Airpower in the Post Cold War

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Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack

Objectives Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Targets Phases of the Campaign

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned

Overview I

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Operation SOUTHERN WATCHThe Conflict and Lessons Learned

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPEThe Conflict and Lessons Learned

History of the BalkansBackground Ethnic Groups

Overview II

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Operation DENY FLIGHTThe Conflict and Lessons Learned

Operation ALLIED FORCEBackgroundNATO ActionsOperation ALLIED FORCE BeginsLessons learned by US MilitaryPolitical Lessons LearnedImpact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget

CFD Review

Overview III

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Conflict began 2 August 1990 Iraq and Kuwait could not settle grievances over oil Saddam Hussein sent armies to invade Kuwait

Gulf War Background

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Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait

Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the

Persian Gulf Protection of American citizens abroad

US Objectives

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CENTCOM CINC—Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf CENTAF Lt Gen Charles A. Horner

Became JFACC during the war

In first five days: Five fighter squadrons, contingent of AWACS, and part of 82d Airborne

Division Equaled Iraqi force in first 35 days

Air Reserves/Air National Guard called to active duty

Operation DESERT SHIELD

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16 Jan—An 11th-hour appeal for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait drew silence

17 Jan—Operation DESERT STORM began as allied forces answered Iraq’s silence

Within 10 days, air sorties reached the 10,000 mark

DESERT STORM Begins

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4th largest armed force in world Well over 1 million troops 750 combat and 200 support aircraft Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities SCUD Missiles

Iraqi Threat

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Iraq’s air defense system thought to be the best outside of the Soviet Union

United States was probably the only nation in the world with the airpower to “disintegrate” an integrated system of this type

Air Defense Threat

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Isolate and incapacitate Iraqi command structure Win air superiority Destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical

capabilities Eliminate Iraqi offensive military capability Eject Iraqi Army from Kuwait

Objectives

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Boyd 2 Video

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Powerful and focused air attacks on strategic centers of gravity over a short period of time Target Hussein Regime, not Iraqi

people Minimize civilian casualties and

collateral damage Minimize Coalition losses Pit US and Coalition strengths

against Iraqi weaknesses

Concept Of Operations

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Developed by Colonel John Warden and his Checkmate staff in WashingtonNamed in direct response to Vietnam’s unsuccessful

Rolling Thunder campaign

Based on a unique five-ring model of the modern nation-state

Instant Thunder

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The Five Strategic Rings

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Target Systems

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Leadership System Essentials

Infra-structure

Population Fielded Forces

Hussein Regime

Electricity

Oil Railroads

Bridges Strategic Psyops

- Iraqis

Destroy Strategic Air Defense

Incapacitate Tele- communications - Civil - Military

- Only internal distribution and storage, not production export capability

- Foreign workers

Destroy Strategic Offense - Bombers - Missiles

Damage Internal Control Org.

Nuclear Biological Chemical Research Facility

Tactical Psyops - Soldiers in Kuwait

Republican Guard

Horner 2 Video

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Four Part Campaign: Phase I: Strategic Air Campaign Phase II: Suppression of enemy Air Defenses over Kuwait vicinity Phase III: Air Attacks on ground forces in Kuwait and vicinity Phase IV: Ground Operations as directed

Campaign Overview

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On 27 Feb 1991, the Iraqi military was scattered and defeated Iraq lost 90 aircraft to coalition forces 122 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran

Stealth provided the needed edge The Persian Gulf War officially

ended on 11 Apr 1991

And in the end…

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Post-Desert Storm Video

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UN Security Council established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks by Saddam Hussein

Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 1991 as a humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees

C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 1991 Lasted approximately 8 years and was then replaced by

Operation NORTHERN WATCH

The Crisis in Iraq—ONW

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The need to avoid fratricide The limitations of airdrops Host-country tensions The need for alternate bases Lack of an exit strategy

The Crisis in Iraq:Lessons Learned—ONW

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OSW was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the 32nd parallel (extended to 33rd in 1996) in southern Iraq

Not an aggression against Iraq—executed as a self-defense measure Coalition partners included the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and

Kuwait Fire from more than 850 Iraqi SAMs and AAAs directed at coalition

aircraft Iraq violated the no-fly zone more than 160 times More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998

The Crisis in Iraq—OSW

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General Ronald R. Fogleman Jul 1995

“What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…”

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Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995 Quality-of-life changes needed due to high Ops-Tempo Reorganized Security Forces

The Crisis in Iraq:Lessons Learned—OSW

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In mid-1992, drought and civil war devastated Somalia Food supplies became a weapon of war Operation PROVIDE RELIEF began by the United States on

22 Aug 1992 to deliver food to Somali refugees Military and civilian aircraft used Over 2,000 sorties, carrying 48,162 metric tons of food

The Crisis in Somalia

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Although a humanitarian effort: 44 American soldiers lost their lives 175 were injured or wounded

Danger of failure due to warlord interference Operation Restore Hope

Coalition peacekeeping operation from 9 Dec 1992 to 4 May 1993 First test of Rapid Global Mobility

from the CONUS

The Crisis in Somalia

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First large scale test of newly formed AMC and the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)

Difficulties evolved in the planning, coordinating, and managing the operation

Austere infrastructure of Somalia added to lack of adequate bases for strategic airlift aircraft

The Crisis in Somalia:Lessons Learned

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After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister

Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946

Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent

The Balkans: A Brief History

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After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister

Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946

Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent

The Balkans: A Brief History

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Serbs—Dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia

Croats—Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western Influences

Muslims—Living mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Three Ethnic Groups In Conflict

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Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina

Operation DENY FLIGHT Enforced the no-fly zone Provided close air support to UN troops Conducted approved air strikes under a dual-key command arrangement

with the UN 28 Feb 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the no-

fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance

Operation DENY FLIGHT

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NATO objectives Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other

safe areas Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total

exclusion zone around Sarajevo Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and

nongovernment officials Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport

Operation DENY FLIGHT

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NATO missions of Operation DENY FLIGHTTo conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance

with UN Security Council Resolution 816To provide close air support for UN troops on the

ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forcesTo conduct approved air strikes

against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas

Operation DENY FLIGHT

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Operation DENY FLIGHT lasted from 12 Apr 93 – 20 Dec 95 Almost 100,000 sorties flown

A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on 21 Dec 95 Forces associated with Operation DENY FLIGHT were then

transferred to Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR as part of the overall NATO operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

Operation DENY FLIGHT

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Lack of doctrine Tactical air and space power problems Bases weren’t large enough to accept the

contingency surges Coalition/Joint problems Technological problems

The Crisis in Bosnia:Lessons Learned

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KOSOVO

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Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population, the majority of which are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)

Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital

The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move

Kosovo Crisis

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Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region

Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions

President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

United States & NATOInterests at Stake

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Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region

Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions

President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

United States & NATOInterests at Stake

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After the failure of repeated international diplomatic efforts since the spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo

North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes

Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government

NATO Action

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A stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression

The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces

The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence

NATO’s Objectives

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The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons

Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law

NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)

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The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons

Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law

NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)

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Demonstrate the seriousness of their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans

Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and reverse ethnic cleansing

Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

NATO’s Strategic Objectives

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“Degrade and damage the military and security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”

William Cohen, SECDEF

15 April 1999

Military Objective

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Kosovo War Aims• Stop the Serbian

slaughter and expulsion of ethnic Albanians

• Remove Milosevic from power

• Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties

Lessons Learned onKosovo War Objectives

US Grand Strategy Maintain a peaceful,

prosperous US-led Europe

Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition

Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct out of area military ops

European Strategy

Maintain a peaceful, prosperous, and independent Europe

Prevent spillover into Albania and Macedonia, then to Greece and Turkey

Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis

Demonstrate European unity

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Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing ObjectivesCommon Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives

United States air refuelers were stretched thin during operation Force structure numbers and resources were inadequate for current

level of commitments (all services); support and training as important to victory as strike

Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough; smart weapons may be better than smart platforms

Need the right force structure for the future C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint and coalition ops On the brink of another “hollow force”

Lessons Learnedby US Military

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Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans Best technology, weapons, and platforms “Made in USA.” Politicians unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique US

capabilities

United States cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests US focus shifted with opinion polls Fear US commitment could falter if US forces take heavy casualties

Political Lessons Learnedby Europeans

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European Union can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day); many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing) Need to build external identity

Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945 Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases

Political Lessons Learnedby Europeans

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No DOD/Allied spending surge like post-Desert Storm International defense market continues to shrink Readiness and retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for

modernization Inevitable tax cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets Services must eventually deal with the bow wave Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms (JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21) Support forces will need big $$$$ too

Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learnedon Future DOD Budget Trends

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“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”

Jacques Gansler Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”

Jacques Gansler Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Distinctive Capabilities—Air and space expertise, capabilities, and technological know-how

Functions—Broad, fundamental, and continuing activities of air and space power

Doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide the actions of military forces in support of national objectives

Review of CFD Model

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CFD Model

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Time Period DistinctiveCapabilities

Functions(missions)

Doctrinal Emphasis

DESERT STORM

Air Superiority Precision

Engagement Global Attack Information

Superiority Agile Combat

Support Rapid Global

Mobility

Strategic Attack Air Refueling Command and Control (C2) Counterair Surveillance and

Reconnaissance

Strategic air attack (precision weapons/stealth)

Suppress enemy air defenses

PROVIDE COMFORT/ NORTHERN WATCH

Rapid Global Mobility

Air Superiority

Airlift Counter Air Strategic Attack Surveillance and

Reconnaissance

Protect northern Iraqi no-fly zone

Humanitarian airdrops for refugees

SOUTHERN WATCH

Precision Engagement

Air Superiority

Counter Air Strategic Attack Surveillance and

Reconnaissance

Theater attack of military targets

Time Period DistinctiveCapabilities

Functions(missions)

Doctrinal Emphasis

PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE

Rapid Global Mobility

Global Attack Air Superiority Agile Combat

Support

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Counter Air/Land Strategic Attack Airlift/Special Operations

AEF concept Humanitarian airdrops

for refugees Strategic Attack

DENY FLIGHT

Air Superiority Information

Superiority Agile Combat

Support

Counterair Surveillance and

Reconnaissance Counterland

No defined doctrine

ALLIED FORCE

Air Superiority Precision

Engagement

Strategic Attack Counterland Intelligence

Strategic attacks on ethnic cleansing Serbs and military capabilities

CFD Model

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Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack

Objectives Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Targets Phases of the Campaign

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned

Summary I

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Operation SOUTHERN WATCH The Conflict and Lessons Learned

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE The Conflict and Lessons Learned

History of the Balkans Background Ethnic Groups

Summary II

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Operation DENY FLIGHT The Conflict and Lessons Learned

Operation ALLIED FORCE Background NATO Actions Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins Lessons learned by US Military Political Lessons Learned Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget

CFD Review

Summary III

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