africa and the ‘world’ cup: fifa politics, eurocentrism and resistance
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Africa and the ‘World’ Cup: FIFAPolitics, Eurocentrism and ResistancePaul DarbyPublished online: 06 Aug 2006.
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Africa and the ‘World’ Cup: FIFAPolitics, Eurocentrism and ResistancePaul Darby
The development of African football in the international playing arena during the last 25years has been such that several noted commentators have predicted that the name of an
African nation will soon be appearing on the World Cup trophy. [1] With the exceptionof Senegal’s valiant efforts in reaching the quarter-finals of the 2002 tournament, the
relatively weak performances of the continent’s other representatives at the two mostrecent editions of the game’s premier international tournament would not appear to bear
out this assertion. [2] The promise offered by Cameroon’s quarter-final appearance atItalia 90, Nigeria and Cameroon’s Gold medals at the 1996 and 2000 Olympic football
tournament and African successes in FIFA’s under-age competitions thus remainsunfulfilled. [3] However, the disappointment that greeted the early exits of most of theAfrican representatives in 1998 and 2002 should not conceal the fact that, in a political
sense, both tournaments were a major victory for the African game. When one considersthat African representation at the World Cup has historically been restricted by a
Eurocentric bias at the heart of FIFA, the participation of five nations at both France 98and Japan/South Korea 2002 allows these tournaments to be viewed as significant
milestones for African football. Drawing on analyses of primary archival materials andother sources, this essay examines the ways in which the World Cup Finals, and more
specifically, the political debate surrounding the distribution of places for the tournamenthas come to represent one of the key arena’s in which Africa’s quest for global footballequity has manifested itself. [4] The essay concludes by assessing the extent to which the
discourse on Africa’s place at the World Cup can be read as a reflection of broader FirstWorld-Third World power relations.
Introduction
The allocation of five places to Africa for the 1998 World Cup Finals and beyond wasthe culmination of a bitterly-contested and acrimonious struggle dating back to the
early 1960s between the game’s emergent regions and FIFA’s European constituents
Paul Darby, University of Ulster at Jordanstown. Correspondence to: [email protected]
The International Journal of the History of SportVol. 22, No. 5, September 2005, 883 – 905
ISSN 0952-3367 (print)/ISSN 1743-9035 (online) ª 2005 Taylor & Francis Group LtdDOI: 10.1080/09523360500143745
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over how berths at the tournament should be distributed. At the centre of thisstruggle was an argument, forcibly articulated by a range of African football
administrators, that FIFA’s self-professed commitment to internationalism wasclearly not being applied to the World Cup. As the world body’s African membership
expanded dramatically with the collapse of colonialism in the late 1950s and early1960s, there was an expectation that realistic opportunities to qualify for and
participate in the World Cup Finals would follow. As the tables below demonstrate,this did not happen. Instead, the World Cup, and more specifically Africa’s place
within it, became enmired in the intercontinental and interpersonal rivalries thathave characterized the governance of world football in the second half of thetwentieth century. As a consequence, until relatively recently, the competition
remained an essentially European and South American enterprise.Before specifically addressing the power struggles that gradually led to FIFA’s
decision to reward Africa’s contribution to the world game with five World Cupplaces, a brief discussion of Africa’s position within FIFA during the colonial era will
set the context for much of what is to follow.
Africa, Football and FIFA in the Colonial Era
In some of the more remote African towns and villages that came under the influenceof European traders, settlers and missionaries football developed in a relatively
Table 2 Distribution of World Cup Berths Across Continental Groupings
Continent 1930 1950 1962 1966 1970 1978 1982 1994 1998 2002
Europe 4 6 10 10 9 10 14 13 15 15South America 7 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 5North/Central America 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3Asia/Oceania 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 4Africa 0 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 1 2 3 5 5Total 13 13 16 16 16 16 24 24 32 32
Table 1 FIFA’s Growth
Continents 1904 1925 1950 1975 2000
Europe 8 28 32 35 51South America 0 6 9 10 10North/Central America 0 3 12 22 35Asia 0 1 13 33 44Africa 0 1 2 35 52Oceania 0 0 1 4 11Total 8 39 69 139 203
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unplanned, haphazard fashion and was enthusiastically embraced by indigenouspopulations. However, in some of the larger industrial centres such as those within
French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and Colonial Zimbabwe, Europeancolonialists utilized their hegemonic position to impose football for their own ends.
[5] However, what is fascinating about the role of the game in African society duringthe colonial period is that when it was gradually diffused downwards to the labouring
classes it came to represent a site for generating resistance to colonialism andpromoting nationalist aspirations. [6]
The dichotomy of football’s role as a bulwark of cultural imperialism and a sourceof resistance in Africa during the colonial period and its immediate aftermath, wasalso apparent within the international governance of the game. Indeed, the
Eurocentric, patronizing and missionary style that characterized the administrationof a range of European colonies in Africa also manifested itself in the approach of a
succession of European FIFA Presidents towards the African game. As a consequence,Africa was regarded largely as an irrelevance, and until the late 1950s FIFA simply
refused to countenance Africa’s lobby for any democratization of the game’sinstitutional and competition structures. For example, attempts to procure a place on
FIFA’s Executive Committee and organize a continental confederation for the Africangame in the first half of the 1950s were routinely frustrated by the world body’s
European constituents. [7]The formation of the Confederation Africaine de Football (CAF) in 1957 by four of
the five independent African nations at that time (Ethiopia, Sudan, South Africa and
Egypt) was hugely significant in providing the African game and those countries thatwere on the verge of independence with a potent stage in which to respond to and
root their struggle against FIFA’s European bias. Given the political and nationalisticpedigree that football in Africa had acquired in the final years of colonial rule and the
practical role it had played in the struggle for independence, [8] CAF became,according to Quansah, ‘among the first international organisations that any nations
achieving independence in Africa applies to join’. [9] However, newly independentAfrican nations quickly realized that if they wanted to register their presence andproject themselves in the international community of nation-states they would have
to look further than pan-African bodies. Thus, organizations such as the UnitedNations saw a rapid increase in the numbers of African nations seeking membership.
This trend was also reflected in FIFA and was underpinned by a realization that anystruggle for global football recognition would be best achieved by joining the world
body and seeking opportunities to play in the game’s most visible and prestigiousinternational competition.
Africa and the World Cup Prior to Decolonization
Africa’s involvement in the World Cup prior to the independence movements of thelate 1950s and 1960s was limited. This was simply a consequence of the fact that until
decolonization there were just four independent African nations that had affiliated to
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FIFA and hence were eligible to take part in the competition. Given that Sudan andEthiopia did not join FIFA until 1948 and 1953 respectively, Egypt was the continent’s
sole eligible representative during the early editions of the World Cup. They qualifiedfor the finals in 1934, where they lost 4–2 in the first round against the highly regarded
Hungary, and in the final qualifying round for the 1954 tournament in Switzerlandthey were pitted against Italy who beat them 7–2 on aggregate over two legs. Egypt’s
involvement in the Olympic football tournament was more frequent, and ultimatelymore successful. They took part in the 1920, 1928, 1936, 1948 and 1952 Games and
their success in reaching the semi-finals of the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam,following victories over Turkey and Portugal, represented the first time that an Africannation had registered a serious presence in international football competition.
