amanda hawes: a formidable force for chemical companies...
TRANSCRIPT
NEW SOLUTIONS, Vol. 21(2) 299-311, 2011
Voices
AMANDA HAWES: A FORMIDABLE FORCE FOR
CHEMICAL COMPANIES TO CONTEND WITH
IN WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY CASES
ANN SAPONARA
Amanda Hawes’ pioneering exploration of how far law and science can mesh
for occupational health and safety is four decades running and still going strong.
Mandy, as she is known by many, sues chemical companies on behalf of clients
who have developed cancer, or whose children were born with birth defects, after
industrial exposure to toxic chemicals. Her work is based on the belief that
these illnesses could have been prevented in safer work environments. I worked
for Mandy from 1996 to 1999 as a young lawyer. I interviewed Mandy in October
and November of 2009 and then interviewed current and former clients, col-
leagues, expert witnesses including neonatologist Dr. Cynthia Bearer, and finally
Mandy’s own son, Kyle. Mandy has a very clear purpose and commitment to
translating complex scientific concepts into legal arguments that chemical com-
panies “should have known better” than to put their workers in harm’s way.
Mandy Hawes is a 1968 graduate of Harvard Law School, one of fewer than
25 women who graduated that year, and has been suing chemical companies for
almost 40 years. Petite, tenacious, and fearless, she has represented hundreds of
workers with cancer after many years of industrial exposure to chemicals. She
argues that the chemical companies knew that exposure to the organic solvents
used by workers to make microchips, electronics, tires, aluminum cans—all
manner of products we consumers consume—could cause gene mutations or
could irreparably harm a developing fetus when a pregnant woman is exposed
to toxics on her job. On solving the mysteries of how workers or their kids
got sick, Mandy says: “I piece together both what the workers were doing, what
299
� 2011, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc.
doi: 10.2190/NS.21.2.l
http://baywood.com
chemicals they were exposed to and if it was preventable, what was done by
the chemical companies or not done that caused this to happen.” She scours
the scientific literature with the trained eye of a self-taught scientist and the
single-mindedness of a lawyer. Representing one worker at a time, or sometimes
a group of workers with similar types of cancers, against some of the biggest
chemical companies in the world is her life’s work. It’s a hard way of winning
change in an intransigent industry, but it has been Mandy’s way.
My first experience with Mandy was while working on a case on behalf of
one worker against eight chemical companies. We represented the widow and
two children of a worker whose name was Glenn. Glenn worked at an aluminum
manufacturing plant where for many years he was exposed to paints, coatings,
and can liner sprays. He developed an aggressive brain tumor and died. The
workers who showed us the plant and talked about the chemicals and the
processes loved Mandy; she easily forgave those who did not want to talk, and
she was at complete ease with suing eight major chemical companies represented
by legions of lawyers for supplying the same chemicals that Glenn had been
exposed to—or different versions of them. She knew the science inside and
out and the litigation, too.
On one occasion I tagged along with Mandy for a deposition of a chemist
speaking on behalf of a chemical company sued in the case. He had been chosen
by the company to defend the hazard information his company provided to
workers about the hazards of chemicals Glenn had used before he died. While
waiting for the deposition to start, Mandy was chatting with the chemist and
the other attorneys about soccer with a happy familiarity. Mandy is easy-going,
a sports enthusiast, a runner of 43 marathons, and pretty unassuming at
5’1” and 110 pounds. Things changed when the deposition started. Although I
knew Mandy had an uncompromising agenda of accountability for chemical
companies, I had never seen it fully in action. Neither had the chemist. Sitting
around a huge conference table with the court reporter typing, there were a few
preliminaries about the chemist’s name and his work history and his job, which
was in an office and not at the plant. He was still at ease. Then, with no notes but
with a wholly unapologetic polite directness, Mandy began naming one chemical
after another, asking about its properties and the chemical make-up of products
the company manufactured. The chemist’s jaw dropped as his answers quickly
revealed he knew far less chemistry than Mandy did. He looked shell-shocked
as he endured citations of epidemiology and toxicology studies and questions
about them. He had not a clue about processes at the plant where the worker’s
exposure occurred. Mandy, again with no notes and in quick succession, asked
him questions about the scientific studies she had found. He could not say he
had read or heard of a single study.
