cellular automata based authentication (caa ) monalisa mukherjee 1 niloy ganguly 2 p pal chaudhuri 1...
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Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA )
Monalisa Mukherjee1 Niloy Ganguly 2
P Pal Chaudhuri 1
1 Department of Computer Science & Technology , Bengal Engineering College ( D . U ) , Howrah ,
West Bengal , India 711103
2Department of Business Administration , Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management , Calcutta ,
West Bengal , India 700073
CA Research Group (BECDU)
• Importance 1. Authentication & Verification of
data source 2. Protection of copyright &
detection of intrusion 3. Prevention of Cyber-Crime
• Wide Applications E-Commerce, Medical, Technology, Government , Law
Authentication
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Message Digest Generation Function
Message Digest Generation FunctionsAccepts a message of arbitrary length as the inputTransforms a key of fixed length called “fingerprint”
or “message digest” as the output One-way hash function with the addition of a secret key forms the basis of this transformation
Authentication Compares fingerprint produced at source and destination end Important for the security protocols inMessage authentication , Data integrity and Digital signature
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SOURCE
MessageDigest
Cellular Automata (CA) based Authentication (CAA)
MessageDigest
DESTINATION
Digest
HashPrivate key
Hash
Private key
Compare Same Not Hacked
Hacker
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Importance of Proposed Method
Limitations of the conventional MD5 based message authentication -Not withstand the advanced cryptanalytic attacks
-The hash function used is weak In the above background, we propose an efficient message digest generation scheme.
The proposed scheme employs a special class of GF(2p) Cellular Automata (CA )
2p Predecessor Single Attractor Cellular Automata(SACA)
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pp pp
1 i-1 i i+1 n
0/1
Input Input Input
OutputOutput Output Output
Input
Output0/1
An n Cell GF(2P) CA
W i
W i+1W i-1
Input
0 --- 2p - 1
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA
Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0
Clock
T =
3 2 0
3 1 2 0 3 2
S 1 = T S 0
0
3
2 3 31
2
2
0XORXORXOR
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300 301 302 303 233200
010 013012 011 022020 021023
030 033032 031
130 131 132 133100333
002 001 003
000
STATE TRANSITION OF A 3 CELL GF ( 2 2 ) SACA
T =
3 2 0
3 1 2 0 3 2
Depth = 3 , Attractor - 0No. of predecessors = 2 p = 4No. of non reachable states = 48
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA
Clock
T =
3 2 0
3 1 2 0 3 2
S 1 = T S 0 + F
Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0
XNOR
0
3
2 3 31
2
2
0
XNOR XNOR
F = 111
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T =
3 2 0
3 1 2 0 3 2
DUAL SACA
F = 111
103
010 011 012 013 233200
110112 111 101100 102
121 123122 120
310 311 312 313330003
133 132 131
130
113
CA Research Group (BECDU)
SACA AND ITS DUAL300 301 302 303 233200
010 013012 011 022020 021023
030 033032 031
130 131 132 133100333
002 001 003
000
103
010 011 012 013 233200
110112 111 101100 102
121 123122 120
310 311 312 313330003
133 132 131
130
113
DUAL SACA
SACA
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HASHING USING SACA AND ITS DUAL300 301 302 303 233200
010 013012 011 022020 021023
030 033032 031
130 131 132 133100333
002 001 003
000
103
010 011 012 013 233200
110112 111 101100 102
121 123122 120
310 311 312 313330003
133 132 131
130
113
SACA
DUAL SACA
Hashing 300 Hashed value 113
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1 0 1 1 1 1 1 08 bits MessageHash Function – 2-cell
GF(22) SACAKey Size = 4
2 3
Message Authentication Through CAA
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 02 3 3 2
Matrix fromfirst token
2 11 3
3 2
Private Key 32
0 02 0
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2 3 3 2
2 3Matrix fromfirst token
Message Authentication Through CAA
2 11 3
32
3 20 02 0
32
01
0 02 0
13
F =
1 3
SACA
DUAL SACA
Private Key
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2 3 3 2
3 2Matrix fromfirst token
Message Authentication Through CAA
3 11 2
13
0 00 02 0
00
01
0 02 0
12
F =
1 2
Message Digest
