dimensions of governance: a selectorate pilot study bruce bueno de mesquita alastair smith new york...
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Dimensions of Governance: A Selectorate Pilot Study
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Alastair Smith
New York University
2
Objectives Measure selectorate theory governance variables
• Selectorate Size (S)• Nominal
• Real
• Blocs
• Winning Coalition Size (W)• Absolute
• Relative
• Blocs Demonstrate the new data’s potential to improve the
government’s ability to identify, explain, and alter:• Prospects for democratization
• Emerging national security risks
3
Pilot Project Countries: Expert Survey
China DPRK Egypt Iran Nigeria Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia
Syria Venezuela
Experts Asked
7 5 22 14 14 15 8 12 5 11
Complete Surveys
5 5 6 6 4 4 5 4 5 5
Usable Data
5 4 6 5 4 4 5 4 5 5
4
Standard View of Governance
Autocracy Continuum Democracy
Alternative Arbitrary
Dividing Lines Between Systems
Autocracy Democracy
5
Limitations of Standard View Dimensions of democracy are conceived as linear and additive Theoretical links to governance or national security are unclear
• Institutions
• Behavior
• Judgements Measures over-weight elections, even if they are rigged,
relative to:• Accountability
• Transparency
• Bloc-controlled choices vs. individual choices regarding
• Leaders
• Policies
• Institutions
6
Governance Dimensions: Nested Selectorate Institutions
Population
Nominal Selectorate
Real Selectorate
Winning Coalition
Blocs
7
Ten Countries in 2006: W and S
010
2030
4050
mea
nWag
e
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100meanNSpop
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
s %
of
Po
pu
latio
n
Nominal Selectorate as % of Population
8
Revenue-Expenditure
PublicGoods
PrivateGoods
Leader’sDiscretionary
Funds
The coalition’swelfare dependson W:
Size of W
Totalexpendituresincrease with Wand decrease asS increases
Tax ratesdecrease as Wincreases andas S decreases
Opportunities forkleptocracy dependson W:
Increases as W increases
Increases as Wdecreases
0
Size of W
Size of W
Leisuredecreases andLabor increasesas W increasesand as Sdecreases
Selectorate View of Policy Choices
Source: Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003
9
Selectorate View: Democratization Prospects
0 Coalition Size (W) 1000
Predicted Diminution of Coalition Size/Democracy
Predicted Expansion of
Coalition Size/ Democracy
Low
High
Leader’s Welfare
Predict No Change in Coalition
Size
Predict No Change in Coalition
Size
Credible Threat to Political Institutions Institutions Secure: No Incentive for Anti-Government
Movement
Institutions Secure: Too
Low Probability of Successful
Anti-Government Movement
Contract W
Expand W
Blue line = Predicted response to threats to the regime in power. Source: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith. 2007. “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change.” NYU Working Paper.
11
Predicting Polity’s Estimate of Democracy-Autocracy (t+5 Years):
A Difficult TestDependent Variable: Polity (t+5 years) Given a Credible Threat to Regime Survival
Polity-Based Model Selectorate Model
Polity -22.28 (5.68) 0.000 %Nominal Selectorate (NS) -0.11 (0.04) 0.002 S/NS 0.06 (0.02) 0.003 W -4.26 (2.05) 0.037 W/S 0.41 (0.19) 0.030 Institutional Clarity -5.97 (2.73) 0.029 Size of Ethnic Bloc in W 10.33 (2.43) 0.000 Size of Religious Bloc in W -10.02 (2.34) 0.000 Size of Military Bloc in W -0.10 (0.04) 0.007 Size of Other Blocs in W -0.19 (0.05) 0.000 Oil 0.005 (0.02) 0.807 0.06 (0.04) 0.120 Polity*Oil -0.02 (0.07) 0.735 W*Oil 0.001 (0.001) 0.882 Aid (%GDP) -0.19 (0.08) 0.016 -0.98 (0.38) 0.010 Polity*Aid 0.79 (0.58) 0.177 W*Aid -0.65 (0.22) 0.004 Log(Per Capita Income) -1.93 (0.34) 0.000 14.33 (4.35) 0.001 Polity*Log(Per Capita Income)
3.61 (0.79) 0.000
W*Log(Per Capita Income) 0.51 (0.24) 0.032 Log(Population) -0.05 (0.17) 0.758 8.47 (2.79) 0.002 Year -0.002 (0.02) 0.909 -0.38 (0.13) 0.003 N=95 χ2 = 195.33
p<0.000 Pseudo R2 = 0.50
N=95 χ2 = 279.46 p<0.000 Pseudo R2 = 0.72
Significance of Selectorate model’s explanatory improvement : p < 0.000
12
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.24
.26
.28
.3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reEgypt
Year
The selectorate model is optimistic about Egypt; the Polity model is pessimistic
13
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.14
.16
.18
.2.2
2.2
4
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reChina
Year
Polity model was more optimistic about China but is now becoming pessimistic relative to the selectorate model
14
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.75
.8.8
5.9
.95
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reVenezuela
Year
