[conference report] political settlements and public service performance
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Conference Report Singapore, 12-14 April 2016
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© 2016 UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
#08-01, Block A, 29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, 119620, Singapore
www.undp.org/publicservice
UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help
build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and
sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life
for everyone. On the ground in more than 170 countries
and territories, we offer global perspective and local insight
to help empower lives and build resilient nations.
The Global Centre for Public Service Excellence is UNDP’s
catalyst for new thinking, strategy and action in the area
of public service, promoting innovation, evidence, and
collaboration.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this publication are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent those of the United
Nations, including UNDP, or the UN Member States.
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Executive Summary
From 12 – 14 April 2016, the UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE)
convened a Conference on Political Settlements and Public Service Performance at its
premises in Singapore. The Conference aims were to: clarify the evidence of the impact of
political settlements in non-crisis settings on public service; analyse the complex politics of
change; and identify opportunities to “work with the grain” to develop practical solutions
for improving public service performance for the delivery of the 2030 Agenda.
The conference brought together over 70 internationally renowned development thinkers
and practitioners with a rich and deep understanding of ‘politics’ in a specific country
context. This interaction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ was critical to achieving the
conference objectives.
The conference was organised by GCPSE with the support of Development Leadership
Program (DLP) and the Centre for Public Impact (CPI).
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Conclusions
This pioneering event featured speakers of international renown, who are on the frontlines
of transformational thought and practice about how development ‘really happens’. Their
research on the political roots of public sector performance has practical implications of
importance for everyone concerned about strengthening state capacity to deliver on an
increasingly complex development agenda, including the SDGs. After three days of animated
discussions and robust debate, the Conference arrived at the following conclusions:
Political settlements, power and politics influence public service performance. These
factors create different institutional environments in which public service
organisations, although structurally similar, behave and perform in significantly
different ways. A public service cannot be separated from the political settlement it
operates in, although there is a temptation in similar discourses to conflate government
and public services.
This impact is felt across all layers and activities of a public service, from mandates,
recruitment policies to policy pathways. Much of this impact is appraised in normative
terms (deviating or adhering to ‘good practice’) instead of being understood as stages
of institutional development in a particular political (and economic) constellation.
There is an urgent need for clear methodologies (and agreement on key concepts) about
how to study (or uncover) political settlements, its horizontal (among elites) and
vertical (among elites and constituencies) dimensions, the relationship between formal
and informal institutions, and especially its impact on institutional development.
There is an equally urgent need for a conceptual framework to analyse public service
systems in terms of different political settlements, as extensions of the political
government, as autonomous organisations and as ideational structures with their own
political interests and incentives, and the impact these have on organisational
development and performance.
An area of special interest arising from the conference was, given a particular political
settlement, the role of the public service to mediate between the economic and political
elites on the one hand and citizens on the other hand.
It is possible to broadly categorise the relationship between political settlements and
institutional environments, and therefore to identify context-sensitive and politically
smart solutions that will promote SDG delivery.
In most development contexts, incremental approaches, political and policy
entrepreneurship and islands of excellence, all of which integrate ‘political’ dimensions,
would work better than standard ‘good practice’ or wholesale reform approaches.
It is important to differentiate between ‘inclusive processes’ and inclusive outcomes’,
although the difference might be, to a certain extent, artificial. A normative agenda can
sometimes complicate the situation further.
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Follow-up
The conference participants asked GCPSE and experts
to contribute to disseminate and mainstream this
message in the development dialogue, to explore
further implications and to support practitioners with
the practicalities of public service organisations
‘working with the grain’ under different political
settlements.
Concretely, GCPSE will:
launch a Joint Fundraising Proposal (GCPSE-SIGOB Facility) for Advisory and Technical
Support Services for Public Service Excellence.
Together with Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice of the University of
Cape Town, South Africa, and other experts, the Centre will develop and offer Solution
Labs - mixed learning and solution events - on how to ‘work with the political grain’.
