not he against him for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of executive powers, since the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is undeniably under the control of the executive department

CFI: granted the writ prayed for and ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess and collect from the Meralco the deficiency corporate income tax plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay 25% thereof to Maniago as informer's reward

Commissioner prayed that the decision of CFI be reconsidered for the issuance or non-issuance of a deficiency assessment is a prerogative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue not reviewable by mandamus

Issue: WON mandamus is applicable in this case

Held: NO

It is a well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power

Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts

Discretion means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others

Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular determination.

Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is charged with the administration of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility of the executive branch of the government, mandamus may not be against the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax assessment not found by him to be due or proper for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of executive functions

Such discretionary power vested in the proper executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others

Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or consciences of other

A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done

If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial

The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment

Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes had after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus.

A contrary view, whereby any stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the operations of the government.

Considering then that respondent judge may not order by mandamus the Commissioner to issue the assessment against Meralco when no such assessment has been found to be due, no deficiency taxes may therefore be assessed and collected against the said corporation ( Since no taxes are to be collected, no informer's reward is due to private respondents as the informer's heirs

CRUZ vs GANGAN

Facts:

On January 15, 1999, Cruz went to the Regional Office of TESDA in Taguig, Metro Manila for consultation with the regional director. After the meeting, petitioner went back to her official station in Caloocan City, where she was the then Camanava district director of the TESDA, by boarding the LRT from Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue to Monumento.

On board the LRT, her handbag was slashed and its contents stolen by an unidentified person. Among the items taken from her were her wallet and the government-issued cellular phone, which is the subject of the instant case. That same day, she reported the incident to police authorities who immediately conducted an investigation. However, all efforts to locate the thief and to recover the phone proved futile.

Three days after, petitioner reported the theft to the regional director of TESDA-NCR. She did so through a Memorandum, in which she requested relief from accountability of the subject property. In a 1st Indorsement dated January 19, 1999, the regional director, in turn, indorsed the request to the resident auditor.

Under a 2nd Indorsement dated February 26, 1999, the resident auditor denied the request of petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the diligence required in the custody of government properties. Thus, petitioner Cruz was ordered to pay the purchase value of the cell phone (P3,988) and that of its case (P250), a total of P4,238.The auditors action was sustained by the director of the National Government Audit Office II.

The matter was elevated to the Commission on Audit. On appeal, the COA found no sufficient justification to grant the request for relief from accountability.

Cruz then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 before the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: WON Cruz was negligent in the care of the government-issued cellular phone.

Whether she should be held accountable for its loss? No.

Ratio:

Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.Petitioners act of riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a negligent act.

Cruz boarded the LRT to be able to arrive in Caloocan in time for her 3:00 p.m. meeting. Any prudent or rational person under similar circumstances can reasonably be expected to do the same. Possession of a cellular phone would not and should not hinder one from boarding an LRT coach as petitioner did. After all, whether she took a bus or a jeepney, the risk of theft would have also been present. Because of her relatively low position and pay, she was not expected to have her own vehicle or to ride a taxicab. Neither had the government granted her the use of any vehicle.

The Rules provide that property for official use and purpose shall be utilized with the diligence of a good father of a family. Extra-ordinary measures are not called for in taking care of a cellular phone while in transit. Placing it in a bag away from covetous eyes and holding on to that bag, as done by petitioner, is ordinarily sufficient care of a cellular phone while travelling on board the LRT. The records do not show any specific act of negligence on her part.

Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. But lacking support, the factual finding of the COA on the existence of negligence cannot stand on its own and is therefore not binding on the Court.

PRC vs. DE GUZMAN | Tinga, J. (21 June 2004)

FACTS

1. PRC released the names of respondents, all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, as successful examinees in the Physician Licensure Exams.

2. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima College in the two (2) most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, were unusually and exceptionally high.

3. Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. PRC asked the NBI to investigate. It also requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results.

4. Fr. Nebres reported that that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two (2) subjects. It must be a cause strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc. NBI concluded that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

5. Respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction with the RTC.

6. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated 21 July 1993, charging respondents with immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified.

7. RTC granted the preliminary mandatory injunction. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physicians oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.

8. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ. CA affirmed trial court.

ISSUE: WON the CA committed a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the TC that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

HELD/RATIO

YES. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. Section 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully:

1. Neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or

2. Excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled.

On the existence of a duty of the Board of Medicine to issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under R.A. No. 2382

For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion. Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the act, and the performance of the duty has been refused.

To determine whether petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of Medical Act of 1959.

A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word shall with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. In statutory construction the term shall is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician.

Section 8 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination. Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered to physicians who qualified in the examinations. The operative word here is satisfactorily, defined as sufficient to meet a condition or obligation or capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance. Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents satisfactorily passed the licensure examinations.

Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.

