al-kindi on creation agains aristotle

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Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge to IslamAuthor(s): Kevin StaleySource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1989), pp. 355-370Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709566.

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AL-KINDI ON CREATION:ARISTOTLE'S CHALLENGE TO ISLAMBY KEVIN STALEY

Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (c. 800-870) was the first philosopher ofIslam. It is difficult to overstate the incredible intellectual vitality of theperiod of Islamic culture to which his thought belonged. The translationmovement had grown from its early beginnings in the eighth centuryinto what has been called a full-fledged scramble for Greek scientific andphilosophical texts on the partof the caliphateand wealthy citizens alike.1This period also witnessed the political ascendancy of the dialecticaltheologians known as the Mu'tazilites, who began to adapt philosophicalmethods to theological matters.2 It would be a mistake, however, toconstrue this period merely as an Hellenization of Islam. Early in theAbbasid period the separation of theology (kaldm) and the study of thelaw (shari'ah) into two distinct disciplines took place, and each profitedfrom its new independence.The four majorschools of jurisprudencewerealready established by al-Kindi's time, and the canonization of the Tra-

'See M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy(New York, 1970), 21ff. Althoughsome early historians identified al-Kindi as a translatorhimself, this is probablynot thecase. See G. N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindi: The Philosopherof the Arabs (Rawalpindi, 1966), 14,and M. Moosa, Al-Kindi's Role in the transmission of Greek Knowledge to the Arabs,Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, 15 (1967), 1-18. However, al-Kindi played akey role in formingthe conceptual apparatusand technical vocabularythat werenecessaryfor meaningfully appropriatingGreek thought. In his On the Definitions of Things andTheir Descriptions (R. fiHudud al-Ashya wa Rusumiha, ed. M. CA.H. abu Ridah inRasa' il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyah [Cairo, 1950-53], I, 165-80), al-Kindi gives a number ofdefinitions for each of ninety-six philosophical terms in an effort to recast the abstractconceptual data of Greek thought into the predominantly poetic language of the Arabs.See Atiyeh, 12.2 Al-Kindi's precise relationship to the Mu'tazilite theologians is a matter of debate.Richard Walzer has argued for a very close relationship on the basis of overwhelmingdoctrinal and methodological similarities. See R. Walzer, New Studies on al-Kindi,Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy(Oxford, 1962), 175-205. Alfred Ivryargues that this evidence is insufficient for showing any intimate or unique relationshipbetween al-Kindi and the Mu'tazilites. He argues that these similarities might be sharedby anyone who is more or less rationally oriented to one's faith. Ivry prefers to see al-Kindi as a solitary man, happy with his science and philosophy with apparently littleinclination for insisting upon the particularsof religious or political creeds. See A. Ivry,Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany, 1970), 32. Walzer has made too strong a claim byidentifying al-Kindi as a Mu'tazilite theologian (Ibid., 187), while Ivry's position thatal-Kindi stood aloof from the concerns of the theologians seems equally excessive. Thedistancebetweenal-Kindi and the Mu'tazilites-as regardstheir methodology, principles,and origins-appears to be that between philosophy and theology. This relationship iscarefully defined by al-Kindi, as I hope to show.

355Copyright 1989 by JOURNALOFTHEHISTORYOF IDEAS, INC.

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356 KEVIN STALEYditions of the Prophet led to the consolidation of Sunnism as well as tothe development of Islam's own historical consciousness.3In the midstof all this intellectual vitality, al-Kindi's thought stands as a highlycreative and unique appropriationof the wealth of scientific and philo-sophical texts which had become available.4In spite of this pervasive Hellenic influence, al-Kindi remained sen-sitive and committed to his Moslem creed, but it would be mistaken toconstrue al-Kindi's introduction of philosophy to Islam merely as anintroduction of philosophical methodology into traditional theologicalspeculations. The first part of perhaps his greatest treatise, On FirstPhilosophy,did something more than that. It was nothing less than aninvitation to Islam to philosophize. Thus, al-Kindi exhibited a deeprespect for the ideals of philosophy and the Philosopher himself. Never-theless, unlike later Moslem philosophers such as Ibn-Sina and al-Farabi,he was compelled to overturn a tenet central to the Aristotelian Physicsand Metaphysicsand directly contrary to the Moslem creed, namely, theeternity of matter, motion, and time.In this essay, I hope to do justice to the unique position which al-Kindi holds within the intellectual history of Islam by examining hisphilosophy of creation. Because part of his uniqueness lies precisely inthe fact that he handled this doctrine philosophically, I begin by lookingat al-Kindi's definition of philosophy and its relation to revelation andtheology. In the second part of the essay I provide a detailed analysis ofal-Kindi's argument for the non-eternity of the world. The final sectionsof the essay are devoted to a criticism and assessment of al-Kindi'sposition from an Aristotelian perspective.

