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Resistance is Futile? Institutional and Geographic Factors in
China’s Great Famine
Elizabeth Gooch∗
November 21, 2017
Keywords: China, Famine, Terrain Ruggedness, Economic Development
Abstract
I present evidence that China’s state capacity was an important determinant of famine mortality
during China’s Great Famine (1959-61). I hypothesize that variation arising from the interaction of
terrain ruggedness and provincial-level political ideology identifies the propensity for local leaders’ will-
ingness to shirk implementation of the 1958 national development plan, the Great Leap Forward. I find
that communities under the jurisdiction of a Party Secretary aligned politically with Mao Zedong were
differentially shielded from famine conditions by rough terrain. I also find that additional benefit from
ruggedness applies to these communities’ subsequent economic development and is attributable to the
limiting effect rugged terrain had on provincial authorities’ ability to administer their territory including
demanding compliance of local leaders during the period.
∗Gooch: Economic Research Service, USDA, 1400 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC, elizabeth.gooch@ers.usda.gov.
1
There is mounting circumstantial evidence that Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward Development Plan
(GLF) which began in 1958, spurred the famine conditions in 1959, 60, and 61. This catastrophe, commonly
known as China’s Great Famine, killed 32 million people across China (Cao, 2005). Among the evidence,
the timing is incriminating. The GLF was implemented in the spring of 1958, and that following winter
hundreds of thousands of people began to experience famine conditions. More damning, the GLF policies had
the potential to interrupt rural people’s food entitlement. The probable conclusion from the circumstances
is strong, and there is little doubt of the causal relationship. Since a preponderance of evidence already
exists for the case against the GLF, what fruit could further investigation bear? This research addresses
questions that need further scrutiny: who is to blame? And to what extent? To answer these questions,
direct evidence is necessary. I construct a source of exogenous variation in intensity with which GLF policies
were implemented at the local level that provides proof without inference or presumption of the fact that
the central government bears a large portion of responsibility for the famine.
The official and unwavering stance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), henceforth referred to as
the “Party”, is that the famine conditions stemmed from a combination of poor weather and the random
atrocities committed by local cadres1 After the Great Famine, in the early 1960s, the Party authorities
penalized local leaders governing places with extreme excess death rates during the famine years. Scholars
across research fields have deduced patterns in the distribution of the famine conditions. Disparities in
famine mortality are apparent between provinces. This provincial-level variation has been determined to
arise from the political ideology of the provincial First Party Secretary during the GLF period.2 The job of
the Secretary is to guide provincial authorities in following the national political agenda. In 1958, his beliefs
could be described as a continuum from conservative to radical. In the late 1950s, a radical ideologue was
known to be loyal to the CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and willing to implement the GLF rigidly.
Three Secretaries are regularly named as extreme radicals, commonly referred to as zealots. They are
Zeng Xisheng of Anhui province, Wu Zhipu of Henan province, and Li Jingquan of Sichuan province.3 I have
identified a collection of qualitative evidence supporting the uniqueness of these three men’s alignment with
1Party is a conventional way to reference the Chinese central government. Cadre is used to refer to indoctrinated leadersactive in promoting the interests of a revolutionary party.
2The province is the first-level administration division in China.3Evidence for this proposition is presented in section 3.
2
Mao. Also, I exploit quantitative variation to capture the ideology of the First Party Secretary: (1) special
promotion pattern of the Secretary before 1959, (2) provincial-level communal dining hall participation rates,
and (3) provincial-level agricultural output inflation rates.
Below the province-level, the rigidity or cruelty with which the GLF policies were enforced is debatable,
and evidence of random assignment is growing. For example, Bramall (2011) accessed the relationship
between famine-related deaths in Sichuan province and grain output, rainfall, and temperature and concluded
that variation in mortality is random. Meng et al. (2015) also confirms that no distinctive pattern in the
distribution of caloric shortages is apparent within provinces and struggles to find a strong association
between grain procurement rate and food shortage as well as communal dining participation rates and food
shortages.
Meng et al. (2015), however, concludes that there are local-level characteristics that have unusual rela-
tionships with the distribution of famine conditions (1959-61). Specifically, the authors find that agricultural
suitability is positively correlated with famine mortality. In light of this evidence, Meng et al. (2015) pro-
poses communities were targeted for grain procurement by the Party, contributing to the famine severity.
The research of Cao (2014) and Liu et al. (2014) provides additional evidence that the aim of the state
brought about famine conditions. In a case-study conducted in Wuwei county, Anhui province, the famine
severity was compared between communes along a small navigable waterway and landlocked communes. The
communes in their analysis were very close together geographically, but the ones with direct access to the
waterway had more grain removed through procurement policies and realized more extreme food shortages.
People’s Communes played a major role in the Great Famine and the Party’s capacity to administer
the GLF. Before the early 1950s, the rural population in Wuwei county, for example, were part of small
villages. During the 1950s, these communities were divided up into agricultural production cooperatives.
Then, between August and October 1958, these cooperatives aggregated in much larger communes known
as the People’s Communes. The communes during the GLF period were the largest ever in China, some
reaching 10,000 households (Harvard University, 1962). For centuries, rural Chinese had been closely tied
to the land that they farmed and, in times of famine, would emigrate to escape the circumstances, if only
temporarily (Westad, 2003). However, in the mid-1950s, the Party implemented the Hukou Internal Passport
3
system which confined rural Chinese to live and work only in their hometown. Under the GLF, mobility was
further restricted. Members of the People’s Communes, which comprised the entire rural population, were
fully restricted from disenrolling or even physically leaving their assigned commune.
My methodology follows an empirical framework established by Nunn and Puga (2012), who accessed
another detrimental “policy” executed by a far-away state: the African Slave Trades. I expand upon the
theoretical basis for the relationship and construct a formal model relating the interaction between the reach
and ideology of the Party to establish local leaders’ propensity to shirk GLF implementation duties. I capture
the reach of the state using terrain ruggedness and the ideology of the Party using variation in a provincial
First Party Secretary allegiance to Mao Zedong. Terrain ruggedness has been shown to limit state capacity
by making cooperation more costly and facilitate conditions for insurgency (Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubasoglu,
2015, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Wang, 1995). A Secretary’s loyalty to Mao has been demonstrated to increase
the rigorousness which GLF policies were implemented at the provincial level (Kung and Chen, 2011, Yang
et al., 2014). For the baseline analysis, I define provincial radicalism qualitatively. Radical provinces are
Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan. However, I conduct a series of sensitivity and robustness tests to bolster the
results. The unit of observation in the analysis is an old sub-national unit called a fu, which I refer to as
a district. This study is conducted to include province-level fixed effects because party secretaries made
decisions for their constituents.
The results confirm my hypothesis that, as under radical provincial leadership, the intensity with which
the GLF was implemented declined as terrain ruggedness increased. I find that famine mortality in rugged
districts is relatively less than in their provincial counterparts with low topological hurdles. The protection
from famine conditions afforded by rough terrain is most evident in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan but exists
in the other five provinces administered by First Party Secretaries who went through a special promotion
process under the discretion of Mao in 1956. I conducted a variety of robustness tests for which the results are
maintained, but the analysis at the boundary between provinces under radical and moderate/conservative
leadership is the most compelling. At the border, it is likely that the only difference between districts is the
discrete change in Secretary ideology. I find that even with this subset of districts the estimated relationships
supporting the overall conclusions of the paper persist.
4
The principal contribution of the research to the literature is the creation of direct evidence that the
Party’s administration of the GLF caused the Great Famine. In Gooch (2017), I identified the causal impact
of the Great Famine on GDP per capita in 2010. An additional component of the research presented here tests
whether or not the Great Famine acted as a causal mechanism through which the GLF affected subsequent
development. I find that the estimated impact of the GLF on income in 2010 is completely absorbed by
famine severity as a mediator variable. The GLF affects contemporary income disparities through the famine
it caused.