On the right of the respondents to be registered as physicians

The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.

It is the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.

Privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

On the ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus

Section 26 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely:

(a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC;

(b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and

(c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari.

Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does NOT apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Azajar vs. Ardales | Padilla

FACTS

Sometime in December 1950, petitioner Maria P. De Azajar (Azajar) applied for the purchase of a parcel of land belonging to the public domain located in the Province of Albay.

An opposition to the application was filed by Francisco Ardales (Ardales) on the ground that the applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is not entitled to acquire lands of the public domain.

Thus, Azajar filed a complaint with the CFI of Albay seeking a declaratory judgment or relief because the opposition to her application raises uncertainty or insecurity as to her citizenship which is prejudicial to her interest and, unless it be judicially determined, the Bureau of Lands would likely deny her sales application.

After hearing, the court rendered judgment holding that Azajar is a Chinese citizen and as such is not entitled to acquire lands of the public domain.

Azajar appealed and the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that an action for declaratory relief is not the proper proceedings for the purpose of securing a judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship and, thus, the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to decide it on the merits except to dismiss it.

In Azajars pleading objecting to the motion to dismiss, she moved that the appeal be forwarded to the SC as it involved purely questions of law.

The Solicitor General objected to the motion but the CA ruled that as the Solicitor General raises the question of jurisdiction of the trial court to decide the case on the merits and there being practically no controversy over the facts on which the appellant's claim is based, it certified the appeal to this Court.

ISSUES/HELD

Is a petition for declaratory relief the proper remedy of Azajar? NO.

RATIONALE

Azajar is not interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument; nor are her rights affected by a statute or ordinance and so her grievance against Ardales who objected to her sales application for a parcel of land of the public domain has not brought her under and within the scope of section 1 of Rule 66.

A sales application filed with the Bureau of Lands must go through the different stages as prescribed by law until the Director of Lands, the officer clothed with the authority to alienate lands belonging to the public domain, renders his decision.

For that reason, until after all these administrative remedies shall have been exhausted, no court may compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal to decide one way or another any sales application as that is vested exclusively in them.

Citizenship cannot, therefore, be determined in a complaint for declaratory judgment or relief, as it is not the proper remedy or proceedings.

If she is a Filipino citizen as she claims, she should go ahead with the administrative proceedings in the Bureau of Lands and submit the evidence to prove her citizenship.

The appellant may resort to the courts, if the exercise of her rights as citizen be prevented or denied, to compel the officer, who prevented or denied her the exercise of her rights as a Filipino citizen, to allow her to exercise such rights.

In this case, it is not the jurisdiction of the Court below that is involved but the availability of the remedy sought on the basis of the averments in the complaint.

DE BORJA v VILLADOLID | Torres | 1949

FACTS:

De Borja is a licensed fish peddler and is the owner of 2 motorboats. These boats are used by him solely and exclusively in connection with his business of buying fish for the purpose of selling said fish in Manila

Villadolid, Director of the Bureau of Fisheries, required de Borja to obtain a commercial fishing boat license

De Borja refused on the ground that he is not required under the law to procure such license since he is not operating his motorboats for the purpose of catching fish

In view of De Borjas insistent refusal, Villadolid forwarded the case to the Office of the City Fiscal for appropriate action

Upon learning this, De Borja filed with the CFI a complaint for declaratory relief praying the court to issue a declaratory judgment "declaring that he is not required by law to secure a commercial fishing boat license," for the operation of his motorboats engaged in the transportation of fish

CFI DISMISSED the complaint for lack of merit

ISSUE: WoN the complaint for declaratory relief be granted

DECISION: NO.

Sec.2 of Rule 66 of the ROC provides that the action for declaratory relief must be brought BEFORE THERE HAS BEEN A BREACH of a contract or statute the construction of which is sought

The general purpose of a declaratory judgment is to provide for adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status of the respective parties

IN THIS CASE, there is nothing left for the courts to adjudicate or construe regarding the legal rights, duties and status of De Borja (if he is prosecuted and found criminally liable, then the punishment prescribed by law will be imposed upon him; otherwise the charge will be dismissed)

If De Borja is sustained, he would have the courts prejudge the impending criminal actions against him, without necessarily terminating the same

IT MIGHT BE ARGUED that no criminal action has as yet been filed. HOWEVER, the law does not require that there shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a breach of the law to bar a complaint for declaratory judgment

NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. vs. MEER | En Banc (1951) | Bautista-Angelo, J.

FACTS

- Defendant Meer is the Collector of Internal Revenue.

- This is an action for declaratory relief to obtain a ruling on whether sales of dental gold or gold alloys and other metals used for dental purposes come within the purview of theNational Internal Revenue Code(Art. 184).

- Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground (1) that plaintiff has no cause of action for declaratory judgment.

- RTC dismissed the case.

