Trans-Atlantic Security:

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection

Threat Assessment for the “Mobilizing NATO for Afghanistan and Pakistan” Initiative

Jeffrey Thomas, Senior Fellow Updated: February 2012

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY & CONGRESS

CONTENTS

AFGHANISTAN AND THE BIRTH OF GLOBAL JIHAD 1 Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihadist Movement The Al-Qaeda – Taliban Alliance

PAKISTAN AND GLOBAL JIHAD AFTER 9/11 3 Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Exodus to Pakistan The New Training Ground for Global Jihad

AL-QAEDA ALLIES IN PAKISTAN 5 The Taliban Relocates to Pakistan Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (“Movement of Holy Warriors”)

Jaish-e-Muhammad (“Army of the Prophet Muhammad”)

Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Righteous”)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“Taliban Movement of Pakistan”)

TARGETING EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 14 The Threat to Europe The Threat to North America

CONCLUSION 24

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Trans-Atlantic Security: The Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection

Neither international terrorism nor religious extremism is a recent development in world affairs. However, their convergence to form an ideology and strategy targeting the West is a phenomenon that dates back only two decades, with the emergence of global jihadism in the 1990s. With antecedents in the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s (and even earlier in anti-colonialist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries), this phenomenon transformed the international security environment and defined the first major threat to homeland security in America and Europe after the Cold War. Global jihadism is not specific to South Asia, and its chief ideologists and strategists are not originally from the region, but events in Afghanistan and Pakistan gave rise to the global jihadist movement and remain driving forces behind anti-Western Islamist terrorism today. The death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 may alter these circumstances. Moreover, the Arab Spring may presage a decline in the ideology and the appeal of global jihadism. But Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a nexus for transnational terrorist networks motivated by militant Islam.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE BIRTH OF GLOBAL JIHAD Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihadist Movement Throughout most of the 20th century, Islamist activism—peaceful and militant variants alike—focused on bringing about social-political change in the Muslim world. In most cases, Islamist political activists and militants were preoccupied with casting off colonial rule or overthrowing secular governments in their own countries. This focus on internal revolution kept militant Islam confined largely to the Muslim world. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 added a broader international dimension to political Islam. Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam and his former student, Osama bin Laden, created Maktab al-Khidamat (the “Services Bureau”) to help finance and supply the Afghan resistance. This organization also served as a recruiting tool that attracted Muslim volunteers from around the world to fight against the Soviet occupation. These efforts helped mobilize a pan-Islamic movement, based on the concept of “defensive jihad,” which united Muslims across national and ethnic divides to defend fellow Muslims.1 Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, many non-Afghan resistance fighters returned to their countries of origin to fight for the creation of Islamic states. Others, emboldened by victory in Afghanistan and instilled with a transnational outlook, went to Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, and elsewhere to help Muslim populations fighting against non-Muslim forces. To support the continuation and expansion of jihadist activities, Osama bin Laden and his associates established al-Qaeda (“the Base” or “the Foundation”).2

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As the international scope of Islamist militancy expanded, Osama bin Laden and like-minded militants began advocating a shift in focus toward the West, or the “Far Enemy.” While retaining the goal of establishing theocratic rule in Muslim lands, advocates of this view pressed their belief that Western powers were oppressing Muslims around the world, with the assistance of apostate regimes in many predominantly Muslim countries. To repulse this perceived threat, they called for a “global jihad” against Western interests around the world, including targets within Europe and North America. They also placed an emphasis on mass-casualty terrorist attacks and the use of suicide bombings against civilians in what they perceived as a global conflict that extended beyond traditional Muslim lands.3 For Osama bin Laden, this strategic shift in focus occurred in 1990, when the United States led an international coalition to repulse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and prevent an Iraqi military incursion into Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, who had approached the Saudi royal family and offered to raise an all-Muslim force of mujahideen to repel the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s military, was enraged by the presence of infidel soldiers in the land of Mecca and Medina, the birth place of Islam.4 Throughout the 1990s, his advocacy of anti-Western jihad, suffused with selective interpretations of Islamic law and tradition, abetted the rise of what became a diverse and widely dispersed “global jihadist movement.” Although rejected by most Muslims—including most Islamist militants, the majority of whom remained focused first and foremost on overthrowing secular regimes at home—this amorphous movement appealed to fringe elements that wanted to punish the West for its perceived unjust treatment of Muslims worldwide. Global jihadism is comparable to—and has been described as a part of—the broader anti-globalization movement, which sparks frequent protests and occasional violence.5 In recognition of al-Qaeda's dominant role in the rise of this transnational movement, former CIA analyst Marc Sageman has suggested that it be called "the al-Qaeda Social Movement."6 In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a declaration of war against the United States and called on Muslims to drive Americans and their allies from the Arabian Peninsula.7 He expanded this mission in a more ambitious declaration issued in February 1998. This declaration, made in the name of the World Islamic Front against the Crusaders and the Jews, stated:

The ruling to kill Americans and their allies—whether civilians or military—is incumbent upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him. . . We also call upon Muslim religious scholars, leaders, youth, and soldiers to attack the American devil and those allies of Satan who have aligned themselves with [America].8

Islamist terrorism against the West spiked following this declaration. Al-Qaeda initiated this rise in violence with simultaneous suicide bombings against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring 5000.9   Over the next three years, al-Qaeda and allied militants launched operations across Europe, North America, and around the world, culminating on September 11, 2001 in the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history. The Al-Qaeda – Taliban Alliance A critical element in al-Qaeda’s rise as a global terrorist organization was its alliance with the Taliban. In 1990 and 1991, Osama bin Laden relocated his principal base of operation to Sudan

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at the invitation of the ruling National Islamic Front. From this base in Africa, he formed alliances with Islamist insurgencies and terrorist groups around the world, from Europe to Southeast Asia. However, under international pressure to end support of terrorist organizations, the Sudanese government forced him and his lieutenants to leave the country in 1996. In May of that year, Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, where he formed a cooperative relationship with the Taliban. The Taliban (“Seekers” or “Students”) emerged during the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s as a loose amalgam of Islamist militants, most of whom were affiliated with a network of madrassahs located across Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. By 1994, this collection of militants had coalesced into a cohesive movement under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Under Omar’s direction, the Taliban movement was dedicated to enforcing a harsh version of shari’ah (“Islamic law”) and imposing order on Afghan society, which had descended into civil war after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. In September 1996, four months after Osama bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan, the Taliban captured Kabul and overthrew the government of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Taliban later declared the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with Kandahar as its capital.10 As the Taliban continued its efforts to consolidate control over the country, Osama bin Laden recognized Mohammad Omar as Amir al-Mu’minin (“Commander of the Faithful”). This relationship benefited both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Osama bin Laden contributed several hundred foreign mujahideen to participate in Taliban offensives against the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s principal rival for control over Afghanistan.11 In September 2001, just two days before the attacks of 9/11, al-Qaeda orchestrated the assassination, via suicide bombing, of Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud.12 Al-Qaeda, in returned, gained a secure sanctuary, which allowed the organization to establish a network of training camps to indoctrinate and train terrorists and insurgents from around the world. Al-Qaeda members traveled freely throughout Afghanistan, entered and exited the country at will, imported vehicles and weapons, and used the Afghan state-owned Ariana Airlines to courier money into the country. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, from 1996 through September 2001, between 10,000 and 20,000 foreign militants trained in Afghan camps supported by Osama bin Laden.13

PAKISTAN AND GLOBAL JIHAD AFTER 9/11

Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Exodus to Pakistan The Afghanistan-Pakistan border, more than 1600 miles long, stretches almost the entire length of Afghanistan and about two-thirds the length of Pakistan, from northeast to southwest. A remnant of the region’s colonial past, this border was drawn up in 1893 to demarcate a buffer zone between British-controlled India and the Russian Empire by British statesman Mortimer Durand (hence the border’s popular designation, the Durand Line).14 Like many colonial-era borders, the Durand Line does not account for traditional boundaries. As a result, the modern Afghanistan-Pakistan border arbitrarily divides ethnic groups and tribes.

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Most importantly, the ethnic Pashtun population is split, with approximately 14 million Pashtuns on the Afghan side and approximately 27 million on the Pakistani side. The ethnic Baloch are also divided by the border, with about 700,000 in Afghanistan and about 6 million in Pakistan.15 Local populations on both sides of the border generally ignore the Durand Line. Family members and members of the same tribe frequently cross back and forth without regard to national citizenship. The enormity of the territory, the hostile natural landscape, and the local people’s often-uncompromising dedication to autonomy deter effective policing of the border. Additionally, since 1947, consecutive Afghan governments have claimed territory on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line and have refused to recognize it as the legal border.16 Pakistan’s tribal belt is located along the Durand Line and stretches across Pakistani territory for roughly 175,000 square miles. This territory is divided into three administrative regions:

• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the Northwest Frontier Province), located in Pakistan’s north, is home to almost 20 million inhabitants (mostly ethnic Pashtun). The province includes the city of Peshawar and the Swat Valley.17

• The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), with a population of 4 million people

(predominantly Pashtun), exercise substantial legal autonomy from federal authorities. The area is divided administratively into seven tribal regions (or “agencies”):18

Khyber Mohmand North Waziristan

Durran Bajaur South Waziristan

Oraksai • Balochistan Province, located in the southwest, is geographically the largest of Pakistan’s

provinces, but is sparsely populated with about 8 million inhabitants, mainly Baloch and Pashtun. In addition to its border with Afghanistan, Balochistan shares a roughly 500-mile-long border with Iran.19

Across much of this frontier region, Pakistan’s federal government exercises limited power. From 2004 to 2006, following clashes between local militants and the Pakistani Army, federal authorities negotiated a series of truces granting substantial autonomy to tribal leaders in North and South Waziristan.20 In 2009, a similar agreement in the Swat Valley granted Islamist militants the authority to impose shari’ah across the valley.21 Each of these agreements later collapsed, leaving the Pakistani military with the task of imposing a degree of order in areas with a tradition of hostility to outside interference.22 The poorly monitored Afghanistan-Pakistan border, leading into Pakistan’s tribal belt, provided both al-Qaeda and the Taliban an obvious escape route from Afghanistan after 9/11. Al-Qaeda members and their families crossed into Pakistan in successive waves in late 2001 and early 2002, first establishing a base of operations in South Waziristan, then expanding to other tribal regions.23 By 2005, al-Qaeda had set up bases throughout the FATA—especially in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, and Bajaur—and in adjoining areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (renamed