I am sure the chemical companies’ lawyers and Mandy already knew how
that deposition would go down. I think Mandy would have been genuinely
surprised if the chemist did know any of the answers to her questions during the
300 / SAPONARA
deposition. Mandy says they never know because they never look. And the
chemical company lawyers were well acquainted with Mandy’s then 30-year
history of litigating these cases. It was only the chemist and I who got an
education at that deposition. We were the only ones who didn’t know the chemist
was road kill. The chemical companies’ lawyers’ were not taken aback by the
“gotcha” moments because they and Mandy knew that the real battle involves
motion after motion, with expert declarations on both sides about which company
should have known what scientific evidence when, and whether an individual
study can prove “causation” (i.e., that a particular chemical was more likely
than not to cause the worker’s cancer). The chemical companies’ arguments are
always that the studies Mandy cites are “junk science,” and that workers could
not have been protected more adequately than they were, and Mandy’s argu-
ments are always that they should have known long ago what more could have
been done but purposely buried their heads in the sand.
In Glenn’s case, the chemical company defendants argued that his brain
tumor was just a fluke mutation of a gene. Mandy countered their claims with
scientific studies showing the particular type of brain tumor Glenn developed
was statistically significantly more likely to occur after his exposure to
solvents. The chemical companies had experts saying the opposite. I left the
firm for personal reasons during the trial so I do not know the terms of the
settlement for Glenn’s family; Mandy cannot tell me because they are con-
fidential. Whatever they were, one of the goals Mandy has in every case was
accomplished: solely by virtue of litigating the case, Mandy put the eight
chemical companies forever “on notice” of the studies of the chemicals at issue
as well as the opinions of the expert witnesses, whom her firm hired, that
industrial exposure to those chemicals is not safe. In Mandy’s view, win, lose
or settle, her effort was worth it because in the next case, the next lawyer for
chemical companies might have some real problems with the oft-repeated defense
of “we didn’t know.”
Mandy argues in each of her cases that chemical companies are such sophis-
ticated entities, with vast resources and highly trained and knowledgeable
people, that they have the means, the legal duty, and the moral obligation to
read the research on chemicals, to do their own testing of chemicals, to carefully
scrutinize worker safety and to warn workers of the results. Better yet, they
should work as tirelessly as she does to “eliminate the job hazard, not the job.”
Currently, Mandy represents a group of workers who have blood cancer after
years of working for the Uniroyal Tire Company in Eau Claire, Wisconsin.
In 2006, Mandy sued Exxon Mobil, Sunoco, Texaco, Ashland Chemical, Shell
Oil, and others, on behalf of Uniroyal Tire Company workers. These chemical
companies allegedly supplied benzene-containing rubber solvent to Uniroyal,
and Mandy believes that occupational exposure to this carcinogenic material
caused these cancers. Mandy maintains that death from lymphohematopoetic
cancer has been a serious problem in the tire industry for years.
AMANDA HAWES / 301
Joyce Jenson is the lead plaintiff and worked at Uniroyal from 1964 to 1974,
before marrying and moving to Michigan. She did administrative work for
the next 30 years at another company. While at Uniroyal, Joyce was a “splicer,”
working two tables with foot pedals to cut sheets of rubber that went to workers
who would build the tire around a drum. From a five-gallon container of rubber
solvent that splicers had at their workstation, she would fill a bottle and squirt
the rubber with rubber solvent (or “gas” as it was known to Joyce and her
co-workers). The “gas” was applied to keep the rubber from sticking to itself so
it would flow smoothly. About two times a day, Joyce also waxed the tables
she worked on and poured “gas” all over them to help defeat the tackiness of
the incoming sheets of rubber. That is a job benzene does in many scenarios,
including as an additive to the gasoline we pump into our cars, ensuring that it
flows smoothly. In 2003, Joyce was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a bone
marrow cancer. Joyce points out that today, gas stations have warning signs
about carcinogens, or cancer-causing agents, in use at the gas pump.
The idea that “gas” could cause blood cancers never occurred to Joyce while
she was working at Uniroyal. “I never gave it a thought,” she says. “I was young
and when you work for someone you have faith that they wouldn’t have you
doing something unsafe. You trust your employer to keep you safe.”