- Plaintiff contends that it can do so under section 1, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, which contains no prohibition to a taxpayer to file an action for declaratory relief to test the legality of any tax

- Defendant contends that the failure to incorporate in Rule 66 the proviso added by Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1, of Act No. 3736, does not imply its repeal and, therefore, it still stands and applies to the plaintiff.

- The original law on declaratory relief is Act No. 3736, which went into effect in 1930 provides:

"SECTION 1. Construction. - Any person interested under a deed, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in Court of First Instance to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."

- In 1936, Congress approved Commonwealth Act No. 55 adding the following proviso:

". . . Provided, however, That the provisions of this Act, shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue."

- SC promulgated: Rule 66, section 1, which reproduces the declaratory relief provisions contained in Act No. 3736, eliminates the proviso introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 55.

- Chief Justice Moran who intervened in the preparation of said Rules of Court, has the following to say:

The proviso added by Commonwealth Act No. 55 is not incorporated in the Rule 66 in order to make it discretionary upon the courts to apply or not to apply the remedy in such cases. Of course, where the tax is already due and collectible, the taxpayer cannot prevent collection by a declaratory action, but he should pay the tax and sue for its recovery within the period limited by law. But, where the tax is not yet due, there can be no valid reason why a tax-payer cannot by declaratory relief test its validity.

ISSUE/S & HELD:

whether or not plaintiff can bring the present action for declaratory relief. NO.

RATIONALE

- The failure to incorporate the above proviso in section 1, rule 66, is not due to an intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to leave its application to the sound discretion of the court.

- And even if it be desired to incorporate it in rule 66, it is doubted if it could be done under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court considering that the nature of said proviso is substantive and not adjective, its purpose being to lay down a policy as to the right of a taxpayer to contest the collection of taxes.

- With the adoption of said proviso, our law-making body has asserted its policy: not to grant such a right to the taxpayer.

"The Government may fix the conditions upon which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. . . .."

- "The power of taxation being legislative, all the incidents are within the control of the Legislature".

- In other words, the proviso contained in Commonwealth Act No. 55 is still in full force and effect and bars the plaintiff from filing the present action.

- Moreover, Section 306 of the National Internal Revenue Code, lays down the procedure to be followed in those cases wherein a taxpayer entertains some doubt about the correctness of a tax sought to be collected:

The tax should first be paid and the taxpayer should sue for its recovery afterwards.

- The purpose of the law obviously is to prevent delay in the collection of taxes upon which the Government depends for its very existence. To allow a taxpayer to first secure a ruling as regards the validity of the tax before paying it would be to defeat this purpose, and to prevent this result the rule regarding declaratory relief was declared inapplicable to cases involving collection of taxes.

MIRANDO vs. WELLINGTON TY & BROS, INC. | Guerrero, J. (16 February 1978)

FACTS

1. Shortly after the liberation of Manila from the Japanese Army, petitioners occupied and lived in the premises of Arellano University at Legarda St., Manila, from 1945 to 1950. To solve the problem posed by the squatters to public health and sanitation in general and to meet the needs of the University for its premises in particular, Mayor de la Fuente of Manila secured the approval of Mayor Diaz of QC to relocate the squatters in certain lots adjoining Broadway St., Q.C.

2. These lots were formerly owned by a Japanese. Because he was an enemy alien, the Phil. Alien Property Custodian and later its successor, the Phil. Board of Liquidators, took possession of these lots. During their occupancy of the lots in question, petitioners constructed their respective houses thereon and were charged nominal rentals by the respondent Phil. Board of Liquidators. They also filed their respective applications with the Board through the Office of the President for the sale of the lots to them.

3. Sometime in 1953, the Phil. Board of Liquidators with the approval of the President of the Philippines, bartered the two parcels of land in dispute with another piece of land owned by the late Carmen Planas.

4. 08 December 1964: The administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas sold the lots in question to private respondents, Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. The case was registered and TCT No. 87901 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Q.C. in the name of private respondents. Soon thereafter, the private respondents made demands upon the petitioners to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises. Petitioners refused, claiming that they had preferential rights to the property. Private respondents reacted by filing an ejectment proceeding in the City Court of Q.C.

5. 04 September 1968: Petitioners-appellants filed a petition entitled Declaratory Relief for Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction before the CFI Rizal, Branch XVII, claiming inter alia:

a. that they are the bona fide occupants of the lots in question, having, constructed thereon their respective resident substantial houses; and

b. that through the fraud and misrepresentation of the Respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros, Inc., in collusion with the Phil. Board of Liquidators, they were deprived of their preferential right to purchase said lots from the latter.

The petition sought the cancellation of the title of Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc., the reconveyance of the disputed lots in their favor, and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against further proceedings in the ejectment case filed by Respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros, Inc. against the Petitioners-appellants.