GCPSE will also work on a Strategy Workshop offer for UN Country Teams (UNCT) that
are about to embark on their UNDAFs to facilitate innovation and “new thinking” –
incorporating political settlements/thinking and working politically (TWP),
foresight/alternative futures and reform moments/islands of excellence.
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Introduction
The public service, a key state organisation to project power, implement political priorities
and accumulate governing capacity, is central to the political settlement i on which
development depends - but rarely viewed in that light.
No fewer than 10 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals require effective public
institutions. Without a capable public service, the vision of the 2030 Agenda will be out of
reach for a substantial number of people. Governments will look for new opportunities to
improve public service performance. Previous reform efforts have been unsatisfactory. The
results of 30+ years of technical fixes and ‘good practice’ models have been underwhelming.
Future efforts to strengthen institutional capacity for SDG implementation should
incorporate the crucial lesson learned: that power and politics have a huge impact on the
ability and desire of public service systems to deliver on inclusive development.
This impact goes far beyond the occasional or systematic meddling of politicians in
bureaucratic affairs. Bureaucracies do not exclusively, and often not predominantly, exist
for the sake of public welfare and the provision of social goods. Governments in the real
world do not neatly divide in political and technocratic spheres of influence; in any political
reality, the lines are blurred and messy, and politicians and bureaucrats constantly bump
into each other in the grey zones of governance. A bureaucracy is by its very nature invested
with power, susceptible to political contestation and a political actor with vested interests
of its own. Crisp moral categories are of little use in dealing with this situation: ‘power’ and
‘politics’ are not necessarily evil forces that undermine public sector performance, while
technical competence is not the sole basis of ‘capability’.
The public service, a key state organisation to project power, implement political priorities
and accumulate governing capacity, is central to the political settlement 1 on which
development depends - but rarely viewed in that light. For the purpose of this event,
“Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged
between elites, about how power is organised and exercised. They include formal
institutions for political and economic relations… But they also include informal, often
unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system….”2 The event focuses on non-
crisis contexts.
The technical jargon of public sector reform – HRM policies such as recruitment, promotion,
and performance management; policies aimed to improve accountability, transparency and
responsiveness; and, more recently, the ‘science of delivery’ and the policy cycle – hides a
complex political reality. For example, the staffing of a civil service is not solely determined
by ‘meritocratic’ arguments: a political settlement, and the resulting social and political
peace, might partly depend on equal representation of ethnic groups in government
1 In the current development debate, the structure of ‘power’ and ‘politics’ is captured by the concept of ‘political settlements’. There are multiple definitions of this concept, with contestation and uncertainty over context (post-conflict vs. stable), actors (exclusively elites vs. elites, institutions and society) and temporality (one-off vs. on-going). Implicit in these multiple definitions is a different understanding and capacity to spot and explain dynamics and opportunities for change. 2 Edwards Laws and Adrian Leftwich, Political Settlements, DLP Concept Brief 01 October 2014
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institutions, access to ‘safe’ government jobs, or opening up government employment to
previously excluded social groups. In these circumstances, an insistence of ‘meritocracy’ to
improve performance will not survive the political calculus or could destabilise a fragile
political balance of power.
Disillusioned with the slow pace of progress, if any, of work on the structural dimensions of
public management systems, and the potential impact this might have on performance,
practitioners have increasingly turned to those dimensions where performance can actually
be measured: delivery. But politics also plays a crucial role in the not so straight forward
‘science of delivery’. The process of translation of broad strategic decisions in concrete
policies, for example, involves many political choices. Which policies are put forward? Who
stands to benefit most from these policies? Will they be sufficiently funded? How do they
compete with other policies over scarce resources? Which implementation mechanisms
work best in which circumstances? Are all the key people on board to provide leadership?
Is a centrally located delivery unit the solution to all delivery woes or does that disturb a
fragile balance of power among the different agencies involved?
Armed with a better understanding of the ‘politics’ of public service performance,
governments, development practitioners and development thinkers can start to explore,
prototype and implement feasible activities that will strengthen the performance of public
management systems for SDG implementation. It should be possible to identify politically
feasible, expedient or beneficial entry points for structural reforms (while avoiding
politically fraught choices). One can also start to identify and test ‘politically informed’
activities, such as coalition building, policy entrepreneurship, etc.