When Joyce was in her early sixties and her days at Uniroyal long since passed,
she broke a rib and her doctor found abnormalities in a bone density test. She
was referred to an osteoporosis doctor who took more tests. While sitting at her
desk at work, she got a call from a medical assistant who told her the additional
lab results were also abnormal and they were referring her to an oncologist/
hematologist. They suspected multiple myeloma. Joyce was shocked, both by
the news and by having received it over the phone. She sat at her desk crying.
“You just assume the worst,” she said. She went home to cry in the arms of
her husband who, ironically, was a safety engineer. She looked up “multiple
myeloma” on the computer and it really scared her. She read the words “longevity
is very short,” panicked in thinking of her son and husband, and decided then
and there to stop reading anything more before she saw a doctor. She then had a
skeletal survey where x-rays of each bone in her body were taken, many urine
and blood lab tests, a bone marrow biopsy, and a seemingly endless Fourth of
July holiday weekend that delayed test results. Finally, on July 18, her oncologist
gave her the diagnosis of multiple myeloma. Luckily, she says, she was “at
Stage I,” the earliest stage of the disease which is called “smoldering,” and her
doctor was optimistic about treatment. She began a new drug that is a “bone
strengthener” and took that for two years. She now goes to the Mayo Clinic once
every three weeks to receive an infusion of a drug newer to the market that is
also meant to strengthen her bones.
Soon after Joyce was diagnosed in July of 2003, she went to a reunion picnic
at Uniroyal tires because she thought it would be nice to see old friends. She
was greeted by a large hanging banner announcing a fundraiser for “Barb,” who
302 / SAPONARA
was in the hospital with very advanced multiple myeloma. Joyce had worked
with Barbara, who was younger than she, and was shocked to hear Barbara was
ill with Stage IV multiple myeloma.
About a year went by and Joyce’s brother found studies published on the
Internet showing benzene can cause blood cancers. He researched more, found
animal and epidemiological studies, and began searching for a lawyer. Mandy
agreed to fly to Eau Claire, Wisconsin, in November of 2004 to meet with
Joyce, her husband, Barbara, a friend of Barbara’s who was also a splicer, and a
union representative invited by Joyce. Joyce remembers sitting next to Mandy
observing how fast Mandy was typing, and that she was getting every word.
“She didn’t miss a beat,” she says. Joyce marvels at what a “little lady” Mandy is.
Joyce says she was at first intimidated at the meeting because she “doesn’t have
all those fancy degrees” and was worried about what she could remember
about Uniroyal because it had been so long ago. But Mandy put Joyce at ease.
Joyce now describes Mandy as “very bright but not intimidating,” and always
encouraging and upbeat. Joyce says there’s no question she can ask that Mandy
doesn’t consider important: “if it’s important to you, it’s important to her to
answer. . . . She makes you feel good and makes you feel important.”
As in all the many other cases similar to Joyce’s that Mandy has pursued
over the years, she is unrelenting in the pursuit of chemical companies who
supplied rubber solvent to Uniroyal in Wisconsin. “She really digs,” Joyce says.
Mandy gained access to the Uniroyal plant and has been through it several
times. She has encouraged others to research death records to see if Uniroyal
workers died of blood cancers at a proportionally greater rate than in Wisconsin
as a whole. She has interviewed countless co-workers and plant guards who
saw what was coming and going. Joyce tells of Mandy interviewing her boss,
whom she describes as a “white shirt man,” and who was unwilling to talk to
Mandy at the beginning. When he got cancer himself, he wanted to share
information. Mandy was just as understanding of his unwillingness to talk as
she was of his change of heart.
Barbara died some years ago. Joyce still goes to a multiple myeloma support
group she began when she was first diagnosed. She is the only one in her
group still at Stage I. Others are far worse off. “I’m waiting for the other shoe to
drop but it hasn’t and I just count my blessings,” she says, “The thing you
live with is the hope that there are always new drugs” and Joyce has faith that
her doctor is “very up on” all the new drugs. Joyce worked with a friend at
Uniroyal in Wisconsin who, unlike Joyce, moved with the company to a new
plant in Alabama in 1991. She says her friend still sprays rubber solvent to keep
rubber from sticking together. She can’t believe that after all the studies, toxic
chemicals are still being used in tire production. Her friend has not become
sick and is not worried, and the pay is good. The chemical companies do not
admit to liability, and the case for Joyce, Barbara’s heirs, and a number of their
co-workers is ongoing.
