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MARMARA AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

MARMARA UNiVERSiTESi AVRUPA BiRLiGi ENSTiTUSU YA YINI A PUBLICATION OF MARMARA UNIVERSITY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE

Yaymlayan I Publisher Prof. Dr. Necla Pur Marmara Oniversitesi Rektorli I President of Marmara University

Editor I Editor Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dartan

Editor Y ardtmcdan I Associate Editors Do<;. Dr. <;igdem Nas o Yard. Do<;. Dr. Armagan Emre <;ak1r oAr~. Gor. Levent Eraydm o Ar~. Gor. Emirhan Goral

Dam~ma Kurulu I Advisory Board Prof. Dr. Taner Berksoy, Bilgi University o Prof. Dr. Christopher Brewin, Keele University o

Prof. Dr. Nedret Kuran Bur<;oglu, Yeditepe University o Prof. Dr. A. Lorca Corrons, Madrid Autonomous University o Prof. Dr. Georges Delcoigne, CERIS o Prof. Dr. Naz1m Engin, Marmara University o Prof. Dr. Haluk Kabaalioglu, TUNAECS o Prof. Dr. Erol Kat!rcwglu, Bilgi University o Prof. Dr. Hagen Lichtenberg, Bremen University o Prof. Dr. Nanette Neuwahl, Montreal University o Prof. Dr. Cengiz Okman, l:jtk University o Prof. Dr. Vural F. Sava~, Yeditepe University o Dr. Karen Smith, London School of Economics o Prof. Dr. Orhan Sener, Kadir Has University o Prof. Dr. Paul Taylor, London School of Economics.

Yaym Kurulu I Editorial Board Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dartan o Yard. Do<;. Dr. Sait Akman o Yard. Do<;. Dr. Murat T. Yorling o

Yard. Do<;. Dr. imre Ersoy o Yard. Do<;. Dr. Rana izci o Yard. Do<;. Dr. Miinevver Cebeci o

Yard. Do<;. Dr. Yonca Ozer o Dr. Mustafa T. Karayigit o Dr. Y1d1ray Sak o Dr. E. ilker Mutlu o

Ar~. Gor. H. Selin Piirselim

Tiim yaZI~ma ve katktda bulunmak isteyenler i~in adres: Avrupa Ara~tlrmalan Dergisi, Marmara Dniversitesi Avrupa Birligi Enstitiisii, Goztepe Kampiisii Kad1koy, 34722 istanbul

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Copyright © 2008

MARMARA AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

ISSN 1301-1359

Ci1t I Volume: 16 Say1 I No: 1-2 2008

i9indekiler I Contents Sayfal Page

• Tiirkiye ve Avrupa Birligi'ne Dye Bazi Ulkelerin Egitim Yap1lan ve Yonetimleri A9Ismdan Kar~Ila~tmlmasi Sefer Ada- Z. Nurdan Baysal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. 1

• Entegrasyon Siirecinde Dilin Onemi: Tiirkiye'deki Entegrasyon Kurslan Siieda Ozbent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

• The Application ofNeo(neo)functionalist Theory to Justice and Home Affairs • Catherine Macmillan.................................................. 37

• Multicultural Europe? • Ebru Ogurlu .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 59

• Impact of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Income Inequality in European Monetary Union • jmre Ersoy- Bilgehan Baykal- Pznar Deniz 19

• Turkish Image and Anti-Turkish Lobbies in Europe • Kaan Sahilyol....... 91

• The Effects of Customs Union on Turkish Home Appliance Industry Zelha Altznkaya. ................................................................... .. 107

• The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice After the Lisbon Treaty Mustafa T. Karayigit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 133

• Makale Yaz1m Kurallan I Notes for Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 155

AVRUPA ARA9TIRMALARI DERGISI • Cilt 16 • Say1: 1-2 • 2008

TURKiYE VE A VRUPA BiRLiGi'NE VYE BAZI ULKELERiN EGiTiM YAPILARI VE YONETiMLERi

A<;ISINDAN KAR~ILA~TIRILMASI

Ozet:

Sefer ADA* Z. Nurdan BA YSAL ••

Kar~tla~tmnah egitim kapsammda yer alan bu c;ah~mamn amact, Tiirkiye ile on AB iilkesini (Almanya, A vusturya, Danimarka, Finlandiya, Fransa, ingiltere, ispanya, isvec;, Portekiz, Yunanistan); egitim basamaklan -okuloncesi egitim, zorunlu egitim, ortaogretim, yiiksekogretim- ve yeti~kin egitimlerine ek olarak egitim bakanhklan, okul yonetimleri, egitimin finansmam, tefti~i ve ogretmen yeti~tirme programlan acylSlndan incelemektir. Ele ahnan iilkeler egitim yapllan ve yonetimleri acylSlndan benzerlikler ta~tmakla birlikte bir taktm farkhhklara sahiptir. Omegin, soz konusu tiim iilkelerde okul oncesi egitim zorunlu egitim kapsammda degilken, zorunlu egitimin siireleri acylSlndan iilkeler c;e~itlilik

sergilemektedir. Tiirkiye on iilke ile kar~tla~tmldtgmda zorunlu egitim siiresi en ktsa olan iilkedir. <;::ah~mada yer alan iilkelerde lise tiirleri, iiniversiteye giri~ diizenleri ac;tsmdan c;e~itli uygulamalar soz konusudur. TUm iilkelerde iiniversite dUzeyinde on lisans, lisans ve lisansiistii programlar mevcuttur. Egitimde yetkili ve sorumlu kurumlann saytst, okul yoneticilerinin unvanlan iilkeden iilkeye degi~mektedir. Egitimin finansmam ac;tsmdan iilkeler degerlendirildiginde ele alman iilkelerin tiimiiniin egitime Tiirkiye 'den daha fazla kaynak aytrdtgt goriilmektedir. Okul denetiminde ise Finlandiya' da ele ahnan diger iilkelerden farkh olarak ayn bir okul denetim sisteminin olmamast dikkat c;ekicidir. Ogretmen yeti~tiren okullarm ogrenim siireleri Tiirkiye'de oldugu gibi 4 ile 5 ytl arasmda degi~mekle birlikte -omegm Finlandiya'da- ogretmenlik yapabilmek ic;in mutlaka yiiksek lisans mezuniyet derecesini almt~ olmak gerekmektedir. <;::ah~mada incelenen Almanya, isvec; egitim sistemi,

• Prof. Dr., Marmara Oniversitesi Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi ilkogretim Boliimii Smtf Ogretmenligi Anabilim Dab •• Yrd. Do9. Dr., Marmara Oniversitesi Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi ilkogretim BOliimii Smtf Ogretmenligi Anabilim Dab

2 TORKIYE VE AB EGITiM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERI KARl;)ILAl;)TIRMASI

ozellikle de son y1llarda uluslar aras1 smavlarda buyuk ba~an gosteren Finlandiya egitim sistemi ozgiln olma ozelligini ta~Iyan ulkelerin ba~mda gelmektedir. <;ah~madan elde edilen verilere bagh olarak Tilrkiye i~in

zorunlu egitim suresinin, ortaogretimden universiteye ge~i~ ko~ullannm yeniden ele almmas1, egitime aynlan kaynagm arttmlmas1, tefti~ sisteminin iyile~tirilmesi gibi onerilerde bulunulmu~tur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kar~1la~hrmah egitim, egitim yap1s1, egitim yonetimi, A vrupa Birligi Ulkeleri

Abstract:

The aim of this study which is based on comparative education is to examine Turkey and ten EU countries (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, England, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Greece) in terms of educational levels - preschool education, obligatory education, secondary education, higher education and adult education - and in addition to that, in terms of educational ministries, school administrations, education finance, inspection and teacher education programs. Although these countries have some common similarities as for their educational systems and administrations, they have some differences. For example, as not all these countries propose compulsory pre-school education, they how some variances in their extension of compulsory education. Turkey, when compared to the other ten countries, has the shortest compulsory education period. The countries involved in this study have some different applications in high school types and university acceptance rules. In all these countries, there are pre-graduate, undergraduate and graduate programs at university level. The number of authorities in education and responsible institutions and the title of school administrators differ from country to country. When examined in terms of educational finance, all these countries are observed to finance education much more than Turkey. As for school inspection, it is surprising that there is no school inspection system in Finland as opposed to the other countries. While the instruction time in teacher education schools ranges between 4 to 5 years as it is in Turkey, it is obligatory to have a graduate degree to be able to become a teacher, as in Finland. The educational systems of Germany, Sweden and Finland - which has exhibited a great success at international exams in recent years - are the leading countries that have some original perspectives. Based on the data gathered from this study, it has been suggested that compulsory education period and university acceptance rules should be rediscussed, the allocation of finance to education should be increased and inspection system should be improved.

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISI 3

Keywords: Comparative education, educational system, educational management, European Union Countries.

Giri~

Her toplum varhgmt siirdiirebilmek ve gelecekte kendisine yeterli saglam bir yap1 olu~turabilmek i((in ko~ullanna uygun ekonomik, sosyal, siyasal, kiiltiirel yaptsmt, ozellikle de egitim sistemlerini olu~turmak zorundadtr. Her sistem onemli ve vazge((ilmezdir. Fakat egitim tiim sistemlerin i((inde en onemli olamdtr. <;iinkii egitimin belirleyici ve etkileyici ozelligi diger sistemlere gore daha fazladtr. En pahah ve en karh olan egitim sistemi eger yanh~ olu~turulur ve uygulamrsa diger tiim sistemler de bundan olumsuz yonde etkilenir. Sistemin dogruluk ya da yanh~hgt, ihtiya((lara cevap vermesi ve gelecek i((in geli~meye uygun ortamm olu~masma baghdtr. Geri kalmt~ ya da geli~mi~ olan iilkelerin bugiinkii durumu ge((mi~teki egitim sisteminin sonucudur. Bir sistem hem alt hem de iist ba~ka sistemlere baghdtr ve onlarla etkile~im i((indedir. Her sistem do gal olarak i((inden ((Iktlgt toplumun iiriiniidiir. Y ani toplumun tarihsel geli~imi, kiiltiirii, ekonomisi, siyasal yap1s1 vb. sistemin olu~umunu ve i~leyi~ini etkiler. Her toplum kendi i(( ve d1~ dinamikleri ile ((e~itli alt ve iist sistemlerini olu~tururken ge((mi~teki etkileri gelecekteki hedefleri goz oniinde bulundurmak zorundadtr.

Kar~Ila~tlrmah egitim ((ah~malanmn temelleri ozellikle XXI. yiizytldan itibaren htz kazanmt~tlr, siirekli de geli~mektedir. Edmund King'in "Her kurulan sistem hi((bir zaman uzun siireli kahct olmaz aksine siirekli yenilenir" sozii de bunu dogrular niteliktedir. Claxton (1998: 70) son 20 senedir siirekli bir degi~im ve geli~im ((agma girildigini belirtmi~tir. Rogers (1993: 77) ve Brown (1999: 19-20) da kar~Ila~tlrmah egitim ((ah~malanyla iilkelerdeki egitim anlayt~mm ve egitim sistemlerinin geli~tigini

savunmu~tur.

Lawrence Stenhouse (1979: 5) kar~Ila~tlrmah egitim ((ah~malanyla farkh kiiltiirlerin tanmabilecegini vurgulam1~ aym zamanda kiiltiirel ogeleri yorumlamayt saglayacagm1 da belirtmi~tir. Stenhouse (1979: 18)'a gore, kar~Ila~tlrmah egitim bilimi bir pozitivist sosyal bilim dahdtr. Toplumlann farkh egitim politikalanm kar~Ila~tlrmasmt saglar. Schriewer (2000: 20) kar~tla~tlrmah egitim ((ah~malanmn farkh egitim ideolojilerini, farkh sosyokiiltiirel ama((lan tammayt ve yorumlamayt saglayacagt konusunda hemfikir olmu~tur. Uluslar aras1 kiiltiire1 tamm1ann o1u~masmt destekleyecegini belirtmi~tir. Ulkelerin egitim sistemlerindeki zaytfve gii((1ii yon1eri ke~fedip diger ii1kelerle kar~Ila~tmp yorumlayarak gelecege yonelik geli~im ve degi~im hareketlerini destekleyecegini eklemi~tir (aktaran Broadfoot, 2000).

4 TORKIYE VE AB EGiTIM YAPILARI VE YCNETIMLERI KAR91LA9TIRMASI

Bu 9ah~ma ka~tl~tmnah egitim kapsammda degerlendirilebilir. Bu yiizden kar~1la~t1rmah egitimin ama9lanna hizmet etmesi ama9lanmaktad1r. Kar~tla~tlrmah egitim ama9lan aynntlh bir ~ekilde ~oyle Slfalanabilir:

• Egitim sistemlerine, sorunlanna ve etkinliklerine i!i~kin

ge9erli bilgiler elde etmek;

• Y erel, ulusal ve uluslar aras1 bir konu olan egitimde, bir dizi hipotezi, gerekli yontem ve teknikleri, yorum i9in gerekli esaslan ve sonu9lan geli~tirmek;

• Egitime etkin olan etmenlerin, 9e~itli iilkelerdeki evrimini ve gorliniimiinii inceleyerek, egitim politikasmm saptanmasma yard1m edecek gorli~ii kazand1rmak;

• Bir iilkenin kendi egitim sistemini geli~tirmesi i9in kuramsal ve uygulamah olarak katk1da bulunmak.

Bu alanm aynca, kiiltiir ufkunu geni~letmek, uluslar aras1 gerginligi azaltmak, egitimi bilim ve kiiltiir siireci olarak zenginle~tirmek, uluslar aras1 anlay1~a katk1da bulunmak ile diger iilkelerle dost9a ve a91k bir ileti~im kurmak gibi ama9lanna (Lauweyers, Van~ & Neff, 1979: 6; Noah, 1984: 552; Ruscoe & Nelson, 1964: 390'dan aktaran Demirel, 1998: 8) globalle~meyi desteklemek ve tiim tilkelere yonelik uluslar aras1 bir egitim anlay1~mm dogmasm1 saglamak gibi ama9lar da eklenebilir (Sutton, Post, Merkxi & digerleri, 2006).

Belirli anlay1~1 payla~mak amac1yla kurulan 9e~itli i~birlikleri, ortak ya da benzer programlar uygulayabilirler. Bunun en somut omegini A vrupa Birligi (AB) olu~turmaktad1r. Tlirkiye bu birlige girmek amac1yla; 31 Temmuz 1959'da ba~vuruda bulunmu~tur. 12 Eyliil 1963'de Ortakhk Anla~mas1'nm imzalanmas1yla Ttirkiye 1999'da Aday Ulke statiisli alm1~t1r. Ttirkiye, 2001 'de Kahhm Ortakhk Belgesiyle, nihayet 2005'deki tam liyelik mlizakerelerinin ba~lamas1yla yolunu, hedefini belirlemi~tir.

AB 'nin temel hedefi; liye tilke1er arasmdaki i~birligini ve dayam~may1 saglamak amac1yla i1gili lilke1erin vatanda~lan arasmdaki kar~l11kh anlay1~1 ozendirmek ve A vrupahhk bilincini a~1lamak, bu slire9te ogretmen ve ogrenci1erin Ar-Ge a1an1anna etkin katlhm1anm sag1amaktlr (Milli Egitim Bakanhg1 [MEB], 2006: 15). Ttirkiye, AB'nin o1u~turdugu; Gene1 Egitim (Socrates), Mesleki Egitim (Leonardo da Vinci) ve Gen91ik (Youth) programlanna kat11arak ongorlilen amac1 ve uyum slirecini ger9ekle~tirmeye 9ah~maktadu. Yanm as1rdan fazla bir zamand1r ba~lanan bu siire9te, Tlirkiye kendi ko~ullanna gore uygun programlar geli~tirmekten 9ok, i1gi1i


baz1 tilkelerin sistemlerine uygun-benzer anlay1~lan gen;ekle~tirme gayreti i<;ine girmi~tir. Bu <;ah~mada Tlirkiye ile on AB tilkesinin (Almanya, A vusturya, Danimarka, Finlandiya, Fransa, ingiltere, ispanya, isve<y, Portekiz, Yunanistan); egitim basamaklan -okuloncesi egitim, zorunlu egitim, ortaogretim, yliksekogretim- ve yeti~kin egitimlerine ek olarak Egitim Bakanhklan, okul yonetimleri, egitimin finansmam, egitimin tefti~i ve ogretmen yeti~tirme programlan ele ahnarak incelenmi~tir.

Egitim Basamaklan

Ttirkiye ve on AB tilkesinde egitim basamaklan, degi~ik ogrenim slireli okul oncesinden ba~layarak liniversiteye kadar, ge<yi~lerde farkh kriterlerin uyguland1g1 bir yap1ya sahiptir. Tablo I, Tlirkiye ile AB tilkelerinin okuloncesi egitim basamagmm ya~ ve zorunlu egitim kapsammda ele ahmp ahnmad1gm1 gostermektedir.

Tablo I Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde okul 6ncesi egitim Ulke Ya~ gubu Zorunlu Tiirkiye 5-6 Almanya 3-6 Avusturya 3-6 Danimarka 0/6-7 Finlandiya 1-7 Fransa 2-6 ingiltere 3-5 ispanya 0/3-6 isve9 1-7 Portekiz 3-6 Yunanistan 3.5-5.5

(-: degil) Kaynak: Erginer, 2006; Lappalainen, 2006; Moon, 2001; bz, 2001; Oltamr, 2000; Karacaoglu & <;abuk, 2002; Pokon, 2003; Y1ldmm, 2008'den yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

Tablo 1 'de gortildtigli gibi okul oncesi egitim Ttirkiye'de 5-6 ya~ arasmda zorunlu degildir. Ele ahnan AB tilkelerinde de okul oncesi egitim zorunlu egitim kapsammda yer almamaktad1r. Okul oncesi egitim genellikle ilkogretime haz1rhk niteliginde olup ele alman tilkelerde oncesinde <yocuklann bak1m1 ve egitimini listlenen <;e~itli kamu ve ozel kurumlar bulunmaktad1r. Tablo 2 'de kamu ve ozel egitim kurumlannda 4 ya~m altmda okulla~ma oranlan gorlilmektedir.

6 TORKIYE VE AB EGITIM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

Tablol Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde 4 ya~zn altznda okulla~ma oranlarz (2002) Ulke Okulla~ma oram Tfukiye Almanya 80.3 Avusturya 63.8 Danimarka 86.9 Finlandiya 39.6 Fransa 119.7 ingiltere 81.2 ispanya 112.5 isve9 75.5 Portekiz 66.4 Yunanistan 28.5

Kaynak: OECD, 2004'den aktaran <;ah~kan Maya, 2006.

Tablo 2 incelendiginde AB iilkelerinde 4 ya~m altmda niifusun % 75.4'iiniin okulla~tig1 goriilmektedir. Bu oran ile AB iilkelerinin 4 ya~m altmda okulla~ma oranlan bak1mmdan olduk~a iyi durumda oldugu vurgulanabilir. Tiirkiye'de ise 4 ya~ okulla~ma oramna ili~kin veri bulunmamaktad1r. Tum iilkelerde ~agda~ ya~amm geregi olarak, zorunlu egitimin paras1z olmasma kar~1hk ogrenim siiresi, ya~ smm bak1mmdan farkhhklar gostermektedir. Tablo 3'de Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde zorunlu egitim ya~ ve siireleri yer almaktad1r.

Tablo3 Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde zorunlu ej{itim Ulke Ya' grubu Siire (yd) Tfukiye 6-14 8 Almanya 6-18 12 A vusturya 6-15 9 Danimarka 7-16 9 Finlandiya 7-16 9 Fransa 6-16 10 ingiltere 5-16 11 ispanya 6-16 10 isvec 6-16 9 Portekiz 6-15 9 Yunanistan 6-14 9

Kaynak: Ada, 2007; <;ah~kan Maya, 2006; Erginer, 2006; Eurydice, 2005; GUltekin, 1998; Laycock, 2002; Nothern Ireland Goverment Department of Education, 2001; Education System in Finland, 2006'dan yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.


Tablo 3 'de goriildiigii gibi ~ah~mamn kapsam1 i~erisinde yer alan iilkelerde en dii~iik zorunlu egitim siiresi 8 yll, en yiiksek zorunlu ogrenim siiresi ise 12 ylldtr. Ya~ itibariyle de okula ba~lama ya~1 en dii~iik 5, zorunlu egitimi bitirme ya~1 en yiiksek 18'dir. AB iilkelerinde zorunlu ogretim kapsammda ogrenciler 9-12 ytl arasmda degi~en siirelerle egitim gormektedir. Baz1 iilke1erde zorunlu egitimi tamamlayamayan ogrencilere ek siire verilmektedir. Omegin, Tiirkiye'de bu ek siire iki ytldtr. AB iilkeleri ile kar~tla~tmldtgmda Tiirkiye zorunlu egitim siiresi en az olan iilkedir. Tablo 4, zorunlu egitim ya~lanm i~ine alan 05-14 ve 15-19 ya~ niifusu i~in okulla~ma oranlanm gostermektedir.

Tablo 4 Tilrkiye ve AB illkelerinde 05-14 ve 15-19 ya~ yilfosu okull~ma oranlan (2002) Ulke 05-14 ya~ niifusu 15-19 ya~ niifusu Tiirkiye Almanya 97.5 89.2 Avusturya 98.9 77.1 Danimarka 99.1 81.8 Finlandiya 94.4 85.0 Fransa l 0 l.l 86.7 ingiltere 98.9 76.8 ispanya 103.8 80.4 isvec; 98.2 86.2 Portekiz l 06.0 70.9 Yunanistan 96.3 82.6


Tablo 4 'te yine Tiirkiye i~in 05-14 ya~ ve 15-19 ya~ niifuslannda okulla~ma oram verileri bulunmazken AB iilkeleri niifusa gore ortalama okulla~ma oranlan 05-14 ya~ niifusun %99.4 'iiniin, 15-19 ya~ niifusunun ise %81. 7'sinin okulla~t1g1 goriilmektedir.

Y tlhk ogretim i~giinii ~ah~maya konu olan ~e~itli iilkelerde farkhhk arz etmektedir. Omegin, Almanya'da ortaogretim I. devre i~in 180-208 arasmda, Fransa'da 158, ingiltere'de 190, Tiirkiye'de ise 180 i~giiniidiir. ilkogretimde haftahk ders saatleri de iilkelere gore degi~iklik gostermektedir. Omegin, Danimarka'da 20-28, Almanya'da 17-28, Yunanistan'da 23-32, ispanya'da 25, Fransa'da 26, Portekiz'de 25 ve Tiirkiye'de 30 olarak ders saatleri diizenlenmi~tir. ilkogretimde bir ders saatinin siiresi ise ~ah~maya konu olan iilkelerde genellikle 40 ile 50 dakika arasmda degi~mektedir. Omegin, Danimarka ve Almanya'da 45 dakika, Yunanistan'da 40-50 dakika, Tiirkiye'de 40 dakika iken Fransa ve Portekiz'de ise siire konusunda ogretmen serbest btrakllmt~tlr. Her

8 TORKIYE VE AB EGiTiM YAPILARI VE YQNETIMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

ogretmen kendi Simfmm ogrenim sliresini kendisi ayar1amaktadir. Soz konusu lilke1erde haftahk ogretim glinli genellik1e 5 gun o1mak1a bir1ikte A1manya'da ve Portekiz'de hazen 6 gun o1maktadir. Soz konusu AB ti1ke1erinde yi1hk ogretim glinli 180 i1e 200 gun arasmda degi~mektedir (Gultekin, 1998).

Somestr say1s1 baz1 li1ke1erde 2, baz1 ti1ke1erde ise 3 ya da 4 ~ek1inde dlizen1enmi~tir. Tlirkiye'de tanm top1umu yaplSlnm ozelligini arz eden bir dlizen1emeye gidi1mi~, hasat zamam denk ge1en yaz tatili uzun tutu1mu~tur. U1kemizde yaz tatilinin sliresi yak1a~Ik 3 ay iken AB tilke1erinde ise genellik1e 1.5 ay i1e 2.5 ay arasmda degi~mektedir.

Baz1 tilke1erde teme1 egitimden bir list egitim kurumu o1an gene1 ya da mes1ek1 okullara ge9i~ i9in ya not orta1amasi ya da ogrenci1erin i1gi ve yetenek1erini o19en degi~ik smav sistem1eri uygu1anmaktadir. Ortaogretim kendi i9erisinde iki gene1 kategoriye ayn1maktadir. Baz1 li1ke1erde mes1ege hazirhk program1anmn uygu1andigi 1iselerin yanmda bir list ogrenim kurumu o1an yliksek okullara ogrenci hazir1ayan okullar da mevcuttur. Omegin; Ttirkiye'de gene11ise1er, A1manya'da gymnasium gibi okullar bu kategoride sayi1abilir. Gymnasium ilkogretimde i1gi, yetenek, 9ah~ma ve ba~ansmdaki geli~im slirecine gore yliksekogretim yapabi1ecek diizeyde bu1unan ogrenci1erin yon1endiri1digi bir oku1dur (Oz, 2001). Danimarka'da da gymnasium yiiksekogretime haz1rlayan li9 yilhk program1ardir. isve9'te ise ortaogretim 16-19 ya~ grubunu kapsayan gymnasieskola ad1 veri1en kurum1arda ger9ek1e~tiri1mektedir.

ingiltere'de ortaogretim i9in resmi okullar (maintained schools), 90k programh okullar (comprehensive schools), gramer okullan (grammar schools), ~ehir tekno1oji ko1eji (city technology college-CTC), sanat tekno1ojisi ~ehir ko1eji (city college for the technology of the arts-CTAS), ileri egitim kolejleri (further education college) ~eklinde sira1anabi1ecek 9e~itli okullar bu1unmaktadir (DFES, 2004a). Fin1andiya'da ortaogretim II. devre gene1 ortaogretim 16-19 ya~ aras1 gen91eri yiiksek ogretime hazu1amaktadir. Bu okullann siiresi ii9 y11 o1mak1a birlikte yeti~kin1ere de a91k o1an bu devre en az 2 en faz1a 4 yilda tamam1anmak ko~u1u i1e hizmet vermektedir. Ortaogretimden yliksekogretime ge9i~ i9in farkh li1ke1erde degi~ik uygulamalar yapilmaktadtr. Tablo 5'te Ttirkiye ve AB tilkelerinde ortaogretimden yiiksekogretime ge9i~ ko~ullan yer a1maktadir.

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGISI

Tablo 5 Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde ortaogretimden yiiksekogretime get;i~ Ulke Ge\'i~ ko~ulu Turkiye Almanya Avusturya Danimarka

universite giri~ smav1 olgunluk smavt (abillir) olgunluk smavi Ortaogretim smavt (studenterksamen)/ Yuksekogretim Haztrhk Smavt-HF/ Yliksek Ticaret Smavt-HHX/ Yliksek Teknik Smavt-HTX birinden ba~arth olmak

Finlandiya universite giri~ smav1 Fransa universite giri~ smavi (bakalorya) ingiltere sertifikalar ile ispanya lise not ortalamast+universite giri~ smavt+haztrhk sm1f1 puam isve9 lise not ortalamast/liniversite standart giri~ testi Portekiz yetenek testlerilher kurumun aytigi ozel smavlar Yunanistan kurumlann kendi yaptigi giri~ smavlan

9

Kaynak: Bentolila & Jimeno, 1998; Eurydice, 2005; Eurydice, 2007; Eurydice, 2008a; Ministere Education Nationale, 2008; Oltamr, 2000'den yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

Tablo 5 incelendiginde TUrkiye'de oldugu gibi AB Ulkelerinin baztlannda da yUksekogretime ogrenci kabulUnUn smav ile yapildtgt gorUlmektedir. Fakat AB Ulkelerinin ~ogunda yaptlan smav tek ko~ul olarak degerlendirilmemekte aynca ogrenctyt alma ilgili yUksekogretim kurumunun karan ile gen;ekle~mektedir. isve<;: ve Portekiz gibi baz1 Ulkelerde ytiksekogretime ge<;:i~te ba~ka ko~ullara ek olarak yaptlan bir taktm testlerin sonu<;:lan da goz online almmaktadtr. Universiteye giri~ TUrkiye'de tek bir smav ile merkezden yapthrken Almanya, Fransa ve ingiltere incelendiginde ogrencilerin ge<;:i~te ortaogretim ba~an durumlanmn ve her kurumun kendi belirledigi kriterlerin de ge<;:erli oldugu gorUlmektedir (Kilimci, 2006).

Universitelerde on lisans, lisans ve lisansUstU programlar yer almaktadtr. Sisteme giri~ i<;:in 1. stmf haztrhk adt altmda bazt okullarda programlar uygulanmakta sonrasmda ogrenci kendi egilimine gore farkh programlara yonelebilmektedir. Genellikle her Ulkede ara elemam yeti~tirmek amact ile 2 ytlhk on lisans programh meslek yUksek okullan bulunmaktadtr.

Y eti~kin Egitimi

GUnUmuzde teknoloji ve bilimsel alanda meydana gelen htzh geli~meler, bir insamn orgtin egitim <;:agmda edinmi~ oldugu bilgileri bUtUn ya~amt boyunca kullanmasmm mUmkiin olamayacagmt gostermi~tir. Bu nedenle orgtin egitimin i<;:inde, dt~mda ve yamnda <;:e~itli Ulkelerde dUzenlenen

10 TORKIYE VE AB E~ITIM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

yeti~kin egitim programlan da mevcuttur. Bu programlar ya ilgili bakanhklar tarafmdan, ya yerel yonetimler tarafmdan ya da orgiin egitim kurumlan tarafmdan haztrlanmakta ve yiiriillilmektedir. Bazt iilkelerde -Danimarka ve isve~ gibi- iiniversitelerde yeti~kinler i~in belirli bir kontenjan aynlmaktadtr. Y eti~kin egitimine yonelik programlar her iilkede iilkenin ko~ullanna uygun olarak farkh niteliklerde yaptlmaktadtr. Bazt iilkelerde yeti~kin egitimi programlan meslek agtrhkh, bazt iilkelerde kiilllir ve bo~ zamam degerlendirme agtrhkh, bazt iilkelerde de tamamlama egitimi niteliginde diizenlenmektedir.

Tablo 6, AB iilkelerinde 20 ya~ ve sonrast okulla~ma oranlanm i~ermektedir.

Tablo 6 Turkiye ve AB Ulkelerinde 20-29, 30-39 ve 40 ve uzeri ya~ nufusu okulla~ma

oranlan (2002) 20-29 30-39 40

Ulke ya~ ya~ ve niifusu niifusu iizeri ya~

niifusu Tiirkiye A1manya 25.5 2.8 0.2 Avusturya 17.0 3.1 0.3 Danimarka 31.4 5.5 0.8 Finlandiya 39.5 10.7 2.2 Fransa 19.6 1.8 ingiltere 26.8 16.2 8.3 ispanya 23.3 2.6 0.4 isvev 33.6 14.1 3.5 Portekiz 22.4 3.8 0.6 Yunanistan 24.5 0.3


Tablo 6 incelendiginde AB iilkelerinde niifusa gore ortalama 20-29 ya~ niifusun %26.4 'iiniin, 30-39 ya~ niifusun %6.1 'inin ve 40 ve iizeri ya~ niifusun iilkelerin sekizinde %2.1 'inin okulla~tlgt goriilmektedir. Tiirkiye i~in ise bu ya~lar arast veri1ere rastlanmamaktadtr.

Egitim Yonetimi

Ele ahnan iilke1erde egitimde yetkili ve sorumlu kurumlar ~e~itlilik arz etmek1e birlikte bazt iilkeler merkezi baztlan yerel baztlan ise merkezi ve yerel yonetimin her ikisini de benimsemi~ bulunmaktadtr (Tablo 7).


Tablo 7 Turkiye ve AB ulkelerinde ei{itimin yonetim ~ekli ve yetkililsorumlu kurumlar Ulke Egitimde yetkili/sorumlu kurumlar Egitimin yonetim

Tiirkiye Almanya

Avusttrrya Danimarka

Finlandiya Frans a

ingiltere

ekli Egitim Bakanhgt merkezi Egitim Bakanhgt I Valilik I Egitim yerel Yoneticiligi Egitim, Bilim ve Kiiltiir Bakanhgt Sosyal i~ler Bakanhgt + Egitim Bakanhgt + Kiiltiir Bakanhgt Egitim Bakanhgt

merkezi

yerel merkezi

Egitim Bakanhgt + Ara~tlrma ve Teknoloji merkezl. Bakanhgt+ Tanm ve Bahkc;:thk Bakanhgt + <;ah~ma ve Sosyal Giivenlik Bakanhgt + Genc;:lik, Spor ve Kiiltiir Bakanhgt Egitim Bakanhgt (Department for merkezl+yerel Education and Skills-DFES) + Yerel Egitim Kurumu (Local Education Authority-LEA)

ispanya Egitim ve Bilim Bakanhgt merkezl+yerel isvec;: Egitim ve Bilim Bakanhgt merkezl+yerel Portekiz Egitim Bakanhgt merkezi+yerel Yunanistan Ulusal Egitim ve Din i~leri Bakanhg1 merkezl

11

Kaynak: Diplome National du Brevet, 2008; DFES, 2004b; Dogan, 2002; Erginer, 2006; Eurydice, 2008b; Lauwers & digerleri, 1979; MEB, 2001; Sozer, 1997; Ultamr, 2000'den yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

Tabla incelendiginde Tiirkiye 'de merkezi yonetimin ve Milli Egitim Bakanhgt'nm sarumlu ve yetkili kurum aldugu goriilmektedir. Almanya ve Danimarka'da ise egitim yerel yonetimlerce diizenlenmektedir. ingiltere, ispanya, isve~ ve Partekiz'de ise egitimden hem merkezi hem yerel yonetim soz kanusudur. Egitimde yetkili ve sarumlu kurumlann saylSlmn iilkeden iilkeye degi~tigi goriilmektedir. Aynca bu kurumlar Egitim Bakanhgt, Egitim ve Bilim Bakanhgt, Egitim, Bilim ve Kiiltiir Bakanhgt, Milli Egitim Ara~tlrma ve Teknalaji Bakanhgt, Ulusal Egitim ve Din i~leri Bakanhgt gibi farkh isimler almakla birlikte sarumluluk ve yetkinin birden fazla kurum arasmda payla~tldtgt farkh iilkeler de mevcuttur.