The event addressed the following issues:
a deeper understanding of how the political settlement impacts the performance of
public service
an identification of the political dimensions of crucial areas of public service
performance (and a way to ‘measure’ the relative impact of politics on these areas in
different political settlements)
clarification of concrete opportunities and activities that, while in keeping with,
leverage ‘politics’.
To find ‘what works’ and let independent evidence speak requires examining political
realities – without partisan or ideological posturing.
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Opening Session
Max Everest-Phillips, Director of GCPSE, welcomed the audience to the conference. In his
speech, Max drew attention to the fact that some of the topics that would be discussed
remain sensitive in some quarters; the proverbial elephants in the room. He listed six
sensitive topics that would be discussed: a re-evaluation of ‘politics’ in development; the
conceptualization of ‘political settlements’; the centrality of an ‘effective public service to
development outcomes’; an explicit discussion of the question ‘why so many public service
reform fail’; the acceptance of ‘how the broader political settlement have an impact on
political and administrative leadership pacts’ and the realization that ‘failure is indeed
endemic in public service reform’. At its core, the problem lies not in unsuccessful public sector
reform as such but the daily politics and the deep, underlying political settlement that, may be
either deliberately or accidentally weakening the public service. Nevertheless a demoralized,
disillusioned and disempowered public service is not going to deliver the SDGs.
Session 1: On Theory of Political Settlements & Impact on the Nature of Public Service
Organisations
Magdy Martinez-Soliman, UN Assistant
Secretary-General, UNDP Assistant Administrator
and Director Bureau for Policy & Programme
Support (BPPS), opened the first day of
presentations. In his Key Address, Magdy firmly
framed the discussion in terms of implementation
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He
reiterated the imperative of Agenda 2030,
emphasized the importance of a well-performing
public service for attaining the SDGs and exhorted
the conference to come up with practical solutions
to make ‘the system work’ for an equitable and
sustainable future. Public Service Performance is, ultimately, a measure of political leadership,
wisdom of budget investments, and a mirror in which each society can compare itself with its
neighbours and with its past. Reasonable political settlements need to include consensus on
vision, a model of activist developmental State that opens avenues to vibrant private initiative,
and a stellar performance of a public service committed to sustainable development.
Brian Levy, Academic Director of the Graduate School for Development Policy and Practice
at the University of Cape Town and the author of the book Working with the Grain:
Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies, gave the Keynote
Presentation. He presented a conceptual framework that categorized in a 2x2 typology how
different political settlements combined with institutional arrangements, and
demonstrated persuasively, with country examples, how some of the key assumptions of
development partners with regards to institutional performance are wrong.
The ‘good governance’ approach conjectures that a good dose of political will is sufficient to
make the basic systemic relations between state, providers and citizens, supposedly similar
everywhere, work for inclusive development. Brian’s conceptual framework shows that
different political settlements create radically different systemic relationships between
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state, providers and citizens. For example, in his category characterized by ‘personalized
competition’, to which a substantial number of developing countries belong, these systemic
relationships are marked by broken hierarchies, public officials with high discretion,
multiple contending factions and civic pressures, NGOs and lobbying.
When looking to improve public service
performances for inclusive development
under these ‘political’ conditions, it might be
more productive to approach ‘delivery
problems’ not in terms of technical
(organizational) structures, but by analysing
the attitude and interests of multiple
principals and stakeholders involved
(informed by their position and role in the
political settlement) and identifying reform
and blocking coalitions, and possible islands
of effectiveness.
Verena Fritz, Senior Public Sector Specialist at the World Bank, explored the relationship
between political settlements and failed public sector reform and, while emphasizing that
the correlation between political constellations and dynamics and performance is far from
straightforward and that sound technical advice remains important, she concluded that the
available evidence showed that ‘politics’ should be integrated in reform.