AMANDA HAWES / 303
In order to fight these battles, Mandy taught herself chemistry, toxicology,
and epidemiology in her long career. She says, “I try to take the lessons from
one case or set of cases and work on some way of changing something so harm
doesn’t keep on happening.”
Mandy recently responded to a request on a listserv of worker health advocates,
after the BP oil spill, that asked what the ambient air standards for VOCs (volatile
organic chemicals) should be in the Gulf to protect workers. Toluene is a
chemical present in the oil spill cleanup, and the activists asked for information
about it. Mandy immediately sent a 1993 study from the U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission entitled “Hazard Assessment for Spray Paint and Paint
Stripper Containing Toluene,” a Memorandum from the U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission in Washington, D.C., dated May 27, 1993. Mandy had
found the document when litigating a birth defects case for a worker’s daughter,
who was born blind and with oral clefts after her mom was exposed to toluene
on the job during her pregnancy. The particular study she forwarded to Gulf
activists on the listserv is a study discussing the history of revised standards for
toluene in 1992, a byzantine process that included many agencies and studies.
This article led the ever-tenacious Mandy to the ACGIH 1992 documentation
on toluene that, in its 13 pages, refers in a single sentence to a 1986 epidemio-
logical survey published in a journal called Safety and Health Aspects of Organic
Solvents [1]. This documentation, in turn, became an element of the liability she
argued applied to the chemical company she sued on behalf of the girl born with
birth defects in 1994. According to Mandy, the employer should have known
about the developmental effects of toluene at levels relevant to the workplace
and had a duty to warn the mom and her co-workers of these risks. As Mandy
says, she “always argues that the most relevant standard is the one that is most
health protective vis-à-vis the most vulnerable endpoint.” Mandy has never
accepted any standard except the one she finds for a particular chemical in a
particular case that is the most health protective; this issue becomes a focus of the
litigation. Mandy then compiles “snapshots” of what was in the peer-reviewed
literature when a particular worker was exposed to a particular chemical, whether
in the 1960s, ’70s, ’80s, ’90s or now. Mandy says, it’s “what employers, chemical
suppliers, etc. [were] supposed to know about, warn about, and most importantly,
do something about.”
The fact that there is not one set of standards for everyone when it comes to
toxic chemical exposure is a major motivator for Mandy’s work—she believes
without compromise that there should be a single set of standards, with the most
protective ever declared anywhere in the world as the one that should be adopted.
The argument she has made in every one of her cases is that OSHA PELs (the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Permissible Exposure Limits)
for workers are “no good,” as Mandy succinctly puts it. Looking at the website
by OSHA for the BP oil spill, it is remarkable to see her views of the past 30
years vindicated by the agency itself for the first time ever. In the first FAQ about
304 / SAPONARA
the spill, “Does OSHA use its Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) to determine
what exposures are safe for workers?” OSHA’s response is:
No. OSHA recognizes that most of its PELs are outdated and inadequate
measures of worker safety . . . [i]n characterizing worker exposure OSHA
instead relies on more up-to-date recommended protective limits set by
organizations such as NIOSH, the American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), and the American Industrial Hygiene Asso-
ciation (AIHA), and not on the older, less protective PELS [2].
When I sent the FAQ link to Mandy by e-mail, her response was: “Nice.”
Mandy’s underwhelming reaction is understandable. She has argued long and
hard that chemical companies should not be able to hide behind OSHA standards.
In each of her cases about what the applicable standard should be for what is
“safe” worker exposure, chemical companies say they can’t be liable because
they complied with OSHA. In an interview with Mandy before the BP oil spill
occurred, Mandy spoke of the amazing fact that OSHA standards, which are
meant to protect workers, are far less stringent than environmental standards:
“It took years and huge fights with the chemical industry to get an OSHA standard
of 1 ppm of benzene in workplace air. But environmental standards for benzene
are much stronger and more protective than this 1 ppm standard.” Mandy likes
to pose this question: “How long does a worker have to be exposed to benzene
at the OSHA legal limit of 1 ppm to have been exposed to a lifetime dose of
benzene measured by a health-protective environmental standard? Ten years?