Although Egypt’s performances in early editions of the World Cup were relativelynon-descript, the performances of a number of African-born players on the game’s
most prestigious international stage clearly demonstrated the abilities and potentialof African players. For example, the Moroccan-born Just Fontaine, scored a record 13
times for France at the World Cup Finals in 1958. Indeed, France has continued tobenefit from the talents of naturalized Africans in some of the more recent World
Cup tournaments. Perhaps the clearest example of Africans excelling at the WorldCup pre-1970 whilst representing other nations can be found in the performances of
Mozambique-born Eusebio whilst playing for Portugal at the 1966 tournament inEngland. Indeed, he is widely accredited with being the inspiration behind Portugal’sthird place finish. [10]
The post-colonial period saw increasing numbers of African nations participatingin World Cup qualification. For example, there were six African entries for the
qualifying rounds of the 1962 World Cup, [11] a trend that was also reflected in theOlympic football tournament. Indeed, at the 1964 Games in Tokyo, both Ghana and
a combined Egypt-Syria team, which entered the competition under the name theUnited Arab Republic (UAR), took part with great success. UAR topped a group
containing Brazil and the Korean Republic whilst Ghana did likewise in a groupcomprised of Japan and Argentina. Both teams met in the quarter-final where UARemerged victorious. Although UAR lost the semi-final 6–0 to the eventual Gold
medallists Hungary, the relative success of Africa’s representatives at this tournamentsent out a message that where realistic opportunities to qualify were provided,
African teams could hold their own in top-level international competition.
Europe Defends ‘Their’ World Cup
By the mid 1960s FIFA’s hugely expanded African constituency, numbering over30 national associations, began to seek ways of ensuring that the international
game’s institutional and competition structures developed in ways thataccommodated their needs and aspirations. Given that FIFA’s electoral franchiseat Congress operated on the principle of one nation one vote, it might have been
expected that CAF would be in a position to challenge the power imbalances that
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lay at the heart of the International Federation. However, European adminis-trators, anxious to maintain hegemony within FIFA, had organized themselves
into a politically unified confederation in 1954 and they resolved to consolidatetheir position within FIFA whilst at the same time marginalizing Africa and Asia.
Stanley Rous, then FIFA President, summed up the prevailing mood within UEFAat the time by expressing his concern over the fact that the established European
football nations ‘should have no more than equal voting rights with any of thenewly created countries of Africa and Asia’. [12] These sentiments were echoed
two years later by Gustav Weiderkehr, later to become President of UEFA, whenhe outlined in stark terms the nature of the threat that the expansion of thegoverning body posed for Europe
At present, FIFA is composed of 126 members, thirty-three of which are fromEurope. The admission of six further Associations would, therefore, theoreticallyallow that a three quarter majority of non-European Associations alter the Statutesof FIFA even against the unanimity of Europe. Since the last revision of the FIFAStatutes, the Executive Committee consists of eight European and ten othermembers . . . It can hardly be denied that this situation is somewhat dangerous.(author’s italics) [13]
Concerned about being pushed further into the electoral minority at FIFA Congressor on the Executive Committee, UEFA made several attempts during the late 1950sand early 1960s to introduce a pluralist voting system that would more adequately
reflect their self-perceived standing in world football, [14] but their failure to effectthe requisite statutory reform persuaded them to seek to maintain their hegemony in
other ways. Chief amongst these was a strategy aimed at ensuring that the format ofthe World Cup Finals continued to protect European interests at the expense of
FIFA’s rapidly expanding third world constituency. For example, in the early 1960sUEFA’s Executive Committee considered the idea of reducing the number of
participants in the finals of the competition as a method of consolidating its positionand limiting opportunities for the developing world. However, the proposed measurewas abandoned because of fears that a reduction in the size of the World Cup would
‘offend particularly the associations of South and Central America’. [15]In proposing such measures UEFA was clearly responding to FIFA’s rapidly
expanding African constituency and the pressure that this was applying on the worldbody to provide that continent’s football nations with an adequate and realistic
opportunity to take part in the World Cup Finals. FIFA’s European-dominatedExecutive Committee remained steadfast and as part of qualification for the 1962
tournament in Chile, the world body stipulated that the winners of the Africanpreliminary round (Morocco) would be required to play a further qualifying match
against Spain. [16] FIFA’s refusal to grant Africa its own World Cup berth wasformalized in 1964 when the world body introduced a rule requiring the winners ofthe African zone to play the winners of the Asia/Oceania zone to qualify for future
World Cup Finals.
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Kwame Nkrumah and the Campaign for an Equitable World Cup
Africa’s response to FIFA’s continued resistance to democratize the World Cup wasto initiate a sustained political offensive aimed at acquiring equitable representation
in the game’s most visible international arena. The first element of this strategymanifested itself in the form of a campaign, initiated and orchestrated by the leading
Ghanaian nationalist and pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah, to boycott the 1966Finals in England. That Nkrumah was a central figure in the politicized response to
FIFA’s allocation of places for the World Cup is hardly surprising. In the immediateaftermath of Ghanaian independence, achieved in 1957, he recognized the capacity ofsport to help imbue the local population with a sense of nationhood that could
potentially transcend parochial tribal loyalties and bind them to common social,economic and political objectives. [17] For Nkrumah, football in particular had a
central role in mobilizing the youth of the country around a common identity and herecognized its potential as a barometer of international standing for newly
independent African nations.As a consequence of these beliefs, Nkrumah quickly targeted the Ghanaian football
team as a way of building national unity. An official football association wasestablished in 1957 and, in the following year, Ghana became affiliated to FIFA.
Under the stewardship of the first Ghanaian sports director, Ohene Djan, theGhanaian team began competing in international competition with the specificpurpose of engendering patriotic sentiments amongst the population. [18] Poor
performances in World Cup qualifying rounds in 1962 did nothing to dampenNkrumah’s desire to draw on the mobilizing potential of football. Indeed, in 1962 he
cast the national team in an ambassadorial role when he suggested that they embarkon a tour of Europe as a way of instilling national confidence and challenging
European prejudices about Africans. [19] The strength of Nkrumah’s convictionsregarding the contribution of football to his Africanist philosophies were such that he
established a club himself, Real Republicans, who were to act as ambassadors for pan-Africanism and ‘the new spirit of the African man’. [20] Two years later at the 1964Tokyo Olympics the national team demonstrated this ‘new spirit’ when, as
highlighted earlier, they finished top of their group before losing in the quarter-finals to UAR. Olympic success would clearly have been welcomed but Nkrumah was
eager to accrue the type of international recognition that could be gleaned fromqualification for the World Cup. Thus, Nkrumah, intensely frustrated at the limited
opportunities for realizing this ambition, came to represent the central axis aroundwhich discontent at FIFA’s allocation of World Cup berths revolved.