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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010). Some senior al-Qaeda leaders took refuge in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, where the Taliban leadership established its post-9/11 headquarters.24 The New Training Ground for Global Jihad Secure and isolated locations provide terrorist organizations with space and seclusion to turn new recruits into terrorists. Hands-on training—in surveillance, bomb-making, use of firearms, logistics—increases the ability of individuals to execute complex operations. Isolating recruits from external information allows militant leaders to facilitate socialization and indoctrination of new members through unchallenged ideological peer pressure. Secluded training grounds also provide an environment for acculturating recruits to violence, an important step in overcoming inhibitions against committing acts of indiscriminate murder.25 During the late 1990s, Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan served as ideal locations for training camps operated by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The result was a large international network of trained terrorists, comprising al-Qaeda cells, militant groups linked to al-Qaeda, and autonomous groups and individuals participating independently in the global jihadist movement. International intervention after 9/11 eradicated the large terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. However, since regrouping in the Pakistani tribal belt, al-Qaeda and allied militant groups have established new training grounds and produced hundreds of trained terrorists. Alain Grignard, director of counterterrorism for Belgium’s Federal Police, recently pointed out that the region had become the destination of choice for extremists seeking militant training. In 2009, he stated, “Not since the year before 9/11 have we seen as many people travel towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict region”26 American al-Qaeda operative David Headley corroborated this assessment. In an e-mail message sent before his arrest in 2009, he wrote, “Just walk around the bazaar in Miram Shah (the local capital of Pakistan’s North Waziristan region]. This bazaar is bustling with Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Russians, Bosnians, some from EU countries, and of course our Arab brothers.”27

AL-QAEDA ALLIES IN PAKISTAN As al-Qaeda expanded its presence into Pakistan’s tribal belt, militant groups in the region increasingly became active supporters of al-Qaeda’s global agenda. Some groups in the region had long associated themselves ideologically with anti-Western militant Islam. Dating back to the early 1980s, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan encouraged the expansion in Pakistan of radical clerics and madrassahs, militant training camps, and pro-militant sympathies among some elements of the population. The rise of the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the mid-1990s exacerbated this trend.28 The expansion of al-Qaeda’s presence in Pakistan after 9/11 further heightened pro-militant sentiments and facilitated closer cooperation between al-Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups. The operations—and even membership—of different terrorist organizations in the region soon overlapped, with groups sharing resources and training facilities, adopting common agendas, and

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cooperating in striking targets.29 Some indigenous groups also began launching terrorist plots in Europe and the United States, far outside their traditional area of operation.30 The Taliban Relocates to Pakistan The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 forced the Taliban leadership to flee across the border into Pakistan with their al-Qaeda allies. In the winter of 2001-2002, thousands of Taliban fighters crossed the border into Balochistan, where many of them had grown up in Afghan refugee camps during the Soviet-Afghan war. Mohammad Omar and his senior lieutenants established a new base of operations in the city of Quetta, Balochistan's provincial capital, and formed a consultative council (the Quetta Shura) to coordinate insurgent activities in Afghanistan. 31 The Quetta Shura Taliban (or the Afghan Taliban, as this group is sometimes called), is the central organizing force behind the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network, based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan region, is active across eastern Afghanistan, including Kabul Province. The group's nominal leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, once served as commander-in-chief of the Taliban's armed forces in Afghanistan. He and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is in charge of the organization’s day-to-day operations, reorganized Taliban forces in southeastern Afghanistan after being expelled by U.S.-led forces. Both men are loyal to Mohammad Omar and the Quetta Shura.32 Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HeI-Gulbuddin), named after its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, formed from a splinter faction of Afghanistan's Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) in 1979. This group became one of the main mujahideen factions resisting Soviet occupation during the 1980s. Following the Soviet withdrawal, HeI-Gulbuddin fought against the Taliban during the Afghan civil war. Gulbuddin Hekmaytar fled to Iran in 1997 as the Taliban consolidated its rule across much of Afghanistan. After 9/11, he settled in Peshawar, in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, and allied his forces with the Quetta Shura Taliban.33 These three groups—the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the HeI-Gulbuddin—constitute the backbone of the Afghan insurgency today and are often loosely referred to as the “Taliban.” They do not share a formal command-and-control structure, but they coordinate activities aimed at overthrowing the post-Taliban Afghan regime and expelling foreign forces.34 The Taliban employs a combination of guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks to destabilize the country. Along with attacks on Afghan military and international security forces, the Taliban strikes civilian targets, including government officials and civil servants, Members of Parliament, tribal leaders, moderate imams, teachers, and even school children.35 In November 2008, an acid attack on students and teachers at a girls’ school near Kandahar maimed several girls.36 The Taliban has also attacked foreign civilians in Afghanistan, especially foreign diplomats, NGO and U.N. workers, mine removal teams, and construction crews working on roads and infrastructure projects.37 A disturbing development, which may be indicative of al-Qaeda’s influence on the Taliban’s operations, is the rise in suicide bombings in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s assassination of Northern Alliance commander Massoud in 2001 was Afghanistan’s first suicide bombing. The next two

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suicide bombings occurred in 2003, followed by three in 2004. The next year, as the Taliban expanded the use of this tactic, suicide bombings began an exponential progression: 17 attacks in 2005, 123 attacks in 2006, 160 attacks in 2007. Suicide attacks most often target Afghan and international security forces, but also strike civilian targets and include mass-casualty attacks in mosques, public gatherings, and urban centers. Civilian bystanders account for the large majority of casualties from suicide attacks.38 To date, Afghan Taliban attacks on the West have been confined to Afghanistan. Some Taliban commanders have stated their intention to strike targets abroad. In June 2007, a Pakistani journalist filmed a Taliban graduation ceremony for suicide bombers who were supposedly trained for missions in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Taliban commander Mansur Dadullah, who chaired the ceremony, threatened to unleash a wave of suicide attacks against the West and asked why the Taliban should wait for the West to come to Afghanistan, when Afghans could take the war to the enemy.39 Such attacks from the Afghan Taliban have not yet materialized. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan emerged in the late 1990s as a coalition of Islamist militants operating in Central Asia. The movement originally focused on establishing its version of shari’ah rule in the Ferghana Valley, which encompasses a large segment of Uzbekistan and smaller parts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. At the end of the 1990s and throughout the next decade, the IMU adopted a broader agenda as it became increasingly intertwined with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The network of militants that would coalesce into the IMU began to take shape during the post-Soviet Islamic revival. As Soviet central authority weakened and eventually collapsed in 1991, the Islamist-oriented Adolat (“Justice”) Party seized control of Namangan, a city in the Ferghana Valley, and enforced Islamic practices on its residents. Uzbek authorities retook control of the city in March 1992, forcing Adolat’s leaders—Jumaboi Khojaev (popularly known as Juma Namangani) and Tahir Yuldashev—to flee to neighboring Tajikistan. Namangani remained in Tajikistan, where he fought alongside fellow Islamists in the Tajik civil war (1992-1997). Yuldashev traveled throughout the region and the Middle East, eventually settling in Kabul in a house provided to him by the Taliban. In summer 1998, Namagani and Yuldashev met in Kabul to announce the formation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.40 In February 1999, in a terrorist attack widely attributed to the IMU, a series of car bombs in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent killed several people and injured more than 100. In the summer of 1999, the IMU issued a call for jihad against the regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, as well as against neighboring Kyrgyzstan (for its supposed persecution of ethnic Uzbeks), and declared its intent to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley. The IMU also conducted a series of raids from bases in Tajikistan into neighboring Kyrgyzstan, kidnapping government officials and several foreign mountain climbers for ransom.41 In November 1999, under pressure from the Tajik government and Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors, several hundred IMU militants relocated to the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. During the next several months, both Namangani and Yuldashev met with Mohammad Omar and

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Osama bin Laden in Kandahar to plan military operations, logistics, and funding. This support aided the IMU as it conducted raids into the Ferghana Valley in the summers of 2000 and 2001.42 At the same time, the IMU became increasingly integrated with the Taliban. Throughout 1999 and 2000, the movement accepted Uighur and Pakistani recruits whom the Taliban transferred to IMU training camps (a tactic that allowed the Taliban to avoid the appearance of hosting terrorists operating against the Chinese or Pakistani governments). In summer 2000, the IMU began participating in Taliban offensives against the Northern Alliance, contributing hundreds of fighters to the Taliban ranks. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Namangani led a force of IMU militants to resist the U.S.-led advance into northern Afghan city of Kunduz.43 During U.S.-led military operations against the Taliban, the IMU suffered substantial casualties, including the death of Juma Namangani. When the Taliban regime collapsed, IMU militants dispersed throughout the region, eventually regrouping under the leadership of Yuldashev in Pakistan’s South Waziristan region. From this new base of operation, the IMU resumed terrorist attacks in Central Asia, including mass-casualty bombings and guerrilla raids.44 Alongside its revived campaign in the Central Asia, the IMU continued to adopt a broader regional agenda. In alliance with local Pakistani militants, the IMU began participating in attacks against Pakistan’s military in 2007.45 In Afghanistan, IMU militants resumed coordinating with the Taliban in attacks on U.S. and international forces, sending hundreds of fighters from Pakistan and Central Asia into the country.46 In 2003, the IMU attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy and a hotel in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. Kyrgyz authorities disrupted the plot before it could be launched.47 In January 2010, in defiance of reports that he had been killed months earlier in a missile strike from a U.S. aerial drone, Yuldashev appeared in a new online video. The IMU leader affirmed his movement’s broadened focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan and committed the IMU (at least rhetorically) to a global jihadist agenda, stating:

We must rid the world of infidels. There are no limits for us. Our goal is to take over not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the whole world and to re-establish a caliphate as Allah commanded.48

Despite these claims, the IMU has not demonstrated an ability to reach targets outside of South and Central Asia, focusing instead on Western and other targets in the region. However, it has attempted to establish a presence in Europe. In May 2008, a joint European operation led to the detention of nine people—seven in France, one in Germany, and one in the Netherlands—suspected of setting up a financing network for the IMU.49 The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) reported that the suspect detained in the Netherlands was an IMU operative in direct contact with the movement’s leadership in Pakistan.50 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) The Islamic Jihad Union formed in 2002 from a splinter faction of the IMU. Like its parent organization, the IJU is closely allied to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and has focused principally on

