folk moral relativism (m&l) · of moral relativism?1 prior work regardless of the position...

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FolkMoralRelativism

[ForthcominginMind&Language]

HagopSarkissian1,JohnPark2,DavidTien3,JenniferColeWright4andJoshuaKnobe5,6

1DepartmentofPhilosophy,BaruchCollege;2DepartmentofPhilosophy,DukeUniversity;3DepartmentofPhilosophy,NationalUniversityofSingapore;4DepartmentofPsychology,CollegeofCharleston;5Programin

CognitiveScience,YaleUniversity;6DepartmentofPhilosophy,YaleUniversity

ABSTRACT: It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding ofmorality involvesarejectionofmoral relativismandabelief inobjectivemoral truths.Theresultsofsixstudiescall thisclaim intoquestion.Participantsdidofferapparentlyobjectivist intuitionswhenconfrontedwithquestionsaboutindividualsfromtheirownculture,buttheyoffered increasinglyrelativist intuitionsastheywereconfrontedwithquestionsaboutindividualsfromincreasinglydifferentculturesorwaysoflife.Inlightofthese data, the authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment tomoralobjectivismbutinsteadtendtoadoptdifferentviewsdependingonthedegreetowhichtheyconsiderradicallydifferentperspectivesonmoralquestions.

Supposethattwoindividualsarediscussingmathematics.Oneofthemclaimsthatthenumber

2,377isprime,whiletheotherclaimsthatitisnotprime.Inacaselikethis,itisusuallyassumedthat

oneofthetwoindividualsmustbewrong.Thereisafactofthematteraboutwhether2,377isprime,

andanyonewhoholdstheotheropinionhastobemistaken.

Butnowsupposeweswitchtoadifferenttopic.Twoindividualsaretalkingabouttheseasons.

OneofthemclaimsthatJanuaryisawintermonth,whiletheotherclaimsthatitisasummermonth.

Facedwiththislattercase,wemightwellreachadifferentconclusion.Thereisnosingleobjectivefact

aboutwhetherJanuaryisawintermonthorasummermonth.Rather,itcanonlybeawintermonthor

asummermonthrelativetoaspecifichemisphere.Soifoneofthemistalkingaboutthenorthern

hemisphereandtheotheristalkingaboutthesouthernhemisphere,theycanmakeseeminglyopposite

claimsbutstillbothbecorrect.

Whataboutmoralclaims?Supposethattwoindividualsaretalkingaboutthemoralstatusofa

particularaction.Oneclaimstheactionismorallybad,whiletheotherclaimsitisnotmorallybad.Must

oneoftheseindividualsbewrong,orcoulditturnoutthattheyarebothright?

Withinthephilosophicalliterature,thisquestionremainscontroversial.Somephilosopherssay

thatthereisasingleobjectivetruthaboutwhetheraparticularactionismorallybad,sothatiftwo

individualsholdoppositeopinions,oneofthemmustbemistaken(Railton,1986;Shafer‐Landau,2003;

Smith,1994).Otherphilosopherssaythatmoralclaimscanonlybeassessedrelativetoaparticular

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moralframeworkorsetofvalues,sothatdifferentmoralclaimscouldberightwhenassertedby

differentindividuals(Dreier,1990;Harman,1975;Pinillos,2010;Prinz,2007;Wong,1984;2006).The

debatebetweenthesetwoviewshaspersistedatleastsincetheancientGreeksandshowsnosignof

lettingup.

Ouraimhereistoexplorewhatordinarypeoplethinkaboutthisage‐oldphilosophicalquestion.

Dopeoplebelieveinobjectivemoraltruth,ordotheyacceptsomeformofmoralrelativism?1

PriorWork

Regardlessofthepositionbeingdefended,theusualassumptionwithinthephilosophical

literatureisthatpeoplesubscribetosomeformofmoralobjectivism.Forexample,MichaelSmithwrites

thatordinaryfolk

seemtothinkmoralquestionshavecorrectanswers;thatthecorrectanswersaremade

correctbyobjectivemoralfacts;thatmoralfactsarewhollydeterminedby

circumstancesandthat,byengaginginmoralconversationandargument,wecan

discoverwhattheseobjectivemoralfactsdeterminedbythecircumstancesare.(Smith,

1994,6).

Thisclaimthatordinaryfolkaremoralobjectivistsenjoysasurprisingdegreeofconsensusinmoral

philosophy,andcanbefoundintheworksofadiverserangeofmoralphilosopherswithdisparate

theoreticalcommitments(e.g.Blackburn,1984;Brink,1989;Mackie,1977;Shafer‐Landau,2003;Smith,

1994).Ofcourse,philosophersholdverydifferentviewsabouthowthestudyoffolkintuitionscan

contributetomoralphilosophy(Appiah,2008;Kagan,2009;Kauppinen,2007;Knobe&Nichols,2008;

Ludwig,2007),andevenaboutwhetherfolkintuitionshaveanyrelevanceatall(Singer,1974;2005).

Yetinspiteoftheseimportantdifferences,theclaimthatthefolkbelieveinsomeformofmoral

objectivismiswidespreadinmoralphilosophy.

1Noteonterminology:Theword‘relativism’isusedindifferentwaysindifferentdisciplines.Inmoralphilosophy,itisusedbroadlytodescribeanyviewaccordingtowhichmoralclaimscanonlybeassessedrelativetoaparticularcultureorsystemofvalues(e.g.Harman,1975;Wong,1996;2006),whereasinformalsemantics,itisusedtopickoutoneveryspecificwayofunderstandingthisrelativity(e.g.MacFarlane,2007).Wewillbeusingtheterminthebroader,non‐technicalsenseinwhichitappearswithinmoralphilosophyandwillnotbeexploringthemorespecificquestionsthatarisewithinformalsemantics.

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Now,thisclaimoffolkmoralobjectivismis,onthefaceofit,anempiricalclaim—onethatis

amenabletosystematicinvestigation.Researchershaveforsometimebeenexploringthisvery

question,andthetraditionalphilosophicalviewhasenjoyedconsiderableempiricalsupport.Resultsof

manystudieshavethusfarsuggestedthatpeoplerejectrelativismaboutmorality,andbelieveinstead

insometypeofabsolutemoraltruth.

Forexample,inapioneeringstudy,Nichols(2004)presentedparticipantswithastoryabouttwo

individuals—JohnandFred–whoappearedtoholddifferentmoralviews.Johnsays,“It’sokaytohit

peoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,”andFredsays,“No,itisnotokaytohitpeoplejustbecauseyoufeel

likeit.”Participantswerethenaskedtochoosewhichofthefollowingoptionsbestrepresentedtheir

ownviews:

1. Itisokaytohitorshovepeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,soJohnisrightandFrediswrong.

2. Itisnotokaytohitorshovepeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,soFredisrightandJohnis

wrong.

3. Thereisnofactofthematteraboutunqualifiedclaimslike“It’sokaytohitorshovepeoplejust

becauseyoufeellikeit.”Differentculturesbelievedifferentthings,anditisnotabsolutelytrue

orfalsethatit’sokaytohitpeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit.