Okul yoneticilerinin unvanlan iilkeden iilkeye farkhhk gostermekle birlikte bazt iilkelerde de aym iinvanlar kullamlmaktadu. Omek vermek gerekirse; Almanya ve isve~Y'te ilkogretim akul yoneticisine rektor (rector) unvam verilirken, ispanya ve Fransa'da direktOr (director), ingiltere'de ise ba~ogretmen (headteacher) unvam kullamlmaktadtr. Tabla 8'de iilkelere gore ilkogretim ve artaogretim kurumlannda akul yoneticilerine verilen adlar sunulmaktadtr.

12 TORKIYE VE AB EGITIM YAPILARI VE YCNETIMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

Tablo 8 Tiirkiye ve AB ii/kelerinde i/kogretim ve ortaogretimde okul yoneticileri Ulke Tiirkiye Almanya Avusturya Danimarka Finlandiya Fransa ingiltere ispanya isve~ Portekiz Yunanistan

Okul yonetimi okul miidiirii rektOr+okul konseyi direktor +okul konseyi rektor yonetim kurulu+ogrenci kurullan direktOr ba~ogretmen (headteacher)+yonetim kurulu direktOr rektor direktOr okul miidiirii+ogretmenler kurulu

Kaynak: Erginer, 2006; DFES, 2004b; Ministere Education Nationale, 2008'den yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

Her iilkede degi~ik kademedeki okullann yonetiminden sorumlu degi~ik statiiye sahip yoneticiler mevcuttur. Tiirkiye'de yonetim gorevinde bulunanlar okul miidiirii, okul miidiir yardtmctst, egitim ~efi, bOliim ba~kam, dekan, rektar vs. adlarla ifade edilmektedir. Bunlar genellikle bakanhk ya da list kurullara kar~t sorumludur. Bunun yam stra degi~ik iilkelerde okul yoneticisini destekleyen s;e~itli organlar bulunmaktadtr. Omegin; Danimarka'da orta ogretim kurumlannda (gymnasium) ogrenci, ogretmen, personel, aile temsilcileri ve kent kurulu temsilcilerinden olu~an bir delegeler kurulu bulunmaktadtr. Kurul, okul biits;esi, stmf biiyiikliigii, okulda sunulacak derslerin ses;ilmesi konulannda diizenlemeler yapabilmektedir (Erdogan, 2006).

Yoneticilerin gorev ve yetkileri de kurallarla belirlenmi~tir. Her iilkede yasalann yoneticilere vermi~ oldugu yetki ve sorumlulugun stmrlan farkhhk gostermektedir. Omegin, Fransa' da okul miidiirleri okulun yonetimini ve denetimini yapma, ogretmenlerin s;ah~malanm kontrol etme, ders programlanm, ders kitaplanm belirleme, personel ahmt, ders aras;geres;lerini temin etme, okul-s;evre ili~kisini geli~tirme vb. gorevlerle yiikiimliidiir (Ministere Education Nationale, 2008).

Bazt iilkelerde okul yoneticisi olmak is;in ogretmenlik diplomasma sahip olmak gerekmektedir. Bazt iilkelerde ise okul yoneticileri ses;imle, yan~ma smavtyla ya da ki~isel dosyalann incelenmesi ve miilakat ile belirlenmektedir. Hemen hemen her iilkede okul yoneticilerinin gorev ve sorumluluklan benzerdir. Bu gorev ve sorumluluklan pek s:ok iilkede okul


kurullan payla~maktadtr. Bazt iilkelerde ise okul yoneticileri denetlenmekte ve degerlendirilmektedir. Omegin; Almanya'da okul yoneticisinin se~ilmesi i~in kamu ilanma ya da Eyalet Bakanhgt tarafmdan beceri ve degerlendirmelerin sonu~lanna bagh olarak mahalll idarelerin onerilerine dayah olarak atama soz konusudur. Ba~vuru sahibinin yetenegi, beceri ve uzmanhk bilgisi temelinde se~imini okul kurullan ve okul konseyi (schulkonferenz) yapmaktadtr. Almanya'da yoneticiler eyaletin Egitim ve Kliltlirel i~Ier Bakanhgt tarafmdan atanmaktadtr (Erden & Erden, 2005). Almanya'da okul yoneticileri, egitimle ilgili tUm konulardan sorumludur. Kararlarm almmasmda ogretmenler konseyine ve okul konseyine dam~tlmaktadtr. Almanya'da okul yoneticileri, memur olduklan i~in kariyerlerinin onemli basamaklannda (terfi, tayin vb.) degerlendirilmektedir. Her eyalette bulunan okul denetleme birimleri denetimden sorumludur (The Education System in Turkey, 2007).

Egitimin Finansmam

En pahah yatmm olan egitim, uzun bir zaman dilimini kapsadtgt i~in slirekli ve bliylik bir harcamayt zorunlu ktlmaktadtr. <;ah~mamn kapsamt i~erisindeki iilkelerin tlimlinde zorunlu egitim parastzdtr. Bazt giderler ise ilgili otoriteler tarafmdan kar~tlanmaktadtr. Tablo 9 iilkelere gore finansman kaynaklarmt i~ermektedir.

Tablo 9 Tiirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde egitim finansman kaynaklarz Ulke Finansman kaynaklan Tiirkiye Egitim Bakan1tgi + katkt payt ve bagt~1ar A1manya eya1et yonetim1eri + yere1 yonetim1er A vusturya Egitim, Bilim ve Kiiltiir Bakanhgt +

Danimarka Finlandiya

Fran sa

ingiltere ispanya

eya1et yonetim1eri + yere1 yonetim1er Egitim Bakanhgt + yere1 yonetim1er Egitim Bakanhgt + yere1 yonetim1er+ki~i ve kuru1u~1ar Egitim Bakanhgt + diger bakanhk1ar + diger yonetim birim1eri + goniillii kuru1u~lar yerel yonetimler + ozel kurulu~lar Egitim Bakanhgt + ozerk bolgeler + yerel kaynaklar

isvery Egitim Bakanhgt + yerel yonetimler Portekiz merkezi yonetim + halk ve ozel kurulu~lar Yunanistan merkezi yonetim + ixi~leri Bakanhgt

Kaynak: Erdogan, 2006; Giilcan, 2005; HEFCE, 2008; OECD, 2007; Sozer, 1997; Tuzcu, 2006; Tiirkoglu, 1998'den yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

14 TORKIYE VE AB EOITIM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

Tablo 9' da da goriildiigii gibi bazt iilkelerde -Tiirkiye' de oldugu gibimerkezi hiikiimetler egitim i<;in giderlerin biiyiik bir ktsmmt kar~tlarken, bazt iilkelerde de merkezi hiikiimetin yam stra eyaletler, yerel yonetimler giderlere yasalann ongordiigii oranlarda katktda bulunmaktadtr. Omegin Almanya'da egitimin finansmam; resmi okullar, eyalet yonetimleri ve yerel yonetimlerce ortakla~a yaptlmaktadtr. Ogretmen giderleri eyalet yonetimince kar~tlamrken, okul binalannm yaptmt-onanmt ve diger giderleri yerel yonetimler kar~tlamaktadtr. Federal hiikiimetin giderlere kattlma payt giderek artmaktadtr (Sozer, 1997).

Bazt iilkelerde de egitim giderleri i<;in yasalarla diizenlenen ozel gelir kaynaklan olu~turulmu~tur. Omegin; Tiirkiye'de 8 ytlhk temel egitime katkt olu~turmak amact ile ge<;ici olarak <;tkanlan <;e~itli mallardan ahnan vergilerden olu~an katkt gelirleri daha sonra yeni bir yasal diizenleme ile zorunlu duruma getirilmi~tir. Aynca, <;e~itli iilkelerde bazt okullar doner sermaye esasma gore <;ah~ttklan i<;in kendileri kaynak olu~turmaktadtr. 6zellikle yiiksek ogrenim duzeyinde battdaki bir<;ok ulke projelerle yabanct iilke ogrencilerinin egitimleri ile kaynaklar saglamaktadtr. Bir ba~ka gelir kaynagt da ogrencilerden ahnan har<;lardtr.

Avusturya'da yiiksekogretimin finansmam ulusal biit<;eden saglanan kaynaklarla kar~tlanmaktadtr. Bu biit<;eden %47'si iiniversite personeline aynlmaktadtr (inandt, 2005). Finlandiya'da da yiiksekogretimin giderleri devlet biit<;esinden saglanmaktadtr. Universiteler aynca dt~ finansal kaynaklardan da gelir elde etmektedir (OECD, 2007). ingiltere yiiksekogretim kurumlannm ve enstitiilerin ogrenim ve ara~ttrma masraflan ingiltere i<;in Yiiksekogretim Fon Kurulu (The Higher Education Funding Council for England-HEFCE) tarafmdan finanse edilmektedir (HEFCE, 2008).

Tablo 10'da AB iilkelerinin tiimiiniin tiim diizeylerde egitime Tiirkiye'den daha fazla kaynak aytrdtgt goriilmektedir. Her iilke kendi gelir durumuna gore ogrenci ba~ma dii~en harcama miktanm ayarlamaktadtr. Omegin, 2001 rakamlanna gore Almanya'da ilk ve ortaogretimde ogrenci ba~ma dii~en harcama 6055, yiiksekogretimde ise 10.504, Finlandiya'da ilk ve ortaogretimde 5733, yiiksekogretimde ise 10.981, Yunanistan'da ise ilk ve ortaogretimde 3475, yiiksekogretimde ise 4280 dolar ogrenci ba!?ma harcama yaptlmt~ttr (Milli Egitim Bakanhgt [MEB], 2007).

Tablo 10'da GSYiH'nin toplam kamu harcamalan yer almaktadtr.

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSi

Tablo 10 AB illkeleri ve Tilrkiye 'de GSYiH'nin bir yilzdesi olarak egitimde kamu harcamalan (2001) Ulke ilk ve ortaogretim Yiiksekogretim Egitimin

Tlirkiye 2.5 1.2 A1manya 3.0 1.2 Avusturya 3.8 1.4 Danimarka 4.8 2. 7 Fin1andiya 3.9 2.1 Fransa 4.0 1.0 ingiltere 3.4 0.8 ispanya 3.0 1.0 isvec; 4.8 2.0 Portekiz 4.3 1.1 Yunanistan 2.4 1.2 Kaynak: OECD, 2004'den aktaran <;ah~kan Maya, 2006.

Egitimin Tefti~i

tiim diizeyleri 3.7 4.6 5.8 8.5 6.2 5.7 4.7 4.4 7.3 5.9 3.9

15

Egitim sisteminin i~leyi~ini belirlemek, tespit edilen ama<ylara ula~Ip

ula~Ilmadtgmt saptamak amac1 ile ya da alanda <yah~an ogretmenlere rehberlik etmek gayesi ile tefti~ veya denetim ad1 altmda <ye~itli kontrol birimleri olu~turulmu~tur. Baz1 iilkelerde -Ttirkiye' de oldugu gibi- degi~ik

kademeleri denetleyen mtifetti~ ad1 ile amlan ya ozel bir orgtin egitimden ya da hizmet i<;i egitimden ge<yirilen gorevliler mevcuttur. Ttirkiye'de ortaogretimi denetleyen mtifetti~ler ile ilkogretimi denetleyen mtifetti~lerin gorev, ama<y, yeti~me bi<;imleri birbirinden farkhdtr. Bununla birlikte iilkelere gore denetimin sorumlulan da tilkeden tilkeye degi~mektedir. Tabla 11 Ttirkiye ve AB iilkelerinde denetimden sorumlu kurumlar yer almaktad1r.

16 T0RKiYE VE AB EGITiM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERi KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

Tablo 11 Turkiye ve AB ulkelerinde egitimin denetiminden sorumlu kurumlar Ulke Egitimde yetkili/sorumlu kurumlar Turkiye Mill! Egitim Bakanhgt A1manya Egitim ve Ktilllir Bakanhgt A vusturya Egitim ve Sanat Bakanhgt Danimarka Egitim Bakanhgt Finlandiya Fransa ingiltere ispanya isve<; Portekiz

Milli Egitim Denetleme Kurulu Egitim Standartlan Ofisi (OFSTED) Ytiksek Denetleme Kurulu Egitim Bakanhgt+yerel yonetimler Egitim Genel Tefti~ Heyeti

(-: kurum bulunmamaktadtr)

Kaynak: Gerhard, 2005; Harris, 1993; Johannesson & digerleri, 2002; Kodde & Ritzen, 1994; Stingti, 2005; Yolcu, 2006; The Education System in Turkey, 2007'dEn yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur.

Kurumun amact; bag1ms1z olarak egitim standartlannm ve niteliginin geli~imini saglamak ve egitimden sorumlu devlet sekreterine bilgi sunmaktu (Harris, 1993). isves;'te ise Ulusal Egitim Ajans1 (skolverket) takip geli~tirme ve denetleme ile egitim standartlanm goz online sermeye s;ah~maktadu. isves;'te denetim hem kalite kontrolti hem de rehberlik etmeyi amas;lamaktad1r. Ogretmenler denetim esnasmda olduks;a rahattu. <;::Unkli mlifetti~lerin gorevi tefti~ degil rehberlik etmektir (Gerhard, 2005).

Finlandiya'da ise ele alman diger Ulkelerden farkh olarak ayn bir okul denetimi mevcut degildir. Egitim kurumlan kendi s;ah~malanm ve etkilerini degerlendirmekle yliklimltidtir. Egitimin degerlendirilmesinin amac1 kanunda belirtilen hedeflere ula~1ld1gmdan emin olmak ve egitimin geli~imini desteklemenin yamnda ogrenme f1rsatlanm da geli~tirmektir. Bu Ulkede okullann kendi kendilerini degerlendirmeleri, kanun ve sozlti uygulamalarla gitgide daha da yerle~mektedir. Okul yasas1, kendi kendilerini degerlendirmeyi her okul is;in resmi bir sorumluluk haline getirmi~tir (Johannesson & digerleri, 2002).

Ogretmen Egitimi

Bu s;ah~manm kapsam1 is;inde yer alan Ulkelerde ogretmen yeti~tirme dlizeni ary1smdan da sUre, is;erik, ogrencinin geldigi kaynak baklmmdan farkhhklar vard1r. Hemen hemen tUm Ulkelerde her kademe ve her tlir okul lylll ogretmen yeti~tirme programlannm birbirinden farkh oldugu soylenebilir. Ancak her ogretmen egitimi programmda genel ktilttir, alan

AVRUPAARA$TIRMALARI DERGISI 17

bilgisi ve mesleki formasyon (pedagojik formasyon) ders gruplan degi~ik kredi ve agtrhklarda bulunmaktad1r. Ogretmen yeti~tiren okullara giri~te baz1 iilkelerde -Tiirkiye 'de oldugu gibi- smavla, baz1 iilkelerde ise ortaogretim not ortalamas1 ile birlikte smav da yap1lmaktad1r. Ogretmen yeti~tiren okullann ogrenim siireleri Tiirkiye'de oldugu gibi 4 ile 5 ytl arasmda degi~mektedir.

Diploma derecesi baktmmdan da okullarda ~ah~an ogretmenler genellikle lisans mezunudur. Ancak on lisans ve lisansiistii mezunu olan ogretmenlerin ~ah~tigi iilkeler de mevcuttur. Ornegin; Yunanistan'da onceleri ortaogretim I. ve II. devre okullanndaki (gymnasio ve lykeio) alan ogretmenligi i~in, ilgili alan fakiiltelerinde 4 yllhk ogrenim gormii~ olmak yeterli bulunurken 2003 ythndan itibaren 4 yllhk alan ogretiminden sonra 1 ytl siireyle ogretmenlik meslek bilgisi ogrenilmesi zorunlulugu getirilmi~tir. Finlandiya'da da ogretmenlik egitiminin siiresi be~ yildtr ve ogretmenlik meslegi Fin toplumunda en onemli mesleklerden biri olarak algllanmaktad1r. Ogretmenlere ger~ek profesyoneller olarak en iyisini yapacaklan konusunda sonsuz bir giiven duyulmaktadtr. Smtfta ogretmenlere kayda deger bir pedagojik bagtmstzhk verilmi~tir. Maa~lann miktan diger A vrupa iilkelerinin bazllanndan dii~iik olmasma ragmen ogretmenlik ba~vurulanmn sadece %15'i kabul edilmektedir. Aynca ogretmenlik yapabilmek i~in mutlaka yiiksek lisans mezuniyet derecesini alm1~ olmak gerekmektedir (LinnkyUi, 2004).

Sonu~ ve Oneriler

Bir sistemi olu~tururken her toplum kendi degerlerinden hareket etmek durumundadir. Toplumsal ger~ekleri goz oniine almadan olu~turulan ya da ba~ka iilkelerden transfer edilen sistemlerin kisa donemde ihtiya~lara cevap vermedigi pek anla~Ilmaz. <;iinkii girdinin iiriine donii~mesi uzun bir siireci gerektirir. Uzun donemde i~e yaramad1g1 anla~Ilan sistem degi~tirilse bile toplumda biiyiik zaman, enerji, para, insan kaytplanna yol a~mas1

ka~mtlmaz olur. Giiniimiizde genellikle geli~mekte olan baz1 iilkeler kendi egitim sistemlerini olu~turmak yerine kolaycthga ka~arak geli~mi~ olan bir ba~ka iilkenin egitim sistemini ktsmen ya da tamamen alarak ~ogu zaman da hi~ uyarlamaya bile gerek duymadan uygulama gayreti i~ine girmektedir.

<;ah~mamn konusu kapsammda degerlendirilen degi~ik geli~im diizeyleri ve sosyo-ekonomik yap1da bulunan iilkelerin genelde egitim sistemlerinin birbirinden farkh oldugu goriilmektedir. Her iilke kendi sistemini i~ dinamiklerine bagh olarak olu~turma ~abas1 i9erisindedir. Bu ():ah~mada, Tiirkiye ve on AB iilkesinde karma~Ik ve dinamik bir ozellik ta~Iyan egitim olgusu belirli ba~hklar halinde incelenmi~tir. Geli~mi~ iilkelerin egitim

18 TORKIYE VE AB EGITIM YAPILARI VE YONETiMLERI KAR$1LA$TIRMASI

sistemleri incelendiginde kendilerine has bir yapmm oldugu ac;tk bir ~ekilde goriilmektedir. <;::ah~mada incelenen Almanya egitim sistemi, isvec; egitim sistemi, ozellikle de son ytllarda uluslar arast smavlarda biiyiik ba~an gosteren Finlandiya egitim sistemi ozgiin alma ozelligini ta~tyan iilkelerin ba~mda gelmektedir. Boylece c;ah~mada tek bir egitim sistemi, modelinin olmadtgmt ortaya konulmu~ ve Tiirkiye ic;in bu sonuc;lardan ne gibi oneriler getirilebilecegi a~agtda belirtilmeye c;ah~tlmt~tlr. <;::ah~madan elde edilen verilere bagh olarak getirilebilecek oneriler ~unlar olabilir:

• AB iilkelerinde dort ya~ okulla~ma oranlan oldukc;a iyi durumda olmasma kar~m Tiirkiye'de bu ya~ ic;in verilerin bulunmamast ilgi c;ekicidir. Tiirkiye'de okulOncesi egitimde okulla~ma oranlan ya~lar itibariyle tespit edilmelidir. Tiirkiye'de okul oncesi egitimde iyile~tirme c;abalan arttmlmahdtr.

• Zorunlu egitim ya~t AB iilkeleri ile kar~tla~tmldtgmda en dii~iik zorunlu egitim, 8 ytlhk egitim siiresi ile Tiirkiye'nindir. Zorunlu egitim siiresi Tiirkiye'de altyaptst iyi haztrlanarak tekrar diizenlenmelidir.

• Zorunlu egitim okulla~ma oranlan AB iilkelerinden Fransa ve Portekiz'de %100'e ula~mt~, ortalama okulla~ma oram ise AB iilkelerinde 05-14 ya~ arast %99.4'e varmt~tlr. Tiirkiye'de okulla~ma oranlan ic;in ya~lara gore veriler belirlenmeli okulla~ma oranlanm artttrmak ic;in i~levsel onlemler ahnmahdtr.

• Tiirkiye'de haftahk ders saati AB iilkeleri ile kar~tla~tmldtgmda daha fazladtr (30 saat). Haftahk ders saati saytst tekrar incelenebilir. Ogretmenlere ders saatleri ac;tsmdan serbestlik sunulabilir. AB iilkelerinde somestr siiresi bizdeki kadar uzun degildir. Tiirkiye'de tatil siireleri tekrar gozden gec;irilebilir.

• Tiirkiye' de ortaogretimden iiniversiteye gec;i~ ko~ullan, sadece iiniversite smavt ile sec;imde adaylarda aranan c;e~itli nitelikler olc;iilemediginden bu konuda yeni diizenlemeler getirilebilir.

• Y eti~kin egitimi i\!in AB iilkelerinde oranlara baktldtgmda 40 ya~ ve iizerinde bile ortalama %2.1 oramnda okulla~mamn olmast soz konusudur. Tiirkiye'de ise bu ya~lar arast veriler bulunmamaktadtr. Tiirkiye'de yeti~kin egitiminin durumu gozden gec;irilmeli ve iyile~tirilmelidir.

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSI 19

• AB tilkelerinden baz1lan merkezi, bazllan yerel, bazllan ise hem merkezi hem yerel yonetimi uygulamaktad1r. Tiirkiye'de ise merkezi yonetim soz konusu olmakla birlikte tilkemizin her yerinde egitimde nitelik farkhhklannm oldugu da bir gers;ektir. Tiirkiye is;in diger yonetim ~ekillerinin uygun olup olamayacag1 iizerinde dii~iiniilmelidir.

• AB iilkeleri ile kar~lla~tmld1gmda Tiirkiye' de egitime yeteri kadar maddi kaynak aynlmad1g1 goriilmektedir. Tiirkiye'de egitim, finansman as;1smdan giis;lendirilmelidir.

• Ulkeler arasmda egitimin denetiminde onemli farkhhklar bulunmaktadlr. isves; 'te denetim, ogretmenler kendilerini geli~tirici bir s;ah~ma olarak algllad1klan is;in olduks;a olurnlu bir bak1~ as;lSl ile ve rahat bir ortamda yapllmakta iken, Finlandiya'da ise d1~tan egitimi denetleyecek bir otoriteye ihtiyas; duyulmamaktad1r. Tiirkiye'de ise denetim miifetti~lerce Milli Egitim Bakanhg1 tarafmdan yapllmakta fakat denetimin niteligi tart1~1hr bir durum arz etmektedir. Tiirkiye'de egitimin denetimi ele~tirel odakh olmak yerine niteligi arttmc1 ~ekilde tekrar ele almmahd1r.

• AB iilkelerinin bazllannda ogretmen egitimi yiiksek lisans diizeyinde yapllmakta ve boylece ogretmenler smlflannda etkin uygulamalar yapabilecek ~ekilde donat1lmaktad1r. Tiirkiye 'de de bu anlamda kalitenin ve ogretmenlik mesleginin statiisiiniin arttmlmasma yonelik s;ah~malar yap1lmahd1r.

Ulkeler kar~lla~tumah egitimin kapsam1 is;erisinde birbirlerinin egitim sistemlerini inceleyip kendi modellerini olu~turmada digerlerinden esinlenebilirler. Ancak his;bir tilke bir ba~ka iilkenin egitim sistemini oldugu gibi alma hatasma dii~memelidir. Genellikle ba~ka iilkeleri kopya alarak egitim sistemlerini diizenleyen iilkeler uzun zaman dilimi is;erisinde geli~mekte olan iilkeler kategorisinden kurtulamam1~tlr.

20 TORKIYE VE AB EOITIM YAPILARI VE YONETIMLERi KAR~ILA~TIRMASI

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Karacaoglu, 6. C., & <;abuk, B. (2002). ingiltere ve Tiirkiye egitim sistemlerinin kar~tla~tmlmas1. Millf Egitim Dergisi, 155-156.

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AVRUPA ARAl;)TIRMALARI DERGISI• Say1 16 • No: 1-2 • 2008 25

ENTEGRASYON SURECiNDE DiLiN ONEMi: TURKiYE'DEKi ENTEGRASYON KURSLARI*

Sueda Ozbent**

Ozet:

Entegrasyon siireci oldukr;a karma~zk toplumsal bir olaydzr. Bu silrer;te dilin ve dil ediniminin rolii biiyiiktiir. Bir yere uyum saglayabilmenin on ko~ulu orada ya~ayan insanlarla ileti~im kurabilmekten ger;er. 2001 yllmda "Bagzmszz Gor; Komisyonu" Almanya ya gelecek olan yabancllarm Hollanda ve isver; 'te oldugu gibi dil ve entegrasyon kurslanm ba~anyla tamamlamasz ~artlm getirmi~tir. 2004 ve 2005 yzlmda toplanan komisyon bu talebi yinelemi~tir. Bu gor; yasasma gore dil kurslanm (AI seviyesinde) ba~arzyla tamamlamayan ki~ilere vize verilmemektedir. Bu durum evli r;iftler ir;in de ger;erlidir ve istenmeyen bir dizi sorunlara yo! ar;maktadzr. insanlarm evlenebilmeleri bir yerde almanca edinebilme yetenegine endekslenmektedir.

Bu r;alz~mada dil edinimi teorileri ve silreci r;alz~manm kapsamz el verdigi olr;iide i:jlenmi:j, irdelenmi~ ve 2,5 ay gibi kzsa bir silrede almanca gibi zor bir dilin ogrenilmesinin imkanszz oldugu vurgulanmz~tzr. Aynca yasamn uygulamasma yonelik szkmtzlar dile getirilmi~tir. Ornegin kurslar iicretli olup "Goethe Enstitiileri" tarafindan sadece istanbul, Ankara ve izmir'de verilmekte ve ~imdiye kadar Konsolosluk tarafindan sadece "Goethe Enstitilsil "niin verdigi sertifikalar kabul edilmektedir. Her insamn e:jini serbestr;e ser;meye ve aile olarak ya~amaya hakkz vardzr.

Anahtar kelimeler: Entegrasyon, yabancz dil edinimi, dil edinim teorileri, gor; yasasz

Abstract:

Integration process is a quite complicitaed social issue. The language and the language acquisition have great role in this process A basic precondition of an adaptation to a place is to be able to cominicate with the

* Mak:alenin Almancast "Die Rolle der Sprache bei der Integration" ad1 altmda 17 Ocak 2008'de M.D. "Avrupah Turk Go~menler" adh konferansta sunulmu~tur.

** Yrd.Do~. Dr., Marmara Universitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakiiltesi

26 ENTEGRASYON SORECINDE DILIN ONEMI

people in that place. In 2001," Independence Emigration Committe" put some requierments, as it existed in Holland and Sweden ,for the newcomer foreigners to Germany like achieving language and integration courses successfuly. The reassembled comission in 2004 and 2005 repeated this request again. According to this emigration law, the people who failed in this language courses (AI level) are not able to get a visa. This is also valid for married couples and cause some series of problems. In a way, marriage is being indexed to one's ability of acquiring a language.

In this study, the language acquisition teories and process are scrutinized as far as within the scope of this study and it is emphasized that it is imposible to learn a difficult language like German in 2,5 months. In addition to this, difficulties in practise lead by this law are expressed. For example, courses cost money and are given by Goethe Instrtutes only in istanbul, Ankara and Izmrr. Consulate accept the certificates only given by "Goethe Instrtute". Each person has right to choose his or her spouse and bring up a family

Key words: Integration, language acquisition, language acquisition teories, emigration law

Entegrasyon olduk9a karma~1k toplumsal bir sure9tir. "Sosyolojik bir terim olan 'entegrasyon' davram~sal ve ~uursal olarak degerler sistemine ve davram~ omeklerine entegre etme veya benzetmedir; bu (a) ~ah1slar vas1tas1yla belli gruplara, organizasyonlara veya toplumun kendileri i9in onemli alanlanna (oziimseme, sosyalizasyon), (b) toplumun 9e~itli gruplan, tabakalan, smlflan arasmda; (c) farkh toplumlar arasmda yeni 'daha yiiksek' ortak klilllirel yap1larm olu~umu ve sosyal duzen adma (klilllirle~me ve asimilasyon)" ger9ekle~ir (Hartfiel I Hillman, 1972: 344). Almanya gibi 90k klilllirlu bir toplumda entegrasyon sure9lerinde toplum i9in bir zorlama ve her zaman aktuel olan oldukya yiiksek bir dinamik soz konusudur. Kulllirler aras1 egitim hem kendi kiillliriine hem de ba~ka klilllirlere ba~ka bir a91dan bakmay1 ogretir. Tecrubeler ihtilaflarla ve ihtilaflardan edinilir. Globalle~me devrinde dunyada var olan ekonomik, i9 i9e baglantllar nedeniyle go9 alan lilkelerin nufuslan 90k 9e~itlilik gostermektedir. <;:e~itli lilkelerden insanlar bir araya gelerek birlikte ya~amak zorundad1rlar. Paralel toplumlardan bahsedilmektedir. "Tiirkiye Ara~tlrmalar Merkezi Vakf1'nm verilerine gore Almanya'da 2,75 milyon Turk y~amakta olup bunlann %42'si Alman vatanda~1d1r (zft, 2007). Berlin Turk Buyukel9iligi'nin verilerine gore 2000 y1hmn sonunda 746.651 Turk Almanya dogumludur. Bu arada bu rakam muhtemelen bir milyona ula~m1~tlr. Hailbronner 2005

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi 27

y1h itibariyle "her be~ yabanc1dan birisinin (tam olarak 1,499 milyon) Almanya'da dogdugunu" soylemektedir. "Turk vatanda~lan oldukr;a buylik bir oranda (%34,9) pay almaktad1rlar. Her ur;te bir ki~iden fazlas1 Almanya'ya Ttirk pasaportu ile gelmemi~, Almanya' da dogmu~tur"

(Hailbronner, 2006: 8). Almanya'da ur; nesil Turk ya~amaktad1r.

Entegrasyon soz konusu oldugunda i~, sosyal kontrol mekanizmalan, dinler, ideolojiler, dunya gorli~leri gibi birr;ok faktorlerin yam ma, dil r;ok onemli bir faktordur. Toplumlarm etnik yap1lanna gore ktiltlirel, sosyal mesafeler ve etnik ir;i ve etnikler aras1 temas ve r;eli~kiler mevcuttur. Her toplum ir;in kendine has bir dinamik geli~ir. Dil bir r;ok entegrasyon surecinin hem on ~artl hem de sonucudur. Dil edinimi aym zamanda ilgili klilttirlin de edinimidir. Kim bir klilttirde kendini rahat hissetmek istiyorsa, o kultlirlin dilini ve sosyal degerlerini ogrenmek ve ozelliklerini kabul etmek zorundad1r. Fakat bu surecin bir 'asimilasyona' donu~mesi istenmez. "Bag1ms1z 'gory' Komisyonu 2001 raporunda (259ft) Hollanda ve isver; ornegine gore dil ve entegrasyon kurslannm duzenlenmesini tavsiye etmekte ve bOylece gor;menlerin dil arylSlndan entegrasyonunu vurgulamaktad1r" (Esser, 2006: 11). Bu tavsiye Almanya'dan vize ba~vurusunda bulunan e~ler ir;in "Gor;men yasas1" olarak yurlirllige sokulmu~tur. "2004 'Gor;menler ve entegrasyon bilirki~i kurulu' yllhk raporunda ve 2005 gor;menler, kar;aklar ve entegrasyon memorandumunda bu tavsiye ve dilin entegrasyon ir;in onemi tekrarlanm1~ ve vurgulanm1~t1r" (Esser, 2006: 11 ). Entegrasyon kurslan hakkmdaki tart1~maya girmeden once dil edinimi surecini yakmdan incelemek gerekir.