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insurgent and terrorist operations in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. However, the IJU has succeeded in setting up operations beyond the region, especially in Europe. Following the IMU’s expulsion from Afghanistan by U.S. and allied forces, Najmiddin Jalolov led a breakaway faction of the IMU to the town of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, where he founded the Islamic Jihad Group (renamed the Islamic Jihad Union in May 2005.)51 This new group conducted its first operations in 2004, launching a series of suicide bombings (the first ever in Central Asia) and guerrilla assaults in Uzbekistan. Targets included a popular bazaar, the Prosecutor-General’s office, and the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent.52 The IJU claimed that the attacks “were an answer to the injustice of the apostate government [of Uzbekistan] and an expression of support for the jihad of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Hijaz [the coastal region of western Saudi Arabia that encompasses Mecca and Medina] and other Muslim lands.”53 The IJU’s attacks in Uzbekistan and its denunciation of the Uzbek regime demonstrated its dedication to violent social change in Central Asia, the original cause of its parent organization. At the same time, its early adoption of mass-casualty suicide bombings against Western embassies and its rhetorical embrace of pan-Islamic causes signaled its identification with the global jihadist agenda. Until his death in a missile strike from a U.S. aerial drone in January 2008, Abu Laith al-Libi, one of Osama bin Laden’s top field commanders, appears to have served as al-Qaeda’s liaison to the IJU.54 In 2006, members of an IJU cell were arrested while attempting to carry out multiple bombings in Islamabad. In late 2007, the IJU joined militants in Pakistan’s Swat valley to fight against Pakistani forces and, in March 2008, the group issued a statement pledging revenge for the Pakistani army’s storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad the previous year.55 Also in 2008, the IJU conducted a series of suicide bombings against international forces in Afghanistan, including a suicide attack by Cüneyt Ciftcihe, a German resident of Turkish origin, on an American outpost.56 As it intensified operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the IJU also established a presence in Europe. In September 2007, German police arrested three German citizens (members of the IJU’s “Sauerland Cell”) for plotting to bomb American and other targets in Germany.57 The following year, IJU’s media arm, Badr al-Tawhid (the “Full Moon of Monotheism”) released a series of propaganda videos online. One video showed the training of suicide bomber Cüneyt Ciftci. Another featured Eric Breiniger, a German convert to Islam, who called for Muslims living in Germany to join the jihad against the West.58 In February 2010, German police arrested the wife of Fritz Gelowicz, leader of the Sauerland Cell, on suspicion of fundraising for the IJU.59 In addition, German authorities claim to have identified at least a dozen German citizens and permanent residents who have joined the IJU.60 Signs have emerged that the IJU is also active in Turkey. In 2007, a fourth member of the IJU’s Sauerland Cell was apprehended in Turkey and extradited to Germany.61 In June of the following year, a Turkish national named Hasan Alpfidan, operating for the IJU, conducted a suicide bombing against the Afghan intelligence service in Khost province.62 In April 2009, Turkish authorities seized weapons and detained extremists with ties to the IJU.63

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The IJU has not yet succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack against Western targets outside of Central and South Asia. Jalolov’s death in September 2009, due to a missile strike from a U.S. aerial drone operating over North Waziristan, may have disrupted IJU operations for a period.64 However, the group’s successful outreach and recruitment operations in Turkey and Germany (which has a Turkish community of more than four million) have given the IJU a link to Europe and a potential means of targeting Western nations. Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (“Movement of Holy Warriors”) Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) emerged in 1985 to participate in the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan. After the Soviets withdrew, HuM remained close to al-Qaeda. It operated several terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until U.S. air strikes destroyed them in 2001, and many Afghan and Arab veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war remain members of HuM. In 1998, HuM’s leader, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, signed Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States and its Western allies, issued in the name of the World Islamic Front.65

Throughout the 1990s, HuM participated in anti-Western violence through attacks against American and European targets in South Asia. In 1994, a plot by HuM militants to kidnap Western tourists in India and exchange them for imprisoned comrades ended in failure when Indian authorities captured the kidnappers and freed their hostages. A second HuM operation to kidnap Western tourists the following year resulted in the murder of all five kidnap victims.66 HuM and affiliated militants are also suspected of assassinating six Americans in Karachi: two U.S. diplomats in 1995 and four American oil workers in 1997.67 HuM militants also target India and participate in the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir, with the goal of expelling Indian forces and establishing Islamic rule under Pakistan’s administration. In December 1999, HuM militants hijacked an Indian passenger plane and demanded the release from prison of high-ranking HuM members in exchange for 155 hostages. India complied with the HuM demands.68 Since 9/11, HuM has focused primarily on attacks against Indian security forces in Kashmir, while also providing sanctuary and support for al-Qaeda in Pakistan. During the May 2011 Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, U.S. forces discovered a cell phone that belonged to the al-Qaeda leader’s courier. The cell phone contained contact information for HuM, which uses Abbottabad as a recruitment base and a transit point for militants traveling to Kashmir. HuM is believed to maintain active training camps in nearby Mansehra.69 Jaish-e-Muhammad (“Army of the Prophet Muhammad”) In February 2000, a splinter faction of HuM established a new group, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), possibly to exercise greater independence from the Pakistani military. This new organization opened a campaign of violence against India with a series of suicide bombings. In April 2000, JeM carried out the first ever suicide bombing in Kashmir, targeting an Indian army barracks.70 The following year, JeM conducted several suicide car bombings in Kashmir, including the bombing of the regional legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 38 people.71 In 2006, JeM claimed responsibility for a second wave of bombings in Kashmir.72

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JeM has also attacked India beyond the borders of Kashmir. In December 2001, JeM militants participated in a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi that killed fifteen people.73 The following year, Indian police arrested three JeM operatives for plotting to kidnap Rahul Gandhi, a Member of Parliament and son of National Congress Party leader Sonia Gandhi.74 In contrast to HuM, factions within JeM have launched attacks against Pakistani targets (not just against Westerners in the country), indicating a willingness to challenge the Pakistani government. In 2002, JeM engaged in sectarian (anti-Christian) violence, attacking a school, a hospital, and other civilian targets in Islamabad and two other cities. That same year, Osama bin Laden issued a statement calling on his “Pakistani Muslim brothers . . . to get rid of the shameful [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf.” In December of the following year, JeM militants tried twice to assassinate President Musharraf, once with a suicide car bomb that killed 15 people and wounded 50.75 JeM’s operational ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which remained strong after 9/11, may account for the group’s boldness in challenging the government of its host country. Until the fall of 2001, JeM operated training camps in Afghanistan, as did its parent organization, HuM. Since al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Afghanistan, JeM has provided shelter to al-Qaeda militants and has hosted al-Qaeda training centers in Pakistan.76 In June 2008, JeM militants publicly beheaded two Afghans for passing information to international forces in Afghanistan.77 JeM has also established links to Europe’s Muslim population, especially in Britain. Militant elements of Pakistan’s population provide the bulk of JeM’s members, but the organization also recruits from Britain’s large Muslim community. A British convert to Islam, Muhammad Bilal, conducted the April 2000 suicide bombing (Kashmir’s first) against an Indian army base.78 Another British citizen, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (who participated in the HuM kidnapping of Western tourists and later joined JeM) was convicted in Pakistan for helping orchestrate the kidnapping and beheading of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002.79 Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Righteous”) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), although focused heavily on Kashmir, has from its inception embraced a broader jihadist vision. With assistance from Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and partner during the 1980s, two Pakistani engineering professors founded Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (the Center for Preaching and Guidance) outside of Lahore in the late 1980s. Spread out over several hectares, this facility served as a mosque and community center, while promoting an extremist interpretation of Islam. Annual gatherings at the center attracted as many as 100,000 people and prominently featured calls for jihad.80 LeT emerged in 1993 as an armed wing of this religious center, with the goal of establishing Islamic rule first in Kashmir, then throughout India.81 In the first decade of the 21st century, LeT made a name for itself regionally with a several high-profile attacks against India, including an attack on India’s historic Red Fort military base in December 2000, a failed attack by a squad of suicide bombers on Kashmir’s Srinagar Airport in January 2001, a series of bombings in Delhi in October 2005, and bombings across Mumbai’s commuter rail system in July 2006. The group has also been implicated, along with JeM, in the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. 82

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The group expressed broader, international ambitions in March 2003, during a “Defense of the Muslim Community” conference in Islamabad. Hafiz Saeed, the LeT leader, proposed a global jihadist vision to participants, proclaiming:

“The powerful Western world is terrorizing the Muslims. We are being invaded, humiliated, manipulated, and looted. How else can we respond but though jihad? . . . We must fight against the evil trio—America, India, and Israel. Suicide missions are in accordance with Islam. In fact, a suicide attack is the best form of jihad.83

Five years later, in November 2008, LeT gained international recognition as one of the most brutal terrorist organizations, when it carried out a three-day armed assault on civilian targets across Mumbai that left nearly 200 people dead. Tourist sites and other locations frequently visited by foreigners—including five-star hotels, a train station, and a Jewish community center—were directly targeted during the attack.84 One year later, authorities in Bangladesh and India arrested several LeT militants for planning suicide car bombings of the American and Indian embassies in Dhaka.85 Both of these plots had been foreshadowed in 2007, when Indian police arrested an LeT-trained militant for planning a series of bombings aimed at American and Israeli tourists on India’s Goa beaches.86 Like HuM and JeM, Lashkar-e-Taiba has maintained close links to al-Qaeda. LeT’s earliest recruits were trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Kunar, Afghanistan.87 After al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Afghanistan in 2001, LeT provided sanctuary for al-Qaeda members, including senior al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubayda, who was captured in an LeT safe house in March 2002 in Pakistan’s Punjab region.88 Along with sanctuary, LeT provided training for new recruits going on missions for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. This function was especially important for al-Qaeda as the organization’s leadership struggled to establish a secure presence in Pakistan after 9/11. Several Western terrorists trained by LeT returned to their home countries to attempt mass-casualty attacks, including Richard Reid (the 2001 shoe bomber), Dhirin Barot and Omar Khyam (leaders of two separate bomb plots in Britain), and David Hicks (an Australian al-Qaeda operative). LeT also trained militants—and sent its own cadres—to fight against U.S., NATO, and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.89 As it facilitated activities for al-Qaeda, LeT developed international contacts to expand its operations. Within Britain’s large Pakistani diaspora population, LeT has recruited new members for its activities in Kashmir and has maintained a successful fundraising operation through the LeT-linked charity Jama`at-ud-Da`wa (“Party of the Calling”). British and Pakistani authorities suspect that money raised through this charity was used to finance the thwarted plot to detonate liquid explosives on several transatlantic flights in 2006.90 In October 2009, the FBI arrested two men in Chicago—American David Headley and his Canadian accomplice—for plotting a terrorist attack in Denmark. Authorities subsequently learned that Headley had conducted at least five reconnaissance missions in Mumbai to help LeT identify targets for its November 2008 attack on the city.91 In November 2009, one month after