Five years? One year? Three months?” The answer, according to Mandy, is
none of the above: it’s less than three months. California’s Office of Health
Hazard Assessment recommends that exposure not exceed 7 ppb, which is
thousands of times lower than the OSHA “permissible exposure limit” of
100 ppm. And the American Petroleum Industry has been on record since
1948 that “the only safe level of exposure to benzene is zero,”[3] but, Mandy
says, that information has not been shared with workers.
Since that interview I conducted with Mandy on November 13, 2009, OSHA
itself has come to disagree with its own PELs, but that’s just the first hurdle
in Mandy’s cases anyway. Next comes which standard should apply. There are
so many different standards for each individual chemical from a vast array of
agencies, that there is much argument for attorneys on both sides to make.
The EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), ATSDR (Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry), IARC (International Agency for Research
on Cancer), California’s OEHHA (Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment), and the ACGIH (American Conference of Industrial Hygienists)
all publish standards and do not agree on the most protective standard. To
those of us for whom science doesn’t come easily, the agencies themselves
don’t make it easy.
AMANDA HAWES / 305
As David Pellow, a co-editor with David Sonnenfeld and Mandy’s husband
Ted Smith, of Challenging the Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice
in the Global Electronics Industry [4], said in an interview with Mandy: “You
have been able to demystify this whole science of epidemiology and toxicology.
You’ve broken this very complex stuff down so that people can understand
it. You have developed a real skill to the point where you seem to know this
better than anybody.” In an article Mandy wrote for a nonprofit called “Just
Transition Alliance,” she set forth an explanation that I would rename “Chemical
Knowledge for Dummies.” Mandy’s main points in the article were that while
“organic” means wholesome and natural and healthy to most of us, it is quite
the opposite for “organic solvents” commonly used in industrial settings. In
that case, “organic” only means a compound whose molecule contains carbon.
Organic solvents work well in cleaning fast and leaving shinier surfaces. They
also put the staying power in paint after it dries and after the solvents from
the paint have evaporated. Organic solvents like benzene, trichloroethylene
(TCE), and toluene vaporize (evaporate into the air) and that’s why paints can
be smelly. Unless you are wearing a respirator or are working with fantastic
local exhaust ventilation when you apply solvent-based paints, solvent-based
pesticides, solvent-based cleaning products, or solvent-based beauty products,
you are around solvent vapors. We all instinctively know it’s not wholesome
or good for us but we figure that a few squirts to clean or a little color on our
nails or a little product on our hair or painting our rooms is not going to kill
us. And we’re probably right. It’s never been the consumers or the weekend
gardener for whom Mandy works so hard. Mandy fights to prevent the day-in
and day-out use of organic solvents by workers, since such exposure crosses
the blood-brain barrier and goes “straight to your head.” Chronic occupational
exposure is Mandy’s concern, and harmed kidneys, liver problems, cancer
and birth defects in children exposed in utero are her cases. And many
workers work with more than one organic solvent at the same time, so
that the risks are likely to be greater. Those are the basics of chemicals
and worker safety according to one who has made those two realities her
life’s work.
Mandy is unique in insisting that the law and science must mesh for worker
safety in hard cases that most lawyers shy away from. She doesn’t take the
route of representing workers exposed to asbestos, or to cigarette smoke, where
the science is well established. She takes cases that often require science never
tested in a legal forum before and she pushes to the limit what law and science
together can do on behalf of workers.
Mandy’s son Kyle, who is a firefighter in San Diego, says, “Mom has this
insatiable desire to just go for it in life against the odds; not pity yourself
for having to go against the odds—just get out there and do it because there’s
no reason not to because life is too short.” He says it comes from her dad
(his grandpa), “this feeling of ‘I can do anything.’” “She has this David versus
306 / SAPONARA
Goliath perspective” and “wants to be a voice of the small person” against these
major corporations.
Gail Bateson is the Executive Director of Worksafe!, a non-profit on whose
board Mandy serves. Gail has a master’s degree in Energy and Resources, but
it’s Mandy’s energy and enthusiasm that she reveres: “Mandy is filled with joy
and has a clear internal sense of purpose. . . . She does not live in a place of fear.”