I. Al-Kindi defines philosophy as knowledge of the true nature ofthings, insofar as it is possible for man. 5 As a human art or science,philosophy must attain truth through research (talab) and effort (tak-alluf). Unlike prophetic knowledge, which is granted to particular in-dividuals immediately through inspiration (ilham) and purification3For a concise discussion of this period in Islamic history, see W. M. Watt, Islamic

Philosophyand Theology (Edinburgh, 1962), 72-81.4 One can trace the intellectual inheritance evidenced within al-Kindi's writings toAristotle, Plato, Porphyry, the Stoics, John Philoponus, and Nicomachus, among others.See A. Ivry, Al-Kindi's On First Philosophy and Aristotle's Metaphysics, Essays onIslamic Philosophyand Science, ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany, 1975); H. Davidson, JohnPhiloponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation, Journal ofthe American OrientalSociety, 89 (1969), 357-91; and M. E. Marmura and J. M. Rist,Al-Kindi's Discussion of the Divine Existence and Oneness, Medieval Studies, 25(1963), 338-54.5 OnFirstPhilosophy(fi al-Falsafah al-Ula), 97, 9 (henceforth identified as FP), fromA. Ivry's translation in his Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany, 1974); reference is to theabu Ridah pagination of the Arabic edition (97-162) given in the columns of Ivry's text.



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 357(tathir), the path of philosophy is long and arduous.6Therefore,althoughthe findings of philosophy are in agreement with revealed truth, it is tobe strictly distinguishedfrom prophetic knowledge which human beingsare unable by their very nature to attain through nature alone. 7Al-Kindi also distinguishes philosophy and theology proper. Philo-sophical investigation does not take its start from revealed truths. Rather,it begins with those concepts which are verified in the soul, validatedand renderedcertain through the veracity of intellectual principleswhichare known necessarily.... It is characteristic of these concepts thatthey are free from all imagery of sense and imagination: This is aperception of the soul which is not sensory, is necessary, and does notrequire an intermediary. 8The richly concrete and poetic language ofthe Koran alone rules it out as a candidate for providingthe firstprinciplesof philosophical discourse.Al-Kindi does not, therefore,intend to replacerevelation and theologywith philosophy, but he does grant philosophy its own charter and itsindependence from revelation. This was bound to raise suspicion. Al-Kindi no doubt encounteredopposition on this score. Unfortunately, thespecific historical details of this situation are sparse. Suffice it to say thatal-Kindi anticipatedsuch opposition and attemptedto convince his fellowMoslems of the benefits of the new science he was introducing. In thetext with which I am principally concerned, On First Philosophy,he notonly presents an account of the nature and aim of philosophy; he alsogives an apologia for its utility and harmony with Islam's own quest fortruth:9Theknowledge f the true natureof things ncludes he knowledgeof Divinity,unity,andvirtue,andcompleteknowledge f everythinguseful,andof the wayto it; and a distance rom anythingharmful,with precautions gainst t. It istheacquisition f all of thiswhichthetruemessengers rought romGod,greatbe his praise.

6For an English translationof al-Kindi's discussion of the distinction between humanscience and prophetic knowledge taken from his treatise On the Number of Aristotle'sBooks, see R. Walzer, New Studies on al-Kindi, Greek into Arabic, 178.7 Walzer, 178, and Atiyeh, 28-32.8FP, 107, 13-108, 3 (page, line number). Failure to follow this methodological cri-terion is largely responsible for the error and confusion which attend investigations ofmatters divine: For this reason many of the inquirers into things which are beyondnature have been confused, since they, as children [do], have used in their investigationof them their [sensible] representation n the soul . . (FP, 110, 15ff). Clearlythe Koran,which is largely poetic narrative, falls into this class.9FP, 104, 8-10. Ivry suggests that this formulation of revelation may have increased

opposition to al-Kindi's philosophical endeavor, for in this summary there is apparentlyno room for such Islamic principles as fasting, pilgrimage, or prayer. In effect, al-Kindi is attemptingto minimize doctrinal particularities( Al-kindi's OnFirstPhilosophyand Aristotle's Metaphysics, 23).



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358 KEVIN STALEYAl-Kindi here refers, of course, to the prophets, but he does so in orderto emphasize the like-mindedness of the philosopher and prophet. Eachis bound by the same constraint and in pursuit of the same good, truth.Therefore, we ought not, al-Kindi urges, be ashamed of the truthand of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even if it comes from racesdistant and nations different from us. For the seeker of truth nothingtakes precedence over the truth. 'oIn an eloquent paraphraseof a passage from Alphaellaton of theAristotelian Metaphysics,al-Kindi expresses his deep appreciationof theGreeks:1It is proper hat our gratitudebe greatto those who havecontributed ven alittle of the truth,let alone to those who have contributedmuch truth,sincethey havesharedwith us the fruitsof theirthoughtand facilitated or us thetrue (yet) hidden inquiries.... If they had not lived, these true principles withwhich we have been educatedwould not havebeen assembledorus, evenwithintenseresearch hroughout ur time.The very arduousness of philosophical endeavor calls for the co-operationof all men. Al-Kindi argues that those who fail to appreciate the con-tribution of the Greeks suffer from a narrow understanding,dirty envy,and the lack of true religion.12In al-Kindi's eyes, First Philosophy is by far the best among the artsand sciences that the Greeks bequeathed to Islam: The noblest part ofphilosophy and the highest in rank is First Philosophy, i.e., knowledgeof the First Truth, Who is the cause of all truth. '3 Because First Phi-losophy is knowledge of the First Cause, it is prior to, more noble than,and virtuallycontains the truths of all other arts and sciences.'4Moreover,First Philosophy is the most certain of the human sciences. Because theFirst Cause is independent of matter and motion, man's knowledge ofthis cause is independentof sensation and imagination. First Philosophyis not, therefore, subject to the error and vicissitudes of sense and fancy.Beginning with truths grasped by the intellect alone, First Philosophyattains to the apodictic certitude proper to demonstrativesciences. Errorand confusion arise only when one attempts to utilize imaginative rep-resentation and sensation in matters metaphysical.'5Al-Kindi remained confident that the results of First Philosophywould ultimately be in agreement with revealed truth; but Mecca andAthens were in conflict on at least one serious issue, whether or not theworld was created in time. The philosopher whom al-Kindi perhaps had

10FP, 103, 4-5.1FP, 102, 10-14.12FP, 104, 2-9.13FP, 98, 1.14FP, 98, 15.15FP, 112, 15ff.