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Headley’s arrest, Italian police arrested four Pakistani men for providing funding for the Mumbai attack. A fifth suspect avoided capture and fled Italy.92 These international connections give LeT greater resources to fund its operations, while enhancing its ability to recruit non-Pakistanis, who may have easier access to targets in India, Europe, and North America. During his 2009 presentation of the intelligence community’s annual threat assessment to Congress, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Denis Blair stated:

Although [Lashkar-e-Taiba] is not focused on the United States, we are concerned that, in general, it is becoming more of a direct threat, and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights. LeT’s plotting against India and willingness to attack Jewish interests and locations visited by Westerners, as demonstrated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, raise concerns that either the group itself or individual members will more actively embrace an anti-Western agenda.93

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (“Taliban Movement of Pakistan”) The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (the “Taliban Movement of Pakistan,” or simply the “Pakistani Taliban”) serves as an umbrella organization for several militant groups based in Pakistan’s tribal belt. This alliance of Pashtun militants has focused principally on anti-government attacks in Pakistan. However, the Pakistani Taliban has demonstrated an ability to strike NATO and allied forces in Afghanistan, as well as a capability to reach Western targets beyond the region. The Pakistani Taliban arose as a formal alliance in December 2007, when a shura of militant leaders convened in South Waziristan to establish a permanent coordinating body. The shura appointed Baitullah Mehsud, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, as its leader. The new umbrella organization quickly established a presence across all seven regions (or agencies) of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the neighboring Northwest Frontier Province (especially the Swat Valley), with an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 members.94 In contrast to most other prominent Pakistani extremist groups, the Pakistani Taliban arose in direct opposition to the Pakistan regime. The network’s leadership announced a defensive jihad to counter the Pakistani army’s incursions into Pakistan’s tribal belt and declared its intention to eliminate Western influence in the country and establish an Islamic state. The Pakistani Taliban is widely suspected of carrying out the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s secular and reformist former Prime Minister, via suicide bombing in December 2007, just days after the network formally announced its creation (although Baitullah Mehsud denied involvement).95 Since then, the Pakistani Taliban has conducted numerous attacks on Pakistan’s police and security personnel. In addition to resisting the Pakistani military in the tribal belt, the Pakistani Taliban has launched assaults against security forces in other regions, including the siege of the Manawan police academy in Punjab and the suicide bombing of a police station in Islamabad, both in March 2009.96 The Pakistani Taliban is also linked to the June 2009 suicide truck bombing of the Pearl Continental Hotel, a luxury hotel in Peshawar with a large foreign clientele.97 During the same month, the Pakistani Taliban launched near-simultaneous suicide bombings in different regions. One killed outspoken anti-Taliban cleric Sarfraz Naeemi in Lahore; the second struck a mosque near a military base in northwestern town of Nowshera.98

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Parallel to its assault on Pakistan’s government, the Pakistani Taliban actively participates in the Afghan insurgency. Many Pakistani Taliban militants are veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan and continue to fight alongside their counterparts across the border. The Pakistani Taliban also provides sanctuary in South Waziristan to Afghan Taliban insurgents. In February 2009, the network’s leader Baitullah Mehsud joined with other militant leaders to form the Council of United Mujahideen, which pledged allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Mohammad Omar.99 In August 2009, a U.S. missile strike in South Waziristan killed Baitullah Mehsud, who was succeeded by his cousin, Hakimullah Meshud, as leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Four months later, in cooperation with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban engineered a revenge attack, striking a CIA facility in Khost with a suicide bombing that killed seven CIA agents and a Jordanian intelligence official. In a propaganda video released after the attack, the suicide bomber, a Jordanian citizen whom the CIA had hoped to employ as a double agent to infiltrate al-Qaeda, appeared next to Hakimullah Mehsud and vowed revenge for the killing of the Pakistani Taliban’s previous leader.100 The Pakistani Taliban has been linked to two terrorist plots in Europe and North America. In January 2008, Spanish authorities arrested 14 suspects on suspicion of plotting bombings of the Barcelona subway system, to be followed by attacks in several other West European countries. Dutch police arrested another suspect and extradited him to Spain. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attempted attack in a video-recorded interview.101 In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen from Pakistan, attempted an attack on New York’s Times Square with a car bomb, which failed to detonate. Shahzad received training and financing from the Pakistani Taliban, which later released a “martyrdom video” featuring Shahzad discussing plans for an attack against America.102

TARGETING EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA The threat to homeland security that global jihadism posed to Europe and North America became apparent in the 1990s, even though the magnitude of the threat was not widely understood until years later. A number of Islamist militants and extremist groups active in Europe and the United States began adopting the global jihadist agenda in the early part of the decade. The anti-Western message of global jihadism also began attracting disaffected Muslims with no prior involvement in militant Islam. The terrorist threat inherent in this trend surged shortly after Osama bin Laden consolidated al-Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan and his 1998 declaration on killing Americans and their allies. By the end of 2011, militants inspired by the global jihadist ideology had launched more than 100 terrorist plots, including several successful attacks, against targets in Europe and North America. Many of these plots were linked directly to al-Qaeda and, in a few cases, to al-Qaeda allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. THE THREAT TO EUROPE Contemporary Islamist terrorism in Europe emerged first in France as an outgrowth of the civil war in Algeria across Mediterranean Sea. In January 1992, fearing an Islamist takeover, the

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Algerian Army declared martial law and cancelled parliamentary elections to prevent an almost-certain victory by the Islamic Salvation Front, a moderate Islamist party. In response, an Islamist-led insurgency arose to resist military rule. The most prominent group fighting against the regime was the Armed Islamic Group (known by its French name Groupe Islamique Armée, or GIA). Led largely by Algerian veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, the GIA organized a campaign of violence against the Algerian regime, including guerrilla attacks against government forces and terrorist attacks on civilian targets. As the Algerian civil war escalated, the GIA also targeted France for supporting the secular Algerian government. In December 1994, the GIA hijacked an Air France passenger plane in Algiers. French commandos raided the plane on the ground in Marseille, where it had landed to refuel, thwarting the hijackers’ plan to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower. During the following summer, the GIA targeted French civilians in a series of bombings, including explosions in Paris metro stations, killing eight people and injuring more than 100.103 These attacks were designed to punish France specifically and were not part of an overarching terrorist campaign against the West. However, they foreshadowed attempts of indiscriminant mass murder that a new wave of Islamist terrorists, motivated by hostility toward the West more broadly, would soon launch across Europe. The first such terrorist plot emerged in March 1996, when French police disrupted a plot by an Islamist militant group (the “Roubaix Gang”) to bomb international participants at the G-7 Summit in Lille. This plot targeted not just France, but also other Westerners attending the summit. The perpetrators included French converts to Islam and second-generation French citizens of North African descent, rather than Algerian GIA terrorists.104 Since the Roubaix Gang’s plot, the trend toward terrorist operations in pursuit of the global jihadist agenda has presented a threat to countries across Europe. The chronology below describes terrorist plots in Europe that can be traced back to Afghanistan or Pakistan. It counts NATO member Turkey as a European country, but does not include Russia, which faces a separatist Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus that is beyond the scope of this project.

2000 Germany/France: Plot to Bomb Christmas Market – In December 2000, German police arrested four Algerians planning to bomb a market in Strasbourg (across the border in France) on New Year’s Eve. Police found explosives and a videotape of the market that labeled the market shoppers “enemies of God.” The assailants, who authorities believe trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, were part of a larger terrorist network (the “Frankfurt Group”) comprising Algerians and French-Algerians.105

2001 Italy: Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy – In January 2001, Italian police uncovered a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Rome. A German-Italian task force later arrested four members of an al-Qaeda cell, operating out of Milan, in connection with the plot.106

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France: Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy – In July 2001, police in Dubai arrested a French citizen, who confessed to planning an attack on the U.S. embassy in Paris. Five French accomplices were later arrested for participating in the plot. Al-Qaeda trained and instructed the group’s leaders.107 Belgium: Suicide Bombing Plot against U.S. Airbase – In September 2001 (two days after 9/11), Belgian police arrested Nizar Trabelsi, a former Tunisian professional soccer player, for planning a suicide bombing against a U.S. airbase the city of Kleine Brogel. Trabelsi confessed that he initiated the plot on instructions from al-Qaeda.108 Transatlantic Flight: Attempt to Bomb Airliner – In December 2001, British citizen Richard Reid tried to down a Paris-to-Miami flight carrying 197 people with a bomb hidden in his shoe. Passengers and crew subdued him before he ignited the bomb.109 Co-conspirator Sajid Badat abandoned plans to destroy another transatlantic flight—also with a shoe bomb—departing Amsterdam.110 Al-Qaeda trained and instructed the assailants.