Gail describes Mandy’s attitude as “We’ll get through this and isn’t it fun to
be part of the struggle?”
Dr. Cynthia Bearer, who is Chief of Neonatology at the University of
Maryland, has served as an expert witness in Mandy’s cases nearly a dozen
times. In preparing a case well before she’s involved, Dr. Bearer says of Mandy:
“She will go through piles of literature on any particular topic very thoroughly
for the toxicological properties of every chemical that might be at issue.” She
says, “Mandy has read all the scientific articles I have and she thoroughly
understands the issues.” About Mandy defending her in a deposition, Dr. Bearer
says with a chuckle, “I feel very well-protected by Mandy.” Dr. Bearer thinks
Mandy’s motivation in pursuing her work is akin to that of a scientist: “to know
when you’re moving from the cutting edge of science to a close approximation
of the truth.” Dr. Bearer explains, “in science, we never know what ‘the truth’
is; we don’t have absolute certitude. We only have a current paradigm of what
we think the truth is. Paradigms are constantly evolving. The point at which
we’ve accumulated enough of a body of knowledge to say ‘we think we know
a truth’ is the ultimate question for a scientist.” She thinks Mandy loves this
challenge too, on top of being “an incredibly intense and intelligent woman
always fighting for better conditions for women and, in the work I mostly do
with her, for their unborn kids.”
Dr. Bearer’s work right now focuses on a phenomenon called “lipid rafts.”
She is exploring how solvent exposure can cause dysfunction of lipid rafts so
that communication to the central nervous system is impaired. As Dr. Bearer
explains, when a pregnant woman is exposed to solvents, the lipid raft dys-
function from solvents can have a devastating impact on the developing brain
of her unborn child. Making the connection between Dr. Bearer’s research (and
others’) and chemical companies’ accountability to a child born with birth
defects is not for your average lawyer or scientist. Mandy melds both worlds.
Mandy explained to me that Dr. Bearer’s research was about the mechanisms
of fetal damage from lipid-raft disruption secondary to solvent exposure. It’s
relevant, Mandy says, because her work “helps eliminate any lingering doubt
about whether regular exposure to industrial solvents during pregnancy is
‘okay.’” She continues: “It’s not and it never has been.” Chemical companies
always argue that unless a scientifically plausible mechanism has been identified
and is generally accepted in the scientific community, it is simply too soon to
rush to judgment and conclude that there is an association between the chemical
and any adverse health outcomes (and therefore that the chemical company has
AMANDA HAWES / 307
some responsibility). Dr. Bearer said in our interview, “If it’s already in a
textbook, that means it’s dated and there’s probably more recent research out
there to be considered too.” One of the standards for establishing causation in
law is biological plausibility. It’s the plausibility part that fascinates Dr. Bearer
and motivates her work and, I think it does for Mandy, too. For Mandy, the
“generally accepted” chemical company standard is far too late for working
people “to get real protection from toxics like substituting safe production
methods” rather than current exposure realities to toxic solvents.
During the course of our interviews, when I asked Mandy to put all humility
aside, she shoots a look as if to say I’ve crossed the line from asking softball
questions to playing hardball. She is relentless in wanting to deflect credit and
focus attention to others. So I ask her why she does what she does. She says,
“I’m not afraid of anything. Having a law degree and having mixed it up with
the outfits I’ve mixed it up with, either you just get totally disgusted and fed
up or you go, well, I can do this just as well as you can but I got news: I can last
longer than you. Because I really do care and believe in what I’m doing and
I don’t do it for the money.” Mandy lives modestly and invests much of what she
earns as a lawyer into supporting nonprofit environmental and health groups,
and in doing her best to be well prepared for her next case.
The most high-profile cases Mandy has been involved with were the IBM
cases on behalf of “clean room” workers. Clean rooms are immaculately clean
of even the smallest particles, such as dust, for the manufacture of semiconductor
chips. Mandy represented hundreds of former IBM employees in San Jose,
California, and Fishkill, New York, from 1997 to 2005. Her clients believed
their rare cancers or their children’s birth defects were caused by the industrial
exposure to the many hundreds of chemicals that went into making the chips.