Dil edinimi insanlann dili ( dilleri) nasll anlad1klanna ve konu~tuklarma dair surer;tir. Dil edinimi gramer kurallanm ve kelimeleri ezberlemekten ibaret degildir. Bir dili bilmek demek, dogru yerde dogru sozleri kullanabilmek demektir. Butlin dil edinimi ttirlerinde, sosyal baglamda dili kullanmaya dair olan gelenekleri de dahil olmak uzere, dil sisteminin tamam1 ogrenilmek zorundad1r. Dil ileti~im arac1d1r ve her zaman bir ktiltlir ile birlikte edinildigi ir;in insanlarm sosyal entegrasyonun bir parr;as1d1r. Dil edinimi ve bili~sel geli~im r;ok yakm kar~1hkh etkile~im ir;erisindedir ve r;evresel sosyal faktOrlerden oldukr;a etkilenir. Anadil edinimi problemsiz geli~ir ve ozel bir motivasyona ihtiyar; duymaz, ancak yabanc1 dil edinimi ba~ka tlirllidur. Turk r;ocuklan oyle bir toplumda dunyaya gelmektedirler ki, kendilerini iyi hissedebilmeleri ir;in hem Turkr;e'yi hem de Almanca'y1 aym zamanda ogrenmeleri gerekmektedir. ileride iyi bir pozisyonda r;ah~abilmenin on ko~ulu olarak iyi bir tahsil yapmalan gerekmektedir; bunun ir;in de ileri duzeyde Almanca bilmeleri gerekir. Fakat aym zamanda aile ir;indeki sosyal hayatl payla~abilmek ir;in de Turkr;e bilmeleri


gerekmektedir; omegin Tiirk kom~ulan ziyarete geldiklerinde veya Tiirkiye'ye tatile gittiklerinde. Aile i~inde uyumlu bir ya~am i~in Tiirk~e gereklidir ve nesiller arasmda yabancila~ma olmamas1 gerekir. ileride hastanede, mahkemede veya poliste vb. terciimanhk i~lerinde ~ah~arak her iki dili kullanabilirler. Atalan Tiirkiye'de oldugundan ve en azmdan ebeveynler giiniin birinde Tiirkiye'ye donii~ yapma arzusunu i~lerinde

ta~1d1klan i~in, Tiirkiye'deki akrabalan ile olan baglanm koparmamak zorundad1rlar. Ebeveynler geri donii~ hayallerini ~ocuklanndan ayn ger~ekle~tirmek istemezler. Demek ki Tiirk ~ocuklanmn sosyalizasyonu her iki dilde ve kiiltiirde ger~ekle~mektedir. ilk sosyalizasyon ailede ve Tiirk~e olarak ger~ekle~mektedir. <;ocuklann ilkokula ba~lamas1 ile, eger okuma yazma onlar i~in yabanc1 bir dil olan Almanca'da yap1hrsa ve anadil ogretilmeye devam edilmezse, anadil edinimi birdenbire kesintiye ugrar. Tiirk~e'nin edinimi okul ~agmda heniiz tamamlanmam1~ oldugu i~in, hem anadil edinimi hem de genel anlamda bili~sel yetenekler bundan zarar goriirler; zira bu yetenekler daha sonra ~ocuklann soyut kavramlarla ~ah~malan gerektiginde, bili~sel akademik dil yetenekleri i((in ~arthr. Bu durumda ((Ocuklann Tiirk~e gramer bilgisinin onemli bir kismi, kelime hazinesi ( evde kullamlmayan kelimeler) ve yaz1m kurallan hakkmda bilgileri eksik olacaktlr ve Tiirk~e'nin kurumsal sosyalizasyonu eksik kalacaktlr. <;ocuklar deneme yamlma yontemi ile hem dillerini hem de i((inde ya~ad1klan diinyayi ogrenirler. Bu nedenle anadildeki sosyalizasyondaki eksiklikler ikinci dil edinimine olumsuz olarak yanSir. Cummins'in kar~1hkh etkile~im teorisine gore "bir ki~inin ikinci bir dilde eri~ebilecegi dilsel beceriler (yetki ve performans seviyesi), biiyiik <H~iide o ki~inin anadilde edindigi seviyeye baghd1r. . . . Cummins (1979) akiCI okuma ile ilgili yaptlgi ara~tlrmalannda bir dilin normal ediniminde sadece belli bir dilin degil aym zamanda genel anlamda dilin ne oldugu ogrenilmektedir, sonucuna vanr. ilk ve ikinci dil ediniminde bili~sel akademik dil yetenekleri aym boyutun bir gostergesi olarak kar~1m1za ~1kar. Eger bu yetenekler gerektigi bi((imde desteklenmezse bir k1s1r dongii olu~ur: Ba~lang1~ta klSltlanan bili~sel akademik dil yetenegi kendi geli~im ~artlanm kisitlayarak, gittik~e daha fazla klSitlamalara sebebiyet verir. Bunun sonucu ise klSith okuma, yazma ve diger okul becerilerinde eksikliktir. Okul miifredatmm ileri a~amasmda bili~sel akademik yetenekleri gerektiren ((ah~malar giindeme geldiginde bu a((Iklar kendini gostermeye ba~lar." (de Cillia, 2005: 4) Bu nedenle Tiirk~e gozde ortak ileti~im dili olmasa bile desteklenmeli ve geli~tirilmelidir. Nehr ve Karajoli'nin Berlin okullannda yaptigi ara~t1rmada (Cillia'ya gore, 2005: 6) iki dilli (Almanca - Tiirk((e) okuma yazma egitiminin ((Ok ba~anh oldugu kamtlanm1~hr. Bu entegrasyona yonelik ve kiiltiirler aras1 metoda gore ((Ocuklar en azmdan ilk

AVRUPA ARAI;;TIRMALARI DERGISI 29

u~ veya dort ytl anadillerinde egitiliyorlar. Bu uygulama azmhgm da kendi hakkmda pozitif du~unmesine ve kendi grubuna kar~t olumlu tavtr takmmasma, dolaystyla da sosyal hayattm etkilemektedir. Ebeveynler ve okul arasmda iyi bir ili~ki oldugu i~in, ~ocuklann okuldaki motivasyonu ytiksek oluyor. Bu olumlu bakt~ a~tst hem ~ocuklann hem de ebeveynlerin ba~anh sosyal entegrasyonuna hizmet etmektedir. "Okulda anadilin te~vik edilmesi ikinci bir dilin ogrenilmesine ve okul ba~ansma kesinlikle zarar vermemektedir" (Esser, 2006: 268) denilebilir. Anadil ikinci dili ~ok az etkilese dahi, yukanda saytlan sosyal, ailevi ve entegrasyonla ilgili sebepler nedeniyle yine de desteklenmesi gerekir.

Dogu~tanct (nativist) teori davram~~~ (behaviorist) teoriye tepki olarak ortaya ~tkmt~tlr ve dilsel yaptlann veya bilgilerin dogu~tan var oldugu var saytmt ile hareket eder. Derek Bickerton'un Bioprogramt ve Chomsky'nin evrensel dilbilgisi bu teorinin temelini olu~turur. Chomsky ~ocuklann eksik Input ( dilsel girdi, veri) ile birka~ sene i~erisinde nastl olup da dilsel edinimi geli~tirebildiklerini ara~ttrmt~ttr. Cocuklarm dogu~tan, biyolojik ve genetik bir ogrenme sistemine sahip olmalan gerektigini benimsedi ve buna LAD (language acquisition device) admt verdi. LAD dogal dillerde mumkUn olan yaptlan belirleyen, evrensel dilbilgisi anlayt~ma uygun temel kurallan i~ermektedir. LAD ogrenilecek olan dilde hangi dilsel yaptlann mevcut oldugunu kontrol eder ve dil edinimini hipotezlerin dogrulugunu test etme yontemiyle (deneme-yamlma) yonetir. Dil edinimindeki ki~isel farkhhklar bu hipotezlerin test edilmesi esnasmda var olan ogrenme ~artlan ( ~evre) ile ilgilidir. Etkile~imsel (interaktionist) teori de dogu~tan var olan yetenekleri kabul eder, fakat dogu~tanct teoriden farkh olarak sosyal <;evrenin ve ogrenme motivasyonunun onemini vurgular. Bu anlayt~a gore konu~ma sadece ve sadece sosyal etkile~imsel ortamlannda cereyan eder. Bu nedenle dil ancak etkile~imsel ortamlarda ogrenilebilir, <;unku dilsel sinyaller dilsel olmayan i~aretlerle belli durumlar i~erisinde kullamhr. Boylece farkh dillerde farkh kodlamalar meydana gelir. Dili ogrenen ki~i bu kodlan dogru bir ~ekilde ~ozumleyebilirse i~te o zaman Piaget'in anladtgt anlamda yarattct olabilir. Dil sosyal ya~antmm bir par~ast olduguna gore bir dili ogrenen ki~inin sosyal rollere gore davram~t, ki~iler arasmda ge~erli olan toplumsal kurallan ve buna benzer bir <;ok ~eyi ogrenmesi gerekir. Piaget'nin goru~lerini yansttan bili~sel (kognitiv) teori (1982) geli~im psikolojisini ele ahr ve dil edinimini manttkh bir du~unme sureci olarak a<;tklar. Cocugun zihinsel geli~imine paralel olarak dil edinimini birbiri uzerine kuran evreler ~eklinde geli~ir. Piaget ~evrenin ~ekillendirici ve yonlendirici rolunu dil ogrenen bireyin ki~isel yarattcthgtyla birle~tirir. Bireyin butUn bunlan ger<;ekle~tirebilmesi i~in "kavramla~ttrma, degi~ik

30 ENTEGRASYON SORECiNDE DiLIN QNEMi

sinyalleri birle~tirme ve bu tip gozlemlerden sonus; s;tkarabilme yetisine" (Wode, 1988: 49) ihtiyac1 vardtr. Birs;ok klinik ara~tirmalan sonucunda Lenneberg (1967) ergenlik (12. ya~) ile birlikte beyinde loplar arsmda bir gorev payla~tmmm meydana geldigine karar verir. "Kritik donem" adt verilen bu evreye kadar s;ocuklar ogrenme esnasmda her iki lopu da kullamrlar. Bu donemden itibaren anadil edinimi ve ikinci dil edinimi biyolojik ve beyin fizyolojisi bak1mmdan daha zordur. Bu ozellikle aksan olarak kendini gosterir. Bu teze gore ikinci dil edinimi is;in gos;menlerin ogrenme ve iilkeye geli~ ya~lan yOk onemlidir. "Kritik donemin" tam ya~I hakkmda degi~ik gorii~ler mevcuttur. Johnson ve Newport 1989da Amerika'ya 3 ila 39 ya~ arasmda gelen ve en az be~ senedir Amerika'da ya~ayan 46 <;inli veya Koreli akademisyenlerle bir ara~tirma yapmt~tir. ingilizce sentaks ve morfoloji yetileri ara~tmlm1~ ve 23 Amerikah ile kar~Ila~tmlmt~tir. Bu ara~ttrmaya gore ingilizce bilgileri ki~ilerin Amerika'ya geli~ ya~lan ile yakmdan alakahdtr; yani ikinci dil ediniminin ne zaman ba~lam1~ oldugu s;ok onemli rol oynamaktadtr. (Johnson/Newport,1989). Dil edinimini yedi ya~ma kadar gos;menlerde ve yerlilerde paralel geli~mektedir, fakat daha sonra s;ok belirgin bir du~u~ soz konusudur:

·~·of aniw. and En~lisll ~nammarscore

l-1 I-'ll 11-15 11-39

Johnson/Newport, 1989

3-15 ya~ grubunda ya~ ilerledik<;:e ingilizce bilgisi gerilemektedir. 15 ya~mdan sonra Ulkeye gelmi~ ki~iler i<;:in ula~tlan ingilizce seviyesi ile Ulkeye geli~ ya~I arasmda sistematik bir baglanti yoktur. Johnson ve Newport'a gore 15 ya~mdan itibaren du~uk ve yiiksek degerler sahip hem gens; ya~ta hem de ileri ya~ta ki~iler mevcuttur. Johnson ve Newport'un elde ettikleri sonu<;:lar, mukemmel aksanstz bir ikinci dil edinimi i<yin, 6-7

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSi 31

ya~mda ba~layan "kritik donemin" varhgmt ispatlamaktadtr. Ya~ ilerledikc;:e ogrenme yetenegi yava~, fakat gittikc;:e daha fazla gerilemektedir. Tek tiik ba~anh omekler ise kural degil istisnadtr. Bu vakalarda zekilik, egitim diizeyi veya sosyal ~artlar gibi ba~ka ki~isel faktOrlerin ara~tmlmast gerekir. Genel olarak ikinci dil edinimi ic;:in ~unu soyleyebiliriz: "Ne kadar gene; olursa o kadar iyi sonuc;: elde edilir!" Ya~I ilerlemi~ ki~ilerin dili iyi ogrenebilmeleri ic;:in motivasyonlannm yiiksek olmast, ogrenilen dili anadili olarak konu~an ki~ilerden oldukc;:a fazla bu dili duymast, dogru telaffuz etmeye onem vermesi ve c;:ok c;:ah~mast gerekmektedir. Motivasyonu dii~iik ki~ilerden ba~an beklenemez. Bongaerts 1999da 12 ya~mdan once ingilizce duymami~ 31 Hollandah ile bir ara~tlrma yapm1~t1r: Bu grup iyi ingilizce konu~an 11 Hollandah ve tesadiifen sec;:ilmi~ 20 Hollandahdan olu~maktaydt. "ikinci dili miikemmel konu~an be~ Hollandah dogru telaffuza onem verdiklerini ve dili ogrenmeye ba~lamalanndan itibaren 'large amount oflnput from native speakers' aldtklanm soylemi~lerdir. <;ok yogun c;:ah~ttklanm belirtmi~lerdir." (Esser, 2006: 262) Ozellikle bu tip vakalar tam olarak "kritik donemin" kac;: ya~mda ba~ladtgt tartt~tlsa bile, boyle bir donemin varhgm1 ispatlamaktadtr.

2007' de yiiriirliige giren yeni goc;:men yasasma gore, yabanctlar aile birle~imi c;:erc;:evesinde Almanya'ya gelmek istiyorlarsa 18 ya~mda olmak zorundadtrlar, basit bir ~ekilde Almanca konu~abilmek ve entegrasyon kurslanna katilmak zorundadtrlar. Bu kurslar dil ve egitim diizeyine gore en az 600 saat olup; temel ve list kurstan, "aynca Hukuk diizeni, kiiltiir ve tarih hakkmda bi1gilendiren bir oryantasyon kursundan olu~maktadtr"

(Hailbronner, 2006: 37). Oryantasyon kurslan ic;:in aynca 30 saat ongoriilmii~tiir. Fakat e~lerin Almanya'ya gidip bu kurslara kattlabilmeleri daha kendi iilkelerinde vize ba~vurusunda bulunduklannda basit diizeyde Almanca konu~uyor olmalan gerekmektedir. Bu A1 seviyesinde "Start Deutsch 1" diye isimlendirilen smav1 ba~armalan anlamma geliyor. Bu ki~iler ba~hca ~u zorluklarla kar~Ila~tyorlar:

Aile birle~imi c;:erc;:evesinde Almanya 'ya gelmek isteyen ki~iler yukanda bahsedilen "kritik donemi" c;:oktan a~m1~ olduklan ic;:in, ikinci bir dili ogrenmeleri hie; de kolay degildir. istanbul'daki Goethe Enstitiisii'niin verdigi bilgiye gore bundan sonra entegrasyon kurslan iki kere be~ hafta olmak iizere (toplam 160 ders saati, haftada 4 giin) "A1" GER (Gemeinsamer Europaischer Referenzrahmen; Avrupa Ortak Dil Kriterleri) seviyesinde yapilacaktir. Her kursun iicreti 500 YTL ve smav iicreti 115 YTLdir. Almanya'ya gelmek isteyen e~ler 2,5 ay ic;:erisinde basit bir ileti~im kurabilecek kadar Almanca konu~abilmek zorundadtr. "Bu smav Almanya 'daki giinliik ya~antiya katilmayt amac;:ladtgi icy in ozellikle ileti~im


kurabilme yetenegini smamaya yoneliktir"(Botschaft der Bundesrepublik, 2008). <;ogu ki~i i~in bu 2,5 ay talep edilen Al seviyesinde ileti~im kurma yetisi i~in yeterli olmayacakttr, zira anlama yetisi kendini ifade edebilme yetisinden once geli~ir. Yabanct dil ogrenen ki~?inin oncelikle dinleyerek anlama yetisini geli~tirmesi gerekir. Anlama konu~madan once ogrenilir. Genellikle daha dogru tek bir ciimle kuramazken bir~ok ~eyi anlanz. Bazt ki~iler ~ekingen olduklan i~in yazth olarak kendilerini kusursuz ifade edebildikleri halde, sozlii olarak yapamazlar. Az saytda dil ogrenmeye yatkm ki~ilerin yam stra, ~ekingen ve i~ine kapamk ~ok saytda insan vardtr. Bir dili ogrenebilmek i~in daha fazla zamana ve yeterince anadili konu~an ki~ilerle birlikte olmak gerekir. Tiirkiye'de yabanct dil ogrenen bir ki~i Almanca'yt sadece derste duyma ~ansma sahiptir. Almanca ogrenen bir ki~i her giin Almanca'yt kullanmast gereken durumlarla kar~t kar~tya kalacagt i~in, Almanca'yt Almanya'da daha iyi ve daha ~abuk ogrenebilir. Almanlarla kurulan arkada~hklar sosyal entegrasyonu geli~tirmeye yarar.

Entegrasyon kurslan ve smavlan Goethe Enstitiileri'nde yaptlmaktadtr. Fakat Goethe Enstitiileri sadece Ankara, izmir ve istanbul'da olugu i~in kursa kattlan bazt ki~?iler bu durumdan magdur olmakta ve hatta bir de kalacak yer i~in masraf yapmak zorundadtrlar. Okur yazar olmadtgt i~in, kursu halihaztrda sunuldugu ~ekliyle takip edip ba~anyla tamamlayamayacak durumda ki~iler de bu durumdan magdurdur. Biitiin insanlann aile birle~imi hakkt vardu. Alman vatanda~?hgma ge~mek istendiginde Almanca'nm ~art ko~?ulmast anla~?tlabilir bir durumdur, ancak aile birle~imi i~in kabul edilemez. Aile birliginin korunmast her ~eyden daha onemlidir. Ba~?ka hangi kurulu~lann smav yapma hakkma sahip oldugu tam olarak belirlenmemi~tir. "Goethe Enstitiisii'niin dil sertifikast vize i~?lemi i~in gerekli olan Almanca'nm onaylanmasmt otomatik olarak saglamaz. Vize ba~vurusu hakkmdaki karar sadece vize merciindedir. Dil sertifikasmm dogrulugu; bazt ~iiphe uyanduan durumlarda ba~vuru sahibinin Almanca bilgisinin makul ve giincel olup olmadtgt kontrol edilir." (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 2008).

ileri ya~taki yabanct dil ediniminde dogru motivasyon son derece onemlidir. insanlar baskt altma ahnarak motive edilemez. Almanca ve Tiirkce'nin yapt itibariyle birbirinden cok farkh diller olmast dil edinimini aynca zorla~ttrmaktadtr.

"30 seneden beri Alman toplumunda problemsiz olarak ya~?ayan, fakat B 1 seviyesinde dil ~artmt yerine getirmemi~ yabanct i~?~iler var" (Maas, 2005: 122). Utz Maas'a gore A2 seviyesine uzun siiren ikametgahm sonunda zaten eri~ilmektedir. Hollanda'da sistematik olarak yaptlan ara~?ttrmalara gore, 600 saat ders gorse bile katthmctlann %20si A

AVRUPA ARAl?TIRMALARI DERGISI 33

seviyesinin iistiine ((tkamamaktadtrlar. (Maas, 2005: 120-121) Esser'e gore "dil ve entegrasyon kurs1annm etkisi hakkmda ~u ana kadar uygun ampirik ((ah~ma yoktur" (Esser, 2006: 543).

Aynca soz konusu dil sertifikasmm ibrazt iistiin vastfh ki~ilerin, ara~ttrmactlann, ~irket kuran ki~ilerin ve Avustralya, israil, Japonya, Kanada, Kore Cumhuriyeti, Y eni Zelanda veya Amerika Birle~ik Devletleri vatanda~larmm e~lerinden istenmiyor olmast bu diizenlemelerin nedeninin siyasi oldugunu gostermektedir. Bu kanun hedef kitlenin biiyiik ((ogunlugunu Alman vatanda~hgma ge((mi~ yabanctlar (Tiirkler) olu~turdugu i((in, Almanlar i((in de ge((erlidir. Ama9 bu ~ekilde Almanya'ya daha fazla tiirkiin gelmesini engellemektir. Peki dil smavmt ba~aramayan, fakat evli olan ki~iler ne yapacaklar? Bo~anmahlar mt yoksa bundan sonra dil smavt evlilik i((in onko~ul haline mi gelecek? Beklide ama(( Almanya' da ya~ayan e~leri Tiirkiye'ye donmeye te~vik etmektir. 2002 ythnda Berlin Senatosu'nun yabanctlar sorumlusunun Berlinli Tiirk1erin ya~am durumu hakkmda yaptlgt anket sonu((lanna gore; Berlin'de ya~ayan Tiirklerin %3 dil ve entegrasyon kurslanna kar~t ve %95i kurslara olumlu baktyor (T.C. Berlin Biiyiikel((iligi 2002, 18). Bu yurt dt~ma ((tkan bir ki~inin gittigi yere uyum saglamak zorunda oldugunu bildigini ve kabul ettigini gosterir. Bu nedenle insanlan bu kurslan Tiirkiye'de ba~armaya zorlamamak gerekir. Vize ba~vurusunda bulunan bir ki~i hence entegrasyonu kabul ettigine dair iyi niyetini gostermi~tir ve bu davram~t da vize i((in yeterli olmahdtr. Go(( ekonomik biiyiimeyi tetikler ve ((Ok kiiltiirliiliik bir ftrsat olarak goriilmeli avantaja donii~tiiriilmelidir.


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Berlin Bliylikelc;iligi (2002). TC. Berlin Bliylikelc;iligi. Eri~im: 23.9.2007 www.tcberlin.be/de/archiv/2002/ALkitap2002.pdf

Bongaerts, Theo (1999). Ultimate Attainment in L2 Pronunciation; The case of Very Advanced Late L2 Learners, in: Birdsong, David (Hg.), Second language Aquisation and the Critical Period Hypothesis, Mahwah, NJ/London, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, S.133-159, (Esser, Hartmut'a gore).

Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2008). Visa Merkblaetter. Eri~im: 1 0.1.2008, www.istanbul.diplo.deNertretung/Istanbul/de/ 04Nisa-Merkblaetter/Merkblatt F2F Nachweis Deutschkenntnisse - - -_ Ehegattennachzug_ DD,property=Daten.pdf

Bundesamt fiir Migration und Fllichtlinge (2007). Eri~im: 3.11.2007, http://www .integration-in-deutschland.de

Cillia, Rudolf (2005). Spracherwerb in der Migration. Informationsbliitter des Referats fiir interkulturelles Lemen Nr. 3/2005. Eri~im: 14.12.2007, http//:www.bmukk.gv.at/medienpooV4423/nr3 2005.doc

Esser, Hartmut (2006). Sprache und Integration. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag

Franz, Marielle (2006). Familienzusammenfiihrung in der Einwanderungspolitik der Europiiischen Union. Rechtsfragen aus dem Eurpa- und Volkerrecht, IMIS Beitriige, Universitiit Osnabrock, cilt 30, 45-69, Eri~im: 2.10.2007, www.imis.uni-osnabrlick.de

Hailbronner, Kay (2006). Asyl- und Ausliinderrecht. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer

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MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES • Volume 16 • No: 1-2 • 2008 37

THE APPLICATION OF NEO(NEO)FUNCTIONALIST THEORY TO JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

Catherine Macmillan*

Abstract: This paper attempts a neofunctionalist appraisal of the development of Justice and Home Affairs, which has been one of the most dynamic EU policy areas in recent years. It argues that neofimctionalism can explain the increasing supranationalisation of this policy area despite the fact that internal security has traditionally been conceived as an integral part of national sovereignty.

Keywords: JHA, Neo.functionalism, Spillover

Ozet: Bu makalenin amacz, son yzllarda AB 'nin en dinamik alanlarmdan olan Adalet ve i9i~lerinde i~birligi ile ilgili geli~meleri Yeni i#evseci yakla~zmz kullanarak 96ziimlemektir. k giivenlik konularz ulus devletin egemenligin ayrzlmaz bir unsuru olarak goriilmektedir. Makale, buna ragmen Adalet ve i9i#erinde i~birligi alamndaki geli~en uluslariistii yapzya ge9i~i Yeni i~levselci yakla~zmm apklayabilecegini savunmaktadzr.

Anahtar Kelimeleri: Adalet ve ki#erinde i~birligi, Yeni i#evselcilik, yayzlma

1. Introduction

Justice and Home Affairs has been one of the fastest-growing policy areas in the EU in recent years. From its humble roots in the Trevi agreement of the 1970s, JHA is now at the forefront of EU activity. Moreover, JHA has become considerably supranationalised since the Maastricht Treaty, when decision-making was largely intergovernmental. This is almost astonishing when it is taken into consideration that, for centuries, internal security and border policies were considered to be an essential part of a nation state's sovereignty (Monar, 2005: 1). Explaining the Member States' agreement, and sometimes enthusiasm, to hand over large amounts of sovereignty to the EU in an area that was considered 'high

• Dr., Yeditepe University Department ofEnglish Language and Literature

38 APPLICATION OF NEO(NEO)FUNCTIONALIST THEORY TO JHA

politics' until recently has therefore been a challenge for many students of European integration.

2. A Quick Overview of Neofunctionalist Theory

2.1. The Concept of Spillover

Although based on Mitrany's functionalism, according to which interest shifts automatically from the national to the supranational arena, neofunctionalism argues that this process requires a certain amount of political action. This may be in response to a crisis in the integration process, which national actors seek to resolve by spillover, or co-operation in new policy areas (Schmitter, 2002: 15). In neofunctionalism, then, the default outcome for integration between states in order to solve a common problem does not involve either a loss of state sovereignty or task expansion. This outcome, known as encapsulation, can be seen, for instance, in many international organisations, which remain strictly intergovernmental in nature (Schmitter, 2002: 15).

For this reason, then, according to neofunctionalism, certain background conditions are required for integration to break out of its capsule, such as shared basic values, a certain degree of homogenity in levels of political, social and economic development, a network of transactions, comparable decision-making processes and compatibility of expectations (Groom, 1994: 114). Moreover, neofunctionalism argues that it is important that the tasks assigned to the organisation are inherently expansive, as only in this way can spillover occur (Lindberg, 1994: 107).

There must also be a shared belief that integration will lead to an increased satisfaction of needs and a belief at both mass and elite level that problems can be solved in a mutually acceptable way (Groom, 1994: 114). Haas argued that spillover could occur if mass support was knowledgeable, and therefore supportive of, the benefits of integration, while national elites would support integration if they considered that it would serve their own best interest. This concept was later refined to suggest that the perceptions of the benefits, and of low costs, of integration were important, while the perception of an external threat could also be influential (Moxon-Browne, 2003: 93).

If intergovernmental co-operation were to prove ineffective, and these background conditions were fulfilled, then, the members concerned may

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES 39

decide to opt for new strategies re-evaluating both the level and scope of cooperation and perhaps even adopting a new set of objectives, i.e. moving from economic to political integration (Bainbridge, 2001: 299).

Therefore, in common with functionalism, neofunctionalism predicts that, provided that these background conditions are fulfilled, co-operation in one area will produce a spillover effect resulting in co-operation in related areas. It differs from functionalism, however, in that according to neofunctionalism, spillover, as well as being 'semi-automatic', may also be 'manually operated', as interest groups within Member States push for further integration. This spillover can be divided into three different types as follows:

Functional spillover: Projects of integration engender new problems which, in tum, can only be solved by further integration (TranholmMikkelsen, 1991 : 4-6). While this was originally conceived as taking place in the area of economics, economic integration may foster not only deeper economic integration but may, eventually result in political integration, as deeper economic integration would require a degree of supranational regulation (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991: 60).

However, according to neo-neo functionalism, perhaps the most recent 'incarnation' of neo-functionalism, and other newer versions of neofunctionalism such a process may also be set in motion as a reaction to tensions in the global environment as well as previous integration projects, providing that the background conditions discussed earlier are suitably fulfilled (Schmitter, 2002: 32-33).

Political spillover: This occurs when elites (both governmental, such as bureacracies and non-governmental, such as trades unions or leaders of political parties) begin to percieve that their interests may be better served by supranational institutions than by their nation states and, consequently, refocus their activities towards these institutions (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991: 4-6). As a result, as the integration process develops, national actors appear to be less of a homogenous unit with a single integrative or disintegrative strategy, and seem to become fragmented into various negotiating units (Schmitter, 2002: 35) which may hold different positions during any integration crisis. Thus, the various governmental and nongovernmental national elites become actors in their own right at the EU


level, and may support integration strategies different from those upheld by their government.

Political spillover is also promoted by the complex system of engrenage which has taken place between national and EU bureacracies, and which is difficult for national governments to control (Groom, 1994: 4-6). Moreover, as nationally based interest groups realise that their interests are beter served by Brussels, they also begin to lobby their governments accordingly. The net result would be an increase in support for integration on the part of national political systems (Rosamond, 2000: 59).

Although it has generally been assumed that political spillover was an exclusively elite phenonemon, it has more recently been suggested that public opinion may also play an important role in moving integration 'along the continuum from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism'. While it has long been taken for granted that policy making at EU level takes place behind closed doors, and that public opinion, due to the democratic deficit, therefore has little impact, recent research has shown that elite and public opinion may show less divergence than was previously assumed (Lahav, 2004: 11-17).

Support for integration at mass level, however, appears to be most closely linked to perceptions of the effects of integration rather than objective conditions as pulic opinion may be distorted by political elites' attempts to gain credit and apportion blame for these developments (Marsh, 1999: 198). For this reason then, public opinion, although it has generally not been taken into consideration by European integration studies until recently, will also be taken into account in this evaluation.

In addition, political spillover may be centred on the other supranational institutions apart from the Commission. NGOs, for instance, may focus their lobbying on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Parliament (EP) as well as the Commission. This has been particularly emphasised by Schmitter's neo-neofunctionalism. While traditional neofunctionalists consider that the finalite politique of neofunctionalist spillover is a federal state, Schmitter, for instance, argues that this is not necessarily so, and that the end result may instead be a regional organisation dominated by multilevel and poly-centric governance (2002: 39).

The ECJ appears to be particularly important in this regard. As Mattli and Slaughter point out, 'Pressure groups have made use of greater rights


under Community law than under national legal rules to play a significant part in the development of substantive Community law, particularly in employment law and gender equality' (1996). Lobbying aimed at the EP, on the other hand, is usually carried out in areas where the EP has the right of co-decision, and therefore an effective veto (Wessels, 1999: 1 09).

Cultivated spillover: Neofunctionalism supposes that, over time, supranational institutions are likely to develop an increasingly independent identity, with ideas of their own that cannot simply be reduced to the preferences of a single national or subnational group. Therefore, supranational institutions themselves may seek to encourage further integration (and meanwhile strengthen their own power-base) by encouraging co-operation in areas which are perceived to have a common interest. They may do this by cultivating functional or political spillover or by cultivating integration more generally (Schmitter, 2005: 260).

Haas suggested that, while intergovernmental bargaining rarely went beyond a 'lowest common denominator' solution, the presence of an intermediary, such as the Commission, may result in 'upgrading the common interest' and, consequently in further integration (Groom, 1994: 4-6). However, it should be emphasised here that, while most cultivated spillover may be centred on the Commission, the role of the ECJ in this regard has been frequently underestimated. In reality, it favours integration as well as ruling on the basis of legal arguments (Stroby-Jensen, 2003: 87). Therefore, and, due to the primacy of EC law and the ECJ' s frequently 'imaginative interpretations of specific treaty provisions', it has also had a significant influence in shaping policies (Schmitter, 2002: 12).

The EP is also expected, according to neofunctionalism, to have a supranational orientation and to develop loyalties to the EU which often override national interests (Stroby-Jensen, 2003: 87). According to Lahav's survey of MEPs this appears to be true, although she points out that while MEPs are generally pro-integration, they differ in the amount and speed of integration that they support (Lahav, 2004: 165).

Moreover, although it can be argued that the power of the EP to cultivate spillover was severely curtailed until recent years by its lack of a decisionmaking role, the gradual introduction of co-decision since the Maastricht Treaty has given it new opportunities for action. In addition, despite the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU public appears to continue to


demand more transparency and democracy in decision-making, making it likely that the EP will become even more of a key player in the years to come.

2.2 Not Just Integration: Counterveiling Forces in Neofunctionalism

Early proponents of neofunctionalism such as Haas and Lindberg assumed there was no going back once the process of spillover had been initiated, and, moreover, that the process was bound to gain momentum. They certainly saw little evidence, in the early days of the European Communities, that the system was in any danger of collapse (Rosamond, 2000: 63). By early 1965, then, prior to the De Gaulle's Empty Chair Crisis, developments in the EC seemed to bear out the neofunctionalist hypothesis. Indeed, Haas was able to state that the EC had 'come close to voiding the power of the national state in all realms other than defence, education and foreign policy'(Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 36).

The stagnation in integration that began with the 'Empty Chair Crisis' and continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s provoked a crisis in neofunctionalism, with even Haas himself describing the theory as 'obsolete'. It became clear, as a consequence of the 'Empty Chair Crisis' and the resulting Luxembourg Compromise, that governments could, and in some cases would, try to stop further attempts at integration. Although it was premature to announce the demise of neofunctionalism, at this point the theory did lose some credibility, and it was significantly reworked as neofunctionalist scholars realised that they had underestimated the role of nationalism in defining European integration. One of the most important concepts to come out of these studies was that of 'spill back', a retreat of integration either at sectoral, or institutional level, or both (Rosamond, 2000: 64-65).

Niemann (2006: 13) suggests that spillback may result from three basic counterveiling forces to integration. Spillover may be stalled by leaders, such as De Gaulle and Thatcher, who are especially wary of handing over sovereignty to supranational institutions. Such an attitude may be cultivated, or it may result from national traditions and identities.

In addition, governments may be constrained by domestic groups, including lobby groups, opposition parties, the media or public opinion, as well as by structural limitations. As this may prevent the government in question, even if it is itself pro-integration, from rising above a certain


common-denominator, this may have a negative effect on integration (Niemann, 2006: 13).

Finally, diversity may have a negative effect on integration as common positions or policies may require one or more MS to depart from deeplyrooted structures, customs or policies. Such diversity is, of course, reinforced through the enlargement process (Niemann, 2006: 13-14).

As well as spillback, another alternative reaction to spillover was that of 'muddle-about', in which actors try to maintain their integration without institutional changes. Other possible outcomes include 'spill-around', the proliferation of functionally specialised, independent but strictly intergovernmental bodies and 'build-up', the granting, by MS, of greater authority to a regional organisation without expanding its mandate (Schmitter, 2002: 32).

Indeed, some later neofunctionalists such as Schmitter argue that spillover is fairly unlikely to result from a crisis in integration. According to this view, such a crisis is far more likely to result in encapsulation, or an intergovernmental solution, although the chances of spillover increase according to the previous level of integration of the regional organisation. Only if the background conditions are fulfilled and encapsulation fails to address the problem will other solutions (one of which may be spillover) be sought (Schmitter, 2002: 32).