Approximately78%ofparticipantschoseeitherthefirstorsecondoption.Inotherwords,themajority

ofparticipantsseemedtorejecttheideathat,e.g.,hittingorshovingmightbebothgoodandbad—

goodrelativetoonepersonyetbadrelativetoanother.Onthecontrary,theyappearedtosuggestthat

therewassomedefinitefactofthematterastowhetherhittingorshovingwasmorallygoodorbad,

andthatanyonewhoheldtheoppositeopinionmustbemistaken.

Inasubsequentstudy,GoodwinandDarley(2008)providedparticipantswithalargenumberof

statementspurportingtomakeclaimsabouthowthingsareinfactualmatters(“theearthisnotatthe

centeroftheknownuniverse”),moralmatters(“consciouslydiscriminatingagainstsomeoneonthe

basisofraceismorallywrong”),conventionalmatters(‘talkingloudlyandconstantlytothepersonnext

toyouduringalectureisapermissibleaction’),andmattersoftaste(“classicalmusicisbetterthanrock

music”).Afterbeingaskedwhethertheyagreedwiththesestatements,participantsweretoldthat

noneofthestatementshad,infact,elicitedfullagreement;whateverjudgmenttheyhappenedtohold,

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therewassomefellowparticipantholdingtheoppositeview.Onceagain,participantswereaskedhow

theywouldinterpretsuchdisagreements.Thistime,theoptionswere:

1. Theotherpersonissurelymistaken.

2. Itispossiblethatneitheryounortheotherpersonismistaken.

3. Itcouldbethatyouaremistaken,andtheotherpersoniscorrect.

4. Other.

Inthemoralcases,70%ofparticipantsansweredthattheotherindividualhadtobeincorrectinher

moraljudgments(option1).ForGoodwinandDarley,thissuggeststhatpeoplearehighlyobjectivist

aboutmanycanonicalmoraltransgressions—indeed,onlysomewhatlessobjectivistthantheyareabout

factualquestions(suchaswhethertheearthisatthecenteroftheknownuniverse).

Importantly,thissameresulthasbeenfoundacrossdifferentagegroups.Wainryband

colleagues(2004)presentedchildrenages5,7,and9withcasesofdisagreementinanumberof

domains,includingthemoraldomain.Forexample,subjectsweretoldthatSarahbelievesit’sokayto

hitandkickotherchildren,whereasSophiebelievesitisnotokaytohitandkickotherchildren.They

werethenaskedwhetherbothSarahandSophiecouldbecorrectand,ifnot,whichofthetwowas

correctandwhy.Theresultsstronglysupportedtheviewthatpeopleareobjectivistsaboutmorality:

100%ofthe5and7yearoldsand94%ofthe9yearoldsthoughtthat,incasesofsuchdisagreement,

onlyoneoftheindividualscouldbecorrect.Infact,childrenwereasobjectivistaboutmoral

disagreementsastheywereaboutpurelyfactualdisagreements(e.g.,disagreementaboutwhether

pencilsfalldownorshootupwhenyoudropthem).

Acrossallthesestudies,thesamemethodhasrevealedthesameresult,timeandagain.It

seemsthatordinary,pre‐philosophicalfolkrejectthenotionthatmoraldisagreementscanadmitof

manydifferentanswers,eachofthemcorrectrelativetothepersonwhoismakingthejudgment.

Rather,thefolkappeartobelievethatwhenindividualsholdoppositeopinionsaboutamoralquestion,

onlyoneofthoseindividualscanbecorrect.

ANewHypothesis

Inourview,however,theappearancesherearedeceiving.Itistruethatexistingstudieshave

consistentlyelicitedapparentlyobjectivistresponses.However,wewillarguethatthispatternonly

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arisesbecauseofaparticularfeatureoftheexistingexperimentalprocedures.Whenthestudiesare

conductedinaslightlydifferentway,amorecomplexpatternofresponsesbeginstoemerge.

Togetabettersensefortheissuehere,considerpeople’sordinarywayoftalkingaboutthe

seasons.Manypeopleunderstandthatatatimeofyearitcanonlybesaidtobeaparticularseason

relativetoagivenhemisphere.Sotheyunderstandthatifindividualsfromdifferenthemispheresmake

seeminglyoppositeclaimsabouttheseasons,thereisnoreasontoconcludethatoneofthese

individualshastobewrong.Itisalwayspossiblethatbothofthemaresayingsomethingperfectlytrue.

Nowsupposewedecidedtostudypeople’sattitudestowardtheseasonsusingafairly

straightforwardexperimentaldesign.Participantswouldbetoldthatoneindividualsays‘Januaryisa

wintermonth’whileanothersays‘Januaryisnotawintermonth.’Howmightparticipantsrespondina

caselikethat?Wouldtheysaythatoneoftheseindividualshadtobewrong,orwouldtheysaythat

bothcouldactuallyberight?

Well,itdepends.Dotheparticipantsassumethatthetwoindividualsareindifferent

hemispheres,ordotheyassumethattheyarebothinthesamehemisphere?Aslongasexperimental

materialsaredesignedinsuchawaythatparticipantstendtothink,e.g.,thatbothindividualsareliving

intheUnitedStates,theywillpresumablyconcludethatoneoftheindividualshastobewrong.Yetsuch

aresponsewouldnotshowthatpeopleareobjectivistsabouttheseasons—thattheythinkthereis

someobjectivetruthaboutwhatseasonitisatanygiventime,fullstop.Rather,thelessontodraw

hereisthatpeople’sdeeperunderstandingoftherelativityabouttheseasonswillonlycomeoutclearly

iftheyareencouragedtotakeabroaderviewandconsideranumberofpossibleperspectives—for

example,iftheyareaskedaboutacaseinvolvingbothAmericansandAustralians.

Orconsideramoreextremeexample.Supposeweaskedpeopleabouttheclaimthatthereare

twenty‐fourhoursinaday.Facedwithacaselikethis,peoplemightinitiallythink,‘Thatclaimis

objectivelytrue,andanyonewhoholdstheoppositeopinionmustsurelybemistaken.’Butnow

supposewetriedtobroadentheirperspective.Supposeweencouragedthemtothinkaboutother

planets,emphasizingthatdifferentplanetstakedifferentamountsoftimetorotatearoundtheiraxes,

withsometakinglessthantwenty‐fourhoursandsometakingmore.Peoplemightthenbegintohavea

differentintuition.Theymightbegintothink,‘Iguesstherejusthappentobetwenty‐fourhoursinaday

onthisparticularplanet,butifthereareindividualsonotherplanets,theymightbeperfectlyrightto

saythatthenumberofhoursinadaywashigherorlower.’