6. After their motion to dismiss was denied, respondent appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. filed its Answer to the petition, claiming as a special and affirmative defense the indefensibility of their title under the Land Registration Act, being purchasers for value and in good faith. Further, they reiterated the grounds of their motion to dismiss, among them that the present action is not the proper remedy.

7. Without going to trial, the case was submitted for decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The petitioners do not cite the provision of the law that prohibits the Alien Property Custodian from entering into a barter agreement with Carmen Planas. On the contrary, the Alien Property Custodian as the administrator of the alien property in question, with the consent of the Office of the President as in the instant case, has the full authority to enter into such a barter agreement with Carmen Planas. The fact that the present petitioners were relocated by the then City Mayor of Manila, Mayor Manuel dela Fuente with the consent of the City Mayor of Q.C., to the land in question, which was never owned by either City, did not confer on the petitioners any right over it.

8. The MFR was denied. Petitioners-appellants appealed to the CA claiming that the decision was contrary to law, jurisprudence, and the government policy of land for the landless. CA found that controversy hangers on WON respondent Phil. Board of Liquidators had a right to dispose alien-owned property under its administration and control by sale, barter or otherwise, and WON Petitioners-appellants' occupancy of the lots in question prior to their sale to private respondent conferred upon them a preferential right to purchase the same, and to that end, WON they are entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for. Being purely questions of law, elevated to SC.

ISSUE/S

1. WON petitioner-appellants have the preferential right

2. WON petitioner-appellants action for declaratory relief is proper

HELD/RATIO

1. NO. In the absence of proof of defect in the acquisition by Carmen Planas of, or proof of infirmity in her title to, the lots occupied by Petitioners-appellants, the validity of the contract of sale executed between the administrator of her estate and the Respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. cannot be questioned.

Pursuing further the contention of the Petitioners-appellants that they had the preferential right to buy the lots they occupied, the SC looked into the provisions of the law then in effect, R. A. 477, Sec. 1, effective 09 June 1950, and not R. A. 3348. The fact that the applications of the Petitioners-appellants to buy these parcels of land from the national government, thru the Board of Liquidators, had not been given due course by the latter no doubt shows that, as authorized under the above provision of law, the national government reserved these lots for its own use with no intention to subdivide them into convenient-sized lots to be awarded to bona fide occupants. That Petitioners-appellants paid nominal fees for the use of the lots is of little consequence, in the absence of positive proof that the fees were in consideration of any claim of priority rights. In fact, unrebutted testimony was presented appellants were considered squatters, not as bona fide occupants by the Board of Liquidators to the effect that petitioners occupants thereon. Their use and occupation of the land was merely tolerated by the national government, and could not have vested in them any claim, right, or adverse interest in such property.

2. NO. Declaratory relief is an action which any person interested under a deed will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

Petitioners-appellants brought this action with a claim that they were deprived of their preferential right to buy the disputed lots by virtue of a contract of sale involving said lots executed between the administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas and respondent Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. But it is evident from the records that from the date of their relocation to the disputed lots in 1950 to the date of the filing of this petition for declaratory relief, at no time did the Petitioners-appellants acquire any interest whatsoever in the parcels of land subject of the aforementioned contract of sale. They enjoyed no rights which were violated, or at the least, affected by the exchange of properties between the national government and the late Carmen Planas, and eventually, by the above contract of sale between the administrator of the estate of Carmen Planas and the Respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc.

The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions:

a. there must be a justifiable controversy;

b. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;

c. the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and

d. the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

All these requisite facts are not present; the complaint must, therefore, fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.

HABEAS CORPUS

MEJOFF vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy by the U. S. Army. and was handed to the Commonwealth Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. The People's Court ordered his release.

The deportation board, however, found that Mejoff had no travel documents. After the corresponding investigation, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948 declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.

The petitioner was taken to custody on March 18, 1948. In May, 1948, he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and in August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port but their masters refused to take petitioner and his companions alleging lack of authority to do so.

In October, 1948, after repeated failures to ship Mejoff abroad, the authorities transferred him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the time of filing of thie petition for habeas corpus.

Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be issued? No.

Ratio:

Temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned, and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

The record fails to show how long Mejoff has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does Mejoff indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. Unless it can be shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation, or unless the Government admits that itcan not deport him, or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period, the Court will not interfere.

In Borovsky vs Commissioner of Immigration, a delay of twenty months in carrying out an order of deportation has not been held sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. In view of the fact that Mejoff was arrested on March 1948 (16 months from the date of filing), the petition was demoed by the Court.

Dissenting: Perfecto, J. - To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from confinement. He has not been convicted for any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him no pretext to keep him imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag.

Co vs. Deportation Board supra

Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs Liwag supra

INJUNCTION AS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY

COLL. OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. REYES AND CTA Felix, J. | January 31, 1957

FACTS:

The Collector of Internal Revenue demanded from Aurelio P. Reyes (Reyes) payment of his alleged deficiency income taxes with the suggestion that the aforesaid tax liabilities be paid either to the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the City Treasurer of Manila.