In her extremely rich presentation, Verena gave interesting evidence that questioned some
of the more ingrained assumptions with regards to the relationship between economic
growth, good governance and institutional development. For example, there are many
public administration strengthening plans but little progress on government effectiveness,
including in high non-OECD countries. Equally, we cannot automatically assume that
economic growth will lead to better public service; there is only a limited correlation
between levels of GDP and public sector performance. Regime type also does not make a
significant difference on performance.
When looking for the impact of political settlements, or more broadly, political
constellations and dynamics, on public sector performance, one has to look beyond crude
categories like ‘regime type’ or the existence of ‘programmatic parties’. Although political
and technical dynamics might play out differently across countries and time periods, there
are some common patterns. For example, the available evidence shows that legitimacy and
‘looking good’ are key political drivers for governments to initiate and sustain public service
reform, while the much vaunted ‘development state’ with a clear ‘development vision’ is
much less prevalent.
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Sometimes reforms go directly against the ‘logic’ of the prevailing political settlements, for
example when efforts to introduce meritocratic recruitment is seen to undermine
patronage and loyalty rewards on which the political settlement is based, or when technical
efforts to improve procurement practices endanger illicit forms of financing electoral
reform. Sometimes the ingrained political settlement simply turns the reforms on their
head: anti-corruption campaigns unleashed on political opponents, performance bonuses
allocated on the basis of loyalty, etc. Privatizations might offer opportunities to distribute
assets among ‘friends’, while greater ‘managerial control’ (a New Public Management
favourite) opens up possibilities for ‘leakage’. Politically harmless reforms, on the other
hand, are either abandoned or have little impact.
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Session 2: On Politics and Public Service Performance
Michael Woolcock, Lead Social Development Specialist in the World Bank's Development
Research Group, kicked off Session 2 with his presentation Engaging the ‘everyday state’.
Like the speakers before him, Michael uncovered some of the key assumptions driving
development activities. Too often, in his experience, development outcomes are reduced to
‘sound policy + effective implementation’. However, Michael persuasively argued that the
gap between the capacity to design beautiful policies and actually implement them is wide
and growing.
Efforts to address this imbalance between ambitions and capacity are historically naïve and
pointlessly uniform. For example, public education in today’s OECD countries builds on
consolidated and highly variable pre-existing systems (‘functional literacy’). ‘Good practice’
de facto denies developing countries this rich institutional diversity and perpetuates
‘capacity traps’ from which they cannot escape. ‘Isomorphic mimicry’, i.e. looking like an
effective state, keeps the aid flowing but changes little.
It is about to get worse. State capacity in historically developing countries is stagnating or
even declining (with a few notables exceptions), due to the tyranny of ‘good practice’, the
practice of ‘isomorphic mimicry’ and, crucially, the depletion of ‘low-hanging development
fruits’. The switch from quantity (e.g. number of school buildings, teachers trained, kids in
school) to quality (e.g. curriculum and pedagogy relevant to 21st century, learning
experiences integrated with other social welfare programs) will be tough. The complexity
of quality development outcomes cannot be simply engineered by technocratic approaches.
Michael presented the Problem-Driven
Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) approach as a
possible solution. PDIA looks for local
solutions for local problems; pushes local
‘positive deviance’ for real problems;
propagates the virtuous cycle of try-learn-
iterate-adapt, and; scales learning through
diffusion. The emphasis on ‘positive
deviance’ puts a premium on more granular
data, for example at sub-national or sub-
sectoral level.
Alina Rocha Menocal, Senior Research Fellow at DLP, drew the participants’ attention to
‘inclusion’, a crucial aspect of Agenda 2030, and the challenges ahead to make a public sector
work for inclusive development in an ‘exclusive’ political settlement. Political settlements
have to be understood as continuous, evolving and dynamic processes, shaped almost every
day by countless transactions, not just between elites (horizontal) but also between elites
and their broader constituencies (vertical). Both processes have a significant impact on the
public service.
Alina illustrated her point with the comparative example of Costa Rica and Guatemala,
countries which shared many structural characteristics and political and socio-economic
development in the 1950s but which ended up in sharply different situations because of
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political settlement dynamics. In Costa Rica, where elite divisions combined with popular
demand led to the opening up of the political settlement and the establishment of a
progressive pro-reform coalition committed to democracy and broad-based development,
democracy took root. Interestingly, the 1949 Constitution, the blueprint of the new political
settlement, devolved important policy responsibilities to autonomous bureaucratic entities.