1 Important Events in China’s Political History, 1949 to 1961
Already I have begun to use political terms like radical, conservative, cadre, and Party. This terminology
is commonplace when discussing and analyzing 20th century China. The 1950s, when a majority of the events
occurred which determined attitudes, decisions, and outcomes covered by this analysis, were extraordinarily
politically charged and centered on Mao Zedong. Westad (2003) provides an illuminating perspective on the
political scene:
[The Party] used a charismatic style of leadership in which the cult of Mao’s personality, the ideal
of complete adherence to his instructions, and the belief in the myths and visions he developed
gradually became the center of the [P]arty’s existence.
In this section, I outline the chronology of events from 1949 to 1958 leading up to the Great Leap Foward
(1958-61). I pay particular attention to the creation of circumstances that enabled the manifestation of the
most devastating famine conditions on record. This historical background primarily draws from Harvard
University (1962) in which the authors collated and analyzed 42 official documents published and speeches
given between 1952 and 1958. At the time of publication in 1962, the authors did not know the extent and
scale of famine conditions between 1959 and 61.4
4The first American demographic assessment of the famine causalities was in 1982 (Aird, 1982). Information on the magnitudeof the famine became available with the publication of the single year age distributions from the country’s first highly reliablepopulation census in 1982 (Smil, 1999).
5
1.1 Creation of the Political Environment in the 1950s
In 1949, the CCP under the control of Chairman Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War (1946-50) and
took military control of China. To begin remaking China as a socialist state, the CCP implemented land
reform, which redistributed land ownership and created a large new class of small landholders in the early
1950s, often referred to as peasants.
In the summer of 1955, the Party’s First Five-year Development Plan (1953-57) was ready.5 This plan
called for the formation of “agricultural producers’ cooperatives”. These cooperative again redistributed
land ownership but this time away from private property to ownership by the state. At this time, CCP
leadership recognized that advancement towards collectivization would be tough and genuinely proclaimed
the principles of “gradualness” and “volunteerism” regarding the transitions. Already, rapid collectivization
had been attempted in the spring of 1953, fall of 1954, and again in the spring of 1955 but the bursts of
acceleration had met obstacles and were abandoned.
Chinese leadership was also keenly aware of the tragic experiences in the 1930s Soviet Union when rapid
collectivization led to famine conditions and high mortality. Nevertheless, Mao called for another uptick
in the pace of collectivization in the summer of 1955. By mid-1950s growth in China’s industrial sector
was outpacing increased agricultural productivity; therefore, an increase in the economy of scale through
collectivization was one way that agricultural output could improve. The Party also considered cooperative
farming a more manageable system as compared to private plots allowing for easier labor organization, grain
taxes collection and food ration administration. In a statement given in 1955, Mao personally acknowledged
that progress on the formation of these new cooperatives would have to be checked two to three times a
year. In the winter of 1954, 700,000 new rural cadres were recruited to facilitate the transition.
The unanticipated and forced surge in collectivization between the summer of 1955 and spring of 1957
is now known as the Small Leap Forward but at that time was referred to as a “leap forward”. Mao’s
sudden call for a speed up in the transition to a socialist state in July 1955 conflicted with the principles
of “gradualness” and “volunteerism” guiding China’s institutional evolution up to that point. During the
Small Leap Forward, the opposition was apparent, but official documents published in the winter of 1955-56
5Though two and half years late.
6
such as “Decisions on Agricultural Cooperation” which said that “Rightest tendencies in the Party should
be censured and overcome...” countered the antagonism. Mao reiterated this message at the same time in
the preface to his essays Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside.
By late summer 1956, it became apparent that the methods of transformation of China’s agricultural
sector were not working well. Localized famine conditions were reported in Guangxi province, and peasants
began to hoard grain. The Party authorities in the area allowed a limited free market to open up which
quickly turned into an uncontrolled black market. In the fall of 1956, the peasants’ burden was identified as
the newly enlarged cooperative system. Peasants reacted by withdrawing from the collectives which in turn
led to the dissolution of some collectives. Between fall of 1956 and summer 1957, 570,000 people move from
rural areas to cities.
September 1956 was a time in which moderates within with CCP were especially influential of the
Party agenda. The setbacks and reversals that followed the Small Leap Forward vindicated the criticism
voiced during 1956 Hundred Flowers campaign to engage intellectuals in the revolution. The slogan, “let a
hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend,” aimed at giving academics a greater sense
of participation. By the fall of 1956, the CCP struggled to deal with the faction of “rightest” who opposed
the Small Leap Forward and “dogmatists” who disagreed with the Hundred Flowers campaign.
During the spring of 1957, seven meetings sponsored by the CCP took place. In these meetings, criticisms
that called for an end to the political monopoly of the CCP were put forth by Democratic political parties. At
the same time, professors and students at Beijing University talked of revolt. In the summer of 1957, the CCP
now had to deal with open political opposition and general criticism. The counter-offensive began in June
1957 of which the primary tactic was to discredit the intellectual class. Simultaneously, Mao prematurely
instituted a rectification campaign likely in response to the results of the Hundred Flowers campaign coupled
with the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 in which the people revolted against the Soviet-imposed policies of the
Hungarian government. Rectification referred to re-education following the CCP line of thought, neither too
far to the right or the left. The CCP did not want to lose its monopoly of power.
In the fall of 1957, the CCP leadership focused on rectifying cadres already in the field and recruits.
During 1957, the failings of advancement of agricultural productivity and maintenance of the collectives
7
were apparent. A fundamental administration problem existed on the ground. Cadres in the agricultural
cooperative system need to make the peasants work harder for the benefit of others and turn over the harvest
to the state. It seemed obvious that cadres from the local area would have the greatest influence on the
peasants but local cadres also presented a danger to the Party’s goal. It was likely that a local cadre would
be quicker to sympathize with the hardships faced by the farmers and shirk his duties to hold the Party line.
Propaganda dispensed by the Party at that time disguised the tension between localism (sympathy with the
peasants) and collectivism (loyalty to the Party) with the concept of “class struggle” in the countryside.
In preparation for the next “leap forward” extensive re-education and purges of cadres with localist and
rightest tendencies took place. The CCP’s counter-attack on open discourse at the tail end of the Hundred
Flowers campaign made it difficult for anyone to criticize radical policy in any way without incurring the
charge of rightism.
The slogans accompanying the announcement of another “leap forward” were similar to those that spurred
the 1956 acceleration, however, in the fall of 1957, Mao personally escalated the rhetoric. He set a goal
for China’s industrial development to surpass Britain within 15 years. In Lui Shaoqi’s May 1958 speech
launching the Great Leap Foward, he reiterates Mao’s “militant call” and warns against allowing misgivings
to interrupt progress. Harvard University (1962) characterizes this challenge Liu gives to conservatives in
the Party on matters of agricultural policy within the new goals as particularly strange.
Those conservatives referred to by Liu were already being targeted. In the spring of 1958, provincial
party secretaries conduct rectification campaigns were carried out by their respective governments and six-
teen provinces outed the conservative opposition in the People’s Daily. Specific purges of the Party (often
including the Party secretary) were mentioned.
For example, Pan Fusheng was deposed as Party Secretary of Henan for his strong element of “localism”
and opposition to CCP policies since 1955. But what happened to Pan was not typical. The secretaries
in other provinces reported that conservative-minded cadres, those who wanted to advance gradually and
doubted the possibility of a leap forward, had been overcome. Cadres in Gansu province accepted Liu’s
challenge from his 1958 speech. They responded in writing that they would “reckon accounts with leaders
after the fall..” which referred to the censuring, or economic crisis, they expected following this leap. Even
8
by the March of 1958, it was clear that opposition continued within the Party regarding the Great Leap
Forward and would re-emerge if the policies began to create problems.