2002 Germany: Plot to Attack Jewish Targets – In April 2002, German police arrested members of al-Tawhid (Unity of the Faithful), a terrorist group led by Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, who later became leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The German cell planned a series of mass-casualty attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in Germany.111 Zarqawi received paramilitary training in a camp along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and fought for the Afghan mujahideen in 1989. He returned in 1999 and, with assistance from al-Qaeda, set up his own terrorist training camp in the Afghan city of Herat.112 France: Planned Attacks on Multiple Targets – In December 2002, French authorities arrested a group of militants planning attacks in Paris, potentially striking the Eiffel Tower, a shopping center, police stations, and Israeli interests. Police found gas canisters, fuses, and a chemical protection suit during the arrest. French courts convicted 25 people of participating in the plot. The group leaders trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya.113

2003 Turkey: Istanbul Bombings – In November 2003, a group of terrorists conducted a series of suicide truck bombings against two synagogues, the British consulate, and a British bank in the Turkish capital, killing 58 people and wounding 750.114 Al-Qaeda provided financing and initial instructions to the bombers, who were all Turkish citizens.115

2004 Spain: Madrid Train Bombings – In March 2004, terrorists bombed four commuter trains during rush hour, killing 191 people and injuring nearly 1800.116 Seven of the assailants blew themselves up in an apartment building after being surrounded by police a month later. The group responsible for the bombing evolved from the remnants of an al-Qaeda cell dismantled in late 2001 by Spanish police. Amer Azizi, a member of the cell who attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, fled Spain before police could apprehend him. Before leaving the country,

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Azizi recruited key members of the group that would later carry out the Madrid bombing and maintained e-mail communication with the group’s leader. Azizi was killed alongside senior al-Qaeda leader Hamza Rabia in a U.S. missile strike in Pakistan in December 2005.117 Britain: Attempted Mass-Casualty Bombing – In March 2004, a British police raid (Operation Crevice) led to the arrest of five members of a terrorist group planning to bomb targets across Britain. Members of group, all British citizens, received training and instruction in Pakistan from al-Qaeda.118 Britain: Plot to Bomb London Targets – In August 2004, police arrested Dhiren Barot, leader of an al-Qaeda cell planning a series of attacks across London. Among its targets, the cell planned to bomb a commuter tunnel beneath the Thames River during rush hour, an attack that would have drowned hundreds of people. Barot, a British citizen of Indian origin, had converted from Hinduism to Islam. Prior to 9/11, he conducted surveillance for attacks in the United States at the instruction of al-Qaeda.119

2005 Britain: London Public Transit Bombings – In July 2005, suicide bombings on three subway trains and a bus during rush hour killed 52 people and injured 800.120 Al-Qaeda developed plans for the attack and provided training and instruction to the plot leader, Mohammed Siddique Khan, and at least one of his accomplices.121

Britain: Attempted Second Bombing of London Transit System – In July 2005, two weeks after the London transit bombings, a second wave of attacks failed because faulty detonators did not ignite bombs planted on subway trains and a bus. All four assailants were immigrants from East Africa. Plot leader Muktar Ibrahim received training and instruction in Pakistan.122

2006 Transatlantic Flights: Plot to Bomb Multiple Airliners – In August 2006, British police arrested eleven men plotting to detonate liquid explosives, disguised as beverages, aboard at least seven commercial airliners leaving London for cities in Canada and the United States. As many as 1500 passengers would have been killed had they succeeded. Al-Qaeda directed the plot and trained several of the assailants, most of whom were British citizens of Pakistani origin.123

2007

Denmark: Plot against Multiple Targets – In September 2007, Danish police arrested a Danish citizen of Pakistani origin and an Afghan man for participating in a terrorist group (the “Glasvej gang”) and planning a series of bombings. Video surveillance showed the suspects testing the same type of explosives used in the 2005 London transit bombings. Hammmad Khurshid, the group leader, received training from al-Qaeda in Pakistan.124 Germany: Plot to Bomb Multiple Targets – In September 2007, German authorities arrested three operatives (the “Sauerland Cell”) of the Islamic Jihad Union, a terrorist group based in

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Pakistan. The three assailants, along with a fourth man arrested in Turkey, planned to bomb multiple targets across Germany.125

2008 Spain: Plot to Bomb Barcelona Transit System – In January 2008, Spanish police arrested a dozen Pakistani nationals for planning suicide bombings of Barcelona’s subway system, to be followed by attacks in Portugal, Britain, France, and Germany. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the plot.126 Belgium/France: Planned Suicide Bombing – In December 2008, a joint Belgian-French operation led to the arrest of several militants in Belgium and France. Authorities feared the group was preparing a suicide bombing, possibly on European Union summit in Brussels.127 Eight suspects were convicted of operating a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda. The group’s leader, Malika El Aroud, is the widow of Abdessatar Dahmane. In September 2001, Dahmane conducted a suicide attack in Afghanistan that killed Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.128

2009 Britain: Planned Attacks in Manchester – In April 2009, British police arrested a group of Pakistani nationals on suspicion of operating an al-Qaeda cell and planning to bomb a shopping center in Manchester. The cell leader, Abid Naseer, trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Peshawar and maintained communications with senior al-Qaeda leader Saleh al-Somali in Pakistan.129 Denmark: Plot to Bomb Danish Newspaper Office – In October 2009, police arrested Chicago resident David Headley and Canadian citizen Tahawwur Rana. Both men were charged with assisting al-Qaeda in a plot to attack the office of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which printed satirical cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005. The attack was to include suicide bombings and beheadings of newspaper employees.130 Authorities subsequently discovered that Headley had helped the terrorist group Laskhar-e-Taiba plan its 2008 attacks in Mumbai.131

2010 Norway: Plot to Bomb Multiple Targets – In July 2010, Norwegian and German police broke up a terrorist cell consisting of three Norwegian residents—an ethnic Uighur from China, an Iraqi Kurd, and an Uzbek national. Authorities identified the group as a cell linked to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and believe the suspects planned to bomb the office of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which published derogatory cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005.132 European Cities: Planned Coordinated Terrorist Raids – In September 2010, U.S. intelligence uncovered plans for coordinated attacks in European cities, most likely Berlin, London, and Paris. Styled after the 2008 Mumbai massacre, the attack plans called for assaults by small teams of militants who would open fire at tourist sites, capture and execute hostages, and raid hotels. U.S. authorities learned of the threat from Ahmed Sidiqi, a German citizen of Afghan heritage, who was captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.133 U.S. intelligence sources

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believe that Osama bin Laden, earlier in the year, sent messages via couriers to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups urging Mumbai-style attacks in Europe.134

2011 Germany: Planned Mass-Casualty Attack – In April 2011, Germany authorities arrested three men preparing a mass-casualty bombing. At the time of their arrest, the men were constructing a shrapnel-laden bomb, allegedly as part of an al-Qaeda plot to strike an unspecified crowded public space in Europe. According to German intelligence sources, one of the conspirators, Abdeladim El-Kebir of Morocco, received training in an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan in 2010.135 Turkey: Plot to Attack the U.S. Embassy – In July 2011, Turkish police arrested 15 members of a suspected al-Qaeda cell. Authorities believe the suspects planned to attack foreign diplomatic targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. During the arrests, police seized more than 1,500 pounds of chemicals used to make bombs.136 Britain: Suicide Bombing Plot – In September 2011, a British counterterrorism unit arrested six Birmingham residents on suspicion of preparing a suicide bombing campaign. Authorities charged four of the suspects with conspiring to commit an act of terrorism, including two who were accused of receiving terrorist training in Pakistan and making a “martyrdom video.” Two other suspects were charged with failing to disclose information about the plot and providing financial support for it. British police arrested the suspects before they had selected targets.137 THE THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA Terrorists motivated by global jihadim first established a presence in the United States in the early 1990s. In 1986, at the height of the Soviet-Afghan war, supporters of the Afghan mujahideen set up the al-Kifah Refugee Services Center in New York in order to raise money and recruit fighters to resist Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The center began operating out of al-Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn, then shortly afterward moved to a building a few blocks away.138 As a North American hub for anti-Soviet jihadist activity, it attracted militant supporters from across the United States and Canada, especially among recent immigrants. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, a core group affiliated with the al-Kifah Center began turning their attention to other militant Islamist causes. The arrival in 1990 of Omar Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian cleric who was seeking asylum from the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, strengthened anti-American sentiment within this network. Despite being listed on the State Department’s terrorist watch list, Abdel Rahman was able to travel across the United States and into Canada to give sermons denouncing America, especially regarding its support for Israel and the Mubarak regime.139 In 1990, a few months after Abdel Rahman’s arrival in New York, Egyptian immigrant El Sayyid Nosair committed what was possibly the first act of violence in America by a member of the al-Kifah militant network, which was steadily adopting a global jihadist outlook. In November of that year, Nosair assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane, the staunchly anti-Arab cleric who created the Jewish Defense League. Nosair shot and wounded two others in an attempt to

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escape after killing Kahane, but was shot and captured by police.140 This political assassination, although not an act of terrorism targeting America, marked a significant turning point in the evolution of Islamist militancy in North America. Three years later, terrorists perpetrated the first mass-casualty attacks on American territory inspired by the global jihadist ideology. In January 1993, a Pakistani immigrant opened fire with an assault rifle on cars entering the CIA’s Virginia headquarters, killing two and injuring three.141 The following month, terrorists (including at least three members of the al-Kifah network) detonated explosives in the garage of one of the World Trade Center towers, killing six and injuring more than 1000.142 The mastermind of the plot, Pakistani national Ramzi Youssef, fled the country. During the next two years, he explored additional terrorist plots against the West, including plots to assassinate President Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul II, and an ambitious plot to bomb several American passenger planes simultaneously. None of these plans reached advanced stages of development before Youssef’s arrest in 1995 by Pakistani authorities.143 In 1994, investigators following leads in the World Trade Center bombing uncovered another plot to inflict mass casualties in New York. This plot called for simultaneous bombings of the United Nations building, the Lincoln and Holland traffic tunnels under the Hudson River, the George Washington Bridge, and the FBI main office in Manhattan. Radical cleric Abdel Rahman and nine co-conspirators were subsequently convicted of “waging an urban war of terror” against the United States.144 These terrorist plots in the first half of the 1990s marked a shift in militant Islam toward attacks against targets on American and, to a lesser extent, Canadian territory. They also marked the beginning of al-Qaeda involvement (even if indirectly) in terrorist operations in North America. Ramzi Yousef trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan before coming to the United States in 1992 to lead the first attack on the World Trade Center. He received some funding for the operation from his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who would later mastermind the 9/11 attacks against America. Evidence also indicates that Osama bin Laden financially supported Omar Abdel Rahman during his stay in New York.145 The following chronology describes terrorist plots in the United States and Canada that are linked to Afghanistan or Pakistan.