However, with hindsight, it can be argued that neofunctionalism has actually been enriched by this challenge. As Schmitter points out;

Any comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a theory of disintegration: it should not only explain why countries decide to co-ordinate their efforts across a wider range of tasks and delegate more authority to common institutions, but also why they do not do so or why, having done so, they try to defect from such arrangements (2002: I).

3.A Neofunctionalist Analysis of Justice and Home Affairs

3.1 Functional Spillover

According to neofunctionalist theory, functional spillover may occur when earlier integration initiatives have knock-on effects which also need to be tackled at the level of the regional organisation. In the case of JHA, then, when searching for functional spillover, the first step would be to examine if


the development of such policies at EU level could be explained as a consequence of earlier EC/EU initiatives. Indeed, it can be argued that, to a certain extent, the development of the EU's border policies is a direct result of earlier EC/EU integration policies such as the Single Market and the Schengen agreement. The decision to dismantle internal borders in the Schengen area can be viewed as an extension of the logic of the free movement of people, an inherent part of the concept of the Single Market (Walker, 2004: 19).

Meanwhile, particularly in the more unstable atmosphere following the collapse of Communism to the EU's East, it was thought necessary to compensate for the dismantling of internal borders with increased vigilance at the external borders, resulting in the creation of over 20 new intergovernmental bodies dealing with JHA issues between 1986-1991. Moreover, it was argued that despite the completion of the Single Market, it was still difficult for businesses and individuals to gain access to adequate judicial representation in other Member States (Monar, 2000: 755).

This situation meant that governments were increasingly affected by each others' decisions relating to immigration and border controls, and were therefore ready to co-operate in an area which had traditionally been seen as 'high politics'. While the earliest attempts at co-operation were largely intergovernmental in nature, governments were gradually forced to acknowledge that effective decision-making in this area needed a more supranational approach.

On the one hand, the absence of the Commission as an independent agenda-setter meant that governments themselves had to come up with legislative proposals, which often promoted the narrow national interests of the governments concerned. On the other, it was becoming clear that the use of unanimity was hampering decision-making in an area where decisions often need to be taken quickly (Hix, 1999: 323). Moreover, there was, and still is often infighting between government ministries, particularly foreign affairs and interior ministries, which made, even for a single Member State government, arriving at a coherent position on JHA issues difficult at times (Guiraudon, 2001: ). In addition, Member States, particularly those participating in the Schengen Agreement, now recognised that they were affected by each other's choices regarding refugee, immigration and policing policies and therefore had an interest in developing a more supranational regime in order to avoid 'the pitfalls of collective action


problems' (Lahav, 2004: 50). This, then, partly explains the willingness of the European Council at Amsterdam and, later, in the negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty to accept an increasing communitarisation of JHA.

Moreover, a rather more cynical view is the 'Europe to the Rescue', or what may also be dubbed the 'Blame it on Brussels' approach. According to this concept, Member States governments are eager to hand controversial or contentious policies, such as migration or asylum policy in particular, to the EU in order to escape attacks by their domestic adversaries or the general public (Lahav, 2004: 49). ·

However, other seemingly unlinked, policies have also resulted in functional spillover to JHA. An example is the introduction of the Euro, which resulted in Europol being granted more responsibility for tackling counterfeiting. In addition, the 1999 Helsinki summit's decision to speed up the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force also spilled over into JHA as civilian police units were to carry out some of the Petersberg tasks relating to peacekeeping and nation-building (Occhipinti, 2004: 187)

3.2 Political Spillover

If we were to find evidence of political spillover in the development of JHA, we would expect to find national elites, perhaps pushed to a degree by pressure from the general public, looking increasingly towards EU supranational institutions, rather than to their nation state, for leadership in this area.

This, in general, seems indeed to be the case. On the one hand, it is apparent that, since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant change of voters' attitudes towards JHA. Whereas before it was largely viewed as a high-politics issue which should be left in the hands of the Member States, since around the time of the Amsterdam IGC JHA has been percieved as an area in which the EU should take further action. This is borne out by a Spring 1996 Eurobarometer report in which free movement of persons and internal security were high on the list of respondents' demands for more EU action (Hix, 1999: 323-324).

A more recent series of questionnaires carried out for Eurobarometer on the subject of JHA also backs up the idea that there is significant public support for integration in this area as opposed to other policy fields. Moreover, this support is extended both to the immigration and asylum


policies and to co-operation in police and judicial affairs, with an overall approval rating of between 56% and 90% according to the question (Eurobarometer, 2004: 5-34).

However, it has also been argued that sectors of the European public have been critical of the increasing secrecy and unaccountability which characterised JHA co-operation, at least up until the Amsterdam Treaty. As a result, and in tandem with institutions such as the EP, public dissatisfaction with the opaque nature of decision-making in JHA led to pressure for the creation of the AFSJ, which was supposed to be based on the principles of democracy and transparency (Eder and Trenz, 2003: 112-113). In this case, therefore, public opinion appears to have contributed directly to spillover in this area.

Pushed therefore either by public opinion or other motives, various actors have been attracted to increased EU co-operation or integration in JHA. As Guiraudon points out regarding immigration policy, however, the actors involved and the policy outcomes they support are disparate:

In this motley crew, we find law and order officials from Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs ministries, international NGOs, activists and Commission fonctionnaires from different directorates. Although each in its own way came to believe that immigration policy should become 'Europeanized', they exploited different venues and policy frames resulting in a set of policy instruments involving varying degrees of supranationalization or decision-making rules (2001: 4).

The first group of actors to 'go transnational' were law and order officials in charge of border and migration control, who tended to favour migration control over positive migration or integration strategies. Guiraudon argues that, finding themselves increasingly constrained at national level due to an increase in pro-migrant legislation during the 1980s, they began to seek new policy venues, namely the Schengen agreement and the early 1990s transgovemmental agreements on immigration and asylum (2001: 8-9).

It has also been argued that the threat posed to interior and justice ministries by the relaxation of border controls as part of the Single Market programme also played a part in their switching attention to the European level. Faced, therefore, with a loss of resources and revenue from customs duties, interior and justice ministers across the EU produced reports arguing


that there was a major danger of cross-border crime as a result of the Single Market1

• These scaremongering reports were designed to frighten politicians into granting more resources to their ministries (Hix, 1999: 325).

Meanwhile, Guiraudon suggests that the decision to 'supranationalise' large sectors of JHA in the Amsterdam Treaty was actually partly due to 'revenge' against the Justice and Interior ministries on the part of Foreign Affairs ministries which are, of course, responsible for negotiating treaty revisions ( Guiraudon, 2001: 11 ). That is, there is evidence of competition between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and those of Justice or the Interior for influence at the European level.

As an aside, it is interesting that this is exactly what Schmitter's neo-neo functionalisn predicts will happen once the EU has entered a 'transformation cycle', or the final stages of integration. In Schmitter's own words:

A new regional change process could well emerge. Let us call it the Domestic Status Effect. The redefined scope/level of regional institutions will tend to affect relative status and influence in the domestic politics of its member states. Ministries, autonomous agencies, associations and parties that have 'gotten in on' the earlier rounds of regional decision-making will have acquired more resources (proportion of the budget, regulatory capacity, international status, votes, etc.). This should cause other national institutions to try to 'get in on ' the operation, although not necessarily in support of it (Schmitter, 2002: 35).

Moreover, as Geddes points out, iterative interaction, or a 'wining and dining culture' at a European level can affect the prefererences and identities of actors, both ministers and officials, who take part in EU level policy forums. In addition, in cases where actors, particularly judges and bureaucrats, are shielded from direct electoral pressure by the EU's 'democratic deficit', this may offer scope for more liberal outcomes, emphasising migrants' rights rather than immigration control (Geddes, 2003: 4-5).

At the same time, perhaps as a reaction to the increasingly restrictive development of migration policy at European level, both national and

1 In fact, according to statistical evidence, there has only been a moderate increase of international crime and the movement of persons as a result of the Single Market.


Brussels- based NGOs have also been active in lobbying for more supranational policy making in the areas of migration and internal security. Their argument is that intergovernmental decision-making is often secretive, and that this implies a lack of parliamentary and judicial control (Hix, 1999: 328-329), in other words a 'democratic deficit'.

Pro-migrant NGOs, such as the Migrants' Forum, Migration Policy Group and Starting Line have been particularly active at EU level. These organisations, which are relatively weak at national level due to the fact that public opinion across the EU tends to be anti-immigration, have increasingly turned towards the European Commission and ECJ, where, arguably, decision-makers are still relatively shielded from public opinion due to the democratic deficit. In this way, these NGOs aim to use the example of the EU, with the power and authority associated with it, to challenge national ways of dealing with immigrants (Geddes, 2003: 8-9).

Moreover, developments in the EU acquis can also help to account for the increase in lobbying at EU level on the part of these organisations. Firstly, with the Maastricht Treaty's granting of rights to EU citizens, it can be argued that the gap between EU citizens and resident Third Country Nationals (TCNs), who were not granted EU citizenship, has widened. Secondly, these groups have used the EU's 'war on social exclusion' to lobby for more rights for migrants, arguing that TCNs are among its prime victims ( Guiradon, 2001: 18-19).

In addition, it can be argued that political spillover has been centred on the ECJ as well as the Commission. As has already been pointed out, Mattli and Slaughter have suggested that NGOs tend to influence EC legislation by taking advantage of comparatively greater rights at EU than at national level (1996). Luedtke has argued that this is what has happened regarding TCNs. As some TCNs have been granted the right of free movement as a consequence of being married to an EU national, working for an EU firm or because of association agreements, NGOs have argued that it is unsustainable to exclude other TCNs from this right (2005).

In conclusion, then, there has been considerable political spillover in the area of JHA, with the general public, officials and lobbies increasingly acting, and calling for more action, at European level. However, while there is almost unanimous support among these groups for more action at EU level, there is disagreement on the nature of the kind of action to be taken.


While the general public and law and order officials are calling for a security-oriented, restrictive border policy, officials more shielded from electoral pressure, as well as NGOs, tend to support more liberal policy outcomes focusing on migrants' rights.

3.3 Cultivated Spillover

Finally, the development of JHA also shows some evidence of cultivated spillover. Despite the fact that it was almost excluded from JHA according to the Maastricht arrangements, the Commission has consistently lobbied for more power in this policy area. It has done this largely by aiming to persuade governments to delegate the right of initiative to it by consistently coming up with policy proposals and ideas. Moreover, the Commission sucessfully put pressure on Member States to give it more powers by arguing that its lack of an agenda-setting role was a major contributor to the lack of progress in this area (Hix, 1999: 327-38).

An example of this is the Commission's proposals regarding the reform of the JHA pillar, presented to the Amsterdam IGC. In these, it particularly criticised the use of unanimity in JHA decision-making, arguing that this was slow and cumbersome. Moreover, it argued that the limitations on the Commission's right of initiative made it reluctant to use it, thereby further slowing policy development. Therefore, it advocated qualified majority voting (QMV) and an exclusive right of initiative for the Commission in order to speed up policy-making progress while, of course, giving the Commission itself a more active constitutional role in JHA (U~arer, 2001: 9).

The result of this is that the constitutional powers of the Commission as an agenda-setter in JHA have gradually increased. Starting from practically no involvement at all in the Trevi group or the intergovernmental agreements on asylum in the early 1990s, it progressed to a shared right of initiative in the Maastricht Treaty, to sole right of initiative today. As expected, the Commission has generally shown a more pro-integration stance in this area than the Member States themselves, with, so far, only relatively few of the Commission's proposals being translated into law (Apap and Carrera, 2003: 8).

In addition to its formal agenda-setting powers, the Commission has also been adept at using its informal agenda-setting powers, defined by Geddes as including the highlighting of problems, advancing proposals, and


identifying the possible material benefits of integration. Moreover, the Commission's capacities as an informal agenda setter have gradually increased as its institutional ability to deal with JHA have increased, particularly with the creation ofthe JHA DG (U<;arer, 2001: 9).

An example of informal agenda-setting is the Commission's emphasis, even in the post-September 11 atmosphere of increased securitisation of immigration, on co-ordination of labour migration rules between Member States, and on the development and co-ordination of integration policies for immigrants. This is reflected, for instance, in its 2003 communication on immigration, social policies and integration (Moraes, 2003: 124-127).

In this context, the Commission has argued, with some reason, that it has taken both a longer-term and a wider view of migration policy and has paid more attention to maintaining human rights standards in this area. This is despite the fact that, from the point of view of most national governments and the majority of the European public, preventing illegal immigration has been seen as much more of a priority, particularly since September 11, as could be seen in the 2002 Seville Council.

In addition, the Commission has sought, arguing that common problems need Europe-wide solutions, to 'advertise' itself as the co-ordinator for national action plans for 'positive' migration, including the management of migration flows, admission of economic migrants, partnerships with third countries and the integration of TCNs. This can be seen, for example, in its proposal to co-ordinate migration policies made in its July 2001 communication. In this way, then, the Commission can be seen to attempt to increase its power in this area by offering its services as an information store and co-ordinator (Geddes, 2000: 7).

The Commission has also aimed to increase its influence in JHA by funding national and sub-national lobby groups representing migrants, and thereby adding to them a European, supranational dimension. For instance, during the period 1991-1993, when the Maastricht Treaty had not yet been signed and European immigration and asylum co-operation was, in theory, entirely intergovernmental, the European Commission was already funding 500 such projects (Geddes, 2000: 143-144).

In addition, the Commission's activism in JHA has not been limited to migration and asylum policies. The Commission has also pushed for a certain amount of supranationalisation in police co-operation, an area that,


due to the association of the use of force with national sovereignty, is still very much intergovernmental in nature. In a 2002 communication, for instance, the Commission argues that a common framework for both interational police and judicial co-operation is necessary. Moreover, although it considers that co-operation between national police forces is sufficient to reach most of the goals, it points out that the issue of the democratic and judicial control of Europol must also be resolved (Fijnaut, 2004: 278). In this case, then, although it uses a rather diplomatic language which appears to support the idea that police co-operation should remain intergovernmental in nature, the Commission actually appears to be arguing here for a certain amount of supranationalisation of police co-operation. By suggesting that co-operation between national police forces is enough to achieve most goals, it is also hinting that it is not sufficient to reach all of them. As well as this, by bringing up the issue of democratic and judicial control of Europol, it seems to be advocating the involvement of the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament.

However, although the Commission has been the most active of all the supranational institutions in this field, there is also evidence for some limited cultivated spillover on the part of the Court of Justice. This is despite the fact that the Member States specifically did not grant the ECJ jurisdiction in JHA. As Mattli and Slaughter point out, there are two ways in which Community law can penetrate into the domestic law of the MS. The first of these, known as formal penetration, involves the expansion of areas covered by supranational jurisdiction. The second results from the spillover of Community legal regulation from the economic domain to social and political issues (Luedtke, 2005).

As has already been mentioned, the ECJ still has relatively little formal power in the area of JHA, although it was granted a limited jurisdiction in the Amsterdam Treaty. Firstly, the ECJ does not have direct effect in matters relating to TCNs. Secondly, the ECJ was also denied jurisdiction in all areas of border control relating to internal security and law and order, although the ECJ can define what fits these criteria itself After the Amsterdam Treaty the ECJ was given jurisdiction when national courts of 'final instance' requested rulings2

, althugh this still implies a limited role.

2 This is not, however, equivalent to direct effect, according to which any national court can request an ECJ ruling.


Despite the limitations of the ECJ' s formal role in JHA, Luedtke argues that the institution has managed to gain some power to legislate over TCN immigrants due to its jurisdiction over free movement of workers. This is, then, spillover from the economic domain to social and political issues. As Luedtke points out, 'If we can find evidence of the Court making use of this role to eventually grant TCNs free movement rights against the wishes of national politicians, then we can say that spillover ... has occurred' (2004: 10-11).

Firstly, according to the ECJ, TCN family members of EU nationals are entitled to the same residence, work and welfare rights as EU citizens. Moreover, the ECJ may interpret 'spouse' to include same-sex partners, in which case free-movement rights could be extended to TCN same-sex partners of EU citizens, which is explicitly against the wish of many MS (Luedtke, 2004: 16-17).

Secondly, the ECJ has ruled in the 1990 Rush-Portugesa case that TCN employees of EU companies cannot be refused entry to another EU Member State on the grounds that immigration from non-EU states is a matter of national sovereignty. In this way, then, TCNs gain free-movement rights if they are employed by an EU firm. Moreover, in addition to using its capacity to legislate on the Single Market in order to grant TCNs freemovement rights, the ECJ has also used, in some cases, association agreements to grant TCNs the rights to free movement and social entitlements (Luedtke, 2004: 14 ). Moreover, although these rulings on the part of the ECJ seem to have a very limited effect as they only apply to a relatively small proportion of TCNs, their actual consequence may be greater. This is because pro-migrant NGOs are arguing that it is untenable to extend rights of free movement to one group of TCNs while excluding the rest.

Finally, there has also been some evidence of cultivated spillover on the part of the EP in the area of JHA. Neofunctionalist theory expects the EP to be a supranationally oriented institution, in favour of European integration (Stroby Jensen, 2003: 87). The EP, then, has generally been in favour of increased supranationalisation of immigration and asylum policies and of less restrictive policies. It can therefore be seen to be a natural ally of the other supranational institutions, most notably the Commission, and lobby groups in aiming towards this goal (Geddes, 2003: 143). However, due to its relatively limited official powers in JHA, the EP has mainly been active in


putting pressure on national governments and other EU institutions to act in this area. This is not to say that the EP has not sought greater power for itself in this area. The EP has continuously argued that there was a democratic deficit in this policy domain as decision-makers were no longer accountable to national parliaments, and that, in consequence, more powers of scrutiny should be granted to the EP. However, at the 1996 IGC Reflection Group, the EP pursued a 'minimalist' strategy, arguing that it should have the right of consultation (rather than co-decision). This, in tum, was accepted by the Member States due to the limited nature of the demand and the percieved reduction in the democratic deficit that this would bring (Hix, 1999: 328).

Like the Commission and the ECJ, the EP has also been critical of intergovernmental asylum and immigration policies for their restrictive, 'lowest common denominator' nature, and has therefore called for more supranationalisation of this policy area. The EP has been particularly critical of Commission initiatives being subject to long delays in the Council of Ministers, or being watered down or even completely abandoned by the Commission itself in the belief that they would not otherwise receive unanimous approval (Geddes, 2003: 41-42). Moreover, it has particularly been concerned with fighting racism and xenophobia, and has encouraged the Commission to produce proposals to this end (Geddes, 2003: 142-143). In fact, since the 1970s, the EP has itself produced reports promoting integration, social policies and rights for resident migrants, and highlighting the need to fight racism and racial discrimination. The EP has also, due to its budgetary powers, been able to fund initiatives such as the 'European Year against Racism' (Lahav, 2004: 63-65).

Based on the concern about racism and xenophobia in evidence at the 1994 Corfu Council, and the report of the Kahn Comission which proposed binding legislation to combat racism and xenophobia, the EP argued that the Maastricht Treaty should be amended to deal with racial discrimination. The EP's lobbying, along with pressure from the Commission, finally ensured that a clause allowing action against discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic group as well as gender was included in the Amsterdam Treaty (Geddes, 2003: 14-143).


4. Conclusions

Although 'real live neo-functionalists may [now] be an endangered species', neo-functionalism has proved to be a surprisingly resilient theory considering the dramatic changes and crises that the EC/EU has undergone since the early days of neofunctionalism and has influenced many other, newer theories of European integration (Schmitter, 2002: 18). It can thus be argued that, despite the words of Ernst Haas, the theory as such has never become completely obsolecent even in its most unpopular hours, namely during the stagnation period of the 1970s and, perhaps, the present day.

As this paper has aimed to show, the development of JHA appears to fit fairly well into the neofunctionalist framework, with examples of functional, political and cultivated spillover. Functional spillover in this area principally resulted from the Schengen agreement and the Single Market Project. Political spillover occured due to a combination of competition between national officials, engrenage, public opinion and pressure from pro-migrant and business NGOs. Finally, cultivated spillover originated principally from the Commission, but also from the Court of Justice and the European Parliament.

However, counterveiling forces have also been at work in the development of JHA. Firstly, there has been considerable diversity among the national policies in the areas covered by JHA resulting in some difficulties in harmonisation of and co-operation in these policies. Moreover, pressure from nationalist oriented leaders and/or public opinion in some Member States has led to instances of 'enhanced co-operation, resulting in JHA being often cited as an example of 'Europe a la carte'. It has become even more so following the recent Lisbon Treaty, in which the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Poland were granted new opt-outs, in particular in the areas of police and criminal judicial co-operation (Peers, 2007: 2) (Carrera and Geyer, 2007: 4). However, while such a situation is problematic from the point of view of neofunctionalism, Schmitter's neoneo-functionalism is more accepting of opt-outs and lengthy derogations as it sees the likely finalite politique of the EU as a diverse entity characterised by polycentric and multi-level governance rather than a federal state (Schmitter, 2002: 41).

In addition, significant areas of JHA still remain, to various extents, under national control. Regarding immigration policy, for instance, while


there is considerable integration in the area of control and regulation of immigration there is very little evidence of supranational, or even intergovernmental, integration in the area of incorporation, including such matters as citizenship policies, education, acculturation and language issues (Lahav, 2004: 49). However, the Commission has also been pushing for integration in these areas and, particularly at the Tampere council, it can be seen to have had a certain amount of success.

In conclusion, though, while it is undeniable that the Member States have had a vital part in the development of the JHA acquis, it cannot be argued that they are the only major players in this policy area. Indeed, cooperation in JHA has increasingly escaped the control of the Member States, first as a result of intergovernmental bargaining and later, and more significantly, as a consequence of increased supranationalisation resulting, at least in part, from neofunctionalist spillover. The recent Lisbon Treaty has developed supranationalisation in this area even further despite the increase in opt-outs granted to certain Member States (Peers, 2007) (Carrera and Geyer, 2007). However, that is not to say that development in JHA cannot be stalled. As neofunctionalists remind us, spillover is not the only possible outcome, and it can be disrupted to cause spillback, a halt or even reversal in integration. This would take a severe crisis. However, it is possible that the most recent and forthcoming enlargements could cause such a shock.

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MULTICULTURAL EUROPE?*

Ebru OGURLU**

Abstract:

Starting from the first years of the 21'1 century, multiculturalism has emerged as one of the major research areas in the European political agenda as a result of the challenges to the modernist approach of nation building processes. Considering its various implications, this study shows the two sides of the same coin by focusing on the positive and negative connotations of this concept and tries to answer whether multiculturalism -in a positive sense - is a viable policy in Europe. In this framework, the specific country examples prove the fact that recent multicultural discourses are only used as justifications for the elimination or assimilation ofvarious sub-cultures in Europe by preserving the primacy of the dominant ones. This tendency, however, can easily impose an inward-oriented nature both on Europe as a continent and the EU as a political entity. In order to eliminate this risk, Europe of the 2rr century should be open to other cultural amalgamations and influences as the sources of its own strength and richness.

Keywords: Multiculturalism, Europe, minorities, integration, cultural pluralism

Ozet:

Ozellikle yirmi birinci yiizyrlm ilk yzllarmdan itibaren, r;okkiiltiirliiliik kavramz Avrupa giindeminin en onemli ara$tzrma konularzndan biri olarak oniimiizde durmaktadzr. Kavramzn farklz yorumlarznz ve bu yorumlarzn akla getirdigi farklz r;agrz$zmlarz da goz oniinde bulunduran bu r;alz$ma "-olumlu anlamda- r;okkiiltiirlii bir Avrupa miimkiin miidiir?" sorusuna yanzt aramaktadzr. Ulke orneklerine ba$vurularak elde edilen sonur;lar son

* "Multiculturalism in Europe" paper presented at Cosmopolitanism and Europe Conference, organised by Royal Holloway- University of London, Egham, April 22-23, 2004. **Dr., Marmara University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations.

60 MULTICULTURAL EUROPE?

zamanlarda szklzkla kullamlan "9okkiiltiirliiliik soy/em ve politikalan "nm hem Avrupa 'da goriilen farklz alt kiiltiirlerin etkisizle~tirilmesi hem de baskm kiiltiirlerin kendi hakimiyetlerini siirdiirebilmeleri i9in ortaya kullamldzgmz gostermektedir. Oysa bOyle bir egilim hem gene/de Avrupa 'mn hem de ozelde (siyasi bir yapzlanma olarak) Avrupa Birligi 'nin kendi i9ine kapanmasma neden olacaktzr. Bu gidi~i onlemek i9in yirmi birinci yiizyzl Avrupa 'smm -kendi zenginliginin kaynagz olarak- farklz kiiltiir ve etkile~imlere a91k olmasz zaruridir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: (:okkiiltiirliiliik, Avrupa, azmlzklar, entegrasyon, kiiltiirel 9ogulculuk

Introduction

The European political agenda has always been dominated by various topics under different circumstances. In the 1920s the inter-state rivalry and recovery from war were the widely discussed topics. In the 1930s the dominant issue was the rise of fascism and Nazism. It was the dawn of the cold war in the 1940s; the creation of new institutional structure and the beginnings of the European Union (EU) in the 1950s; the revolt against authority in the 1960s; stagnation amid the geo-political detente in the 1970s; nuclear fears, transatlantic tensions and east-west civic initiatives in the 1980s and post-cold war euphoria in the 1990s. The first years of the 21st century witnessed the emergence of the topics of minorities; cultural, ethnic and religious plurality and diversity; tolerance and equality. As a result of the recent challenges to the modernist approach of nation building process and the weakening of the nation-states as the most powerful actors in international politics multiculturalism has emerged an alternative way of thinking and dominated the political spectrum of the European states.

Although multiculturalism has some positive connotations for the groups which are different from the majority of the society where they live, this study will try to show that it is only one side of the coin, while the other side may imply the justification and even legalisation of the assimi1ationist policies through multicultural discourses. In other words, this paper will try to answer whether multiculturalism would be possible in Europe. In doing this, the reference point will be the Turkish population in Germany. The first part, as the definitive part, will explore the meaning and implications of multiculturalism. The second part will examine the emergence of


multicultural societies in Europe within the framework of the national responses to multiculturalism by focusing on the citizenship regulations of the Germany, France and the United Kingdom as three examples representing the European approaches. The third part will evaluate the situation of the Turkish population in Germany with references to its governmental policies.

What is Multiculturalism

The 20th century has witnessed the re-emergence of different groups of people who have been oppressed by the majority of the society in which they live. This oppression is mostly seen because of their different historical roots, traditions and life-styles. In this framework, the native people, national minorities, ethno-cultural nations, old and new migrants, feminists and greens as some of them have led to the initiation of the new challenges to the traditional and well-established intellectual and political thoughts. As different from the conventional assumptions and thoughts, their common departure point depends on the resistance to the widespread homogenous policies and practices acknowledging the view that there is only one real and normal way to understand and construct all parts of the life (Parekh, 2002: 1 ). In most of the circumstances those different groups have suffered from to the assimilationist policies of the central governments and their rationalist, universalistic, egalitarian ideals, although they have been in favour of protecting their own cultures, traditions and beliefs. In this framework, with the rejection of the central and unitary character of the modem nation-state (Giilalp, 2003: 161), multiculturalism has appeared as an alternative political response to ensure a peaceful coexistence and a freer political system.

Despite being a controversial and contested concept, in a very general sense, arguments of multiculturalism are directed against "essentialist" or "monoist" definitions of nationality which assumes cultural homogeneity in the societies (Modood, 2000: 175). In essence, essentialism denies a historical reality of the interaction among different cultures. Moreover, modernist thinking has confined most of the universal values to the national boundaries and closed the dialog channels among different cultures. In parallel, anti-essentialist understanding defines multiculturalism as the "mosaic" of several bounded, nameable, individually homogenous and unmeltable minority uni-cultures which are pinned onto the backdrop of a similarly characterized majority uni-culture (Modood, 2000: 176). In that


sense, ethnic identities are not simply accepted as given, static or atemporal identities. On the contrary, they are considered as dynamic ones changing under new circumstances and according to different social spaces which they share with other heritages and influences (Modood, 2000: 177). In this framework, multiculturalism implies a society or containing various cultures which are in a continuous interaction with each other. It also suggests a largeness of conception, a transcendence of sectional interests and openness to the variety of human pursuits and achievements Caws, 1996: 381). Under multiculturalism, single cultures may continue their existence in their pure forms. They can be aware of their own needs and are deemed to have the same right to exercise political power through the vote or through some other means. In this framework, in multicultural societies autantic cultures are regarded as equal to each other and cultural resources are revitalized in the name of diversity (Giilalp, 2003: 179). Therefore, as Peter Caws argues it the two key elements of multiculturalism are "the value of alternative cultures and their utility as vehicles for self-identification in the face of an oppressive dominant culture" (Caws, 1996: 373).

Multiculturalism in practice, however, can be read from two opposite dimensions. The first definition is based on the cultural essentialism and rejects any idea that cultures can change in time and interact with each other. By laying too much emphasis on the cultural relativism, it may imply a congregation-based model envisioning the co-existence of different cultures where each of them has the chance to survive within an autonomous area reserved for themselves (insel, 2001: 104 ). In segregated communities, people tend to define themselves within the framework of their collective existence and the isolated cultures which do not contact each other and consequently may lose communication among and influence from each other. As a result, each specific culture may become protective by building fences around themselves and lose any opportunity to know others (Aksoy, 2001: 53). This definition of multiculturalism implying the domination of the leading culture on other groups represents the exclusionist aspect of multiculturalism.

From the other perspective, on the other hand, multiculturalism is based on a sort of "melting pot" praxis deriving from the interaction among different cultures to encourage cultural enrichment (insel, 2001: 1 05). According to this understanding, throughout history, different cultures have not prospered within the boundaries of a single and particular culture. On


the contrary, they have transcended national boundaries and influenced each other (Aksoy, 2001: 53). The interaction among different cultures may disturb the cultural purity of different groups and lead to the cultural intercourse among them. Such an understanding may easily lead to the creation of a cosmopolitan cultural sphere formulated by the groups, independent from their national, religious or similar affiliations (La~Yiner, 2001: 161). This fact shows us that the modem cultures are no more identical and homogenous and the differences among various groups in the society should not prevent them from harmonious and peaceful coexistence. What is important here is the unifying impact of a composite culture formulated by deculturalisation (insel, 2001: 1 05). Thus, multicultural policy gives specific claims and status to different cultural groups within the society, in order to ensure that they will continue as distinct cultural groups rather than being assimilated into the dominant culture (Wallace and Shaw, 2002: 4).

It should not be forgotten that there is a delicate balance between multiculturalism on the one hand and assimilation and integration, on the other. Therefore, those concepts have to be clearly analysed. By referring to Tariq Modood's definitions, it can be recognised that "assimilation is a oneway process affecting relationship between social groups where the desired outcome for society as a whole is seen as involving least change in the ways of doing things of the majority of the country and institutional policies. Integration is a two-way process of social interaction where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something, so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing to or not trying to integrate" (Modood, 2005). As different from them and with emphasis to cultural diversity, hybridity and fusion, multiculturalism implies a two-way process of integration which works differently for different groups implying a pluralistic integration (Modood, 2005). In that sense, for better treatment of the different cultural groups in the dominant culture -without assimilationist concerns-, it has to be acknowledged that the societies are plural and heterogeneous in today's world and this heterogeneity does not form an obstacle for a peaceful coexistence among its different parts. However, it is not always easy to accept the view that homogenous structure of the societies is no more existent and universal human rights are no more sufficient to satisfy the special needs and different claims of various groups living in those heterogonous societies. Moreover, even if those facts are accepted in theory, it is not sufficient by itself due to


the need to transfer this rhetoric into the political arena which is not an easy task mainly due to the fear of the heterogeneous structures of the societies and the existence of "foreigners" living there.

Throughout history, the people had to leave their countries due to economic, political, social or religious reasons and search for a new home for themselves. But, new home which accepted them as "foreigner" or "Other" has always meant new difficulties and new restrictions for them (Aksoy, 2001: 51). Actually, the idea of foreigner has a long history. Although it has kept is validity in all periods, its meaning has changed. During the Renaissance period, there was a religious understanding in terms of ethical and intellectual framework. The non-European foreigners ("Other") were called as infidel. In the Enlightenment period, the main characteristic of the "Other" was his ignorance and superstition. In the 191

h

century the reference point for the foreigner was development or evolutionary process. With the dissolution of the empires and the emergence of the nation-states, the meaning of the "Other" changed once more. In this period the national homogeneity principle emerged and any person who is not the citizen of the nation state because of his/her belonging to a different ethnicity, language, and religion or even to a different sect was regarded as the "Other" (Morley and Robins, 1997: 24).

When we have come to the 20th century, the problem has complicated further. With the end of the colonization period, migration to those coloniser countries has intensified. The need for man-power increased in most of the European countries in the post World War II years which was the period of reconstruction and industrial growth. With the short of labour due to the disastrous effects of the war, foreign workers came to meet the need of domestic labour market. So, the European countries had to confront new waves of migration and the immigrant workers settled in the receiving societies raising serious economic, social and political challenges for integration. These people were always regarded as enemies and threats by the members of the majority. However, it has never been easy to find a convincing answer to the question why the West has accepted the "Other" always as a threatening factor in its own imagination (Morley and Robins, 1997: 24). On the other hand, as a response to their unfavourable treatment, the newcomers have always demanded the recognition of their own cultural and ethnic differences, when they became aware of the fact that the principle of "equal citizenship" can no more be sufficient to settle their


problems. Instead, a different kind of citizenship a "pluralist, multilogical and dispersed one as amplifying a certain kind of politics" (Modood, 2007) has been accepted as an alternative way or a possible solution to improve the situations of the unequally treated people.

In this framework, the following chapter of this paper will focus on the citizenship practices of three countries, namely Germany, France and the United Kingdom, with the a reference to their compatibility with multicultural theory and practices.