Harvard University (1962) records reflections on the surge and censure associated with the Small Leap
Forward. In May 1958, Liu Shaoqi characterized China’s socialist development path as U-shaped. The
upward surge in 1955-56, the slump in 56-57, and another surge in 1958. A local cadre in Fujian province
was confused by the Party’s support for another “leap forward” in 1958. He said, “We were very vigorous
in the first half of 1956 and were censured in the second half of the year. This year we’re asked to be even
more vigorous. Is there a bigger censure waiting?”
1.2 The Great Leap Forward Development Plan, 1958 to 1962
The Great Leap Foward established people’s communes which were composed of the former agricul-
tural cooperatives. In the fall of 1958, the communes corresponded to townships or even county-units.
Each commune conducted it’s administrative, governmental, economic, and industrial functions. Commune
administrators mobilized labor for public works in agriculture, provided financing for the industry, and coor-
dinated agricultural with industrial production. Other elements of collectivization were being tried around
the country. The larger communes enabled administrators to more quickly mobilize labor for the construc-
tion of irrigation and water conservation works. The abolishment of family life was also a principal feature
of the commune system, and the CCP leader and propaganda were clear about this objective. Without
traditional family life, women would be free from household work and could contribute to the agricultural
and industrial production potential in their commune.
Harvard University (1962) claims that in the late summer of 1958 there was unlikely any popular demand
for this form of reorganization. Sherman (1959) adds that even though the enlarged collectivization was
known in advance by the provincial administrators, the final steps were rushed through to give the peasants no
time to react against it. However, the analysts of Harvard University (1962) favor an alternative explanation.
In a repetition of events in 1955, Mao suddenly decided the time was ripe for communizing.
Coinciding with enlarging communes, the CCP was also recruiting new members for the “People’s Militia”
to protect the Offshore Islands. Harvard University (1962) cannot conclude what real intention for the ramp-
9
up in military force was in reality. But sources do report that once the Offshore Island crisis died down
the primary use of the army was for agricultural “shock operation”. However, it is possible that controlling
revolts in the countryside may have been the main goal of the enlarged defensive force all along.
In December 1958, the CCP crafted a resolution to direct the Great Leap Forward. The decision frankly
addressed some issues that had arisen during the fall 1958 collectivization and clarified the path forward. (1)
The CCP insisted that cadre treat the peasants gently and let the Militia carry out stricter enforcement. (2)
Confusion about the private property was rampant. Some people thought that everything even wristwatches,
small animals, and other personal items were the assets of the state. The Wuhan resolution made it clear
that people could keep these types of things. (4) The resolution also postponed collectivization in urban
areas until the spring of 1960. (5) Wages payments were to remain, free-supply is not to be adopted at this
point. (6) In commune industrial ventures, cadres were warned not to forfeit quality for self-reliance. For
example, in a papermaking factory, workers wanted to use local straw for the process instead of waiting for
wood pulp to be delivered from outside the commune. (7) The transition to Communism is a slow process;
China is starting with the first stage, the transition from agricultural producers’ collectives to communes.
In August 1959, a virulent anti-campaign began. The political tensions at the time are extreme. Harvard
University (1962) explains the sentiments in this excerpt from their 1965 analysis:
It is, of course, hard to tell whether such polemics [public charges against rightists] should be
taken at their face value. They may be merely or partly intended to warn critics within the Party
[CCP comrades] that technical criticism will be willfully misinterpreted as high political treason.
This is perhaps the implication of a speech by Lu Ting-yi on October 31, 1959, in which he
says that the political line of demarcation is “to obey Chairman Mao or not.”...The sober if not
certain conclusion is that from the fall of 1958 until at least the end of 1959, rightest opposition
within the CCP had been a considerable force, with growing grievances against the leadership.
An acute motivation to quickly crush conservative opposition in the late summer of 1959 was because
on October 1, the CCP regime celebrated their 10th anniversary. In preparation, inflated production figures
remained and a second year of the “leap forward” was prepared. However, the conservative made progress
by adjusted output estimates for 1959 down a little.
10
Localism was rampant throughout China and obstructed the Party’s policy of collectivism. In minority
areas, cultural and religious issues exacerbated the Party’s troubles. For example, in Gansu province, even
after the ousting of the Vice-Governor, it was reported that one-tenth of Party cadres doubted the success
of the Great Leap Forward.
Harvard University (1962) summarizes the means by which China could achieve the progress mandated
in the Great Leap Forward as follows:
The Government is committed to a mixture of bold targets for heavy industry; thrift and ingenu-
ity in developing light industry, and agriculture simultaneously; maximum work in the farm fields;
“planned consumption” (i.e., the minimum necessary rations of food, clothes, and other neces-
sities); and continual propaganda...The Party must take command everywhere...“Sky-rocketing
enthusiasm” must everywhere be displayed.
The 1962 analysis eerily foretells the magnitude of the event for which the rightists with the Party would
finally be vindicated.
It cannot be expected that rightist opposition can force any great changes of policy on the Central
Committee, until experience and experiment have proved the rightist point of view correct.
Unbeknownst to the outside world, including the foreign dignitaries who came to China to celebrate the
CCP’s 10th anniversary, famine conditions had begun in many parts of China in the winter of 1958-59.
1.3 The Great Famine, 1958 to 1961
In the late winter of 1958, rural communities across China began to experience food shortages. Official
recognition of the disaster by the CCP as the Three Years of Natural Disasters for which there was an excess
of 15 million deaths. In this research, I use excess death rates in 1959, 60, and 61 from Cao (2005) who
estimates 32.5 million unnatural deaths. Meng et al. (2015) emphasizes that mortality above the normal
rate in these three years was almost entirely due to acute starvation and not associate disease commonly
accompanying famine conditions at other times (Thaxton, 2008).
11
By the summer of 1959, the CCP shifted is priorities from industry to agriculture. In April 1959, Zhou
Enlai addressed the National People’s Congress and insisted that the 80 percent of the workforce needed to
be devoted to agricultural output. Harvard University (1962) considers the Central Committee of the CCP
to be fully supportive of right-wing political ideology regarding the Great Leap Forward policies by the spring
of 1959. The conservatives taunted by Liu Shaoqi’s challenge in May of 1958 were, a year later, surrounded
by agreeable colleagues. However, October 1959 marked the tenth anniversary of the CCP regime’s control
of China. To bolster the Party, leaders did not back off their promises for production and participation set
a year earlier. The persistence of GLF implementation and conditions through the winter of 1960-61 is not
clear. However, in the spring of 1961, a year before the set end of the Great Leap Forward, the policies
were aborted, and aid was distributed to disaster areas. The aftermath of the famine is poorly recorded.
There is evidence that some regions completely abandoned collectives whereas others continued to uphold
the socialist institutions. Also, evidence that famine conditions persisted in the mid-1960s exists in some
areas.
In recent years, more personal accounts of the famine have been published. Yang et al. (2014) began his
account of the famine with his own story. The young author, at school in the nearby city, hears that his father
is dying in their countryside home. He returns home to find his father in a state of severe malnourishment.
His father died a few days later, and the author believes that his family tragedy is an isolated event, only
to learn, years later, that many people around the country had died during that same period. Additionally,
academic researchers and journalists have traveled through rural China, capturing the personal accounts of
villagers (Thaxton, 2008).
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Variation in Great Leap Forward (1958-61) Implementation at the District
Level
The GLF was a national policy, and there is no reason to think that implementation was not intended
to be uniform. Additionally, the assumption that Mao wanted GLF implemented intensely to produce to
12
transform the local community structure can be drawn from the historical narratives. I model the GLF
implementation decision of the district leader given information about the GLF implementation decision of
the provincial authorities to capture variation in GLF intensity at the district level.