The selectorate and Polity models anticipate improvement followed by decline in Venezuela
15
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.1.2
.3.4
.5.6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reNigeria
Year
The selectorate model anticipates a more precipitous decline for Nigeria than does Polity
16
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.3.4
.5.6
.7
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
rePakistan
Year
The models share a common view for Pakistan’s governance future
17
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.4.4
5.5
.55
.6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reIran
Year
The selectorate view anticipates improvement followed by new erosion in democracy in Iran
18
Predicting Governance in Five Years
-.05
0.0
5.1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reSaudi Arabia
Year
Both models anticipate very poor governance performance for Saudi Arabia through 2011
19
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.1.1
5.2
.25
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reSyria
Year
Both models anticipate improvement in Syria around 2010, but the selectorate takes a dimmer view of current Syrian governance than does Polity
20
Predicting Governance in Five Years
.5.6
.7.8
.9
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Future
Win5 Polityin5
Pre
dic
ted
Co
alit
ion
Siz
e a
nd
Po
lity
Sco
reRussia
Year
The selectorate view expects russia to get worse before it gets better (around 2010)
21
A Sample Application in the National Security Arena
Predicting Coups, Civil War,
and Interstate War
22
Predicting Coups, Civil War or Interstate War in One Year
Conflict (t+1 year) Conflict (t+1 year) Polity Democracy-Autocracy 8.58 (3.20) 0.007 S/NS 0.02 (0.01) 0.040 W 1.00 (0.26) 0.000 W/S -0.07 (0.03) 0.005 Clarity or Opacity -1.73 (0.44) 0.000 Aid/GDP 0.06 (0.06) 0.342 0.14 (0.07) 0.054 Log(Income per Capita) -0.54 (0.22) 0.012 -0.31 (0.27) 0.239 Polity*Log(Income per Capita)
-1.23 (0.46) 0.008
W*Log(Income per Capita) -0.12 (0.03) 0.000 Log(Population) -0.67 (0.19) 0.000 -0.83 (0.24) 0.001 Credible Threat -0.50 (0.20) 0.014 -0.31 (0.18) 0.074 Constant 14.04 (4.30) 0.001 14.46 (5.05) 0.004 N=251 χ2 = 59.23 PRE = 12% N=260 χ2 = 72.50 PRE = 24%
23
Nominal Selectorate
Survey Question
How many people have at least a nominal say in choosing the national leader whether these people are in the selectorate or not?
(Recall, for instance, all adult citizens in the Soviet Union had a nominal say through the ballot box even if they were not members of the Communist Party; that is, even if they were not members of the selectorate.)
24
Nominal Selectorate (0-100%)
China DPRK Egypt Iran Nigeria Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia
Syria Venezuela
Mean 3.6 71.3 49.3 38.5 32.0 37.7 73.2 33.3 100 55.0
Median 3.6 100 40.1 41.5 31.3 29.7 100 0.0 100 46.6
25
Middle Eastern Nominal Selectorates
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
IranNS SaudiNSEgyptNS SyriaNS
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
as
%P
op
ula
tion
26
Asian Nominal Selectorates
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
ChinaNS DPRKNSPakistanNS
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
as
%P
op
ula
tion
27
Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Nominal Selectorates
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
VenezuelaNS RussiaNSNigeriaNS
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
as
%P
op
ula
tion
28
Selectorate Size
Survey Question
What was the size of the selectorate as a percentage of the total population?
(Recall that the selectorate is the politically relevant class of the society, those with the opportunity to influence the selection of leaders.)
29
Selectorate: % of Nominal Selectorate Selectorate: % of Population
China DPRK Egypt Iran Nigeria Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia
Syria Venezuela
S to Nominal S: Mean
0.1 0.5 15.9 40.4 86.5 48.0 32.4 0.0 9.0 93.3
S to Nominal
S: Median
0.1 0.1 9.9 46.1 87.2 40.4 33.5 100 2.7 94.1
S: Mean 0.0 0.4 7.4 15.0 25.6 19.4 30.3 0.0 9.0 51.0
S: Median 0.1 0.1 3.9 8.5 22.1 8.5 33.5 0.0 2.7 43.6
30
Middle Eastern Ratio of Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
SaudiStoNS EgyptStoNSIranStoNS SyriaStoNS
Se
lect
ora
te a
s %
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
31
Asian Ratio of Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
ChinaStoNS PakistanStoNSDPRKStoNS
Se
lect
ora
te a
s %
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
32
Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate
02
04
06
08
01
00
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
VenezuelaStoNS RussiaStoNSNigeriaStoNS
Se
lect
ora
te a
s %
No
min
al S
ele
cto
rate
33
Winning Coalition Size
Survey QuestionWhat was the size of the winning coalition?