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 359admired the most, Aristotle, had taken a stance directly opposed to thatof revelation. Of course the fallibility of a particular philosopher neednot entail the incompatibility of philosophy and theology. However, al-Kindi's confidence in their compatibility remained something of a prom-issory note, and to make good his claim he set out to demonstrate onphilosophical grounds what his fellow Moslems accepted on faith.

II. In its most general form, al-Kindi's attempt to demonstrate thenon-eternityof the world and its creation in time consists of the followingpremises. 1) All that is quantitative (which includes body, time, andmotion) is finite. 2) But time is the measure of the being of the body ofthe universe. 3) Therefore, the universe is of finite duration, that is tosay, it must have a temporal beginning with regard to its very existence.4) But the body of the universe cannot have been the cause of its ownexistence. 5) Therefore, it has been caused to exist by another, in time,and from nothing.The success of his argument depends, then, on his establishing threecrucial premises. First, he must show that time is quantitatively finite.Secondly, he must verify that time is the measure of the total durationof the universe and not only of a part of that duration. Finally, he mustshow that the universe cannot be the cause of its own existence. I willconsider each of these premises in turn.Premise One: At the heart of al-Kindi's demonstration of the non-eternity of the world is his proof that an actually infinite quantity isimpossible.Although he maintainsthat this is the case precisely inasmuchas something is subject to quantity, his initial argument in On FirstPhilosophy deals only with the impossibility of an infinite bodily mag-nitude.He begins his demonstration by supposing that there is an actuallyinfinite body. By showing that this supposition entails false and contra-dictory results, he proves the impossibility of an infinite body through areductioad absurdum. In order to get the proof underway, he makes asecond supposition, namely, that a finite magnitude is subtracted fromthis infinite body. He then specifies the mutually exclusive results of sucha subtraction: If there is an infinite body, then whenever a body offinite magnitude is separatedfrom it, that which remains of it will eitherbe a finite or infinite magnitude. 6 The stage is now set for the decisivemoves of his argument.Suppose that the remainderof the subtraction of a finite magnitudefrom an infinite magnitude is finite. It is evidently true that the sum ofthe subtrahend and the remainder must equal the original magnitude.The conjunction of a finite subtrahend and a finite remaindercan neveryield an infinite quantity. If both the subtrahend and the remainder are

16FP, 115, 1.



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360 KEVIN STALEYfinite, it follows that the original magnitude must have been finite. Butit was supposed to be infinite. Therefore, the supposition of a finiteremainderyields an impossible contradiction.17

Suppose, then, that the remainder is infinite. In this case, the re-mainder and the subtrahend together must either be greater than orequal to what it [the remainder] was before the addition [of the subtra-hend]. 18 Obviously the whole composed of the remainder and the sub-trahend cannot be equal to the remainder;for this entails that the wholeis equal to a part of the whole-which is impossible.19 t remains thenthat the whole composed of the subtrahend and the remainder (theoriginal infinite body) must be greater than the remainder alone. Butthis is also impossible, as al-Kindi sees it.

By hypothesis, the remainderitself is infinite. Therefore, if the infinitewhole is greater than the remainder alone, then one infinity is greaterthan another. Al-Kindi argues for the impossibility that one infinitequantity be greater than another by observing that the smaller of thetwo is equal to a portion of the greater. 20But two equal things arethose whose similarity is that the dimensions between their limits are thesame. 21 If the lesser infinite, then, is equal to a portion of the greaterinfinite, it must have limits-given the nature of equality. Thus, thesmaller infinite object is finite, and this is an impossible contradiction. 22Having argued that the supposition of either a finite or infinite re-mainderyields impossiblecontradictions, al-Kindi's reductiois complete.He immediately draws his intended conclusion: It has now been ex-

plainedthat it is impossiblefor a body to have infinityand in this manner,

17FP, 115, 2-6.8FP, 115, 8-9.19FP, 116, 1-4. See also On the Explanation of the Finitude of the Universe, AbuRidah, 188;tr. N. Rescher and H. Khatchadourianin Al-Kindi's Epistle on the Finitudeof the Universe, Isis, 56 (1965), 429.20FP, 115, 13.21FP, 115, 14-15.22FP, 115, 17. See also On the Unity of God and the Finitude of the Body of theUniverse (abu Ridah, 202-4; translated in Al-Kindi: Cinq Epitres [Paris, Editions duCentre National La RechercheScientifique, 1976], 94) and On What Cannot Be Infiniteand Of What Infinity May Be Attributed (abu Ridah, 194-98; tr. F. A. Shamsi inIslamic Studies, 14 [1975], 137-38). Al-Kindi offers a somewhat different argument inhis epistle On the Explanation of the Finitude of the Universe : since the supposedsmaller infinite can be subtractedfrom the larger, the smaller infinite must be equal tosome portion of the greater infinite. An addition to this portion is obviously possible,since it is part of but less than the greater infinite magnitude. But if an addition to the

portion is possible, then it is finite because addition in it is possible. This argumentrests on the premise that no addition can be made to an actually infinite magnitude,rather than a premise about the nature of equality (see Rescher and Khatchadourian,431-32). Although some recent mathematiciansagreewith al-Kindi on this point, Cantor'sset theory allows for the addition but does not allow the initial subtraction of the lesserinfinite from the greater in the first place (see Craig, 80-85).