The following notation will be used:
b = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive.
p(h) = punishment given to the district leader by the provincial government for shirking the
GLF; p is positive for h ≥ 0.
h = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h is positive.
d(c) = probability of detection; d is negative for c ≥ 0.
c = fixed enforcement costs; c is positive.
The formal model follows Polinsky and Shavell (1992) who model an individual’s willingness to commit
a crime and the enforcement process. For this analysis, I redefine the “crime” a district leader shirking his
duty to the Party of implementing the GLF at the level requested by his provincial First Party Secretary.6 In
other words, the district leader is choosing some level of “localism” below the level dictated by his superiors
concerning the intensity with which he implements the GLF. The Party authorities punished district leaders
who shirked their responsibility in implementing GLF policies, but detection was costly. A district leader
will avoid implementing GLF policies to some degree if his benefit is greater than or equal to the expected
punishment.
b ≥ p(h)d(c) (1)
where b is the benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF. The advantage to a leader from not
implementing all or parts of the GLF is both unobservable and broadly defined. The GLF stipulated a
change to community institutions with the establishment of large communes. Shirking this transition from
6The socialist ideals upheld in 1950s China advocated for gender equality but it likely that a vast majority of districtauthorities were male. For ease of discussion, I use the pronoun he when referring to these high-level leaders.
13
traditional life was circumvented cost in emotional, social and financial terms. Additionally, evading specific
policies like the procurement of the harvest to urban rations or export was advantageous.
The punishment given for shirking, p(h), is a function of h, the harm caused to the state if shirking is
committed. Harm to state refers to the Party leaders at the provincial level not meet their GLF goals.7
District leaders incurred punishments such as criticism and self-criticism session which incorporated public
humiliation and sometimes physical violence. A leader who was accused of shirking was often removed from
office. The probability of detection, d(c) is a function of fixed enforcement costs, c.
However, equation (1) is simple and does not capture intricate details of the situation of interest. I
propose two extensions that will end up driving my empirical investigation. First, historical studies have
documented that the harm to the state, h, and the benefit to the district leader, b, may not be uniform
across Chinese provinces but vary with the first party secretary’s political ideology; instead, provincial GLF
goals set by the secretary are relative to the secretary’s allegiance to Mao Zedong’s GLF agenda. I model
this variation for province j as mj ∈ [0, 1], where mj = 0 when the provincial agenda of the secretary is not
aligned with Mao’s national plan and mj = 1 the secretary’s and national agenda are one in the same.
Second, the development literature has established that ruggedness of terrain limits state capacity through
increasing the costs of cooperation. Ruggedness hinders infrastructure development and restricts interac-
tions among constituencies. Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubasoglu (2015) finds that terrain ruggedness presents
challenges to the provision of public goods. Nunn and Puga (2012) determines that topographic irregularities
limited the scope of slave traders in Africa (1400-1900). And in a case study, Osborne (2013) reports that
Southeast Asia groups living near one another but separated by highly rough surfaces rarely exchange or
cooperate due to the insurmountable transportation costs they face. I include the topographic irregularities
in a local area, ri, as a determinant of fixed enforcement cost, c(ri).
Notation is updated as the following:
7These Higher-Up authorities were also punished for not commanding their constituents, but that is out of the scope of thispaper.
14
b(mj) = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive for m ≥ 0.
mj = index for provincial-level political ideology; m ∈ [0, 1].
p(hj) = punishment given to the district leader by the provincial government for shirking the
GLF; p is positive for h ≥ 0.
h(mj) = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h are positive for m ≥ 0.
d(ci) = probability of detection; d is negative for c ≥ 0.
c(ri) = fixed enforcement costs; c is positive for r ≥ 0.
ri = measure of terrain ruggedness; r ∈ [0, 1].
Conceptually, the inclusion of provincial ideology and local terrain ruggedness alters incentives to shirk.
First, when m → 1 the benefit of shirking increases because the district leaders opt of a relatively large
transition and the harm to the provincial goals when shirking is committed is relatively large. Therefore,
both b and h and functions of m; and both b and h are positive for m ≥ 0. It follows that fines p are also a
function of m and f is positive for m ≥ 0. Secondly, the measure, ri ∈ [0, 1] where ri = 0 denotes smooth
terrain and ri = 1 is very bumpy and inaccessible. Detection in district i is also a function of district’s
topographic irregularities, d(ri) and d is positive for r ≥ 0. Therefore, the linear form of the three variables
from equation 1 b(mj), p(mj) and d(ri) can be rewritten as:
b(mj) = κ1 − αmj , (2)
p(mj) = κ2 + γmj , (3)
d(ri) = κ3 − δri, (4)
Plugging equations (2), (4) and (3) back into the model (1) and solving for zero determining the relative
15
levels of ri and mj for which a district leader would choose to shirk the GLF.
κ4 − κ5mj + κ2δri + γδmjri ≥ 0 (5)
where κ4 ≡ κ1 − κ2κ3 and κ5 ≡ α + κ3γ. Equation (5) summarizes the incentives for district leaders’
willingness to shirk the GLF.
2.2 Together the Reach of the State and Ideology of the Provincial First Party
Secretary Influence Famine Mortality (1959-61)
The traditional literature regarding the Great Famine surmises three factors determined that the scale
and distribution of mortality: (1) reduced grain production between 1958 and 1961, (2) unequal distribu-
tion of grain supplies through excessive state grain procurement and output overreporting, and (3) “over-
consumption” of the available food supply in the communal canteens and increased demand caused by the
mobilization of the population to work or irrigation expansion and steel production (Bramall, 2011). Fol-
lowing from above, a district leader’s shirking decision, si, influenced the degree to which these factors
determined food acquisition his district a(s); a is positive for s ≥ 0. Let’s also add terrain ruggedness into
the function of food acquisition such that a(s, r); a is negative for r ≥ 0.
Sen (1986) created the “Entitlement Approach” to explain how the determinants of food acquisition,
a(s, t) determine famine conditions f ; f is negative for a ≥ 0. The approach does not conflate supply, which
can fluctuate with natural forces, with command over food. A person has an entitlement set which is made
up of an original bundle of ownership, the endowment and the ability to acquire additional bundles. The
person experience famine through the loss of the original endowment, like land or labor power, and the loss
the ability to acquire, like lower wages or higher prices.
The linear form of three relationships a(s, r) can be f(a) written as
a(s, r) = κ6 + τsi − πri (6)
16
f(a) = κ7 − λai (7)
Famine conditions for a district i are a function of the district leader’s shirking choice such that the
combination of (6), (7) and (5) leads to the motivating equation of this research.
f(m, t) = κ8 + κ5λmj + κ9ri − λγδmjri (8)
where κ8 ≡ κ7 − λ(κ4 + κ6) and κ9 ≡ λ(π − κ2δ). Equation (8) summarizes the relationships between
ruggedness, the ideology of the provincial First Party Secretary, and the famine conditions. It illustrates
the core hypothesis of this paper: that for provinces with First Secretaries aligned with Mao Zedong at the
onset of the GLF, there is an additional negative effect of ruggedness on famine conditions (I capture this
variation with the average excess mortality rate during the Great Famine) that works through the district
leaders increased probability of shirking the Great Leap Foward in rugged districts, −λγδ.
3 Data
My basic unit of analysis is a historical sub-provincial administrative unit known as a fu. I align my other
variables with this unit of observation. The fu is based on the zhou regions from early history and was a stable
administrative unit for a millennium. The fu unit was chosen by Cao (2005) to bring together demographic
information across the 1953, 1964, 1982 censuses for 17 provinces to create excess death rate data between
1959 and 1961. Fu were only recently abandoned by the CCP (circa 1950). The 1820 boundaries of fu are
published by Harvard’s CHGIS department (CHGIS, 2010, Twitchett and Fairbanks, 1979). For ease of
discussion, I will refer to the fu as a district for the rest of the paper.