Wewanttosuggestthatasimilareffectarisesinthedomainofmorality.Peopledosometimes

displaywhatappeartobeobjectivistintuitionsaboutmorality,butitwouldbeamistakejustto

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concludestraightawaythatpeoplearemoralobjectivists.Themoreaccuratethingtosayisthatpeople’s

intuitionsdependontheprecisewayinwhichtheyarethinkingofthequestion.Aslongastheyare

thinkingonlyaboutindividualswhoarefairlysimilartothemselves—say,individualsfromtheirown

culturalgroups—theirintuitionsmightlookmoreorlessobjectivist.Butwewillarguethatpeople’s

intuitionsdonotalwayshavethisobjectivistcharacter.Onthecontrary,people’sintuitionsundergoa

systematicshiftastheybeginconsideringdifferentsortsofindividuals.Soastheycometothinkmore

andmoreseriouslyaboutindividualswhoaredeeplydissimilar—individualswithradicallydifferent

cultures,values,orwaysoflife—theirintuitionsmovesteadilytowardakindofrelativism.They

graduallycometofeelthateveniftwoindividualshaveoppositeopinionsonsomemoralquestion,it

couldstillturnoutthatneitheronewouldhavetobewrong.

Study1

Asaninitialtestofthishypothesis,weconductedastudyinwhichparticipantsrandomly

receivedeitherastraightforwardcaselikethoseusedinearlierstudies,oracasethatspecifically

encouragedthemtoconsiderdifferentculturesandwaysoflife.

Allparticipantsreadvignettesthatdescribedanagentperformingabehaviorandother

individualsjudgingthatbehavior.Thedifferencebetweenconditionslayonlyinthedescriptionofthe

individualsjudgingthebehavior.SomeparticipantsweretoldthattheindividualswereAmericansmuch

likethemselves;othersweretoldthatoneoftheindividualswasfromaverydifferentsortofsociety

witharadicallydifferentformoflife.(Insteadofsimplystatingthattheindividualwasfromadifferent

society,thestimulusmaterialsweredesignedtopresentthisothersocietyinasvividandcompellinga

wayaspossible.)Thehypothesiswasthataspeoplewereencouragedtothinkaboutevermoredistant

formsoflife,theywouldcometohaveevermorerelativistintuitions.

Methods

Participants.Twohundredtwenty‐threestudents(112females)takingintroductoryphilosophy

coursesatBaruchCollegevoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireafterclass.

MaterialsandProcedure.Eachsubjectwasrandomlyassignedtooneofthreeconditions:same‐

culture,other‐cultureorextraterrestrial.

Participantsinthesame‐cultureconditionwereaskedtoimagineapersonnamedSam.They

weretoldthatSamwasafairlyordinarystudentattheirowncollegewhoenjoyedwatchingcollege

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footballandhangingoutwithfriends.TheywerethenaskedtoconsiderSam’sopinionsabouttwo

moraltransgressions.Foroneofthesetransgressions,theyweregiventhesentence:

Horacefindshisyoungestchildextremelyunattractiveandthereforekillshim.

TheyweretoldtoimaginethatoneoftheirclassmatesthinksthatthisactismorallywrongbutthatSam

thinksthattheactismorallypermissible.Theinstructionsthenwere:

Giventhattheseindividualshavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,wewouldliketoknow

whetheryouthinkatleastoneofthemmustbewrong,orwhetheryouthinkbothofthem

couldactuallybecorrect.Inotherwords,towhatextentwouldyouagreeordisagreewiththe

followingstatementconcerningsuchacase

SinceyourclassmateandSamhavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,atleastoneofthem

mustbewrong.

Responsestothisquestionwererecordedonascalefrom1to7.Totestthegeneralityoftheeffect,we

alsoincludedasecondtransgression:

Dylanbuysanexpensivenewknifeandtestsitssharpnessbyrandomlystabbingapasserbyon

thestreet.

Instructionsforthissecondtransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.(Wedidnotpredictany

significantdifferencesbetweenthetwotransgressions.)

Participantsintheother‐cultureconditionwereaskedtoimagineanisolatedtribeofpeople

calledtheMamilons.TheyweretoldthatthistribelivesintheAmazonrainforestsandhaspreserveda

traditionalwarriorculture,withquitedifferentvaluesfromthoseofthepeopleinthesurrounding

society.Participantsinthisconditionthenreceivedexactlythesametwoquestionsasthosereceivedby

participantsinthesame‐culturecondition,exceptthattheywereaskedtoimaginethattheindividual

regardingthetransgressionsasmorallypermissiblewasaMamilon.

Finally,participantsintheextraterrestrialconditionwereaskedtoimaginearaceof

extraterrestrialbeingscalledPentars.TheyweretoldthatthePentarshaveaverydifferentsortof

psychologyfromhumanbeings,thattheyarenotatallinterestedinfriendshiporloveandthattheir

maingoalissimplytoincreasethetotalnumberofequilateralpentagonsintheuniverse.These

participantsthenreceivedthetwoquestions,thistimewithaPentarastheindividualwhoregardsthe

transgressionsaspermissible.

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Results

Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐modelANOVA,withconditionasabetween‐participants

factorandtransgressionasawithin‐subjectfactor.Therewasnomaineffectoftransgressionandno

interactioneffect.However,therewasasignificantmaineffectofcondition,F(2,218)=20.7,p<.001,

η2=.16.

Ratingsforthetwotransgressionswerehighlycorrelated(r=.82,p<.001)andcouldtherefore

beaveragedtoformascale.ThemeanforeachconditionisdisplayedinFigure1.

Figure1.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’

bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Participantsinthesame‐cultureconditiontendedtoagreethatatleastonepersonhadtobe

wrong(M=5.4,SD=2.15),thoseintheother‐cultureconditionwereapproximatelyatthemidpoint(M

=4.4,SD=2.05),andthoseintheextraterrestrialconditiontendedtosaythatbothcouldactuallybe

right(M=3.2,SD=2.28).Post‐hocTukey’stestsshowedsignificantdifferencesbothbetweenresponses

intheother‐cultureconditionandthesame‐culturecondition(p<.05)andbetweenresponsesinthe

extraterrestrialconditionandtheother‐culturecondition(p<.01).

Discussion

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Theresultsofthisfirstexperimentallowustolocatetheresultsfromearlierstudiesinabroader

framework.Thoseearlierstudiesdemonstratedthatwhentwoindividualsholdoppositemoralviews,

peoplethinkthatatleastoneofthoseindividualshastobewrong.Thepresentstudyreplicatesthat

basicfinding,butalsoshowsthatitonlyarisesundercertainquitespecificconditions—namely,when

theindividualsarefromthesameculture.Astheindividualsunderdiscussionbecomeevermore

dissimilar,peoplebecomelessandlessinclinedtoagreewiththeclaimthatoneofthemhastobe

wrong,sothatwhenthetwoindividualsbecomedissimilarenough,peoplewerefarmorewillingtosay

thatbothofthemcanberight.

Overall,then,theresponseswefindinthesame‐cultureconditiondonotappeartoreflectany

kindofgeneral,across‐the‐boardcommitmenttomoralobjectivism.Onthecontrary,itseemsthat

people’sintuitionsarehighlysensitivetothenatureofthequestionposed.Themorepeopleare

encouragedtoconsiderradicallydifferentculturesandwaysoflife,themoretheyaredrawntomore

relativistresponses.

But,ofcourse,itwouldbeabigmistaketodrawanyfar‐reachingconclusionsfromjustthisone

experiment.Theonlywaytogetaproperunderstandingofwhattheseresultsmeanistoconduct

follow‐upstudiesdesignedtoexaminespecifichypothesesaboutthenatureoftheeffectobservedhere.

