preview of “ned geneva epistemic excuses .pdf”
Post on 22-Jul-2016
216 Views
Preview:
DESCRIPTION
TRANSCRIPT
Another Plea for Excuses
Clayton Littlejohn (KCL)
Thursday, 12 September 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
Let’s
say
that
the
epist
emic
ext
erna
lists
thin
k th
at s
ome
of th
e fa
cts
that
ha
ve t
o do
with
epi
stem
ic j
ustifi
catio
n (e
.g.,
whi
ch p
ropo
sitio
ns o
ne
has
just
ifica
tion
to b
elie
ve,
whi
ch r
easo
ns j
ustif
y on
e’s
belie
fs,
whi
ch
reas
ons
one
has,
etc
.) d
on’t
stro
ngly
sup
erve
ne u
pon
the
fact
s ab
out
an in
divi
dual
’s n
on-fa
ctiv
e m
enta
l sta
tes.
Coh
en
(198
4)
pres
ents
an
in
fluen
tial
obje
ctio
n ag
ains
t ep
istem
ic
exte
rnal
ism, t
he n
ew e
vil d
emon
pro
blem
.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
I th
ink
the
evil
dem
on h
ypot
hesis
… u
ncov
ers
a de
fect
in th
e Re
liabi
list
posit
ion.
We
can
see
this
by
supp
osin
g th
e hy
poth
esis
to
be t
rue.
Im
agin
e th
at u
nbek
now
n to
us,
our
cog
nitiv
e pr
oces
ses
(e.g
., pe
rcep
tion
mem
ory,
infe
renc
e) a
re n
ot r
elia
ble
owin
g to
the
mac
hina
tions
of t
he m
alev
olen
t dem
on. I
t fo
llow
s on
a R
elia
bilis
t vie
w th
at th
e be
liefs
gen
erat
ed b
y th
ose
proc
esse
s ar
e ne
ver
just
ified
.
Is th
is a
tena
ble
resu
lt? I
mai
ntai
n th
at it
is n
ot. O
f cou
rse,
we
are
not h
ere
supp
osin
g th
at w
e kn
ow th
at th
e de
mon
hyp
othe
sis is
true
. Cer
tain
ly if
we
wer
e to
kno
w th
at o
ur c
ogni
tive
proc
esse
s ar
e un
relia
ble
then
the
belie
fs t
hey
gene
rate
wou
ld n
ot b
e ju
stifi
ed.
Wha
t w
e w
ant
to s
uppo
se i
s th
e m
ere
truth
of
the
dem
on
hypo
thes
is. N
ow p
art
of w
hat
the
hypo
thes
is e
ntai
ls is
that
our
exp
erie
nce
is j
ust
as i
t w
ould
be
if ou
r co
gniti
ve p
roce
sses
wer
e re
liabl
e. T
hus,
on
the
dem
on h
ypot
hesis
, we
wou
ld h
ave
ever
y re
ason
for
hold
ing
our
belie
fs, t
hat w
e ha
ve in
the
actu
al w
orld
.
It st
rikes
me
as c
lear
ly fa
lse to
den
y th
at u
nder
thes
e ci
rcum
stan
ces
our
belie
fs c
ould
be
just
ified
. If w
e ha
ve
ever
y re
ason
to b
elie
ve e
.g.,
perc
eptio
n, is
a r
elia
ble
proc
ess,
the
mer
e fa
ct t
hat u
nbek
now
n to
us
it is
not
re
liabl
e sh
ould
not
affe
ct it
s ju
stifi
catio
n - c
onfe
rrin
g st
atus
.
(Coh
en 1
984)
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
He
cont
inue
s...
My
argu
men
t hin
ges
on v
iew
ing
just
ifica
tion
as a
nor
mat
ive
notio
n. In
tuiti
vely
, if S
's be
lief i
s ap
prop
riate
to
the
avai
labl
e ev
iden
ce, h
e is
not t
o be
hel
d re
spon
sible
for
circ
umst
ance
s be
yond
his
ken.
The
Relia
bilis
t mig
ht a
ckno
wle
dge
that
ther
e is
a c
lear
epi
stem
ic d
istin
ctio
n be
twee
n th
e be
liefs
of A
and
B,
but
that
the
dist
inct
ion
has
noth
ing
to d
o w
ith t
heir
just
ifica
tiona
l st
atus
. Ra
ther
the
diff
eren
ce i
s th
at A
's be
liefs
are
rea
sona
ble
or r
atio
nal w
here
as B
's ar
e un
reas
onab
le o
r irr
atio
nal.
This
man
euve
r w
ould
be
of
no h
elp.
Firs
t of a
ll, 'r
easo
nabl
e' a
nd 'r
atio
nal'
are
virt
ual s
ynon
yms
for
'just
ified
'. Bu
t we
need
not
qui
bble
ov
er s
eman
tics.
If th
e Re
liabi
list w
ants
to d
istin
guish
'jus
tified
' fro
m 'r
easo
nabl
e' o
r 'ra
tiona
l' he
may
do
so.