1993 Shooting outside CIA Headquarters – In January 1993, Pakistani immigrant Mir Aimal Kansi fired an assault rifle at cars turning into the entrance of CIA headquarters in Virginia, killing two CIA employees and wounding three. After the attack, Kansi fled to Pakistan, where he remained in hiding until his arrest and extradition to the United States in 1997. He was convicted in a Virginia court and sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out in 2002.146 World Trade Center Bombing – In February 1993, terrorists detonated a truck bomb in a garage of the World Trade Center. Their plot to cause the North Tower to collapse into the South Tower failed, but six people were killed and more than 1000 were injured in the explosion. The group’s leader, Ramzi Yousef, was the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who later played a lead role in planning the 9/11 attacks. He fled the country after the attack, but was arrested by Pakistani authorities two years later and extradited to the United States.147

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1999 Plot to Bomb Los Angeles Airport – In December 1999, U.S. customs officers arrested Ahmed Ressam (the “Millennium Bomber”) in the act of transporting explosives, stored in the trunk of his rental car, across the Canadian border into the United States. With the aid of accomplices operating in Canada and the United States, he planned to bomb a terminal at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve. Ressam, an Algerian national, received training at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan in 1998 and 1999.148

2001

9/11 Attacks – In September 2001, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four passenger planes in the United States, crashing two into the World Trade Center towers and one into the Pentagon. The fourth plane, headed for the White House or the U.S. Capitol, crashed in a Pennsylvania field when passengers tried to take control of the aircraft. Nearly 3,000 people died in the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history.

Plot to Attack Multiple Targets in the U.S. – In December 2001, authorities arrested Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a dual national of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Al-Marri, who attended terrorist training camps in Afghanistan between 1998 and 2001, arrived in the United States on a student visa one day before 9/11 to prepare for future terrorist attacks. He maintained e-mail communications with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other al-Qaeda leaders, while researching the use of poisonous compounds and identifying potential targets, including dams, waterways, and tunnels in the United States. Al-Marri had not designated specific targets at the time of his arrest.149 He pleaded guilty to supporting al-Qaeda. Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Passenger Planes – In December 2001, British citizen Richard Reid tried to bring down a Paris-to-Miami passenger plane with a bomb hidden in his shoe. Passengers and crew subdued him before he ignited the bomb. Co-conspirator Sajid Badat, also a British citizen, abandoned plans to destroy transatlantic flight departing Amsterdam on the same day with a similarly constructed shoe bomb. Al-Qaeda trained and instructed the assailants.150

2002

Plot to Crash Plane into LA Skyscraper – In February 2002, an undisclosed Southeast Asian nation detained the leader of an al-Qaeda cell planning an attack in Los Angeles. Subsequently, other cooperating nations in the Asia-Pacific region arrested three additional members of the cell. The plotters planned to fly a hijacked airplane in the Library Tower (renamed the U.S. Bank Tower in 2003), which is the tallest building on the U.S. West Coast. According to U.S. officials, the cell leader received training in bomb-making from al-Qaeda and all four cell members met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 2001 to pledge their allegiance.151 Reconnaissance for Attacks on Targets across the U.S. – In May 2002, police detained Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member, at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport upon his return from Pakistan. Padilla trained at an al-Qaeda camp in 2000 and discussed potential attacks with al-Qaeda leaders, including detonating a radiological device (“dirty bomb”) and bombing

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apartment buildings in U.S. cities. At the time of his arrest, he had not identified specific targets. Padilla and two other defendants—Adham Hassoun, a Palestinian from Lebanon, and Kifah Jayyousi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan—were convicted of providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, and maim individuals overseas.152 Potential al-Qaeda Cell in New York State – In September 2002, authorities arrested a group suspected of constituting an al-Qaeda cell in the United States. During the spring of 2001, seven Yemeni-Americans from the town of Lackawanna, in western New York State, traveled to Afghanistan to receive paramilitary training from al-Qaeda. Kamal Derwish, an al-Qaeda operative who moved to Lackawanna in 1998, recruited the men and accompanied them to Afghanistan. Four of the recruits returned to the Lackawanna before completing the six-week training course; two completed the course, then returned. The seventh recruit remained abroad. Authorities arrested the six men who returned to Lackawanna (the “Lackawanna Six”). The group’s continued affiliation with al-Qaeda upon their return is ambiguous, and no specific attack plan on their part was uncovered. They pleaded guilty to supporting al-Qaeda.153

2003 Chemical Weapons Plot Targeting the New York Subway System – In February 2003, Saudi and U.S. intelligence uncovered an al-Qaeda plot to release cyanide gas in the New York subway system and other public spaces. Plans for the attack were discovered on the laptop computer of an al-Qaeda operative captured in Saudi Arabia. An informant with ties to al-Qaeda subsequently confirmed the existence of the plot and claimed the terrorist organization had placed a cell in the United States the previous year to make preparations. He also claimed that Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda’s second in command, called it off for unknown reasons. Authorities made no arrests in connection with the plot.154 Plot to Collapse the Brooklyn Bridge – In March 2003, police arrested Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, for plotting to use blowtorches to cause the collapse the Brooklyn Bridge. Faris, who trained at an al-Qaeda camp and discussed the plot with senior al-Qaeda leaders, returned to the United States to investigate means of carrying out the attack in spring 2002. He sent coded messages about the plot to contacts in Pakistan, but suspended operations due to increased security around the bridge.155 Plot to Bomb Multiple Gas Stations in Maryland – In March 2003, police arrested Uzair Paracha, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, for taking part in an al-Qaeda plot to ignite underground storage tanks at gas stations in Maryland. Three of Paracha’s co-conspirators, all members of al-Qaeda, were subsequently arrested overseas and sent to Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Two of the co-conspirators were also legal permanent U.S. residents from Pakistan: Saifulah Paracha (Uzair Paracha’s father) and Baltimore resident Majid Khan. The fourth co-conspirator, Ammar al-Balochi, a Pakistani national who resided in Kuwait, is the nephew of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.156

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2004 Plot to Bomb Multiple Targets in New York and Washington – In August 2004, British police arrested members of an al-Qaeda cell planning multiple bombings across London.157 In the subsequent investigation, authorities discovered that Dhiren Barot, the London cell leader, had also led an al-Qaeda reconnaissance mission in the United States in 2000 and 2001. The reconnaissance team conducted surveillance on several targets in the New York and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas, including the World Bank, the IMF, the New York Stock Exchange, and Citigroup Center in Manhattan. According to U.S. officials, the group’s plans to attack U.S. targets were put on hold after 9/11, but remained active until the arrest of Barot and his associates in 2004.158

2005 Infiltration for Attacks on Targets in the U.S. – In June 2005, FBI agents detained Hamid Hayat, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, upon his return to the United States from an al-Qaeda training camp in Pakistan. Hayat was found guilty of receiving terrorist training and returning to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism. No known targets had been designated before Hayat’s arrest.159

2006

Plot to Bomb Commuter Trains in New York – In April 2006, Lebanese authorities arrested Assem Hammoud in Lebanon on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack in the United States. Lebanese and U.S. officials claimed that Hammoud had been recruited into al-Qaeda and was developing plans with at least seven co-conspirators to bomb commuter trains in tunnels under the Hudson River between New York City and New Jersey. Hammoud’s computer contained maps and detailed bombing plans for the plot.160 Plot to Attack Multiple Targets in Canada – In June 2006, Canadian police arrested members a group (the “Toronto 18”), including Jahmaal James, who traveled to Pakistan for paramilitary training in 2005. The group planned to attack the Toronto Stock Exchange and other targets with truck bombs, to be followed with additional attacks in Ontario, including storming the Canadian parliament.161 Plot to Bomb Passenger Planes Bound for North America – In August 2006, British police arrested eight men plotting to detonate liquid explosives, disguised as beverages, aboard at least seven commercial airliners leaving London for cities in Canada and the United States. Had they succeeded, the attacks would have killed as many as 1500 passengers. Al-Qaeda directed the plot and trained several of the assailants, most of whom were British citizens of Pakistani origin.162

2007 Plot to Bomb Targets across the U.S. – In April 2007, FBI agents arrested Christopher Paul, an American convert to Islam who had attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in 1990 and had worked for al-Qaeda for more than a decade. Paul pleaded guilty to conspiring to use explosive devices against American targets in the United States and abroad.163

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2008

Plot to Bomb New York’s Penn Station – In November 2008, Pakistani authorities arrested Bryant Neal Vinas, an American convert to Islam, and extradited him to the United States. Vinas subsequently revealed to investigators that he had trained in an al-Qaeda camp and had helped the terrorist organization develop plans to bomb a Long Island Railway commuter train as it entered Penn Station in downtown New York. Vinas pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to kill American nationals and providing support to a foreign terrorist organization.164

2009 Plot to Attack Marine Base in Virginia – In July 2009, the FBI arrested eight members of a group based in North Carolina (the “Triangle Terror Group”) for planning to fight against the U.S. military abroad and to attack the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia. Authorities believe the group’s leader, Daniel Patrick Boyd, trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992.165

Plot to Bomb New York’s Subway System – In September 2009, authorities arrested Najibullah Zazi, a legal U.S. resident from Afghanistan, for an aborted suicide bombing on the New York subway system. Two former high school classmates of Zazi—Aarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin, originally from Afghanistan and Bosnia, respectively—were charged as co-conspirators.166 All three assailants trained in al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan. Investigators identified the plot’s principal organizer as senior al-Qaeda leader Saleh al-Somali.167

2010

Nascent Plan to Bomb Sports Stadium – In March 2010, police in Chicago arrested Raja Lahrasib Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, for engaging in terrorist activities. He met twice with Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior al-Qaeda operative, in Pakistan and provided funding for terrorist operations against Indian forces in Kashmir. Two weeks before his arrest, Khan also discussed the idea of attacking an unidentified stadium in the United States using remote controlled bombs. No further details or planning for such an attack have emerged. Khan pleaded guilty to providing financial support to al-Qaeda.168 Plot to Bomb New York’s Times Square – In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, attempted an attack on Times Square with a car bomb, which failed to detonate. Shahzad received training and financing from the Pakistani Taliban, which later released a “martyrdom video” featuring Shahzad discussing plans to attack America.169 Multiple Planned Bombings in Canada – In August 2010, Canadian police arrested members of a terrorist group (the “Ottawa Cell”) planning to bomb targets in Canada and to launch attacks against Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan. Authorities believe unidentified co-conspirators facilitated the plot from Afghanistan and Pakistan, where at least one of the accused received training in making bombs.170

