1 world war one. 2 ww1: strategic overview contributing factors & conditions growing...

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World War One

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WW1: Strategic Overview Contributing factors & conditions

• Growing populations, industry, transportation:– Road networks & railroads

• Central Government control of above:– Enhanced power & direction of population;– More efficient mobilization– More resources available for larger armies

• Nationalism shapes attitudes of people:– Patriotism verging on jingoism

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Contributing factors & conditions- 2• WWI involved global participation – 50 Million people• Divided world into opposing alliance blocs:

– Central Powers versus the Allies• Plus 30+ from Europe, Asia, & Africa

VS.

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Contributing factors & conditions- 3

• Initial Expectations & assumptions?– ?________________ … again!… (why?)– Hugh ?________________ & ?________________ expected– Therefore modern societies would force political leaders to end it

• Reality? (both right and wrong about above- how?)– What did World War I soon evolve into? ?________________

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WW1: Total War• Government dedicated all people & resources to war

– Beyond Napoleonic or American Civil Wars• Central economic planning extensive

• Total industrial mobilization

• Mass armies for battle

• Conscription of all eligible males

• Lethal weapons for more efficient killing

• WWI produced new Strategies & innovative tactics:– Tactical & Operational Aim & motivation?

• Maneuver break-through of opponent’s defenses quickly

• Overcome the stalemate of the trench

• New weapons make debut:

– Aircraft, SS, Tank & others much improved (MG & Arty)

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Europe’s Political & Social Institutions

• Impact of WWI on Europe’s social institutions?• Major Geo-political, strategic, military, & $$$

changes:– Russia underwent major revolution

– Austria-Hungry ceased to exist

– US became a major power

• Hugh casualties: – 8.5M killed & 20M wounded

– Entire generation of Europe’s best & brightest lost

• Ultimately sew the seeds of even more destructive war

Major War Plans: Germany• Background: German

Unification in 1871:– Victory of Franco-Prussian

War & annexation of France’s Alsace-Lorraine

– Prime focus of the French

• Key assumption: short decisive war of maneuver

• German approach: make detailed & precise plans

• Plan’s architect: Chief of General Staff (1891-1906):– Count von ?________________

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Germany’s Original strategy• Original strategy for

sequential 2 front War:– Initially beginning with

attack on Russia first• What complicaton forced

Germany to modify the plan?

• Complication: 1894 - France & ?_________ alliance– Innovative but very risky

strategy now was required– Forced German planners

to reverse sequence

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Revised Strategy• Germany was forced to revise

their strategic plan– Numerous iterations made

(The Count made 49 as COS)– What exactly was the major

change made to the plan?• Attack France first – then

Russia – why? – Time expected for Russia’s

mobilization?• ?_____ __________

• Operational Concept: – Sweep through Holland &

Belgium & envelope Paris• Key Assumption?

– Exploit French strategic aims to recapture what?

– ?________________

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Moltke’s Modifications of the Plan

• Moltke (the Younger) took over General Staff in 1906– Made major changes to von Schlieffen’s basic plan – result?

• Weaken & compress German Right Flank (violate only Belgium neutrality)

• + Modified mission of German Left Flank to hold, then attack=> impact?

– Moltke weakened the weight of the ?________ to strengthen his ?________________

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Friction & Murphy’s Law

• Problem: German shortfalls & Murphy’s Law:– Not enough troops for 2 Front War:

• France & Russia have more troops

– Plan’s secrecy also impeded timely coordination

• Logistics & transportation challenges significant:– Especially as LOCs are stretched => + attrition:

• Compounded by Strategic consumption

– Inflexible deployment schedules (rigid RR time tables)

• Friction: no margin for error or missed deadlines:– Result: Murphy’s Law & its many correlations intrude

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France: Plan XVII- Offensive a’outrance• French troops with Élan,’

courage & the bayonet:– Assault entrenched positions

against rifles, machine guns & arty– Problem with this plan: Germans have

similar capabilities & determination

• French Strategy?– Fight & win decisive battle

with Germans– Big question: how exactly?

• Great flexibility but short on details;

– No clear strategic objective:• With one possible exception? • Regain ?________________

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French Objectives & Operational Concept

• Two pronged attack into Lorraine:– All forces attack on each

side of Verdun-Toul line

– French Fourth Army held in reserve– (to change later):

• (to strike NE into Belgium if required);

• Reason: Halt possible German RF envelopment;

• Result – French will play into German hands – how?– Where is main attack axis?