3.1 Capturing Variation in the Ideology of the Provincial First Party Secretary
at the Start of the Great Leap Forward
The famine accounting literature has established two primary methods for accessing the political ideology
of the First Party Secretary (1) evidence of atypical or special promotions of the Secretary in the few
17
years prior to the GLF and (2) observation of GLF policies between 1958 and 1961: communal dining hall
participation rates, inflated agricultural production output, and excessive grain procurement rates Meng
et al. (2015). Evidence that the pattern of promotion for leaders played a role in their expectation of the
national agenda has been confirmed by Kung and Chen (2011) and Yang et al. (2014). Moreover, Yang et al.
(2014) finds specific evidence that those leaders who gained their positions through a special promotion were
relatively more politically loyal to Mao Zedong.
My data on atypical or special promotions between 1956 and 1962 comes from Yang et al. (2014). I
simplify my analysis by creating two indicators: I1956 = 1 if the secretary received special promotion during
the “small leap forward” in 1956 and 0 otherwise and I1959 = 1 if the Secretary received special promotion
by 1959 and 0 otherwise. By construct, provinces for which I1956 = 1, I1959 = 1 as well.
Additionally, I create an indicator for three First Party Secretaries, in particular, Li Jingquan of Sichuan
province, Wu Zhipu of Henan province, and Zeng Xisheng of Anhui. I single out these three secretaries
because there is a body of qualitative evidence that these three individuals demonstrated allegiance to Mao’s
agenda before 1959 in unique and extreme ways and likely implemented the GLF policies most rigorously.
In table 1, I collate evidence from analyses of political history in the late 1950s to identify first party
secretaries that fully supported the GLF. Numerous sources identify the secretaries of Anhui, Henan, and
Sichuan as ardent supports of the GLF. Accounts of actions taken by Zeng (Anhui), Wu (Henan), and Li
(Sichuan) bolster the uniqueness of these leaders propensity to rigorously GLF policies. I construct a binary
indicator variable equal to one, ILWZ = 1, if the district lies within Anhui (headed by Zeng), Henan (headed
by Wu), or Sichuan province (headed by Li) and zero otherwise; for Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan provinces,
ILWZ = I1956 = I1959 = 1. A few sources also classify the secretaries of Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, and
Shandong as particularly rigorous GLF implementors but evidence of extremism in the political perspective
of these leaders is lacking. Instead, it likely the intensity of GLF implementation is likely conflated with the
famine outcome for these other provinces.
Finally, I construct a categorical variable such that the base level consists of provinces for which the First
Party Secretary was promoted ordinarily, I1959 = 0, with three other levels (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2)
I1956 = 1 and ILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1. The provinces in each category are mapped in figure 1.
18
I use the communal dining hall participation rate at the province level published by Chang and Wen (1997)
and the agricultural output inflation rate by local officials in 1958 published at the provincial reported by
Fan et al. (2016). The dining hall participation rate captures the shift from private households to commune
living for a province, a central intention of the GLF. The output inflation rate in 1958 shows the extent
to which local cadres were willing to exaggerate production to meet Party ideals. This inflation, though
publically denounced by Mao, aligns with the political eagerness rewarded at the time.
3.2 Capturing Variation in District-Level Topological Irregularities
To capture the accessibility of a community, we employ a relief intensity index constructed by Dijkshoorn
et al. (2008) based on 90-meter digital elevation data (90m DEM) of the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission
(SRTM) (CGIAR-CSI, 2004). I calculate the median terrain relief intensity (TRI), ri, for each sub-provincial
district and use the natural log of it for ease of interpretation. TRI is defined as the median differences
within one km2 circle around the pixel in consideration and measures small-scale terrain irregularities such
as caverns, caves, and cliffs. These topographic hurdles isolated communities from regional administrators
because transportation over irregular terrain is slower and more costly.8
3.3 Capturing Variation in in District-Level Famine Conditions
Excess mortality between 1959 and 1961 was primarily due to starvation (Meng et al., 2015). Therefore,
famine mortality and famine conditions are highly correlated. I use excess death rate (EDR) data created by
Cao (2005) to measure variation in famine mortality. EDR is the ratio of average unexpected deaths (1959-
61) relative to the population in 1958. The aggregation of excess death according to Cao (2005) assessed
the total number of famine-related causalities at 32.5 million. This estimation of the total death toll is far
above the official estimate but below the highest estimate at 45 million (Dikotter, 2010).
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics are presented in table 2. A majority of my empirical results and conclusion
rely on the differential effect between the group of provinces administered by the most radical First Party
8I explore other measures of terrain irregularities as a sensitivity check in table 12.
19
Secretaries (Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan) all other provinces. I assess the difference in mean TRI between
these groups using a two-tailed t-test and find that the null hypothesis that the means are similar and cannot
be rejected (p-value = 0.17). I also test the difference between the group of provinces with a Secretary who
had gone through a special promotion process in 1956 and all other provinces and for provinces with a
Secretary who had gone through a special promotion process by 1959 and all other provinces. I again find
that the magnitude of the test statistic does not warrant rejection of the null hypothesis (p-values equal 0.17
and 0.7, respectively.)
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Evidence that the Party Authorities Influenced the Distribution and Inten-
sity of GLF Policies Famine Severity
Guided by equation (8), I estimate the following relationship between ruggedness, provincial ideology,
and famine mortality:
fi = β0 + β1mj + β2ri + β3mj × ri + ei (9)
for each fu, i, in province, j. The outcome variable, fi, is the natural log of average excess death rate (1959-
61). I capture variation in the ideology of first party secretary, mj using a few different measures described
in section 3.9 In the baseline estimation, I use the binary indicators for special promotions in 1956 (I1956 = 1
if yes, 0 if no) or by 1959 (I1959 = 1 if yes, 0 if no), the indicator for whether or not the province was run
by Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, or Zeng Xisheng (ILWZ = 1 if yes, 0 if no), or the categorical variable. The
categorical variable is coded in the following way: the base level is if first party secretary was promoted in an
ordinary way during the years leading up to the GLF and the three categories are (1) promoted by 1959, (2)
promoted in 1956, and (3) provinces administered by Li, Wu, or Zeng (Sichuan, Henan, and Anhui.) Relief
intensity, ri, captures accessibility and Ωj introduces province-level fixed effects. ei is a classical error term.
I now examine if relief intensity limited famine conditions between 1959 and 61. In column 1 of Table
9As discussed in section 3, m was chosen to represent alignment with Mao Zedong.
20
3, we re-estimate equation (8). I find that the coefficients on TRI interacted with each type of political
radicalism proxy, I1959, I1956, or ILWZ , in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively, are negative and statistically
significant. This positive differential effect provides evidence that topological irregularities limited famine
conditions between 1959 and 61 for provinces under more zealous leadership.
In column 4, I create an interaction term between the continuous variable, TRI, and categorical indicator
of different types of special promotions and the identification of Li, Wu, and Zeng specifically.10 The provinces
that comprise the base level with which each group is compared was led during the GLF period by a First
Party Secretary who was promoted in an ordinary way. The results show that the differential benefit is most
apparent for Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan province but also extends to the other provinces whose Secretaries
received a special promotion during the Small Leap Forward.
4.2 Evidence that the Great Famine is the Causal Mechanism through which
the GLF Policies Effected Subsequent Economic Development
The estimates in table 3 provide evidence that the GLF directly affected famine mortality. Next, I will
examine whether or not the Great Famine is a causal mechanism through which the GLF has impacted
income today. In Gooch (2017), I already established a causal relationship between famine mortality (1959-
61) and GDP per capita in 2010 using an instrumental variable approach.11 Extending the theoretical
and empirical framework, following Nunn and Puga (2012), I formalize the legacy of the GLF on economic
development through the following series of equations:
qi = κ10 − ρfi (10)
where i indexes districts; qi is a measure of the efficiency or quality of the organization of society; ri is relief
intensity; and κ10, and ρ are constants (ρ > 0).