But c
lear
ly t
he im
port
ant e
pist
emic
conc
ept,
the
one
epis
tem
olog
ists
hav
e be
en co
ncer
ned
with
, is
wha
t the
Re
liabi
list
wou
ld c
all
'reas
onab
ility
' or
'ra
tiona
lity.
' Th
e di
ffere
nce
betw
een
the
belie
fs o
f A
in
the
evil
dem
on w
orld
and
the
belie
fs o
f B in
the
evil
dem
on w
orld
see
ms
to c
aptu
re th
e co
ncep
t tha
t epi
stem
olog
ist
have
bee
n w
orrie
d ab
out r
athe
r th
an th
e di
ffere
nce
betw
een
the
belie
fs o
f A
in th
e ac
tual
wor
ld a
nd th
e be
liefs
of A
in th
e ev
il de
mon
wor
ld. I
n ef
fect
, the
Rel
iabi
list w
ould
be
chan
ging
the
subj
ect.
A lo
t of e
pist
emol
ogist
s ap
peal
to th
e ne
w e
vil d
emon
intu
ition
and
take
Coh
en’s
obj
ectio
n to
be
deci
sive.
I ta
ke i
t th
at t
hey
agre
e w
ith C
ohen
’s v
erdi
ct.
Do
they
also
agr
ee w
ith h
is r
atio
nale
? I
thi
nk t
hat
they
sh
ould
n’t.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
Whi
le e
very
one
seem
s to
be
fixat
ed o
n C
ohen
’s c
ritic
ism o
f re
liabi
lism
, le
t m
e ju
st fl
ag o
ne p
assa
ge th
at g
ets
very
lit
tle a
ttent
ion:
The
stro
nges
t vi
ew o
ne c
ould
tak
e re
gard
ing
the
truth
con
nect
ion
is th
at t
aken
by
Des
cart
es.
The
Car
tesia
n vi
ew is
tha
t ju
stifi
catio
n lo
gica
lly e
ntai
ls tr
uth.
To
put
it sc
hem
atic
ally
: It
is a
conc
eptu
al t
ruth
tha
t, if
cond
ition
s C
just
ify b
elie
f B
for
subj
ect S
, the
n C
logi
cally
ent
ails
that
B is
true
.
The
lega
cy o
f th
e C
arte
sian
view
is
skep
ticism
. D
esca
rtes
dem
onst
rate
d in
the
firs
t m
edita
tion
that
no
such
con
nect
ion
is fo
rthc
omin
g ...
Giv
en a
ny p
laus
ible
spe
cific
atio
n of
C fo
r an
y S,
it w
ill a
lway
s be
logi
cally
con
siste
nt to
sup
pose
that
not
B.
This
is w
hat t
he e
vil d
emon
arg
umen
t sho
ws.
Whe
re,
e.g.
, C
com
prise
s fa
cts
abou
t sen
sory
dat
a, a
nd w
here
B is
a b
elie
f ab
out
the
truth
of
som
e em
piric
al p
ropo
sitio
n, i
t is
alw
ays
logi
cally
pos
sible
tha
t th
e ev
il de
mon
has
arr
ange
d fo
r C
to
obta
in w
here
B is
false
. Not
wish
ing
to b
e sa
ddle
d w
ith th
is s
kept
ical
res
ult,
mos
t con
tem
pora
ry p
hilo
soph
ers
have
reje
cted
th
e C
arte
sian
view
and
hav
e op
ted
inst
ead
for
a fa
llibi
list
theo
ry o
f ju
stifi
catio
n. A
fal
libili
st t
heor
y al
low
s th
at w
here
C
mak
es B
just
ified
for
S, it
is s
till p
ossib
le th
at B
is fa
lse (
Coh
en 1
984)
.
Hav
ing
show
n to
his
sat
isfac
tion
that
just
ifica
tion
does
n’t
requ
ire tr
uth,
he
targ
ets
the
prob
abili
stic
acc
ount
s of
the
tru
th-
conn
ectio
n. I
’ll s
ay s
omet
hing
abo
ut th
is pa
ssag
e in
the
final
sec
tion
of th
e pa
per.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
Resp
onse
s to
the
NED
obj
ectio
n:
(i) A
ccep
t Coh
en’s
arg
umen
t for
inte
rnal
ism a
nd li
ve u
p to
its
scep
tical
con
sequ
ence
s. (
Free
for
the
taki
ng!)
(ii)
Try
to v
indi
cate
Coh
en’s
intu
ition
s by
tink
erin
g w
ith y
our
(pur
port
edly
) ex
tern
alist
acc
ount
of
just
ifica
tion
(e.g
., A
lvin
G
oldm
an, S
arah
Saw
yer,
and
Mar
tin S
mith
).
(iii)
Acc
ept C
ohen
’s a
rgum
ent f
or in
tern
alism
and
insis
t tha
t it h
as n
o sc
eptic
al c
onse
quen
ces.
(Alm
ost e
very
epi
stem
olog
ist
I mee
t who
isn’
t her
e in
Gen
eva
toda
y, a
nd p
ossib
ly s
ome
that
I’ll
hear
from
in Q
&A
.)(iv
) A
ccep
t not
hing
.