Study2

Tobeginwith,theparticipantsinStudy1wereallAmericanundergraduates.Itmighttherefore

besupposedthattheseinitialresultsarenotrevealinganythingimportantaboutthenatureofmoral

cognitionpersebutaresimplyshowingussomethingabouttheidiosyncrasiesofcontemporary

Americanculture.(Forexample,Americanstudentsmightthinkitwouldbepoliticallyincorrecttopass

judgmentsonindividualsfromotherculturesanddeclaretheirmoraljudgmentstobewrong.)To

addressthisworry,weconductedafollow‐upexperimentwithapopulationofsubjectsfromadifferent

culture,onethatfocuseslessonindividualsandmoreongrouplevel,communalnorms.

Methods

Participants.Onehundredandfifty‐onestudents(71females)takingintroductoryphilosophy

coursesatNationalUniversityofSingaporevoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireatthestartofclass.

Materialsandprocedure.ThematerialsandprocedurewerethesameasusedinStudy1.

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Results.Amixed‐modelANOVAwasrun,withcultureofthesubjectasabetween‐subjects

factorandtransgressionasawithin‐subjectfactor.Therewasasignificantmaineffectofthecultureof

thesubject,F(2,146)=3.1,p=.05,η2=.04.Therewasnosignificantdifferencebetweentransgressions

andnosignificantinteractioneffect.ThemeansperconditionarereportedinFigure2.

Figure2.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’

bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Discussion

ThepatternofresponsesinthisSingaporeansamplemirroredthepatternofresultsfoundwith

Americans.Hereagain,themoreparticipantswereencouragedtothinkaboutindividualswithvery

differentculturesorwaysoflife,themoretheywereinclinedtoendorserelativistclaims.

Ofcourse,thefactthatthissamepatternemergedintwodifferentculturesshouldnotbetaken

asproofthatthepatternissomesortofcross‐culturaluniversal.Itispossible,andindeedquitelikely,

thatdifferentcultureshavequitedifferentintuitionsabouttheobjectivityofmoralclaims.Still,the

presentresultsdoprovidestrongreasontosuspectthatthepatternobtainedhereisnotsimplya

reflectionofsomeidiosyncraticfeatureofcontemporaryAmericanculture.Itappearsthatweactually

aregettingatsomethingofimportanceaboutmoralcognition.

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Study3

Inthesefirsttwostudies,participantsgavedifferentresponsesdependingonwhetherthey

receivedthesame‐culture,other‐cultureorextraterrestrialcases.Wenowwantedtoknowwhether

participantswouldcontinuetoshowthiseffecteveniftheyreceivedallthreecasesside‐by‐side.

Previousresearchhasshownthatincaseswherepeoplethemselvesregardanaspectoftheirmoral

judgmentsasakindof‘bias’or‘error,’differencesbetweenconditionsdisappearwhenparticipantsare

abletoseealloftheconditionsatonce(Hsee,Loewenstein,Blount&Bazerman,1999).Wewantedto

knowwhetherasimilarpatternwouldarisehereorwhetherparticipantswouldaffirmthedifference

betweenconditionsevenwhentheywerepresentedwithallthreeatthesametime.

Methods

Participants.61students(52females),takingIntroductiontoPsychologicalSciencecoursesat

theCollegeofCharlestonsignedupforthestudyforresearchparticipationcredit.

Materials&Procedures.Participantsinthisstudyreceivedallthreeconditions(same‐culture,

other‐culture,andextraterrestrial)incounterbalancedorder(1:Sam/Mamilon/Pentar,2:

Mamilon/Pentar/Sam,3:Pentar/Sam/Mamilon).Otherwise,thestoriesandquestionswereidenticalto

thoseusedinStudy1.Studentssignedupforthestudyandthenweresentanonlinesurveylinktothe

questionnaires,whichtheywereinstructedtocompleteontheirowninaquietsetting.

Results

ThemeanresponsesforeachculturalconditionarereportedinFigure3.

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Figure3.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbe

mistaken’bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐modelANOVA,withculturalconditionandtransgression

aswithin‐participantfactorsandcounterbalancingorderasabetween‐participantsfactor,revealinga

significantmaineffectforculture,F(2,116)=22.3,p<.001,η2=.28.AsinStudy1,participantswere

significantlymorelikelytogiveanobjectivistresponse(atleastoneofthejudgmentshadtobewrong)

inthesame‐culturecondition(M=5.2,SD=2.02)thanintheother‐culturecondition(M=4.3,SD=

2.11)andevenlesslikelyintheextraterrestrialcondition(M=3.7,SD=1.97).

Discussion

Evenwheneachparticipantreceivedallthreecasesside‐by‐side,theycontinuedtooffer

differentresponsesdependingonwhichsortofindividualtheywereconsidering.Justasinthetwo

earlierstudies,participantsweremoreinclinedtorejecttheclaimthatatleastoneindividualmustbe

wrongastheymovedtowardindividualswhoweremoredeeplydifferentintheircultureorwayoflife.

Theseresultsshowussomethingimportantaboutthenatureoftheeffectunderstudyhere.Itis

notjustthatpeopleresponddifferentlyinthedifferentconditions;theyseemactuallytothinkthatitis

righttoofferthesedifferentresponses.So,evenaftertheyhavegivenaclearlyrelativistresponsein

onecondition,theyarehappytosayinanotherconditionthatifthetwoindividualsholdopposite

opinions,oneofthemhastobewrong.

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Study4

Theexperimentalresultsthusfarseemtoindicatethatparticipants’intuitionschangeasthey

begintoconsiderindividualswithradicallydifferentculturesorwaysoflifejudgingasinglemoral

transgression.However,somemightwonderwhetherimportantdetailsareleftoutofthedescriptions

ofthetransgressionsthemselves.Afterall,therearetwocharactersinourvignettes.First,thereisthe

agent,theindividualwhoactuallycommitsthemoraltransgression(e.g.,Horace,whokillshisown

child).Then,second,thereisthejudge,theindividualwhomakesajudgmentaboutwhethertheagent’s

actionwasmorallybadormorallypermissible(e.g.,theMamilon,anAmazoniantribesman).Sofar,

we’veonlyaskedpeopletoconsiderthelatterofthesetwo.But,detailswithrespecttotheformer

couldarguablyberelevanttopeople’smoraljudgmentsaswell.Forexample,whereisHoracelocated?

Mightpeople’sjudgmentschangeiftheyaretoldthatHoraceisamemberoftheirownculture—

perhapsevenapeer?Mightpeopleholdeveryonetothesamemoralstandardswhenjudginganact

takingplaceintheirowncultureorbackyard?Conversely,wouldpeopleapplyverydifferentstandards

whenjudgingasimilaractiftookplacefaraway,onanothercontinentandinadifferentcultural

context?Ourclaimhasbeenthatparticipants’intuitionsabouttherightnessorwrongnessofa

judgmentmightactuallydependontheidentityofthejudge,sothatdifferentjudgescouldrightlyarrive

atdifferentjudgmentsoftheverysameagent.Butwhatabouttheidentityoftheagent?Couldthis

swaypeople’sintuitions?