Together with said letter of assessment, Reyes received a warrant of distraint and levy on his properties in the event that he should fail to pay

Since the Treasurer was instructed by the CIR to execute the warrant of distraint and levy on the amount demanded if the same is not settled, Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review of the Collector's assessment of his alleged deficiency income tax liabilities. This was followed by an urgent petition to restrain the CIR from executing the warrant of distraint and levy on the grounds that

The right to collect by summary proceedings the tax demanded had already prescribed pursuant to section 51 (d) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as his income tax had been filed more than three years ago

That a distraint and levy on his properties would work injustice to him.

That the requisite of RA No. 1125 for the filing of a bond or deposit before a writ of distraint and levy may be suspended is not applicable in this case.

The CIR opposed said petition on the ground that the CTA has no authority to restrain him from executing the warrant of distraint and levy.

The CTA ordered the CIR to desist from collecting by administrative method the taxes allegedly due from Reyes pending the outcome of his appeal.

NOTE: The warrant of distraint and levy was issued only 3 years, 5 months and 16 days after Reyes has filed his returns for the tax year 1950.

ISSUE:

WON the CTA can restrain the CIR from enforcing collection of income tax deficiency by summary proceedings after the expiration of the 3 year period provided for in the NIRC? YES

Granting that the Collector could be restrained, WON the CTA had any power to grant an injunction without requiring the filing of a bond as prescribed RA 1125? YES

RATIO:

The three year prescriptive period provided under Section 51 (d) of the NIRC constituted a limitation to the right of the Government to enforce the collection of income taxes by the summary proceedings of distraint and levy though it could proceed to recover the taxes due by the institution of the corresponding civil action

The CIR, however, relies on Section 305 of the NIRC which states that: No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax, fee, or charge.

Section 11 of RA 1125, however, provides, in part that: when in the opinion of the Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue . . . may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding may suspend said collection.

It can be inferred from then that there may be instances like the one at bar, when the CIR could be restrained from proceeding with the collection, levy, distraint and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer.

RE: THE BOND REQUIREMENT

The requirement of the bond as a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ of injunction applies only in cases where the processes by which the collection sought to be made by means thereof are carried out in consonance with the law for such cases provided and not when said processes are obviously in violation of the law to the extreme that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing the interests of the taxpayer. It is therefore premised on the assumption that the collection by summary proceedings is by itself in accordance with existing law; and then what is suspended is the act of collecting. IN THE CASE AT BAR what the CTAsuspended was the use of the method employed to verify the collection which was evidently illegal after the lapse of the three-year limitation period. The CTA issued the injunction in question on the basis of its finding that the means intended to be used by petitioner in the collection of the alleged deficiency taxes were in violation of law.

Assuming arguendo, however, that the posting of a Bond is necessary and Reyes refuses to comply, The pronouncement made by the respondent Court, after due hearing, to the effect that summary methods of collection by distraint and levy would be improper in the instant case, was done in the exercise of its power to pass judgment on all matters brought before it. It was a lawful exercise of the jurisdiction

PINEDA v LANTIN Regala, J. (1962)

FACTS:

Lacson and Lopez wrote a letter of complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), claiming that Bacolod-Murcia Milling through its President and General Manager J. Amado Araneta has committed various acts in violation of its Articles of Incorporation and pertinent provisions of the corporation code and the rules of the SEC.

Mariano Pineda was SEC Commissioner who ordered the investigation and designated Yabyabin and Pizarro as investigators.

Yabyabin and Pizarro subpoenaed Araneta and other officers of Bacolod-Murcia.

Bacolod-Murcia filed a Petition to Reconsider Order and Set Aside Subpoena Duces Tecum. Their theory is that since the SEC has not adopted the rules that allows them to subpoena, therefore such order was invalid.

PINEDA denied the petition.

Bacolod-Murcia and Araneta filed a Motion to Quash and Discontinue Entire Proceedings, also based on the allegedly illegal subpoena.

Again, PINEDA denied the motion

Bacolod-Murcia and Araneta now filed a special civil action for prohibition against Yabyabin and Pizarro, and enjoined Lacson and Lopez as respondents. It was docketed in the sala of Judge Gregorio Lantin.

Yabyabin and Pizarros Theory: The writ applied for would amount to a review, and would overturn the jurisdiction of the SEC, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI (SC dapat), so they filed a motion to dismiss.

LANTIN deferred Yabyabin and Pizarros motion to dismiss until trial on the merits.

Yabyabin and Pizarro filed an answer to the petition for prohibition.

PINEDA again raised the issue of jurisdiction and that it was beyond the authority of the Manila CFI to review the SEC. ( denied again by Judge LANTIN.