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Great Britain’s War Plans • British Navy to effect control

of North Sea:– British to cover English

Channel & French North coast– French to cover Mediterranean

• British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to cover French 5th Army’s Left Flank – Fill gap North to the Channel &

prevent German envelopment– Also provided BEF with LOC

to the English Channel & Royal Navy

– But Britain also had no clear strategic objective

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Russia’s Military Plans• Russia – establish Eastern (2nd)

Front:– Collaborate with French efforts in

West

• Plan G: – Defend against East Prussia &

Austria-Hungary– Mobilize & counterattack

• Plan A: – Assumed France is attacked first:– Mobilize & attack Austria-Hungary

& East Prussia– Fulfill promised deployment of 800K

troops by D+15 & attack ASAP

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Other War Plans• Austria-Hungary – address 3 contingencies:

– Threats on 3 sides: Italy, Russia, Serbia;• Case I, R, & B

– Army divided into 3 major groups

• Main forces for either of cases I & R

• Secondary force against Serbia;

• Third force available to reinforce either of above;

• Complication:

– Nation has multi-ethnic peoples & languages

• Common factor for all of above plans:– All mostly Offensive (over Defensive) Strategies

– Most fatally flawed – why?

• Plan is only as good as worst ?________________

• No plan survives the 1st ?________________

• At best – provides ?________________ to adjust to

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World War One- Strategic Overview (Map)• Background:

– Historical events:• Escalation of Terrorist act in Balkans to…• A Regional crisis and from there to a World War

– Significance of mobilization => Act of War:• August 1-6 sequence of events- series of miscalculations & reactions

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Western Front (Aug-Sept 1914) • Execution: Opening Battles- (Map):

– Initially according to plan:• Germans sweep around French Left Flank (LF):• France attacks into Lorraine• Russia attacks East Prussia & Austria-Hungary• Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia

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Friction & “The best laid plans…”• Then friction intrudes (definition & impact?):

– Bottleneck of 1st & 2nd German Armies in Belgium (space!)

– Time & Forces required to reduce fortifications

• Strategic consumption• Impact on Moltke's rigid

RR timetable => delay

• Command, Control, Communications problems:– Timely HQ decisions OBE as they tend to chase events– Rigid timetables impossible to keep- result in confusion– Moltke in rear & out of touch & control=> (indecision)

• Von Kluck placed under OPCON of Burlow (2nd Army) – Attempt to retrain & control outer belt’s freedom of movement– 1st Army over extended its LOC

• Meanwhile the French labor under their own illusions

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French Offensive – Belated Response to Real Threat

• Joffre follows Plan XVII (ground truth?!)– Concludes enemy activity to North

is what?– German ?________________

• German 6th & 7th Armies invite attack IAW Plan– French blunder heroically into

Germans’ kill zone– French infantry fail to coordinate

arty support– Ordered by Joffre to advance &

suffer heavy causalities as a result

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Better Late Than Never• Joffre finally realizes his

mistake & quickly responds:– Relies on FM French’s

BEF to cover extreme left flank of French Army (5th )

• Joffre shifts remaining available French troops north to confront German main attack– Situation in doubt –

desperate actions required to salvage it

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Allied Retreat: 24 Aug to 5 Sep 1914• Germans continue to push

Allies SW in retreat:– French 5th Army keeps retreating

w/o informing BEF– Result: BEF’s right flank

exposed forcing their belated withdrawal under fire

– Any attempt to hold line results in heavy Brit casualties so entire Allied line must continue retreat

• FM French rapidly loses confidence in French Army– Looks to protect his LOC for

withdrawal as a contingency

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“Miracle of the Marne”The German Advance

• Kluck is over-extended– 1st Army outruns its logistics & supplies– Horse drawn guns fail to keep up with

advance• Moltke detaches 2 corps from 2nd & 3rd

Armies:– Sends East to reinforce 8th Army against

Russia advance• Messages from HQ delayed & OBE:

– Uncertainty, confusion, & misunderstandings reign

• Result: contradictory orders to Kluck from both Moltke & Burlow:– Leave Kluck on own to decide which ones

best to comply with– Decision factor: 1st Army almost a day

ahead of 2nd Army & its logistics

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“Kluck’s Turn”• Kluck complies with Burlow’s

request of 30 Aug to cover 2nd Army’s Right Flank:– Concludes Moltke behind events now

unfolding rapidly on the ground to Kluck’s front

• What exactly does Kluck decide to do?– Turns to ?________ & inside of ?

________ to close 2nd Army’s exposed RF

– Result: opportunity presents itself (what & for who?)