In Guatemala, on the other hand, a military regime
in the same period stamped down on popular
demands for democracy and social reform, and
enabled the landowners (the economic elite) to
dominate the political space. They tended to see
the state as their personalized source of
enrichment – including the politicization and use
and abuse of the public sector – and certainly not
for social welfare provision. Even after the post-
conflict transition in the 1990s, this underlying
political settlement is subverting many formal
arrangements.
Alina drew a sharp distinction between ‘inclusive processes’ (how decisions are made and
who is involved) and ‘inclusive outcomes’ (a state’s broad or narrow responsiveness to
different social priorities). Her statement that ‘a state can be inclusive without being
broadly responsive (e.g. Lebanon) and it can be also be broadly responsive without being
inclusive (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia and Singapore)’, goes to the heart of many ‘good
governance’ discussions and was the subject of much subsequent discussion and soul
searching.
Jairo Acuna-Alfaro, Policy Advisor of UNDP Responsive and Accountable Institutions
Team, highlighted three key functions of political settlements, viz. distribution of power and
resources; regulation of monopoly of violence and taxation-;, and fears and favours in the
public sector. Political settlements inevitably entail trade-offs, and so do development
partners’ efforts to modify it.
The majority of developing countries find themselves in ‘limited access orders’.
Development assistance to institution building (for inclusive and equitable development)
cannot be business as usual. It requires more realistic priorities and a better sequencing of
interventions that are sensitive to the evolving dynamics of the political settlements, the
disposition of implementers, and the balance between formal and informal processes.
Governance ‘deficiencies’ have as much a political as a technical origin.
Jairo used the two examples of Costa Rica and El Salvador to illustrate the importance of
‘critical junctures’ at which the scope for possible action widens significantly (and
conversely, the futility of trying to do something ‘transformational’ outside these critical
junctures.) In this sense, ‘cleavages’ or ‘crisis’ are opportunities (although constrained by
antecedent conditions) which lead to a ‘turning point’ (the selection of a particular option –
democracy in the case of Costa Rica, political repression in El Salvador). If (and that is a big
‘if’) the core attributes of the selected option are stable enough the system will solidify.
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The moderator of Session 2, Thomas Parks, Governance & Fragility Specialist of Dept. Of
Foreign Affairs & Trade, Australia, in his closing remarks focused on the tension between a
normative and a ‘delivery’ agenda (closely related to Alina’s point about the apparent
contradiction that ‘exclusive processes’ can still provide ‘inclusive outcomes’) and asked the
audience to carefully consider what to work on.
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Session 3a: Country Cases on Political Settlements and Efforts to Improve Public
Sector Performance
Michelle Gyles-McDonnough, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident
Representative Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, moderated the in-depth
discussion following the presentations of the country cases on Rwanda by Anastase
Shyaka, CEO of Rwanda Governance Board, and on Papua New Guinea by John Ma’o Kali,
Secretary of the Dept. of Personnel Management.
Anastase presented the audience with the bleak outlines of the situation in Rwanda after
the Genocide in the 1990s: over a million people massacred, more than five million refugees
in the country and region, severe disruption of the fabric of society, devastated economy
and collapsed public institutions. The response was guided by a set of imperatives: the unity
of Rwandans, Accountability and Think Big.
Key drivers were the resilience of Rwandans, home grown
solutions and transformational leadership. Public service
innovations such as IMIHIGO (performance contracts), the
National Leadership Retreat and the importance of Citizen Report
Cards in both have made a major contribution to the real and
steady transformation in the country. The case of Rwanda
demonstrated how important an inclusive and shared sense of
purpose, inherent to the political settlement (elements of which
are still part of an on-going discussion with the wider
development community), is key to the performance of the public
service.