ISSUE:

May a Court of First Instance enjoin the Securities and Exchange Commission?

HELD/RULING:

NO. Under the Rules of Court and the law applicable to the case at bar, a CFI has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against the SEC. That power is lodged exclusively to the Supreme Court.

Whenever a party is aggrieved by the ruling of the SEC, his remedy is to go to the Supreme Court to petition for a review and not to seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction.

Only the Supreme Court possesses the jurisdiction to review or pass upon the legality or correctness of any order or decision of the SEC, and, as circumstances might warrant, to modify, reverse, or set aside the same.

Even with the private respondents theory that the principal purpose of the action is to question the jurisdiction of the SEC, the main aim of the petition for prohibition is still to order a review of the SEC.

The private respondents cannot also claim that the questioned orders were merely interlocutory, because the general rule is that interlocutory orders are not appealable.

The last ruling was about the SECs indispensable role to Philippine society as the safeguard agency for corporation which affects our economy and the countrys citizenry. The regular courts cannot overstep these objectives.

LEMI vs. VALENCIA | Castro, J. (1968)

FACTS

- RA 1553 authorized petitioner Lemi to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting and television station (Station DZQR). The Radio Control Office of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued to him a license. This license was effective for one year, that is, from May 24, 1960 to May 23, 1961.

- On April 12, 1961, Lemi applied for renewal of the license and paid the corresponding renewal license fee of P50. The Radio Control Office took no action on this renewal application. On May 31, 1962, he again applied for renewal of the license, to cover the period from May 24, 1962 to May 23, 1963, and again paid the corresponding renewal license fee. Again the Radio Control Office took no action thereon.

- He continued operating the radio station without any interference whatsoever from the office of the Public Works Secretary and the Radio Control Office. As a matter of fact, a letter of the chief even requested the licensee "to feature the many newly recorded Philippine Christmas songs."

- While the radio station DZQR was broadcasting, an agent of the Public Works Secretary, and a radio regulation inspector of the Radio Control Office, accompanied by agents of the PAGCOM, armed with a search warrant, searched the radio station and thereafter seized and carried away a radio transmitter which was being used at the time, on the pretext that it "was without any name plate or serial number and is entirely different from the authorized transmitter," in gross violation of the Radio Control Law.

- Lemi instituted the present original petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction.

- The Court issued a resolution commanding the respondents to return the radio transmitter, upon the filing of a bond of P1,000.

- Petitioner avers the ff. (among many others):

- The summary and unwarranted seizure of the transmitter "was a wanton and deliberate disregard" of the pertinent provisions of the Radio Control Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder providing for "due formal hearing before a seizure or closure";

- that the transmitter "was never illegally used as it was used with full knowledge and approval and consent of the respondents themselves ";

- and that the continued deprivation of the use of the transmitter during the pendency of the petition would work great injustice and irreparable damage and injury to him because he would then be prevented from fulfilling his contractual commitments with his numerous clientele.

- The petitioner further averred the chief radio inspector of the Radio Control Office, inspected the station and found the equipment and installations therein "in order and in compliance with the pertinent requirements of radio regulations, [and] recommended the issuance of a radio station license"; and that in spite of such recommendation, the respondents Public Works Secretary and Chief of the Radio Control Office, "with the evident purpose of prejudicing the operations of the herein petitioner, unlawfully neglected the performance of their duties by maliciously withholding the license for station DZQR already paid by the petitioner, although the law specifically enjoins issuance thereof as a ministerial duty after petitioner had complied with the requirements of the law and regulations."

- Respondents in their answer avers: that the radio transmitter was seized "by virtue of a valid search warrant after it was clearly established .. that the transmitter .. was illegally constructed and installed without any previous permit".

- The respondents further averred that the renewal application was filed only on May 15, 1962, in violation of Section 2 of Act 3846, as amended which provides that applications for renewal of radio licenses should be filed at least two months before the expiry dates of the licenses sought to be renewed.

- Respondents further maintained that the petitioner not having exhausted other available remedies in the ordinary course of law, namely, (1) a court action to quash the search warrant, and (2) an appeal to the respondent Secretary, the petition is prematurely filed.

- Court issued a resolution by virtue of which Court granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to return to the petitioner the radio transmitter.

ISSUE/S & HELD:

Is the petitioner entitled to the reliefs prayed for? YES.

RATIONALE

- Section 3 of Rule 65 of the new Rules of Court authorizes the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

- It is essential that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

- The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and specific. Mandamus will not issue in doubtful cases, as it simply commands the exercise of a power already possessed or to perform a duty already imposed. Mandamus will lie to compel action, or to remedy official inaction.

- Under Section 3 of the Radio Control Law, 7 the Public Works Secretary is empowered to regulate the establishment, use and operation of all radio stations and to issue such rules ad regulations as may be necessary.