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Opportunity Knocks

• 1st Army’s move to SE exposes its own RF to Paris & the newly formed 6th Army– Air recon sent by Gallieni verifies Kluck’s exposed right flank– Gallieni urges Joffre to attack it immediately

• Gallieni rapidly deploys troops to front by all means, including “Taxis of the Marne”

• With BEF’s support, Joffre orders 6th Army to deploy to threaten Kluck’s RF:– Move east & prepare to counter-attack

• French troop redeployment alerts Moltke on 4 Sept:– Realizes Kluck’s right flank is now vulnerable– But Moltke’s message warning arrives 11 hours later & only serves

to confuse Kluck

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Kluck’s Turn- 2• Kluck is convinced Moltke uninformed:

– Believes (wrongly) that French still not ready to attack

– Kluck’s 1st Army therefore continues its move South & across the Marne

• But Kluck hedges his bets– leaves 1 corps in Reserve -positioned on the North side of the river to guard his RF

• French 6th moves East & attracts Kluck’s Reserve corps attention– Kluck’s Corps held in reserve attacks 6th Army:

• Pre-emptive strike eliminates tactical surprise just in time• Buys time for Kluck to realign to face west & protect his RF

• But Realignment offers Joffre another opportunity:– What is this second & very critical opportunity?– What does Joffre do about it?

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French Response • Kluck’s Realignment to protect

his RF opens gap between 1st & 2nd Army– A 45 KM gap opens between the

two armies near Chateau Thierry

• Burlow’s RF exposed & is forced to withdraw toward North– Kluck soon forced to follow to

protect his Left Flank

• Joffre seizes opportunity to counterattack– Pushes BEF & left flank of

French 5th in gap & attacks => Result?

– Germans must ?_______________

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“Race to the Sea” • Germans are forced to retreat &

attempt to re-establish front on Aisne River – Joffre saves Paris & Moltke is

relieved (too pessimistic)

• Falkenhayn replaces Moltke– Rebuilds German right wing for

another try at flanking Allies

– Allies in turn move North in attempt to out flank Germans

• Both sides counter the other’s movements to sea– By winter (1914-15): 350 mile

extended & entrenched Front established from the Swiss border to the North Sea

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Eastern Front – Aug-Dec 1914 • Contrast between Western vs. Eastern Front (Map):

– Geography & distances to maneuver• Impact on logistics support

– Transportation needs favor internal LOCs – why?

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Key Factors Affecting Match Up

• Size of Russian Army (12M) vs. 11M of Germans– French have 8.4 million troops

• Russian tactics:– Massive frontal assaults (Set piece, mindless & brutal)

• Conscript Troops not trained or properly equipt– No coordination between supporting arms:

• Infantry, artillery, & Calvary do their own thing

• Infighting & petty jealousy at Russian high command levels:– Result: Operational support between & among Armies suffers– Incompetent generalship & poor leadership => bad tactical & Op. decisions

• German Factors & Tactics:– Small but well led & trained forces;– Better coordination developing;– Effective exploitation of internal LOCs

• Exploit lateral Railroad transport for redeployments & concentration

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Eastern Front- Strategic Goals & Map Overview

• Germany’s strategic goal:– Avoid defeat in East– Maintain stabilized Eastern

Front– Delay Russian advance

• Russian strategic goal:– Fulfill promise to France

• Establish 2nd Front in East

– Relieve pressure from Germans on France in West

– Attack East Prussia ASAP

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Battle of TannenbergOrder of Battle & Operational Plans

• Russia NW Army Group (Commanded by the incompetent Zhilinski) with two Armies:– 1st Army – (Rennenkamph):

• 200K troops• Marches West to the North of Masurian Lakes to attack German Army

defending East Prussia

– 2nd Army- (Samsonov):• 14.5 Infantry & 4 Calvary Divisions with 1160 guns • Marches West around South of the Lakes & then North• Objective: Join Rennenkamph in attack by enveloping German Army

from the south in its rear & trap it

• German 8th Army (Prittwitz):– 135K Troops (11 undermanned Inf & 1 Calvary divs)– Plan: Establish defense line to hold off Russian advance– Concentrate to either North or South as required

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Battle of Tannenberg- Prelude• Germans forced to engage Russian 1st

Army in North– 8th Army attacks 1st Army w/9

Divisions at Gumbinen:

– Indecisive tactical outcome- but Prittwitz withdraws to the West

• Intel reports indicate that 2 Russian Armies are to his south

– Prittwitz panics– Fears his LOCs will be cut off – Decides to retreat behind Vistula River &

abandon East Prussia!• Informs Moltke – who does what?

– Soon decides to relieve Prittwitz– Replaced by whom?