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CONCLUSION The global jihadist movement has posed a direct challenge to the transatlantic community for two decades, and continues to threaten Western interests and lives at home and abroad. It remains a leaderless, diverse, and widely dispersed collection of formal organizations, autonomous groups, and individuals who share enmity toward the West and a willingness to engage in violence at least loosely connected to radical interpretations of Islam. Some participants in this movement are religious fanatics who distort Islamic teachings to justify atrocities, while others are only nominally Muslim with little understanding of Islam’s religious or moral precepts. The movement may also appeal to some disaffected non-Muslim Westerners who convert to Islam pro forma to participate in organized violence against their own societies. Al-Qaeda does not lead the global jihadist movement, but it is a powerful symbol of violent opposition to the West and a principal facilitator of violent jihad. It trained thousands of terrorists in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, and since relocating across the border in Pakistan has trained hundreds more. It has launched numerous terrorist attacks in North America and Europe, and continues to plan attacks against the West and to train terrorists to carry them out. The death of Osama bin Laden in a U.S. Navy Seal raid on his compound in May 2011 was a major blow to the terrorist organization he led for more than two decades. However, al-Qaeda remains active. Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has assumed leadership of the organization and a core group of al-Qaeda militants still operates in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has also built alliances with militant organizations beyond South and Central Asia. Even though its operational coordination with such groups is severely limited today, al-Qaeda’s ability to retain loose affiliations with terrorist networks abroad—such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Shabaab in Somalia—helps keep the anti-Western transnational outlook of global jihadism alive. Furthermore, since regrouping in Pakistan after 9/11, al-Qaeda has facilitated the growth of anti-Western militancy in the region. Along with the Taliban, which also relocated across the border, al-Qaeda has strengthened cooperation with old allies (such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and formed alliances with new militant groups (such as the Islamic Jihad Union and the Pakistani Taliban). The result is an overlapping network of militant organizations that share resources and members. Reducing the threat posed by this overlapping network of terrorist groups requires action to deprive militant organizations of secure bases of operation, to decrease the flow of foreign (especially Western) militants coming to the region for terrorist training, and to reduce indigenous support for global jihadism. Accomplishing these objectives, in turn, is contingent on the ability of Afghanistan and Pakistan to provide a minimum level of security and stability to their populations, promote development, and institute good governance and the rule of law on both sides of the border. These are all long-term propositions that will extend well into the future. Developing and sustaining a strategy to help both countries in these efforts after NATO ends direct military involvement is a key element of homeland security for Europe and the United States.

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84 Ali and Shehzad, “Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad,” CTC Sentinel, p. 13; Lydia Polgreen and Souad Mekhennet, “Militant Network Is Intact long after Mumbai Siege, New York Times, September 29, 2009. 85 Haroon Habib, “Three Pakistani Lashkar Militants Arrested in Dhaka,” The Hindu, November 15, 2009; Shariful Islam, “2 Lashkar Men Held inside Indian Border,” The Daily Star (Dhaka), November 24, 2009. 86 Stephen Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Kings College London, 2009), p. 22; Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-i-Tayyiba: One Year After Mumbai,” CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, Vol. 2, Issue 11, November 2009), p. 4. 87 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 38. 88 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, pp. 8-9. 89 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, pp. 10-11, 16, 20; Susan Schmidt and Siobhan Gorman, “Lashkar-e-Taiba Served as Gateway for Western Converts Turning to Jihad,” Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2008. 90 Tankel, Lashkar-e-Taiba, pp. 21. 91 Ginger Thompson and David Johnston, “U.S. Man Accused of Helping Plot Mumbai Attack,” New York Times, December 7, 2009. 92 Anna Momigliano, “Italy Arrests Four Men Accused of Funding Mumbai Terror Attacks,” Christian Science Monitor, November 23, 2009. 93 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2009), p. 11. 94 Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists” (Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009) <www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html>, Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008. 95 Bajoria, “Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists,” October 2009. 96 BBC News, “Bomb Attack on Islamabad Police,” March 23, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7959850.stm>; BBC News, “Official Confusion over Lahore Siege,” March 31, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7973901.stm>. 97 BBC News, “Suicide Attack on Pakistani Hotel,” June 9, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8092349.stm>; Simon Ross Valentine, The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: Ideology and Beliefs (Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, United Kingdom, September 8, 2009), p. 5-6. 98 BBC News, “Bomb Kills Senior Pakistan Cleric,” 12 June 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8096776.stm>. 99 Valentine, The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, p. 4. 100 BBC News, “Afghanistan CIA Bomber Shown Vowing Revenge,” January 10, 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8449789.stm>. 101 Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2008 (The Hague, April 2009), p. 23; Fernando Reinare, “A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2009), p. 7; Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008. 102 Al Baker and William Rashbaum, “Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square,” New York Times, May 1, 2010; Rashbaum, Tavernise, and Healy, "Bomb Suspect Said to Train in Pakistan,” New York Times, May 4, 2010; Liam Stack, “Pakistani Taliban Helped Faisal Shahzad,” Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 2010; Liam Stack, “Pakistani Taliban Release Faisal Shahzad's Martyrdom Tape,” Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 2010. 103 Clara Beyler, “The Jihadist Threat in France,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 3, February 2006. 104 Jeremy Shaprio, “France and the GIA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, edited by Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2007). p. 159. 105 Beyler, “The Jihadist Threat in France,” p. 99; BBC News, “Strasbourg Bomb Plotters Jailed,” March, 10, 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2835587.stm>; Mark Lanler, “Germans Convict Four Algerians in Plot to Bomb a French Market,” New York Times, March 11, 2003. 106 BBC News, “Italy Jails Four Terror Suspects,” February 22, 2002 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1835577.stm>; CBS News, “Convictions and more Arrests in Italy,” February 22, 2002 <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/22/terror/main330245.shtml>. 107 Philippe Naughton, “Six Jailed over al-Qaeda Bomb Plot in Paris,” The Times, March 15, 2005; Keith Richburg, “Six Guilty of Targeting U.S. Embassy in Paris,” Washington Post, March 16, 2005. 108 BBC News, “Al-Qaeda Suspect Tells of Bomb Plot,” May 27 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2941702.stm>.

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109 Pam Belluck, “Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is Given a Life Sentence,” New York Times, January 31, 2003. 110 Jenny Booth, “Gloucester Shoebomber Jailed for 13 Years,” The Times, April 22, 2005; “Would-Be Suicide Bomber Gets 13 Years,” The Guardian, April 22, 2005. 111 Edmund Andrews, “German Officials Find More Terrorist Groups, and Some Disturbing Parallels,” New York Times, April 26, 2002; U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaida Terrorists,” September 24, 2003 <www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js757.htm>. 112 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July/August 2006. 113 BBC News, “France Jails 25 for Attack Plot,” 14 June 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5078812.stm>. 114 BBC News, “Istanbul Rocked by Double Bombing,” November 20, 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3222608.stm>. 115 Karl Vick, “Al-Qaeda's Hand in Istanbul Plot,” Washington Post, February 13, 2007. 116 BBC News, “Madrid Train Attacks,” February 14, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/2004/madrid_train_attacks>. 117 Fernando Reinares, “Al-Qaeda Is Back,” National Interest, January 8, 2010; Fernando Reinares, “The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2010, pp. 83–104. 118 BBC News, Five Get Life over UK Bomb Plot,” April 30, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6195914.stm>; Reuters, “The British Fertilizer Bomb Plot,” April 30, 2007 <www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2559097320070430>. 119 BBC News, “UK al-Qaeda Cell Members Jailed,” June 15, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6755797.stm>. 120 BBC News, “London Attacks in Depth,” July 8, 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/uk/2005/london_explosions>. 121 James Brandon, “Al-Qa`ida’s Involvement in Britain’s Homegrown Terrorist Plots,” CTC Sentinel, March 2009, Vol. 2, No. 3; pp. 10-12; Daniel Mcgrory, Zahid Hussain, and Karen Mcveigh, “Top Al-Qaeda Trainer Taught Suspects to Use Explosive,” The Times, August 12, 2006. 122 BBC News, “Four 21/7 Bomb Plotters Get Life,” July 11, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6291238.stm>; James Brandon, “Al-Qa`ida’s Involvement in Britain’s Homegrown Terrorist Plots,” CTC Sentinel, March 2009, Vol. 2, No. 3; pp. 10-12; Paul Cruickshank, “The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghan-Pakistan Border Region and the West” (New America Foundation, February 2010), pp. 3, 10. 123 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2008 (The Hague, 2007), p. 19; Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “UK 2006 Liquid Explosives Plot Trial Overview” <http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/terror_plot_hearing.shtm>. 124 Paul Cruickshank, The Militant Pipeline (New American Foundation, February 2010); Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2008 (The Hague, 2008), p. 18; John Tagliabue, “Denmark: 2 Guilty In Terror Case,” New York Times, October 22, 2008. 125 Mark Landler, “German Police Arrest Three in Terrorist Plot,” New York Times, September 6, 2007; Yassin Musharbash and Matthias Gebauer, “Islamic Jihad Union Threatens Attacks Outside Germany, Spiegel, September 12, 2007. 126 Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Annual Report 2008, p. 23; Al Goodman (CNN), “Informant Testifies on Alleged Barcelona Terrorist Plot,”, November 16, 2009 <www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/11/16/spain.terror.trial/index.html>. 127 David Charter, Al-Qaeda Terror Plot Fears at EU Summit, The Times (London), December 11, 2008 <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5326082.ece>; Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 (April 2009). 128 BBC News, “Belgium Convicts Eight on Terrorism Charges,” May 10, 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8673229.stm>. 129 BBC News, “Terror Suspect Abid Naseer Held on U.S. Warrant,” July 8, 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/10543048.stm>; Dina Temple-Raston (NPR), “Feds: N.Y. Subway Bomb Plot Included U.K. Targets,” Morning Edition, July 8, 2010; Spencer S. Hsu, “Al-Qaeda Operative Is Charged in N.Y. Subway Plot,” Washington Post, July 8, 2010. 130 Michael Isikoff, “Bin Laden Is ‘Healthy, Giving Orders’ Says Terror Suspect,” Newsweek, March 29, 2010; Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” New York Times, March 25, 2010. 131 Ginger Thompson and David Johnston, “U.S. Man Accused of Helping Plot Mumbai Attack,” New York Times, December 8, 2009.