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Brute Force AttackKey Size can be increased with
minimum cost
Attack Changing key
Related Key Cryptanalysis
Differential Cryptanalysis
Security Analysis For CAA
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Attack changing Message
File SizeFile Size
No of Ones in xored cyphertextNo of Ones in xored cyphertext
Key 128bitKey 128bit Key 256bitKey 256bit 128128
P=4P=4 P=8P=8 P=8P=8 P=16P=16 MD5MD5
32393239 3434 70 70 128128 122122 6969
6578065780 5555 7676 114114 138138 6464
259120259120 5151 6464 130130 136136 7070
P1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101P2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011
XORED = 101110No of 1’s = 4
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Attack changing key
File SizeFile Size
No of Ones in xored cyphertextNo of Ones in xored cyphertext
Key 128bitKey 128bit Key 256bitKey 256bit 128128
P=4P=4 P=8P=8 P=8P=8 P=16P=16 MD5MD5
32393239 5454 6363 134134 130130 6464
6578065780 4545 6464 104104 134134 6868
259120259120 5555 6464 132132 128128 6666
K1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101K2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011
XORED = 101110No of 1’s = 4
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Differential Cryptanalysis
No of 1’s = 5
P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011
No of 1’s = 3
P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011
No of 1’s = 3 No of 1’s = 4
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Differential Cryptanalysis
No of 1’s = 5
P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011
No of 1’s = 3
P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011
No of 1’s = 3 No of 1’s = 4
P1 P2 = 3P1 P2 = 3
C1 C2 C1 C2 FreqFreq
11 nn11
22 nn22
33 nn33
44 nn44
55 nn55
66 nn66
77 nn77
88 nn88
Standard Deviation of distribution
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Differential Cryptanalysis
Avg. Std. Devn. Of XOR Distribution (%) using CAA
P=16P=16P=8P=8P=8P=8P=4P=4Key 256bitKey 256bitKey 128bitKey 128bit
File SizeFile Size
4.9864.9865.0025.0025.0345.0346.6676.6676578065780
5.1225.1226.1236.1236.134 6.134 8.4588.4583586035860
4.0334.0336.1026.1027.9827.98210.21310.213259120259120
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Time Needed for MD5 & CAA
File SizeFile Size
CPU Time in SecondsP=1P=1 P=2P=2 P=4P=4 P=8P=8
MD5MD5n=12n=1288
n=64n=64 n=32n=32 n=16n=16
16081608 0.0550.055 0.050.0500
0.040.04 0.040.04 0.550.55
142164142164 0.2050.205 0.160.1655
0.110.1188
0.080.0811
0.220.2200
852984852984 0.2930.293 0.250.2522
0.200.2055
0.200.2055
0.330.3300
Speed calculated in WindowsNT 4.00 -1381 , IBM
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Watermarking – Its Importance
• Invisible Fragile Watermarking
- Image Authentication / Ownership
- Tamper Detection
- Verification of Image Integrity
•Application
- Legal matters
- News reporting, Medical
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Watermarking
• Existing Tools
- MD5 based One-way Hash Function
•Advantages
- Easy Software implementation
- License free nature
•Disadvantages
- Non-keyed primitive
- Lacks sound & realistic cryptanalysis
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Watermark Insertion / Extraction
Host ImageWatermark Image
Watermarked Image
Insertion Scheme
255 128108 11
1 01 1
11111110 1000000001101100 00001010
1 11 0
CA Based Hashing
0 1 0 1
11111110 1000000101101100 00001011
254 129108 11
11111111 1000000001101100 00001011
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Watermark Insertion / Extraction
Host ImageWatermark Image
Watermarked Image
Insertion SchemeExtraction Scheme
Watermarked Image
Watermark Image
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Proposed Scheme
Resists Holliman-Memon Attack
Vector Quantization Attack
Higher PSNR
Watermarking
Image Name
Data inBytes
PSNR Values in dB unit
P = 4 P = 8 MD5
Lena 1064071 53.463 53.788 51.243
Concord 1485604 54.020 54.527 51.318
Rabbit 964451 52.444 52.725 51.104
CA Research Group (BECDU)
Current & Future Works on Watermarking
• Invisible Robust Watermarking
- Survives Image Cropping & Compression
• Audio & Video Watermarking
• Application
- Prevent Unauthorized Access & Forgery
- Copyright Protection & Authentication
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