Multiculturalism in Europe

Historical Evaluation

Historically, the West has assumed its superiority over other cultures and forced them to accept their inferiority. However, with increasing cultural diversity in Europe, Western centralization and superiority have lost its validity. Instead a "hybrid Europe in continual cultural flux" (Amin, 2002: 9) and multiculturalism has become the most constructive and morally sustainable way for public policy to engage with challenges posed by mass immigration movements starting in the post-World War II era (Wallace and Shaw, 2002, 3).

After the post World War II migration movements, West European countries found themselves in a position to find the ways of peaceful cohabitation of diverse cultural groups. Therefore, it can easily be claimed that ethnic and racial diversity after the war has become the central backdrop of multicultural claims (Joppke, 1998: 289). The migration movements which started in 1950s and 1960s with the guest workers continued in the form of family unification in 1970s. The situation has changed since the 1980s when the integration of world economy, the globalisation of capital and labour and the rapid development of transport and communication networks have contributed to new types of migration movements As different from the older ones, the new types of migrant are characterised by their fragmented nature: they include new forms of flexible labour, insecure legal status, variable duration, new gender roles and multiple destinations (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 8). The implosion of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989 has made the new context even more volatile and dynamic due to the diverse


forms of population movements from CEE to West Europe after the opening of the borders between the two sides. As a result the problem has become more problematic due to the complexity and differentiation of migrant communities in terms of their country of origin, entry status, educational levels, and skills. Large numbers of migrants have arrived, worked and stayed in most of the European countries and these have generated a much more differentiated migrant population in European states (Kofman, 2004: 4-5). The beginning of the new century, on the other hand, has been characterised by further developments mainly due to the complex picture of the new and old migrations as a result of the fluidity of the EU borders.

The historical perspective given above shows that Europe has to live together with the "other/foreigner" starting from the 1950s, although it was not an easy task for Europeans, as well as for the foreigners. European leaders had the concern about the adaptation of the new people to the existent political, economic and social structure. European labour was hesitant about the threat of deterioration of their life styles due to the existence of illegal labour force. For these reasons, migration was perceived as a threat to the cultural and societal values and to the basic determinants of Europe. Since if the governments could not build upon the multicultural tolerance within the society, but rather move quickly to define common national goals and to root out this targeting of minorities, xenophobia will be likely to emerge and make the new immigrant groups the victim of racist spleen (Watson, 2000: 36). Under those conditions, especially since the 1990s, multiculturalism has gained reputation as a political theory representing a critique and alternative to the traditional "assimilation" policies (Vassaf, 2002: 183-184), which assumes that the cultural differences imported into the receiving society by immigrants should and would be extinguished in the long run (Joppke, 1998: 289). With the recognition of different features of the post-war immigrants in comparison to their predecessors and their less homogenous and less hierarchically organised structure, it has become dangerous to neglect (or to reject) the challenge of developing a vision of organising diversity (Schiffauer, 2006: 112).

In this framework, on the theoretical side, we can identify some influential persons who are the proponents of diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism in the continent. Claude-Henri Saint-Simon, Fran~ois-Rene de Chateaubriand, Heinrich Mann, Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-


Kalergi, Milan Kundera are only a few of them all of which have agreed on the rejection of the imposition of Western values on other cultural groups. Accordingly, in stead of the domination of one common culture, a tolerant and peaceful Europe which accepts the diversity and differentiation of other cultures should be created (Liitzeler, 2001: 6-8). Besides them, Jiirgen Habermas should also be remembered within the framework of citizenship discussions which have a direct impact on the multicultural policies. Specifically, he is against the German ius soli principle in granting the citizenship status to the individuals as being against the strict tie between citizenship and national identity. He argues that democratic right of selfdetermination shall include the right to preserve one's own political culture which includes the concrete context of citizen's rights (Habermas, 1995: 258-259). Accordingly, only within the constitutional framework of a democratic legal system can different ways of life coexist equally and only democratic citizenship can prepare the way for a condition of world citizenship which does not close itself off within particularistic biases, and which accepts a worldwide political communication. In this framework, he argues that state citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum that already shows itself in outline form (Habermas, 1995: 278-279).

On the other hand, as an another important name, Will Kymlicka supports the idea of "multicultural citizenship" as a way of integration of different groups into the society and expression of their group-differentiated right (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995: 305). He suggests special protection for minorities in the name of universal human rights, and sees human rights at the same time as a criterion to avoid any potential misuse of these special rights (Liitzeler, 2001: 5). The multicultural givens in contemporary Europe demand a dialogic relationship between the cultures of majorities and minorities; they demand a mutual openness toward the other and a readiness to undergo new synthesis (Liitzeler, 2001: 5). According to this understanding, the protection of the minority rights in multicultural societies would not only strengthen the unity and cooperation among the members of this group and provide them moral support, but also provide them the means for collective political action (Rex, 2000: 61). As a result, the ability of different cultural groups to continue their different languages, religions and traditions within the dominant culture would provide them the opportunity to sustain their lives without being subject to any assimilationist policies.


National Responses

As it can be recognised from the above discussions, the emergence of ethnic relations and immigration as a central issue within the European polities has especially been apparent since the 1990s with the emergence of migrants and minorities as the influential political actors in the continent (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 14). In this framework, concrete policy proposals and initiatives have been discussed under various platforms the most concrete example of which was the Amsterdam Treaty. It accepted the concepts such as migration, refugees, asylum-seeker or migrant citizenship as the prior subjects of the EU agenda. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the migration related concepts were moved from the third pillar to the first pillar and became one of the key issues of the Intergovernmental Conferences. However, in most of the cases the demands for these groups created tensions in the related countries and led to the strengthening of the xenophobic policies and racist attempt. That is why; from the 1990s, member states agreed on the restriction of the existing measures against the possible threats. In this framework, they accepted the strengthening of the external border controls, promotion of internal security cooperation, and devaluation of migrant rights to the level of common denominator of the participating member states (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 41). However, these policies implied the possibility of the process which might lead the EU to a "Fortress Europe" by minimizing its relations with the outside of Europe (Morley and Robins, 1997: 42). For this reason the European states are aware of the fact that the most important structural problem for them is to deal with the issue of the diversity of cultural groups and the possibility of their equal co-existence.

In this framework, John Rex divides national policies designed to cope with the issue into four categories which will be summarized below (Rex, 2000: 58-59). The first model demands the exclusion of immigrant minorities and their repatriation to the countries from which the immigrant generation had come.1 They are not tolerant to the existence of diverse groups. The second model implies the essentialist understanding of culture by arguing the fixity, traditionalist and unchanging character of the culture. Therefore, it refuses to recognise the separate existence of different groups. But it offers citizenship rights under the principle of jus soli to those born in

1 Le Pen in France, Haider in Austria, and Vlaams Blok in Belgium.


the country of immigrant settlement and to those immigrants who become naturalised. Although this option seems compatible with democracy, it may easily lead to total assimilation and violate the integrity and dignity of the cultural groups. The third model accepts the newcomers and their children as temporary residents. So, they are expected to turn back to their countries of origin. That is why the political citizenship rights are not entitled to these groups. Their rights are only dependent on the beneficent paternalistic concern of the related bodies, trade unions or churches. This model makes a difference between citizens with full political right and denizens without political rights. But among the others, the fourth alternative offers multiculturalism as a feasible solution in three different forms. It may envisage a total transformation of the culture of the society in which a national unitary culture is displaced by a new one which is more diverse and complex or hybrid; it may be based on the recognition of minority cultures and communities but involve negotiations with them to bring them under state control; or it may attempt to combine the recognition of cultural diversity with the promotion of individual equality (Rex, 2000: 59).

According to these policies, member states have tended to adopt different citizenship policies and models which are in direct relationship with the possibility of a multicultural Europe. In this context, we can mention about two principles of granting citizenship status which are influential in determining the degree and form of inclusiveness/exclusiveness. While the first one -jus sanguinis- with its emphasis on ethno-cultural attributes implies a more closed system, the second one -jus soli- has a more open and tolerant implications with its emphasis on civic and territorial attributes. On the other hand, citizenship policies and principles also determine the positions of the related government in terms of their inclinations towards either more assimilationist or more pluralistic approaches. Those which accept the assimilation as the ideal model policy vis-a-vis the foreigners can be considered as more demanding. On the other side, those which support cultural pluralism as the only way in dealing with diversity can be regarded as more accepting. By combining these dimensions three citizenship models can be identified in Europe; namely the ethno-cultural exclusionist (in Germany), civic assimilationist or republican (in France) and the multicultural pluralist (in the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands). The next part will summarize the impacts of the citizenship regimes of three countries -Germany, France and


the UK as the main examples of the valid models within the European framework- on the conditions of their migrants and foreigners.

'Ethnic' or 'exclusive' citizenship model in Germany basing on linguistically and culturally unified group denies migrants' and their descendants' access to the political community or at least makes this access very difficult by way of high cultural or institutional barriers to naturalization. There, hundreds of thousand of German-born descendants of migrants are still officially "foreigner" (Auslander) without any political rights (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 196). But on the contrary, ethnic German immigrants from the area of the former Soviet Union (Aussiedler) can obtain full political and social rights due to their hereditary link to the nation. In France, although it is relatively easy to acquire citizenship status, this does not mean that French community does not have any difficulty regarding their minorities who are required a high degree of assimilation in the public sphere and given little or no recognition to their cultural and religious difference through acquisition of citizenship by jus soli. In return of rights, migrant are expected to place loyalty to French republican values and political culture above allegiances to religious or cultural differences (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 19-20). Naturalisation laws were designed to make Frenchmen out of foreigners (Ireland, 2000: 237). On the other hand, migrants are provided with easy formal access to citizenship in the UK. Moreover they are recognized as ethnic minorities together with their own cultural rights and privileges (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 196). The differences in the citizenship models have also forced those countries to apply different labels to the migrants in their countries. They are foreigners in Germany, immigrants in France and ethnic minorities in Britain. Those citizenship policies also prove that multicultural discourses and practices would be more feasible and possible in the UK in comparison to other two examples. Among others, in the following chapter the German case will be analysed from a more detailed perspective with a specific reference to the Turkish people living there.

Turkish Population in Germany

Germany is a country which has historically been open to migration movements and searched for appropriate policies to deal with the issue of foreigner within its boundaries. The presence of recent immigrant populations makes legitimate claims for recognition which propel a debate on multiculturalism into the public sphere, although it is difficult to


guarantee it. 2 In this sense, those who campaign for multiculturalism had to show that the recognition of cultural diversity was compatible with and did not undermine those institutions which were concerned with guaranteeing equality between individuals and classes (Rex, 1996: 120).

Germany never accepted that it is an immigration country. New comers have always been considered as temporary residents who would return to their home countries in the future. Primarily, multiculturalism in Germany is for Germans themselves about the meaning of "Germanness". Only secondarily is it about migrants and foreigners (Joppke, 1998: 300). In the country, the migrants3 -under the label of foreigner- have only a marginal role in the political arena mainly due to the exclusivist citizenship law (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 199). Although the people with nonGerman origin can easily be accepted to the labour market, they can not participate in the political arena. The institutional mechanisms for their political participation could not be formed and their involvement has always been prevented. Therefore, Germany is one of the best examples of the ethnoculturally exclusionist citizenship regimes which impose a strong and powerful distinction between "us" and "them" (Joppke, 1998: 301 ). The Christian Democrats are quite powerful to continue this understanding and to keep the characteristics of the German "high culture" alive. This approach, however, makes the acceptance of multiculturalism more difficult even at the theoretical level. But on the other hand there are also some other political groups, i.e. the Greens or most of the Social Democrats which support and encourage cultural plurality by defending the rights of the migrants and refugees.

In Germany, specifically Turkish migrants are important to understand the exclusivist tendencies and policies of German government. Although Turkish immigration was encouraged at the beginning due to the practical reasons, their existence was initially perceived as a temporary measure to cope with labour shortage problem (Watson, 2000: 33). Guest workers were expected to return back when their jobs were done and once their contracts had expired. But over time it was understood that it is something permanent

2 Legally, the provisions of the related treaties and the regulation in European legislation are not adequate to implement such kind of a policy. 3 They are mostly the people who came from Turkey. Former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece and Poland are some other countries exporting migrants to Germany.


or semi-permanent despite the lack of attempts to encourage their integration with the society without forced assimilation. Thus, each side has become aware of the fact that they were culturally separate and Turkish society in Germany is an inclusive and inward-looking oriented one (Watson, 2000: 33-34). Although German governments provide some public services to Turkish migrants, i.e. school service for children or German language learning opportunities, they are always accepted as the means of German governments to serve the interests and benefits of Germany. To be more specific, it can be argued that the "foreigners" would become familiar with the system and could contribute efficiently to the running of the economy through those services.

As it is common to all migrant communities, another problem for the Turkish migrants is the lack of their political rights and the obstacles for them to become active members of the democratic society. They do not have any institutionalized channels of access to the political process. As it can be understood from a speech by Helmut Kohl, integration for them only means peaceful existence in the society, but not being a citizen. However, the inclusiveness of Turkish society mentioned above underlines the distinction between the Turkish migrants and the societies of the countries where they live. It also emphasizes something contrary to Kohl's argument; integration should not mean just to settle down. On the contrary, interaction between two sides is important for a peaceful co-existence. In this framework, inadequate answers to the demands of migrant societies might force these groups facing with the discriminatory policies of the dominant culture to become much more conservative and authoritarian to preserve their own cultures. As a response to the governmental and legal measures, they might strengthen their nationalistic or religious ties to defend themselves. As an example, after a change in the German citizenship law which provided the right to acquire German citizenship, but only after leaving their Turkish nationality, only a limited number of Turks applied to be a German citizen. This situation proves the reservations and concerns of a total integration into the dominant culture from the perspective of the minority groups in general and the Turkish migrants in particular.

In recent years, the exclusionist tendencies in German society have intensified due to the deterioration in economic, social and structural conditions of the country, especially after the unification of West and East Germany. The foreigners have been seen as the only responsible and main


scapegoat of the all kinds of problems (Watson, 2000: 34). These factors have also led to the strengthening of discrimination against foreigners in the society.

Conclusion

The examples of West European countries have shown us that the policies and mechanisms developed by them for the treatment of foreigners in their own countries are from being efficient and sufficient for foreigners themselves. On the contrary, they have produced unfavourable results for the foreigners which have made them more and more protective and inwardlooking due to the fences they have built around themselves. Therefore, it can be argued that the recent multicultural discourses have appeared as a new kind of nationalism to preserve the dominance of the nation-states by strengthening its culturalisation policies. In other words, multiculturalism has recently implied the domination of the leading culture on other groups and represents the discriminatory and exclusive aspects of the concept by making the other as exotic (Kaya, 2003: 17) which makes them dependent on the interest, support and preservation of the majority. Accepting the minorities in terms of their folkloric rights and demands but disregarding their participation in the societal life have created a societal inequality, exclusion and discrimination for the inferior other due to their needs for the tolerance of the majority and creates a power relation by putting the majority at a privileged and superior position as compared to the minority. This situation, however, reduces the minority groups into cultural differences without providing any opportunity in economic, social or political aspects of the life.

Considering these theoretical perspectives, we can identify two Europes; namely the "conservative Europe" which is a holistic one implying that religious, ethnic, historical and traditional baggage of the people is of utmost importance for the European integrity and a more dynamic and open-minded Europe where diversity, difference and plurality are far more important than the past, culture, tradition or heritage. Considering the racist and extremist movements and practices in the European societies, it can be argued the first model is the dominant and valid one for the presence and it is undermining the hopes and prospects for a more diverse and plural Europe. Considering the fact that [Europe] would gain its power from a multicultural whole forming various groups (Vassaf, 2002: 219-220), it is a must for Europe to revitalize its dynamics to embrace all kinds of diversities


in the continent. Actually, it has to be recognised that the historically dominant view that "West is West and East is East and these two groups can never be joined together" would loose its validity in time (Vassaf, 2002: 280). On the contrary, the existence of the foreigners in the continent will inevitably create a synthesis of the East and West with the help of the dynamic nature of Europeanness process.

As conclusion, it should also be emphasised that Europeanness is not a static concept with clear cut boundaries. It has always been structured and restructured. In this context, the harmonious coexistence among various groups has become unavoidable, even if it is a difficult task. At this stage, what is important is to promote and encourage "inter-culturalism" as the expression of cultural and ethnic differences in public space as well and the solution of the problems emerging from differences by intercultural dialogue. Considering the fact that an inward-oriented nature of the EU would clearly limit its prospects of playing the role of a genuinely global actor, ethnically and religiously mix Europe of the 21st century which is open to other cultural amalgamations and influences would be more preferable by all of its members as a source of their strength and richness.

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IMPACT OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES ON INCOME INEQUALITY IN EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

Abstract:

imreERSOY* Bilgehan BA YKAL **

Pmar DENiZ***

The article investigates the relationship between ECB 's monetary policy, SGP constrained fiscal policies of EMU members, the growth levels and the members' social development pattern embodied as income distribution. Panel co integration analysis is employed for the period between 1999 and 2008 in search for the impact of economic and monetary unification of the first 12 EMU members on the increasing income inequality. The results of the empirical analysis show that both the monetary policy of ECB and the restrained fiscal policies of the EMU members have negative effects on income equality. The findings also suggest that growth has positive effect on income distribution but the pace ofGDP growth is declining in EMU.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Income Distribution, Models with Panel Data

Ozet:

Bu r;alr~ma Avrupa Merkez Bankasz 'nm (AMB) para politikasz, Ekonomik ve Parasal Birlige (EPB) iiye iilkelerin Biiyiime ve istikrar Paktz kurallarz r;err;evesinde uyguladzklarz maliye politikalarz ve biiyiime seviyeleri ile iilkelerin sosyal kalkmma modelinin gostergesi alan gelir dagzlzmz arasmdaki ili~kiyi ara~tzrmaktadzr. EPB olu~umunun ilk 12 iiyenin

*Asst. Prof. (PhD), Marmara University, European Union Institute, Department of EU Economics ** PhD Candidate, Marmara University, European Union Institute, Department of EU Economics *** MA Student, Marmara University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics

80 IMPACT OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES ON INCOME INEQUALITY

artan gelir dagzlzmz adaletsizligi iizerindeki etkilerini ara§tzrmak it;in 1999 ile 2008 yzllarzm kapsayan donem it;in panel koentegrasyon analizi uygulanmz~tzr. Ampirik c;alz~mamn sonuc;larz, hem AMB 'mn para politikaszmn hem de EPB iiyelerinin kontrol altzndaki maliye politikalarznm gelir dagzlzmz iizerindeki olumsuz etkilerini gostermektedir. Sonuc;lar ayrzca, biiyiimenin gelir dagzlzmzm olumlu etkiledigini gostermektedir ancak EPB 'in biiyiime hzzz da dii~mektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Para Politikasz, Maliye Politikasz, Gelir Dagzlzmz, Panel Veri Modelleri

1. Introduction

The relationship between economic growth and income distribution has been the subject of debate for decades. The theory developed by Kuznets (1955) argues that there is a positive relationship between the income inequality and growth until a certain development level where the relationship starts to reverse as shown by the Kuznets curve.

Figure 1: Kuznets Curve

The results of empirical findings on the relationship between growth and income equality are rather inconclusive. Keefer and Knack ( 1999), Deininger and Lyn Squire (1996), Perotti (1996), Weede (1997), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) analyzed the effect of inequality on


income growth and obtained diverse findings. Deininger and Lyn Squire ( 1998) argue that asset inequality lowers income growth for the poor; however this is not the case for the rich. For the causality relationship from growth to income equality, Lucas (2004) argues that increasing production helps reduce income inequality. However, Cordoba and Verdier (2008) find that people are willing to sacrifice growth in order to reduce inequality.

Romer and Romer (1998) argue that there are several channels, long-run and short-run, attaching income distribution to inflation that is created by monetary policy. They state that decline in the real value of wages and transfers due to inflation affects poor negatively. Bulir and Guide (1995) also find that both inflation and its variability deteriorate the income distribution. Pryor (2007) also argues that the most important reason for the increase in income inequality is the rising inequality of property incomes including the interest rates. Li, Xie, Zou (2000), employing an unbalanced panel data within the period 1950-1992 for many developed and developing countries, argue that income taxation and government spending lower income inequalities. They also analyze Kuznets curve theory and verify it for the middle-to-low-income sample, but not for the high-income sample.

In the EMU-12, the Gini coefficient, which is an indicator of inequality of income distribution increased from 28 in 2000 to 30 in 2007.1 In the euro-zone, monetary policy is implemented by European Central Bank (ECB), whose primary objective is to maintain price stability. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) envisages a balanced budget for the normal times and a maximum of 3% budget deficit to GDP in problematic conjunctures and a maximum of 60% Public Sector Borrowing to GDP ratio for the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) members. The growth rate of members since the start of EMU has been, on average, lower than both the USA and UK.2 This study investigates the effect of monetary policy, fiscal policies and growth on income distribution in Euro-zone employing panel cointegration analysis. Section 2 explains the methodology and the dataset

1 Eurostat, Inequality of income distribution Gini coefficient updated on 29 April 2008 2 The growth rates for 1999-2008 in EMU are (in%) 2,9, 3,9, 1,9, 0,9, 0,8, 2,1, 1,7, 3,0, 2,7, 0,7 whereas for U.K 3,5, 3,9, 2,5, 2,1, 2,8, 3,0, 2,2, 2,9, 2,6, 0,6 and for US 4,8, 4,1, 1.1,1.8, 2,5, 3,6, 3,1, 2,7, 2,1, 0,4


employed. Section 3 portrays and discusses the empirical findings. Section 4 concludes.

2. Methodology and Dataset

There are various methodologies to measure economic inequality, like Theil Index, GINI index, or lowest, highest relevant percentiles of income distribution, among others. In this paper, GINI index is employed.

2.1. Dataset

Annual data is used for 1999-2008 for 12 EMU countries? GINI coefficients are found with some missing values, however via interpolation technique the data is extended to the relevant time period chosen. GINI coefficients, Budget Balance, GDP growth and Interest rates- as Open Market Operation (refinancing operation) - data are obtained from source sites; UNDP, Worldbank, Eurostat and ECB website. Inflation values are collected from OECD website as annual CPI inflation rate and converted. Real interest rates are obtained for each country.4 Annual Budget Balance values are divided by GDP values. 5

2.2. Methodology

The paper employs Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, hereafter IPS) panel unit root test, Pedroni (1999) panel cointegration test and Pedroni (2000) Panel Fully Modified OLS tests.

2.2.1 Panel Unit Root Test

IPS (2003) test has unit root in the null hypothesis and allows for heterogeneity of the autoregressive coefficient. The test has the alternative hypothesis that a fraction of the series in the panel is stationary. In order to

3 First 12 EMU countries are namely; Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 4 Real interest rates are obtained by using the equation:

5 The following abbreviations are used for the variables; GINI (GINI coefficients), INT (Real interest rates of OMO refinancing operations), BB (Budget Balance divided by GDP), Growth (GDP growth rate).


calculate the statistics, IPS test requires the cross-sectional units to be balanced.

n

Al;., =at+ p,Y,.t-1 + L lf'tAY,J-t +AI+ o, +£1, k=l

i =L. ... N t=l, ... , T (l)

2.2.2 Panel Cointegration Test

Pedroni (1999) tests are cointegration tests for panel data. Pedroni has created seven tests to check cointegration. There is no cointegration in the null hypothesis of Pedroni tests. Thus, in order to say that there is panel cointegration, we have to reject the null hypothesis. Pedroni panel cointegration test allows for heterogeneity in the errors across cross sectional units and also allows for the cointegrating vector to vary. The seven tests also include panel unit root tests. The seven tests Pedroni created are below:

The panel v-statistic:

(2)

The panel p-statistic:

(3)

The panel t-statistic (non-parametric):

(4)


The panel t-statistic (parametric):·

(5)

The group p-statistic:

(6)

The group t-statistic (non-parametric):

(7)

The group t-statistic (parametric):

(8)

2.2.3. Panel Fully Modified OLS test

Pedroni (2000), basing on Philips and Hansen (1990) paper proposed a Fully Modified OLS approach for homogenous cointegration vectors to get estimates, by presenting an FMOLS group mean estimator. In the null hypothesis, there is a common value for the cointegrating vector. In the alternative hypothesis, the cointegrating vector need not be common. The FMOLS group mean estimator is simply the average value of the individual FMOLS estimates.


3. Findings and Discussions

In this study, we employed BB, Growth and INT together as regressors of GINI. However, it is probable to have multicollinearity between BB and Growth since government expenditures are observed in national income model and accordingly an increase in government expenditures lead to mcrease in GDP and contribute to Growth. In order to overcome this problem, we employed two more regressions with regressor; ( 1) Growth and INT, (2) BB and INT. Hence, we will not only eliminate the priori problem of multicollinearity, but also check the robustness of the analysis. In Table 1, we have the results of panel unit root test, IPS test for constant and constant-trend case.

Table 1: Panel Unit Root Test

IPS Uait Root Test

Coutant Coutant :md Treud

GINI -1.544 (0.061) 0.045 (0.518)

BB -0.861 (0.194) 1.076 (0.859)

Growth -1.461 (0.072) 0.095 (0.537)

INT -2.106 (0.017) -0.316 (0.375)

Note: Max lag is chosen as 2. Modified Hannan Quinn Criterion is used for automatic lag selection. The values in brackets are p-values.

We fail to reject the null of unit root, since the probability values are given in brackets are higher than 5% significance level. After we obtain the result that the variables are unit root, we can continue to the panel cointegration tests. In Table 2, we have Pedroni panel cointegration test for all three regressions. First of all, we check the regression with the regressors; BB, Growth and INT. As we mentioned before, Pedroni panel cointegration test has no cointegration in the null hypothesis. The test shows that we reject the null within 5% significance level. Afterwards, we apply cointegration test for the second regression with the regressors; BB and INT. The test displays the existence of cointegration again. Lastly, the third regression with the regressors; Growth and INT, shows that except for panel rho statistic, all six test rejects the null hypothesis.


Table 2: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test

~ BB - Growth- INT BB-INT Growth-INT T

Panel v-Statistic -3.055 (0.003) -3.026 (0.004) -2_651 (0.011)

Panel rho-Statistic 3.241 (0.002) 2.224 (0.033) 1.639 (0.104)

Panel PP -Statistic -7.290 (0.000) -6.216 (0.000) -5.169 (0.000)

Panel ADF -Statistic -6.050 (0.000) -4.255 (0.000) -5.876 (0.000)

Group rho-Statistic 4.218 (0.000) 3.330 (0.001) 3.168 (0.002)

Group PP-Statistic -10.295 (0.000) -7.870 (0.000) -6.795 (0.000)

Group ADF-Statistic -6.931 {0.000) -4.328 (0.000) -5.168 (0.000)

Note: Max lag is chosen as 2. Constant and Trend case is selected. The values in brackets are p-values.

After showing the existence of panel cointegration for all three regressions, we estimate the coefficients using FMOLS technique. In Table 3, we have FMOLS results.

Table 3: FMOLS results

Regre:aiDn: BB - Gmwtlt - Ir..T ~e:aiDn: BB -Ir..T Regn:aiDn: Gmwtlt- INT

BB Growth INT BB INT Growth INT

0.11 -020 0.07 0.18 033 -0.06 0.19

(-9.08) (-5.14) (-4.07) (-12.43) (-2.50) (-12.82) (-7.17)

Note: N = 12, T = 10, max-lag= 1, Constant- trend case is employed. The values in brackets are the t-statistics

All of the estimates are significant since the t-statistics given in brackets are higher than the 5% critical values. First regression shows that BB and INT seem to affect GINI positively and Growth affects GINI negatively.6

6 A positive (negative) effect on GINI indicates positive (negative) effect on income inequality


As we have mentioned before, to avoid the pnon existence of multicollinearity between BB and Growth, we split the regression into two new regressions. The second regression displays that both BB and INT have positive effects on GINI. Lastly, the third regression shows that Growth has a negative and INT has a positive effect on GINI. The FMOLS results for the two new regressions are consistent with the first regression that includes all variables. Hence, we can argue that the findings are robust.

The results we obtained are also found to be consistent with the theoretical basis. FMOLS results show that BB affects GINI positively. We can attribute this positive sign to the mechanism that whether the increase in the budget balance is achieved through the increase in tax payments or the decrease in the government expenditures, income going to the low income groups will be deteriorated. Thus, income equality will be harmed and accordingly GINI index will increase.

The effect of Growth is found to be negative in both regressions. The countries we employ are developed countries. Accordingly, we can argue that these countries probably have crossed the critical boundary in the Kuznets curve. Hence, the increase in the per capita income will refer to the improvement in income distribution.

Both regressions show that INT has a positive effect on GINI. We attribute this to the theoretical framework that high income groups have income higher than their subsistence level and direct some amount to investment. Thereby, they are able to earn extra income/wealth. This process widens the income gap between low and high income groups.

4. Conclusions

European Economic and Monetary Union has been successful not only in economic, monetary and financial unification of the now 16 members but also in the international arena. However, since its establishment EMU shows an increase in income inequality. The empirical analysis between 1999 and 2008 for the first 12 members of EMU shows that the monetary policy of the hard-nosed ECB and the SGP restrained fiscal policies of the members have positive effect on the increase in income inequality in EMU. The empirical findings also suggest that growth has negative effect on income inequality in euro zone, a result which is in line with the Kuznets


curve. The problem in EMU, however, is that there is also a decline in GDP growth compared to non-EMU EU members like U.K and also USA.

The SGP should be again revised to bring more flexibility to budget deficits and to take not only stability but also growth into account. The conservative ECB policy aimed at price stability by focusing on money supply and economic-financial indicators should watch more closely the developments in terms of increasing income inequality in EMU.


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Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1998). New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 57,259-287.

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Weede, E. (1997). Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered. European Journal of Political Economy, 13, 751-764.


Abstract:

TURKISH IMAGE AND ANTI-TURKISH LOBBIES IN EUROPE*

Kaan SAHiLYOL

Although means of ethnic lobbying and propaganda have been available for few centuries in the form of books and tales, the emergence of global media and mass communication provided contemporary lobbyists with tools which were unimaginable even few decades ago. Turkish lobbyists, unlike their Armenian and Greek counterparts have rather been latecomers to the lobbying arena, and therefore tend to lack certain skills and experiences to defend Turkish causes. Ethnic lobbies with a proven anti-Turkish agenda, such as Armenian and Greek organizations in Europe, however, reached a high level of know-how regarding the use of mass media in promoting their ethnic agendas which often corresponds to undermining Turkish causes. As Turkey faces a critical decade regarding its permanent position in the European Union, the advantage and better know-how of anti-Turkish lobbies emerges as the biggest stumbling block on Turkey's EU bid. The prejudices and opposition to Turkish EU membership in many European countries can only be overcome by bridging this know-how gap between Turkish- and rival ethnic lobbies.

Keywords: Ethnic lobbying, anti-Turkish propaganda, EU-Turkey relations, Turkish image in Europe

Ozet:

Etnik lobicilik ve propaganda kitaplar ve halk hikayeleri bi9iminde yiizyillard1r var olmasma ragmen global medya ve kitlesel ileti~im ara9lan giiniimiiz lobicilerine k1sa zaman oncesinde hayal bile edilemeyecek imkanlar sunmaktad1r. Turk lobicileri ise lobicilik miicadelesine Yunan ve Ermeni meslekta~lanna nazaran daha ge9 ba~lad1klan i9in Tiirkiye'nin davalanm savunmak i9in gerekli baz1 deneyim ve bilgiye sahip degildir. Tiirkiye ise, oncelikle A vrupa Birligi i9indeki nihai konumunun

*This article is a reformulation and summary of the author's Ph.D thesis submitted to the European Union Institute of Marmara University.

92 TURKISH IMAGE AND ANTI-TURKISH LOBBIES IN EUROPE

belirlenmesine sadece birka~ y1l kald1g1 i~in, Turk kar~1tl lobilerin etkinliklerine yamt vermek i~in gecikme liiksiine sahip degildir. A vrupa i~indeki Tiirk kar~1h onyarg1lar ve bir~ok Avrupa iilkesindeki Tiirkiye'nin AB iiyeligine muhalefet ise ancak Tiirk kar~1h lobilerle Tiirk lobileri arasmdaki bilgi, tecriibe, ve etki farkmm kapatllmas1 ile miimkiindiir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik lobicilik, Turk kar~ztz propaganda, AB-Turkiye ili~kileri, Avrupa 'da Turk imajz

Introduction

Only few decades ago, the term ethnic lobbying was arguably confined to the promotion of one ethnic group's interests and positive qualities, and did not include the denigration and defamation of rival ethnic groups. This phenomenon had most probably to do with the fact that almost all host countries were dominated by only one of historically rival ethnic groups. To cite few examples, the lobbying scene in the United States was dominated by Jewish Americans while the influence of rival Arab Americans was minimal. In France, the Armenian community enjoyed significant political influence, while the Turkish community, let alone a Turkish lobby, was nonexistent until early 1970s.

Even though the Jewish lobby in the United States continued to have the upper hand vis-a-vis the Arab lobby, and the French-Armenian community upheld its superiority over French-Turkish community, both dominant lobbies had to acknowledge the existence and challenge of rival ethnic groups. Due to the realization that the positions and arguments of the dominant lobbies were going to be challenged by rival ethnic groups, it became no longer sufficient to promote an ethnic group's causes only. It became also necessary to disprove, challenge, and discredit rival ethnic groups' positions, which turned ethnic lobbying into a relatively less ethical activity than it was few decades ago.