Ultimately, the various IBM cases resolved differently. A judge in San Jose
adopted the chemical companies’ “junk science” arguments and excluded a
great deal of key scientific testimony, which resulted in a finding of no liability
against IBM in a highly publicized fraud case brought by two IBM workers
from the San Jose plant who had developed cancer. In New York much of that
same scientific evidence was found admissible.
An exposure that was common to most of the electronics workers from
the 1970s whom Mandy has represented came from “vapor degreasers” used to
clean computer components by immersing them in solvent vapors generated by
converting solvents from the liquid to the gas phase. Mandy says, “the degreasers
in that era were very primitive. They typically had a ‘cooling coil’ around the
top degreaser to turn the vapor back into liquid. And when maintenance workers
would sometimes pass out from the accumulation of heavier-than-air vapors
escaping the degreaser, these events were hushed up fast. Product literature that
would have the worker believe that the vapors created by the degreaser would
all stay within its confines was a form of magical thinking. Many workers later
were disabused of this magical thinking in ways that were tragic for them and
308 / SAPONARA
often for their offspring exposed in utero.” While these problems were occurring
on the shop floor, “the EPA took action because of concern that escaping vapors
of these chlorinated solvents would cause a hole in the ozone layer,” she con-
tinues, and therefore many of these solvents were gradually phased out. With a
ferocious intensity, Mandy says: “You sure as hell don’t have to get as far as the
ozone layer to realize these vapors are horrible and can be lethal for the people on
the ground, feet touching earth, exposed to this day in and day out on their jobs.”
Several excellent articles have been written about the IBM cases, one by
a graduate student in journalism at Stanford named Lily Bixler called “The
Clean Room: Why did so many IBM employees come down with cancer after
working in Silicon Valley?,” which appeared in a Stanford-published journal
of new voices [5]. Another, by Jim Thompson, was called “Poison Valley: Is
workers’ health the price we pay for high-tech progress?” and was published
by Salon in 2001 [6].
The IBM cases were a David-versus-Goliath fight, the only kind Mandy
fights. Although she was gravely disappointed by the verdict in the one San Jose
case that went to trial on claims of fraudulent concealment by IBM, one of
Mandy’s proudest moments as a lawyer is that a large health monitoring database
that IBM kept for more than 30 years was made available for analysis. It took
Mandy five years in litigation to uncover the raw data that comprised what
IBM itself called the “Corporate Mortality File” and have it analyzed by
epidemiologists; when the judge in San Jose excluded the analysis from the jury
hearing the fraud cause, she vowed to “get the data sprung.” It was. In 2006,
Dr. Richard Clapp, an epidemiologist at the Boston University School of Public
Health, published a set of results based on 31,941 workers who died between
1969 and 2001, who had worked for at least five years and whose death infor-
mation was collected in the corporate mortality file with “a unique identifier . . .
so that the death and work history data for individual decedents could be linked.”
The article appeared in the May 2006 edition of a peer reviewed journal,
Environmental Health [7]. When accessed online, the article is highlighted
as both “Highly Accessed” and “Open Access.” What was cloistered by IBM
for so long now has had many readers on the Internet. The study found signifi-
cantly elevated levels of specific cancers in manufacturing workers: including
lymphohematopoetic cancers, brain and central nervous system cancer, kidney
cancer, melanoma of the skin, and pancreatic cancer. The San Jose jury in the
case of Alida Hernandez and Jim Moore did not have access to the data or
the analysis, but word that it has been “highly accessed” since then is music
to Mandy’s ears.
Mandy has ridden a tumultuous 30-year route that has at times seen environ-
mentalists pushing aside labor and belittling the word “worker” as pejorative.
On the flip side, labor unions have belittled environmentalists as ivory-tower
types knowing nothing about life with feet on the ground. Mandy doesn’t care
about those long-thriving tensions, and she never has. What she cares about
AMANDA HAWES / 309
is what she calls a “life-cycle approach.” As she describes it, she would do
nothing less than:
Close the gap between workplace and environmental standards. Phase out
organic solvents in industrial processes. ‘Replace the job hazard, not the
job.’ If it’s worthwhile, you can find a way to do it without hazardous
materials. Green jobs should not only mean jobs that help the environment
but also jobs that are non-toxic for workers doing them. Medical surveillance
to exposed workers should be commonplace instead of steadfastly avoided;
it would make early detection of worker ill health possible. And doctors
should have to report all suspected cases of industrial poisoning; that very
documentation could save the next person’s life.