African Boycott and FIFA’s Response
Nkrumah’s idea of withdrawing from the finals quickly secured approval from CAFand at its Executive Committee meeting in Cairo in July 1964, a resolution was
passed in opposition to Africa’s ‘outrageously unfair’ allocation of places for the
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World Cup Finals. [21] Charged with ‘making the World Championship a real worldmanifestation far from any exclusivism’, CAF informed FIFA of the intention of all
African national associations to withdraw from the qualifying stages of the 1966Finals. [22] According to Ohene Djan, who was also instrumental in CAF’s boycott
strategy, Africa would not participate in the World Cup until FIFA rewarded theprogress of African football with adequate opportunity for participating in the Finals:
‘We are not asking this as beggars. We are putting forward just and moderatedemands, taking account of the huge progress made in our football.’ [23] The Asian
nations soon followed Africa’s lead, arguing that ‘as a World Cup, the competitionshould represent the world and not just Europe and South America’. [24]FIFA’s response to the boycott was a fine of 5,000 Swiss Francs imposed in July
1965 on each of the national associations that had withdrawn from the competition.The imposition of the fine not only placed a considerable financial burden on African
football but also increased the antipathy of CAF’s constituents towards the worldbody. A reduction of the fine to 1,000 Swiss Francs following the intervention of CAF,
did little to abate the African nations’ enmity. In a letter to his counterpart in FIFA,Dr Helmut Kaeser, CAF’s Secretary General, Mourad Fahmy, registered the anger of
his constituents by arguing that the allocation of one World Cup Finals berth to threecontinents comprising more than 65 Associations was ‘absurd’ and did not
adequately reflect the prevailing situation in world football. [25] Furthermore,CAF’s President, Ydnekatchew Tessema, challenged FIFA’s assertion that the boycottwas totally without justification as the basis for the fines:
FIFA has adopted a relentless attitude against the African Associations and itsdecisions resemble methods of intimidation and repression designed to discourageany further impulses of a similar nature. In our opinion, the African NationalAssociations which, in spite of the flagrant injustice that drove them to abandonthe World Cup series, submitted sportingly to the regulations in force, so as toconsolidate the moral authority of the FIFA, really deserved a gesture of respectrather than a fine. [26]
The boycott marked the beginning of Africa’s campaign for a more equitable World
Cup and despite FIFA’s initial hard-line response, it soon had the desired effect. AsQuansah observed, the withdrawal of all African and Asian competitors from the
World Cup qualifying tournament ‘shook the very foundations of FIFA which votedat its pre-tournament Congress in London to allow African representation on their
own merit’. [27]The performances of Africa’s representative, Morocco, at the 1970 Finals in Mexico
did much to legitimate the actions of those who boycotted the 1966 World Cup.Indeed, the 1970 competition saw the genesis of Morocco’s proud tradition of
furthering the cause of African soccer through their performances in the internationalplaying arena. Although they obtained just one point from their group games,Morocco almost caused a sensation when they took a shock lead against West
Germany in their opening match before eventually losing to a goal scored with just
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over ten minutes remaining. The performance of the qualifiers from the Asia/Oceaniazone, Israel, also strengthened the general principle underpinning Africa’s quest for
greater representation at the World Cup. The significance of their results, a narrowdefeat by Uruguay, a 1–1 draw with Sweden and a goalless draw with the beaten
finalists, Italy, is put into context by Tomlinson who has argued that, ‘the small,unfancied or traditionally weak sides were capable now of competing with the very
best’. [28]Perhaps of greater significance than Morocco’s efforts for the African football
lobby was the fact that, at the 1970 FIFA Congress in Mexico City, UEFA lost itsmajority representation on the crucial World Cup and Olympic Tournamentcommittees. The European confederation was outraged at this political loss and it
convened an Extraordinary Congress in Monte Carlo in June 1971. Louis Wouters,the Belgian delegate, voiced the concerns of those present when he suggested that this
move raised question marks over ‘the future of Europe in world football’ and that‘political questions were given precedence over questions of sport and a clearly anti-
European attitude had been exhibited’. [29] UEFA were particularly worried that itsdiminished influence on FIFA’s most important committees would adversely affect
its constituents’ chances of hosting and qualifying for future World Cup Finals.Gustav Weiderkehr, the President of UEFA at that time, thought that the situation
‘had become critical’, [30] arguing that, ‘The reduction of the European influencewithin the competent Committees . . . is not acceptable’. [31] Weiderkehr was alsoquick to seek assurances from FIFA that the views of European nations on the issue of
the allocation of World Cup berths would continue to be respected:
The European countries expect that the competent committees of FIFA, whentaking any decisions but particularly when deciding the distribution of finalistplaces in the World Cup in 1974 in the Federal Republic of Germany, take intoconsideration the various aspects of European football, both from the view ofquantity and quality. [32]
UEFA Responds to Africa’s Challenge
Despite losing its majority representation on FIFA’s World Cup committee, Europe
still controlled FIFA’s core decision-making machinery, thus ensuring that calls foran expanded format and a more equitable distribution of places at the competition
were resisted. For example, following calls from the African delegates at the FIFA/CAF Consultative Committee meeting in February 1972, Stanley Rous called the
World Cup Bureau to a meeting in May 1972 to consider the possibility of increasingthe number of teams and reserving additional places for FIFA’s emerging
constituencies. However, European resistance precluded any suggestion that theWorld Cup should accommodate ‘weaker’ nations. [33] A further example ofEurope’s efforts to block attempts to expand the World Cup or, indeed, alter the
balance of power in the international game can be found in the events surrounding
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the Congresses of UEFA and FIFA in 1972. Prior to its Congress, UEFA had learnedthat the Argentinean Football Association intended to propose an expansion in the
number of participants from 16 to 24 for the 1978 World Cup Finals. At UEFA’sCongress in Vienna, the suggestion to enlarge the finals was rebuffed by the delegates
and they pointed to a referendum of European national associations held two yearspreviously that had illustrated that the overwhelming majority were opposed to an
extension in the number of participants. In concluding the discussions, UEFA’sPresident, Gustav Weiderkehr, reiterated the findings of the referendum and further
reaffirmed that this view was also held by FIFA. [34]The Argentine FA pressed on with its proposal regardless and they continued to
attempt to harness support for the idea of increasing the number of participants for
the 1978 World Cup. A meeting between the presidents of the continentalconfederations was convened prior to the FIFA Congress in 1972 and Dr Salinas,
the President of the Argentine FA, intimated that Argentina would withdraw theiroriginal suggestion and propose instead an increase to 20 participants. This proposal
was received more favourably and all those present at the meeting supported the ideaexcept Weiderkehr who reiterated the opposition of UEFA to a change in format.
With such strong resistance emanating from Europe, it was unlikely that the three-quarters majority required to pass the proposal at Congress would be obtained. In an
attempt to placate UEFA’s President, it was suggested at the meeting that Europewould be guaranteed one of the four new World Cup berths. When this suggestionwas presented to UEFA’s Extraordinary Congress the following year, it did more to
antagonize as opposed to placate Europe. Louis Wouters, the Belgian delegate andoutspoken Eurocentric, articulated the concerns of his UEFA colleagues by raising the
question of why Europe, representing practically 80 per cent of world football, shouldbe satisfied with one additional participant. In qualifying this assertion by arguing
that ‘the European Associations, by their activity, support and organisation,contribute by far the largest share to world football’, [35] Wouters’ was arguing
that because of their disproportionate financial contribution to the world game,Europe deserved the lion’s share of the spoils. [36]UEFA’s resistance to improving the third world’s international profile at the World
Cup was clearly part of a broader response to the political consequences of FIFA’sdramatic expansion in this period. FIFA’s franchise arrangements at Congress were
such that those nations that did not join FIFA until the 1960s had the same votingpower as the world body’s founding European members. With FIFA continuing to
expand rapidly as a consequence of the collapse of Empire, UEFA was finding itselfbeing squeezed into an electoral minority. However, with only those taking part in
officially sanctioned FIFA competitions eligible to vote at Congress, it was clearly inthe interests of the world body’s established members to seek to restrict opportunities
for the Third World to compete in such competitions. Although writing in the early1980s, the sentiments of CAF’s President at that time, Ydnekatchew Tessema,accurately reflected the frustrations and aspirations felt by African Football at FIFA’s
consistently-Eurocentric stance on the World Cup:
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Although we acknowledge the role played by certain continents in the creation ofFIFA, its development and their moral, material and financial contributions, weestimate that democratic rule dictates that all rights and duties that form aninternational organisation should be the same for all. This is why in the frameworkof legitimacy, and by following a process consistent with the interests of worldfootball and its unity, a progressive equilibrium of the representation in the heart ofFIFA and its competitions is required. [37]
Despite the fact that Africa had improved its power base within FIFA it was clear that
acting alone the continent’s football nations could not have hoped to effect seriousdemocratization within FIFA’s competitions and indeed, corridors of power.However, during the early 1970s, Joao Havelange, the former Brazilian Olympian,
IOC member and business magnate, emerged as the individual most likely to loosenEurope’s grip on the world game. Havelange was an interested observer of the
skirmishes between FIFA’s developed and developing constituencies and in the earlystages of his campaign to wrest the FIFA Presidency from Stanley Rous he recognized
that Africa’s frustrations could be harnessed to fulfil both his own and CAF’saspirations within world football.