I do
n’t r
eally
sha
re C
ohen
’s in
tuiti
ons
abou
t jus
tifica
tion
and
I th
ink
that
the
vario
us c
laim
s th
at h
e m
akes
abo
ut r
easo
ns,
ratio
nalit
y, e
vide
nce,
just
ifica
tion,
res
pons
ibili
ty, e
tc. a
re a
ll de
eply
pro
blem
atic
. I’ll
exp
lain
why
.
I’ll a
lso c
onfe
ss th
at I
just
mig
ht n
ot u
nder
stan
d w
hat h
is c
urre
nt p
ositi
on is
. S
ome
of h
is c
laim
s ab
out r
atio
nalit
y st
rike
me
as b
eing
rat
her
plau
sible
. I d
on’t
unde
rsta
nd w
hy h
e eq
uate
s ra
tiona
lity
with
just
ifica
tion
and
will
exp
lain
why
I th
ink
this
equa
tion
is p
robl
emat
ic b
elow
. A
t any
rat
e, le
t me
just
flag
one
pos
sible
sou
rce
of c
onfu
sion.
I
thin
k th
at t
he fo
llow
ing
clai
ms
abou
t ‘ra
tiona
l res
pons
es’ a
re p
retty
pla
usib
le:
* Ap
pear
ance
s ra
tiona
lize
- The
way
thin
gs a
ppea
r to
you
det
erm
ine
whi
ch d
oxas
tic, a
ffect
ive,
and
pra
ctic
al r
espo
nses
are
ra
tiona
l.*
Doxa
stic
prio
rity
- If y
ou r
atio
nally
take
F-in
g to
be
the
thin
g to
do,
it w
ould
n’t b
e ra
tiona
l for
you
to m
aint
ain
this
belie
f an
d do
oth
erw
ise.
Jus
t as
fact
ual m
istak
es d
on’t
nece
ssar
ily im
pugn
the
ratio
nalit
y of
a b
elie
f (e.
g., t
he b
elie
f tha
t F-in
g is
the
thin
g to
do)
, th
ey d
on’t
nece
ssar
ily i
mpu
gn t
he r
atio
nalit
y of
the
act
ions
rat
iona
lized
by
the
belie
f (e
.g.,
F-in
g).
[Def
ende
d by
Ric
hard
Fol
ey, J
ohn
Gib
bons
, and
Ral
ph W
edgw
ood.
]
For
som
e re
ason
, I t
hink
Coh
en m
ight
rej
ect t
hese
. Fo
r so
me
reas
on,
I thi
nk C
ohen
mig
ht a
ccep
t the
se.
I’ll j
ust a
ssum
e he
ac
cept
s th
em a
nd d
eal w
ith m
esse
s in
the
Q&
A.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Coh
en’s
Dem
on
Let’s
con
sider
my
pref
erre
d re
spon
se to
the
NED
obj
ectio
n to
epi
stem
ic e
xter
nalis
m:
(iv)
Acc
ept n
othi
ng.
Ther
e’s
a ve
rsio
n of
thi
s re
spon
se in
Prit
char
d’s
new
boo
k, E
pist
emol
ogic
al D
isjun
ctiv
ism.
He
says
that
the
subj
ect i
n th
e ba
d ca
se i
s bl
amel
ess
and
so b
lam
eles
sly h
olds
the
fal
se b
elie
fs b
ased
on
hallu
cina
tions
. H
e do
esn’
t th
ink
that
the
se
belie
fs a
re b
acke
d by
the
sor
ts o
f re
ason
s th
at s
uppo
rt o
ur b
elie
fs in
the
good
cas
e.
I co
mpl
etel
y ag
ree.
(W
e di
sagr
ee
abou
t wha
t tho
se r
easo
ns a
re, b
ut th
at’s
for
anot
her
day.
)
Ther
e’s
a st
anda
rd r
espo
nse
to t
his
resp
onse
in th
e lit
erat
ure
that
Prit
char
d do
esn’
t disc
uss.
(W
hy d
oesn
’t he
? I t
hink
he’
s no
t ver
y co
mba
tive.
) T
he r
espo
nse
is to
say
som
ethi
ng t
o th
e ef
fect
that
this
is r
ight
, but
it d
oesn
’t go
far
eno
ugh.
W
hile
th
e su
bjec
ts ar
e bl
amel
ess,
so
too
are
subj
ects
that
are
bra
inw
ashe
d, o
r dr
ugge
d, o
r un
der
the
age
of t
hree
, or
sub
ject
s th
at s
uffe
r fro
m m
enta
l illn
ess,
or
have
bel
iefs
sta
mpe
d in
to th
eir
brai
ns b
y al
iens
, or
subj
ects
who
are
kitt
ens,
etc
.
On
one
appr
oach
, ig
nora
nce
and
mist
ake
mig
ht e
xcus
e w
ithou
t ju
stify
ing.