• ?________________ & ?________________

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Battle of Tannenberg- 8th Army’s New Plan• Meantime: 8th Army HQ staff (LTC

Hoffman) comes up with good plan:– Hold static Russian 1st Army in place in North:

• One Calvary Division to screen 1st Army • Bulk of 8th Army to deploy South via

internal lateral LOC• Tactical Objective: Lure & trap vulnerable

2nd Army into the weak center of an arc – Then hit both of Samsonov’s right & left

flanks– Pincer Envelopment– Unfortunately Prittwitz failed to inform Moltke

of this revised plan – so he was relieved• Hindenburg & Ludendorff arrive & take

over:– Concur with Hoffman’s revised plan– Ludendorff deploys 4 corps South to attack – (Intel windfall: Russian plan & C3 intercepts)– Samsonov & 2nd Army completely unaware of

danger until too late

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Battle of Tannenberg- Samsonov’s Blunder• Samsonov blunders into 8th Army’s trap

– Presses into “soft” German center– Ignores serious reservations of his

subordinate commanders• Pressured by Zhilinski to continue 2nd Army’s

advance (“Won’t let Samsonov play coward”)– Aug 26-27: 2 German corps attack 2nd

Army RF– Another German Corps hits his Left Flank

soon after– Aug 28: 2nd Army then attacks soft center

& is trapped as planned• At same time Russian 2nd Army’s LOC

has been seriously overextended:– Troops & horses begin to starve

(3 days w/o rations or winter clothes)– Samsonov’s appeals for help & relief,

but his pleas go unheeded:– Zhilinski & Rennenkamph simply

abandon Samsonov & his army

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Battle of Tannenberg- Results• Disaster follows – Samsonov shoots himself in forest:

– Russia’s 2nd Army destroyed:• Russian loss: 92K POWs & 50K casualties

• Tactical & short lived operational victory for Germans– Certainly not a strategic victory – why?

• Russian losses easily ?________________ – (37+ corps)

• Hindenburg & Ludendorff re-deploy forces to North:– Objective: Attack Russian 1st Army

– Rennenkamph withdraws across Russian border

• By 20 Sept: Russian Army would return w/stronger force:– Push Germans West to East Prussian frontier– By 25 Sept – strategic situation in East is unchanged

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Operations in Galicia & Poland

• Austria-Hungary vs. Russia:– Superior Russian numbers ultimately

overcome initial Austrian successes– Russian victories preclude

exploitation of Tannenburg• Poland: Germans forced to come

to Austria-Hungary’s rescue:– Enables Austria-Hungary to push

Russians back to start of Offensive– Both Germans & Austria-Hungary

exhausted– Unable to exploit short lived tactical

victories for strategic or Op success• Serbia:

– Austrians fail to sustain earlier limited success

– By 15 Dec: Serbs drive Austrians out of Serbia

– Remains under Serbian control until late 1915

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Assessment • Central Powers fail to achieve quick, decisive

tactical & strategic victory- why?

• Joffre & “Miracle of the Marne”– Firm & decisive action & leadership at critical moment– Last minute adjustment to reality of ground truth– Seized opportunity & retrieved initiative from Germans

• Eastern Front: – German tactical & operational victory:

• Battle of Tannenburg– But Germans fail to achieve strategic victory - why?

• Major limitation: limited ?______ & ?______ & ?______ !

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Assessment- Longer Term Perspective

• From longer term perspective – Germany’s future grim– Austria-Hungary ally more of a liability than credit

• Von Schlieffen Plan (as modified) failed in execution:– HQ (Moltke) leadership poor & indecisive– Command, control, & communications problems severe– Overextended lines of communication – (Kluck’s 1st Army)– No quick victory possible (key German assumption for war)

• Western Front: long static defensive stalemate ensues:– Numerous attempts by both sides to break stalemate:

• Result in costly & unsuccessful frontal assaults

• Focus now: sustain logistics needs of Army - top priority– While both sides desparately search for new strategy & tactics to

break the stalemate

Back-up Slides

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The World at War 1914-1918

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Battle of Tannenberg- Samsonov’s Blunder• Samsonov blunders into 8th

Army’s trap– Presses into “soft” German center– Ignores reservations of subordinate

commanders• Pressured by Zhilinski to continue

2nd Army’s advance (“coward”)– Aug 26-27: 2 German corps attack

2nd Army RF– Another German Corps hits his Left

Flank soon after– Aug 28: 2nd Army then attacks soft

center & is trapped as planned• At same time Russian 2nd Army’s

LOC seriously overextended:– Troops & horses begin to starve (3

days w/o rations or winter clothes)– Samsonov’s appeals for help & relief

unheeded:– Zhilinski & Rennenkamph abandon

Samsonov