Havelange and the Struggle to Democratize the World Cup
Once he had decided to stand for the FIFA presidency, Havelange focused much ofhis canvassing efforts on emphasizing the dichotomy and unequal power relations
between FIFA’s European constituents and its newer members from the Third World.As his election ‘manifesto’ reveals, Havelange’s platform was based unashamedly on
increasing opportunities for the Third World within world football. [38] In a movethat demonstrated his sharp political acumen, the Brazilian pledged to expand the
World Cup from 16 to 24 places and in doing so accommodate calls for a moreequitable distribution of places for African and Asian countries. Havelange’s skilful
employment of the rhetoric of Third World enfranchisement ultimately won overAfrica and Asia and, with their votes, he was duly elected FIFA President at the worldbody’s 1974 Congress in Frankfurt. Rhamadan Ali, the respected Tanzanian sports
journalist and former international footballer, articulates the significance ofHavelange’s election for FIFA’s African members:
By ousting Sir Stanley, Africa and the rest of the Third World have struck aresounding blow for a more equitable distribution of sporting power and influencein the world . . . it (CAF) has brought its influence to bear on a number of issuesand has succeeded in breaking Europe’s monopoly on world football. [39]
The outcome of the vote stunned UEFA and signalled an unparalleled transformationin FIFA’s development as the balance of power shifted from the northern to thesouthern hemisphere. With Rous’ failure to prevent the accession of a South
American to the FIFA Presidency, UEFA had lost possession of the most powerful
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position in the game’s global administrative infrastructure. Furthermore, theInternational Federation’s franchise arrangements coupled with the dramatic
globalization of the game was increasingly rendering the European body as apolitical minority at Congress. Artemio Franchi was in no doubt that these
developments had created a political environment in which ‘other continents’ feltconfident enough to ‘seek to undermine its [UEFA’s] standing and influence’. [40]
The response of sections of the European press was to suggest that UEFA either exertthe full extent of its influence over world football affairs or withdraw entirely from
the International Federation. [41] UEFA’s figurehead, conscious that the latter optionwould deny FIFA’s European constituents the opportunity to participate in theWorld Cup Finals, favoured the former position. Nonetheless, in outlining a strategy
aimed at upholding UEFA’s position in world football, Franchi sounded a clearwarning to those who continued to challenge Europe’s position: ‘The suggestion that
UEFA should withdraw from FIFA would then appear a radical one which, I feel,should only be taken at a point when coexistence were no longer possible or
tolerable.’ [42]A central plank in Franchi’s strategy was to counter Havelange’s plans to enlarge
the World Cup. For example, at the 1977 UEFA Congress in Istanbul, 26 membersused a consultative vote to express a desire to maintain the Finals in their present
format. Although 21 associations indicated that they were not necessarily against anenlargement of the competition, they argued that if the competition was to beexpanded then Europe’s proportion of berths should remain unchanged. UEFA’s
figurehead underpinned these sentiments with the following reasoning:
Europe contains a large number of national teams of an equally high standard whoare all capable of making their presence felt in world football. This is a fact – a factborne out by results from past World Cup tournaments which have seen manydifferent teams from Europe taking top honours. This is a claim that can be madeby no other continent and one which enables Europe to make certain demands ofits own. Thus, Europe could only subscribe to an enlargement of the World CupFinals if this new formula takes proper account of the power, the potential, thetraditions and the importance of European football. [43]
Whilst Europe unquestionably shares with South America the mantle of being the
most successful continental group at the World Cup, [44] Franchi’s assertions clearlyfailed to recognize the improving standard of football outside these two continents.
Furthermore, as the many memorable performances of African and Asian nations atsubsequent 24 and 32 team World Cups illustrate, the views of the European
associations also failed to recognize the significant levelling of standards thatopportunities to compete against the game’s best international teams could herald.
Instead, Franchi continued with his unrelenting criticism of suggestions to reward theefforts of Africa and Asia with improved representation at football’s showpiecetournament. Speaking at a Press conference in London on the morning of the 1977
Final of his confederation’s most venerated club competition, the European
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Champions Cup, Franchi defended UEFA’s position by alleging that ‘if we increasethe number of teams, particularly those from other continents, this would create a
lower standard and would lower interest’. [45]Europe’s consistent and at times vehement opposition failed to detract from the
strength of African or, indeed, Asian, resolve to effect a fairer distribution of placesfor the Finals. Acrimonious exchanges between Europe and the developing countries
ensued at the 1978 FIFA Congress in Buenos Aires, when the Kuwait FootballAssociation, supported by their counterparts in Bahrain and Iraq, tabled a proposal
calling for a thorough reappraisal of the distribution of World Cup Finalists’ slots. Inpresenting their proposal, the Kuwait delegate unambiguously articulated the logicupon which the third world’s attempt to secure a more equitable World Cup was
based and is therefore worth quoting at some length:
Despite the fact that national associations of Asia and Africa constitute more thanhalf of the members of FIFA, the Executive Committee and its sub-committees,such as the World Cup Organising Committee, ignore this fact and deal with theseassociations as of a second-class membership [sic] . . .despite the fact that thenumber of teams entitled to join World Cup Finals is 16 teams, all nationalassociations of Africa and Asia in addition to Oceania, altogether constituting morethan 75 national associations, compete to enter one team from Africa and anotherfrom Asia and Oceania into the World Cup Final rounds. The arguments repeatedabout Asia and Africa not only acquiring the level which qualify them for increaseof their representation in the World Cup Finals should be rejected, for if this matteris left solely to such assessments the situation would not change, as we do believethat one of the major means by which the standard of the game could be developedis the creation of incentives, the best of which as far as Asian and African teams areconcerned would be to give them the opportunity for more than one team toqualify to World Cup Finals [sic]. [46]
The proposal was concluded by making reference to the ‘absence of equality’ in the
actions of an Executive Committee that still possessed a high proportion of Europeanmembers and argued that all requests to alter the structure of the World Cup Finalshad been received ‘with a negative attitude’. [47] Based on a perception, realistic or
otherwise, of their place within FIFA’s world order, the Asian representative thensuggested an alternative formula for the World Cup, which not only would have
increased the allocation of places for the emergent football nations but, significantly,also proposed a marked reduction in the number of places afforded to the
International Federation’s European members.When the matter was opened for discussion Claude Ganga, representing the
Congolese association, informed the Congress that, in order to avoid a seriousconflict of interest, the Kuwait delegation had agreed to withdraw their proposal so
that less controversial recommendations, made on behalf of the African nationalassociations, could be heard. The African proposals mirrored the theme of theAsian motion by reaffirming the belief that the present apportioning of places was
‘unjust’. Ganga also argued that increased opportunities to participate in
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international football’s most prestigious competition would create a self-sustainingdevelopment dynamic within the Third World, thereby enabling FIFA to fulfil its
fundamental global mission of promoting the game on a world-wide basis.However, no specific proposals were put forward in respect of how places could be
distributed across the confederations. Instead, Ganga suggested that FIFA’scompetent committees be charged with the responsibility of examining ‘all
possibilities’ which would take greater account of Africa’s and Asia’s calls for moregenerous representation.