Togetatthisquestionmoredirectly,weconductedastudyinwhichweindependentlyvaried

theculturalidentityofboththeagentandofthejudge.Hence,theagentwhoperformedthe

transgressioncouldbeeitheranAmericanorsomeonefromanotherculture,andthejudgecouldbe

eitheranAmerican,someonefromanothercultureoranextraterrestrial.Thisdesignenabledusto

clarifywhatimpacttheagent’sidentitymighthaveonpeople’sintuitions(apartfromthejudge’s

identity).

Methods

Participants.Onehundredandeighteenstudents(91females)takingIntroductionto

PsychologicalSciencecoursesattheCollegeofCharlestonsignedupforthestudyforresearch

participationcredit.

Materials&Procedure.Participantsweregiventhesamewithin‐participantsquestionnaireasin

Study2(counterbalancingthethreejudges:same‐culture,other‐culture,andextraterrestrial),onlynow

theyweredividedintotwogroups:halfreceivedthelocalagenttransgressioncondition,inwhichthe

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child‐killerwasrepresentedasbeingAmericanandtheknife‐stabberwasrepresentedasbeingaCollege

ofCharlestonstudent,andhalfreceivedtheforeignagenttransgressioncondition,inwhichthechild‐

killerwasrepresentedasbeingAlgerianandtheknife‐stabberwasrepresentedasbeingUniversityof

Algiersstudent.

Results

Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐designANOVA,withtheidentityofthejudge(same‐

culturevs.other‐culturevs.extraterrestrial)andtransgressionaswithin‐participantfactorsandthe

identityoftheagent(localvs.foreign)asbetween‐participantfactors.Therewasamaineffectforthe

identityofthejudge,F(2,224)=34.7,p<.001,η2=.24,butnomaineffectoftheidentityoftheagent.

Therewasalsoasignificantinteractioneffect,F(2,224)=3.1,p=.048,η2=.03.

ThemeansforeachconditionaredisplayedinFigure4.Inspectionofthesemeansindicatedthat

theinteractioneffectarosebecauseparticipantsgaveespeciallyobjectivistresponseswhenpresented

withthecaseinvolvingalocalagentandasame‐culturejudge.

Figure4.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbe

mistaken’bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Discussion

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Althoughwefoundnomaineffectfromourmanipulationoftheidentityoftheagent,wedid

findamaineffectfromourmanipulationoftheidentityofthejudge.Inotherwords,thepatternof

intuitionsobservedheredoesnotseemtobearisingsimplybecausepeoplehavedifferentreactionsto

differentkindsofagents.Rather,itseemsthatpeoplecanhavedifferentreactionstojudgmentsabout

theverysameact,performedbytheverysameagent,solongaswevarytheidentityofthejudge.

Therewasasignificantinteractioneffect,yetthiswasdue,inlargepart,tothehighlevelsof

objectivistresponsestothelocalactortransgressionwhenjudgedbythetwoclassmates(inthesame‐

culturecondition).Thisresultisinlinewiththehypothesisofthispaper.Afterall,itismadeexplicit

thattheagentandthejudgesarelocatedinthesamelocationandwithinthesamemoralframework,

Whenthejudgesandtheactorareallwithinthesamemoralframework,itseemsreasonabletoassume

thatparticipantswouldbeleastlikelytoagreewiththeclaimthatthedifferingresponsesofthejudges

couldbothbecorrect.Itwouldbemorelikelytothinkthatinsuchasituationpeopleshouldbeheldto

thesamestandards,thatmoralnormsapplytothemallinthesameway.Whenframeworksalignin

suchafashion,itseemsnaturalforpeopletoassumethattherecanbeanobjectivefactofthematteras

towhethertheactor’stransgressionispermissible—relativetothatframework.

Thispatternofintuitionssuggeststhatpeopleareevaluatingeachmoraljudgmentrelativetoa

setofstandardsthatapplyspecificallytothejudgeinquestion,ratherthanthe(potentiallydifferent)set

ofstandardsthatapplytotheagentswhoacted.Suchafindingmayinitiallyseemabitpuzzlingor

bizarre,butworkinnaturallanguagesemanticshasshownsimilarsortsofeffectsinotherdomainsthat

havenothingtodowithmorality(Egan,Hawthorne&Weatherson,2005;Lasersohn,2009;MacFarlane,

2007;Stephenson,2007),anditseemsreasonabletosuspectthattheeffectsthatariseintheseother

domainsmightapplyinthemoraldomainaswell.

Agreatdealofcontroversyremainsabouthowexactlysucheffectsaretobeunderstood,and

wecannothopetoresolvethosedifficultissueshere.Nonetheless,thedatadoseemtobesuggesting

thatthesortsofeffectsthatariseconcerning,e.g.,judgmentsoftastecanalsobefoundwhenweturn

tomoraljudgments.Peopleappeartorejecttheideathatasingleabsolutestandardcanbeappliedto

allmoraljudgmentsofagivenagentandtooperateinsteadwithasystemthatappliesdifferent

standardstodifferentjudges.

Study5

Instudies1‐4subjectsappeartoberespondinginwayssuggestingthattheyareapplying

differentsetsofstandardstothepersonswithdifferingjudgmentsaboutthepermissibilityofagiven

16

action.Ourhypothesishasbeenthatthisisbecauseordinaryfolkmightbetacitlycommittedtomoral

relativism.However,itispossiblethatsubjectsinthesestudiesarenotexpressingarelativisticview

aboutmoralityinparticular.Instead,theymightbeexpressingamoregeneral,mad‐dogsortof

relativism—arelativismthatappliesnotonlytomoralquestionsbutalsotopurelydescriptivequestions,

suchasthosethatcomeupinscience,historyormathematics.

Inordertoascertainwhetherthefolkreallyarerelativistsinthismoreradicalsense,we

conductedafollow‐upexperimentthatmadeitpossibletocompareintuitionsaboutmoralclaimswith

intuitionsaboutnon‐moralclaims.

Methods

Participants.Eighty‐eightstudents(26females)takingintroductoryphilosophycoursesatDuke

Universityvoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireattheendofclass.

MaterialsandProcedure.Surveymaterialsweredistributedforparticipantstofillout.All

participantswerepresentedwiththeOther‐CulturevignetteusedinStudy1.Participantswerethen

randomlyassignedtooneoftwoconditions.

ParticipantsinthemoralconditionwereaskedtoconsidertheMamilon’sopinionsabouttwo

moraltransgressions.Forthefirsttransgression,theyweregiventhesentence:‘Jasonrobshis

employer,theRedCross,inordertopayforasecondholidayforhimself.’Theywerethenaskedto

imaginethatoneoftheirclassmatesbelievedwhatJasondidwasmorallywrong,butthattheMamilon

thoughtwhatJasondidwasnotmorallywrong.Afterreadingaboutthesedifferentjudgments,they

wereaskedthesamequestionasinStudy1—namely,whethertheyagreedwiththestatement‘Since

yourclassmateandtheMamilonhavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,atleastoneofthemmustbe

wrong.’’Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1(‘disagree’)to7(‘agree’).Forthesecond

transgression,participantsweregiventhesentence:‘EmilypromisestotakeMolly'ssickchildtothe

hospitalforanimportantsurgicalprocedure,butinsteaddecidesshe'drathergoshopping.’Instructions

forthisothertransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.Theorderoftransgressionswas

counterbalanced.