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 361he adds, it has been explained that any quantitative thing cannot haveinfinity in actuality. 23This addition is far from casual, for from it al-Kindi draws one of the crucial premises for his argument for the non-eternityof the world, namely, that time itself must be finite. He continues:Now time is quantitative, and it is impossible that time have infinityin actuality, time having a finite beginning. 24Even if time is finite, al-Kindi does not yet have his intended con-clusion, namely, that the universe as a whole has its very beginning intime. Time, for al-Kindi, is the measure of motion. It is at least conceivablethat the body of the universe could have existed in some fashion priorto any motion and therefore to the beginning of time. Like the stonewhich precedes in existence the warmth it receives from the sun, thepresent universe may only be a temporary agitation of an eternal sub-stratum, destined to resolve itself back into a state of motionlessness.Such a view of the universe is far from fantastic. It had in fact beenembraced by several of the ancients with whom al-Kindi was no doubtfamiliar from his reading of Aristotle.25 n this case creation ex nihilo aswell as creation in temporeare effectively ruled out. Al-Kindi must, then,provide support for perhaps the most crucial premise in the overallargument, namely, that time is the measure of the total being of theuniverse.

Premise Two:Al-Kindi's response to this challenge is fairly straight-forward. Time is the measure of motion. Therefore, motion never existswithout time nor time without motion.26Consequently if body neverexists without motion, then body never exists without time. Time willbe co-extensive with the total being of the universe. Al-Kindi arguesintensively for this conclusion, for with it his entire demonstrationstandsor falls.

Having shown that motion never exists without body,27 al-Kindi be-23FP, 116, 5-6.24FP, 116, 7-8. Five pages later, al-Kindi advances another argument to show thattime must be finite: if past time were infinite, since an infinite cannot be traversed, onecould never arrive at some definitely known time-including the present. So past timemust be finite. Since past time must be finite, future time must be finite as well; for the

forward progression of time will only add finite and determinate periods to a finite past(FP, 121, 5-122, 9). This is not as independent an argument as it first seems; for onecan speak of traversing time in this way only if one assumes that time is like a bodilymagnitude,the partsof which co-exist and can be traversed n succession.This assumptionis most evident in On What Cannot Be Infinite And Of What Infinity May Be Pred-icated (see Shamsi, 139-40). Therefore, the demonstration of the impossibility of anactually infinite bodily magnitude remains fundamental in al-Kindi's overall strategy.25 See Aristotle's Metaphysics,983b, 6 ff.

26 ... time is but the number of motion, i.e., it is the duration counted by motion.If there is motion, there is time; and if there were not motion, there would not be time(FP, 117, 5-6).27FP, 117, 7-14.



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362 KEVIN STALEYgins his first argument by assuming the opposite of his intended conclu-sion. Suppose that body exists and that it is without motion. One of thetwo alternatives must follow. Either motion is absolutely absent, and itis impossible that it should ever be present;or it is absent, yet its presenceremains a possibility. If neither of these alternatives actually obtains, al-Kindi will have shown that his original supposition is false and will haveestablished his intended conclusion.

It is simply not the case, however, that body by its very nature excludesmotion as a radical impossibility. Al-Kindi has shown that motion isalways the motion of some body. Thus, the fact that we observe motionis sufficient to show that at least some bodies are subject to and do notexclude motion all together. Motion is therefore not an impossibility forbody as such.28Only the second alternative remains. Suppose that the body of theuniverse is completely without motion, and yet motion remains a pos-sibility. Al-Kindi argues that this supposition is also false; for if there isbody and it is possible for that body to be in motion, then some bodymust (already) be in motion. In short, possibility entails prior actuality,for we say something is possible with respect to a certain substance onlyif similar substances actually possess it. We affirm the ability to speakof the newborn because other humans have already learned how tospeak.29 f motion is a possibility for body, then it must actually exist insome body. Body and motion must ultimately be concomitant. The orig-inal assumption that there can be body without motion is false. Whenthere is body, there is motion necessarily.30In a second argument al-Kindi addresses more directly the opinionthat the universe was originally at rest and only subsequentlymoved. He

28 There are problems with the original manuscript here. The text, as emended byIvry, reads in translation as follows: If there is a body and there was no motion, theneither there would be no motion at all, or it would not be, though it would be possiblefor it to be. If there were no motion at all, then motion would be a non-existent.However,since body exists, motion is an existent, and this is an impossible contradiction; and itis not possible for there to be no motion at all if body exists (FP, 117, 15-118, 1). Itake the phrase no motion at all to signify the absolute impossibility that body everbe in motion. This is justified to the extent that al-Kindi contrasts no motion at allwith a situation in which there is no motion, yet motion remains a possibility. Secondly,the premise since body exists, motion is an existent is taken to be an appeal to theempirical fact that motion exists (following Ivry, 155, n. 117.17). If taken literally, itasserts as a premise the proposition which al-Kindi wants to prove.29 FP, 118, 4-6. Al-Kindi has in mind not only logical, but temporal priority as well.If it were not for the necessity of temporal priority, the conclusion that body is at notime without motion would not follow.30 Motion, therefore,necessarily exists in some bodies, and exists in the simple body(al-jirm al-mutlaq), existing necessarily in the simple body; accordingly body exists and

motion exists (FP, 118, 5-10). By simple body, al-Kindi means the outermost of theheavenly sphere in the Aristotelian cosmos.