- The exercise of the above-enumerated specific powers and duties involves judgment and discretion on the part of the Secretary.

- A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the impropriety of the act done.

- If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

- In the case at bar, the respondents Secretary and Chief of the Radio Control Office patently neglected the discharge of the duty, under Section 3(1), to "approve or disapprove" the petitioner's applications for renewal of the radio license.

- The respondents maintain, however, that the petitioner is not entitled to the renewal of his license, because the first renewal application was filed only on April 12, 1961, 41 days more or less before license expired.

- This violation ceased to exist when it was condoned by the fact of the previous non-observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations of the Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal.

- Petitioner had been allowed to operate his radio station for so long practically without any interference on the part of the Radio Control Office.

- The respondents further maintain that in the operation of radio station DZQR, the petitioner was using a transmitter different from the authorized one: Court resolved this issue in our resolution of February 28, 1963, by virtue of which we granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to return to the petitioner the radio transmitter.

- The use of the radio transmitter by the petitioner having been "known and - to a certain extent tolerated" by Radio Control Office, "the violation in legal effect, ceased to exist."

- The respondents finally maintain that the present petition is premature because the petitioner failed to exhaust available remedies on the administrative level. This contention is without merit. There is no statute providing for an appeal from an action taken by the Radio Control Office to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

- And even if an appeal there be to the respondent Secretary, this remedy is not such "adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" as would bar the present action for mandamus, for the acts committed by the respondents are "patently illegal" having been performed in violation of the Radio Control Law and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and the immediate return of the transmitter demanded "urgency of judicial intervention" as its seizure completely immobilized the radio station DZQR and prevented the petitioner from complying with his contractual commitments.

DISPOSITIVE: The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued is made permanent.

Honda vs. San Diego | Dizon

FACTS

Since the year 1959, respondent Alfred Hahn (Hahn) has been importing into the Philippines Honda motorcycles bearing the trademarks "HONDA", "HM" and "HM with wings", which trademarks are owned by Honda and duly registered in Japan and other countries.

However, on 13 December 1962, Hahn filed with the Philippine Patent Office a verified petition seeking the registration in his name of the trademark "HM HONDA".

Honda opposed said application alleging that it manufactured and sold in the Philippines and elsewhere motorcycles under the trademarks already mentioned even way back and continues to do so in the present.

After the hearings had already begun and after Hondas evidence had already been admitted, Hahn for the first time questioned the personality of Honda to appear before the Patent Office and asked orally that its opposition be dismissed.

The oral MTD was denied.

On February 14, 1964, however, Hahn filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that since Honda is not licensed to do business in the Philippines, the Patent Office could not be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of said oppositor.

On March 2, 1964 petitioner Director of Patents issued an order granting Hahn a period of 10 days within which to submit the necessary authorities and arguments in further support of his motion to dismiss.

However, instead of complying with the above order, Hahn filed a petition for certiorari with the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the order of the Patent Office denying his motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that registration with the Bureau of Commerce and a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission is sine qua non to have capacity to become a party "applicant or oppositor" to an inter partes proceeding in the Philippine Patent Office.

Honda, the Director of Patents, and the other petitioners herein filed their respective motions to dismiss.

Notwithstanding the MTDs, the TC granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed for the annulment of the orders of the TC.

ISSUES/HELD

Was is proper for the lower court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the Philippine Patent Office? NO.

RATIONALE

The petition must be granted because the TC had no jurisdiction to issue the orders complained of.

It is well-settled that a writ of injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former.

The law in this jurisdiction vests upon the SC, and not the lower courts, the authority to review final orders and decisions of the Public Service Commission.

In Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service Commission, it was also held that, in the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance to grant injunctive relief against orders of the Public Service Commission, it would appear that no court, other than the Supreme Court, possesses such jurisdiction.

It is also undeniable that the Philippine Patent Office and the Public Service Commission are similarly situated and that both are, to say the least, of the same rank or category as Courts of First Instance and, consequently, no one of the latter has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against them.

Furthermore, under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, appeals from orders and decisions of the Director of the Patent Office must likewise be taken to Us.

NOCNOC V. VERA J. Santos | February 27, 1979

Facts

September 19, 1972- petitioner-claimant filed a claim for compensation under Act 3842 (Workmens Compensation Act) with the Workmens Compensation Unit (WCU) for the death of his son, Norberto Nocnoc, who died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in the transportation business of private respondent, Ernesto Manarang.

March 7, 1973- after the period to controvert the claim expired, private respondent moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that petitioner had previously entered into an amicable settlement of the claim and that the petitioner-claimant had in fact received P2,330.

WCU denied the motion to dismiss, and instead awarded to petitioner-claimant the sum of P6,240, but deducted therefrom P2,330 which was deemed as advance and/or partial payment on the claim.