Institutional quality has a close positive relationship with income. Additionally, topological irregularities
play a role in economic development, making cultivation, building, and trade more costly. These relationships
10Li, Wu and Zeng were part of the group of Secretaries promoted in 1956.11The data for GDP per capita in 2010 comes from NBS (2010) at the county level. There are many counties in each district.
I calculate the population-weighted GDP for each district. GDP at the county level was first reported in 1997 for a subset ofcounties. The full set of country was published for the first time in 2000.
21
can be written as
yi = κ11 − θri + ψqi (11)
Substituting equation (8) from section 2 into equation (10) and then into (11) yields
yi = κ12 − κ13ri − ψρκ5λmj + ψρλγδmj × ri (12)
where κ12 ≡ ψ(κ10 − ρκ8) − κ11 and κ13 ≡ θ + ψρκ9. Equation 12 summarizes the relationships between
income, ruggedness, and the famine mortality (1959-61). It illustrates a secondary core hypothesis of this
research: that for provinces with a first party secretary that aligned with Mao Zedong, there is an additional
positive historical effect of ruggedness on income that works through the Great Famine, ψρλγδ.
Guided by equation (12), I estimate the following relationship between ruggedness and income:
yi = β4 + β5mj + β6ri + β7mj × ri + ui (13)
I now estimate the general effect of TRI on income per person in China and its differential effect for
provinces with radical First Party Secretaries. The baseline estimates of equation (13) are given column 5 of
Table 4, the specification when mj ≡ ILWZ . By regressing income per person on TRI while allowing for a
differential effect in radical provinces, I find that the coefficient for relief intensity is negative and statistically
significant: β6 < 0 in equation (13), which indicates a negative effect of TRI for most of China. This adverse
effect is consistent with ruggedness negatively affecting income by increasing the costs of trade, construction,
and agriculture.
The coefficient estimate for interaction term, TRI × ILWZ , positive and statistically significant: β6 > 0
in equation (13). This differential effect means that TRI has an additional positive effect on income that
may arise from the detrimental effect on the death due to the GLF in districts with more gentle topographic
features.
Recall that using equation (8), I modelled the intensity of famine conditions as determined by food
acquitions potential relative to mj and ri. Since excess death rate, fi, more accurately captures variation
22
in famine conditions, if I add include fi in equation (13), f(m, t), then the terms mj × ri and fi in my
estimating regression will be collinear in theory. Empirically, the pairwise correlation between the TRI and
EDR is 0.82 when ILWZ = 1 and 0.27 when ILWZ = 0.
In column 6 of table 4, I re-estimate equation (13) with fi and fi × ILWZ included as covariates.
The coefficient on for interaction term, TRI × ILWZ is now insignificant and close to zero. Thus, fi
predicted f(m, t) with a substantial degree of accuracy. Multicollinearity in a model does not reduce the
reliability of the model but did affect the calculation of the predictor TRI × ILWZ . Specifically, creating
an insignificant regression coefficient for the affected variable. The disappearance of a statistically and
economically significant differential effect of TRI provided in province administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng
means that the GLF determined a substantial portion of famine severity in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan
provinces where 18.67 million people died or 60 percent of the Great Famine. According to the estimates in
columns 7 and 8, the collinearity between famine conditions predicted by ruggedness and zealotry for Anhui,
Henan, and Sichuan provinces is unique as compared with other Party Secretaries promoted in 1956 or by
1959.
4.3 Evaluating the Economic Significance of the Baseline Empirical Results
Using a counterfactual calculation, we find that the economic magnitude of the direct impact of TRI on
famine and indirect historical impact of TRI on income for Sichuan, Henan, and Anhui provinces under the
leadership of Li, Wu, or Zeng, working through the Great Leap Famine, are substantial.
Using estimates from column 3 of table 3, I calculate the change in the excess death rate for a coun-
terfactual district with mean level TRI and mean level excess death rate. Within the group of provinces
administered by Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, and Zeng Xisheng (ILWZ = 1), the counterfactual district’s excess
death rate would be f ′i = 4.65 as opposed to the actual mean excess death rate of fi = 8.17. For Anhui,
Henan, and Sichuan provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 1.19 standard devia-
tion decrease in the excess death rate. If I conduct a similar analysis for a counterfactual district in another
province under more politically moderate leadership (1959-61) the counterfactual excess death rate would
be greater than the actual excess death rate: f ′i = 2.65 > fi = 2.32. In the other provinces, a one standard
23
deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.11 standard deviation increase in the excess death rate.
Using estimates from column 5 of table 4, I calculate the change in the excess death rate for a counter-
factual district with mean level TRI and mean level EDR. Within the group of provinces administered by
Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, and Zeng Xisheng (ILi, Wu, Zeng=1), the counterfactual district’s GDP per capita
in 2010 would be y′i = 17124.93 as opposed to the actual GDP per capita in 2010 of yi = 16323.16. For
Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.13 standard
deviation increase in income in 2010. If I conduct a similar analysis for a counterfactual district in another
province under more politically moderate leadership (1959-61) the hypothetical district’s GDP per capita in
2010 would be y′i = 15198.47 as opposed to the actual GDP per capita in 2010 of yi = 18964.81. For these
other provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.75 standard deviation decrease
in income in 2010.
When the famine mortality (1959-61), however, is taken into account in the specification, column 6 of
table 4 then the impact of a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.7 decrease in income in
2010 for provinces with more politically moderate leadership during the GLF period and a 0.28 decrease in
income for Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan. Now, a one standard deviation increase in TRI produces lower GDP
per capita in 2010 that is not significantly different from the other provinces. Therefore, the differential
benefit from TRI is due to its limiting effect on famine mortality during the Great Famine.
4.4 Pinpointing the Extent of Topological Protection from Enforcement
I re-estimate equations (9) and (13) with and without taking into account famine mortality (1959-61)
using a categorical measure of promotion status and a binned version of TRI data and present the results
in table 5. I divide districts in into three categories based on their TRI percentile grouping. Districts with
smooth terrain fall in percentile ∈ [0, 33), districts with the moderately rugged terrain are in percentile
∈ [33, 66), and district in rough terrain have TRI in percentile ∈ [66, 100). The benefit of combining two
categorical measures of the topological irregularities, ri and provincial ideology, mj is that I can locate the
specific districts for which TRI limited famine and if this barricade to anthropogenic famine has had a lasting
effect on economic development.
24
In column 1, the differential benefit of topological irregularities on famine mortality (1959-61) is most
pronounced for districts with the roughest terrain in the provinces administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng, Li,
Wu, & Zeng, specifically × High relief, as well as for the other provinces with First Party Secretaries who
received a special promotion during the Small Leap Forward in 1956, Special Promotion in 1956 × High
relief. Additionally, in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan, even districts in moderately rugged terrain realized a
differential positive effect on their famine mortality, Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × Medium relief.
The differential benefit of rugged terrain on income in 2010 with and without accounting for the mortality
consequences associated with the GLF period are presented in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The estimates
are economically but not statistically significant. A simple assessment of the benefit for the most rugged
terrain on income in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces, Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × High relief,
reveals that the differential effect cancels out the common effect and in the moderately rugged districts, ×
High relief, the differential effect combined with the common effect equals an overall benefit of topological
irregularities on economic development. However, once famine mortality (1959-61) is taken into account, the
benefits vanish.
The legacy of the GLF is less discernable to non-existent in Special Promotion in 1956 and Special
Promotion by 1959 province groups relative to the base. The positive coefficient on Special Promotion in
1956 × Medium relief in column 2 is large and significant, and this magnitude does not go away once
the EDR is taken into account. This anomaly may be due to the small number of districts on which this
regression was estimated. Interestingly, the coefficient on Special Promotion in 1956 × High relief in column
1 is both economically and statistically significant whereas the coefficient in column 2 is small in magnitude.