Despite the more conciliatory tone of this proposition, UEFA remained resolute inits opposition and in doing so confirmed their intent to jealously uphold theirprivileged position at the World Cup. For example, Sir Harold Thompson, the
Football Association’s representative, responded to Ganga’s proposals by suggestingthat ‘it would be ridiculous to try and reduce the number of [European teams] in the
Final competition and it might even have grave consequences for FIFA’s future’. [48]The President of CAF, Ydnekatchew Tessema countered Thompson’s terse rejection
of the validity of the emergent nations’ concerns by reiterating the fact that theAfrican proposal had been offered to Congress by way of ‘appeasement’ and a desire
to ‘safeguard FIFA’s unity and the universality of world football’. In a clear attack onEurope’s traditional monopoly of the world game, Tessema argued that ‘certain other
continents [Europe] should renounce their privileges and other continents shouldacquire better standing’. [49] Despite UEFA’s opposition, the perseverance of thegame’s emergent regions combined with the sympathetic attitude of the FIFA
President towards their cause proved highly persuasive and soon bore tangibleresults. The outcome of the vote on whether or not the World Cup would be enlarged
revealed that 96 nations were in favour of staging future competitions with either 20or 24 participants, whilst only four were opposed. [50]
FIFA Expands the World Cup
Although Zaire’s weak performances at the 1974 World Cup in West Germany didlittle to support the African cause, [51] Tunisia’s feats at the 1978 competition in
Argentina, achieving Africa’s first victory in a World Cup game and narrowly failingto qualify for the second round following a goalless draw with West Germany, not
only restored the belief that the continent could become a force in the internationalplaying arena but also lent political support to calls for improved African
representation. At a FIFA Executive Committee meeting in Zurich in March 1979,the combined weight of CAF’s politicized campaign, Tunisia’s performances and, of
course, Havelange’s forceful championing of the Third World cause was brought tobear and the decision was taken to double Africa and Asia’s representation to two
places apiece for the 24-team competition in Spain in 1982.Despite its improved allocation of places, the distribution of the eight extra berths
angered the CAF. Central to the confederation’s sense of injustice was the fact that
Europe was clearly the main beneficiary of the protracted negotiations. [52] Indeed,
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in securing four additional places, bringing their total to 14 berths, the Europeanassociations had actually been afforded increased opportunities for qualification.
More significantly, in dictating the terms upon which the future of the competitionwas to be organized, UEFA had exerted the full extent of its influence in FIFA’s
committee structures and provided evidence of the fact that despite losing thePresidency, it was still a potent political force within world football. Although
Europe’s privileged position at FIFA’s premier international tournament had beenpreserved, the European media greeted Havelange’s move to expand the format of the
competition with scepticism and derision. The prominent British journalist andvociferous Havelange critic, Brian Glanville, who suggested that ‘Havelange hasruined the World Cup, has sold it down the river to the Afro-Asians and their ilk’,
[53] exemplified the sneering and often arrogant posture of the Europeans. Hisbrazenly Eurocentric observations reached their most vitriolic proportions with the
following anti-Third World diatribe:
The 1982 World Cup is, with its twenty-four teams, more of a madman’s flytrapthan ever. FIFA, thanks in no small part to the electoral machinations of Havelange,have fallen badly for the sentimentalism and the double standards of the ThirdWorld, always eager to reject any kind of paternalism, except when they themselvescan benefit from it. [54]
Glanville displayed equal disdain in his criticism of those European associations thathad voted for the expansion, describing them as ‘stupid, short sighted and narrowly
self-interested’ and claiming that ‘the World Cup would be diluted in quality andseverely exacerbated in its demands on teams and players’. [55]
Narrowing the North-South Gap: Africa at the Enlarged World Cup
Irrespective of the reservations of Franchi and those sections of the European press
that claimed that opening the doors of the competition wider would dilute thequality of play and damage the prestige of the event, [56] the performances ofnational teams hailing from the so-called developing football countries at the
enlarged competition indicated that the gap between the established nations andthe Third World had grown visibly narrower. Both of the African representatives
performed with merit in 1982 and were very unfortunate not to qualify for thesecond round. Cameroon left the competition undefeated following draws with
Peru, Poland and the eventual champions, Italy, whilst Algeria caused the upset ofthe competition, defeating the beaten finalists and footballing super power, West
Germany, in their opening group game. A 3–2 victory over Chile following defeatby Austria should have been enough to secure Africa’s first qualifier to the second
round of the Finals. However, West Germany and Austria contrived to play out anotoriously uncompetitive 1–0 German victory, later dubbed by sections of theAfrican sporting press as the ‘great Gijon swindle’, which sent both European teams
through to the second round at the expense of the furious Algerians. Official
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condemnation of the negative approach of both teams by Havelange failed toappease African anger at what they believed represented further evidence of
Europe’s desire to defend its privileged place within the world game at the expenseof the Third World. [57]
The imbalances that persisted within the World Cup were becoming increasinglydifficult to defend in light of the improving performances of African nations. Spain
‘82 in particular provided clear evidence of the legitimacy of their demands in respectof the World Cup, a view forcibly put across by Ydnekatchew Tessema, CAF’s
President at the time, in an article in an African sports magazine:
The glorious participation of Algeria and Cameroon in the final tournament of theXIIth World Cup is a subject of pride for all Africans and shows that the establishedvalues, putting African football in the range of novices and troublemakers, have nolonger reason to exist. [58]
Indeed, even within Europe, the contribution of Cameroon and Algeria to thecompetition did not go unnoticed. In an unprecedented move that lent further
support to calls for enhanced Asian and African representation, nine communistmembers of the European Parliament from France and Italy and two social
democrats from Germany, called on FIFA to ‘create the conditions for greaterrepresentation of and non-discrimination against these teams at the next WorldCup’. [59] The majority of UEFA’s member nations did not share the leftist political
outlook of this group so CAF pressed on with its efforts to challenge Europe’sprivileged position at the World Cup. At the 1986 FIFA Congress in Mexico, the
Guinean delegate, on behalf of the African confederation, presented a series ofproposals for the modification of FIFA’s statutes aimed at ‘creating a new equilibrium
(in world football) among the different continents’. [60] One of these proposals was amotion to regroup the four British Associations into one single association, thereby
limiting them to one vote at Congress and, crucially, one place at the World Cup. Inthe eyes of African football administrators, the ‘special’ status of the four Britishassociations within FIFA [61] was a clear manifestation of the disproportionate
distribution of power that had simultaneously restricted the advance of Africa andconsolidated Europe’s position within world football and its premier international
competition. Mustapha Fahmy, CAF’s General Secretary, articulated the frustrationthat this situation caused for CAF
It is unthinkable that on the eve of the 21st Century , one single association couldbe represented by four teams in the World Cup while only one single continentsuch as ours which has forty-seven countries is only entitled to two teams to thefinal tournament of the World Cup. [62]
Although Africa’s proposals were vetoed, the Congress did decide to set up a
committee charged with exploring the possibility of changing FIFA’s statutes and
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rethinking the British associations’ independent status. The possible impact that thestatute revisions committee might have had on these associations’ place at future
World Cups was starkly spelt out by Harry Cavan, FIFA’s Northern Irish senior vice-president at the time: ‘I venture to suggest that if, through the statutes committee,
they restrict us to one vote they may well be paving the way to us only having oneteam after the 1990 World Cup.’ [63] However, the presentation of the new texts to
the 1990 Congress in Rome revealed that Africa’s efforts to effect the statutory reformneeded to change the position of the British associations had ultimately proved futile.
Whilst attempts to effect a more equitable World Cup via FIFA’s Congress andcommittees were proving problematic, African performances at the tournament itselfwere creating an increasingly irrefutable case for improved representation. During the
1986 tournament in Mexico, Africa produced its first qualifier for the second roundof the competition. Morocco’s achievements in finishing on top of a group which
contained the elite of western, southern and eastern Europe (England, Portugal andPoland) and a last-minute defeat at the hands of West Germany in the second round,
served notice of the increasing strength of Africa’s football tradition. This promisewas delivered during the 1990 tournament where Cameroon defeated Argentina in
the opening game and topped a group containing Romania and the USSR beforeeventually losing narrowly after extra-time in the quarter-final to England. As
Tomlinson observed, with Cameroon’s feats at Italia ‘90, Europe’s resistance toimproving the representation of the Third World at the World Cup Finals becameincreasingly difficult to justify:
The respectable and improving performances of sides from Asia and other areasbeyond the power bases of world football gave lie to those critical voices from thecentres of authority and privilege . . . the inventory of performances by theemergent footballing nations was beginning to suggest that western (and in somecases smug Latin American) assumptions about the innate superiority of theirgame were ill-founded. [64]
Indeed, when the Executive Committee met in Zurich in December 1990, FIFAtook the decision to reward Africa’s contribution to the World Cup by granting
them an additional place for the 1994 edition in the USA. [65] In the lead-up toUSA ‘94 there was great expectation that one of the three African qualifiers would
emulate Cameroon’s feats at the previous edition of the competition. Cameroonand Morocco both disappointed, finishing bottom of their respective groups.
However, Nigeria finished top of a first round group comprising Bulgaria,Argentina and Greece before losing narrowly after extra-time in the second round
to beaten finalists Italy. [66]
Africa Secures World Cup Recognition
By the mid-1990s Africa had clearly made significant strides in world football’s
competitions and institutional structures. Since the ascendancy of Havelange as
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FIFA President and the emergence of figures such as Ydnekatchew Tessema andIssa Hayatou as leaders of the African confederation, FIFA functioned, at various
levels, as a body which articulated African interests and provided them with aforum to resist and challenge European hegemony. The World Cup had
increasingly served as an arena in which Africa demonstrated its capabilities onthe field of play whilst the broader struggle over the distribution of Finals berths
highlighted the growing political strength of the African constituency withinFIFA’s corridors of power.
The rapid globalization and democratization of the game up until the 1990s hadclearly created huge problems for UEFA. In the early 1990s these problems becamemagnified. In the aftermath of the political upheavals in the former Soviet Union,
UEFA saw its membership ranks swell by 16 new nations all anxious to express theirnational identity and independent status in international sporting competition. As a
consequence, UEFA began to experience intense pressure from within to worktowards ensuring that FIFA and world football developed in ways that accom-
modated the world game’s expanded European constituency. A European challengeto the FIFA Presidency from UEFA President, Lennart Johansson, formed the
cornerstone of a strategy aimed at reclaiming control of FIFA. [67] However, UEFA’slongest-standing members also resolved to ensure that their chances of making it to
the World Cup would not be adversely affected by the inclusion of 16 ‘new’ countries,many of whom were highly competent football-playing regions, into the Europeanqualifying tournament.
Within this context it is little surprise that when FIFA took the decision to expandthe World Cup from 24 to 32 teams, the resultant negotiations aimed at deciding
how the extra berths would be distributed were fiercely contested. At the worldbody’s Executive Committee meeting in October 1994, Issa Hayatou, CAF’s
President, issued a thinly veiled threat to Havelange in relation to continuedpolitical support for Africa, by saying that he ‘could not predict what would happen if
Africa did not get two of the eight berths’. [68] UEFA on the other hand, entered thenegotiations on the premise that four places should be divided up amongst Africa,Asia, CONCACAF and Oceania and that the remaining berths should be allocated to
those confederations that had produced the semi-finalists of the 1990 World Cup.[69] This proposal would have afforded South America one additional place whilst
Europe would have gained three positions.During the course of the negotiations, UEFA’s FIFA Executive Committee
members, under the direction of Lennart Johansson, adopted a radically differentapproach to their historically narrow stance on World Cup places. Not only did they
modify their demands to two berths, but they also lent support to Africa’s calls fortwo additional places. This move was a precursor to the more amicable relationship
that developed between UEFA and CAF during the mid-1990s. [70] That Johanssonwas the central figure in this emerging alliance had much to do with the fact that hisinvolvement in the governance of European and world football was influenced by an
upbringing steeped in Swedish Social democracy and a commitment to the
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egalitarian and internationalist philosophies embodied therein. [71] However,Johansson was also a shrewd politician and his compromise on World Cup places
was taken with one eye on the upcoming election for the FIFA Presidency in 1998.Indeed, at the time it was rumoured that UEFA expected its backing of Africa in
relation to World Cup berth, to be reciprocated in the form of African support for aEuropean presidential candidate. [72] The significance of this move was magnified
by, what was perceived by CAF, to be a lack of effort on the part of Havelange inhelping Africa secure two additional places at the competition. [73] Whilst
acknowledging that the highly contested nature of the decision on the allocation ofnew berths had placed Havelange in a difficult position, Issa Hayatou commented onthe Brazilian’s involvement in the negotiations in the following terms:
When one is responsible at world level, it is difficult to satisfy everybody . . . ThePresident had to adjudicate between different requests. I admit it was a difficulttask. But we did not appreciate that in his own proposals, Mr Havelange hadforgotten all the promises he had made in giving five places to Africa. My reactionwas overwhelming. I announced at the time that Africa would only work with itsfriends and that it would fight all those who considered attacking it. [74]
After acrimonious exchanges, FIFA’s Executive Committee decided on a package in
which two new places were reserved for the emerging soccer nations in Africa andAsia/Oceania, one apiece went to South America and CONCACAF, whilst two wereallocated to the ‘new’ Europe. This new format was widely lauded in African football
circles and was regarded as a belated recognition of the contribution of the emergingfootball nations to the game’s international competitions. Indeed, FIFA General
Secretary at the time and current President of the world body, Sepp Blatter, describedthe outcome of the New York meeting as the culmination of a North-South dialogue
through which ‘the pupils have come up to match their teachers’. [75] EmmanuelMaradas, the widely respected commentator on the African game, aptly summed up
the significance of the outcome of the meeting:
At last the wrangling is over, and the African game has won the recognition itdeserves; five African nations will compete at the 1998 World Cup in France . . . theresult is the latest stage of a long march which began in 1957 in Portugal, when agroup of Africans got together under Sudan’s Dr Abdel Mohamed Halim, anddecided it was time for the continent’s voice to be heard in world footballgoverning circles. That Africa now has such a strong presence at the world’spremier football feast is a tribute to those long gone, who had laid the foundationson which to build the continental game. [76]
Conclusion
Can the discord, acrimony and conflict between FIFA’s African and Europeanconstituencies described above be adequately interpreted as a phenomenon specific
only to the governance of world football or the issue of the distribution of World
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Cup places? Does the narrative provided above tell us anything about relationsbetween the developing and developed world? In attempting to answer these
questions it becomes apparent that when located in the context of internationalpolitical and economic relations, much of the story of Africa at the World Cup
can be read as a reflection of the broader power relationship between the first andthe Third World. [77] More specifically, UEFA’s role as chief adversary of Africa’s
emergent football nations can be viewed as being rooted in a tradition of widerglobal conflicts of interests between rich and powerful western European nations
and their poorer, more dependent counterparts in the Southern hemisphere. Forexample, the rhetoric and language employed by high-ranking, European footballadministrators such as Gustav Weiderkher, Louis Wouters and Artemio Franchi
during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was clearly reflective of European colonialattitudes to their African ‘inferiors’.