In the case of Papua New Guinea, John devoted his whole working
life to the performance of the Papua New Guinea Public Service,
from Graduate Cadet in 1976 to Departmental Head. He brought
some of his experience with the interaction between the political
system and the civil service to bear during his presentation on
Papua New Guinea. The Papua New Guinea is currently going
through a range of reforms, as enshrined in the new 2014 Public
Services (Management) Act, and amendments to the Organic Law
on Provincial Governments. The civil service strives hard to
adhere to the normative ‘good practice’ agenda, but is
encountering political challenges rooted in historical
developments.
The Development Research Centre in China was represented by Zhang Hongfei. Hongfei
was candid in his characterisation of public sector reforms in China as state-led and
experimental.
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Session 3b: Country Cases on Political Settlements and Efforts to Improve Public
Sector Performance
In the afternoon of the second day, the tables were turned and the Conference audience
became active participants. People were divided into small working groups (around 10
members each, five groups in total) and were asked to select one or two country examples
to discuss in more detail. Brian Levy’s 2*2 typology provided the navigational tools to make
sense of the main characteristics of the current political settlement in the country under
consideration and to identify possible clues to vexing problems or promising opportunities
in public service performance.
The ensuing discussions were rich and complex. The countries discussed in depth were
Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam. Although it was difficult to neatly fit each country
in the theoretical categories – as Brian Levy had already pointed out during his short
presentation - some clear patterns emerged. For example, Egypt is currently reverting to
the political order pre-dating the Arab Spring; the polity is dominant and ruled by an
autocratic strong man, while the institutions – the rules of the game – are discretionary, i.e.
centred around personalized deal making. The core of the bureaucracy – part and parcel of
what is often called the ‘Deep State’ of Egypt - has deeply entrenched interests in this regime,
while it also plays an important role in sustaining it. Not coincidentally, the efforts by the
previous regime of the Muslim
Brotherhood to appoint an increasing
number of its own people in the public
service contributed significantly to its
eventual disposal by the military. As in
many other country cases, in as far as the
political order is either the main obstacle
or the most promising opportunity for
inclusive development, in Egypt it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to isolate
institutional development of the public
service from the purpose of the political
settlement.
Vietnam, on the other hand, provided an example of a country where a dominant political
order combines with institutions that rely on the impersonal applications of the rule of law
(a combination referred to as ‘rule-by-law’). Vietnam is a prime example of a country where
a ‘exclusive decision making process’ provides ‘inclusive outcomes’ (as discussed by Alina
Rocha Menocal) and where, perhaps, development practitioners are more inclined to
temporarily shelf the ‘normative’ agenda and exploit the many opportunities for ‘delivery’
of development outcomes (as mentioned by Tom Parks). The success of ‘development
states’ like Vietnam seems to subvert some of the key principles of the ‘good governance’
agenda, especially the need for representative institutions. The fact that the public service,
which plays a key role in the delivery of inclusive development outcomes in Vietnam, is open
to receive and adapt to public feedback, is another indication of its complex role in the
political settlement.
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According to the discussants, Indonesia was a clear example of Country Type #3, in which
politics were fiercely competitive but the rules of the games, including the behaviour of
institutions, was heavily personalized and based upon personal deal-making. They
recognized many of the characteristics given in Levy’s typology. The hierarchy between the
political government and public service is broken. Public officials have a high level of
discretion which is all too often used to further their own (individual or organizational)
interests. Citizens, including economic and social elites, use a multitude of strategies to
make the government and public service responsive to their needs. In this seemingly chaotic
constellation – in which many late developing countries find themselves – ‘development’ is
just one of the many objectives of the key players and institutions involved, including the
public service. Systematic efforts to make the system work (primarily) for development face
an uphill battle.