Participantsinthenon‐moralconditionwereaskedtoconsidertheMamilon’sopinionabout

twonon‐moralcases.Forthefirstcase,participantsweretoldthefollowing:‘Agroupofindividualsare

discussingwherepastacomesfrom.Alejandrothinkspastaismadebycombiningflour,water,and

eggs,whereasMaryathinkspastagrowsontreesandisharvestedbyspecialfarmerscalled

“Pastafarians”onceevery5years.’Theywerethenaskedtoimaginethataclassmateagreeswith

17

Alejandro,andthataMamilonagreeswithMarya.Afterreadingaboutthesedifferentjudgments,they

wereaskedthesamequestionasinthemoralcondition.Thesecondcasewasasfollows:‘Agroupof

individualsarediscussingthemilitarystrategiesofNapoleanBonaparte.AnitathinksthatNapolean

rodeintobattleonahorse,whereasFabiothinksNapoleanflewintobattleinahelicopter.’Theywere

thenaskedtoimagineaclassmateagreeswithAnita,whereasaMamilonagreeswithFabio.

Instructionsforthisothertransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.Theorderof

transgressionswascounterbalanced.

Results

Ratingsforthetwotransgressionswerehighlycorrelated,bothforthenon‐moralcases(r=.67,

p<.001)andforthemoralcases(r=.75,p<.001),andtherewerenosignificantdifferencesbetween

them.Theycouldthereforebeaveragedtoformascale.Themeanforeachconditionisdisplayedin

Figure5.

Figure5.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’

bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Participantswerestronglyobjectivistwhenthedifferingjudgmentswereaboutnon‐moralcases

(M=5.5,SD=1.84)butweresignificantlymoreinclinedtoembracerelativismwhenthediffering

judgmentswereaboutmoralcases(M=3.3,SD=1.99),t(88)=5.3,p<.001.

18

Discussion

Participantsshowedtheusualtendencytoendorserelativismaboutmoralquestions,butthey

didnotshowthissametendencywhenconfrontedwithnon‐moralquestions.Instead,theirresponsesin

thenon‐moraldomaintookamoreobjectivistturn.Theytendedtoagreewiththeclaimthatiftwo

individualsheldoppositeopinionsabouthistoricalfacts,thenoneofthoseindividualshastobewrong.

Inshort,itdoesnotappearthatpeoplesubscribetoablanketrelativismthatappliesequallyto

allissues.Peopleseeminsteadtobedistinguishingbetweendifferentdomains,endorsingrelativist

claimsaboutmoralitybutnotaboutstraightforwardmattersoffact.

Study6

Finally,onemightworryabouthowpeopleareinterpretingthequestiontheyreceiveinthe

stimulusmaterials.Participantsinthesestudiesarepresentedwithstoriesabouttwojudgeswith

seeminglyoppositeopinionsandthenaskedwhethertheyagreewiththeclaimthatatleastoneofthe

judgesmustbe‘wrong’or‘mistaken.’Buthowexactlyareparticipantsunderstandingthewords‘wrong’

or‘mistaken’inthiscontext?Thusfar,wehavebeenassumingthatparticipantsunderstandthesewords

tomeanthattheopinionsofthejudgesarenottrue.Soourassumptionhasbeenthatwhenpeople

disagreewiththeclaim,theyaresayingsomethinglike:‘Eventhoughthetwojudgeshaveopposite

opinions,itcouldbethatbothoftheiropinionsaretrue.’Thisreallywouldbeanendorsementofmoral

relativism.

Butitseemsthattheclaimcouldactuallybeunderstoodinother,verydifferentways.For

example,onecouldinterpretthewords‘wrong’or‘mistaken’tomeansomethinglikenotareasonable

inference,giventheavailableevidence.Onthisalternativeconstrual,participantsarenotsaying

anythingdeeplycontroversialaboutthetruthofthejudges’opinions.Theyaresimplysayingsomething

straightforwardoftheform:‘Eventhoughthetwojudgeshaveoppositeopinions,itcouldbethatboth

havegoodreasontoarriveatthoseinferences,giventheavailableevidence.’Suchastatementwould

notamounttoanendorsementofgenuinemoralrelativism.(Inthejargonofphilosophy,itwouldbe

classifiedasapurely‘epistemic’claim.)

Toaddressthislastworry,weconductedastudyinwhichparticipantswereaskedbothabout

whetherthevariousjudges’beliefswere‘incorrect’andaboutwhethertheyhad‘nogoodreason’to

19

believewhattheydid.Thismethodmakesitpossibletodisentangleintuitionsaboutthetruthofthe

judges’opinionsfromintuitionsaboutwhetherthoseopinionswerereasonableinferencesfromthe

availableevidence.

Methods

Participants.Participantswereninetyundergraduatestudents(45females)takingintroductory

philosophycoursesatDukeUniversity.

MaterialsandProcedures.Surveymaterialsweredistributedforparticipantstofillout.Asin

Study5,allparticipantswerepresentedwiththeOther‐CulturevignetteusedinStudy1.Participants

werethenrandomlyassignedtooneoffourconditionsina2x2design.

Halfofthesubjectsreceivedoneoftwo‘truth’conditions.Intheseconditions,theyweregiven

eithertwomoralcases(therobbingandpromise‐renegingtransgressionsusedinStudy5)ortwonon‐

moralcases(theNapoleonandpastacasesusedinStudy5).Theywerethenaskedtoimaginethata

classmateandaMamilonhavedifferingjudgmentsaboutwhether,forexample,themoraltransgression

waspermissible,orwhetherNapoleanrodeahorseorahelicopter,andwereaskedtowhatextentthey

agreedwiththefollowingstatement:‘GiventhatyourclassmateandtheMamilonhavetheseparticular

beliefs,atleastoneoftheirbeliefsmustbeincorrect.’Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1

(‘disagree’)to7(‘agree’).

Theotherhalfofthesubjectsreceivedoneoftwo‘justification’conditions.Intheseconditions,

theyweregiveneitherthesamemoralornon‐moralcasesfromthe‘truth’condition.Whentoldthat

theclassmateandtheMamilonhaddifferentjudgmentsaboutthecase,theyweregiventhefollowing

question:“Theseindividualshavedifferentbeliefsaboutthiscase.Wewouldliketoknowwhetheryou

thinkonlyoneofthemhasgoodreasontobelievewhatheorshedoes,orwhethertheybothhavegood

reasons.”Theywerethenaskedtowhatextenttheyagreedwiththefollowingstatement:“Giventhe

particularbeliefsthatyourclassmateandtheMamilonhave,atleastoneofthemmustnothavegood

reasontobelieveasheorshedoes.”Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1(‘disagree’)to7

(‘agree’).