Due to this growing rivalry between ethnic lobbies, it can safely be argued that almost all ethnic lobbies in Europe, as well as in North America, follow two different forms of propaganda activities simultaneously. These activities are, in its simplest form, promotion of the lobbies' causes and defamation of rival groups' causes. In its more traditional and harmless version, ethnic lobbies promote the homelands of their ethnic kinsmen in cultural, historical, political, and financial arenas. Since this type of lobbying activity by itself does not harm or denigrate rival ethnicities directly, it can also be called 'constructive', as well as 'promotional'


lobbying. The second type of lobbying, on the hand, primarily focuses on damaging rival lobbies' image and causes, and can therefore be called 'destructive' lobbying. 1

The activities of the Greek Americans in the United States, for example, can be mostly considered as promotional lobbying. Greek Americans spend great efforts to present Greece as the sole representative of the antic Hellenic civilization, and try to prove that the entire Western civilization is based upon Hellenic values. Even though there is a certain amount of indisputable validity in these claims, Greek American lobbies professionally exaggerate the Hellenic influence in Western societies. Consequently, the Greek lobbies render the American public opinion more sympathetic towards the Greece of today, since it arguably represents everything which was once Hellenic.

The more clandestine and lesser known version of lobbying is propaganda activities directed against a rival ethnic group, with the aim of denigrating and defaming the image and causes of the rival lobbies. These types of activities, which can also be called 'destructive' lobbying, are usually performed by experienced and professional lobbyists. As public opinions in the Western world became relatively more sensitive toward open acts of racism and ethnic chauvinism especially after the end of the Second World War, professional lobbyists usually engage in well-disguised forms of defamation and anti-propaganda. Although this destructive form of lobbying has been existent in the Western world for centuries in the form of anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, and anti-Turkism, it was effectively refined recently in order to gain acceptance among more educated masses. Thus, 'destructive' lobbying mostly aims at the subconscious of public opinions, and thus remains the most refined and dangerous form of ethnic lobbying.

The emergence of the negative Turkish image in Europe

The primitive form of Turcophobic propaganda, which had started centuries ago in Europe, however, was not refined or concealed for a long time since it was mostly directed at an uneducated, and mostly illiterate European public opinion. Anti-Turkish propaganda in Europe, which was initially started with the aim of gathering volunteers for the Crusades, reached varying forms and intensities over the centuries. Especially during

1 The terms 'constructive I promotional lobbying' and 'destructive lobbying' were coined by the author of this paper. It is therefore highly unlikely to find identical expressions that define the types of lobbying which have been explained by the author.


the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Ottoman state was at the peak of its power, the success of the Turks was presented as a punishment of God. Mostly relying on the ignorance and bigotry of the masses, the Catholic Church propagated the view that the Turkish menace would stop if the people would follow the orders of the clergy properly. Having spread over a period of several centuries, especially Catholic Church's anti-Turkish propaganda penetrated even children's books and prayers, thus becoming a permanent part of the European folklore (Kuhlmann & Co~an, 2006).

Anti-Turkish propaganda continued way into the 18th century, when the Ottoman Empire stopped being a menace for Europe. Johann Gottfried Herder, who had lived between 1744 and 1803, and was known to be the most influential and intellectual philosopher of his time, proposed the idea of 'Republic of Europe' for the first time in history. Even though the major part of Ottoman territories was in Europe by the time of Herder's proposal, the German philosopher did not want to see the Ottoman Turkey in his imaginary Republic of Europe. Since Herder was a big admirer of ancient Greeks, and he had never forgiven Ottomans for having ended the Byzantine Empire, it is probable that his judgment about Ottoman Turkey's 'European ness' was influenced by his personal feelings. Despite his alleged dedication to rationalism and objectivity, Herder's antagonism towards Ottoman Turkey became more bizarre in the light of the fact that he had never been to Ottoman lands in his lifetime (Kuran-Bur~oglu, 2005: 42-44).

It is arguably surprising that even Johann Gottfried Herder, whose intelligence, knowledge, and insight was admitted by his critics, allowed his judgment to be influenced by his anti-Turkish prejudices. Although the modem sense of 'political correctness' was not a pressure factor by the 18th century, the newly emerging enlightenment required a certain amount of objectivity from personalities of Herder's caliber. Thus, Herder's inability, or unwillingness, to provide solid evidence of Ottoman Turkey's lack of European ness is arguably astonishing even in the less objective circumstances of 18th century. The lack of opposition or criticism from Herder's European contemporaries can be thus considered as a further demonstration of the prevalence of anti-Turkish attitudes among European peoples.

The arguably appalling habit of basing anti-Turkish attitudes on historical myths rather than on facts continued also in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when Europe literally entered the modem ages. While it became unacceptable to present any serious political argument without supporting evidence, unabashed criticism and insult directed at Ottoman Turkey was


largely tolerated. While the alleged atrocities and barbarisms of other nations were received with a great benefit of doubt, allegation about Ottoman misdeeds were almost always acknowledged as established facts.

Regarding the bilateral relations between Ottoman Turkey and neighboring countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was arguably Greece which had gained most of the negative Turkish image prevalent in Western Europe. The Greek manipulation and promotion of negative Turkish image, in tum, was predominantly kept alive by the British politician William Gladstone, who had served four times as Prime Minister between 1868 and 1894? Gladstone described the Ottoman Turks as 'a tremendous incarnation of military power, an advancing curse that menaced the whole of Europe, leaving a broad line ofblood marking the track behind the'. He was also straightforward in his view that he saw the Turks as a relic from 'the black day when they first entered Europe, one great anti-human specimen ofhumanity' (Pettifer,1993: 192).

Ottoman-Greek relations in the light of anti-Turkish bias in Europe

Given the biased and harsh attitudes of Western European statesmen, which were most clearly epitomized in the opinions of William Gladstone, Greek statesmen and politicians frequently resorted to the sympathies and assistance of Western powers whenever the opportunity rose. This was especially the case in the period between 1821 and 1913, in which the Greek kingdom had expanded its territory at the expense of Ottoman Turkey for the five times. Arguably in all of these Ottoman-Greek conflicts between 1829 and 1913, Greek statesmen and political activists managed to present the Ottomans as aggressors, and to enlist the support of European major powers which did not need to be asked twice. It was hardly surprising then, that the young Greek kingdom, which has always been the aggressor state in the Ottoman-Greek wars, managed to obtain territory from the Ottomans five times in 92 years, despite having lost all military battles with the exception of the First Balkan War.

Another noteworthy consequence of the Greek territorial expansion in the 19th century was that hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Turks were left at the mercy of the occupying or advancing Greek forces. While many Ottoman Turks preferred to escape from the advancing Greek armies and

2 A comprehensive summary of William Gladstone's political career and British Foreign Policy during his four terms as Prime Minister is available at the BBC official website http://www. bbc.co. uklhistory /historic_ figures/ gladstone_ william_ ewart. shtml


settled in unoccupied parts of the Ottoman states, many more were unable, or unwilling to leave their hometowns and villages. As a result, those Ottoman Turks who remained in Greek-occupied territories became subjects, and also often victims, of the Greek kingdom. Nevertheless, the European powers, and especially the British politicians, routinely downplayed the atrocities committed against Turks while they categorically exaggerated the Turkish misdeeds. In the words of Greek-Canadian historian and researcher Andre Gerolymatos, who combined his own observations with those of 19th century prominent British historians:

"The siege ofTripolis in 1821 and the subsequent slaughter of the Muslim population was the result of a combination of fear and the [Greek} army's sense that it had been cheated. For six months, the Greeks had laid siege to the city, and the troops had been promised booty to make up for their not being paid..... The Greek insurgents stumbled onto brutality because they lacked the professionalism needed to conduct disciplined warfare. For the Ottomans, on the other hand, savagery was the mechanism of imperial control." (Gerolymatos, 2001: 174-175)

It goes without saying, in the light of Andre Gerolymatos' biased evaluation of Turkish and Greek atrocities towards each other, that the downplaying of Turkish sufferings, in addition to the exaggeration of Turkish misdeeds, constitutes an important component of anti-Turkish propaganda. As it would be impossible for a reasonable historian to deny or neglect the plights of Ottoman Turks at the hands of the Greeks, the only possible way to maintain a predominantly anti-Turkish attitude would be to downplay or belittle Turkish sufferings. It can therefore be argued that Gerolymatos tried to do exactly this by presenting Greek brutality as an exception while portraying the Turkish transgressions as a rule. By presenting the wrongdoings of other nations towards Turks as reactions against Turkish brutality or as exceptionally rare incidents, historians and academicians like Gerolymatos arguably urged their readers to think that the usual villains were, as it had always been, the Turks.

If it was William Gladstone who was most eager to be manipulated by anti-Turkish propaganda, it was Eleutheros Venizelos who, after having intensively studied and contemplated the anti-Turkish attitude in Europe, had made most use of these prejudices for the sake of his own country. Intensifying his anti-Turkish propaganda after the defeat of Germany in 1918, V enizelos started an intensive campaign in order to convince especially British- and French public opinions that ethnic Greeks were being massacred in Anatolia. The majority of French- and British statesmen,


having been exposed to the same anti-Turkish propaganda as their public, did not have to be asked twice. In the words of academician ibrahim Erdal, who has done extensive research about Turkish-Greek relations in the early 20th century, "Venizelos has step by step succeeded in accomplishing the 'Megali Idea' from 1919 until 1922. His propaganda was so successful that the Allied Powers officially declared that the reason for the Greek occupation of Izmir was 'preventing the massacres of Greeks. (Erdal, 2006: 25).

The observations and conclusions of Turkish academician ibrahim Erdal were further corroborated by the findings of British academician, journalist and researcher James Pettifer who has done extensive research on TurkishGreek relations in the 191

h century. Although certain positions of Pettifer could arguably be tarnished with anti-Turkish bias as well, his general conclusions about the Western European perception of Turkish-Greek conflicts have arguably been commendable. In an arguably rare example of self-criticism, Pettifer thus managed to summarize the pro-Greek and antiTurkish bias in Western Europe, from which he was admittedly influenced as well. In the words ofPettifer, "behind all Greek-Turkish disputes, there is a ball and chain of old symbolism and iconography in which Greece is seen to represent law, decency, rationalism, Christianity and European civilization, while Turkey represents anti-democratic principles, Islam, totalitarianism, and so on" (Pettifer, 1993: 192). Though Pettifer acknowledged a relative decline in the Western European anti-Turkish bias after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, he nevertheless insisted on the enduring validity of his claim until present.

The Greek occupation of Western Turkey from 1919 until 1922, which had detrimental effects both on ethnic Turks and ethnic Greeks, eventually led to an increased understanding of Turkish causes in Europe. The notion that other European nations, especially Greeks, were also capable of dreadful atrocities started to gain acceptance in Western Europe. Even though it was too late to reverse the tragic fate of ethnic Turks and Greeks in Aegean Turkey, it became relatively more difficult in Europe to make Turks scapegoats for all bloodsheds. For the first time in recent history, it was acknowledged, even by some Greek authors, that the eruption of a major war was not the result of Turkish barbarism, but of pure Greek aggression. (Sotiriou, 2005: 300-301) Thus, it became a necessity for antiTurkish propagandists to develop new and more subtle methods of lobbying after the 1920s.


The relative improvement of new Turkey's image in Europe made it impossible for anti-Turkish lobbyists to propagate their agendas in traditional and relatively direct ways. Since it became clear that especially British and French statesmen were hoodwinked by Greeks into a major war in Anatolia in 1919, anti-Turkish propaganda in its rudest form became highly suspected and disliked in Europe. Even though there has not been an official apology or assumption of responsibility regarding the occupation of Anatolia between 1919 and 1922, certain groups and circles in Europe publicly admired Turkey's successful war against this occupation which derived its alleged legitimatization from Greek propaganda. Nevertheless, this admiration did not prevent anti-Turkish propaganda from searching and finding more subtle and alternative channels, such as literature and media.

The transformation of anti-Turkish propaganda after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic

Following the collapse of traditional defamation activities against Turkey after the Turkish military victories in 1922, new categories of destructive propaganda started to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s in Europe as well as in North America. Even though the emerging forms of antiTurkish propaganda did not claim to be based on scientific facts, they managed to keep centuries-old anti Turkish notions alive until this day. These new forms of propaganda can be grouped into films, novels, television sequels, and caricatures in the daily press. While novels had been the first and most prevalent form of this new form of anti-Turkish propaganda until the 1950s, they had mostly been replaced by films, TV sequels, and newspaper caricatures since then.

Franz Werfel's 'Forty Days in Musa Dagh', and Karl May's 'Durch das wilde Kurdistan' can be considered as significant examples of anti-Turkish propaganda in forms of novels. Having the equivalent effect of today's television series, these and similar novels in the 1930s and 1940s reached a high level of popularity in German-speaking countries in Europe. Even though these novels did not provide readers with historical documents or scientific proofs, they conditioned readers' minds about Turks' allegedly unpredictable and violent nature. Since these novels were not of diplomatic or official nature, there was no way that they could be repudiated, disputed, or countered by Turks or by those who thought that the novels did not reflect the reality.

In his novel, 'Forty Days in Musa Dagh', Franz Werfel described the struggles of some Armenian villagers who were resisting deportation orders of Ottoman authorities. During the course of the book, the struggles of the


Armenians were praised while the efforts of Ottoman soldiers to evacuate the villagers were strongly criticized. In Karl May's 'Durch das wilde Kurdistan', Turks were depicted as the sole responsible nation for Kurds' plights and lack of a homeland. Both novels concur in their conclusion that Turks are somewhat occupiers in a land which has never belonged to Kurds or Armenians. Nevertheless, as only a small part of the readers would be familiar with these facts, the historical reality would not help Turkey much in saving its stained image.

As means of mass communications have drastically improved after the Second World War, movies and eventually TV series replaced novels as subtle propaganda tools. As even television was not as widespread as movie theaters until the late 1970s, it can be asserted that the preferred means of propaganda from the early 1950s until early 1980s have been movies. Movies like Midnight Express, for example, which had depicted Turkey as a backward, authoritarian, and totally corrupt country, achieved great successes in terms of attendance and sales. The movie, which had greatly exaggerated the shortcomings of the Turkish penal and judicial system, arguably defamed Turkey more effectively than any anti-Turkish lobby could do in any other form of propaganda.

Even the apology of Alan Parker, the director of the movie, was arguably too late in order to reverse or repair the damage done to the image of Turkey. Given that even the author of this research paper was mocked with reference to Midnight Express several times during his stay in the United States, suggests that the movie successfully penetrated into the American pop culture. In other words, the 'realness' of the happenings in 'Midnight Express' has stopped mattering long time ago, as the images and messages of the movie had been carved deeply into the memories of the American public.

Another form of propaganda which requires little proof and factual information is the use of caricatures as means of defamation. Although a known means of journalistic art since the late 191

h centuries, the use of caricatures became popular in the 1980s. Mainly appearing on the political satires or newspaper columns, this means of propaganda was also discovered by anti-Turkish lobbies. As it is extremely difficult to protest or disprove a message conveyed by a caricature, Turks living abroad were usually helpless against these defamation attempts. Having discovered an effective and subtle way to provoke the anti-Turkish feelings among European readers, anti-Turkish lobbyists started to resort to caricatures with increasing frequency.


The image of corrupt Turk, fundamentalist Turk, uncivilized Turk, and oriental/un-European Turk is widely used in the caricatures which frequently appear in American and European newspapers. (Adanah & Erensii, 2005: 6-24) Especially when the caricatures accompany a column or article which criticizes Turkey, the caricature serves also the purpose of strengthening the message of the columnists or journalists. While there is always a possibility of writing a counter-argument against a newspaper article however, it is highly unrealistic to take the same action against a biased caricature. Especially when the reader possesses already a subconscious anti-Turkish bias due to his or her prior education, the caricatures contribute to the affirmation of these prejudices.

Long term effects of anti-Turkish propaganda

It would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that watching of an antiTurkish movie or reading of an anti-Turkish caricature would tum people instantly into haters of Turks and of Turkey. It would undeniably take more than one piece of anti-Turkish propaganda in order to manipulate an individual's opinion about Turks and Turkey. Nevertheless, given that the European, and increasingly also the American public opinion has been inundated with anti-Turkish propaganda, even small amounts of media prejudice would serve as complements of the defamation efforts. Consequently, even admirable and praiseworthy actions of Turkish public may be presented as deplorable actions, mostly without being detected by the targeted public.

As a result of carefully directed propaganda, even the most education sections of the European public were eventually indoctrinated by the antiTurkish lobbies. By the amalgamation of anti-Turkish novels, movies, TV series, and caricatures, the Europeans who consider themselves as intellectuals also received their share of indoctrinations and biases. Academic researchers, journalists, and lawmakers who are supposed to constitute the most educated subsections of European public opinion consequently lost part of their objectivity when they were dealing with Turkish matters. As the opinions expressed by these highly intellectual group of Europeans is highly respected, however, their own anti-Turkey biases usually harm Turkish image more than any other form of antiTurkish propaganda.

Especially when a well-known European journalist reports about Cyprus, the status of the army in Turkey, PKK terrorism, or Armenian allegations, most Europeans are arguable ready to read a piece of article which will be almost certainly anti-Turkish in its attitude. Due to the combined efforts of


anti-Turkish lobbies and their extensions in the media, Cyprus would most likely be associated with Turkish aggression, PKK terrorism would be coupled with human rights issues, Armenian allegations would be presented as genocide, and the Turkish Army would be accused of being antidemocratic in most articles. According to the observations of Sedat La~iner, whose specific focus is the Armenian lobby:

"The combined efforts of Armenian groups, combined with the activities of Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Kurdish separatist, and other radical anti-Turkish groups greatly hinders the lives of Turkish immigrants, as well as of Turkish individuals who are in business contacts with European countries. The persistent anti-Turkish propaganda activities of these well-organized groups sooner or later lead to a communication breakdown between Turkey and Western public opinion. Eventually, Turkey meets a strong public resistance in matters such as Cyprus, EU accession, free trade, free movement of workers, and Kurdish issue which initially seem not interrelated. This public resistance, in turn, often forces the leaders in European capitals to assume anti-Turkish attitudes as well". (La~iner, 2004: 158)

According to La~iner, especially the Armenian lobby has engaged all of its resources and allies in order to damage Turkey's image in Europe, and thus managed to become a part in Turkish-EU relations especially in the areas of thorny issues. Due to successful Armenian propaganda and manipulation, problems stemming from Kurdish separatist activities or Greek intransigence in Cyprus may have repercussions in Armenian genocide allegations, or vice versa. Consequently, an image of a very dangerous and opportunistic Turk is created, who should not be compromised or tolerated even in issues where the other side is undeniably mistaken. Accordingly, the Turkish side should always be treated with utmost intolerance and intransigence, so that the arguably interrelated interests of Armenians, Greek-Cypriots, Kurdish separatists, and the EU in general can be protected.

Turkey's EU bid and EU's growing anti-Turkish bias

Though the ultimate message conveyed by the anti-Turkish lobbies is highly biased and bigoted, it is abundantly manifest that this message is being received with increasing eagerness in Europe. It arguably serves the agendas of most European politicians to postpone Turkey's EU accession based on the accusations of anti-Turkish lobbies. As it is extremely likely that careful journalistic or academic research would disclose the unfairness of these accusations, the anti-Turkish European organizations would most


likely intervene in order to prevent such a research from being conducted. Therefore, preference and financial support would be granted to those researchers and journalists with a known anti-Turkish bias, so that their coverage of Turkish issues would reflect the same biases and prejudices. Other journalists and researchers, on the other hand, who are known to conduct independent research regardless of financial incentives or intimidations, will most probably be left out in the first place.

As Western Europe is arguably the most educated and democratic public opinion, however, it would be inevitable that certain politicians, academicians, journalists, and researchers become aware of the injustices committed against Turkey. As it is impossible to silence or oppress these individuals overtly in a democratic society, anti-Turkish lobbies and their political auxiliaries would try to marginalize and discredit these individuals as best as they can. By doing so, the anti-Turkish lobbies, in collaboration with their political connections, would not only prevent these individuals from creating a pro-Turkish attitude among their respective communities, but they would also try to hurt their own respectability as a means of punishment.

One alarming example regarding the current increase of anti-Turkish within the EU is the increased amount of opposition to Turkish membership in Austria. According to the report of ESI, a Berlin-based research and policy group, there was little distinction between Austrian attitudes towards Turkey and other EU candidate states. According to the ESI report, the Democratic Party, which was in opposition in 2004, accused the ruling Austrian People's Party (OVP) of 'going soft' on Turkey and forced the OVP to block EU's accession talks with Turkey. The OVP government, which has generally been steadfast in resisting to opposition parties' demands and pressures, made an exception in the case of Turkey. In accordance with the demands of the opposition party, the OVP did all it could do in order to stall the start of EU-Turkish accession negotiations during the Brussels Summit in December 2004. (ESI Report: Austrian opposition to Turkey stems from ignorance, 04/02/2008: TDN Online edition)

The ESI report further stressed the fact that while the EU enlargement have normally included intense debates across business associations, media, trade unions, and academic institutions, the Austrian politicians have avoided 'any serious debate on the merits of Turkish accession. "Instead, politicians have played on popular fears and prejudices, absolving themselves of responsibility for the decision by pushing off the issue off to a


referendum. Public opinion has therefore hardened against Turkish accession." As a result of this 'hardened public opinion' in Austria, the ESI report furthermore predicts that any referendum on Turkish accession between 2014 and 2020 would have a strongly hostile outcome against Turkey. (Ibid)

What the ESI report arguably omits, however, is that there has been a subtle and latent anti-Turkish bias in most Austrians' minds for several centuries. Even though such a bias may have remained in a dormant or suppressed form for a few decades following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, events after the 1960s arguably contributed to the reactivation of the anti-Turkish bias in Austria. The arrival of conservative, undereducated, and isolated Turkish guest workers in early 1970s and the arrival of genuine as well as phony political refugees in the 1980s led to an intensification of the latently existing anti-Turkish attitude in Austria. Not surprisingly, many PKK activists as well as terrorists were hidden among the pseudo-refugees which arrived in Austria in great numbers. In roughly a decade following their arrival in Austria, these terrorists and their sympathizers organized themselves as an efficient anti-Turkish lobby and propaganda group.

While Turkish authorities were quite busy and successful to contain the PKK propaganda in Germany, this was regrettably not the case in Austria. Thus, when the Austrian Democratic Party, which was in opposition in 2004, tried to comer the ruling Austrian People's Party, it enthusiastically wagered Turkey's European aspirations, and the ruling OVP defended itself by sacrificing the proposed wager. Although the Austrian public opinion would have arguably revolted against such a demagogic act if it had involved any other EU candidate country, there was no significant criticism or protest against the sacrifice of Turkey. It was hardly surprising then, that the right wing Freedom Party found the courage to plaster Vienna with posters declaring 'Turkey in the EU? Not with mel' during the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign. (Morris: 2005, 24)

Another striking and regrettable incidence regarding the growing antiTurkish sentiment in Europe took place in France, which, like Austria, stood out in the first decade of the new millennium as a fervent opponent of Turkish membership in the EU. The zealous aggression of French antiTurkish organizations became most evident by the Armenian actions against reputable American historian Bernard Lewis. Because Bernard Lewis frequently stated that the genocide allegations were Armenian attempts to bend history in their own interests, he has been persistently harassed by Armenian lobbyists in France since the early 1990s. Although initial


Armenian attempts to bring Lewis' statements into trial were unsuccessful, a Paris court eventually decided to hear the Armenian case against Lewis. Mainly due to extensive Armenian lobbying at French political and judicial levels, a French court ultimately condemned Bernard Lewis for 'denying the Armenian genocide' in 1997. (Gresh: 2005)

It should furthermore be noticed that the decision of the French court was reached prior to 2001, when French legislators officially recognized the Armenian 'genocide'. The fact that Armenian lobbies simply managed to have Bernard Lewis' freedom of speech condemned even prior to the French genocide law clearly demonstrates the power of the anti-Turkish forces in France. By condemning a respectable and prominent author like Bernard Lewis, French legislators furthermore demonstrated that they take the allegations of French-Armenians more seriously than the wellresearched findings of a distinguished academician. It should hardly be surprising then, by the same token, that no other writer or academician took the courage to criticize Armenian allegations on French soil ever since the decision on Bernard Lewis.

Conclusion

Given that most independent-minded scholars, statesmen, and media members in Europe are increasingly being intimidated by anti-Turkish organizations, a new field of activity for Turkish lobbies is becoming inevitable. In addition to their activities for the promotion of Turkish causes, Turkish interest groups abroad have to support and defend individuals who independently resist the anti-Turkish bias present in their respective countries. Since several prominent intellectuals, scholars, and academicians, as in the previously mentioned case of Bernard Lewis, are vehemently lambasted by European anti-Turkish organizations, defending the personal and professional integrities of these individuals has arguably become a Turkish strategic task as well. As these individuals are often portrayed by anti-Turkish lobbies as Turkish agents or propagandists on Turkish payroll, Turkish lobbies face a multifaceted task while defending these supporters of Turkish causes.

On the one hand, Turkish lobbies can proactively challenge the efforts of those who try to present all pro-Turkish journalists, politicians, and academicians as Turkish agents by effectively demonstrating that the majority of these individuals are in no way connected or affiliated with Turkish interest groups. As the burden of proof lies with the accusers and defamation activists, Turkish lobbies should preferably take legal action against the organizations which try to defame pro-Turkish individuals


without any tangible proof. Once these groups become aware of the prospect of legal action and probable conviction, most anti-Turkish organizations would most likely hesitate to defame pro-Turkish individuals. In other words, by challenging the defamation attempts legally, anti-Turkish organizations can be discouraged from attacking and insulting Turcophile academicians and journalists indiscriminately.

On the other hand, Turkish lobbies should assist these voluntary supporters of Turkish causes by providing them with legal, moral, and academic support in their efforts to counter the defamation attempts of antiTurkish organizations. It is therefore extremely important for the Turkish lobbies to screen and analyze the opinions of all prominent European journalists, academicians and researchers who focus on Turkey. Since the majority of these individuals did not conduct their research with the expectation of any financial compensation from Turkish lobbies, defending them when they are in need is morally and ethically justifiable. Without such a promised support from Turkish lobbies, any European who has means to publish her findings with a probably pro-Turkish conclusion is increasingly vulnerable to the harassment and defamation of anti-Turkish lobbies. As winning the support of the educated European public opinion is arguably the most essential task of Turkish lobbies, failure to support and defend pro-Turkish Europeans will eventually lead to the failure of this essential mission as well.


References:

Erdal, ibrahim (2006). Milbadele. (Ulusla~ma Silrecinde Tilrkiye ve Yunanistan I923-I925). istanbul: IQ Kiiltiir Sanat Yaymc1hk

ESI Report: Austrian opposition to Turkish membership stems from ignorance. (2008, February 4). Turkish Daily News Online Edition: http:/larama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-623448

Gerolymatos, Andre (2002). The Balkan Wars. Conquest, Revolution and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond. New York: Basic Books.

Gresh, Alain (2005). Malevolent Fantasy of Islam. Le Monde Diplomatique Retrieved: September 18, 2007, from http:/ /mondediplo.com/2005/08116lewis

Kuran-Buryoglu, Nedret (2005). Die Wandlungen des Tilrkenbildes in Europa. Vom II. Jahrhundert bis zur heutigen Zeit. Eine kritische Perspektive. Zurich: Spur Verlag

Laviner, Sedat (2004). Tilrkler ve Ermeniler (Turk Ermeni ili~kileri). istanbul: Kaknlis Y aymlan

Morris, Chris (2005). The New Turkey. The Quiet Revolution on the Edge of Europe. London: Granta

Pettifer, James (1993). The Greeks. The Land and the People since the War. London: Penguin

Sotiriou, Dido (2005). Farewell Anatolia. (First published in 1962 in Greek) Athens: Kedros Publishers.


THE EFFECTS OF THE CUSTOMS UNION ON TURKISH HOME APPLIANCE INDUSTRY*

Zelha ALTINKA YA

Abstract:

The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of the Customs Union on Home Appliance Manufacturing Industry in Turkey in the period between 1996-2006. The home appliance industry has been producing domectically since 1960s. Most of the product in the industry has been produced only by one or two producers for a long time. Only after 2000, the number of producers who produce refrigerator inreased to three. Not only the number of producers but previous studies on the concentration ratios also support that the structure of the home appliance industry is oligopolistic market structure. In 1996, the tariffs for the home appliance products imported from the European Union were reduced to zero. This raised the volume of import from the European Union Countries. The net profit margin for the leading company in Turkey was 10 % in 1996 where the same ratio is 2. 1 % for Whirlpool, a leading multinational company. While in the 15 years period, Whirlpool have kept its profit level around the same ratios during the period from 1991 to 2006, the ratio decreased 4. 7 % for the leading company in Turkey, in 2006. This decrease would be explained by large increase in the volume of the import of these products when the tariffs were removed in 1996.

Keywords: The Customs Union, home appliance industry, oligopoly, import discipline hypothesis

Ozet:

Bu s;ah~ma, Gi.imrtik Birligi'nino 1996-2006 y1llan Beyaz E~ya Sanayi i.izerindeki etkisini degerlendirmeyi amas;lamaktad1r. Beyaz E~ya Sanayi yurtis;inde iiretime 1950'li ylllardan itibaren ba~lanm1~tlr. Uriinlerin pek s;ogu sadece bir yada iki i.iretici tarafmdan i.iretilmi~tir. Ancak, 2000 y1lmdan

*This article is a reformulation and summary of the author's Ph.D thesis submitted to the European Union Institute of Marmara University.

108 EFFECTS OF CUSTOMS UNION ON TURKISH HOME APPLIANCE INDUSTRY

sonra endustrideki uretici say1s1 u~e ~1kabilmi~tir. Beyaz e~ya sanayinde daha onceki ylllarda yapllan ~ah~malar da endustri de yogunla~mamn yogun oldugunu gostermektedir. 1996 y1hnda Gumruk Birligi'nin ba~lamas1yla, Avrupa Birligi'nden ithal edilen beyaz e~ya urunlerinden ahnan gumruk vergi ve tarifeleri s1f1rlanm1~tlr. Bu nedenle, Avrupa Birligi'nden ithal edilen beyaz e~ya urunleri hacmi geni~lemi~tir. Hem uretici say1s1mn artmas1, hem de yap1lan ithalatm artmas1, beyaz e~ya pazanndaki rekabeti art1rm1~t1r. Levinshon'un en onemli argumam olan, ithalat disipline eder yakla~1m1, Turkiye beyaz e~ya sanayinde de etkin olmu~, artan rekabet ile birlikte rekabet artm1~ ve 1990 h ylllarda ~ok a~m karlar elde edilen beyaz e~ya sanayinde, 2000'li ylllann ortalannda, karhhk oramnda bir du~u~ onemli bir du~u~ kaydedilmi~tir. SektOrde lider konumda olan firmanm "net karhhg1" 1996 %10 iken 2006 y1hnda %4. 7 du~mu~tfu.

Anahtar kelimeler: Gilmriik Birligi, beyaz e§ya sanayi, oligopoly, ithalat disipline eder

1- Introduction

The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of the Customs Union on Home Appliance Manufacturing Industry in Turkey. The basic idea behind the Customs Union is to utilise the benefits of free trade amonlooojkrfdsazx. 1 kg the trading parties. Although, this is the basic argument of traditional trade theory on perfectly competitive market, the latest developments in international trade required inclusion of imperfectly competitive markets into theory. Depending on the challenges in theories, the policy arguments have also been changed. Especially, development in industrial economics and the arguments for the structure conduct performance paradigm and game theory put forward the policies which can also be effective in international trade. The selective use of trade barriers and industry subsibidies in order to capture the profits handled by foreign firms is only one of these policies. The effective trade and industry policies, especially import policies would discipline the markets which are highly concentrated. In these markets, import disciplines the extraordinary profits of the firms. In this study, the effect ofthe Customs Union on home appliance industry will be analysed. Turkish home appliance sector was composed of two sub groups: white home appliance sector and brown home appliance sector. Recently, this classification of the home appliance sector were removed and both type of products have been called consumer durables or home appliance industry.


2- Previous Studies On The Effect of the Customs Union on Turkish Economy

Before this study, there were many studies evaluating the implication of liberalization policies in Turkey since 1980. After Krueger and Tuncer, Foroutan was the second who analysed the process, Foroutan pointed out that import penetration in the highly concentrated private sectors reduced the gross pofit margin in Turkey within the period 1977-1985. Similarly, Katirctoglu, Engin and Ak9ay and Y al((m were the others who tested the price-cost margins by using least square estimation method on panel data of Turkish manufacturing industries over 1983-1994. Katlrcwglu, Engin and Ak9ay found out the import penetration due to foreign trade liberalization of the 1980s reduced the concentration on many oligopolistic industries.

Recently, Akgiindiiz (2005) estimated income and price elasticities of import demand of 9 EU countries by analyzing the period between 1987 and 2004. This paper put forward that the price variable in the long-run import demand function of Turkey from Germany, Belgium and Denmark had negative sign unexpectedly. The real exchange rate does not affect import demand in the long-run from UK, Italy, Portugal and Denmark. This was surprising result either (Akgiindiiz, 2005).

Seymen and Utkulu (2006) analysed the level of price competitiveness of the Turkish firms in the EU Single market in aggregate level for the period 1963-2002. They concluded that both the long-run price and income elasticities of Turkish Exports to the EU significantly reduced after the Single Market. Although the income elasticity was significant and high, measure of import capacity lowered the price elasticity (Seymen and Utkulu, 2006: 38)

Neyapti and Ta~km and Ongor( 2004) estimated import and export functions of Turkey with the EU and non-EU countries. They observed that the income elasticity of both imports and exports are lower for the EU countries, especially for the CU period. While the effect of real exchange rate on export was stronger for the period of the CU. This was explained by the increased imports for during the periods of largely overvalued TL, especially for the period 1993-2000 (Neyapti and Ta~km and Ongor, 2004).