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132 Alan Cowell, Norway Says Three Planned Attack over Cartoons,” New York Times, September 28, 2010 July 8, 2010; Reuters, “Norway Arrests al Qaeda-Linked Suspects over Plot,” July 8, 2010 <http://uk.reuters.com>. 133 Anita Elash, “France Unusually Rattled as Reports of Europe Terror Plot Emerge, Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 2010; Micheal Slackman, “Germany, Unscathed, Is in Eye of Terrorism Scare,” New York Times, October 12, 2010; Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Al-Qaeda’s New Strategy: Less Apocalypse, More Street Fighting, Washington Post, October 10, 2010. 134 Dina Temple-Raston (NPR), “Bin Laden Told Partners to Plan Mumbai-Like Attacks,” September 30, 2010 <www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130242602&f=1001&sc=tw>. 135 Associated Press, “Man Charged in Bomb Plot in Germany,” New York Times, November 10, 2011. 136 Ayla Albayrak, “Turkey Arrests 15 in Alleged Plot to Attack U.S. Targets,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2011; Sebnem Arsu, “Turkish Police Say 15 Suspects Plotted Attacks,” New York Times, July 13, 2011. 137 BBC News, “Six Remanded Over 'Suicide Bomb Plot,” September 26, 2011 <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15064142>; John Burns and Ravi Somaiya, “Six Accused of Plotting Terrorism in England,” New York Times, September 26, 2011; Paul Cruickshank (CNN World), “Alleged U.K. Cell Charged with Terror Training in Pakistan,” September 26, 2011 <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-26/world/world_europe_britain-terror-training_1_terror-training-press-charges-explosive-device?_s=PM:EUROPE>. 138 Benjamin Weiser and Susan Sachs, “U.S. Sees Brooklyn Link to World Terror Network,” New York Times, October 22, 1998. 139 Joseph McCann, Terrorism on American Soil (Sentient Publications, 2006), pp. 193-200; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage Books, 2006), p. 201. 140 Joseph McCann, Terrorism on American Soil (Sentient Publications, 2006), pp. 170-176; Chitra Ragavan, “Tracing Terror’s Roots: How the first World Trade Center Plot Sowed the Seeds for 9/11,” U.S. News and World Report, February 16, 2003. 141 Tim Weiner, “Killer of Two at CIA Draws Death Sentence,” New York Times, January 24, 1998. 142 Federal Bureau of Investigations, “First Strike: Global Terror in America,” February 26, 2008 <www.fbi.gov/page2/feb08/tradebom_022608.html>; Joseph McCann, Terrorism on American Soil (Sentient Publications, 2006), pp. 184-192; Chitra Ragavan, “Tracing Terror’s Roots: How the first World Trade Center Plot Sowed the Seeds for 9/11,” U.S. News and World Report, February 16, 2003. 143 Christopher Wren, “U.S. Jury Convicts 3 in a Conspiracy to Bomb Airliners,” New York Times, September 6, 1996; United States v. Ramzi Yousef <http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com>. 144 Joseph Fried, “Sheik Sentenced To Life In Prison In Bombing Plot,” New York Times, January 18, 1996. 145 Chitra Ragavan, “Tracing Terror’s Roots: How the first World Trade Center Plot Sowed the Seeds for 9/11,” U.S. News and World Report, February 16, 2003.Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage Books, 2006), p. 202. 146 Maria Glod and Eric Weiss, “Kasi Executed for CIA Slayings,” Washington Post, November 15, 2002; Tim Weiner, “Killer of Two at CIA Draws Death Sentence,” New York Times, January 24, 1998. 147 BBC News, “Profile: Al-Qaeda Kingpin,” November 19, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2811855.stm>; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “First Strike: Global Terror in America,” February 26, 2008 <www.fbi.gov/page2/feb08/tradebom_022608.html>; Joseph MaCann, Terrorism on American Soil (Sentient Publication, 2006), pp. 184-192; United States v. Ramzi Yousef, et. al, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, April 4, 2003 <http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com>. 148 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 336-337; The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report (GPO, 2004), pp. 176-179. 149 Department of Justice, “Ali Al-Marri Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda,” April 30, 2009 <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-nsd-415.html>; Warren Richey, “Al Qaeda Sleeper Agent Sentenced to Eight Years in Prison, Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 2009; John Schwartz, “Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence,” New York Times, October 29, 2009. 150 Pam Belluck, “Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is Given a Life Sentence,” New York Times, January 31, 2003; Jenny Booth, “Gloucester Shoebomber Jailed for 13 Years,” The Times, April 22, 2005; “Would-Be Suicide Bomber Gets 13 Years,” The Guardian, April 22, 2005. 151 Peter Baker and Dan Eggen, “Bush Details 2002 Plot to Attack L.A. Tower,” Washington Post, February 10, 2006; Elisabeth Bumiller and David Johnston, “Bush Gives New Details of 2002 Qaeda Plot to Attack Los Angeles,” New York Times, February 10, 2006.

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152 Department of Defense, “Summary of Jose Padilla’s Activities with Al Qaeda,” May 28, 2004; CNN, “Terror Suspect Padilla Charged,” November 22, 2005 <www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/22/padilla.case/index.html>; Abby Goodnough and Scott Shane, “Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial,” New York Times, August 17, 2007; Peter Whoriskey, “Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of Terror Charges,” Washington Post, August 17, 2007. 153 Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York Police Department, 2007), pp. 57, 60, 62-63; Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman, “Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case,” New York Times, October 12, 2003. 154 Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack on New York Subway,” New York Times, June 18, 2006; “How an Al-Qaeda Cell Planned a Poison-Gas Attack on the N.Y. Subway,” Time, June 17, 2006; Ron Suskind, One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 194-195. 155 Eric Lichtblau, “Trucker Sentenced to 20 Years in Plot against Brooklyn Bridge,” The New York Times, October 29, 2003; Eric Lichtblau and Monica Davey, “Threats and Responses: Terror Suspect in Plot on Bridge Drew Interest Earlier,” The New York Times, June 21, 2003; CNN, “Ohio Trucker Joined al Qaeda Jihad,” June 19, 2003 <www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/19/alqaeda.plea>. 156 Julia Preston, “Man Helped Qaeda Figure, Jury Here Finds,” New York Times, November 24, 2005; Scott Shane, “Testimony on Al Qaeda Is Required in Plea Deal,” New York Times, February 29, 2012; Scott Shane and Benjamin Weiser, “Dossier Shows Push for More Attacks After 9/11,” New York Times, April 25, 2011. 157 BBC News, “UK al-Qaeda Cell Members Jailed,” June 15, 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6755797.stm>. 158 Alan Cowell, “British Muslim Sentenced in Terror Attacks, New York Times,” November 8, 2006; Adam Fresco “Die Hard: The Evidence against Dhiren Barot, The Times, November 6, 2006; U.S. Department of Justice, “Three British Nationals Indicted on Charges Of Conspiring to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction, Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” April 12, 2005 www.justice.gov/opa/. 159 Carolyn Marshall, “24-Year Term for Californian in Terrorism Training Case,” The New York Times, September 11, 2007; Department of Justice, “Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges,” September 10, 2007 <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html>. 160 Associated Press, “Lebanon: 2-Year Sentence in Plot to Blow Up Hudson River Tunnels,” New York Times, February 17, 2012; Spencer Hsu and Robin Wright, “Terror Plot Suspects Linked to al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, July 11, 2006. 161 Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18 Terrorist Freed after Guilty Plea,” The Star, February 7, 2010; Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York Police Department, 2007), pp. 52. 162 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2007 (The Hague, 2007), p. 19; Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “UK 2006 Liquid Explosives Plot Trial Overview” <www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2008/09/08/uk-2006-liquid-explosives-plot-trial-overview>. 163 Bob Driehaus, “U.S. Indicts an Ohio Man in Terror Conspiracy Case,” New York Times, April 13, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice, “Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Bomb Targets in Europe and the United States,” Tuesday, June 3, 2008 <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-492.html>. 164 Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” New York Times, July 24, 2009; William Rashbaum and Souad Mekhennet, “L.I. Man Helped Qaeda, Then Informed,” New York Times, July 23, 2009; Clair Suddath, “Bryant Neal Vinas: An American in Al Qaeda,” Time, July 24, 2009. 165 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Daniel Patrick Boyd and the Triangle Terror Group,” December 28, 2012; www.fbi.gov: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “North Carolina Resident Daniel Patrick Boyd Sentenced for Terrorism Violations,” August 24, 2012 <www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2012/north-carolina-resident-daniel-patrick-boyd-sentenced-for-terrorism-violations>; Gerry J. Gilmore (American Forces Press Service), “FBI, Navy Foiled Alleged Terror Plot on Quantico,” September 25, 2009 <www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55980. 166 A. G. Sulzberger, “Two More Men Charged In Plot to Bomb Subways,” New York Times, February 25, 2010. 167 Brett Blackledge (Associated Press), “U.S. Officials Say Zazi Had Links to Bin Laden's Afghan Lieutenant,” New York Times, October 15, 2009; David Johnston and William Rashbaum, “Terror Suspect Had Bomb Guide, Authorities Say,” New York Times, September 21, 2009; Spencer S. Hsu, “Al-Qaeda Operative Is Charged in N.Y. Subway Plot,” Washington Post, July 8, 2010; Dina Temple-Raston (NPR), “New York Terrorism Suspect Pleads Guilty,” All Things Considered, February 22, 2010. 168 Associated Press, “Chicago Man Held in Link to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, March 26. 2010; Chuck Goudie and Ann Pistone (ABC News), “US Cuts Deal with Taxi-Driver Terrorist,” February 6, 2012

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<http://abclocal.go.com>; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Chicago Man Sentenced to Over Seven Years in Prison for Attempting to Provide Funds to Support al Qaeda in Pakistan,” June 8, 2012 <www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2012/chicago-man-sentenced-to-over-seven-years-in-prison-for-attempting-to-provide-funds-to-support-al-qaeda-in-pakistan. 169 Al Baker and William Rashbaum, “Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square,” New York Times, May 1, 2010; Rashbaum, Tavernise, and Healy, "Bomb Suspect Said to Train in Pakistan,” New York Times, May 4, 2010; Liam Stack, “Pakistani Taliban Helped Faisal Shahzad,” Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 2010; Liam Stack, “Pakistani Taliban Release Faisal Shahzad's Martyrdom Tape,” Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 2010. 170 Don Butler, “Canadian Idol Wannabe among 3 Arrested in Terror Conspiracy,” Vancouver Sun, August 26, 2010; UPI, “Details Reported in Alleged Terror Plot,” September 3, 2010 <www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2010/09/03/Details-reported-in-alleged-terror-plot/UPI-32141283526157/>.