AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013

COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMCRegional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia15 Jan, 2013

This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson.

Aim

• Understand current situation

• Discuss the way ahead – ISAF– NATO– Afghanistan, and for the Alliance

• Integrate observations (Security Force Advisor Team, Afghan National Police, 2010-11, Ghazni)

• Discussion – throughout – welcome your views

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3

Agenda

• Current Assessments• “How Insurgencies End”• Taliban status/motivations/objectives

• Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends

• NATO challenges• Options• Your Views

• Strategy / Policy Process overview• Cost• Current strategy crossroads• Requirements for success

I. Afghanistan

II. Operations

III. Strategy

IV. Way Ahead

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Area OverviewPashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan (heritage.org)

• Trends positive since 2011

• Still a major world supplier

• Major funding source for INS

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Indices- Afghanistan

• UN Human Development Index: – 172 of 187

• Transparency International Corruption Index– 180 out of 182

• Press Freedom: – 150 of 179

• Life Expectancy: – Men: 2004: 42 2010: 62– Women: 2004:42 2010: 64

• Inflation: 5% GDP: +5.5% • Phone ownership:

>45%

Right Direction?• Positive opinions relatively constant• Some recent higher negatives

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Stay or go?

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Number of Afghan Asylum Applications, 2011-2011

ISAF – Current Overview

• Stability– Several international agreements to support long-term results– May: US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement– May: Chicago summit, NATO/ISAF support through 2017– July: Tokyo summit, linking reforms in governance and rule-of-

law with sustained financial assistance through 2015– 87%of Afghans living in areas moving to ANSF control

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• Security– Blunted summer offensive– Continued ANSF transition to security lead– Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) up 1% Apr-Sept; shortened poppy

harvest– EIAs down 3% from Jan-Sept 2012 vs same in 2011– EIAs now outside populated areas; cities more secure– Insider attacks – growing trend – measures in place to control

ISAF MISSION

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• Mission: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

• ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency,

• support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),

• and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development

• in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

Governance

• Legitimacy and Effectiveness

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Violence

Time

High

Low

• Security forces• International• Domestic

• Governance • International• Domestic

Where is Afghanistan now?

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ISAF – as of 1 Jan 2013

Troop Strength:130,386

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PRTs – 1 Jan 2013

Process underway of handing over responsibilities to AFG organizations

ANSF Recruiting, Retention

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• Attrition remains

problematic•

Assessments of ANSF

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May 10

Aug10

Nov10

Feb11

Jun1

1Oct1

1Feb

120

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

UnassessedNewly EstablishedDevelopingEffective w/AssistanceEffective w/AdvisorsIndependent w/Advisors

ANA Kandaks

May 10

Jun1

0Aug

10Sep

10Nov

10Ja

n11

Feb11

Apr11

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

UnassessedNewly EstablishedDevelopingEffective w/AssistanceEffective w/AdvisorsIndependent

ANP Districts

May 10 Jun10 Aug10 Sep10 Nov10 Jan11 Feb11 Apr11.000

.500

1.000

1.500

2.000

2.500

3.000

3.500

4.000

4.500

Average (1-6 scale)

May 10

Jun1

0Aug

10Sep

10Nov

10Ja

n11

Feb11

Apr11

Jun1

1Aug

11Oct1

1Dec

11Feb

12.000

.500

1.000

1.500

2.000

2.500

3.000

3.500

4.000

4.500

5.000 Average (1-6 scale)

Evaluation Process - example

•Data (colored charts etc, e.g. CUAT) •In-person assessments

Regular Assessments:Key Terrain Districts and Add’l Interest DIstricts

Ajiristan

Transition to ANSF lead

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• Conventional Operations:• 90% partnered• 85% ANSF led

• SOF Operations:• 83% partnered • 83% ANSF led

Inteqal - Transition

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Tranche 1 Sept 2011

Tranche 2 Jan 2012

Tranche 3 May 2012

Tranche 4 Districts in 12 Provinces; 87% of AFG

Dec 2012

Tranche 5 Remainder – 100% of AFG

July 2013

Enemy-Initiated Attacks• Last 3 months: 13% lower than previous year• But…2012 still higher than 2009, pre-surge

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Executed IED attacks• IEDs- principal INS attack mode• 2012: 17% decrease over 2011