Likewise, Africa’s quest for a more egalitarian and representative World Cupand UEFA’s response to it can be viewed as synonymous with both the wider
political and economic demands of the developing world and the developedworld’s reaction to them. For example, in 1974, at the same time that African and
Asian votes effected the most serious challenge to European hegemony withinFIFA, calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) aimed at bringing
about a thorough re-articulation of ‘North-South’ economic relations and animproved political say in the international arena came to represent the main axisof ‘non-aligned’ and Third World aspirations. [78] Significantly, the Third World
expressed a commitment to building an autonomous, internal developmentdynamic that would minimize subordination to the capitalist world economy. [79]
These solicitations were paralleled by a petition for a ‘New World Informationand Communications Order’ within the United Nations (UN) which registered
the Third World’s antipathy towards the first world’s control and domination ofinternational media services. [80] Even at the most superficial levels of analysis it
is difficult to ignore the marked similarities between ‘non-aligned’ politicaldiscourse and the demands of the developing world’s football nations within FIFAat that particular time.
Similarly, the response of UEFA to Africa’s political lobby for adequate WorldCup representation, and the threat posed therein to Europe’s privileged position
in the competition, almost mirrors the reaction of the developed world tocriticisms of its position in the world economy relative to the Third World. For
example, when challenged during the 1980s by the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) about their disproportionately
dominant position in the world economy, both Britain and the United Stateswithdrew subscriptions from the UN and on other occasions exercised their
power of veto at the organization’s General Assembly. This trend of responding tothe UN’s attempts to democratize the world economic and political order bythreatening to withhold their financial contribution to that organization’s budget
has been apparent well into the 1990s. In a similar fashion, UEFA’s traditional
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response to challenges to its hegemony in the world game and its position at theWorld Cup has been to cite the disproportionately high contribution, currently
estimated at 80 per cent, that it makes to FIFA’s finances. As this essaydemonstrates, in more extreme cases, sectors of European football have threatened
to withdraw from FIFA and its competitions. When one considers that FIFAwould find it difficult to maintain financial viability if UEFA’s members were to
withdraw from the world body, the European confederation’s power over FIFAand the World Cup becomes abundantly clear. The internationalist aims of
transnational organizations like the United Nations and its various sub-groupingshave clearly been immersed in and undermined by broader international politicaland economic relations. As this essay demonstrates, in much the same way the
World Cup’s supposed status as an egalitarian and internationally representativecompetition has also been compromised by the polemics associated with
competing national, regional and continental interests.
Notes
[1] Most notably, Walter Winterbottom and Pele expressed their belief that an African nationwould win the World Cup before the new millennium. Such predictions remain unfulfilled,but the assertion of the former FIFA President Joao Havelange that an African team wouldqualify for the last four by, at the latest, 2002, was a feat that Cameroon and Senegal bothnarrowly missed out on during the 1990 and 2002 World Cups respectively. See F. OsmanDuodo, ‘On the Threshold of Eating With Kings’, FIFA Magazine, Oct. 1996, 13–14.
[2] During France ‘98, only Nigeria qualified for the knock-out phase. At Japan/South Korea 2002only Senegal reached the latter stages of the competition although the four other teamsnarrowly failed to progress from the group stages.
[3] Nigeria and Ghana have twice won the biennial under-17 World Youth Championship sinceits inauguration in 1985.
[4] For a discussion of Africa’s struggle for global equity within FIFA see P. Darby, Africa, Footballand FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002).
[5] A more detailed assessment of the diffusion and development of football in Africa during thecolonial period can be found in P. Darby, ‘Football, Colonial Doctrine and IndigenousResistance: Mapping the Political Persona of FIFA’s African Constituency’, Culture, Sport,Society, 3, 1 (2000), 61–87. An abridged version of this article can also be found in J.D. LeSueur, The Decolonization Reader (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), pp.258–73. Forother analyses of the ways that the promotion of football and sport in general in Africa formedpart of the broader imperialist drive to socialize Africans into accepting colonial rule as thenorm, hence facilitating continued economic penetration, see T. Monnington, ‘The Politics ofBlack African Sport’, in L. Allison (ed.), The Politics of Sport (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1986). See also R.C. Uweche, ‘Nation Building and Sport in Africa’, in B.Lowe, D. Kanin and A. Strenk (eds) Sport and International Relations (Champaign, IL: StipesPublishing Company, 1978), pp.538–50.
[6] See Darby, ‘Football, Colonial Doctrine and Indigenous Resistance’.[7] FIFA, Minutes of the IInd Extraordinary Congress, Paris, 14/15 November 1953; FIFA, Minutes
of the XXIXth Ordinary Congress, Berne, 21 June 1954. For a detailed analysis of thediscussions which took place at this Congress see Darby, Africa, Football and FIFA.
[8] See Darby, Africa, Football and FIFA.
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[9] E. Quansah, ‘The Cup to Surpass All Cups’, Africa Today, (Jan./Feb., 1996), 26.[10] See P. Darby, ‘The New Scramble for Africa: African Football Labour Migration to Europe’,
The European Sports History Review, 3 (2000), 217–44.[11] The six entrants were Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia and United Arab Republic
(UAR).[12] Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.16, April 1961, p. 18.[13] G. Weiderkehr, cited in Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.23, June 1963, p.14. Weiderkehr’s
successor, Artemio Franchi, maintained his predecessors stance well into the 1970s,articulating his consternation that FIFA’s statutes did ‘nothing to stop these emergingfootball countries from joining the enlarged FIFA family’, and describing this state of affairs as‘the uncomfortable truth’ (author’s italics). A. Franchi, ‘Europe and World Football’, inOfficial Bulletin of UEFA, No.87, June 1979, p.21.
[14] H. Bangerter, ‘UEFA Past and Present’, in U.R. Rothenbuhler (ed.), 25 Years of UEFA (Berne:UEFA Publications, 1979), pp.42–4.