MFR by private respondent was denied. Upon the finality of the award, claimant-petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a writ of execution which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the resolution of the pending petition for certiorari is a prejudicial question.

The petition for review on certiorari was considered NOT FILED for failure of petitioner Manarang to pay docket and legal fees.

July 20, 1973- a writ of execution was issued by the WCU.

August 4, 1973- respondent filed a complaint for injunction with the CFI to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of execution so issued, upon his filing of a bond, to be fixed by the court.

August 7, 1973- respondent judge ordered defendants, WCU Chief Referee and the Provincial Sheriff to cease and desist from further orders.

Issue

WoN the CFI, as a court of general jurisdiction, can entertain a case impugning the validity of the award of the Workmens Compensation Unit and, in the process restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution issued by its Chief Referee. NO

Ratio

Respondent judges assertion of jurisdiction over private respondent Manarangs complaint for injunctionarising from proceedings before the Workmens Compensation Unit, on the ground that his court is one of general jurisdictionis contrary to his courts admitted lack of jurisdiction over Workmens Compensation cases.

In reviewing the alleged nullity of the award and enjoining its execution, respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over a matter which could have been elevated from the Workmens Compensation Unit to the Workmens Compensation Commission, and thereafter, on appeal, to the SC.

The decisions, orders and awards entered by the Workmens Compensation Commission are appealable to the SC. The CFI is not empowered or clothed with jurisdiction to modify, much less, annul an award or order of execution issued by the Workmens Compensation Commission.

The proper forum to thresh out the validity of the WCUs award is the Workmens Compensation Commission, and on appeal, the SC and not any other, much less respondents court.

Furthermore, since Manarang did not pursue the remedy of a petition for certiorari by seeking the reconsideration of the Courts resolution and/or paying the required fees, and instead, went to respondent Judges court and filed the complaint for injunction, he may be deemed to have abandoned the appropriate recourse of appeal to the Workmens Compensation Commission and to the SC.

The WCU correctly found that the claim was not controverted by private respondent within the period prescribed by the Workmens Compensation Act and the Commission Rules which require controversion of the claim within 14 days from the date of the disability or within 10 days after the employer or his representative first acquired knowledge of the disability resulting from the accident or illness.

After the failure to controvert, an employer cannot raise the question of being denied his day in court.

Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that the phrase court of general jurisdiction is merely descriptive of Courts of First Instance which have original jurisdiction over civil, criminal and other cases in contra-distinction to courts of special, limited jurisdiction.

The descriptive phrase, however, does not and cannot confer CFIs power to entertain an incident involving a Workmens Compensation case, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC), and of the SC, in case of an appeal.

THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION

DAUAN V. THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Facts

Serapio Dauan filed an application for a homestead of his land, but it is disputed whether the application was approved.

Subsequently, Dauan sold his rights to various portions of the homestead to Simon Ilarde, Lord Calangan, Basilia Tomas without securing the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

Dispute arose when Dauan asked the Bureau of Lands to cancel the application for free patents, which Ilarde, Calangan and Tomas applied for, pursuant to the alleged sale.

Dauan claimed that the transactions were loan agreements , and assuming that it was a sale, the same was void for having been made without the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Ilarde, Calangan and Tomas maintain that since the homestead application had not been approved, there was no need for the approval of the Secretary for the validity of the sales.

Director of LandsHeld that the transactions were valid sales as the homestead application has not been approved.

Dauan did not appeal to the President, instead filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya.

CFIHeld that even if the war caused the disappearance of the record, pertinent papers lead to the conclusion that Dauan is the holder of a perfected homestead, having remained in the possession for a period of more than 23 years; (2) free patenet applications of Ilarde, Calangan and Tomas are null and void for not having been previously approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

Issues/Held

[1] WoN the CFI erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari.NO. Conclusions drawn from facts are conclusions of law, which the courts may properly review.

Ilarde, Calangan and Tomas argue that the decision of the Director of Lands became final for failure of the appellee to appeal to the President, thus the petition for certiorari should not have been entertained.

[2] WoN the CFI correctly concluded that Dauans application for homestead was approved.YES.

Ratio

[1] Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari

The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies would require an appeal to be taken to the President before resort to the courts can be made.

BUT and exception to this rule would be where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.

The question whether from the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly be concluded that appellee's homestead application had been granted is a question of fact.

HOWEVER, because the records of the Bureau of Lands had been destroyed during the war that circumstantial evidence had to be introduced, there was a need for the court to draw a conclusion from the same.

The conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review.

[2] Approval of the Homestead Application

First, in 1936, one Teodocia Escobedo claimed the land in question and its improvements and contested appellee's application but the Director of Lands ruled that Dauan had been allowed to enter the land and that his application had been granted, since under section 13 of the Public Land Act entry is allowed only after the approval of the application.

Second, the documents entitled "Transfer of Homestead Rights," where Dauan transferred