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Insider Attacks

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Attacks on ISAFPersonnel

Attacks on ANSFPersonnel

• Statistically - minor• Psychologically – major• Interaction altered; force

protection measures emplaced

• Reasons, ISAF investigation:• Infiltration (6%)• Co-option (14%)• Personal Motives (38%)• Unknown – INS related (4%)• Unknown – pending (38%)

Example – Khogyani District Ctr• 4 ‘sleepers’ infiltrated; took over station at night• Stole property, burned buildings, kidnapped 12• 10 tortured & killed; 2 escaped; Station later rebuilt

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Casualty Trends• 3256 total • 2010 – peak (711)• 2011 – 20%

decline• 2012 - 28%

decline• IEDs – biggest %• 2012 – trend lower

Source – iCasualties

Fatalities by Province

IED vs All Hostile Deaths

ISAF vs ANSF KIA

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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20120

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

ISAF-AllANSF-all

• 2012 ANSF data vary

Drone Strikes in Pakistan

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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 20130

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1 1 3 535 53

117

64 4670 0

200

31 4314 30

4 110 0

122

73

286

463

801

405

300

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StrikesCivINS

• N & S Waziristan• Haqqani Network• Taliban vs ‘good’

Taliban

Civilian Casualties• INS caused 94% of casualties, Nov 2012• ISAF caused Civ-Cas decreased 39% last 3 months

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• Khogyani District – INS haven, near Ghazni• ‘IED strasse’ – no movement, casualties• IEDs remained• Suspected INS detected; airstrike;

investigation• Barber, Bomber, or both? • Cultural ‘lenses’ help overcome blind spots

Cultural ‘lenses’ are important:Barber, Bomber, or both?

ISAF MISSION

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• Mission: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

• ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency,

• support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),

• and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development

• in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

Example - Stability Ops ‘Players’ and the ‘Game’

Regional Commander Regional Senior Civilian Rep (SFS)

COMISAF Ambassador

Commander POL MFA Rep (vacant)Task Force Staff US DOS rep

Regional Command

Task Force White Eagle

District Support Team State, USAID, USDA

Civilian Team LeadMilitary elements include security forces, ANSF mentors and civil affairs teams

DST Staff Commander

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COMIJC IPA Coord.

US CDR DOS rep DOS, USAID,

USDAPRT Mil

Staff

POL CDRPRT Mil

Staff

(1 est; 2 pending)

Agribusiness Development Team (Texas)

Rule of Law Attorney and

staff

OMLTs; POMLTs

STT / SFAs; LEPs; Legacy

Stab Ops

Joint; Interagency; Multi-national; Intergovernmental

Unity of Effort vs Unity of Command; Team Play

• ADT – Jangal Bagh farm• Major $500k project• Stalled w/o security OPs• Police resources strapped• Solution – OP for Ghazni ‘ring’ plus private security

• PRT – Road expansion• IEDs & threats stalled work• Contractor tried to hire own• CoP explained PD 62• Work continued w/approved

private security• Also Moqur & Qarabagh

Stability Ops ‘Players’ - Examples

American FootballPlay stops / startsRigidly defined positionsSeparate teams & phases offense / defense / etcMostly one-nation sport

Soccer / ‘Futbol’ / FootballPlay continuousRoles vs positionsSame team – lightning

transitions World sport

‘Futbol’ / soccer; not American football

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“How Insurgencies End”

• RAND study on 89 insurgencies• Not predictive; indicates • Some findings:

– 0 of 89 ended in unambiguous success– Insurgencies last on average 10 years—government

chances of “winning” increase over time– State sponsorship is critical—withdrawal usually leads to

crippling of insurgency– Government better off without external intervention/support– Attacks on civilians eventually backfire– “Anocracies” don’t often succeed (15%)– Tipping points—desertions, defections, infiltrations, civilian

reporting

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Status of Taliban

• Largest of 8 insurgent factions• Well resourced -- much by Pakistan’s ISI• Sanctuary in Pakistan for command, logistics, planning,

training, recruitment, treatment, recuperation• Many unhappy with ISI influence over movement• Older leaders being replaced by younger more militant • Believe cause is just; some uneasy about certain tactics• Locals provide food and shelter – thru fear or support• Support more a function of government weakness,

corruption, predatory behavior• Peace initiatives?

* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

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Agenda

• Current Assessments• “How Insurgencies End”• Taliban status/motivations/objectives

• Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends

• NATO challenges• Options• Your Views

• Strategy / Policy Process overview• Cost• Current strategy crossroads• Requirements for success

I. Afghanistan

II. Operations

III. Strategy

IV. Way Ahead

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Strategy/Policy Process

• Strategy – ends+ways+means– What is to be done? (ends)– How will it be done? (ways)– What resources? (means)

• Premises– Proactive– Must know end state

• “If you don’t know where you’re going…”

– Balance ends-ways-means– Risk introduced when out of balance– Policy gives end state – Clausewitz– Hierarchical… National -> military -> theater…

• Where does Alliance policy fit in? – Comprehensive; Based on thorough analysis

From H. Richard Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy”, US Army War College, Sept 2005.

+ Process – complex in democracies+ Alliances – complexity multiplied

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Taliban Motivations

• Multiple and variable by individual• Five main clusters of motivations

– Retaliation for perceived military aggression by foreign forces

– Resistance to perceived invading infidel forces that threaten Afghan and Islamic values and culture

– Resistance to officials regarded as dishonest, corrupt, and unjust who benefit from impunity

– Exclusion from power or resources– Social and economic security for poor (possibly motivation

for over half the insurgent fighters)• Also expediency (coercion or intimidation) or

opportunists (criminal purposes)

* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

Example - Defections• Sept 2010 – 4 from Moqur; feigned illness, left

with police ranger, weapons

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Taliban Objectives

• Withdrawal of foreign troops• Establishment of Sharia Law

– Enforcement of law and order– Harsh punishments– Change constitution (but not saying how)– Honest government– Resist immoral western practices specifically related to

women• Force hijab wear• Separation of men and women, limit girls’ education and

women’s jobs, movement, and freedom

* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”

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Current NATO StrategyEnd state: • Extremism and terrorism no longer a threat to stability; • ANSF self-sufficient; Afghan government extends good governance,

reconstruction, and development to benefit all its citizens • (NATO—3 Oct 08 – reaffirmed in subsequent summits)

Ways / Lines of Effort: • Train and develop ANSF & security institution building• Help strengthen Afghan institutions to establish rule of law, protect

human rights, and promote shared values• Assist Afghan-led counter-drug efforts• Improve unity of effort• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)• Deepen engagement with Pakistan

Way Ahead post 2014? • ? ? ?

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Current US Options

• Key issue: Immunity for US troops, or else withdrawal

• If forces remain, options discussed (LWJ, 10 Jan 2013) – 6,000: CT, one base, limited training / logistical support for ANSF– 10,000: + limited training, JTAC. Similar to 2003-2004.– 20,000: + second base, QRF for ANSF, limited patrolling

• Reported Administration options (with immunity):– 2,500-9,000

Cost

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• US cumulative total thru 2012: $557.1B

• Significant for EU, other NATO

Debt

• Current GDP (Dec 2012): $15.903 trillion• Debt-GDP ratio: 103%

“The most significant threat to our national security is our debt."

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff27 Aug, 2010

US Defense Spending - % of GDP• Prior to 1940, 1-2 % except

in war

• Since 1945, higher share of GDP sustained

• Corresponds to ‘Pax Americana’

US Defense Spending- real terms

• Projection: around $500b• Various

scenarios lower

Korean war Viet Nam

war

ReaganBuild-up

Post 9-11, Iraq, AFG

When Spending Exceeds Revenue

• US entitlement spending and debt interest threaten this

Source: http://www.gao.gov

• Gov’t spending can aid productivity

• Other factors: interest rates, reserve currency role

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Requirements for success

• Afghans in the lead to secure their future• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) providing

security as professional, respected force of ANA, ANP, and local police

• Rule of law at local level• Corruption diminished• No safe haven in Pakistan• Reintegration/reconciliation• Regional cooperation

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Current Situation

• NATO / ISAF

• Pakistan

• Afghanistan

Politics in Afghanistan

Politics: who gets what, when, how.

Frequent question – for public or private benefit? Must address.

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NATO challenges

• Domestic politics – where does AFG fit?

• Is nation-building something NATO can / should do?

• How will AFG influence NATO’s future?

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Options

• Long term commitment to partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan for stability in region?– At what cost in blood and treasure?– Democratic support

• “Balkanization” with small CT focused force– At what cost and consequences?

• Larger training force

• Negotiate with Taliban?– Timing?

Governance

• Legitimacy and Effectiveness

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Violence

Time

High

Low

• Security forces• International• Domestic

• Governance • International• Domestic

Where is Afghanistan now?

Leadership

The right Afghan leaders are the key to the future.

AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013Thanks for your attention – welcome

your thoughts & questions

COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMCRegional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia15 Jan, 2013

This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson.