aim/ - oclc
TRANSCRIPT
AIM/ eKr s
KS # P-059
Burkhart M L RLHILLER11fGenieralmajorQhef of Staff of Third P& izer Army
PROJECT # 47
GNRMAN~ TAINK LOSSiES
Koenigetein/Ts 3.0 Nov 31950
Translator: M. FRIKIEditort G; VAN1'DRSTADTReviewers Cat ]3,X, HUFFORD
HISTORICAL DI VISIONEUROFiRA1 COM sAD
MS P -059
INDEl2X CONTAINED) IN~ THE G I 's" COPY
MS # P-459
File No 72 C 12 Dec 1950
MOAI"Ui FORt Chief, Operational History (Germ) BranchLt Col NAWLOCK1Y
SUBJECT: MS f P.059, Project # 47, TA1NK LOSSES
The following Questions are not answered fully:
lb Tank strength within Feldheer, listed by theater,.
2b Tank losses and replacement for Polish, Norwegian,
French, etc, campaigns,
2c Breakdown of losses by causative agents~ The topic
leader states that he cannot answer these questionsmore fully,
No information at all is given on the bases used inpredicting tank losses (question 2d) and the answer to
question 2e (guidance furnished tank producers...) is so
vague that it can hardly be called an answer at all.
In his introduction, the topic leader refers to a con-tribut ion by Emil LD , the former chief of the Army Armament
Office, This contribution contains very much the same informat;ion embodied in the study but also gives the names and. present
addresses of persons who should be able to give more detailedinformation on product ion and so forth, He further states thatan illustration of the TIGER Panzer and of the model developedby PORSCHE*, the ELEPHANT Panzer on a demonstration trip (No 20)was printed in the September issue of the PINGUIN**,
Professor PORSCHE, the designer of the Volkswagen
** Good illustrations and descriptions of all German panzer
types are to be found in the HANDBOOK ON GERMA1O MILITARY
FORCE S,
H, HEI TiA n1
Consultant & Analyst
MS # ?-059
The Author
Herman -Burkhart U ERHILL BA1Ifl,
Gene ralajr,Born.,- 26 Dec 1904, Dieuze, Lorraine,
;iU: +L +' -HILLeZeBRAN received training
in the Ohrdruf Officer Candidate School
in 1925 after having served since April
1923 in the 16th Cavalzry Regiment, and.later underwent further training at theHannover Cavalry School in 1925/26 andat the Berlin War College in 1934/368
Just before World far II broke out, on
15 September 1939, he was transferred
from the Organization Division of Army
General Staff to the 93 Inf Div as Oper-
ations Officer, On . October 1940 he was
assigned. as adjutant to the Chief of Army
General Staff end in April 1942 as appoint-ed Chief of Organization Division of Army
General Staff. In 1944, after two brief
spells in the OKH Officer Reserve and an
assignment as Commander of 24th Panzer
Regiment, NI +LER-HIa B I'D was assigned
as Chief of Staff to XJOXVI Panzer Corps in
Ukraine and Poland, remaining in that positionuntil transferred as Chief of Staff to the
Third Panzer Army, During the Wear he served.
in France, Italy and on the east front and
was finally captured near Schwerin, Mecklenburg
on 2 May l945
MS F P-059
CONTENTS Pg
COHN3iNS ON G'B.AN TAX K LO S SEiS y r v a v .$ a I t
6 RU A o R Y A K S MD,, 6O' .V"" 4 aai 2
Gere.n Nomenclature and Abbreviations used in the Text 3
1, TYPEiS AND AIu A1: T OF ARM'OREDf V. I CLi3 s " * * 4
a., Types of' Tank Carriages . , .. . . 4
b* Tak f * f .4 " " $ $ a 90 - * . a . ." " 4
c., Assault Guns and Je. .panzers (Tank Destroyers). 6d., Antitank Cannon on Self'--Propelled Mount , .. * 7
e, Nomenclature of' Weapons and Their Abbreviations , 8
f, Performaceof Kw Kand Pak~ ~ , 9
2;p TANK STREiNGTH aW a a " m vs . a b r 10
a, Tank s , ,. . . .. .r a a.~ .v , eafvavo 10
b, Assault Guns and Jagdpanzers (Tank Destroyers), 10
C, Pak on Self- ropelled. IMounts, , 10
3, TANK LOSSS ANDB 2PLAC MNT ., 6 0 0 9 . 0 $ 17
M4S # p-059
Franz EALDEIHR Koenigstein/l 7 Nov 1950Genobst a )
COMMET~itS 0N GBRA TANK LOSSES
(Project ~ 4'?; MS # pO59)
After a thorough study of the subject, the topic leader, former
Genmaj Butrkhart Mueller-Hillebrextd, has succeeded. in answering most of
the uestions in detail,
For question ib, allocation of tanks to theaters of operation,
incomplete data only, covering the years 1940, 1943, 1944 and 1945, could
be obtained, and these do not provide as comprehensive a picture as to the
statistics on strength, production and losses, As for the breaking down
of tank losses according to campaign (question 2 b), according to
types of loss (whether permanent or temporary) and according to cause
(question 2 c), it was impossible to procure data useful in the preparat-
ion of statistics,
The topic leader was able) however, to anwer in greater detail the
remaining question pertaining to strength, production and losses, The
replies are given in the form of tables ani. graphic charts (See appen-
dices), They are of great value because of their completeness and the
clearness with which they have been presented and in this respect they
are perh-aps unique,
In regard to the text, I am in full accord with the author.
(signed) Franz HALDER
Genobst a Dl
MS j p-059
PREFATORY REMARKS
Principal sources of information available to
the author were the monthly bulletins published by
the German Army Ordnance Office under the title,
Suirve of Army armament, These served as the offici
al statistical basis for the German Wehrmacht, In
addition, the original documents of the Inspector
General of the Tank Forces were made available to the
author, and these contained the data for his reports
to the FuIehrer, 'These sources may be regarded as
reliable.
In addition, Gen d Art a D Leeb, the former
Chief of the Army Ordnance Office, also made a study
available to the author,
MS #PO59
In conformity with the original manuscript, German nomenclature
and abbreviations have been retained throughout the translation,
In order to facilitate the reading of this study and attached
statistics, the German nomenclature and abbreviations used in the
text have been consolidated on this page,
Flakc
K
Kwk
MG
Pak
Pak/ Sf1
P z Bef W
Pz Kpfw
Stu Gesch
Plug zeuga bwehrkano ne
Kanone
Kampfwagenkanone
Maschinengewehr
Panzerabwehrkenone
Panzerabwehrkenone aufSelb stfahrlafet te
Penzerbef ehl swagen
Panz erkampfwagen
Sturmgeschuetz
Stu H
Stu K
Stu Ps
Sturmhaubit ze
St urmka none
Sturmpanzer
Jagdpanzer
H Jiashorn" Panzer
antiaircraft gun
cannon
tank gun
machine gun
antitank gun
antitank gun on self-propelled mount
armored command car
tank
assault gun (self-propell-ed)
assault howitzer (self-propelled)
assault cannon (self-*propelled)
assault tank
tank destroyer
"'rhinoceros" tank
MS # p-0O59
1, TYPES AND AR M NET OF ABMORL) VEHICLE~S
a, Types of Tank Carriages:
Abbreviation: Panzerkanipfwagen .Ltank/ Pz Kpfw
Panzer Beofehl swagen Larmnored command carj: Pz Bef W~
Carriages: I to VI, 35 (t),, 38 (t). The two latter types were
taken from the Ozechoslovakian Army and were produced
in Ozechoslovakian factories,
b~ Tanks:
Principal Weapon** Date Indtroduced toTroop Units
Pz Kpfw I
Ps Kpfw II
Pz Kpfw II (F)
Pz Kpfw 35 (t)
Ps Kpfw 38 (t)
Ps Kpfw III
MG
Kw K 38, 20 mm
Flame thrower
Kw K 37 mm
Kw K 3? mm
Kw K 3? mm
Kw K 50 mm L 42
Kw K 50 mm L 60
Kw K 75 mm L 24
* Designation of ti'e includes designation of carriage.* Cf .Sec. e tror abbreviations of weapor nomenclature.
Type*
use in
if to
already
II
'I
if
1940
,
Ii Bt
i, II
if i
is if
Jan 1941
Jan 1942
July 1942
Iv#P-05,9
Principal Weapon Date Introduced to Troop Units
Pz Kpfw III (i')
Pz Kp'lr IV
Pz Kpf'w V Panther
Pz Kpfw VI Tiger I
Pz Kpf'w VI Tiger
Flak tank oncarriage
38 (t) and IV
Pz :8etf W (carriageI-VT )
Recovery tank (carri-'a'ge 38 (t),III, IV, V)
Flamethro~rer
Kw K 75 mm L.24
KW K 40, 75 mm L 43and. 48
Pak 42, 75 mm L 70
Kw K 42, 75 mm L 70
Kw K 36, 88 mmL 56
Kw K 43, 88 mm L 71
Flak 20 mm, 20 mm-four-barreled
Flak 37 mm, 30 mmdouble-barreled
same as Pz Kpfw 1-VI
Feb 43
already in use in 1940
April 42
Aug 44
Feb 43
June 42
Niov 43
1Nov 43
Jun 43
* Also called Komnigtiger LtRoyal Tigerf,
Type
MS f p--059
C, Asault Guns~ and. JagdpanzersLTank Destroyers-7
Abbreviations:
Type*
Sturngeschuetz L;assault gun7: Stu~ GeschKamrofwagenkexione tank cannonj: Kw K
Sturmhaubitze Lasseult howitzer 7:Stu H
Sturmnkanone .Lassault cannonf Stu K
Sturmpanzer Lassault tanskj Stu Pz
Principal Weapon Date Introduced toTroop U~nits
Stu Gesch III
Stu Gesch IV
Stu H 42 (carriageIII)
Stu Pz (carriage IV)
Jagdpanzer 38***
Jagd~pan~zer IV
Jagdpant her(carriage V)
£lefhnt (carriageVI)**
Jagdtiger (carriageVI)
Kw K 75 mm L 24
Stu K 40, 75 nun L 48
Stui K 40, 75 mm L 48
Stu H 42, 105 mm L 28
Stu H 43, 150 mm L 12
?ack 39, 75 mm L 48
Pack 39, 75 mm L 48
Pack 43/3, 88 mm L 71
Pak 43/2, 88 mm L 71
Pak 80, 128 mm L 55
already in use in 1940
Apr 42
Dec 43
Mar 43
Apr 43
Apr 44
Jan 44
Oct 43
Apr 43
Feb 44
Dlesignation of type includes designation of carriages,Cf. Sec. e for abbreviations of wee; on nomenclature,Also 'called "Panzerjaeger 38" or "Hetzer".Also celled "Ferdinand" or "18.8 $tu Gesch, it,
*
**
**4s
MS # PO'59
d~. Ant ita k Cannon on Self -Pro elled Mount
Abbreviation: Panzerabwehrkerione auf Selbstfahrlafette: Pak/ Sfi
Weapon Date Introdiuced to TroopUnit s
7:05 Pak 40/Sfl II
71b Pak 4U / Sfl 38 (t)
7, 5 Peik 40/ Sfl Lorraine**
7,62 Pek/ Sfl II
7,62 Pakf Sf1 38 (t)
Nashorn/ Sf± III or IV
Pak 40, 75 rm
Pek 40, 75 mm
Pak 40,. 75 mm
76, 2 mm Pak 36 or76,2 mm K (r)***
76,2 mm Pak 36 or76,2 mmKIL(r)
88 mm Pak 43/41,L 71
from Feb
from Feb
from Apr
from Apr
from Apr 42
from Feb 42
Designation of type includes designiation of carriage,
French carriage,
Captured Russian gun.n, After rebuilding they were called 117.62 Pak36" : prior rebuilding thaeir designa~tion was 117;62 K (r)"r',Caliber length unknown.
Type*
M4S # P-.059
e, Nomenclature of Weapons anid their Abbreviations
Abbreviation Nomenclature (Germani) Translation (American)
MG'
Kw K
20 mm 3? mm, etc~
L 42, L60 etc,
Pak
Flak
Stu K
Stu H
Mschinengewehr
Kanipfwagenkanone
Kaliberdurchmesser in mm
Kal iberlaenge des Rohre s
Pa c era bwehrkaxsone
Fl ie gerabw eh rkan on e
Stixrikanone
Sturmhaubitze
Machine gun
Tank cannon
Caliber diameter in mm
Length of the barrel
Antitank cannon
Antiaircraft gun
Assault cannon
Assault howitzer
A number behind "Kw K"° or "Pak" designates the type, such as
Kw K 42 or Pak 39, The number, however, does not indicate the year
of introduction or construction.
MS # p-059
f. Performance of Kw K and Pak
Cali- Cali Muzzle Armor-piercing capacity in mm with armor-piercingber ber velo-. shell 39 at an impact angel of 600 and a range ofmm length city
M/sec 100m 50Cm 100Cm 1500m 2000m 250Cm 300Cm
75 48 704 !99 91 82 67 63
75 70 925 138 129 111 99 88
88 56 773 120 110 110 91 84
88 71 1000 .222 185 165 148 132
18 592 228 215 202 190 178 166 155
14S # P#059
2, TAILK STR1E1GTH
=Apiendix 1 shows tank strength on the following dates:
1 Septeber 1939
1 April 1940
1 September 1940
1 January 1941
After January, 1941, strength is shown as of the first of every month
up to 1 February 1945,
Strength in this case indicates the total strength in tanks of all
units of the Army (Field and Replacement Army) and the Waffen-SS at
repair installations, schools, ordnance depots and the like4
Appendix 1 lists tanks according to type, which the author has
classified in the following three groups:
a, Tanks
b, Assault guns and Jagdpanzses tank destroyers-/
c, Pak on self-propelled mounts,
A tank is characterized by a revolving turret; it is the principal
weapon of the Armored Command,
In assault guns and Jagdpaenzer the gun is not mounted in a turret,
which makes the vehicle lower and less ponderous and saves material and
work hours, Assault guns and Jagdpenzers are principally 'employed as
1vS # PO59
infantry stxpprort or antitank weapons in conjunction with other arms
of the service,
The Pak on a self-.propelled mount (Pak/Sfl) is simply an antitank
gun mounted on a tank carriage and is lightly armored in front and.
on the sides. It is open on top. The Pak/Sfl is an emergency weapon
to compensate temporarily for the lack of production of assault guns
and Jagdpanzers.
Obsolete tank models, which can no longer be employed at the front,
are specifically designated as such in Appendix 1.
They were normally used in the Replacement Army; by occupation
troops and in the protection of troops against partisans, The carriages
of some of these tanks which had not been removed comletely from Army
inventories were rebuilt sa PekfSf1 or Jagdpanzers.
It has not been possible, in Appendix 1, to break down the vehicles
according to theater or according to Field. and Replacement Army,
It was possible to give a limited breekdown according to theater but
only for certain key-dates,
a. In the Western Camaign of &ay 1940 the'following tanks
participated as part of the Field. Army (The figure in brackets denotes
the strength, but only after 1 April 1940, The Western; Campaign
(second column) began on 10 May 1940)
Pz, Kpfw. 1 523 (1062)
II 955 (1079)
" " III 349 (329)*
* The figure for ?z,Xpfw III participating in the Western Campaign, whichexceeds the strength as of 1 April, is explained by the fact that vehicles
of this type rolling off production lines in April were delivered to the
field forces in time for the campaign
KS # p-059
Pz Kpfw IV 278 (280)
a "a 35 t 106 (143).
11 " 38 t 228 (238)
Pz Bef W Larmoaconmand car 135(2)
Total 2574 (.3379 )
b, The following tanks were employed on the Eastern Front
on 4 M 1943 by the field forces, inclusive of the Wfaffen-SS. (The
figuires in brackets denote strength of the respective types as of
1 Mae~ 1943) :
Pz IKpfw III 507 (1465)
f IV 541 (1077)
Ha r VI 72 (165)
In repair installations
Total:o 162 (230
NIote: The difference between the figures in the second column and
those in brackets is accounted for by distribution over the remaining
theaters, the Replacement Army, tank repair installations. in the Zone
of Interior and the ordnance depots,
c, The Ps fw II VI and assault guns employed on the
Eastern Front on 10 June 1943 by the field forces, inclusive of the
Waffen-SS amounted to the following:
MS # p059
(The figure in brackets denotes total Army strength as of 1 June
1943),;
Ready for employment 2569
In repair installations 463
Total 3032 (5416)
Notes The difference between the figure and that in -brackets was
distributed as set forth under b, above,
d, A breakdown covering much the same period and several
theaters is possible for the beginning of 1944. (Figures denoting
total Army strength are added in brackets)
Pz Kpfw III (ready for
action)
Pz Kpfw IV ( ready for
action)
Pz Kpfw V (ready foract ion)
Pz Kpfw VI (ready for
action)
Pz Bef W (ready foraction)
Assault guns
Italy
1 Feb
106
171
8
6
141
West29 Feb
99
58?
290
63
194
Last23 Feb 44
ZI Repair Total
29 Feb 44
450
405
128
78
655
:1
171
Strength
I1 Mar44
( 888)
1163 I(1824)
418 (1339)
149' (504)
6 (466)
506 (~noTotal (ready for action) 432 1233 1519
In repair installJationsf 49 1534 1232
- --- --- - r - - -"- 1 - - --~- - I - -r-I-~- '
c--- -- ------- -Gr~nd totali 481 12333 3053 1232 11 5999 (80a)1
MS # p-059
The difference in number of vehicles, i.e. the difference between
8031 and 5999 (2032 vehicles) applies to vehicles in use by occupation
troops in N5orway and in the Balkans, including Crete and Rhodes, newly
activated units in the Zone of Interior, ordnance depots and. the Replace-
ment Army.
e, The following survey shows the reinforcements, according
to month and type of tank, assigned to the tank forces in the 'West dur-
ing the six months preceding the Allied invasion. The percentage of
allover tank strength represented by each month's reinforcement, is
indicated by figures in brackets.
Date Pz III j Pz IV Pz V Pz VI Stu Gesch Total
(%) 1%) ( Jgdpz (%) (%)
31 Dec 43 145 (16) 316 (19) 157 (14)j 38 (10) 223 (10) 879 (14)
31 Jan 44 98 (11) 410 (24) 180 (15)' 64 (15) 171 (7) 1 923 (14)
29 Feb 44 99 (11) 587 (32) 290 (22) 63 (12) 194 (6) 1210 (16)
31 Mar 44 99 (12) 52? (25) 323 (20) 45 (9) 211 (7) 11205 (15)
30 Apr 44 114 (14) 674 (32) 514 (31)'101 (18) 219 (7) 1622 (19)
10 Jun 44 39 (5) 748 (32) 663 (35) 102 (16) 310 (8) 1862 (20)
MiS ; P059-1.
IT. Pz Kpf'w and Stu Gesch with the field forces on the
eastern Front as of' 5 Januar 1945:
Stu Ge sch?z units; brigades
Pz Jaegercompanies 0))
ro
y4E
(q
}{
TotalF..sternFront
Strength(according toAppendix 1)
Pz Kpfw IV
Pz Bef W,Flakpz
Stu GeschJagdp z
596
670
26
641
1933
902 949
902 949
596
670
26
2492
3784
(2259)
(1982)
(428)
(576)
( 6167)
(11412)
*Already included in the figures directly above.0) Stu Gesch Brigades ~[Sturmgeschxetz Brigaden -Assault gun brigades /
are GHC, troops for the reinf'orcement of' infaentry divisions,0)) Pz Jaeger companies are component parts of' infantry divisions,,N~oce: The great Russian offensive, which extended over the entireEastern Front began on 15 January 1945,
-15
0)
us # P-059
g, Tank strength at the Wetern Front on 5 February 1945:
Strength Readyr forion
act- Strength (accord-ing to Appendix 1)
Pz Kpfw III and IV 110 68 (2810)
if n V 219 .96 (1964)
if "r VI 61 26 ( 404)
Pz~efW 299)
Flak tanks (228)
Total number vehicles 390 190 (5705)
Stu Gesch anid Jagclpz IV 892 533 (6054)
Assault tank 32 15 ( 188)
Jagdpz V 66 43 ( 208)
Jagdpz VI 28 I21 ( 51))
Total number of Jagdpz and 1018 .612 (6501)Stu Ge sch
1Nashorn (?ako/SfJ. with 88 mm 12 8 ( 141)cannon)
Total number of Pz Kpfw,Stu ~esh an. lashrn 120 10 12277?)
MS # P-059
3. TANK LOSSES AND I fLACBMirT
a, In principle the repairing of tanks was carried out as close
to the front as possible, The repair services accompanied the troops
to the combat area, as far as enem~y fire permitted.. TLhe motor officers
of the tank battalions accompanied the repair services to the combat
area and directed their employment there. In this manner these officers
were able personally to survey losses and damages.
Daiaged tanks which could not be repaired with the means available
to the field forces were collected by recovery vehicles and turned
over to the repair companies of the tank regiments or to other repair
services. In the evening, battalions or regiments were informed as
to the number of tanks ready for action, the number in need of minor
repairs, the number in need of major repairs and total losses. These
figures were reported through command channels (adjutant to Ia branch
at divisional headquarters and from there to Is. branch at corps head-
quarters, etc.), as well as through traffic control channels (regimental
motor officer to divisional motor officer). This short standardized
report was transmitted by telephone or radio, and from division to
higher echelons usually by teletype.
These daily reports were supplemented by a monthly report through
traffic control channels in which the daily reports were compiled
and, if necessary, corrected and completed by means of accurate and
detailed accounts covering damages and causes. These reports were for-
warded through channels to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration
MS + p-O59
at the Army High Command, who in turn, submitted them to interested
agencies in the Army High Command for further evaluation~
b0 Total losses are compiled in Appendix 2 and are broken
down by month and according to tank types beginning with May 1941,
These losses comprise all losses at the front,. regardless of
whether they occurred in combat through enemy action, were occasioned
by vehicles, falling into enemy hands in damaged or undamaged condit
ion or were the result of "canibalization". of damaged vehicles to
make others fully serviceable,*
Temporary losses (damages) are not considered in Appendix 2.
During the latter part of, the War, 95 percent of damages were
repaired by the field forces, and at least 95 percent of these within
the tank regiment, while only about 5 percent of the damages were
repaired in repair shops in the Zone of the Interior,. In this connect-
ion see also the following;
Performance of the Tank Re air Services
aa At the front, ie, the' tank repair shop companies of the
regiments, armies and army groups, exclusive of repair services in
companies, etc~:
Reductions in number because of sales to foreign countries, transfersto agencies outside the Wehrmacht and total loss in the ReplacementArmy have not been considered. These are so small, however, thatthey would not have affected the statistics to an appreciable extent,
MS P -059 *1P
Month Pz II-VI Stu Gesch Pak/ Sfl Total Motors
Oct 43 973 652 .200 1825 143
Nov 911 698 195 1804 216
Dec 1294 873 224 2391 2831
Jan *44 2190 1111 938 4239 228
Total 10259
bb. Zone of the Interior:
Oct 43 62 22 45 129
1Nov. 90 19 36 145
Dec 57 41 30 128
Jan 44 71 91 39 201
Total 603
C. It was impossible to prepare a breakdown of losses
according to cause.
d~. Estimation of tank losses and replacement
Up to the beginning of the 1941 Rissian campaign, the course of
the War was rather abnormal on the German side because consumption
of materie1 occurred almost exclusively during the short periods
the campaigns (Poland~, Norway, France, Yugoslavia/Greece) lasted. This
made it. possible, in spite of low -production, to increase the stocks of
war materiel whichi were very limited at the beginninz of the War during
-19"4
v S # p-059
the long intervals between the campaigns, so that, in the summer
of 1941, sufficient forces were at hand for the difficult task ahead.,
For production data see Appendix 3,
In spite of very low production of Pz Xpfw and Stu Gesch, it had
been possible to increase the number of tank divisions from ten to
twenty during the period oaf twelve months between the end of the
French campaign and the beginning of the Russian campaign, Some
of the tank divisions, however, had only two battalions instead of
the customary four, Su.bseqyuently, they were to have been brought up
to full strength,
Aside from 4200 Pz Kpfw, at the beginning of the Russian campaign
there was as a result of this situation, practically no reserve avail.,
able. Monthly production amounted to only 260 Pz Kpfw, but it was
increasing, The Army High Command viewed this development with great
concern but had been unable to step up production, N~evertheless, the
Army High Command believed that it could risk being aole to meet re-
quirements for the campaign against Russia. It hoped to be able to
replenish losses from current production, especially since it erroneously
believed that operations on a large scale were impossible in Russia
during the winter.
Approximately 3800 Pz Kpfw were expected to roll off production
lines from the beginning of the camipaign, in June, 1940, to the end of
Mays, 1942, i.e. prior to the beginning of furtner large operations in
that year,
At first actual production came up to expectations, Losses during
-20w
~jS P p-059
the summer of 1941,1900 tanks up to the end of October, were high
but could have been met by current production without difficulty
if two unexpected events had not complicated the situation:
a. The fighting continued unabated during the winter
months,
b, The superiority in armament of the Russian T 34 tanks,
which appeared in ever-increasing numbers, neutralized the lightly
armed German tank models on the battleield, with the result that
the latter had to be withdrawn and replaced by new models equipped
with better cannon, (Of. Appendix 1),
In preparation of the big summer offensive. of 1942, in which the
majority of our tank units was to participate, tanks were withdrawn
from battle in spite of the fact that doing so involved great risks.
Thiese were completely re-equipped so that approximately 2500 Pz Kpfw
could be conmmitted in this operation alone.
From the beginning of the campaign of 1941 up to the start of
the summer offensive on 1 July 1942, approximate losses of 3850 Pz Kpfww
were offset by the production of 4100 tanks. However, an additional
number of over 1000 tanks must be added to the losses, since these
tanks were no longer fit for service at the front,
The Stu Gesch and the PakfSf1 have so far not been taken into
consideration. The Stu Geech was at that time a comparatively new
weapon, still in the development stage, and had to undergo extensive
tests at the front. Its production surpassed losses to a considerable
extent so that the supply of 400 available at the beginning of the
IVS f p-059 -2
campaign increased to 780 by 1 July 1942. These weapons did not
increase the fighting power of the tank divisions, but that of the
infantry divisions. D~endices 5 and 6 show comparative production
and loss figures, The Pak/ Sf1 was introduced in the spring of 1942
to fill the production in the Armored Command. This was a, temporary
emergency solution, designed to increase antitank fighting power at
the front. If these vehicles are included in the estimate, a more
favorable picture develops, as shown by the following statistics:
remd for action
1 Jul 41 lD ec 4l lkiar42 1 Jul42 1 Jan43
Pz Kpfw 4278. 4084 2468 3471 4364
Stu Gesch 416 598 625 780 1155
Pakf Sf1 -- 306 1124
Total 4694 4682 3093 4557 6643
The heavy destruaction of tank forces
a new phase,9 Here, as well as during the
losses increased immensely. From January
to the followings
at Stalingrad introduced
ensuing retrograde. battles,
to April 1943 they amounted
2945 Pz Kpfw,
461 Stu Gesch,
426 Pak/ Sfl1
-22-
MS # p-059
The strength of the Pz Kpfw ready for action thus again decreas-
ed to 2500 during this period, The fact that, as a result of the
Stalingrad defeat, the initiative had passed to the enemy now also
became evident in the field of materiel, Only by conducting the War
on an economical basis would it have been possible in 1943 to regain
this initiative,* This, the German command, however, could not decide
to do,
The Stalingrad mistake was soon followed by another. The un-
successful summer offensive of 1943 at Orel-Kursk (Uitadele'"l),
with the retreats following upon it after July 1943, was again very
costly in tank losses, This is shown in Appendix 2 ahd in the graphic
chats in bend~es 4 and 5,j
Due to the fact that Hitler continuously ordered activation of
new tank units necessary rehabilitation of units was impeded in spite
of a considerable increase in production, The result was that the
available tanks were distributed over an ever-increasing number of
tank units, and this consequently affected the fighting power of
these units, It was only in the spring of 1944, that the number of
available tanks again increased appreciably, so that, for exanple,
in l4arch, 1944, the tank strength as of January 1943, was again
attained, At the beginning of July, 1944,, the number of available
tanks reached its wartime peak with 5800 vehicles, (Cf. Appendix 4),
However, due to the overtaxing of tank forces which. had occurred earlier,
* Similar conditions prevailed in other fields of materiel and personnel.
MS : p-059
the increase in materiel was counterbalanced by a decrease in train-
ed personnel, so that the fighting power of these forces was no
longer commensurate with the number of tanks available. A steady
increase in losses was the result. The high losses in tanks suffered
during the battles after the invasion of France and during the retreats
in Russia could be met to a certain extent by increased production;
as illustrated by A endice - 3 and the graphic chart in Appendix 7.
Developments in the field of assault guns and Jagdpanzers were
more favorable, due to the fact that their requirements in materiel
and' labor were considerably lower than those for tanks, so that it
was easier to increase production,
In conclusion, and judging by the course of events after 144, it
may be regarded as an established fact that although tanks were subject
to almost continuous commitment, the strength of the German tank
forces could be maintained at a fixed level by monthly production of
10 15 'percent of its over-all strength, A prerequisite for this,
however, is that the tank forces have a repair service at their dis-
posal to take care of all small and average repairs within the units
themselves. A sufficient supply of snare parts and interchangeable
units must be made available to unit repair installations to insure
Quick repair of damages sustained, Unless repair installations are
able to work efficiently, the number of total losses quickly increases,
e, Tank production was guided through the following channels:
The Army General Staff, on the -basis of strategic intentions and
organizational plans, filed a request with the General Army Office
for the further development of the tank arm, For the purpose of establish-
ing a pattern, this request took into consideration a long period of
time (several years). The General Army Office in turn worked out
this reauest in detail and forwarded it to the Army Ordnance Office,
In case it should be impossible for these three offices of the
Army High Command to attain a uniform conception, the Commander in
Chief of the Army had to make the decision. The Army Ordnance Office
integrated the resulting plan into its over-all armament plan, which
had to be approved by the Wehrmacht High Command, Tnereafter the
Ordnance Office had to insure that everything proceeded according to
plan±, The industrial output necessary to attain the goal either
already existed or had to be created, During the course of the
War the authority of the agencies involved shifted as a result of
the creation of a Miinistry for Armaments and a. Office of Chief
of Army Equipment, With the dissolution of the post of Commander in
Chief of the Army and the assumption of its fuanctions by the Chief
of the Wehrmacht High Comu and and Hitler himself - particularly
since Hitler showed increased interest in all questions pertaining
to armaments authority shifted more and more to the Fuehrer.
For 1940, prior to the French campaign, the monithly production
quota for tanks and assault guns was established at 600; this goal
was to be attained in 1943, At the beginning of 1940) production
was still considerably below 200, At the beginning of the Russian
campaign the figure wias 300. The increase in tank divisions from ten
MMS # p O59 25-
u26-
to twenty, beginning with the autumn of 1A940, led to a revision
of the monthly production quota of 600 tanks. The result was a
demand to raise the monthly production quota of tanks and assault
guns to 1250, This reqies ,in January, 1941, fulfillment of which
was dependent on the building of new production centers, was opposed
by the Minister of Armaments, Todt, The latter regarded the demands
as exaggerated and impossible to satisfy by German industry, He
obtained an order from the Wehrmacht High Command, Keitel, which
prohibited. an increase over the old quota of 600, For the time
being, the Army High Command was' satisfied with this decision and
oelieved that it would be able to conduct the campaign against Russia
without the increase, The considerations which motivated this attitude
have been mentioned above,
In January, 1942, the Chief of the Ordnance Oftice again presented
the Arnlrls requirements, 1250 tanks and assault guns per month, to
the Minister of Armaments. In the meantime, however, there had been
high losses in tanks in the past during the winter, further activation
of tank divisions had been ordered by Hitler, activation of tank units
tor the SS had started and the demands for assault guns had increased
by leaps and bounds. The inister of Armaments presented the recuire-
ments to Hitler, who failed to make a decision, since he was for the
moment favorably impressed by events at the front and relied upon the
effect of the more efficient antitank guns whose employment wa s imminent,
This made him doubt the future of the tank forces,
In response to renewed pressure by the Chief of the Ordnance
HIS #i p-059
MS + P059
Office von Speer, Minister of Armaments, in July 1942, Hitler
finally was compelled to make a decision, He now exceeded the origin-
el. demand. made by the Army and ordered a monthly production of 1450
tanks and assault guns, The steps which were immediately taken
to increase production and to fill the new quota began to show re-
sults in the spring of 1943, as shown in the graphic charts in
A joences 5 and 60
In order to meet the reauested increases in production it was
necessary to coordinate production of a great many factories of
various kinds, especially as a large number of plants shared in
the production of the following parts:
Tank hulls.
Tracks and bogie wheels.
Motors,
Gears,
Turrets,
Armament.
Optical instruments,
Ammunition, etc,
In addition, frequent changes in tank types, armament, etc,,
which occurre.during the War, had to be considered, It was the mission
of the Ordnance Office and, later, the Ministry of Armaments constantly
to coordinate production orders and the capacity of the manufacturing
plants by allocating manpower, etc, The fact that tnis was to a
great extent achieved in the face of great difficulties and in spite
-27-
1s P-059
of the air war is shown in A nni n h rpi hrsi
Arnendi es 5 and 6_,
The air attacks were successfully minimized by transferring
proOduction centers to areas in less danger and particularly by de-
centralising prodtuction, It was not until the end of 1944 that
the air war affected production. so severely that there was a cow~
siderable drop in production,
sig. Burkhart MUZ " Ri HILLIBRI#
*) a csaul t guns and Tankdestroyirs readfo
1) Te&FA N A E Asaul i-u:xe &vrd Tank Destroyers front uie.
Ld for 1 ppendi x 1 {
3) Antitwangun on self- "Illa. e1 .~rop.led mount. t rnt
Ttma 3t Sz 1.1 (F) 35(t) 38(t) IIIFahrge8tell I II II/III 35(t) 38(t) III
-Tank gun Tank Tank guia Tank
* a f f e M. G. 2 c: rohr 37c~37c ,WepnMachine. Z=t Flame- 477mm 37mm KwK.. L 6o
gun Ta-thrower 5 cm~ Kw.K.
IV IV VPanthf~j
Iv Iv Iv vTank Tank Tank Tank
= 11fl A7 lfn ~fl - n
5cm 7,.5L6 L 24Kw. K. 75mm
=L 42 7.5colun : 7zaw and____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ 50 Eam
1,9.193 9 1445 1223 3 -- 981.4.1940 10c2 1075 7 143 23e 329
1., 11079 955 871 X26
KwK.7,5L 43u.48
Pak-7,9JL 7075mm
it;" "7.5L 70
75mm
VI VITiger Tiger Flak Pz bc-I II Pz. Bef. Wten
VI VI 36(t) I -VI 3Tsnk fTack IV *)armored iain co d 9WUL -
K . X. Kam. K. Flak very ch.~. , ,8 2 cm T0m ariousL 56 L 71 2cm Vier-83mm 86mm uln6
3,7 cmn3?min3 cia ;6w i -
9 10 11 '*1'
ecov r TOTAL T TStu.c --
Summer~f Stu. G. III/ Stu. H. Stu. Jagd-
ITT-TV -0 W-9
d), etrZeilen
I- der III/f rontfac- :III IV
zhe hieeil
QlYuns Pzspf. w. K.XW.K.1-16 tanks 7,5 '7,
ready L24 L48for use tank tank
gun 75.i:3~X
i~4 L48
38/ICI IV IV
H.1©,5L 28
H. Pak15cm 7,5
H. ak Pak Pak Pak15cm7.5 8, , 8,5 12,6
L 12 L 48 L71 L71 L55antitank an-
tank - 88 mm tank
4=DaA-tI e 1IPk/ 11 Is-
Jagd- fart tiger um :3 1.horn
" s nthpr der
Pe C/ ' 1.
* ).front-firers .III/V VI VI Ze ilea, f aeh.
19 -2-
pz.
7!5U.
7,bo2
8,8L '71
rn .IL17 19 20 21 22 2 2, I.-L.
2o:.2O0n ifour-barreled
215243
3195'U ~~30 mm double-T-86 6
3195 88mm 5 5
defLW
Tot lb. th Totl-o th
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27,31
der
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3365i r ' 33n.5
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1751179
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1015111012001323144015011479157116461784
or
barrled453476459499517533.488470499485
2441232260286308330331331335328315
4368446747144650495652645310498947374874
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27382695246827182 946325134,13473373637603 941
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625605625
637697780831873907966
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Without(*) ohne Pz III
;.; , i Wth K,.KC. 37nmR ar_ e t bL :U nicht mehr £:'ontfaeThi ;, sondern nur' noch zu~r Verwenduni8
Im {Siheru Tdes t hin~ter der F1 ront und zur Ausbildung iz &'sataheer geeignet.
Figuxres framed in~ Red indcicate vehiles wnich could no longer be used at the frontbut only in the security service behind the lines and for training troops in theReplacement Armyr.
TYF
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1...... ._, o-,,a e, r- ^f r'*7 I3?K :C: raw. ., ,
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I t A ^,
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AP: -b 1X2V ERL U ST E
ITanks.1 -nzer~amDwa zn.
F, II (F) 38(t) 1III }iii ' I fiNv .- vi L vi
Panther i Tiger I Tiger
Fahrueate1 TITII TI/ITTI 186t) ITTT I TTT -- ~ D- --111LJ
CarrieeILv iv vi i VI
Flak- pz. Ber;pz. .TeIf. W. pz.
38(t)/ 1-VI 38(t),""Iz v,
KW. K, Flanr- Kwi.K. Kw.X. XK. Kw.K. Kw.K. Pak. 1W.K. Xw.K. Kw.X. FlakWa11'e MG 2c ror ,7 3,7 5 1607,5 7,5 795 7,5 8118 898 2cm, tversch. -1-5
WepnFae5 42 :7,5 L24 1.43 L70 L70 L56 L71 2cm Vier-thrower 124 u.48 ling
Column 13 coZwil-
N. d ~ile 11 2 3 1± 56 7 8 91012 139 T 5xMa3i 1941 I - - - 113uni13 16 33 127' 16 112Juili 109 107 175 219 108 1873August 141 96 173 90 70 1258September 7 24 62 98 21 1729
(ktober 15 34 84 35 52 1424November 25 27 144 105 36 634Dezemnber 14~ 89 102 208 6K 2856
1-Suiie111 315 3373 72 1 6 62Januar 1942 18 76 31 ..181 - 48 2838FeLr. 15 40 8 14949 1628Maerz 1 3 7 32 10 j - 8 6April 1 12 11 50 22 410Mai 8 6 6 . 14 30 2 6Juni 5 22 4 110 41 318Jufl - 28 5 235 61 1634August 2 27 20 130 37 -221September 4 21 24 179 48 -428Cvtober 1 11 37 87 54 3 319November 5 . 29 25 266 57 -939Dezember - 12 18 6o -± i 3Swme92 6o 287 196 10152 399268Januar 1943 49 - 30, 231 93 11 1743Febr. 207 - 13 988 343 3 40 19Maerz 51 - 30 2A2 6 2750April 22 - 4 '0 1 1 9 1117. 41
Ma125 1 2 13 90 4 152 17306Juni 12 - - - 2 1 4 - - 1Juli 26 4 - 18 171 19 271 83 33 17365August 4 11 1 :14 . 163 11 269 4.1 40 18-57September 1 9 1 7 1 1 '136 123 65 9-35Ckt ober 2 13 5 10 55 6 193 107 32 26145November 5 11 10 21 184 2 260 79 28. 22254Dezember 1h1!. - Sr 312 301' 92 58 26 15±
- Sunme 1949 108 6322 .096 ._209-766Januar 1944Fe brua rMaerzAprilMa iJuni3u:1
Lugus tSep temle rOdtober
November
321'2114641
3 5 37 10
8 1 - 16 12 38 1
1 I -
86 8
2 31 I -_-
149120276
8326242636529211 20
5
192421141 33347278298283105001.
13289602089
19191
1423919
1
2853
3
531339191690226528
1068769775546254-S17
Dezember II I I 1- o co < 141-<-vI 1 ... I ., 1 r% , , I-nnnn .'Q C.1 '(1 i1~
2) Stunngeschuetze und Jagdpanzer.
Stu. G. Stu. G.III II/IV
3) 1ak/Sti1.I I 1 I l 1
IStu.H. ~Stu. Pz. Jagclpz.
I l4 -
III I TT/TV TTT NT
Jagd- Elef antpanther
Jagd- i'_§___
It ige r .der
VI VI Zeilen
Pa/S~1 horn der
111* I T 11-y. ItY." -"1 .- , 0 .Laa 11; v Seujen
Stu. x. Stu. x. H 10,5 H 15cmPak k P k Pak 7,5 Pa7,5 795 L28 L12t 7,5 8,8 898 12, 8 17-24 u-.7062 6,8 26-27L24 jt448 1L48 L71 L71 L55 L 71
7<15 9 2 2.1 23 24 25 2(211_ 1 -
3. 38 822 2212 3!1220 2010 1C
19 19
53 5310 1025 25
1028 28-13 13-20 20 15 1537 37 25 2532 32 35 3534 34 24 2428 28 23 120 10
390 90 12 .r..127
30-30 5 5246 253 220 220134 1 135 119 119
41--43 82- 82
- 36-. - - 36 1 56- 141 10 17 39 207 76 4 80
132 ,11)- - 143 75 19 94- 216, 8 8 - 224 25 30 55
- 191 16- 1 20o 46 16 62- 219 13 7 4 243 19 1 20
i6,16 -169 67 17 84166 18 a
f 2277243
23632313117,.91436834631512010lj
1.0'? S~o OJI. 00 -- __________3.9ev\ . i~.I II LI.. IL '.J1 )LLAJ. - LI LI ~~1I.j '4(. I
162222
816804474863521
3916210
16
23
423
298
131
3976
2912592603)81391 9v
1056430523551
- 210- ' I'
705822
1.563375
30664
1661219
17243077
46.299
2
1
878252
1634t0
123! 335
73166}14
1'~
I Ine L V 'I 4 J 1J.LfSuiire I - I 0.1 t -nnL i C- I G-7Ih 77 .-
f.t L L -3 - tm--
T 0TA LSommne I .- -- - 1 -
IP ..
1K1~7I 59~11 1721
19dJan rh5 11± 05 11 1±9Q I1 2 1O9 LOO 4..W JZ .JII, ..
18966 5866 67 108 r6o 1 4 '1
Benerk ung : Pz. Kpfw. 35 (t) waren ab 1941 nicht mehr imn Felcdheer vorharxden.
Note: Begi.u ing in 1941, Pz.KNw 35 (t) were no longerused 1y the Field Forces.
T Y PT Y Ph
k -s a
Totp]
Total-
Total
Total
sp,>(, c1. S]nQ
0 7r7r7 , n IO r n... . ~ ALL - .- .
v . 4 J fl as Iv - _r" l.+
1 X16 K4 1 1 1 17 (11 LA in cu
iv. . . [lV 1V 't :IQ
r- i J
J'1
I'-,'., - I I 1 -' I I IQ '1
Viarar% T T T 1V
t..
s y 11 11/ l11 -)Vx'f 111 IV
q8/TV
i
i
i
S
ti
7 -777 411 0_1 ---- 1441.1 1 91 Z (1 .LL1 W tZ 171i i 1 1 'I 1 K . > , i 1 l7 4 C;q7 : 7ii 4. 1 i n 1
-A- I - 7lvIULL 77 4 4 101 O11n f1 un In 1n 11
i 1 Xr7 O'2 7 2 7 ±
_ -- 1TnT% 101. Z
791 h , 4x4Kn
PR ODUCT I OhJPRWDUT ION
1 nzerka we. en 1 tame.
ahrgestel l II III 38(t) III IIIf IV I V V V
Kw.K. F lam,t.. Kw.X. K. K.( wK. Kw.K.PawK KwXW f c i~or,7 3,7 z5crn'7 795 7575
la-5c L60 L 24 tL 43 L 0 L56Weapon 20=m thrower 37mmL 42 7,58mL94 7m 5m7 5mColumn # 37mm I _______
Jan. 1941 - 45 88. 314Febr - 50 108 26Maerz 7 5 22
prl15 49 124 36Mai 12 78 143 2Juni 1
1u 21 65 127 38A'wust 25 64 179 44September 25 76 17c 46j1Oktober j135 53 i164k1iNovemberfl zemiQpr-
Jai
40o 206171
Recovery tank
IIVI 8(t),
Ki.Xlak2cm68cmVier-
L71 ing47
*88mm cm Zwjiinfl
ef.VI. pz. fdeI-V-I Z.eilen
Total of: the
2) Assault Guns and Tank Destroyer
IIIv I IIIIV
III "IIIv
" " V7 VU Q 406 t 4 .4'1 T 'I .1r -eno { trm + f +, a.
Pak/Sf.1.
Ti/f1 . ( cc- tet~d1 s-horn
II I/IV
Pz.
III I~V
Jagd- 1Jagd-panzcer panthe~
3,6/IVI 1 -- - - I --I
versch*I
various
1_.t
.t't
7
+k
f
col.umns Stu.K7,5L 24
btu.X.7.5L'43u.4875mm
tH
10,5L 28
115cmL 12
Plak795L48
Pak8,8L 71
lO5mm 15Uum 7?5mm 88mm
Ele-f'ant
.gd-tiger
VI vi
8, 87. '71
Pak12,8
88mm 128m
der 4
the co- Tot alof thea ____ --
--- -- Total of
Total strength
Sumdert
Zeilenpj
16 -23P ak 7,5u.7,62
75mm an76,2mm
1 ' . -I -
~11 12-Z U 1 U' k.1 25 ' ion v
Pak
L 71
88mm
1'25 u. 2'
I k20nDmm f&uarreled37 mmX0mmiouble)arrele4
At
lb
a2 0
22145
2
7I
.L50204204246276256264312325308348
44303047485634503871
n 1942i22 AaK ( 1E4A IV _ l .1929 __
Maerz 50A~pril 137Mai,ToniJuliAWuutSeptemberOktoberNoyvemberLazember
5~64220
28
2126
1 04
216244246246228231231217I188
1;8
5858
8085
{7288849399
.1131 Kr
320377330363408369339364325324309
45453
3679706o807080
100
'-unmme 192 T0 1 r15265:25 896 4278 327Ta60 2 893n. 1943 1 s ,406 j163 - f35 13 25713Fe tr. 14 65 34 171 18 32 -3 2014- -
Maerz 34 ' 35 205 59 37 - 370 17 1April 1 46 213 - 46 - - 30628 34 0a -43 272 324 50- 6892645 0
Juni. - 5 6 6o 12 48425 3-11 $ 253 202 65 11 511 212
Agu st -284 120 60 15 458295 -
Septemlerj 259 )197 85 - - 20 591 351Oktober 338 257 50- - 17 66239-November 238 1209 56 1 501 7 5616 4
_______r 354 ~299 67- 37 3365071$ure 19L °A!1,t100 21 02 18 !61a 1 87 13 82 . 5966 34 0. 7Jan. 1944 30 79 9 5 41 -j 718 ;3 6 2Fair. 252 256 95 5 13 20 641 774 21;.4 esrz 3027 66_25 1 704 315 1
,Yuri 1 29 3160420 10 1 750 j '8 8 1I i 32345 100 .15. 15t151792 406 3
Juni 300 - 37 Kj7 32 34! 201831 41 10 41Ju1i 300 - 380 64 45 31 20f 840 46 2 3I, ,ust. 300 60 350 '6 94 30 ~ 251 865432100
'ptem~ber 180 "'101 335 - 6Iz24 1 119719(,t obo r 18 147 281006 6 2'67
Noebr IjI200 203431. . 26 29 25 87900Nvme18 J72786 241 8002-
____ _________3125 66 .38k 2.76 260 12 96.
Jan. 194~. 170 235 211 - 40 5 23 684 15 10 55 271-1221i
5unnae total 945 IJn/Febr 0 q_____ 197L - 82 25 0Q.411 62 i
a SJS 09 1 0,E 893 53 60o 6 8 2 2at 3j2 8"56
444303047
4 48563450387146
ANLAGE 3.appendix 3
der
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"Note.24,27
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i 111L[]9"Q0 143796
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This production chart includesall vehicles which were de-livered by the manufacturersto the Arzlr Acceptance Officersduring the respective months.
Bernerku:
Untc~r Produktion' sind die indem betrefienden Monat durch dieI eeresabnahxeste11en von denI Herstellern ueLernoninen Fain'-zeuge zu vers tehen.
120 1±1 1'784122 ! 6189_
130 140 - 140 527140 89 ~14 103< 563207 40 30 70 1 647
30 312 34 41 75 6936o 405 76 35 111. .1205
305 82 35 117 906306 90 44 134 951
2662 1i6 78 832355 101 27 120 1074
1 4407 141 i 42 18. 1252167 100 24 124 852
- 1 .. 22.. 3L0 1030 f3 35 I1074730 5 - 416 67 - 67 120149 7 2 500 72125 97 123875 8- 506 64- 164 1274
129 10 - 594 59 20 I 79 1423140 10 - .629 46 24 V 70 ; 14912201 6 - 797 -- -L624 7034225 15 3 832 -3I6313 16345263 1 3 792 31 31 1688162 '21 8 750 12 12 1482330 8 9 87 7 1 1562405 55 6 1012 5 } 511817
? _ 720 9 Q 1 -8 ___ __ _ __ __ __1729__ __ _
237_6 1 8682 08 13 ! 41182434 72 10 1015 1 211398 1,2 13 68910
8921 0_ _ __2_ _ _ _ _ _ _
lc, 4 15120 21±61 J29S. ~ L2
Bemerkunl;: Pz. Kpfrw. I unc 35 (t;~ wurden at, 1941 niche meir produziert.
Motes From 1941 on P, KDfv I and the 35 tontyp. were no 1on ermawdfactured.
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