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 363begins by posing another disjunction:either the universe is created, thatis, generated out of nothing, or it is eternal. If it has come into beingfrom nothing, it is impossible that it should ever exist without motion;for creation itself is a kind of motion.31On the other hand, if it is eternal,it is impossible that it should ever have passed from a state of rest to astate of motion. In this case what is eternal would have moved fromactual rest to actual motion, but the eternal is by definition changeless.Therefore, if the universe is eternal or was at one time without motion,even now there would be no motion. On either supposition then, it isimpossible that the universe should have ever preceded motion. Theuniverse is in motion; and whenever it is, it must be in motion.32

The force of these argument is to establish that the world has had abeginning in time. Time and motion are, according to al-Kindi, thenumber of the duration of that which changes. 33 Because time is nec-essarily concomitant with motion and motion with body, time is neces-sarily concomitant with body: body, motion, and time are thereforenotprior to one another, and they occur simultaneously in being. 34 There-fore, if time is of limited duration, a conclusion which al-Kindi takes tohave been establishedin the first set of arguments,then the body universeis also of limited duration, which is to say that it has a beginning intime, or better, that it began when time itself began.Of course one could always agree that the universe had a beginningin time, but respond that it is its own cause. In order to establish hisintended conclusion al-Kindi must, therefore,establishthe third and finalpremise in his main argument, namely, that the universe could not havebeen the cause of its own being or, as al-Kindi puts it, that the universecould not have been the cause of its essence.

Premise Three: Al-Kindi begins by posing a fourfold disjunction,which includes all of the permutationsof the relationshipbetween a thingand its essence. Either 1) a thing is non-existent, and its essence is non-31 If it is a generation from nothing, the coming to be of being from nothing being

generation, then its becoming is a motion ... (FP, 118, 19). It is quite clear that al-Kindi here assumes: 1) that creation is a kind of generation and 2) generation itself isa kind of motion (harakah).Here al-Kindi departsfrom Aristotle, and he often construesgeneration/corruption as if it were a change from one contraryto another. (See FP, 113,11; see also Physics 224b 35-225b 9.) This will prove to be quite an unfortunate classi-fication of creation for al-Kindi; for it implies (correctly in Aristotle's eyes) that anysort of generation or change will presuppose an existent substratum.32Al-Kindi offers a third argument for this premise: Body is by nature composite.Composition is itself a kind of motion. Therefore, motion belongs to body by nature.(See FP, 120, 6-121, 3.) This argument simply assumes that that which is composite hasat some time been composed. Al-Kindi seems to be aware of the problem (see FP, 121,2). For a detailed analysis of this argument and its historical precedents, see Davidson,371-72.

33FP, 120, 15-16.34FP, 120, 20.



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364 KEVIN STALEYexistent, 2) a thing is non-existent, but its essence exists, 3) a thing existsbut its essence is non-existent, or 4) a thing exists and its essence exists.If in each of these cases a thing cannot be the cause of its own essence,then, since they cover all the relevantpossibilities,the intendedconclusionfollows by default. In the first case, neither thing nor essence exists, andso one cannot be the cause of the other. Again, in the second case, thething is non-existent. As a thing and its essence are identical, it is con-tradictory to suppose that one could exist without the other. The thirdalternative can be ruled out on the same grounds. This leaves only thefourth alternative, in which the thing and its essence are supposed toexist. However, since a thing and its essence are identical and the samething cannot be the cause of itself, it is clear that something cannot bethe cause of the existence of its own essence. Therefore, the universecannot be the cause of itself.35Al-Kindi's demonstration is now complete. The duration of the bodyof the universe must have had a beginning in time. As such, it requiresa cause, but this cause must be distinct from itself. Therefore, it has beencaused to exist by another in time. The universe has been created in time.