On
anot
her,
igno
ranc
e an
d m
istak
e de
fens
es
can
be ju
stifi
cato
ry, n
ot m
erel
y ex
cusa
tory
. I h
ope
peop
le c
an s
ee th
e re
leva
nce
of th
e qu
estio
n as
to w
heth
er ig
nora
nce
and
mist
ake
excu
se o
r ju
stify
to d
ebat
es a
bout
whe
ther
just
ifica
tion
is an
inte
rnal
ist o
r an
ext
erna
list n
otio
n.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Aus
tin’s
Ple
as
Beca
use
‘A P
lea
for
Excu
ses’
is th
e fir
st a
nd o
nly
thin
g m
ost p
eopl
e re
ad a
bout
exc
uses
if th
ey e
ver
read
any
thin
g at
all
abou
t exc
uses
, let
’s s
tart
with
Aus
tin:
In g
ener
al, t
he s
ituat
ion
is on
e w
here
som
eone
is a
ccus
ed o
f hav
ing
done
som
ethi
ng, o
r (if
tha
t will
kee
p it
any
clea
ner)
whe
re s
omeo
ne is
sai
d to
hav
e do
ne s
omet
hing
whi
ch is
bad
, w
rong
, in
ept,
unw
elco
me,
or
in s
ome
othe
r of
the
num
erou
s po
ssib
le w
ays
unto
war
d. T
here
upon
he,
or
som
eone
on
his
beha
lf, w
ill
try
to d
efen
d hi
s co
nduc
t or
to g
et h
im o
ut o
f it.
One
way
of
goin
g ab
out t
his
is to
adm
it fla
tly t
hat h
e, X
, di
d do
tha
t ver
y th
ing,
A,
but t
o ar
gue
that
it
was
a g
ood
thin
g, o
r th
e rig
ht o
r se
nsib
le th
ing,
or
a pe
rmiss
ible
thin
g to
do,
eith
er in
gen
eral
or
at le
ast
in t
he s
peci
al c
ircum
stan
ces
of t
he o
ccas
ion.
To
take
this
line
is to
jus
tify
the
actio
n, t
o gi
ve r
easo
ns fo
r do
ing
it: n
ot t
o sa
y, t
o br
azen
it o
ut,
to g
lory
in it
, or
the
lik
e. A
diff
eren
t w
ay o
f go
ing
abou
t it
is to
ad
mit
that
it w
asn'
t a
good
thi
ng t
o ha
ve d
one,
but
to
argu
e th
at i
t is
not
quite
fai
r or
cor
rect
to
say
bald
ly ‘X
did
A’.
We
may
say
it is
n't f
air
just
to s
ay X
did
it; p
erha
ps h
e w
as u
nder
som
ebod
y's
influ
ence
, or
was
nud
ged.
Or,
it isn
't fa
ir to
say
bal
dly
he d
id A
; it
may
hav
e be
en p
artly
acc
iden
tal,
or a
n un
inte
ntio
nal s
lip.
Or,
it isn
't fa
ir to
say
he
did
simpl
y A
—he
was
rea
lly d
oing
som
ethi
ng q
uite
diff
eren
t an
d A
was
onl
y in
cide
ntal
, or
he w
as lo
okin
g at
the
who
le th
ing
quite
diff
eren
tly.
Nat
ural
ly t
hese
arg
umen
ts c
an b
e co
mbi
ned
or o
verla
p or
run
int
o ea
ch o
ther
. In
the
one
def
ence
, br
iefly
, we
acce
pt r
espo
nsib
ility
but
den
y th
at it
was
bad
: in
the
othe
r, w
e ad
mit
that
it w
as b
ad b
ut d
on't
acce
pt fu
ll, o
r ev
en a
ny, r
espo
nsib
ility
.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Aus
tin’s
Ple
as
In th
e pa
ssag
e ab
ove,
Aus
tin in
trodu
ces
the
dich
otom
ous
sche
me:
•!In
offe
ring
a ju
stifi
catio
n, w
e in
sist
that
bla
me
isn’t
appr
opria
te
beca
use
the
agen
t had
suf
ficie
nt r
easo
n to
do
wha
t she
did
.•!
In o
fferin
g an
exc
use,
we
conc
ede
that
the
age
nt d
idn’
t ha
ve
suffi
cien
t rea
son
to d
o w
hat s
he d
id b
ut a
rgue
tha
t bla
me
wou
ld b
e in
appr
opria
te in
spi
te o
f thi
s.
For
Aus
tin,
excu
ses
cove
r al
l th
e ca
ses
of b
lam
eles
s bu
t un
just
ified
w
rong
doin
g.
Did
you
not
ice
Aus
tin’s
pos
itive
acc
ount
of h
ow e
xcus
es e
xcus
e? N
o, o
f co
urse
not
. I
don’
t thi
nk h
e th
inks
that
this
can
be d
one.
It
seem
s th
at
his
attit
ude
is th
at a
ll th
at e
xcus
es h
ave
in c
omm
on i
s th
at t
hey’
re
excu
lpat
ory
and
they
’re
not j
ustifi
catio
ns.
Thur
sday
, 12
Sept
embe
r 13
Austin’s Pleas
If I’m right about this, Austin would take a dim view of contrast arguments, arguments designed to show that a kind of defense is justificatory rather than excusatory because it differs from a paradigmatic case of non-justificatory defense in some salient way.