Results

ThedataweresubjectedtoanANOVA,withquestiontype(truthvs.justification)andvignette

type(moralvs.non‐moral)asbetween‐subjectfactors,transgressionasawithinsubjectfactor,and

20

genderandnumberofpreviousphilosophycoursesascovariates.Therewasnomaineffectofeither

questiontypeofvignettetype.However,therewasasignificantinteractioneffectF(1,84)=10.4,p=

.002,η2=.11.

Inspectionofthemeansrevealedoppositepatternsofresponsesforthetwoquestiontypes

(seeFigure6).Onthequestionabouttruth,peopletendedtorejecttheclaimthatatleastoneofthe

judgeshadtobeincorrectinthemoralcases(M=2.93,SD=2.15)butnotinthenon‐moralcases(M=

4.67,SD=2.17),t(43)=2.7,p=.01.Bycontrast,onthequestionaboutjustification,peopletendedto

rejecttheclaimthatatleastoneofthejudgesmustnothavehadgoodreasoninthenon‐moralcases

(M=3.0,SE=1.98)butnotinthemoralcases(M=4.4,SD=2.08),t(43)=2.3,p=.03.

Figure6.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthatand‘atleastonemustbe

incorrect’(the‘truthquestion’)and‘atleastonemustnothavegood

reasontobelieve’(the‘justificationquestion’).ErrorbarsshowSEmean.

Discussion

Inthisfinalstudy,participantsshowedacleardistinctionbetweentheintuitionsabouttruthand

intuitionsaboutjustification.Onthequestionabouttruth,participantsshowedthesamebasicpattern

ofjudgmentstheydisplayedinStudy5:theywerelesswillingtosaythatatleastonejudgehadtobe

'incorrect'inthemoralconditionthantheywereinthenon‐moralcondition.However,onthequestion

aboutjustification,theyshowedexactlytheoppositepatternofjudgments:theywere

21

actuallymorewillingtosaythatatleastonejudgehad'nogoodreason'inthemoralconditionthanin

thenon‐moralcondition.Inotherwords,peopleseemtobewillingtograntthatpeoplefromdifferent

culturesmaylegitimatelyholddifferentmoralbeliefs—thatthesebeliefsneednotbeconsideredillicit

orfalse—yettheyarenotwillingtoacceptthatsuchbeliefsareequallyjustified—thatthereareequally

goodreasonssupportingthem.

Ofcourse,theprecisepatternofjustificationintuitionsdependsinpartonthenatureofthe

vignettesthemselves,andwecoulddoubtlesshaveobtainedaverydifferentpatternifwehadused

differentvignettes.Theimportantpoint,however,issimplythatparticipantsaredrawingaclear

distinctionbetweentruthandjustification.Hence,whenweseethatparticipantsdisagreewiththe

claimthatatleastoneofthebeliefsmustbeincorrect,wehavesomereasontoconcludethattheyare

infactexpressingtherelativistviewthattwojudgescanmakeoppositejudgmentwithouteitherof

themthinkinganythingfalse.

GeneralDiscussion

Thepresentstudiesofferacomplexpictureofpeople'sintuitionsaboutwhethermoralityis

objectiveorrelative.Peopledohaveapparentlyobjectivistintuitionsincertaincases,butourresults

suggestthatonecannotaccuratelycapturetheirviewsinasimpleclaimlike:'Peoplearecommittedto

moralobjectivism.'Onthecontrary,people'sintuitionstakeastrikinglyrelativistturnwhentheyare

encouragedtoconsiderindividualsfromradicallydifferentculturesorwaysoflife.

Overall,then,thepatternofpeople'sintuitionsaboutmoralityappearstoresemblethepattern

oftheirintuitionsabouttheseasons.Inthecourseofatypicalconversation,peoplemightgivelittle

thoughttotheideathatitcanonlybewinterorsummerrelativetoagivenhemisphere.Indeed,people

wholiveintheNorthernHemispheremightordinarilysupposethatacertaintimesimplyiswinterand

thatanyonewhothinksotherwisemustbemistaken.Butthispatternofordinaryintuitionswouldnot

necessarilymakeitrightforustodrawaconclusionoftheform:'Peoplearecommittedtoseasonal

objectivism.'Thethingtofocusonispeople'sability,whensuddenlyconfrontedwithanindividualfrom

anotherhemisphere,torecognizethatasingletimemightbewinteraroundherebutsummer

somewhereelse.

Ordinaryintuitionsaboutmoralityappeartoworkinmuchthesameway.Daytoday,people

mightgivelittlethoughttoissuesofrelativity.Itmightappeartothem,whentheywitnessatypical

transgression,thattheagenthasclearlydonesomethingmorallybadandthatanyonewhothinks

otherwisemustsurelybewrong.Yetthispatternofintuitionsisnotitselfsufficienttomakethemcount

22

asmoralobjectivists.Thekeyquestioniswhethertheyholdontothatvieweveninthefaceofradically

differentperspectives.Theresultsofthepresentstudiessuggestthattheydonot.

1.Relationtopreviouswork

Itmayinitiallyappearthatourchiefconclusionsareopposedtothosedrawnbyearlier

researchers.Afterall,earlierresearchersfoundthatmostparticipantsweremoralobjectivists,whereas

wearesuggestingthatmanyofthoseparticipantsmightactuallyhavehadatendencytowardmoral

relativism.

Ourownview,however,isthatthedisagreementhereisonlyasuperficialoneandthatthereis

adeepersenseinwhichourconclusionsareactuallyinharmonywiththoseofearlierresearchers.The

maingoalofresearchinthisareaisnottofigureoutpreciselywhatpercentageofpeoplearemoral

objectivistsormoralrelativistsbutrathertoreachabetterunderstandingofthepsychologicalprocesses

thatcanpullpeopleinthesedifferentdirections.Ourclaimhasbeenthatpeoplearedrawntoward

moralrelativismbyonespecifictypeofpsychologicalprocess:namely,activeengagementwithradically

differentperspectivesandwaysoflife.Sowhatwereallywanttoknowiswhetherpriorresearch

providesevidenceforthissamepsychologicalhypothesis.

Thoughearlierstudiesfoundthatamajorityofparticipantsgaveapparentlyobjectivist

responses,eachofthesestudiesalsofoundaminoritywhogaverelativistresponses.Correlationaldata

fromthesestudiescanthereforebeusedtogetasenseforthepsychologicaldifferencesbetweenthese

twogroupsofparticipants.Theresultsofferusaremarkablycoherentpicture.Relativistswerehigherin

thepersonalitytraitofopennesstoexperience(Cokely&Feltz,2010).Theyscoredhigheronameasure

of'disjunctivethinking,'whichistheabilitytounpackalternativepossibilitieswhenproblemsolving

(Goodwin&Darley,2010).Theyweremorelikelytofallinaparticularagerange–namely,intheir

twenties(Beebe&Sackris,2010).Theyweremoreabletoexplainalternativeviews(Goodwin&Darley

2010)andtobetolerantofpeoplewithoppositeopinions(Wright,Cullum&Schwab,2008;Wright,

McWhite&Grandjean,2010).Allinall,theseseparatestudiesseemtobeconvergingonasurprisingly

unifiedportraitofrelativistparticipants.Specifically,itappearsthattherelativistswerepreciselythe

peoplewhoweremostopentoalternativeperspectives.