The last country example which was discussed extensively was Myanmar. The inconclusive
discussions reflected the exceptionally fluid situation in the country. For example, it was
obvious that Myanmar has just moved out of Country Type #1 and was no longer an
autocratic polity. It was less obvious whether, under the old regime, the rules of the games
and the institutions were personal
or impersonal. The public service,
outwardly at least, seemed
professional and well-disciplined;
whether it was experienced as
such by the citizens is another
matter. The big question looming
over Myanmar, however, is
towards which box of Levy’s
typology it is moving, and what the
consequences for public service
performance, and the attainment
of development outcomes, would
be. Some discussants were
optimistic and were convinced
that Myanmar made steady
progress towards the antechamber of a full blown liberal democracy, Country Type #4 (with
open competition for political power and impersonal rules of the game). Others were less
optimistic. One discussant saw ominous signs in the behaviour of the leader of the current
government and half expected a move toward Type #4 (dominant and rule of law). Others
were afraid that Type #2 (competitive but personalized) was to be the next station.
Everybody agreed that Myanmar was a special case, in which an old political settlement had
just been discarded and a new one still had to emerge fully. It would be extremely
interesting to see how all of this would impact the bureaucracy and, not unimportantly, how
the bureaucracy, in many ways a relic from the old regime/political settlement, would
respond to the new situation.
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Session 4: Transforming Big Ideas into Everyday Solutions – Reform Entrepreneurs
In Session 4, a high-level panel reflected upon some of the core ideas discussed. Brian Levy
reflected on the tension between the ‘safe conversation’ (about the things we have been
doing all the time, the repetition of the familiar) and the ‘frontier conversation’ (about the
things that are tricky, full with dilemma’s etc.) It was also obvious that the distinction
between engaging the political settlement as such and working with the public service in
any given political context is to a degree artificial; ‘processes’ and ‘outcomes’ are often
intertwined. Brian had observed four separate conversations. The first was related to
country contexts as found in Egypt and Ethiopia. In these circumstances, development
partners have little choice but to accept the political settlement as a given and try to ‘work
with the grain’. The social sector, in particular, offers interesting opportunities in these
situations. The second discourse centred on country contexts as exemplified by Vietnam:
the ‘sweet spot job’. The regime might not be very democratic, but it is stable, well-
functioning and very development oriented. Development partners can add a lot of value in
terms of development outcomes. The third narrative is probably the least explored but may
be the most common. In countries like
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea,
development partners are outside their
comfort zone and struggling to achieve clear
development objectives. Lastly, the
Myanmar conversation is about a country
transitioning from one political order to
another, but the uncertainty over which
creates huge dilemmas. The total of these
conversations revealed a hunkering to the
familiar but also a willingness to engage with
the messiness.
Michelle Gyles-McDonnough addressed
the question on how to operate in a given
political settlement from the perspective of
a UNDP Resident Representative. Her main
message was: act smart. Acting smart is not
easy and can be dangerous; political
missteps can ultimately result in expulsion.
In many middle income countries, further
progress often requires a new or at least
renegotiated political settlement and
therefore a need to stay engaged. This,
however, is still a difficult conversation with
other development partners, especially
donors, although the universality of the SDGs offers some recognition of this need. The
normative framework of development can be rather problematic and progress is not at all
straightforward in individual countries. Acting smart is greatly enhanced by being physical
present in a country, but the current funding situation is challenging its sustainability.
Acting smart also demands an answer to some important questions: how do we value and
evaluate political entrepreneurship? How is it reflected in our risk system? What
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organizational support systems are available? How do we equip people to walk through
these spaces? The ‘best practice’ approach is persistent; reporting and accountability
systems of the organisation and donors expect ‘Denmark’ and have little room or patience
for new thinking or hard evidence of the contrary. Lastly, organisations like UNDP need the
safe space provided by GCPSE to probe these issues and to grapple with possible solutions.
Gambhir Bhatta (Technical Advisor Asian Development Bank) gave the perspective of the
ADB on the issues discussed. ABD does not have the mandate to involve itself in politics.
Before deciding on a specific loan, the Board requires a political economy analysis to gauge
the risks, but it draws a very clear distinction
between economic policies and politics. ADB prefers
to outsource ‘good governance’ activities to
multilateral organisations like UNDP or bilateral
organisations like DfID. This intervention led to some
discussion with the audience. One participant
pointedly drew attention to the fact that in peace
negotiations funding is a key element of any political
settlement. Another questioned the feasibility of
distinguishing between ‘politics’ and ‘economics
policies’.