[15] UEFA, Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Frankfurt, 13 Feb. 1964.[16] Spain defeated Morocco to leave Africa without a representative at the 1962 World Cup.[17] A. Versi, Football in Africa (London: Collins, 1986), pp.33–4.[18] F. Mahjoub, ‘Power Games’, African Soccer, 50 (Dec. 1999), 20–3.[19] Versi, Football in Africa, p.74.[20] E. Quansah, ‘The Fall of a Soccer Empire’, West Africa – Special Edition (March 1990), 37.[21] CAF, Circular Letter to FIFA from the CAF Executive Committee, 21 Aug. 1964.[22] Ibid.[23] O. Djan cited in M. Katimia, ‘The Fight For Recognition’, African Soccer, 35 (June 1998), 54.[24] G. Oliver, World Soccer: The History of the Game in Over 150 Countries (London: Guinness
Publishing, 1992), p.24.[25] Personal communication to Dr Helmut Kaeser from Mourad Fahmy, 16 Aug. 1965.[26] Cited in ibid.[27] E. Quansah, ‘The Cup to Surpass All Cups’, Africa Today, (Jan./Feb. 1996), 27.[28] A. Tomlinson, ‘FIFA and the World Cup: The Expanding Football Family’, in J. Sugden and
A. Tomlinson, Hosts and Champions: Soccer Cultures, National Identities and the USA WorldCup (Aldershot and Vermont: Arena, 1994), p.25.
[29] UEFA, Minutes of IVth Extraordinary Congress, Monte Carlo, 18 June 1971.[30] Ibid.[31] G. Weiderkehr, cited in Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.55, June 1971, p.14.[32] UEFA, Minutes of IVth Extraordinary Congress.[33] FIFA, Minutes of the FIFA/CAF Consultative Committee Meeting, Cameroon, 19 Feb. 1972.[34] UEFA, Minutes of the XIth Ordinary Congress, Vienna, 7 June 1972.[35] UEFA, Minutes of the Vth Extraordinary Congress, Rome, 15 March 1973.[36] P. Darby, J. Sugden and A. Tomlinson, ‘Who Rules the Peoples’ Game? FIFA Versus UEFA in
the Struggle for the Control of World Football’, a paper presented at Fanatics! Football andPopular Culture in Europe, Manchester Metropolitan University, 11–13 June 1996, p.11.
[37] Sport Intern, ‘African Football to Continue its Struggle’, Sport Intern, III, 29/30 (20 Dec.1982), p. 7.
[38] For a detailed discussion of Havelange’s campaign for the FIFA Presidency and his electionmanifesto, see, J. Sugden and A. Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest for World Football: WhoRules the Peoples’ Game (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1998) and Darby, Africa,Football and FIFA.
[39] R. Ali, In the Big League: The Rise of African Football (London: Festac [a division of AfropressLtd], 1984), p.10.
[40] UEFA, ‘Europe and World Football’, Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.104, June 1979, p. 13.
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[41] UEFA, ‘The President’s Page’, Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.78, March 1977, p. 11.[42] A. Franchi, cited in Official Bulletin of UEFA, March 1977, p. 14.[43] UEFA, Official Bulletin of UEFA, No.90, March 1978, p. 8.[44] The World Cup record books reveal a football monopoly by elite South American and
European nations. Only seven nations have won the competition: Brazil, Germany, Italy,Argentina, Uruguay, France and England.
[45] A. Franchi, cited in K. Radnege, ‘UEFA Do a Worthwhile Job’, World Soccer, (July 1977),p. 16.
[46] FIFA, Minutes of XLIst Ordinary Congress, Buenos Aires, 30 May 1978.[47] Ibid.[48] Ibid.[49] Ibid.[50] A. Herren, 90 Years of FIFA, (Zurich: FIFA Publications, 1994), p.33.[51] Zaire lost 2–0, 9–0 and 3–0 to Scotland, Yugoslavia and Brazil respectively. It should be noted
that the 9–0 defeat by Yugoslavia was a consequence of a protest on the part of the playersover non-payment of bonuses.
[52] F. Mahjoub, ‘The World Cup: From Al Teach to Yekini’, in F. Mahjoub (ed.), ConfederationAfricaine de Football: 1957–1997, (Cairo: CAF Publications, 1997) p.96.
[53] B. Glanville, ‘FIFA Knows How to Blow its Own Trumpet’, World Soccer, (Oct. 1984), 14.[54] B. Glanville, ‘World Cup System is a Madman’s Flytrap’, World Soccer, (March 1982), 30.[55] Glanville, ‘FIFA Knows How to Blow its Own Trumpet’, 14.[56] D. Barnes, World Cup in Spain: The Game of the Century (Oxford: Sidgwick and Jackson,
1982).[57] FIFA, Minutes of the XLIIIrd Ordinary Congress, Madrid, 9 July 1982.[58] Y. Tessema cited in Sport Intern, ‘African Football to Continue its Struggle’, Sport Intern, III,
29/30 (20 Dec. 1982).[59] Sport Intern, ‘Panorama’, Sport Intern, III, 8, (16 Aug. 1982).[60] CAF, ‘Editorial’, CAF News, (Oct. 1986), 3.[61] The early relationship between FIFA and the British football associations was a problematic
one. They withdrew from FIFA on a number of occasions and when they were encouraged torejoin in 1946 they procured statutory assurances that they would remain independent entitieswithin FIFA and would also have the automatic right to one of the FIFA vice-presidencypositions.
[62] CAF, ‘Editorial’, p. 3.[63] H. Cavan cited in B. Glanville, ‘Cavan’s Hot Potato Worries Britain’, World Soccer, (Jan.
1997), p. 6.[64] Tomlinson, ‘FIFA and the World Cup’, p.26.[65] Mahjoub, ‘The World Cup: From Al Teach to Yekini’, p.99.[66] Nigeria led 1–0 until Roberto Baggio equalized in the 88th minute. Baggio went on to score
the winner from the penalty spot.[67] For a detailed discussion of Johansson’s struggle with Havelange and later, Sepp Blatter, for
the FIFA Presidency, see P. Darby, ‘Africa, the FIFA Presidency and the Governance of WorldFootball: 1974, 1998 and 2002’, Africa Today, 50, 1 (2003), 3–24 and A. Bairner and P. Darby,‘The Swedish Model and International Sport: Lennart Johansson and the Governance ofWorld Football’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 36, 3 (2001), 337–59.
[68] P. Gardner, ‘Havelange’s Revenge’, World Soccer, (Dec. 1994), 52.[69] CAF, ‘Editorial’, CAF News, (Oct. 1996), 2.[70] For details of this relationship see Bairner and Darby, ‘The Swedish Model and International
Sport’.
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[71] For a discussion on the significance of Johansson’s nationality and political leanings in hisrelationship with the African football confederation see Bairner and Darby, ‘The SwedishModel and International Sport’.
[72] For a discussion of Europe’s support for five African World Cup places see CAF, Minutes ofthe XXIInd Ordinary General Assembly, Johannesburg, 11 Jan. 1996; M. Fahmy, ‘Editorial’,CAF News, 64 (April 1998), 1: African Soccer, ‘Havelange Takes His Revenge’, African Soccer,9 (Jan./Feb. 1995), 39.
[73] CAF, Report of the General Secretary for 1993–5 (Cairo: CAF Publications, 1995), p.3.[74] CAF News, ‘Issa Hayatou: The Cup of Nations Will Never Change’, CAF News, (Sept. 1996),
16.[75] Cited in E. Maradas, ‘Africa’s Long March’, African Soccer, 9 (Jan./Feb. 1995), 9.[76] Ibid.[77] Similar connections within the broader context of the governance of world football are made
in J. Sugden and A. Tomlinson, ‘Power and Resistance in the Governance of World Football:Theorizing FIFA’s Transnational Impact’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 22, 3 (Aug. 1998),299–316.
[78] R. Munck, Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The Case of Latin America (London:Zed Books, 1984), p.69.
[79] Ibid.[80] J.S. Goldstein, International Relations (Washington: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994),
p.542.
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