Ozkale and Karaman (2006) focused on general demand function and main trade commodity groups. They found out that the price changes did not effect the aggregated import demand function. Ozkale and Karaman investigated the differences with regards to volume and behavioural aspects for 19 EU countries and 16 non-EU countries (Ozkale and Karaman, 2006). Real import demand was considered as a function of domestic income and


real exchange rate. Ozkale and Karaman selected 2004 as the base year and first 10 importing chapters(85 chapter of these importing chapters is electrical machinery and including home appliances products). According to the estimation results of equations, after the CU imports from the non-EU countries decreased. They repeated the analysis using equations and found that the CU did not have not trade creation' and trade diversion effect. Ozkale and Karaman interpreted that in case of a decrease in Turkey's GDP, she would give up imports from non-EU countries while imports from the EU countries became less responsive to price changes and imports from non-EU countries became more responsive. Import demand of electrical goods and machinery from the EU increased after the CU, the agreement made trade creative effect (Ozkale and Karaman; 2006: 16)

In their analysis, Erzan, Filiztekin and Zenginobuz (2007) tested the relationship between industry structure and trade variables. When industries were treated together without grouping them according to CR42

, it was observed that increases in output concentration significantly loaded import penetration. When concentration is reduced in concentrated industries through new domestic entry, the share of imports in total consumption would increase. The evaluation of the test results on the impact of industry structure was challenging: concentration reduced exports significantly. Erzan, Filiztekin and Zenginobuz also observed that the impact of PriceCost Margin (PCM) on import penetration was qualitatively same as the impact of CR4 on import penetration. When the study was considered from the import discipline hypothesis perspective, it was observed import penetration does not have any effect on market concentration. When industries were grouped according to their concentration levels, import

1 Trade creation effect: Trade creation means that a free trade area creates trade that would not have existed otherwise. As a result, supply occurs from a more efficiency producer of the product. In all cases trade creation will raise country's national welfare. Trade diversion effect: A free trade area diverts trade away from a more efficient supplier outside the FT A, towards a less efficient supplier within the FT A. In some cases, trade diversion will reduce a country's national welfare but in some cases national welfare could improve despite the trade diversion. 2 Herfhindall Index calculated by summing the square of all firm's market share. It takes value from 0 to 1. If it is calculated to close to 0, then there is low level concentration. If it is calculated as close to 1, there can be more level of concentration ratios. CR 4 is calculated for the first four leading firms in the sector while the CR8 shows the concentration ratio for the eight leading firms. 0-30 indicates low level of concentration 31-50 indicates medium level of concentration 71-100 indicates high level of concentration.


penetration did not reduce concentration in concentrated industries, while for less concentrated industries changes in import penetration had not significant negative impact on market concentration. As for export, no significant impact of exchanges in exports on industry structure was observed for either low or high concentration industries.

Saat9i and Asian (2007) also analysed disciplinary effects of import on Turkish manufacturing industry with two digits under the period starting from 1966 to 2001. Saat((i and Aslan used the panel data in this analysis. Since until that time, the most of the studies were covering different short term periods, they produced different results. Some of them were supporting the import discipline hypothesis and some of them were not. So, Saat((i and Aslan studied so long period of time for the first time on Turkish manufacturing industry. The study concluded that the relationship between import and Turkish manufacturing industry is positive and statistically siginificant. This conclusion approved that the import liberalization just decreased the profitability on Turkish manufacturing industry. Whenever Saat9i and Aslan focused on the relationship between export and price and cost, they also found negative and statistically significant relationship among them. Saat((i and Asian explained this by stating that whenever the producers producing in the imperfectly competitive markets export to foreign countries, they would not discriminate the prices on domestic market and foreign markets and the increase in export inversely effected the price-cost margin on products like it is the case in import discipline hypothesis. They also conclude that the relationship between capital and price-cost margin has been negative and statistically insignificant which means increase in the volume of capital decrease the profitability of production in the analysis period ( Saat9i and Aslan, 2007;1-15).

3- The Structure of Turkish Home Appliance Industry

It is claimed that foreign trade liberalization increases the welfare of a country further under the imperfectly competitive domestic markets because it reduces distortions created in the imperfect competitive markets by removing of barriers. If there are a few domestic firms in a domestic market, the removal of barriers on international trade allow firms acting in industries to enjoy profits in a protected domestic market and force these firms to behave competitively. The effects of removal of tariffs or other trade restrictions are more active in the competitive markets. Levinsohn (1993) calls this situation as "imports as market discipline hypothesis" and defines this hypothesis as the hypothesis about how firms respond to a change in trade policy. Levinsohn's hypothesis can be defined as derivation of the


"Structure-Conduct-Performance"paradigm. Here, firstly, then the structure of the industry will be analysed, then trade effects would be analysed

While within the argument of structure -conduct-performance paradigm, it is argued that structure of the markets determines the conduct of the firms in the market, the conduct of the firms also determines the performance of the firms. Mostly, in competitive structure, firms get normal profits, industries with economies of scale and market power get higher profits than the normal. While trade liberalization would remove trade barriers and make markets more competitive, changes in the market structure from concentrated markets to competitive markets would also change the conduct of the companies, companies would start to behave more competitively and reduce prices and the extraordinary profits.

Abraham Lincoln summarizes his idea on foreign trade as follows: "when I buy coat from England. I have to coat and England has the money. But when I buy a coat in America, I have the coat and America has the money'' (Dixit, 1986: 288). This argument states an important general principle for determining policy and its relevancy to social desirability and opportunity cose.

In mercantilist view, in perfectly competitive markets, free entry means no excess profit exists in the market. Thus, Americans could not benefit from supplying Lincoln's coat and since producing just one extra coat may be matter of indifference as long as the price of coat equals to marginal cost of producing an extra coat to the society as a whole at the margin. Therefore, Dixit does not evaluate this as mercantilist policy to encourage purchase of American coats to discourage to purchase of English coat (Dixit, 1986: 289). When the numbers of coats produced increase and diminishing returns might arise the cost of production above the price, this would be a loss making proposition for the American society as a whole. The losses could be compensated where the coat prices reduce all over the world. Under these conditions, an anti-mercantilist policy of export restraint would be required. In new mercantilist view, the basic model of the economy change to cover the imperfect competition. Firms operating behind the barriers would keep prices in excess of pure profits. Since, these can be thought of as scarcity values of the restricted positions in the industry, this is called as monopoly rent.

3 Opportunity cost: The cost of an input is the value of the forgone opportunity to put it to the next best available use. If markets are functioning efficiently, the prices of inputs will equal their opportunity costs


Any project which substantial amount of capital has been sunk into research and development and only one or a few firms succeed and go on the production stage and these gets large monopoly profits. They would not have undertaken the investment without the prospect of such a reward. After successful firms have become organized in the industry, the sunk cost will constitute an entry barrier for new firms. There is usually free entry to the whole process. In the case where firm plans to make investment into R&D during the early stage of the industry's evaluation, there would be zero excess profit for the process as a whole, the profits of successful firms would just match the losses of the rest (Dixit, 1986: 292). So, if the firms continue to have excess rents, the concentration ratio is a well organized measure of imperfectly competitive markets. Home appliance industry with its structures which require high initial cost and high R&D programs is the typical example of imperfectly competitive market. Even all over the world, the number of producers in the home appliance industry is so low that naturally the home appliance industry in each country has imperfectly competitive market structure. In Turkey, it is the same, home appliance industry has been one of the highly concentrated industries. In addition to the imperfectly competitive market structure, the high tariffs rates imposed on the import of home appliance industry, the industry was one of protected industry.

The Turkish home appliances sector started to production as an assembly industry in the 1950's. The first Turkish made refrigerator was introduced to the market in 1960. It was produced by "Ar9elik". The seventies were the first years that Turkey produced the other domestic home appliance products under its own trade mark again by Ar9elik. Although demand for home appliance products was considerable, the production capacity was limited. This could be due to the technical difficulty. The large part of the domestic consumption was provided by domestic production. Especially, at the beginning of the 1970's, it is observed there was not import from the foreign countries, although, there were small amount of export. The home appliance industry was protected by serious amount of tariffs. In 1971, the average amount of production was 200. 000 units annually (iGEME, 1973: 7). At that time, there were nine producers (including suppliers od auxiliary products) in refrigerator industry. However, only five of them were effective producers and 54 per cent of total production were carried only by one firm. The 31 per cent of remaining part was also produced by the second firm in the industry. So, the 85 per cent of the total supply was provided by only two firms. Following table shows the detail of production capacity of leading firms in 1970s.


Table 3. 1: Refri2erator Production Capacity in Turkey in 1970s Firm Annual Call_acity Current Production

1970 1971 1970 1971 A 70.000 108.000 106.210 116. 056 B 45.000 45.000 52.210 66. 839 c 24. 780 25.000 13.725 19.838 D 12. 500 12. 500 5.489 10.617 E 7.000 7.000 800 857 Total 159.800 197.500 178.425 214.207

Source: iGEME, 1973 (Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Sanayi Bakanhg1 ve Istanbul Sanayi Odas1 (Ministry oflndustry of the Republic of Turkey and Istanbul Chamber oflndustry)

The average amount of production per firm and total production by industry was limited. Therefore, they were able to charge very high prices to their product since they were operating in imperfectly competitive markets. The small scale firms also determined their price at a high level since they were protected by high customs duties, although, they were unable to increase their production level because of financial difficulties and improper production techniques. The profit cost margin of these firms were 30 per cent. Other firms which were producing in modem technology, management and organizations would produce at a lower cost and apply high prices.

In 1980s, although there were five producers producing refrigerator, ninety per cent of products were produced by Ars;elik and Profilo

Table 3. 2: Production Capacity in Home Appliance Products in Turkey

Refrigerator Washing l\olacbine DishWasher Vacuum Cleaner Years ...... 1985 2000 2005 1985 2000 2005 1985 2000 2005 1985 2000 2005 Firm l Ar~elik 600 1400 3200 1150 3100 0 500 900 N.A 1000 1000 Profllo{l) 690 800 1550 450 450 0 0 0 N.A 0 0 Vestel 0 700 2750 0 0 2500 0 0 0 N.A 0 0 Presiz 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N.A 0 0 Others 26 Total 1416 2900 7500 0 1600 6050 0 500 900 N.A 1000 1000

(1) BSH Profilo

Source: Dayamkh Tiiketim Malian ihracat Pazar Ara~tJrmasi, Durable Consumption Goods Export Markets Research, Tiirkiye ihracab Geli~tirme Merkezi, Export Promotion Center of Turkey, 1985;

Annual Reports 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. http: www. an;:elik. com. tr; www. bshp. com. tr, 2002; www. bsh. com. tr, www. vestel. com. tr.


Profilo Inc. had the highest capacity in refrigerator production in 1985. It was dominating 48 per cent of the whole market. Annual production capacity increased to 1. 416. 000 units per year. By trade liberalization program of 1980, home appliance sector also started to export leading growth. Although, since 1989, the industry faced more competition by reduction the customs duties for the home appliance goods imported from the EU, it continued to grow, even in foreign markets. Therefore, this growth can be interpreted as the result of growing competition that caused improvement of quality standards in production, R&D investments and formulation of marketing and production strategies.

By the year 2000s, in Turkish Home Appliance sector, all products of home appliance industry refrigerator, washing machine, dish washers, cooking appliances, vacuum cleaners, television were produced. After, the third largest firm, Vestel, invested for a large amount of production capacity in 2003, the total production capacity for refrigerator increased to 3. 300. 000 units per year. There were eight major producers, more than 50 medium scale manufacturing firms in the industry. Eight major producers are the members of the Ttirkiye Beyaz E~ya Sanayicileri Demegi (TORKBESD), (White Goods Industrialist Association of Turkey (TWGIA)).

Table. 3. 3: Production and Domestic Sales in Turkey's Home Appliance industry I 1000 Units

Refrigerator Washiag Machine DishWasher VacD111D Cleaner Years ll (l _{). _{2

Production Domestic

Production Domestic

Production Domestic

Production Domestic

Sales Sales Sales Sales 1990 960 913 758 734 63 85 261 244 1995 1637 940 828 786 236 241 879 394 1996 1638 1129 993 1067 255 319 1055 508 1997 1849 1303 1454 1464 447 427 1297 725 1998 1875 1711 1375 1494 318 478 1172 810 1999 2139 1610 1219 1222 325 406 1066 743 2000 2446 1244 1343 1121 351 278 1173 866 2001 2483 1255 1029 614 223 !58 591 762 2002 3318 1424 1684 721 346 195 785 829 2003 4286 1680 2459 949 399 !56 768 893 2004 5308 2486 3963 1686 657 385 1563 1602 2005 5538 2140 4382 1675 783 412 1206 1289

Source: BEYSAD- WGSA Statistics, 2006: http: //www. beysad. org. tr /statistics (1) for the data from 1990 to 2002 TURKBESD, for the data from 2002-2003 YUzal,

2005 www. igeme. gov. tr, for the data from 2003-2005 Esen 2007 www. igeme. gov. tr (2) TUiK, Uretim istatistikleri Yilhklan , Production Statistics, Yearly Data Base

www. tuik. gov. tr


Depending on the population, income and technology, the increase in demand of refrigerator also increased the production capacity. The total production capacity reached to 3. 6 million units in 2000 and 7. 5 million in 2005. Six firms were producing refrigerator during 2000s. Ar~elik, BoschSiemens-Profilo, Vestel Beyaz E~ya and Merloni Elettrodomestic. In Turkey, the total production capacity for refrigerator of leading three home appliance producers became 7. 5 million units by the year 2005 (Yiizal, 2006: 1 ). During the 40 years period, Ar~elik has maintained its leadership in Turkish home appliance sector. Ar~elik became one of the fifth largest home appliances manufacturers in Europe with its significant investments and marketing and sales policies. Turkey.

A positive macroeconomic environment, low inflation rate, low consumer credit interest rates and delayed demand during the economic crisis, in the year 2003 and 2006, the considerable growth in home appliance goods was observed in Turkey. These indicators also encouraged production capacity increasing investments. Rapid growth in construction sector also pushed the growth in housing establishments. So. The total production for refrigerators were for 6. 7 million units, for washing machine 5. 2 million units and dishwashers for 1. 2 million units in 2006. 36 per cent of the total production was sold in domestic market, and the remaining part, 64 per cent was exported to over 1 00 countries. While refrigerators production had the highest output units, dishwasher production had 52. 2 per cent increases due to the low market diffusion in Turkey (Annual Report of Bosch-Siemens-Profilo, 2007). With further capital investment the sector grew its production capacity, and factor output of large domestic appliances was up 6 per cent for the year. During the analysis period, rapid development in technology deeply changed the product models, while in 1970, the refrigerator with double doors may be considered as luxury product, nowadays, refrigerators with energy saving specification are the new models; or washing machine with 15 minutes wash-cycles, dishwashers with anti-fingerprint were considered as luxury models(Annual Report of Arcelik, 2006). The high-technology used in production process, high priority in R&D activities have been the main features of Turkish home appliance industry.

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

Graph: 3.1

90 110 70

I : t. :

20 10

0

S~e elf Three Leading Producers

117

1990 "1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 19lJ7 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Years

~elik Vestell

Source: This graph is arranged by the data given on the table 3. 4

Table 3. 4. : Refrigerator Production of Producer Companies in T k /1000 U •t ur ey1 DIS

Share of Bosch

Share of Share of Years Ar~elik

Ar~elik Siemens

B-S-P Vestel

Vestel% Total

(1) Profilo (4) Production (2)

_(3}_ %(2) (2)

1990 537 56 416 43 0 0 965

1995 901 55 N.A. 0 0 1637

1996 984 60 524 32 0 0 1638

1997 1140 62 601 33 0 0 1849

1998 1454 78 598 32 0 0 1875

1999 1375 64 656 31 0 0 2139

2000 1219 50 654 27 235 10 2446

2001 1343 54 460 19 429 17 2483

2002 1500 45 520 16 723 22 3318

2003 1900 44 672 16 1139 27 4286

2004 N.A N.A 903 17 1415 27 5308

2005 N.A N.A 1. 029 19 1718 31 5538 Source: IMKB, (Istanbul Stock Exchange), Fmancia1 Reports of The Compames (1), (3) are taken from Year Book ofthe Companies Stated in IMKB, http://www. irnkb. gov. tr /bilanco/mtablodonem. htm; (!)Annual Reports of Arcelik, http://www. arcelik. com. tr/ YatirimcilliskilerillrnkbArcelik/?MENUID=2; Annual Reports ofBSP http://www. profile. com. tr; http://www. bosch. com. tr; http://www. bosch. com. Annual Report for 2005. (2)The share of each company is calculated by dividing production quantity of its to total production (4) Annual Reports ofVestel http://www. vestelyatirimciiliskileri. corn/ http://www. vestelyatirimciiliskileri. corn/reports/pdf/2006NestelElektronik2006FR. pdf


In this rapidly growing market, there were only two producers for a long time until the third company started to production in 2000. Aryelik is the first one, the other one is the Bosch -Siemens-Profilo. Aryelik is the leader company and B-S-P has been following Arcelik. Aryelik produced the 45 per cent of all refrigerator production in Turkey, in 2002 where the total refrigerator sales by the same companies were 1. 514 million units. Although its market share was 60 per cent in 1996, it decreased to 48 per cent in 2002. There are important influences causing reduction in the market share of Aryelik. Although, import may be evaluated as one of the important factor, the investment carried out by Vestel with high production capacity may also be one the other important reason

4-The Effect of the Customs Union to the Home Appliance Industry

Table 4. 1: The Customs Duties and Import Tax for Home Appliance Products

Yean Rel'rigeraiDr Washin; MachiDe Dish Washer Va""""'a.,....,r

1985(1) 40%+ 150$1unit 25%+100$/Units 25%+ 1 00$/unit 40%+ I $/unit

1992(2) 9 % for the F.U 6.5% for the F.U 2% for the F.U 8% for the F.U

20% fornon-F.U 15 % for non-F.U 5% for non-F.U 18 % for non-F.U

+ 92 $/Units- 46 $/units +16%ofCIF 155$/units 20$/units

1993(3) 6 % for the F.U 6 % for the F.U I% for the F.U 6% for the F.U

14% fornon-F.U 15 % fornon-F.U 3.5 % for non-F.U 13.2% for non F.U

35$/units- 45$/units + 35$ !Unit + 17% ofCIFvalue 20$ /units

1994(4) 3% for the F.U 3 % for the F.U countries 1,9% for the EU 3 % for the F.U

9.4% for non-F.U 10.6 % fornon-EU 4,9% fornon-EU 93% fornon-EU 35$/units-45 $ units

+ 35$ per unit 75$/units

1995(5) Free of Charge for the Free of Chaige for the F.U Free of Charge for Free of Charge for EU EU theF.U

3.8% for non-EU 2.8%forEU 33% for non EU

(1) Tiirktye Cumhunyett Resmt Gazetest dated on 12/31/1985, tssue 18970 pp: 98, 102, 124 (2) Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazetesi dated on 12/31/ 1992, issue 21452 pp: 65, 194, (3) Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazetesi dated on 12/ 31/1993, issue 21805 pp: 219 (4) Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazetesi dated on 12/31/1994, issue 22158 pp: 238,249 (5) Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazetesi dated on 12/ 31/1995, issue 22510 pp: 194, 620

The tariff rate and the other customs duties applied to the products imported from the EU decreased gradually from 1985 to 1996. Although, 40 per cent tariff rates and 150$/units customs duties were applied for refrigerator in 1985, only 3 per cent for the products imported from the EU in 1995. Similarly, the tariff rate applied to washing machine and dish


washer imported from the EU was 25 per cent and the customs duties was 100 $units per unit in 1985.

The tariff rate applied to the washing maschine imported from EU reduced to 3 per cent for the EU countries and 10. 6 per cent for non-EU + 35$ per unit. The import tax applied to vacuum cleaner was 40 per cent and 1$ per unit in 1985.

4. 1. Export of Four Major Products

Source: For the period between 2002-2006 (Esen, 2007: 4) http://www. igeme. gov. tr/bey 2804azesy. For the period between 2000-2001 (Ytiza1, 2006) )http://www. igeme. gov. tr/beyazesy. For the period between 2000-1999 (Ytizal, 2005) )http://www. igeme. gov. tr/beyazesy. For the period between 1999-1996 www. igeme. gov. tr

Exports of the Turkish home appliances sector have been increasing steadily. Refrigerator, washing machine, ovens-cooker and dishwasher are the leading export products of the sector. The large part of home appliance products were exported and the large parts of export has been made to the EU countries. Exports of home appliances were only $25 million in 1990 and it increased to $475 million in 2000, to 1947 million USD $by the year 2005 (iGEME, 2006).

In 1993, 38 per cent, in 1994 46 per cent, in 1996 39 per cent, in 2000, 37 per cent, in 2004, 53 per cent, in 2005 62 per cent of total production were exported. In contrast to the imported products, generally, low quality products have been exported to both The EU and to the other countries at low prices 14 per cent to the United Kingdom, 11 per cent to Spain, 12 per cent to France, 64 per cent of the refrigerator was exported to EU countries, in 2005. An;elik has the market share of 12 per cent in the refrigerator market of the UK.


Table 4. 3: Turkey's Exports of Home Appliances By Destination (Million USA $)

CoDDtry 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 UK 34 53 76 78 79 95 144 178 213 214 295 Germany 43 61 56 67 59 53 97 144 188 218 239 France 37 36 38 40 42 58 86 116 140 184 241 Spain 17 15 17 45 38 39 51 80 119 120 147 Italy 16 22 22 29 28 29 41 53 76 101 130 Others 45 189 183 148 226 78 115 711 916 1110 1354 TOTAL 318 377 400 456 472 574 855 1292 1652 1947 2406

Source: For the period between 2002-2006 ( Esen, 2007: 4) http: //www. igeme. gov. tr/beyazesy. For the period between 2000-2001 (Yiiza1, 2006)) http://www. igeme. gov. tr/beyazesy. For the period between 2000-1999 (Yiiza1, 2005)) http://www. igeme. gov. tr/beyazesy. For the period between 1998-1996 www. igeme. gov. tr

The main export markets for the home appliance products are the EU countries.

4. 2. Import of Four Major Products

Turkey's home appliances import also followed an increasing trend with the exception of economic crisis, especially, devaluation periods. In 1997, the volume of total of four leading home appliance products was just $ USD 526 million, it was $ USD 765 million in 2005. The effect of devaluation can be observed in 2001 and 2002 dramatically. The decrease in comparison to previous year was a 49 per cent in 2001. The reason for such large decrease was devaluation in TL in that year. Decrease in import continued in 2002. It was 12, 7 per cent in comparison to the preceding year. By the recovery in Turkish Economy, the import has also increased from 2002 to 2006.

Table 4. 4: Import of Four Major Home A [Jpliance Products 4

I Years 11997 I 1998 1999 2000 12001 2002 I 2oo3 I 2o04 I 2005 20061 Million

1 526 1 562 505 589 1286 258 1 389 l ss4 1 765 916 1 USA$

Source:Esen,2007:4

In 1997, Italy was the main country of origin for the import of four products Germany was following Italy. From 1998 to 2000, South Korea was the main country of origin for the home appliance products. From 2003 to 2006, China became the main country of origin.

4 These products are refrigerator, washing machine, dish washer and cooking appliances.


T bl 4 5 T k ' I t B C a e . : ur ey s mpor s y t oumry o fO .. I M.Ili USA$ r1gm I on Co autry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 China 24 21 35 72 53 44 95 163 286 327 Gennany 79 104 74 84 38 41 51 87 109 112 Italy 125 109 78 87 41 45 62 72 69 85 France 27 49 43 49 25 27 38 62 54 50 South 86 106 107 126 43 22 21 23 30 42 Korea Japan 44 48 41 36 19 10 7 11 17 22 Thailand 10 16 30 39 13 9 7 12 19 41 Poland - - - - - - 4 11 19 28 Others 129 122 93 91 45 43 85 109 131 210 TOTAL 526 562 50S 590 287 250 363 550 734 917

Source: Tiirkiye D1~ Ticaret Muste~arhg1, D1~ Ticaret Istatistikleri . www. dtm. gov. tr (Turkish Under-secretariat for Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Statistics)

The reason for this change in the country of origin would be explained by the fact that some of Turkish Producers started to produce in South Korea and China in their own factories in these countries. If we consider that this high volume of import from South Korea and China were provided by Turkish originated products, Italy, Germany, France or any other European Union countries were the main country of origin for this period. The total amounts of import of the four leading home appliance products continued to increase from 1997 until 2001. It decreased to 772 units in 2001, because of economic crises in Turkish economy. Especially, the import of refrigerator continued to decrease until 2006. The level of import went down beyond the level existed in pre-CU period within this period. Although, the total import value of refrigerator increased to USD $116 million, in 1998, it decreased again to 18 in 2002.


Table 4. 6: Import Volume of Four Major Home Appliance Products in Turkey

Years Refril!:erator Washin~r Machine Dish Washer Vacuum Cleaner Total Q v Q v Q v Q v v (1) (2) (1} (2} _(1} (2) (1) (2) (2)

1990 21 6 41 14 57 23 16 1 45 1995 68 29 76 22 21 77 152 23 82 1996 133 59 233 65 80 25 350 45 197 1997 147 90 284 99 112 40 609 65 298 1998 186 116 317 77 211 55 449 44 304 1999 323 84 231 49 183 45 505 37 223 2000* 214 75 359 75 220 49 573 37 251 2001* 187 31 173 33 105 23 307 17 107 2002** 51 18 159 35 99 22 300 9 85 2003** 41 19 191 38 102 28 533 21 106 2004** 44 23 187 42 177 49 854 37 151 2005** 63 26 113 83 200 55 1433 65 229

Q(l): Quantity (000 Umts ), V(2): Value (Million USD $) Sources for Quantity (000 Units ): Tiirkiye istatistik Kurumu, Data Procurement Service Sources for Value ( USD $): * Yuzal, 2006, http://www. igeme. gov. tr/english/sectors/index. cfm?sec=sectors ** Esen, 2007, http://www. igeme. gov. tr/english/sectors/index. cfin?sec=sectors

4. 3. The Impact of Increasing Import on Refrigerator Market

Refrigerator import has been fluctuated depending on foreign exchange value. The increase in 1996 was depending on the reason that customs duties for the imports from the EU Member States removed and import got cheaper 7 per cent in this year. The refrigerator import only increased 32 per cent in 1997, 74 per cent in 1998. Nevertheless, it reduced by 34 per cent in 1999 and 13 per cent in 2000. Besides, the factors relating to general economic conditions, introduction of new products by Vestel 's refrigerator facilities. Following technical developments in industry, the import reduced 55 per cent in 2001. Total demand has been procured via import as an 8 per cent in 1996, 13 per cent in 1997, 23 per cent in 1998, 17 per cent in 1999; 13 per cent in 2000; 6 per cent in 2001; 2 per cent in 2002, per cent 3 in 2003.


Graph 4.1

Import Penetration in Refrigerator Market

3000000

2500000

2000000 J!l

1500000 ~ 1000000

500000

0

#~#~~~~~~#~~r~#~~ Years

1-lmport -Consumption I

Source: Tiirkiye Beyaz E~ya Sanayicileri Demegi

Although, it was expected that there should be significant decrease in refrigerator prices depending on the CU, this has not been observed in the period between 1996 and 2002. Even, there is almost no change in price level. However, if the price emerged in 1990 is compared to the price emerged in 2002, 2 only per cent price change can be observed. The price of imported product is almost three times higher than the price of exported product. So, this can be interpreted as the imported products are more luxury model of refrigerators. In the early period between 1998- 2001, Vestel introduced product which it imported by itself. Therefore, prices were down. However, it started to rise again by 2002

Depending on large fluctuations in foreign exchange, the dometic prices in USA $ also fluctuates largely on yearly basis. However, in Turk Liras1 (TL) domestic prices changes paralel to inflation

Demir calculated the concentration ratios for home appliance sector for the year 1997. CR4, CR8 and HR Index demonstrated high concentration in the appliance sector. CR4 was 62, 93. CR8 was 82. H- Index was 0, 1208 (Demir, 2001). Since these ratios have demonstrated that the four leading firm are dominating the home appliance sector


Table 4. 7: Refrigerator Prices in Turkey ( USD $)*

Export Change in Import Change in Domestic Change in Ye~ Price Export Price Price Import Price Price Domestic

(1) % (2) % (3) Price%

1990 177 10 320 35 501 1995 157 4 451 1 512 21 1996 195 24 437 -3 522 2 1997 200 3 474 8 497 -5 1998 204 2 359 -24 499 0 1999 236 16 385 7 491 -2 2000 174 -26 382 -1 534 9 2001 166 -5 360 -6 444 -17 2002 182 10 392 31 455 -15 2003 164 10 430 9,6 535 17,5 2004 181 9 440 2,3 400 25.,2 2005 187 3 490 11,3 646 61,5

... (I) The average pnces calculated by dtvJSlon of export mcome over export quantity (2) The average prices calculated by division of the import expenditure over import quantity. (3) The data obtained from TUiK, Price Statistics, Consumer Price Indexes and converted to$ USD by using Foreign Exchange Value declared by TCMB.

Source: TUiK, Price Statistics, Monthly Database; Foreign Trade Statistics from Information Department. http: //tuikrapor. tuik. gov. tr/reports/ rwservlet?fiyatdb2& report=tufe_fiyat_2003. RDF &desformat=html&p _ baz=2003&p _ tur=O&p _yi11 =2006&p _yi12=2006&p _ ay 1 = 1 &p _a y2=2&p _ ay3=3&p _ ay4=4&p _ ay5=5&p _ay6=6&p _ ay7=7 &p _ay8=8&p _ ay9=9&p _ ay1 0= 10 &p _ ay11 = 11&p _ay12= 12&yer1 =999&p_kodl =053111 * Domestic prices were obtained from TUiK. There are two categories of prices in the data; one is for the refrigerator with one door; the other one is for the refrigerator with two doors. The domestic price used in this analysis shown in table is the average of these two types.

Table 4. 8: 4 Firm Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing for the liance Sector*

1985 1987 1989 Concentration Ratios 50. 6 51. 1 51. 0 Source: Ttkttk. 1997: 24 * Home Appliance Sector is classified as Electrical Machinery Group

Especially, the first firm controlled the 60% of the whole market in 1997, although, this ratio decreased to 54% by the year 2002. Therefore, it is important to analyse these two leading firm's profit. What it can be observed that the market share of domestic producer decreased. In addition to this, Demir also calculated profit cost margin as 27. 6 per cent, import penetration ratio as 9. 9 per cent in electrical appliances.

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES I25

T bl 4 9 N t P fit M ' o/c a e . : e ro 1 argm 0

Whirlpool Arcelik BSH Profilo Vestel Years (1) (2) (3) (4) I99I 2. I 9 N.A. I992 2.5 8 2 0. 7 I993 3.5 8 4 1.7 I994 1.8 4 I 0. I6 I995 2.5 6 4 0.9 I996 1.8 IO 4 8.5 I997 -0. 5 II 4 9.5 I998 3.0 9 5 6.5 I999 3.3 II 5 7. I 2000 3.6 7 5 7.2 200I 0.3 -I4. 9 -2 2.2 2002 2.4 2.3 2 1.8 2003 3.4 4.5 4.4 2 2004 3.0 5.9 4.5 2 2005 2.9 6. I 6.3 2 2006 2.3 4. 7 7. I 1.6

Source: Compames and Istanbul Menkul K1ymetler Borsas1 (1) http: //media. corporate-ir. net/media _files/nys/whr/reports/whr _980 I 0 1_ 200 _120. pdf http: //media. corporate-ir. net/media_files/iroli97/97140/WHR_AR05/WHR_2005AR. pdf http: //media. corporate-ir. net/media_ files/irol/97 /97140/2006ar/whr _sectionS. pdf

(2)for the year between 1992-1998: http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/mtablo92-97. htm for the year between 1999-2004: http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/mtablodonem. htm for the year 2005: http: //www. arcelikas. com. tr/NR/rdonlyres/8AAADFDA-E8F6-A996-

919E091ECBBE/17139/ARCELIKFR05. pdf for the year 2006 : http: //www. arcelikas. com. tr/NR/rdonlyres/9D2E387C-5462-482D-

92CD- 4C581D9D23A/17140/ ARCELIKFR06. pdf (3) for the year between 1992-1998: http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/mtablo92-97. htm for 1999 http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bi1anco/1999/12/tbshev. zip for 2000 http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/2000/12/tbshev. zip for 2001 http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/2001112/tbshev. zip for 2002 http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/2002/12/tbshev. zip for 2003 http://www. bsh. com. tr/assets/pressroom/pi_assetname_l3. pdf for 2004 http://www. bsh. com. tr/assets/pressroom/pi_assetname_15. pdf for 2005 http://www. bsh. com. tr/assets/pressroom/pi_assetname_17. pdf for 2006 http://www. bsh. com. tr/assets/pressroom/_new_pi_assetname_200751014

829265179.pdf (4) for the year between 1992-1998: http://www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/mtablo92-97. htm for the year between 1999-2006 : http: //www. imkb. gov. tr/bilanco/mtablodonem. htrn

http://www. vestelyatirimciiliskileri. com/reports/pdf/2006Neste!Elektronik2006FR. pdf


In the research, the net profit margin was calculated by net profit of firms over net sales for the period between 1991 and 2002. It was observed that net profit margin of domestic firms was larger than the net profit margin of international firms. Also, the net profit margin for the firms did not decrease after the completion of the CU. The comparison of consolidate sales of leading world wide multinational companies and domestic firms are given in the following table. Aryelik has been following the highest net profit margin (Net profit/Sales) since 1991, before and after the CU. Even the local value of BSH has been also higher than the ratio of Whirlpool Incorporation. The following table shows the tendency of net profit margin of three leading homew appliance companies in Turkey and Whirpool which is an international company and not producing in Turkey.