III. Al-Kindi's argument can be challenged in several ways. Thesechallenges will vary, of course, according to one's point of departure.Amathematician might question al-Kindi's mathematical operations withinfinitequantities.Cantorianset theory, for example, arguesthat an actualinfinite does exist, that one infinite can be greater than another, and thatit is not contradictory to say that an infinite part of an infinite set isequal to (has a one-to-one correspondence with) the whole infinite setitself. Although al-Kindi's mathematics is central to his position, ananalysis of al-Kindi's work in light of contemporary mathematics hasalreadybeen carried out by William Craig and F. A. Shamsi.36Therefore,I have selected Aristotle as al-Kindi's critic-as seems especially a proposgiven that much of al-Kindi's philosophical aspiration reflects an Aris-totelian inheritance.Aristotle agrees that an actually infinite body is impossible. Unlikeal-Kindi, he does not establish his position using mathematics. He appealsinstead to physical considerations concerning the nature of the basicelements, their natural places, and so forth.37Nevertheless, it is not thisdifferencein methodology that bringsal-Kindi and Aristotle into conflict.35FP, 123, 3 - 124, 16.36 See Craig, 69-110, defendingal-Kindi against the objectionsof Cantorian set theory.For Shamsi, on the other hand, Cantor wins the day (see 123-33).37 In the PhysicsAristotle sees mathematicaland physical analysesas distinct concerns:We seem to be inquiringinto something general [concerning the infinite as an attribute],

namely, whether there is among mathematical entities an [actual] infinite [extension]... but since our investigation concerns sensible things, we are especially interested inasking whether or not there is among sensible things an infinitely large [actual] body



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 365An Aristotelian analysis turns one's attention away from the math-ematical assumptions implicit in al-Kindi's arguments towards their

deeper ontological presuppositions.There are two points of interest here.First, al-Kindi moves from the conclusion that an actually infinite bodyis impossible to the conclusion that time must also have some beginning.Although Aristotle agrees with the first conclusion, he explicitly arguesthat it is impossible that time have a beginning. Secondly, al-Kindi arguesthat creation is a kind of first motion or change. Aristotle argues that itis impossible that there should ever have been some motion absolutelyfirst in time. Each of these issues is indicative of a fundamentalproblemin al-Kindi's position, as Aristotle would see it, namely, an inadequateunderstanding of the ontology of motion and change, infinity, and ac-tuality and potentiality.

Let me begin then by reviewing for a moment Aristotle's account ofmotion. Aristotle defines motion as the actualization of the potentialprecisely inasmuch as it is potential.38The actuality of the buildable,precisely inasmuch as it is buildable, is the process of building itself. Thecompleted house has changed or come to be, but it is no longer actuallybeing built. As long as the building materials are in simple potency tobecoming a house, the house is not yet being built. Motion, in this casethe process of building, falls mid-way between complete actuality andsimple potency; and this, Aristotle notes, is why it is hard to graspwhat motion is: it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described,hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing. 39

Time, motion, and bodily magnitude are all quantitativeinasmuch aseach is a continuum divisible into parts.40Furthermore, each can bedivided ad infinitum. Thus, Aristotle remarks: time, [motion], andspatial magnitude are subject to the same divisions. If either is infinite,so is the other. And each is infinite in the same way as the other. 41 Abodily magnitude can be said to be infinite inasmuch as it is potentiallydivisible into an infinite numberof parts, as is also the time during which

(PhysicsIII, 5, 240a 32-240b3;tr. R. Hope in Aristotle'sPhysics[Lincoln, 1961]). Aristotlethen argues against an actually infinite body on the grounds that: a) the basic elementsmust exist in definite proportion to one another, which would be impossible if any orall of them were infinite and b) everybody must have a natural place, which would beimpossible for an infinite body (see also, De Caelo, I, 5-7). Al-Kindi seems to have beenwell aware that he was departing from Aristotle's approach, as Rescher and Khatcha-dourianpoint out in their introductionto the epistle On the Explanationof the Finitudeof the Universe (see 426 and 432).

38 Physics III, 1, 201a 10ff.39Physics III, 2, 201b 33-202a 2.40PhysicsVI, 1-2, esp. 231b 18-20 and 232a 22ff.41 Physics VI, 2, 233a 17-18.



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366 KEVIN STALEYmotion over such a magnitude takes place.42Aristotle calls this sort ofinfinity potential, as opposed to actual, infinity.43Given that magnitude,time, and motion are all potentially infinite in this way, one can see whyal-Kindi might argue that, since an actually infinite body is impossible,the duration of the universe must also exclude infinity or eternity. How-ever, this overlooks the crucial differencebetween magnitude, on the onehand, and motion and time on the other-a differencewhich lies not somuch in their quantitativenature as in their ontological status. This maybe seen as follows.

We speak of motion from X through Y to Z as having the parts XYand YZ. If we consider motion inasmuch as it is divided according tothe division of magnitude, then part of its motion (XY) will have alreadybeen completed (and thus no longer motion), while part will not yet becomplete (YZ).44Any given motion therefore,when consideredas havingparts, is composed of a series of successively completed motions which,unlike the parts of a body, cannot co-exist. If they were actually tocoexist, then the same body would both be and not be at the same placeat the same time; or better, it would exist at the same place at the sametime, and there would be no motion. Therefore, the very being of motionessentially depends upon potentiality. Motion is by definition an incom-plete actuality, the being of which depends upon its incompleteness.When a body is actually divided into parts, it is only potentiallywhole. When these parts are joined, the body is completely actual andwholly existent. When a given motion or period of time is complete,however, it is finished, used up, over. In short it is no more becauseincompleteness and potentiality are of its very being.Clearly then, for Aristotle as much as for al-Kindi, no motion canbe actually infinite. It can exist only inasmuch as its parts succeed oneanother through time, whereas an actually infinite quantity requiresthatits parts co-exist as a whole. What is more, all motion is from one termto another, from here to there, black to white, from privation to posses-

42 The potential infinity of magnitude is what is primary, according to Aristotle:Thus, movement is infinite because the magnitude is infinite over which movement oralteration or increase takes place; and time is infinite because movement is so (PhysicsIII, 7, 23 ff).