Adrian Brown (Centre for Public Impact) was struck
by the sheer complexity and multi-dimensionality of
the problems development practitioners and their national partners were working on. He
reminded the audience that it shouldn’t remove itself too far from the real issues. Action
happens on the frontline and it is therefore important to bring the big conceptual discussion
back to a level where real impact can be achieved.
Maria Eugenia Boaz briefly presented the
work of UNDP Sistema de Gestion para la
Gobernabilidad (SIGOB). SIGOB has done
over 80 projects with President’s or Prime
Minister’s Offices, mainly in Latin America.
Their focus is on problem-driven and
process-oriented interventions. Maria
introduced a role play game developed by
SIGOB that mirrored daily practices of a
politician interacting with civil servants and
citizens.
Adrian Brown presented a newly developed
framework to identify problems hampering
delivery and to create more public impact
(i.e. the set of outcomes that governments achieve for their citizens). On the basis of an
extensive literature review (and hundreds of on-going case studies), CPI has identified three
key factors that influence public impact: policy, action and legitimacy. Each factor divides
into three sub-factors which can be further analysed. The main focus of the framework is to
get to effective delivery.
19
Conclusions
Political settlements, power and politics matter in public service performance. These
factors create different institutional environments in which public service
organisations, although structurally similar, behave and perform significantly different.
A public service cannot be separated from the political settlement it operates in,
although there is a temptation in similar discourses to conflate government and public
services.
This impact is felt across all layers and activities of a public service, from mandates,
recruitment policies to policy pathways. Much of this impact is appraised in normative
terms (deviating or adhering to ‘good practice’) instead of being understood as stages
of institutional development in a particular political (and economic) constellation.
There is an urgent need for clear methodologies (and agreement on key concepts) about
how to study (or uncover) political settlements, its horizontal (among elites) and
vertical (among elites and constituencies) dimensions, the relationship between formal
and informal institutions, and especially its impact on institutional development.
There is an equally urgent need for a conceptual framework to analyse public service
systems in terms of different political settlements, as extensions of the political
government, as autonomous organisations and as ideational structures with their own
political interests and incentives, and the impact these have on organisational
development and performance.
An area of special interest arising from the conference was, given a particular political
settlement, the role of the public service to mediate between the economic and political
elites on the one hand and citizens on the other hand.
It is possible to broadly categorise the relationship between political settlements and
institutional environments, and therefore to identify context-sensitive and politically
smart solutions that will promote SDG delivery.
In most development contexts, incremental approaches, political and policy
entrepreneurship and islands of excellence, all of which integrate ‘political’ dimensions,
would work better than standard ‘good practice’ or wholesale reform approaches.
It is important to differentiate between ‘inclusive processes’ and inclusive outcomes’,
although the difference might be, to a certain extent, artificial. A normative agenda can
sometimes complicate the situation further.
The conference participants asked GCPSE and experts to contribute to disseminate and
mainstream this message in the development dialogue, to explore further implications and
to support practitioners with the practicalities of ‘working with the grain’ of public service
organisations under different political settlements.
20
Concretely, GCPSE will:
launch a Joint Fundraising Proposal (GCPSE-SIGOB Facility) for Advisory and Technical
Support Services for Public Service Excellence
Together with Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice of the University of
Cape Town, South Africa, and other experts, the Centre will develop and offers Solution
Labs - mixed learning and solution events - on how to ‘work with the political grain’.
GCPSE will also work on a Strategy Workshop offer for UN Country Teams (UNCT) that
are about to embark on their UNDAFs to facilitate innovation and “new thinking” –
incorporating political settlements/TWP, foresight/alternative futures and reform
moments/islands of excellence.
i In the current development debate, the structure of ‘power’ and ‘politics’ is captured by the concept of ‘political settlements’. There are multiple definitions of this concept, with contestation and uncertainty over context (post-conflict vs. stable), actors (exclusively elites vs. elites, institutions and society) and temporality (one-off vs. on-going). Implicit in these multiple definitions is a different understanding and capacity to spot and explain dynamics and opportunities for change.
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