peter hilger p_hilger@web.de interdisciplinary center of social research, hannover; university of...
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Interdisciplinary Center of Social Research, Hannover;
University of Helsinki
Peter Hilgerp_hilger@web.de
Competition vs. Competition vs. CooperationCooperation
Patterns, Perceptions and Problems of RTD in European
Integration6cp: Crossing borders, 29.10.2003
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Asymmetrical relationship
• adaptation of rules of the game• decision-making• science push and demand pull • participation in FP: formal/effective• disparities and cohesion
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Competition
• ERA rationale: compete world-wide• within EU, amongst CEEC• peer competition in negotiations did speed up
process• catching-up as objective• winners and loosers belong to the game
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Catching-up
• disparities within EU15 / amongst CEEC / between EU-CEEC
• generation and transfer of knowledge• economic growth through RTD needs
absorption capabilities• FP complementary to structural funds: skills
and infrastructure (Sharp 1998)• ‘laggers-behind’ lack absorptive capacity
(Clarysee/Muldur 2001)
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
105
58 54
210199
97
37
79
255
95
53,6
4,26,69,610,018,019,521,022,5
41,452,5
SI EE LV HU CZ SK LT BG PL RO EUcontracts signed 2001 contracts per mio capita
Performance 1
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
23,0
10,0
2,5
7,3 8,3
4,82,2 1,3 2,4
0,7
27,4
44,0
35,7
18,316,7
19,6
12,4
7,8 7,75,4
2,9
53,452,5
41,4
22,521,0
18,0
10,0 9,6
53,6
4,26,6
19,5
SI EE LV HU CZ SK LT BG PL RO EU15
contracts per mio capita signed 1999 2000 2001
Performance 2
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Patterns of FP participation
• 17% of FP5-contracts with CEE-partnership
• performance below EU average• Commission introduced special measures• peer orientation up to one fourth• rarely coordinators from CEEC• entering consortia by invitation
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Cooperation
• reasons to cooperate: – access to complementarity
– risk sharing and critical mass
– application of results
– recruitment of staff
– strategic and subjective preferences
• incremental definition of common goal• norm of reciprocity among equals
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
5,3
21,1
31,6
35,5
46,1
52,6
53,9
60,5
67,1
personal motives
market entry
legal/geografical environment
equipment
enlargement of existing coop.
support for partner
strategic decision
theoret. knowledge
method. knowledge
Results 1: choice of partner
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
26,2
37,7
39,3
54,1
67,2
83,6
86,9
88,5
13,8
24,1
20,7
27,6
48,3
72,4
67,2
79,3
business contact
improvement of product
development of product
development oftechnology
problem solving
extension of knowledge
new cooperations
maintainance ofcompetence
significancerealisation
Results 2: goals
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 3: roles and benefits
• almost 2/3 equal actors• Lower-Saxony:
contacts, publications, financing• CEE-partners:
financing, knowledge/skills, administration, subjective stabilisation and recognition
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 4: experiences
• methodological and theoretical level about equal - equipment worse
• ‘no difference to EU-15’: 58%• ‘cooperate again’: 86%• ‘wished mobility’:
incoming CEEC 78% - outgoing CEEC 58%
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Problems on micro-level
• payment, infrastructure, costs• careers, recognition, disrupted hierarchies • administrative and managerial experience• tacit knowledge• personal and organisational goals
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Problems on macro-level
• environment of RTD: industrial demand• knowledge- and brain-drain• GERD hardly rising• shrinking legitimization for special treatment
Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Conclusions: Where to influence?
• objective of researchers is not macro-political: provide for visibility
• encounters are crucial• don’t forget bilateral cooperation• be present at Brussels• excellence-dilemma:
selected islands of excellence
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