We (might) find an instance of a contrast argument in Audi’s argument that defenses that point to mistakes based on hallucinations justify rather than excuse:
I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, nor do I deserve any criticism (at least on the non-skeptical assumption that we may generally trust our senses in this way). Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence was, we approve of what I did. We consider it reasonable (Audi 2001).
It looks like Audi is arguing that mistakes and ignorance justify rather than excuse because defenses that involve them differ from excusatory defenses.
Pryor seems to do something similar in his ‘Highlights’ paper. He argues that systematically deceived subjects can have justified beliefs on the grounds that there is more to be said for them and their belief forming practices than some systematically deceived subjects who are merely blameless.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Austin’s Pleas
Pryor seems to do something similar in his ‘Highlights’ paper. He argues that systematically deceived subjects can have justified beliefs on the grounds that there is more to be said for them and their belief forming practices than some systematically deceived subjects who are merely blameless. After asking us to consider three BIVs, one who is reckless, one who is careful but follows defective standards, and one who reasons just like we do, he says:
It seems natural to say that, although there’s a sense in which the second and third brains are both epistemically blameless, only the third is conducting his epistemic affairs properly, and so only he is justified in his beliefs. This indicates that there’s a kind of positive epistemic status which goes beyond mere epistemic blamelesness, but which one can possess even if one’s beliefs are reliably false, as the brains’ beliefs are. Such considerations incline me to an internalist, non-deontological account of justification (Pryor 2001).
There are actually two problems with these passages. The first is that they seem to deploy dubious contrast arguments. The second has to do with what the pleas make salient. If Audi’s plea and Pryor’s plea focused on the reasons to believe or the absence of reasons not to believe, this might be an argument for justification, but that’s not what’s salient to me in this passage. What’s salient is that we shouldn’t feel guilt, that the subject was reasonable, responsible, etc. I don’t think Austin would think that these were the marks of justification.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Austin’s Pleas
One reason to think that Austin wouldn’t be impressed is that Austin’s list of excusatory conditions included humdrum factual mistakes.
If excuses excuse by showing that blame is inappropriate, how could ignorance or mistake excuse if the operative mistaken belief wasn’t rationally held or the ignorance helped to explain who the relevant operative beliefs were rationally held?
If the subject didn’t take all the care and concern that could be reasonably expected of them, there couldn’t be an excuse because the agent’s actions would manifest the kind of de re unresponsiveness by virtue of which culpable actions are culpable.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Austin’s Pleas
Because there’s this unfortunate tendency to think that contrast arguments are helpful ways of thinking about the border between justification and excuse, it might help to remind people that there are more elaborate schemes available.
Consider the trichotomous scheme of defenses:•! Justification - Either no wrong is committed or it is done for adequate reason. (Let’s let a
wrong be the violation of a norm.)•! Excuse - While the agent can be held to account for her actions generally, the local
conditions exculpate.•! Exemption/Denial of Responsibility - There are global exculpating conditions that would
preclude us from holding the agent accountable for her deeds generally.
If there are indeed three kinds of defenses, the contrast arguments are bound to fail. There’s just no good inference from the observation that, say, a particular defense differs in salient ways from some non-justificatory defense to the conclusion that this defense must be a justification.
We know this already, of course. Accidental slips are, according to most, excusatory, not justificatory, but they differ in important ways from defenses that cite mental illness or the lack of developed rational capacity.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Austin’s Pleas
While nothing of substance turns on whether we adopt Austin’s scheme or the more complicated scheme we get from Strawson, something substantive does turn on whether defenses that focus on ignorance and mistake are excusatory or justificatory.
I’ll explain why I think ignorance and mistake excuse rather than justify and why it would be a mistake to counter this by insisting that rationality is the mark of justification on the grounds that rationality just is justification.
To defend externalism about practical justification, he’d have to respond to two familiar arguments for internalism about practical justification...
Thursday, 12 September 13
On Ignorance and Mistake
Why think that ignorance and mistake excuse?
Excuses are fitting when they can show that it is inappropriate to blame an agent who has the rational capacities necessary to assume responsibility for her deeds.
They function by showing that the agent’s deeds (or failures to act) don’t manifest de re unresponsiveness.
Factual ignorance and mistake can do both things.
The tricky question isn’t really why ignorance and mistake figure in defenses, but why successful defenses that cite ignorance or mistake don’t constitute justificatory defenses?
In discussing Williams’ petrol and tonic example, they insist that ignorance does justify because it can make an attitude and action rational, sensible, the thing that it makes most sense to do:
Notice that if we asked the unlucky fellow why he did such a thing, he might reply with indignation: ‘Well, it was the perfectly rational thing to do; I had every reason to think the glass contained gin; why in the world should I think that someone would be going around putting petrol in cocktail glasses!?’ Here the unlucky subject … is not providing an excuse for his action or treating what he did as a reason; he is defending it as the action that made the most sense for him to do … He is providing a justification, not an excuse.
What’s wrong with this?
