michael p. mcdonald - brookings institution · 10/27/2006  · the rube-goldberg election machine...

Michael P. McDonaldVisiting Fellow, The Brookings InstitutionAssistant Professor, George Mason Univ.

John SamplesDirector, Center for Representative Gov’tThe Cato Institute

Congressional Elections

Gary Jacobson, University of California, San Diego

Congressional Quarterly’sCompetitive Elections, 1982-2006

Number of “toss-up” or “lean” races

84

67

58

51

41

10398

104

5853

47

29

51

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Num

ber o

f Com

petit

ive

Cont

ests

State Legislative Elections

Dick Niemi, University of RochesterLynda Powell, University of RochesterThomas Carsey, University of FloridaWilliam Berry, University of FloridaJames Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Average Incumbent Re-Election Rates to State Legislatures, 1992-2002

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year

Re-

Elec

tion

Rat

e

Lower Chamber, Single MemberLower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member

Open Seats in State Legislatures, 1992-2002

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year

Perc

ent Lower Chamber, Single Member

Lower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member

Percent Seats Won with <60% in State Legislatures, 1992-2002

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year

Perc

ent Lower Chamber, Single Member

Lower Chamber, Multi-MemberUpper Chamber, Single Member

Primaries

Steven Ansolabehere, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCharles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology James Snyder, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Competitive Primaries

1910-1938

1940-1958

1960-2000

U.S. House

Statewide

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Percent

U.S. HouseStatewide

Campaign Donations

James Gimple, University of MarylandFrancis Lee, University of Maryland

The Election Process Within a DistrictE

lection Outcom

e

National M

ood

The Election Process Within a District

District Partisanship

Incumbent Situation:

Scandal, Age, Ambition

Election O

utcome

Candidate Type:Incumbent, Quality

Challengers

Money Raised

National M

ood

Demographic Change

The Election Process Within a District

District Partisanship

Redistricting Term Limits

Incumbent Situation:

Scandal, Age, Ambition

Election O

utcome

Candidate Type:Incumbent, Quality

Challengers

Campaign Finance Laws

Money Raised

National M

ood

Demographic Change

The Rube-Goldberg Election MachineLegal Framework

Nathaniel Persily University of PennsylvaniaRedistricting

Michael McDonald, George Mason UniversityTerm-limits

Bruce Cain, University of California, Berkeley; and Thad Kousser, University of California, San Diego

Campaign FinanceJeff Milyo, University of Missouri; and David Primo, University of RochesterKen Mayer, University of Wisconsin

Minor PartiesPaul Herrnson, University of Maryland

InitiativesJohn Matsusaka, University of Southern California

General Findings

Competition Varies Among Levels of OfficeTailor reforms to the office

Reforms Can Have Seemingly Perverse Effects on Competition

Example: Clean Elections encourage candidates to run where they have little chance of winning, which increases levels of constestation, but lowers overall levels of competition

Reforms Can Create Perverse IncentivesExample: Term Limits encourage candidates to wait for open seats

Reform Recommendations

There is no magic bullet, the electoral process is complicatedYou may only get one chance to get it right, choose wiselyConsider combining state constitutional amendments with statutes to fill in details and to provide flexibility if something doesn’t work as planned

Current Research

Examining Redistricting Effects on State Legislative Elections and Districts

Post-Redistricting Election Outcomes (including 2004 election and primary data)2000 Presidential Vote in State Legislative Districts before and after redistricting

(Would greatly appreciate help in AR, DE, KY, MI, MS, MT, OR, ND, NE, RI, SD, TN, UT, and WY)

Redistricting

Michael McDonaldThe Brookings InstitutionGeorge Mason University

Gerrymandering and Competition District 1 District 2 District 3 District 4 Total Competitive Districts

0.5

0.5 0.5 0.5

Expected Seats 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.0 Bipartisan Gerrymander

Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 Partisan Gerrymander

0.5 0.5 0.5

Expected Seats 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.0 Figure 2: Three Configurations of Four Equi-populous Districts in a Hypothetical Evenly Partisan Jurisdiction

Patterns in District Competition

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Num

ber o

f Dis

tric

ts W

ithin

Com

petit

ive

Ran

ge 45-55% Range

48-52% Range

1970 1972 1980 1982 1990 1992 2000 2002Note: Counts of the number of districts with a “Normalized” Two-Party Presidential Vote within a competitive range before and after a redistricting

Pro-Republican Bias in Congressional Districts

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

0.55

0.6

0.65

0.7

0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7

Republican Vote Share

Repu

blic

an S

eat S

hare

Post-RedistrictingPre-Redistricting