after the catastrophe: ip network availability and resiliency in the post-disaster environment....

After the Catastrophe:IP Network Availability and Resiliency In ThePost-Disaster Environment.

Rakesh Bharania

Network Consulting EngineerCisco Tactical Operationshttp://www.cisco.com/go/tacops E-Mail: [email protected]: @densaer

http://www.cisco.com/go/tacops

© 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco PublicABAG – IP Resiliency 2

Agenda – After the Catastrophe

The Need for Information In A Post-Disaster Environment

Questioning Assumptions

The role of Cisco in the Infrastructure picture

Examples:1. September 11, 2001 attacks

2. 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

3. 2010 San Bruno, CA gas pipeline explosion


The Fundamental Problem…Public Safety

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In complex disasters with multiple response organizations …

How to deliver the right information in the right format to the right person at the right time?

Defense

National, State & Local Government

HealthcareCritical Infrastructure

Transportation

NGO / International Orgs


Changing Technologies Affect Mission Success

Radio, Phone Integrated Mobile/Fixed

Single Device Any Device

Voice only Voice, Video, Data

Closed Teams Open Collaboration

Command&Control Centric In the field, social media, public

Fixed Locations Deployable anywhere

Goal: Mission workflowand productivitybenefits that save livesand speed recovery.

Goal: Mission workflowand productivitybenefits that save livesand speed recovery.

Evolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian reliefEvolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian relief

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Mythbusting

Assumption: “When a disaster happens, telecommunications will go down.”

Reality: Not always. About 60% of Haiti telecom stayed operational after quake. Other examples: Chile Quake, Japan.

Assumption: “I have a cellphone, an ordinary telephone line, a PBX (etc). Why should I care about the IP network?”

Reality: Everything is IP now –and has been for some time.

Assumption: “The Internet is an optional luxury for public safety.”

Reality: Not anymore – just as critical as radio communications. Haiti was a data-driven response.


Cisco’s Role in IP Resiliency

As a vendor, Cisco doesn’t have direct responsibility for the health of the national telecommunications infrastructure (owned by the Service Providers such as AT&T, Verizon, etc.)

But our products constitute a large part of the national communications infrastructure, We have an obligation to produce secure, reliable products and to assist where appropriate with our expertise.

We participate in the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (DHS) – http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/ - ongoing public/private coordination for tech companies, service providers,Federal gov. agencies.

Cisco has aggressive customer support available for crisis situations: CAP, Cisco Tactical Operations, etc.

http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/


September 11, 2001

Infrastructure to note: WTC 1/2: below-ground fiber from transatlantic cables & Telehouse and 60 Hudson St.

60 Hudson St: termination point to many transatlantic cables

NYIIX at 25 Broadway Telehouse: peering site for 40 ISPs from NY, Europe

South America and South Africa.

WTC 2 collapse severed fiber between 60 Hudson and 25 Broadway

Reachability disruption to <1000 BGP prefixes(less than 1% of advertised prefixes globally)

No global Internet routing instability occurred (But there was with Nimda worm on 9/18/2011)

Global Internet routing continued normally.


Location of Critical Internet Infra on 9/11/2001


2011 Japan Quake and Tsunami

M9.0 quake/tsunami on March 11, 2011 Internet impact:Both IIJ redundant backbone fiber links Tokyo/Sendai were severed.

20% of Japan’s total traffic dropped immediately due to outages.

3 of 8 fiber links failed to USA, but good links remained available.

Japanese ISPs: “outside of immediately affected areas, no region was disconnected from Japan or the world.”

Internet was used heavily by the Japanese public for streaming video, social media, etc.

Rapid recovery from the event:One of the major Tokyo/Sendai fibers restored by March 12

All three trans-Pacific fibers restored by T+28 hrs

ISPs reported 85-90% normal traffic T+10 days after quake

Were we lucky? Most of Japan’s core Internet infrastructure was outside of the affected region.


Example: SINET4

Japan’s Science and Information Network (SINET4) links 700 universities, colleges, and national laboratories.

While there was some network disruption (Sendai), restoration was rapid. Network continued to work normally outside of immediate area and was used for emergency information use (heavy ustream traffic, etc)


San Bruno CA Explosion

Local communications disruption to cellphones, mobiledata services immediately around the affected neighborhood.

Cisco TacOps mutual aid request via NCRIC in supportof San Mateo County OES.

Provided communications support to Incident Command Post.

GIS support through Google disaster responseteam for NTSB.

Extensive After Action:“San Bruno Fire TechnicalDebrief” from CMU-SV DMI


Conclusion

Internet infrastructure in developed countries is highly resilient to disasters at a macro scale – redundant links + dynamic routing.

Local disruptions are possible – prepare redundancy into your organization.

Recent Internet history in disaster demonstrates it isreliable and indispensable in a crisis.


Questions?

after the catastrophe: ip network availability and resiliency in the post-disaster environment....

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