Thursday, 12 September 13
On Ignorance and Mistake
Part of my disagreement with them is substantive. Let’s suppose that justification requires norm conformity. If you think that there are norms that require us to keep promises, help others, refrain from harming, you’ll think that the objective nature of the deeds performed and the consequences of actions are part of what determines norm conformity. Their line might be based on the mistaken but coherent Kantian view that all moral assessment is concerned with the quality of the agent’s will.
If the disagreement is a disagreement about what it takes for a norm to be a norm, then it looks like they’re going to have trouble articulating a coherent account of norms.
In the next few slides, I’ll explain why we shouldn’t accept this equation (holding fixed the idea that justificatory defenses require that the agent conforms to the norms that govern her responses):
R=J: If it is rational for a conscientious agent A to respond doxastically, practically, or affectively by F-ing, A has justification to respond doxastically, practically, or affectively by F-ing.
Thursday, 12 September 13
On Ignorance and Mistake
Let’s focus on the case of factual mistake...
(1) N is a norm (i.e., One must X if C obtains and must not X otherwise.) [Assume].
(2) C obtains [Assume].
(3) A rationally believes C doesn’t obtain [Assume].
(4) It is rational for A to believe she must not X. [Because A rationally believes N is a norm and rationally believes that C doesn’t obtain].
(5) If it is rational for A to believe she must not X, A is justified in refraining from X-ing [On the assumption that non-culpable factual mistakes justify].
(6) A is justified in refraining from X-ing [From (4) and (5) because we’re assuming that mistake/ignorance justifies].
(7) A must X [From (1), (2)].
(8) A is not justified in refraining from X-ing [(7)].
But this is absurd as (8) contradicts (6).
If there are genuine norms with application conditions we can rationally but falsely believe not to obtain, the thesis that ignorance justifies must be mistaken. For just about any non-normative condition we can think of, it seems it would be possible to have strong but misleading evidence that this condition doesn’t obtain. So, the thought that factual mistakes don’t exculpate by justifying must be correct if any plausible objectivist account of obligation is correct but the correctness of such a point doesn’t require it.
Thursday, 12 September 13
On Ignorance and Mistake
Let’s focus on another case of factual mistake...
(1) A rationally believes that N is a norm (i.e., One must X if C obtains and must not X otherwise.) [Assume].
(2) C obtains [Assume].
(3) A rationally believes C doesn’t obtain [Assume].
(4) A is rationally required to believe she must not X. [Plausibly possible in light of (1)-(3).]
(5) If A is rationally required to believe she must not X and rationality just is justification, A is not justified in refraining from X-ing.
(6) A is not justified in refraining from X-ing.
(7) A must X.
Two observations.
First, while A might rationally believe N is a norm, A might be mistaken about that. C might have no normative significance whatever. R=J has the odd implication that A’s mistakes are potentially inculpating.
Second, A’s mistakes would seem to generate obligations where there shouldn’t be.
Both implications of R=J strike me as being quite troubling.
Thursday, 12 September 13
On Ignorance and Mistake
Cohen and Comesana say that rational beliefs about what it takes to conform to some standard excuse action. Even that’s a bit dubious.
Gideon Rosen, for example, has argued that an ancient slaveholder or a sexist father of the 50s might have rational but mistaken moral beliefs where the mistake doesn’t derive from a mistake in reasoning but a non-culpable normative mistake or instance of normative ignorance. Presumably, these subjects might have rationally held moral beliefs. Since their actions manifest de re unresponsiveness, I don’t see why their ignorance would be exculpatory.
Worse, if you think R=J, there might be a situation in which the only justified option would be for them to act on their abhorrent beliefs. If they suffered from akrasia and knowingly failed to do what they judged they ought to do, would we really blame them? The suggestion that their ignorance/mistake might be inculpatory is outrageous. Why would we blame them for failing to act on the beliefs that we rightly take to be abhorrent? Surely blaming them for failing to act in ways we judge to be abhorrent would be abhorrent.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Cohen’s Practical Demon
It’s interesting that Cohen thinks that rational beliefs about what to do can excuse without justifying as it seems quite natural to think that these theses are correct:
* Appearances rationalize - The way things appear to you determine which doxastic, affective, and practical responses are rational.* Doxastic priority - If you rationally take F-ing to be the thing to do, it wouldn’t be rational for you to maintain this belief and do otherwise. Just as factual mistakes don’t necessarily impugn the rationality of a belief (e.g., the belief that F-ing is the thing to do), they don’t necessarily impugn the rationality of the actions rationalized by the belief (e.g., F-ing).
We might imagine a demon sees to it that subjects in different external settings are nevertheless internally indiscernible. It looks like Cohen would have to countenance the possibility that one subject fails to meet her obligations while the other agent always acts with justification. Still, both subjects act rationally.
So, it looks like Cohen has to reject R=J and opt for some more restricted link between rationality and justification.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Cohen’s Practical Demon
If Cohen is going to defend externalism about practical justification, he has to deal with the newer evil demon problem and explain how it’s possible for two internally indiscernible agents to have rational beliefs about what to do and act on these beliefs with only one subject acting with justification.
The rationality rationale
The subjects in the good and bad case would be equally rational if they were to F. If they would be equally rational, they would have equally good justification. So, these subjects have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.
