emergency zones setting in order to control the spread of … · requirements np-004-08 (applicable...
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Федеральное бюджетное учреждение
“Научно-технический центр по ядерной и радиационной безопасности”
Emergency zones setting in order to control the
spread of contamination and for monitoring the
contamination levels of vehicles, personnel and
territories
Albert Shapovalov
Vienna, 2013
www.secnrs.ru
Post-Fukushima issues
2
•due to Fukushima accident the process of strengthening and developing of emergency
preparedness and response regulations and guides, including those related to post-
accident phase, was considerably enhanced by Russian nuclear regulatory body
(Rostechnadzor) and its technical support organization SEC NRS;
•as a part of this process in the year 2013 the safety guide “Minimization of cross-
contamination of areas, traffic routes and vehicles during post-accident phase”
(further – RB-084-13), have been developed and issued;
•the RB-084-13 contains guidelines on post-accident zoning and applicable in case of
accident on facilities (including NPPs). This guidelines should be used to control the
spread of contamination.
www.secnrs.ru
Division of competence
3
Competence Rostechnadzor Social welfare
service
Establishment of
reference levels or
generic
intervention levels
- +
Emergency zoning + -
Establishment of
OILs
- +
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Approaches for planning protective actions
Generic criteria for planning
protective actions
Residual dose concept as recommended by:
•IAEA General Safety Guide GSG-2 (2011)
•ICRP Publication №103 (2007)
Avertable dose concept partially in accordance
with:
• the IAEA Basic Safety Standards SS-115
(1996).
•ICRP Publication № 63 Principles for
intervention for protection of public in a
radiological emergency
In Russia the concept of avertable dose for urgent protective
actions established
by NRB-99/2009 (sanitary norms & rules)4
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Russian regulatory basis. Intervention levels for urgent protective
actions according to NRB-99/2009.
Protective
measures
Intervention level of averted dose, mSv
Whole body Thyroid
А-level B-level А-level B-level
Sheltering 5 50 50 500
Stable iodine
administration:
adults
children
-
-
-
-
250
100
2500
1000
Evacuation 50 500 500 5000
• if the avertable dose less than A-level, then no protective actions required;
• if avertable dose less than B-level and exceeds A-level, then decision are to be made according to
optimization principle;
• in case the avertable dose exceeds B-level, then protective action shall be undertaken under any
circumstances.
There is no commonly accepted procedures on how to make a decision based on optimisation principle
5Reference level for post accident phase is 10 mSv/2months
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Accident threat categories (as established in regulatory
requirements NP-004-08 (applicable for NPPs)
Category characteristic
А01
Following consequences are expected:
•Deterministic effects
•Transboundary transfer
А02 Public exposure that higher than B-level according to NRB-99/2009
А03
Public exposure that higher than A-level according to
NRB-99/2009
А04Public exposure over 5 mSv/a
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www.secnrs.ru
Russian regulatory basis. Buffer zone concept.
Inside Buffer zone following are
prohibited
permanent or
temporary dwelling
of members of public
deployment of child-
care facilitiesdeployment of industrial and auxiliary facilities not related to
facility
Buffer zone – off-site area (area around facility fence) beyond which in normal operation
conditions, exposure of member of public shall not exceed dose constraint set for this NPP
(OSPORB-99/2010, SANPiN 2.6.1.07-03)
Buffer zone concept are used for facility threat category determining
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www.secnrs.ru
Facility threat categories classification
I category If worst-case accident can lead to exposure that exceeding 1 mSv for member of public
(beyond the buffer zone) than this facility is I category
II category If facility not related to I category and worst-case accident can lead to exposure of
personnel that exceeding 5 mSv (in area that between buffer zone and facility site boundary)
than this facility is II category
III category If facility are neither related to I category nor to II category and if there is a possibility of
workers exposure that exceeding 5mSv than this facility is III category facility
IV category remainder
1. OSPORB-99/2010
2. A guide for establishment of facility threat category MU 2.6.1.2005—05
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www.secnrs.ru
IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13
9
Point 4.91 Preparedness and response for a
nuclear or radiological emergency GS-R-2:
“For the emergency zones, arrangements
shall be made for monitoring the
contamination levels of vehicles, personnel
and goods moving into and out of
contaminated areas in order to control the
spread of contamination”.
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IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13 (contd.)
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As a basis for defining sizes of zones in RB-084-13
used recommendations of IAEA EPR series
document “Method for Developing Arrangements
for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency (EPR Method-2003)”, concerning
predefined emergency zones and radius sizes for
threat category I and II facilities.
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IAEA documents used for developing of RB-084-13 (contd.).
Emergency zones and radius sizes for threat category I and II facilities, suggested
by EPR Method-2003.
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Scope of RB-084-13
I category If worst-case accident can lead to exposure that exceeding 1 mSv for member of public
(beyond the buffer zone) than this facility is I category
II category If facility not related to I category and worst-case accident can lead to exposure of
personnel that exceeding 5 mSv (in area that between buffer zone and facility site boundary)
than this facility is II category
According to guide for establishment of facility threat category MU 2.6.1.2005—05 threat
categories I and II defined as:
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RB-084-13 applicable for such facilities of threat category I and II as:
•NPPs and research reactors;
•Spent nuclear fuel storage facilities;
•Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants;
•Radwaste storage facilities.
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Two- and three-zone system
13
•In RB-084-13 is recommended to set two- or three-zone system depending on emergency class
or projected doses.
•Three-zone system in case of accident on NPP are to be set in case if accident classified as A01
according to NP-004-08
•Three-zone system in case of accident on facility different from NPP are to be set in case if
accident classified as a category similar to A01 from NP-004-08 (for these facilities documents
other than NP-004-08 define appropriate threat categories)
Three-zone system consists of following zones:
�nearby zone;
�intermediate zone;
�common use zone.
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Two- and three-zone system (contd.)
14
•two-zone system are to be set in case if radionuclide release could result in exceeding of generic
intervention level (effective dose 50 mSv) for evacuation, established in Russian basic safety
standard NRB-99/2009 and adopted from ICRP Publication № 63 Principles for intervention for
protection of public in a radiological emergency;
•In case of accident on NPP two-zone system are to be set in case if accident classified as A02 –
A03 according to NP-004-08;
•Two-zone system in case of accident on facility different from NPP are to be set in case if
accident classified as a category similar to A02 – A03 from NP-004-08 (for these facilities
documents other than NP-004-08 define appropriate threat categories)
Two-zone system consists of following zones:
�nearby zone;
�common use zone.
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Recommended zones’ radii for various facilities
15
www.secnrs.ru
Examples of protective actions to be fulfilled upon setting of three-zone
system
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•Prevent traffic from nearby zone to intermediate zone
•Implementation of following measures in nearby zone:
�Traffic speed should not exceed 30 km/h;
�Sediments should be washed-off from traffic routes to roadside and immobilized with
special reagents
�Radioactive sediments which are result of washing-off of sediments from transport
routes should be relocated far away from routes;
�Caution signs, which prohibit crossing of roadside and staying on it, should be set
along the traffic routes;
�Those vehicles, used by responders, which couldn’t be used anymore due to
contamination, should kept in nearby zone and substituted by “clear” vehicles from
outside of nearby zone;
•Arrange a transfer of personnel between vehicles when entering from nearby zone to
intermediate zone and from intermediate zone to nearby zone.
www.secnrs.ru
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Thank you for your attention!
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