Mandy is amazed that even cancer doctors often don’t obtain patients’ work
histories. She calls it a head-in-the-sand approach. “If it’s not an oncologist’s
job to record work history information for an epidemiologist or public health
official to analyze, then whose is it?” she says. “For decades Scandinavian
countries have prioritized worker health and shown that prevention does pay.
For example, when kids are born with serious problems, what Mom and Dad were
doing for a job has been important information that is recorded; patterns of
exposure and any adverse birth outcomes are taken seriously. Similar concern
and attention is paid to worker exposures and patterns of chronic disease. Around
here, this level of concern for protecting health of chemically exposed workers
and their families is all too rare. And the human costs of not taking preventive
action end up being ‘outsourced’ to the victims and to the public sector.”
Mandy wants chemists, doctors, and environmental community activists to
take a life-cycle approach so we get the chemicals out of the stream of commerce
before people are made sick at work for making the products:
Messing around with BPA [bisphenol-A] in baby bottles is the consumer-end
or the waste-end and then you’re missing the biggest opportunity which is
the process of how it’s made. The chemical companies love the disparity
between the consumer end of it and lame OSHA laws; they’re not scared
at all. They have blinders on for a purpose. We should be talking about
prevention, fighting the development of disease . . . if we all have to pay for it,
then we’ll be more interested in employers being proactive and protecting
their workers. And if chemical companies are held accountable for failing
to protect and warn workers of toxics, then they’ll begin to think their
responsibility goes beyond their shareholders.
About consumer advocacy to remove chemicals from toys and plastics and nail
polish, Mandy says: “Think about it: where did those products come from?
They got made someplace. And the choices about what materials get put in the
product impact tremendously whether they’re a problem in an environment.”
Joyce Jenson wonders and fears whether Mandy, who is the same age as she
at 67 years old, will one day retire. Mandy’s son Kyle says he doesn’t see it.
310 / SAPONARA
“There’s lots she still wants to do and she says she won’t stop until she stops
enjoying it,” he says. “She’s still making progress.” As for Mandy, she’s working
on a project to index scientific studies to more easily prove when chemical
companies were “on notice” of harm their chemical products could cause,
either as identified in animal studies or in epidemiological studies. She is still
litigating. And she is still taking time every week to dance in the garden with her
granddaughter Roma, a time she calls “Romatherapy.” She’s still running and
dancing in her spare time and she intends to outrun her chemical company
competitors in some of her latest cases.
NOTES
1. Peter C. Holmberg, et al., “Solvent Exposure and Birth Defects: An Epidemiologic
Survey,” in Safety and Health Aspects of Organic Solvents, eds V. Riihimäki and
U. Ulfvarson (New York: Alan R. Liss, Inc., 1986), pp. 179-185.
2. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “Frequently Asked Questions on
Health Hazards and Protections,” http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/interim-guidance-
qa.html#qa (accessed February 26, 2011).
3. American Petroleum Institute (API), Toxicological Review: Benzene, September 1948
(p. 4).
4. Ted Smith, David A. Sonnenfeld, and David Naguib Pellow, eds., Challenging the
Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
5. Lily Bixler, “The Clean Room: Why did so many IBM employees come down with
cancer after working in Silicon Valley?” http://journalism.stanford.edu/studentworks/
2010/bixler-clean-room.pdf (accessed February 26, 2011).
6. Jim Thompson, “Poison Valley: Is workers’ health the price we pay for high-tech
progress?” Salon, July 30 & 31, 2001, http://www.salon.com/technology/feature/2001/
07/30/almaden1 (accessed February 27, 2011).
7. Richard Clapp, “Mortality Among U.S. Employees of a Large Computer Manufacturing
Company: 1969-2001,” Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source, 5:30
(2006), doi: 10.1186/1476-069X-5-30.
Direct reprint requests to:
Ann Saponara
43153 Luzon Dr.
Fremont, CA 94539
e-mail: [email protected]
AMANDA HAWES / 311