The reasons rationale
The subjects in the good and bad case would have the same reasons for action. Reasons justify actions. So, these subjects would have to have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Rationality Rationale
The rationality rationale
The subjects in the good and bad case would be equally rational if they were to F. If they would be equally rational, they would have equally good justification. So, these subjects have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.
It’s obvious where the rationality rationale errs. As we’ve seen, the mark of justification isn’t rationality.
Here’s a helpful suggestion: the reasons that apply to you determine whether you have justification to F but the way the reasons appear and what you would have justification to do if your grasp of the situation were accurate and complete determine what’s rational.
Of course, someone might say, “This maneuver would be of no help. First of all, ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ are virtual synonyms for ‘justified’’, but Cohen can plausibly say that these expressions aren’t synonymous at all and point to the earlier slides to explain why this equation must be rejected.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons Rationale
The reasons rationale
(i) The subjects in the good and bad case would have the same reasons for action. (ii) Reasons justify actions. So, these subjects would have to have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.
I think it’s important to distinguish between two readings of these claims about reasons:
Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.
Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons RationaleNow we have two arguments to consider:
Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.
If the subjects have the very same reasons for believing, they will have the same justification to believe p.
C: If the two subjects are internally the same, they will have the same justification to believe p.
Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.
If the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p, they will have the same justification to believe p.
C: If the two subjects are internally the same, they will have the same justification to believe p.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons Rationale
P1. Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.
P2. If the subjects have the very same reasons for believing, they will have the same justification to believe p.
C: If the two subjects are internally the same, they will have the same justification to believe p.
Both premises are false. Against SRP. The reasons that a subject has are reasons. Reasons are facts. Any fact that a subject knows is among the reasons that the subject has. Since the subjects differ in terms of what they know, they differ in terms of the reasons they have.
We don’t need E=K to give us this. We only need to be clear about what reasons are (i.e., the facts that figure in reasoning) and accept a weak claim about possession (i.e., any fact that you know is among the reasons you have).
Against P2. The reason we distinguished between the reasons the subject has and the reasons that apply to the subject is that there are reasons that apply to us that aren’t in our possession. Such reasons include the reasons provided by norms that we’re not in a position to know apply to us. The categoricity of such norms turns on the idea that these reasons will apply to us even when we aren’t in a position to recognize their authority. [I’ll develop this point in the next slide.]
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons RationaleP1. Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.
P2. If the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p, they will have the same justification to believe p.
C: If the two subjects are internally the same, they will have the same justification to believe p.
This argument is also unsound, but that’s because of (P1), not (P2).
Suppose there’s a norm that says this:
N: One must not believe p if one lacks sufficient evidence to believe p.
In light of this, a reason applies to you if you, say, have the usual grounds for believing that the number of stars is even and you consider whether the number is indeed even. It may well be that the fact that there’s a reason for you to suspend judgment provided by N supervenes upon your mental states. The question is whether the presence/absence of all such reasons supervenes upon your mental states. There’s nothing in Cohen’s argument that would indicate that there are, but this is just what he would need to show to support P1.
For my own part, I think that there are norms with external application conditions. If there are such norms, it should be possible for internal twins to differ in terms of how well they conform to them. For example:
KN: One must not believe p unless one’s belief constitutes knowledge.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons Rationale
It looks like the reasons rationale could only succeed if Cohen could show that there are no epistemic norms with external application conditions.
Because it’s obvious that the points that Cohen could/would offer in response to criticisms of his externalism about practical justification can be carried over to respond to his criticisms of externalism about epistemic justification, I’ll simply note that and move on.
The interesting question, to my mind, is why he still thinks justified belief just is rational belief in spite of the fact that it looks like he rejects R=J.
Thursday, 12 September 13
The Reasons Rationale
It looks like the reasons rationale could only succeed if Cohen could show that there are no epistemic norms with external application conditions.
Because it’s obvious that the points that Cohen could/would offer in response to criticisms of his externalism about practical justification can be carried over to respond to his criticisms of externalism about epistemic justification, I’ll simply note that and move on.
The interesting question, to my mind, is why he still thinks justified belief just is rational belief in spite of the fact that it looks like he rejects R=J.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?
In more recent work, Cohen has offered an argument for linking epistemic justification to rationality, one that doesn’t seem to commit him to the unfortunate view that the rationality of an action ensures that the action conforms to the norms that govern it.
He writes:
... distinguishing between rational beliefs and justified beliefs does not make any sense. It makes no more sense than distinguishing between moral acts and justified acts. Justification is domain relative. A justification for F-ing can be moral, rational, legal, etc. It is moral to F just in case F-ing is morally justified. In the same way, it is rational to F just in case one’s F-ing is rationally justified. So it is rational to believe just in case believing is rationally justified. When one distinguishes between rational belief and justified belief, one can only be distinguishing between rationally justified belief, and some other kind of justified belief. What is the other kind of justification? (‘Theorizing about the epistemic’, pp. 5.).