Soperhapsitwillbepossibletodevelopasingleunifiedaccountthatexplainsthefullpatternof

data.Thebasicideawouldbethatpeople'sintuitionsareinfluencedbythedegreetowhichthey

activelyconsideralternativeperspectives.Onefactorthatleadspeopletoconsideralternative

23

perspectivesisthewordingofthequestionitself(asinthepresentstudies);anotheristhepersonality

traitsoftheparticipants(asinpriorstudies).Butregardlessofthefactorsthattriggerit,theimpactof

thispsychologicalprocessisalwaysthesame.Themorepeopleengagewithradicallydifferent

perspectives,themoretheyaredrawntomoralrelativism.

2.Relationtophilosophicalmetaethics

Asnotedattheoutsetofthispaper,manyphilosophersthinkboththatthefolkareobjectivists

aboutmoralityandthatthefolkviewbearsonthephilosophicaltruthaboutmorality.Inthewordsof

MichaelSmith,“thetaskofthephilosopherinmeta‐ethicsistomakesenseofordinarymoral

practice"—thatis,ordinaryfolkobjectivism(Smith,1994,5).Manyphilosophershaveexplicitlytriedto

fulfillthistask.

Forpresentpurposes,wecandividethewaysinwhichphilosophershavesoughttodischarge

thetaskintothreegeneralcategories:1)affirmthatthefolkaregenerallyright;2)explainwhythefolk

areentirelywrong;3)comewithsomemorecomplicatedinterpretationofwhatthefolkarecommitted

to.Eachoftheserepresentsanattempttoaccommodatefolkobjectivism.We'llexploretheminturn.

Onewaytoaccountforthepurportedfolkviewistosaythatthisviewisactuallycorrect:there

trulyaresuchthingsasreal,objectivemoralfacts.Philosopherswhoadoptthis‘realist’approachhave

sometimesclaimedthattheyhavealeguponopposingtheoriesbecausetheycanmoreeasilyaccount

forthephenomenonoffolkobjectivism(Brink,1989;Shafer‐Landau,2003).InthewordsofShafer‐

Landau,onlyanaccountofthisbasictype"straightforwardlypreservesordinarytalkofmoraltruth"

(Shafer‐Landau,2003,23).

Asecondapproachwouldbetodenytheexistenceofreal,objectivemoralfacts.Philosophers

whoadoptthisapproachmaintainthatthesortsofmoralpropertiespresupposedbyordinaryfolk

simplydonotexist,sothefolkerrinbeingobjectivistsaboutmorality(Joyce,2001;Mackie,1977).

Mackie(1977,33),forexample,arguedthatsuchabsolutemoralproperties–“notcontingentuponany

desireorpreferenceorpolicyorchoice”–aresimplynonexistent.Nonetheless,informulatinghis

theory,Mackieendsupaffirmingtheverysameclaimaboutordinaryfolkmorality.Hesaysthat

ordinarypeopletendto“objectifyvalues,”that“ordinarymoraljudgmentsincludeaclaimto

objectivity”(1977,35).

Finally,somephilosophershavetakenadifferenttack,proposingthatwecouldadoptamore

complexinterpretationofpeople'sordinarymoraldiscourse.Accordingtothisinterpretation,people's

24

ordinarymoralclaimsdon'tmeanpreciselywhattheymightappeartomeanonfirstglance.Thus,when

peopleordinarilymakeclaimslike:'Thatactionismorallybad,andanyonewhosaysotherwisemust

surelybemistaken,'theyarenotliterallysayingthatthereissomekindofobjectivemoraltruthinthe

waythat'moralrealists'havesupposed(Blackburn,1984;Gibbard,1992).Yetevenwhileofferingsucha

complexanalysis,thesephilosophersmaintaintheusualviewabouttheshapeofordinaryfolk

discourse,suggestingthatphilosophicaltheoriesmustendeavortoexplain"whyourdiscoursehasthe

shapeitdoes...toexplain,andjustify,therealistic‐seemingnatureofourtalkofevaluations—theway

wethinkwecanbewrongaboutthem,thatthereisatruthtobefound,andsoon"(Blackburn,1984,

180).

Eachofthesepositionstriestoaccommodatefolkobjectivisminonewayoranother:by

claimingtobestcaptureit,bydismissingitasriddledwitherror,orbyprovidinganuanced

interpretationofit.Buttheresultsofthepresentstudiesraisesomequestionsaboutwhetherthistask

isneededatall.Ifthefolkarenot,infact,moralobjectivists,thenperhapsthereissimplynoneedto

continueengaginginphilosophicalworkaimedatmakingsenseoffolkobjectivism.

Nevertheless,ataskremains.Philosophersareundoubtedlycorrectintheircommitmentto

makesenseofordinarymoralpractice;theonemistakewastosupposethatpeople’sordinarymoral

practiceisastraightforwardlyobjectivistone.Soperhapstherealphilosophicaltaskhereistomake

senseofadifferentsortofpractice:oneinwhichpeople’sviewsdifferdependingontheextenttowhich

theyexplorealternativeperspectives.

3.Conclusion

Recentexperimentalresearchhasinvestigatedpeople'sintuitionsaboutawholehostof

differentphilosophicalquestions–freewill,moralobligation,personalidentity,thenatureof

knowledge.Eventhoughthesequestionsareinmanywaysquitedifferent,theoutcomesofthevarious

experimentalresearchprogramshavebeensurprisinglyconvergent.Againandagain,wefindthatitis

notpossibletocapturethefullpatternofpeople'sintuitionsjustbyconstructingacoherent

philosophicaltheoryandthenclaimingthatthistheorycapturesthe'folkview.'Instead,ithasemerged

ineachcasethatpeople'sintuitionsshowcertainkindsoftensionsorcontradictions,withdifferent

psychologicalprocessespullingpeopleindifferentdirections.(Forafewrepresentativecases,see

Greene,2008;Nahmias,forthcoming;Nichols&Bruno,forthcoming;Nichols&Knobe,2007;Phelan,

2010;Phelan&Sarkissian,2009;Sinnott‐Armstrong,2008).Butperhapsthatisexactlywhatweshould

25

haveexpected.Philosophersdonotwriteaboutquestionswheretheanswerseemsobvious;theywrite

aboutissuesthatprovokeconflictorconfusion.Whattherecentexperimentalworkhasdoneis,inpart,

totracesuchconflictandconfusionbacktocertaintensionswithinpeople'sordinaryintuitions.

Theresultsofthepresentstudiesareverymuchinlinewiththisgeneraltrend.Itis,wethink,a

mistakejusttosaythatordinarypeoplesubscribetosomeformofmoralobjectivism.Peopledohave

objectivistintuitionsincertaincases,buttheseintuitionsaretheproductofpsychologicalprocessesthat

can,inothercases,leadtostrikinglyrelativistintuitions.Futureresearchmightproceednotbyasking

whether'peopleareobjectivists'or'peoplearerelativists'butratherbytryingtogetabettergriponthe

differentpsychologicalprocessesatworkhereandtheconflictsandtensionsthattheseprocessescan

create.

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