43 There is no actual infinite, but there is an infinite potentially and by division....Accordingly, that is infinite of which it is always possible, in regardto quantity, to takea part outside what has already been taken (Physics, III, 7, 206b 12 and 207a, 8-9).

44Strictly speaking, taken without qualification this premise is false. If motion fromX to Y will have been completed, the body in question will have come to rest at Y. Inthat case motion from X to Y will be numerically distinct from the motion from Y toZ; and the entire motion from X to Z will no longer be a single, continuous motion. Itwill be composed of two distinct motions. However, inasmuch as we imagine the divisionof motion according to the division of magnitude, we imagine it to be composed of aseries of successively completed motions which do not coexist. We speak of motion assuccessive when we consider its parts, and as continuous when we consider it as a whole.



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 367sion, etc. Therefore, motion is of its very nature from one limit to another,from beginning to end.45If, however, there were a motion the end ofwhich coincided with its beginning, then such a motion could be infinite,i.e., of indefinite duration. Such is precisely the case with circular motion.If one considers any point along a circular path, it is at one and thesame time the beginningand end of the motion. Unlike rectilinear motionfrom X to Y, there is no point on the circular path at which the bodyin motion must come to rest. It is always in motion from the same pointto the same point at the same time, for which reason one who walks incircles get nowhere. Any segment of motion along a circular path willbe finite. In this sense, circular motion will be composed of an unlimitednumber of successive motions. But again, these parts do not co-exist, sothere is no question here of there being an actual infinite. The infinityor unlimitedness of circular motion, like the being of motion itself, hasits very being in potentiality; for having arrived at any one point alongthe circular path, a body in circular motion will always be in potencyto the next. Nothing prevents circular motion, which is one motion invirtue of its continuity, from extending (into the past and into the future)indefinitely. It is possible, then, that the motion be eternal because a bodyin circular motion is always in potency to further motion.46In light of Aristotle's ontology of motion, al-Kindi's demonstrationthat an actually infinite body is impossible is simply not to the point.Aristotle can fully accept his argument,and still advance unhindered thepossibility of eternal motion precisely because the indefinite duration ofmotion depends on potency rather than actuality. Aristotle sums up thissituation as follows in Physics III, 6:47Hence, we must not take the infinite as actuallyindividual, ike a man or ahouse;ratherdoes the infinitehavethe kindof beingwhich a dayhasor whichthe gameshave-that is to say, the kindof beingwhich does not belongto aconcreteprimarybeingthat has come into being,but the kind of beingwhichconsistsin continualcominginto beingand passingaway,which is finite oneachoccasion,but which even so is different.But in magnitudet happens hatwhathas been taken[for example, n the divisionof a line] persists;whereas

45 Physics, VI, 9, 241a 26ff.46 Physics, VIII, 8-9, 265a 13-266a 10.47206a 30-206b. 2. William Craig argues that this distinction is irrelevant, at leastwith respect to past events: . . . since past events, as determinate parts of reality, aredefinite, distinct and can be numbered,they can be conceptually collected into a totality.Therefore, if the temporal sequence of events is infinite, the set of all events will be anactual infinite (Craig, 96). He then argues that arguments against actual infinites would

apply to past events. But Craig's objection rests on an equivocation. By actual hemeans having really occurred. But, in this context, by actual Aristotle means ex-istent. Clearly, past events are not a part of reality, as Craig maintains, if by actualone means existent. They were, but are no longer. Thus, for Aristotle the impossibilityof an actual infinite would not be relevant.



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368 KEVIN STALEYin time andin thegenerations f man,theparts akenpassaway,but thesupplydoesnot fall.

Of course, to have shown the possibility of eternal motion is not tohave demonstratedthat the universe is actually subjectto eternal motion.However, in order to establish this stronger conclusion, Aristotle needonly appeal to another premise, the truth of which al-Kindi himselfadmits, namely, that there can never be a time in which body is withoutmotion. Al-Kindi has argued that the supposition-that the body of theuniverse was at one time at rest and yet open to the possibility of motionis an impossible supposition;and he did so on the ground that possibilityrequires prior actuality. And this is to say that any given motion pre-supposes a motion prior to itself. In a similar fashion Aristotle arguesthat if the universe had been initially at rest and only subsequently beganto move, then one must account for this fact. Either an impediment tothis motion must have been removed or the cause of the supposed initialmotion must have been brought into contact with the body which beganto move. In either case, one supposes another motion prior to any motionsupposed to be first.48In short, if there is every any motion, motion musthave always been.This brings one to the second, and perhaps the weakest moment inal-Kindi's argument,namely, the assumption that creation itself is a kindof motion or change. In order to assess this problem, one must turn onceagain to Aristotle's definition of motion and change, and again the prob-lem hinges on the element of the potential involved in any change. Motionand change are the acts of the moveable and the changeableas such. Butthe moveable or changeable is not simply nothing. Absolute non-beingis not in potency at all. Even generation presupposes something thatundergoes change. Therefore, if creation were an instance of motion orchange, it too would presuppose something capable of or in potency tomotion or change. Now it is impossible that the creator himself, the trueOne, should be subject to motion. Only creatures are subject to change.Therefore, if creation were an instance of motion or change, it wouldpresuppose the prior creation of that which is capable of motion andchange. And this prior creation would presuppose a creation prior toitself-and so on ad infinitum. Motion will therefore be without begin-ning, as well as time which is its measure.Al-Kindi's created world has suddenly become Aristotle's eternalcosmos, and Aristotle would be quick to point it out. The only way tostop such a regress of motion would be either a) to deny that creationis a kind of generation or motion or b) to suppose that there existed aneternal substratum capable of receiving creative activity, but not itselfthe product of creation. Al-Kindi is not prepared to adopt the first