This strikes me as a bit odd. While I have only aesthetic objections to the introduction of this talk of ‘rationally justified’ believing and agree that ‘rationally justified believing’ is just ‘justified believing’, why can’t we distinguish the rationality of a belief from its justificatory status? Has he just pulled the absence of a distinction out of a hat?
Thursday, 12 September 13
Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?
Here’s how we can coherently argue that epistemic justification and rationality are distinct.
Step one: Specify the norms that govern belief (e.g., one must not believe p if C obtains).
Step two: Provide a theory of justification in terms of norm conformity (e.g., believing p if C obtains is unjustified and believing p otherwise might be justified, provided no further norm prohibits it).
Step three: Show that it’s possible for someone who knows the norms that govern belief to form rational, false beliefs about whether the norm’s application condition is satisfied.
If our aim is simply to show the coherence of distinguishing justification from rationality, we don’t need a good theory of what the norms are. If a bad theory of the substantive norms will do, this should do:
E: One should believe p iff one considers whether p and one has sufficiently strong evidence that supports p.
T: One should believe p iff one considers whether p and p.
It’s possible to be rational in believing falsely that you have sufficient evidence to believe p or to be rational in believing falsely that p. If you knew or rationally believed these norms were norms, it would be rational to believe in violation of E or in violation of T. Such violations cannot be justified, however.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?
Cohen writes, “The fact that F-ing is rationally (morally, legally) justified just in case F-ing is rational (moral, legal) underscore the obscurity of the appeal to epistemic justification ... Do those who distinguish between epistemic and rational justification want to say that an epistemically justified belief is an epistemic belief? We simply have no idea what normative domain ‘epistemic’ refers to.” (Theorizing the epistemic, pp. 6).
If my conjecture from earlier is correct and it’s possible to have rational false beliefs about just about anything, Cohen’s constraint on a theory of justification (i.e., that it equates justification with rational justification with rationality) would prevent us from formulating a coherent theory of justification.
Ordinary people who don’t do epistemology have some grasp of what epistemic assessment amounts to and a pretty good grasp of the difference between rationality and justification. Consider three cases of anger.
(i) p is the sort of thing you should be angry about. You learn p and you’re angry because p.
(ii) p is the sort of thing you should be angry about. You falsely believe p and you’re angry because you believe p.
(iii) p is the sort of thing you shouldn’t be angry about. You learn p and you’re angry because p.
People understand that there’s two ways for anger to be irrational or unreasonable. Anger might be the wrong response to the object of anger or it might be based on an irrational or unreasonable belief. Epistemic assessment is concerned with that second kind of case, not the first. Justified anger is limited to (i) and someone might be perfectly rational for being angry if they’re in (ii).
This idea that justification and rationality terms of art is silly. A little googling reveals plenty of discussions by non-philosophers of justified anger, doubt, fear, regret, etc. and show a willingness to distinguish fitting anger from reasonable anger. In turn, these distinctions have fed into the ways that the law understands things like the excusatory power of anger, fear, etc.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?
If we want to get a fix on the notion of justified belief and the distinction between epistemic justification and epistemic rationality, focus on cases where the fitting response to the fact that p would be to F and think about the difference between rational F-ing that’s merely excusable and justified F-ing.
We might characterize the fundamental epistemic norm this way:
R: One must not believe p unless one’s belief in p provides one with a reason for a doxastic, practical, or affective response.
If such a norm governs belief, we have a straightforward argument for externalism about justification.
Step One: Only true beliefs provide such reasons. [That’s because reasons are facts, not states of mind or falsehoods.]
Step Two: There is no norm that conflicts with R that requires violating it.
Step Three: There’s no further norm that prohibits believing p in conformity with R.
If it turns out that only beliefs that constitute knowledge provide reasons, justification isn’t an internalist notion.
Thursday, 12 September 13
Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?
Consider the hypothesis that justified beliefs are beliefs that provide reasons (J=RPR). On this view, justification entails truth. (False beliefs don’t provide reasons.)
Does this view lead to scepticism? It does vindicate the Cartesian view:
CV: It is a conceptual truth that, if conditions C justify belief B for subject S, then C logically entails that B is true.
It should be clear why Cohen’s objection to CV fails. Cohen assumes that C is the sort of thing that supervenes upon a subject’s non-factive mental states, the things that the demon can manipulate in order to deceive you. What justifies that assumption?
I think that Cohen assumes that the things that move you to believe determine whether the belief is justified. That’s part of it, surely, but the parallel with action is instructive. Nobody assumes that the justificatory status of an action depends just upon the states of mind that move you or could have moved you, but also upon whether in being so moved you’d conform to the norms governing action. The whole point of an excuse that cites, say, a gust of wind or a nudge is to remind us that facts about norm conformity don’t supervene upon facts about motivation. So, why should we assume in the epistemic case that facts about norm conformity supervene upon facts about potential or actual doxastic motivations?
If we model our theory of epistemic justification on a theory of practical justification, we might agree that norm conformity depends upon what moved you to believe, but we wouldn’t think that it does so the exclusion of everything else. And we surely wouldn’t think that the fact that the rationality of our responses depends upon the internal that it’s impossible for there to be external epistemic norms.
Thursday, 12 September 13
top related