5 -Conclusion

The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of the Customs Union on Home Appliance Manufacturing Industry in Turkey. The basic idea behind the Customs Union is to utilise the benefits of free trade among the trading parties. Depending on the challenges in theories, the policy arguments have also been changed. Especially, development in industrial economics and the arguments for the structure conduct performance paradigm and game theory put forward the policies which can also be effective in international trade. While trade liberalization would remove trade barriers and make markets more competitive, changes in the market structure from concentrated markets to competitive markets would also change the conduct of the companies, companies would start to behave more competitively and reduce prices and the extraordinary profits. The selective use of trade barriers and industry subsibidies in order to capture the profits handled by foreign firms is only one of these policies. The effective trade and industry policies, especially import policies would discipline the markets which are highly concentrated. In these markets, import disciplines the extraordinary profits of the firms. Home appliance industry in Turkey was one of these highly concentrated industries. The removal of trade barriers also made the home appliance industry more competitive. The market share of Arcelik consdireably. The volume of import increased, the net profit margin for two producers in the industry decreased. Although, the net profit of Whirlpool, a leading international company in home appliance industry was lower than Arcelik's net profit margin, in Arcelik's net profit decreased significantly.

Finally, the study concludes that trade liberalization in Turkey enjoyed a serious improvement since 1980, its speed has been accelerated


tremendously through the Customs Union. The home appiance industry also enjoyed serious development in production, export and import. The main countries of origin for import and the main countries of destionation for export have been the European Union Countries. However, we still have high profit cost margin in home appliance sector.

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THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE AFTER THE LISBON TREATY

Mustafa T. Karayigit

Abstract:

The third pillar of the EU introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, Justice and home affairs, have rapidly developed as a core priority in the European integration process. The article will examine the area particularly in terms of changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. After explaining the scope of the area of freedom, security and justice, the article examines general provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The article argues the area with respect to the trends of supranationalism and intergovernmental ism, jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the new power structure and its external dimension.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Supranationalism, Intergovernmentalism

Ozet:

Maastricht Anla~maszyla AB'nin ii9iincii siitunu olarak ortaya {:Zkan Adalet ve i9i~leri a/am hzzla geli~erek Avrupa biitiinle~mesinin en oncelikli konularmdan biri haline gelmi~tir. Bu makale Lizbon Anla~masz'yla Adalet ve i{:i~leri alanmda yapzlan degi#kleri incelemektedir. Ozgiirliik, giivenlik ve adalet a/am incelendikten sonra makale Lizbon Anla~masz'nm gene/ hiikiimleri ele almmaktadzr. Makale, ulus/ariistii ve hiikiimetlerarasz yakla~zmlar, Adalet Divam, yeni gii9 yapzsz ve alzmn dz~ boyutlarz 9er9evsinde Adalet ve i{:i§leri alamm incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lizbon Anla~masz, Ozgiirliik, Giivenlik ve Adalet A/am, Uluslariistii ve Hiikiimetlerarasz Yakla~zm

1. Introduction

Justice and home affairs, adopted as the third pillar by the Maastricht Treaty and symbolising an outstanding transition from a predominantly economic to a political Union, have rapidly developed from a peripheral

• Dr., Marmara University, European Union Institute, Department ofEU Law.

134 THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE AFTER THE LISBON TREATY

aspect into a core priority in the European integration process albeit these affairs constitute amongst the most recent fields of cooperation in the EU. (Lavenex- Wagner, 2007: 225) The Amsterdam Treaty established the area of freedom, security and justice with the ambition to transform the Union in to an area of freedom, security and justice, by partially communautarising the justice and home affairs, i.e. visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related free movement of persons (Title IV EC), and by leaving behind the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the third pillar (Title VI TEU). That structure therefore reflects a mixture of supranational and intergovernmental logic. In the footsteps of the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty then attempts to complete this communautarisation process and thus makes some changes and improvements with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice even though they stay behind the expectations.

The article will examine the area particularly in terms of changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. After perusal about the raison d'etre and objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice, it will explore general provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Then follow the scrutiny of the concepts of cooperation, mutual recognition and approximation of procedural and substantive law. Balance between the trends of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, thus compromises such as exceptions, opt-ins/opt-outs and differentiated integration will be analysed. Afterward the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the new power structure, external dimension of the area will be respectively explored.

2. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

In order to clarify the interconnected, intertwined and intersection characteristics of the matters of freedom, security and justice, the Council expressed that the development of an area of freedom, security and justice is closely linked to completion of the single market and its four freedoms. Four freedoms of the internal market (the internal market without internal borders for goods, services, persons and capital) and preclusion of their abuse could be provided by such an area. The abolition of internal borders with the controls raises questions about the internal security and has resulted in the strengthening of the Union's external borders and the development of a common asylum, visa and immigration policy. Furthermore, in the absence of measures, if police forces or judges remain confined to national borders, criminals might be able to take advantage of free movement to escape criminal proceedings. The territorial limits of criminal law increase


the need for police cooperation which is essential for effectively combating cross-border crime. Since four freedoms would fail to produce their full impact without confidence between the Member State judicial systems, the mutual recognition of judicial decisions has become the cornerstone of the developing European judicial area. (Council, 2004)

According to the Council, the aim of the area of freedom is not only to extend free movement of persons but also to promote Union citizenship, protect fundamental rights, especially to respect for private life and the protection of personal data, combat all forms of discrimination and facilitate the integration of third country nationals. The aim of the area of security is therefore to deal with the fight against all forms of organised crime, such as illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms, trade in human beings, crimes against children, international terrorism, corruption and fraud and etc. Lastly as regards an area of justice, despite differences between the Member States, the Union's objective is to guarantee European citizens equal access to justice and to promote cooperation between the national judicial authorities. While on civil matters judicial cooperation should be aimed at simplifying the environment of European citizens, on criminal matters it should strengthen the coordination of prosecution and provide a common sense of justice by defining minimum common rules for criminal acts, procedures and penalties with the emphasis placed upon cross-border disputes. (Council and Commission Action Plan of 3 December 1998; Council, 2005)

3. General Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The area of freedom, security and justice covering areas such as borders, immigration, asylum, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters touches upon on the one hand essential functions, prerogatives of the States and thus their national sovereignty concerns, on the other hand very sensitive political issues such as fight against crime, illegal immigration and asylum system.(Monar, 2005: 226)

Under Title V of the TFEU, the area of freedom, security and justice consists of five chapters: general provisions; policies on border checks, asylum and immigration; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; police cooperation.


According to Article 3 TEU "[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime." The protection of fundamental rights and respect for the rule of law are the foundational principles of the area of freedom, security and justice. According to Article 67 "the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States." Respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States therefore constitute the main obligations of the EU. Furthermore, the legal status and binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights would strengthen the freedom dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice. (Carrera- Geyer, 2007)

Due to the pillarisation fed by the national prerogatives and sovereignty concerns, limitations in judicial protection, democratic and judicial control and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, different procedures and legal instruments in decision-making, lack of supremacy and direct applicability of EU law and lack of infringement procedure in the third pillar, the current structure of the area of freedom, security and justice is contaminated by deficits in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, intricacy and dichotomy and legitimacy. The current pillar structure leads the Union to artificially split up its action concerning a single subject matter between different set of legal instruments adopted pursuant to different procedures under different pillars. (Ladenburger, 2008: 20) The Lisbon Treaty attempts therefore to mitigate these deficits.

In that respect, with regard to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Lisbon Treaty generally, through depillarisation and communautarisation of these matters, improves the efficiency in decisionmaking with the establishment of ordinary legislative procedure, legal certainty with the single and unified set of legal instruments and their legal bases, extension of the ambit of judicial review, the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, effective and uniform application ofEU law with the principles of supremacy and direct effect, democratic and judicial accountability by involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments into the legislative process and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the area of freedom, security and justice and external action of the EU by conferral of new competences and shared nature of the competences.


Heterogeneity as to legal instruments due to the pillarisation with the vanishing of third pillar legal instruments (decisions, framework decisions, conventions and common positions) to be replaced by uniform traditional Community legal instruments and thus separation of decision-making procedures will end. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, through the co-decision procedure upon the initiation of the Commission the Council and the European Parliament may legislate by the qualified majority voting. Since unanimity rule feeds the lowest common denominator because of the veto powers of the Member States, qualified majority voting would improve the standards in decision making.

Besides, the Lisbon Treaty brings the provision providing imposition of financial sanctions within the area of freedom, security and justice under Article 75 TFEU according to which "[w]here necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 67, as regards preventing and combating terrorism and related activities, the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall define a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities."

4. Judicial Cooperation: Mutual Recognition v Approximation of Procedural and Substantive Law

The Lisbon Treaty accordingly improved cooperation and mutual recognition in both civil and criminal matters. According to Article 81 the Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having a crossborder dimension, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. In the same vein, under Article 82 judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. In order to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may establish minimum rules, which shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States and shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection


for individuals, concerning mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure, the rights of victims of crime and any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision adopted by unanimity.

It is a fact that mutual trust has constantly been promoted by the ECJ. It stated that "[t]here is a necessary implication ... that the Contracting States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Contracting States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied."'

As regards substantive criminal law, Article 83 articulates that the European Parliament and the Council may establish by qualified majority and co-decision procedure minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis. Article 83 sets out the areas of crime as following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives, to be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, without prejudice to Article 76, may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. It is worth mentioning that the ambit of the approximation of substantive criminal law is narrowed than that at present by the condition of crossborder dimension and exhaustive enumeration of the fields of crimes.( Ladenburger, 2008: 20)

The Lisbon Treaty therefore establishes increased legal cooperation based on the principle of mutual recognition in civil and criminal matters which requires each national legal system to acknowledge the decisions adopted by others valid and applicable. New measures are related to

1 Case C-436/04 Leopold Henri Van Esbroeck, 9 March 2006, para. 30; Case C-150/05 Jean Leon Van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden, Republiek ltalii!, 28 September 2006, para. 43.


effective access to justice, cooperation as to criminal prosecution and execution of judicial decisions, the establishment of rules and procedures to ensure mutual recognition of judicial decisions and cooperation in collecting evidence. With the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition, which has similarities with the Common Market project, shows its preference to the choice of approximation of laws and regulations and constitutes one of the most important means of creating the area of freedom, security and justice, a major obstacle erected because of different national criminal codes to cross-border law enforcement is removed through judicial cooperation.(Lavenex - Wagner, 2007: 225) Judicial cooperation is thus mainly provided through mutual recognition and if required through the approximation of procedural and substantjve laws via the establishment of minimum rules. In this construction, it is considered that in the core issues touching upon national sovereignty, mutual recognition is accordingly preferred to approximation.

5. Balance between Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism

The abolition of pillar structure does not lead to Community method to be used in every aspect of the area of freedom, security and justice. The Lisbon Treaty, as a compromise for. communautarisation, comprises flexibility, emergency brake, exceptionalism, fragmentation, enhanced cooperation, differentiation and opt-ins/opt-outs, multi-speed Europe, variable geometry. Even the Lisbon Treaty makes it much easier for multispeed Europe to emerge in different policy fields. ( Knil, 2008)

First of all, under Articles 82 and 83 the ambit of approximation of procedural and substantive laws and regulations of the Member States is restricted to minimum rules on criminal matters having a cross-border dimension by allowing the Member States to adopt more stringent rules.

Secondly, approximation of procedural and substantive criminal law, i.e. the establishment of minimum rules will be subject to emergency brake. Article 83 provides emergency brake where a member of the Council considers that a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system. The Member State may thus request that the draft directive be referred to the European Council in case of which the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. "After discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure." In case of disagreement,


and if at least nine Member States wish to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive concerned, they shall notify the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which provides for an automatic authorisation of an enhanced co-operation mechanism for those State. In other words, those Member States which are willing to go ahead for enhanced cooperation do not have to undertake the standard authorisation procedure. In that regard, it constitutes not only brake, but also an accelerator allowing provision of ad hoc op-out for Member States experiencing persistent problems with legislative initiatives.( Ladenburger, 2008, 20) This automatic authorisation is probably introduced to let the Member States develop such kind of cooperation and thus stay within the framework of the EU rather than outside as avoid the cases such as the Priim Treaty? On the other hand, as articulated by Carrera and Geyer, enhanced cooperation may however create many areas with varying and even competing degrees, notions and speeds of freedoms, securities and justices. (Carrera- Geyer, 2007)

Thirdly, according to Article 72 TFEU the area of freedom, security and justice shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. Namely, maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, considered stile as the very core of national sovereignty, remain within the responsibility of the Member States. Moreover, Article 4(2) TEU, by emphasising that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State, lays down that the Union shall respect the Member States' essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. Furthermore, since under Article 73 "[i]t shall be open to Member States to organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security", such forms

2 The Priim Treaty signed by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands and Spain has the objective "to play a pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation especially by means of exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal mi-gration, while leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States of the European Union". 3 Article 64 EC and Article 33 TEU. In the legal literature these competences have been regarded as either an indication as to the limits of Community law or a derogation within the ambit of Community law.


of cooperation and coordination, as intergovernmental residues, imply keeping the EU out of internal security of the Member States.

Fourthly, under Article 84 the European Parliament and the Council may establish measures to promote and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention which is excluded from harmonisation.

Fifthly, the special legislative procedure, as an exception to the ordinary legislative procedure, applies to the following cases in which the European Parliament has only consultative role, except the last one. The Council, under Article 77, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, which requires unanimity after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such identification document. Besides, according to Article 87, the adoption of measures related to operational cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States, including police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences is subject to a special legislative procedure. Additionally, according to Article 89, the Council shall lay down under the special legislative procedure the conditions and limitations under which the competent authorities of the Member States may operate in the territory of another Member State in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of that State. Moreover as regards judicial cooperation in civil matters, under Article 81 measures concerning family law with cross-border implications shall be established by the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure which requires unanimity after consulting the European Parliament. Lastly, in order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust by acting unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

Sixthly, opt-ins/opt-outs are extended to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Opt-outs conversely lead to enhanced cooperation. According to Article 5 of Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Acquis integrated into the Framework of the European Union, proposals and initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis shall be subject to the relevant provisions of the Treaties and where either Ireland or the United Kingdom has not notified the Council its wish to take part, the authorisation referred to in Article 329 for an enhanced cooperation between themselves shall be deemed to have been granted to the Member States. Where either Ireland or


the United Kingdom is deemed to have given notification, it may nevertheless notify the Council that it does not wish to take part in such a proposal or initiative. Nevertheless, for the Member State having made the notification, any decision taken by the Council shall, as from the date of entry into force of the proposed measure, cease to apply to the extent considered necessary by the Council and under the conditions to be determined in a decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. This Protocol provides opt-out of adoption of Schengen building measures even pursuant to opt-in to the Schengen acquis. This derogates from the principle of irrevocable participation imposed by Article 8(2) of Council Decision 2000/365 and signifies probably at least the partial depart of the United Kingdom or Ireland from the Schengen acquis. (Ladenburger, 2008: 20) Moreover, under Protocol (No 21) on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the UK's current opt-out under Title IV EC from asylum, immigration and civil matters is extended to include police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Besides, according to Protocol (No 22) on the Position of Denmark, Denmark shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the TFEU. Furthermore, there are also transitional provisions or exclusions from the rules. Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions provides transitional period (five years) for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters concerning the effects of old legal acts and Commission's supervisionary competence and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. According to Article 9 of that Protocol, the legal effects of the acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union adopted on the basis of the TEU prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty shall be preserved until those acts are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the Treaties. The same shall apply to agreements concluded between Member States on the basis of the TEU.

In other words, legal effects of pre-existing third pillar instruments, thus the exclusion of their direct effect and supremacy, will be preserved until these instruments are repealed, amended or annulled in accordance with the revised Treaties. (Dougan, 2008: 617) Under Article 10(4) at the latest six months before the expiry of the transitional period, the United Kingdom may notify to the Council that it does not accept, with respect to the acts and the powers of the institutions as to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In case the United Kingdom has made that notification all acts, excluding the amended acts, to cease to apply. Namely, it provides for


the United Kingdom to leave acquis in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, neither replaced nor amended. As regards the pre-existing third pillar acts, for 5 years the Commission will not be able to bring infringement actions against the United Kingdom and Ireland and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice will be restricted as currently provided under Article 35 TEU. (Dougan, 2008: 617) It is worth mentioning that for the first time the Treaty therefore allows a member state not only to opt-out from the adoption of future measures, but also to withdraw from the obligations under the pre-exinting measures and so from the existing acquis. (Dougan, 2007: 2008; Ladenburger, 2008: 20) What is more, positions of the United Kingdom and Poland with respect to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights signify exceptionalism. According to Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice or any court or tribunal of Poland and the United Kingdom to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland and the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms. Nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland and the United Kingdom except insofar as they have provided for such rights in their national law.

6. Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

Currently under the third pillar, the jurisdiction of the ECJ to deliver preliminary ruling regarding police and judicial cooperation is not mandatory, but optional subject to the declaration of the Member States. There is no infringement procedure for breaches of obligations as well. For the natural and legal persons action for annulment procedure is not available. Besides currently under the first pillar, as regards visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related free movement of persons according to Article 68 EC merely the courts or tribunals of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law shall apply to preliminary ruling procedure.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is extended in the area of freedom, security and justice. After the communautarisation of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the European Court of Justice will have jurisdiction over all matters of the area of freedom, security and justice, albeit with some exceptions. Fragmentation in the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is therefore removed.


According to Article 256 of the TFEU, the General Court (current the CFI) shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance all actions or proceedings all actions, but preliminary rulings and infringement proceedings against the Member States. Under Article 267, with the abolition of pillar structure, preliminary ruling procedure in respect of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is extended to include not only all Member States and their all courts, but also interpretation of primary law. Besides, limitation merely to last instance courts is abolished in respect of visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related free movement of persons under the current first pillar. There is now sole preliminary ruling procedure encompassing all matters currently falling within the current first and third pillar. Moreover, according to Article 263 the standing conditions for natural or legal persons are extended and relaxed for a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. Natural and legal persons will have locus standi in action for annulment and failure to act proceedings in terms of not only asylum and immigration issues under the current Title IV EC, but also police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the current Title VI TEU. Furthermore, the European Parliament will have locus standi to bring action for annulment to challenge acts adopted under the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Furthermore, under Articles 263, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall review also the legality of acts of the European Council and of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties. The ambit of infringement procedure for breaches of obligations is extended to include police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under Article 260 TFEU and covers the whole area of freedom, security and justice. Under Article 265 the scope of failure to act procedure is extended to include also infringement of the Treaties by the European Council and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union by failing to act. The Member States and the other institutions of the Union may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement established.

Moreover, any natural or legal person may therefore bring an action for failure to act by complaining to the Court that an institution, body, office or agency of the Union has failed to address to that person any legally binding act.


Even though there are lots of agencies such as Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL (College of European Police), EBA (European Border Agency), FRA (Fundamental Rights Agency) in the area of freedom, security and justice, since they do not, in principle, issue binding acts, their acts are not subject to judicial review, but subject to some kind of principal - agent supervision by the institution to which they are attached as well as to indirect control by the European Parliament and the Ombudsman. (Hatzopoulos, 2008) Anyway this extension would provide the removal of the lacuna in terms of judicial protection of individuals against acts of Europol especially affecting personal data rights. (Ladenburger, 2008: 20) Furthermore, the acts of other bodies or offices such as the High Level Group on Asylum and Migration, the SCIF A (Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum) and the SCIFA , the CIREFI (Centre d'Information de Reflexion et d'Echange sur les Frontieres et l 'Immigration), the EURASIL, the European Migration Network and the Immigration Liaison Officers Network are unlikely in the sense of Article 263 TFEU to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties, since they play essentially consultative and/or preparatory role in the design and management of the area of freedom, security and justice. (Hatzopoulos, 2008)

However the acts of funds such as the European Refugee Fund, the External Borders Fund, the Return Fund and the Integration Fund, which are active in the area of freedom, security and justice, seem included within the scope of review and could in the future therefore be challenged under Article 263 TFEU. (Hatzopoulos, 2008)

What is more, Articles 268 and 340 TFEU provide for individuals to bring an action for non-contractual liability against the Union with the claim for damages caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. In other words, individuals may claim for damages caused by the institutions or by the servants in the performance of their duties in the field of current police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Judicial protection of individuals will primarily be enhanced. In Segi and Amnestia, the applications were dismissed by the ECtHR with the reason that the applicants were not directly affected by the common position which has strongly intergovernmental character.4 After the communautarisation of police and judicial cooperation in criminal affairs the barrier before judicial review of the legal instruments concerned before the ECtHR will be

4 App. 6422/02 and 9916/02.


abolished because of their new supranational characteristics under the influence of the principles of direct applicability or effect.

Additionally, Article 267 brought urgency procedure according to which if a preliminary ruling question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the minimum of delay. It may provide more speedy justice. Currently, urgent preliminary ruling procedure is provided in Article 23a of the Statute of the ECJ and Article 1 04b of Rules of Procedure.

Lastly, as regards the ambit of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, according to Article 275 even though the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions, "the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union." It should be emphasised that that exception to the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is related to policies on border checks, asylum and immigration which form Chapter 2 of Title V, i.e. area of freedom, security and justice.

On the other hand, there is also restriction to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, as the residues of previous Treaties.5 According to Article 276, as regards the Chapters 4 (judicial cooperation in criminal matters) and 5 (police cooperation) of the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.

As regards the scope of limitation, it could be mentioned that the limitation is merely related to police and judicial cooperation of criminal

5 Article 68 EC and Article 35 TEU.


matters by maintaining the current 35 TEU and accordingly does not cover the current limitation articulated in Article 68(2) EC.

Moreover, its jurisdiction is restricted not only in terms of preliminary ruling, but also infringement procedure. Accordingly, in that regard supervisory role of the Commission is restricted. It signifies the residues of intergovernmentalism, even after the communautarisation of whole area of freedom, security and justice, within the framework of supranational structure.

Moreover, according to Article 86, "the regulations referred to in paragraph 1 shall determine the general rules applicable to the European Public Prosecutor's Office, the conditions governing the performance of its functions, the rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the admissibility of evidence, and the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in the performance of its functions." It provides for the legislature to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures.

7. The New Power Structure in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Under Article 68 TFEU the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice shall be defined by the European Council.

Furthermore, the powers of the Commission in terms of legislative initiation and supervision of their proper application by the Member States is strengthened. Under Article 76, in terms of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation and administrative cooperation, the acts and measures will be adopted by initiative of either of the Commission or of a quarter of the Member States, which signifies specific characteristics differentiated from other policy areas of the EU and as well as intergovernmental residues in the new structure. At the current structure an initiative for legislative acts could be presented by a single Member State under the third pillar. The Commission may also bring infringement actions against the Member States as to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

With the ordinary decision-making procedure (co-decision procedure via qualified majority voting) the powers of the European Parliament are also


strengthened. The European Parliament's assent is required while establishing Public Prosecutor's Office and extending its powers, establishing minimum rules. The European Parliament will have the authority to bring action for annulment. Parliament's powers in respect of conclusion of agreements and representation in the negotiations and international relations are extended.

Under Article 12 TEU national parliaments contribute actively to the smooth functioning of the Union by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and justice in terms of evaluating executive activities, in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union policies in that area and through being involved in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities.6

According to Article 3 ofProtocol (No 1) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, as regards the ex-ante control of the application of the principle of subsidiarity national parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion on whether a draft legislative act complies with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Therefore, paying attention to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in legislation is especially significant in criminal law so as to avoid excessive criminalisation. (Herlin-Karnell, 2008)

Additionally, under Article 86 in order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union the Lisbon Treaty paves the way to the establishment by the Council via unanimity of the European Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust, which will be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests. As a judicial body with direct enforcement authority, it will exercise the prosecutor's functions in the national courts. The European Council will be able to extend by unanimity the competence of the European Prosecutor's Office to include serious crime having a crossborder dimension such as terrorism, the trafficking in human beings and drugs trafficking. Moreover, under Article 71, a standing committee, which shall facilitate coordination of the action of Member States' competent authorities, shall be set up within the Council in order to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened

6 Articles 70, 71, 85 and 88 TFEU.


within the Union. Besides, the Lisbon Treaty establishes an integrated management system for external borders and strengthens the powers of FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders).

8. External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Under Article 78 as regards the common policy on asylum with the purpose of development a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties, the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt measures for a common European asylum system comprising partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection. Furthermore, according to Article 79 the Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin or provenance.

Article 216 organised under the influence of the ER T A Doctrine stipulates that the Union may conclude an agreement with third countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. Since competences in respect of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters also become in shared nature, therefore the principle of subsidiarity applies, which is to be check by the national parliaments, the implied power to conclude agreements therefore seems important for the external action of the EU in the area of freedom, security and justice. Moreover, recognition of the legal personality of the EU under Article 47 would enhance the capability of the EU in the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice.

On the other hand, according to the Declaration on Article 218 concerning the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by Member States relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Member States may negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries or international organisations in the areas covered by Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of


Title V of Part Three insofar as such agreements comply with Union law. It seems that since those matters touch upon the national sovereignty concerns, the Member States are not eager to leave the field completely to the EU by conferring upon the institutions such nature of external competences concerning these matters.

Conclusion of agreements will be carried out under the common procedure, which leads to enhancement of the powers of the European Parliament, qualified majority voting in decision-making and removal of reservation currently used in the third pillar under Article 24 TEU by the representatives of the Member States in the Council. The Union will be represented by the Commission in the negotiations of agreements. Currently according to Article 24(5) TEU, "[n]o agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally." Furthermore, the agreements concluded under this procedure within the scope of the area of freedom, security and justice will have the same legal force and effect as provided under the current Article 300 EC.

9. Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty reinforces democratic legitimacy and accountability, efficient and comprehensive response by the Union action and enhances legal certainty, trust-building among the Member States. (Zemanek, 2008) The Lisbon Treaty promotes judicial protection, democratic and judicial control, efficiency and effectiveness in decision-making and the rule of law. With regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, with the paranoia especially sparked off by September 11, London and Madrid terrorist attacks, there is growing concern about the fact that security while has becoming the overriding imperative largely crowding out freedom and justice. (Lindahl, 2004: 461) The Lisbon Treaty is able to pave the way to strike fair and appropriate balance amongst security, freedom and justice aspects through the extension of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the binding legal status of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights in EU law.

Justice and home affairs, now the area of freedom, security and justice, signify significant development and evolution in the European integration process. Even though the Lisbon Treaty by abolishing the pillar structure communautarised the whole area of freedom, security and justice, there


remain intergovernmentalist residues in the new structure. In that regard, it reflects a cooperative rather than integrated area of freedom, security and justice. (Monar, 2005: 226) It is understandable that these matters touch upon the very core of the national sovereignty and prerogatives and so the Member States are anxious about losing the entire control. In that regard, as declared by Dougan, the Lisbon Treaty continues the trend of balancing two polar forces, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, one against the other, thus each step towards greater supranational governance is counterweighted by more effective checks and balances to protect national concerns and prerogatives and to ensure the Union remains responsive to them. (Dougan,2008:617)


References:

Carrera, S. - Geyer, F. (2007). The Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs Implications for the common Area of Freedom, Security & Justice, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 141, at http://www.libertysecurity.org/ IMG/pdf _The_ Reform_ Treaty _Justice_ and_ Home_ Affairs. pdf.

Council and Commission Action Plan of 3 December 1998 on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, retrieved April 2008 from http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133080.htm.

Council of the European Union, (2004) Living in An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, retrieved March 2008 from http://www .consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cms _ data/librairie/PDF /PU2086-EN.pdf.

Dougan, M. (2008). The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 CMLRev. 617.

Hatzopoulos, V. (2008) Casual but Smart: The Court's new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty, College of Europe, Research Papers in Law 2/2008.

Herlin-Karnell, E. (2008) The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Criminal Law and Justice", Sieps, European Policy Analysis, Issue 3, at http://www .lissabonfordraget. se/ docs/ sieps-2008 _ 3epa-the-lisbon-treatyand-the-area-of-criminal-law-and-justice. pdf.

Knil, D. (2008). Multi-speed Europe and the Lisbon Treaty - Threat or Opportunity?, EUROPEUM, Institute for European Policy.

Ladenburger, C. (2008). Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon -A New Dimension for the Community Method, 4 Eur. Const. LR 20.

Lavenex, S. - Wagner, W. (2007) Which European Public Order? Sources oflmbalance in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 16 European Security 225.


Lindahl, H. (2004) Finding A Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union's Claim to Territorial Unity, 29 ELRev. 461.

Monar, J. (2005) Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the 'Area of Freedom, Securiy and Justice'?, I European Constitutional Law Review 226.

Zemanek, J. (2008) The Criminal Cooperation within the area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the Treaty of Lisbon, p. 171, retrieved August 2008 from http://www.ecln.net/documents/sofia _ 2008/buch/ecln_ 2008.pdf.


Marmara Universitesi A vrupa Birligi Enstitiisii

A vrupa Ara~tirmalan Dergisi Makale Yaztm KuraUan

Sayfa Diizeni A4 Metin Boyutu: 6000- 8000 kelime Tablo/Graftk/Resim Geni~ligi: 12 em.

Paragraf Diizeni - Paragrafbo~lugu: 6 nk. (once ve sonra) - Kenar bo~lugu: 2,5 em - Sat1r arahg1: 1,5 - Ahntl Paragraflar: Sag ve soldan I em. iceride

Yazt ~kli -Font: Times New Roman (12) - Ahnt1 paragraf: Times New Roman (10) - Ba~hklar d1~mda kahn (bold) karakter kullamlmamahd!r. - Sadece makalenin admda butiin karakterler buy\ik kullamlmahdlr.

A1mtdar: Y az1mz ya da almtl metni (Smith, 2001: 29-30) (Yazar soyad1, yd: sayfa) Y azan belirli degilse; (Yaz1 baslig!, yd: sayfa)

Dipnotlar: y almzca ac!klamah aynnt!lar icin kullamlmaktad!r.

Diger Bilgiler: - 250 kelimeyi ge9meyecek ~ekilde haz!rlanml~ ozet ve 3-4 anahtar kelime Turk9e ve ingilizee olarak eklenmektedir. - Makalenin ba~ka bir dergi ya da yaym tarafmdan bas1m a~amasmda olmamas1 gerekmektedir. - Ba~ka herhangi bir yerde basilm1~ bir makale degerlendinne surecine ahnmamaktad1r.

Marmara University European Union Institute

Marmara Journal of European Studies Notes for Contributors

Page Setup A4 Text lenght: 6000-8000 words Table/graph/image witdh: 12 em.

Paragratb -Paragraph Spacing: 6 pt. (before and after) - Page margins: 2,5 -Line spacing: 1,5 - Cited paragraphs should be indented 1 em.

Fonts - Font: Times New Roman (12) -Cited paragraph: Times New Roman (10) - Bold fonts should only be used in headings. - CAPS LOCK should only be used in the title of the paper.

Citation: Your text or quotation here (Smith, 2001: 29-30) (Author, year: pages) If author name is is not available;

_(Article Title, year: pages)

Footnotes: Used only for detailed explanations.

Other Information: -An abstract (max. 250 words) should be submitted both in Turkish and English as well as 3-4 keywords. - Papers submitted should not be under consideration at any other journal or publication. - Articles published elsewhere before are not taken into consideration.

156

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Author, A. A., & Author, B. B. (Year). Title of book. Location: Publisher.

Temel Belgeler istanbul: Beta.

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uv.•!5~"u•u• Para Politikast. Marmara 1-95.

McCright, A.M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2003). Defeating Kyoto: The conservative movement's impact on U.S. climate change policy. Social Problems 50 348-373.


d. Doktora Tezleri I Ph.D. Thesis

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Geaeral Format

Ornek/ e.g.

Ornek/ e.g.

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Cowles, M. Gren (1994). 'The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: setting the Agenda for a New Europe', Ph.D. thesis. · DC: American · ·

.n. ...... ,,.. A.A. if Damed or Report title if Do author (Year). •Title of the report' if Dot giveD before. Institution I department I

if available. Location: Publisher. Villain, C., and Arnold, R. (1990). 'New Directions for European Agricultural Policy'. Report of the CEPS CAP Expert Group. Brussels: Centre for Studies. Kalecki, M. (1971). 'Political Aspect ofFull Employment'. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy:J933-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Author, A. A. if Damed or Article title if DO author. (Year, Month day). Title of article if Dot giveD before [useful descriptive information]. Title of Magazine, volume if giveD, page-numbers. Giine~, Hur~it. (16 Mart 2006). Brezilya mt daha iyi durumda, Tiirkiye mi? Milliyet. Oil Pipeline to Turkey Backed by ChiefofBP. (2001, June 21). The New York Times Magazine, 28. Kenji, M., & Tanako, K. (2003, February 13). Conflict and cogt!itive control. Science, 303, 969-970.

158

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Author, A. A., Author B. B., & Author C. C. (Year). Title of article. Title of Periodical, volume, page-numbers. Retrieved Month day,

from source. Hopkins, N., & Moore, C. (2001). Categorizing the neighbors: Identity, distance, and stereotyping. Social Psychology Quarterly, 64, 239-252. JSTOR database. Fredrickson, B. L. (n. D.). Cultivating positive emotions to optimize health and well-being. Prevention & Treatment, 3, Article OOOla. Retrieved: February 9, 2004, from

la.html

, B. . (Year). Title of book. Location: from source.

Coward, H. G., & Maguire, D. C. (Eds.). (1999). Visions of a new earth.· Religious perspectives on population, consumption, and ecology. Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press. 9 ~ubat 2004 database. Goldman, E. (1914). The social significance of the modern drama.

e.g. Boston: Richard G. Badger. Retrieved: February 9, 2004, from University of California Berkeley Digital Library Sunsite website:

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i. internet Sitesi I Website

NCAA Committee on Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct.. Operations plan 2001-02 and 2002-03: Strategic planning and budgeting for the 2002-03 and 2003-04 Academic Years. Retrieved: February 9, 2004, from http://www l.ncaa.org/membership/ govemance/assoc-wide/

ethics/index.html

marmaradosya.marmara.edu.tr/avrupa/mjes/mjes_cilt_16_say_1_2.pdf · all correspondance including...

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