In Special Promotion by 1959, the legacy of the GLF is more or less the same as in province with Party
Secretaries that were promoted through the ordinary process.
4.5 Capturing the Ideology of the First Party Secretary with Specific Provincial
Level GLF Policy Variation
As discussed in section 3 the promotion process of the First Party Secretary is not the only means by
which to capture the political ideology of the Secretary, there is information at the provincial level about
25
specific GLF policies. In this analysis I interaction the provincial communal dining hall rate at the end of
1959 with TRI and the provincial agricultural output inflation rate by local leaders in 1958 with TRI to
capture the intensity of district-level GLF implementation. In these specifications, mj , from equations (9)
and (13), is a continuous variable that uniform within province.
As expected the provincial communal dining hall and agricultural output inflation rates are both corre-
lated with famine mortality. In columns 1 and 2 of table 6, I estimate equation (9) and find that the general
effect of these policies in positive when the outcome in the natural log of the excess death rate (1959-61).
The differential effects, CDR × TRI in column 1 and OI × TRI in column 2 are both positive. This
means that when the GLF policies were more rigorously implemented at the provincial level, the districts in
more rough terrain experienced an additional positive benefit from their inaccessible topology.
In columns 4 and 6, I present the estimates from equation (13) and find that each provincial-level GLF
policy has a negative relationship with income in 2010. The differential effect of each policy interacted with
TRI is positive, but only OI × TRI in column 6 is statistically significant. The specification relating TRI,
GLF policies, and EDR to income in 2010 is presented in columns 5 and 7. In these specifications, the
differential benefit of the interaction term is close to zero.
These results, using specific GLF policies, resemble those in the baseline analysis. Measures that capture
variation in the ideology of the First Party Secretary at the start and during the GLF period contribute to
the greater probability to shirk GLF policy implementation at the district level provinces administered by a
more radical ideologue as theorized in section 2.
Grain procurement is another policy that contributed to the famine. Yang et al. (2014) compiled yearly
grain procurement amounts at the provincial level from years 1955 to 1962. Using this data spanning from
the “Small Leap” to the GLF, I construct four measures of relative procurement intensity. First, the Ratio
Decline (1955-56) measures the intensity of censure following the “Small Leap”. A priori, the censure decision
in 1956 captures the willingness of a provincial leader to put into practice “rightest” ideology by moderating
procurement. As recorded in the historical narrative in section 1, leaders’ actions during the “Small Leap
Forward” determined whether or not they were purged and replaced with more radical politicians or targeted
for self-criticism to radicalize them for the GLF.
26
When Ratio Decline (1955-56) is used as a proxy for provincial radicalism, the correlation reported in
column 1 of table 7 shows a strong positive relationship. This means that these provinces with a greater
censure in 1956 had relatively greater famine in 1959 to 61. Additionally, the interaction between the Ratio
Decline (1955-56) and TRI is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, it was in these provinces that
shirking was either more prevalent or most impactful. The coefficients using the Ratio Decline (1955-56)
produce similar results to the other measures of zealous during the GLF in tables 3 and 6. In columns 2
through 4, the coefficients do not follow the hypotheses of this research. The use of procurement choices
during the GLF may present an identification problem. It may be the case that procurement rates during
the GLF are a mechanism through which the term β3mj × ri affects fi from equation (9) and not a good
measure of mj itself because ri may influence procurement rates.
5 Robustness and Sensitivity Tests
5.1 Analyzing the Border between Radical and Conservative Provinces
To test the validity of my estimation, I conduct boundary test to try to balance unobservable character-
istics that may be influencing the results. Restricting the analysis districts that lie near the border between
provinces groups delineated by the ideology of their First Party Secretaries will further address possible
omitted variable bias because only the discrete difference in Secretary ideology should differ between the
districts whereas other characteristics will be similar.
I conduct the boundary analysis using equations (9) and (13) on three samples of districts along the
boundary. First, I examine the boundary between province group ILWZ and all other provinces and present
the estimates in table 8. The differential benefit of rough terrain in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan province
remain economically and statistically significant according to the estimates in column 1. In columns 2 and
3, the effect of TRI on income is negative. The differential benefit of TRI on income in column 2 for Anhui,
Henan, and Sichuan is economically significant but imprecise. In column 3, the differential benefit vanishes.
This boundary analysis resembles the baseline analysis except for a loss of precision and provides a sharpened
look at the protection topological irregularities provided communities under the jurisdiction of Li, Wu, and
27
Zeng.
The second and third anlyses examine the differential effect along the boundary between province group
I1956 and I1959 as compared with other provinces. Their respective estimate are presented in table 9 and
10, respectively. The pattern of estimates from equations (9) and (13) with and without famine mortality
(1959-61) taken into account are similar to those in table 8 and the baseline estimates. In column 2 of table
9, the additional benefit of TRI in radical provinces is statistically significant.
5.2 Including Additional Covariates
The People’s Communes established in 1958 consisted of a township and sometimes, whole counties
(Harvard University, 1962). If this is the case, then a more populated town gave rise to a larger com-
mune. Furthermore, if in provinces with politically moderate First Party Secretaries town were converted to
communes whereas, in provinces with politically radical Secretaries, whole counties were the basic building
block of communes, then this covariate could affect the analysis. Likewise, Meng et al. (2015) proposes
that a districts potential agricultural yield may have motivated Party authorities such that more produc-
tive communities were subjected to greater procurement rate and in turn experience more severe famine
conditions.
In this section, I include two district-level characteristics that could have directed GLF policy application.
Greater population density in 1958, constructed by Cao (2005), may positively influence the size of communes
and better agricultural suitability may have led Party authorities to procurement a larger percentage of a
district’s food supply. In table 11 is re-estimate equation (9) and (13) with and without taking famine
mortality (1959-61) into account. The most conservative estimates for the differential benefit of TRI on the
EDR are presented in column 5 and on GDP per capita in 2010 in columns 10 and 11.
In column 5, the positive coefficient of ILWZ × TRI is economically and statistically significant. The
inclusion of the control variables and their interaction with ILWZ do not alter the results, those topological
irregularities limited famine conditions between 1959 and 1961 in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces.
Additionally, while the interaction between ILWZ and population density and agricultural suitability are
large in magnitude, they are not statistically significant. In column 10, the interaction term ILWZ × TRI
28
remains positive and significant even when population and agricultural suitability are taken into account.
And in column 11, the differential benefit vanishes as it does in the baseline results. The legacy of the GLF
at work on economic development through the Great Famine is maintained when possible confounders are
taken into account.
5.3 Using Alternative Measures of Terrain Ruggedness
The measure of topological irregularities I chose for the baseline analysis is the median terrain relief
intensity. As discussed in section 3, I use relief intensity created by Dijkshoorn et al. (2008) because of the
attention to data peculiarities in China given by the researchers. I use the median measure so that extremes
do not play a large role in the relief variation. In this section, I introduce three additional ways to measure
topological irregularities: (1) mean relief intensity (Dijkshoorn et al., 2008), (2) median terrain ruggedness
(Nunn and Puga, 2012), and (3) mean terrain ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2012). I transform the measured
with the natural log and interaction each measure with the indicator for provinces administered by Li, Wu,
and Zeng.
In table 12 is present the estimates of 9 and 13 with and without taking famine mortality (1959-61) into
account. I find that the differential benefit of the intensity of topological irregularities on famine mortality is
maintained across all types of terrain measures. Furthermore, I find the differential benefit of rough terrain
on income in 2010 is maintained when these alternative measures of terrain are used and the excess death rate
(1959-61) in not taken into account. When the demographic consequences of the GLF period are accounted
for, like the baseline estimates, the additional benefit of rough terrain disappears.