(Recall that this is not based on the total number of people who supported the leader; it is the number of supporters who are essential
to maintaining the leader in power and who receive policy concessions and/or personal
benefits for their support).
34
Winning Coalition: % of Selectorate Winning Coalition: % of Population
China DPRK Egypt Iran Nigeria Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia
Syria Venezuela
W/S: Mean
0.3 0.2 41.8 6.1 14.9 14.9 25.8 3.8 2.1 27.0
W/S: Median
0.3 0.2 39.8 6.0 0.3 17.8 27.8 2.4 0.6 28.7
W: Mean 0 0 3.1 1.0 7.8 3.2 8.7 0 0.7 14.4
W: Median 0 0 3.1 1.4 0 3.3 0.9 0 0 15.2
35
Middle Eastern Coalition to Selectorate Size (W/S)
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
IranWtoS SaudiWtoSEgyptWtoS SyriaWtoS
Co
alit
ion
as
% S
ele
cto
rate
36
Asia: Coalition Size to Selectorate Size (W/S)
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
ChinaWtoS DPRKWtoSPakistanWtoS
Co
alit
ion
as
% S
ele
cto
rate
37
Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Coalition to Selectorate Size (W/S)
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
VenezuelaWtoS RussiaWtoSNigeriaWtoS
Co
alit
ion
as
% S
ele
cto
rate
38
Bloc Size as % of Coalition
China DPRK Egypt Iran Nigeria Pakistan Russia Saudi Arabia
Syria Venezuela
Mean 100 100 100 48.2 100 19.4 0 100 93.3 96.7
Median 100 100 100 0.3 100 0.1 0 100 100 100
39
Middle East: Blocs as % of Coalition Size
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
IranBloc SaudiBlocEgyptBloc SyriaBloc
Blo
cs a
s %
Win
nin
g C
oa
litio
n
40
Asia: Blocs as % of Coalition Size
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
ChinaBloc DPRKBlocPakistanBloc
Blo
cs a
s %
Win
nin
g C
oa
litio
n
41
Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Blocs as % of Coalition Size
020
4060
8010
0
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year
VenezuelaBloc RussiaBlocNigeriaBloc
Blo
cs a
s %
Win
nin
g C
oa
litio
n
43
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
02
.00
e-0
64.0
0e-0
66.0
0e-0
68.0
0e-0
6.00
001
Coa
litio
n
51
5P
olit
y
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
China Coalition Size
44
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
0.0
00
5.0
01
.00
15
Coa
litio
n
51
5P
olit
y
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
DPRK Coalition Size
45
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
0.0
00
2.0
00
4.0
00
6.0
00
8.0
01
Coa
litio
n
15
20
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Egypt Coalition Size
46
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
0.0
05
.01
.01
5C
oa
litio
n
06
5P
olit
y
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Iran Coalition Size
47
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
05
10
15
20
Coa
litio
n
15
90
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Nigeria Coalition Size
48
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
.00
05
.00
1.0
01
5.0
02
Coa
litio
n
15
90
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Pakistan Coalition Size
49
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
01
02
03
0C
oa
litio
n
70
85
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Russia Coalition Size
50
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
0.0
00
2.0
00
4.0
00
6.0
00
8C
oa
litio
n
05
10
15
20
25
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Saudi Arabia Coalition Size
51
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
02
46
8C
oa
litio
n
58
5P
olit
y
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Syria Coalition Size
52
Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy
05
10
15
20
25
Coa
litio
n
35
95
Po
lity
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005Year...
Polity Coalition
Venezuela Coalition Size
53
Future Work The pilot study sows it is feasible to collect subtle data on numerous
governance dimensions suggested by the logic of the selectorate theory.
The selectorate dimensions seem to be better predictors of democratization, defined in Polity terms or in selectorate terms (not shown here), than are Polity scores themselves.
The selectorate dimensions seem to better predict conflict than Polity. The pilot study was limited to 10 non-randomly selected countries
chosen by the contractor. The evidence encourages the view that data on selectorate
dimensions should be collected for all countries for at least the past 50 years and should be updated annually.
The evidence suggests that it may make sense to commission studies of general patterns of governance and of specific countries and their susceptibility to democratization in the coming years.
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