48 Physics, VIII, 1, 251a 9-25 b 10.



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AL-KINDI ON CREATION 369alternative, as it would undermine his argument for the concomitance oftime with the total being of the universe.49f he were to adopt the second,however, creation ex nihilo becomes an impossibility, and no doubt al-Kindi would be quick to recognize this.

Stepping back for a moment, one can assess al-Kindi's situation asfollows. Al-Kindi has in effect established the truth of the propositionthat if there is ever any motion, there must always be motion. Al-Kindifails to exclude the possibility of eternal motion (and time) because hefails to take into account the peculiar sort of being which is proper tomotion.50Motion exists as incomplete actuality. Because it is actual, italways presupposes something prior to itself. By reason of its inherentincompleteness, its actuality cannot sufficiently account for itself. On theother hand, because it is essentially incompleteness in process towardscompleteness and actuality, motion as such always looks beyond itselftowards an indefinite succession of partial completions. The most perfectmotion, then, according to Aristotle, is that motion whose end is itsbeginning, or better, that motion which in completing itself always keepsitself open to furthercompletion. This is circular motion, and circularity

49 See note 31 above. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi has noted that al-Kindi adds ibda' tothe traditional categorization of motion and change (harakah);and it differs preciselyinasmuch as it presupposesno substratum. For a discussion of this term, together withthe Arabic texts, see Walzer, New Studies on al-Kindi, 187-90. A thoroughgoinganalysis of al-Kindi's terminological classification of change (including such terms astabaddul, istihalah, and harakah) is of utmost importance for a final determination ofthe validity of al-Kindi's position, as there are inconsistencies in usage throughout OnFirst Philosophy. See Ivry, notes 113.11, 114.3, and 113.9. Such an analysis, however,lies beyond the scope of the present essay.50 Al-Kindi does give cursory consideration to the notion of potential infinity. Heremarks, for example, that it is possible through the imagination for something to becontinually added to the body of the universe, if we imagine something greater than it,then continually something greater than that-there being no limit to the addition as apossibility-the body of the universebeing potentially infinite, since potentiality is nothingother than the possibility that the thing said to be in potentiality will occur (FP, 116,13-16). He adds that time and motion are also potentially infinite in this fashion. Givena time which is first, it is possible to imagine a time before it. Nevertheless, al-Kindiimmediately adds that in actuality it is impossible that they have infinity. It is importantto keep in mind that such imaginative representationis of no cognitive significance forthe philosopher, according to al-Kindi, especially for the First Philosopher. See note 8above. The sort of possibility al-Kindi has in mind here should, therefore,be construedalong the lines of a barren possibility or fanciful hypothesis. Ivry has grasped the sig-nificance of this passage as regards the light it sheds on al-Kindi's position vis a visAristotle: This depreciating of the potential existence as related to infinite entities isfundamentalto al-Kindi's position, and goes to the heart of his difference with Aristotle.For the Stagirite viewed time, motion, and magnitude as infinite, each in its own way,but all potentially so, understanding their potentiality as a necessary and not merelypossible kind of existence.... Indeed, this acceptance of the ontological legitimacy ofthe potential enables Aristotle to consider the universe as eternal, though in actuality weperceive only finite time, movement, and magnitude (see Al-Kindi's Metaphysics, 152).



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370 KEVIN STALEYis the perfection of motion as motion, that is, of a being whose very beingdepends on the fact that it ever fail completely to be.Thereis, of course, a greatpriceto be paidhere, for Aristotle's universeis inevitably a universe which is always in motion but is never goinganywhere. It is an eternal universe precisely because it constantly lacksthat which it strives to attain. Elsewhere, for example, Aristotle arguesthat the Prime Mover moves as an object of desire. The secret impulseof motion is, as it were, the desire on the part of everything else to attainthat which is first and best. But by the same token, his eternal universeis a universe of constant frustration; for if the Prime Mover ever beattained, desire for what is lacking would yield to joy in a good possessed,and motion would cease.It is only at this level that I think one can appreciate the challengethat the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysicsput to al-Kindi and otherphilosophers of the revealed religions. Their universe, whether Muslim,Christian, or Jew, was a universe of promise and fulfillment. Creation-a unique, singular, historical event in time-is, ontologically speaking,every bit as incomplete as Aristotle's motion; but it looks beyond itselfin the hope that in the fullness of time when, weary with its own incom-pleteness, its motion should come to rest, its desire come to term. Toargue that the universe has been created in time is thus an affair of greatmoment, for it is an expression of hope that what begins in time willfind its completion at the end of time. It may well be that such hopecan never be demonstrated, which is only to say that the medieval phi-losophers of the revealed religions, including al-Kindi, could never dis-pense with revelation.

Saint Anselm College.

al-kindi on creation agains aristotle

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