5.4 Removing Outliers: Extreme Topological Irregularities and Extreme Famine
Mortality
In this section, I address the possibility that my baseline results are being influenced by a few outlying
districts regarding relief intensity and famine severity. I re-estimate the core equations (9) and (13) with
and without taking famine mortality (1959-61) into account while removing 16 districts with the greatest
relief intensity and present the results in table 13. Across all specification for which the outcome variable
29
is the natural log of the excess death rate (1959-61) in columns 1 to 4, the differential benefit of TRI in
provinces administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng persists. In the odd-numbered columns, 5-11, the differential
benefit on income in 2010 and the disappearance of the additional positive effect of TRI on income when
famine mortality is taken into account also persist. The core relationship when districts with the greatest
relief intensity are removed closely resemble the baseline results and provide evidence that outliers of this
type of not influencing the conclusions.
In table 14 I echo the analysis above but remove outliers in famine mortality (1959-61). In the first
specification, I remove the two districts with the greatest EDR (1959-61), then top four, six, and eight. In
columns 1 through 4, I present the results for these four specifications when the outcome is the natural
log of the excess death rate (1959-61) and, in columns 5 through 12, I present the results for these four
specifications when the outcome is income in 2010. Specification presented in columns 5, 7, 9, and 11 do not
take into account famine mortality (1959-61) whereas those in columns 6, 8, 10, and 12 do. I find that all
estimates closely resemble the baseline results further confirming the principal conclusions of this analysis.
6 Parsing Out Famine Caused by the State’s Enforcement Capac-
ity
Anhui and Sichuan provinces realized the highest EDR during the GFL period, and I want to check that
this is not driving my results. The theory presented in 2 supports this proposal since the differential benefit
afforded by TRI arises from district leaders’ willingness to shirk GFL policies based on how much the act of
shirking harms the provincial Party’s goals. To check this assertion, I construct a binary variable, IHigh EDR,
equal to one for provinces that had EDR > 4 and equal to zero otherwise. I substitute IHigh EDR in for mj ,
my measure of provincial-level political radicalism. In table 15, I present the estimates from equation (9) in
column 1 and equation (13) in columns 2 and 3. I find that no different benefit was experienced in rugged
districts in provinces with high provincial-level EDR and there is no indirect benefit from TRI on income
today. This means that, in some provinces with high EDR, Guizhou (EDR=10.23), Hunan (EDR=6.81),
Gansu (EDR=6.45), and Guangxi (EDR=4.63), specifically, there is not sufficient evidence that the aim of
30
the Party systemically drove famine conditions.
To further explore the reach of the state during the GLF, I re-estimate equations (9) and (13) using the
categorical indicator for a special promotion, but in these specifications, I change the base level of Ordinary
promotion to Li, Wu, and Zeng. This restructuring allows me to test the significant difference between the
region for which TRI afforded protection for shirkers (AH, HN, and SC) and the other type of province
groups. In column 1 of table 16, I find that the positive differential effect of TRI for provinces under the
jurisdiction of a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 is not significantly different than in the
jurisdictions of Li, Wu, and Zeng. My inability to reject a difference between the additional benefit of TRI
on the EDR means that famine conditions in Hebei, Shandong, Guangdong, and Yunnan were also systemic
and related to the reach of the Party. The death toll in these seven provinces, where ILWZ = 1 and I1956 = 1
totals 17.038 million or 54 percent of the Great Famine.
In column 2 of table 16 the perplexing positive differential impact of TRI on GDP in 2010 for provinces
under the jurisdiction of a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 is not significantly different
than in the jurisdictions of Li, Wu, and Zeng. This similarity is not shared by the provinces with Secretaries
promoted by 1959. However, interpretation of the estimates in column 3 is confusing. The differential effect
of TRI is insignificant across promotion types when the indirect benefit is absorbed with the covariate, EDR.
The differential benefit of famine mortality EDR × Ordinary promotion and EDR × Special promotion in
1956 in column 3 is interesting. As compared with Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan for which EDR is negatively
related to economic development, the loss of life during the GLF has been much less detrimental in these
other provinces. This difference may arise from the lower overall level of famine mortality. The average EDR
in provinces with a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 was 2.6 and those with a Secretary
who went through the ordinary promotion process was 3.03, whereas the average EDR in the jurisdiction of
Li, Wu, and Zeng was 12.54 and in provinces with a Secretary who received a special promotion by 1959 was
5.02. Perhaps, a lower loss of life created a greater capital to worker ratio while not harming overall human
capital (see Gooch (2017) for theoretical background on this relationship between famine and economic
growth).
Another interesting difference between the jurisdiction of Li, Wu, and Zeng and provinces with a Secretary
31
who received a special promotion in 1956 is the relationship between the indicator for Special promotion in
1956 and GDP in 2010. In column 2, the province group effect is not statistically different than that of the
base level, Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan, but once the EDR is included as a covariate, the province group
indicator become negative and significant.
So what is happening differently in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan compared to other provinces with a Special
promotion in 1956 ? The estimates for each type of group satisfy the hypothesis that topological irregularities
shielded shirkers which in turn lower famine mortality in rugged districts. Both groups present a positive
differential effect of topological irregularities on long-term economic growth. But only in Anhui, Henan,
and Sichuan is this positive differential effect explained through famine mortality (1959-61). Provinces with
Special promotion in 1956 have a lower economic trajectory in general. Therefore, it could be the case that
the legacy of protection against state capacity afforded by TRI in provinces with Special promotion in 1956
extended beyond food acquisition and famine.
7 Conclusion
I have examined the role state capacity in shaping the extent and scale of the Great Chinese Famine
(1959-61). I develop a formal model for a local leader’s willingness to evade his duty of implementing the
policies of the National Development Plan, the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) based on the interaction
between policy-related goals of provincial government authorities and the cost of the enforcement process to
the regional government. I capture variation in the aims of the government using the year of promotion of
the provincial First Party Secretary. I also single out the Secretaries of Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan based
on evidence of these leaders uniquely rigorous adoption of Great Leap Forward policies. To identify a causal
relationship between the Great Leap Forward and subsequent famine mortality, I exploit the interaction
between political ideology at the province-level and topological irregularities at the local level.
In Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan, specifically, the Great Famine killed over 13 million people. These are the
province where the reach of the state had the largest effect on famine condition. I find that while in most
of China, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translated to a little over a 1/10 of standard deviation
increase in the EDR whereas in AHS the same increase in TRI translated to a 1.1 SD decrease in the EDR.
32
Moreover, for seven provinces with First Party Secretaries promoted through an atypical process during the
Small Leap Forward (1955-56), I find that rugged topology afforded protection to communities from GLF
policies resulting in lower famine mortality. These results imply that the goals of the provincial “Party”
authorities generated over 50 percent of the Great Famine’s extent. The historic indirect benefit of TRI
in AHS means that a district in AHS with GDP per capita in 2010 of 16,322 RMB/person would have
17,125 RMB/person if it were located in a topography more rugged by one standard deviation. However, the
indirect historical benefit from the protection afforded by protection for state reach is present in AHS and
fully explained by reduced famine conditions. In Hebei, Shandong, Guangdong, and Yunnan the protection
extends beyond famine mortality.
33
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37
Tables and Figures
Reference Anhui
Fuji
anG
ansu
Guiz
hou
Guan
gdon
gG
uan
gxi
Hen
anH
ebei
Hunan
Hub
eiJi
angs
uJi
angx
iShan
don
gShan
xi
Sic
huan
Yunnan
Zhej
iang
Bramall (2011) X X XChang and Wen (1998) X X X X X XChen (2011) XGoodman (1980) XLi (1994) XRzanna (2010) XWalker (1998) XYang (1996) X XYang and Su (1998) X X X X X
Table 1: Evidence of Extremely Radical Political Ideology of First Party Secretaries’ Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu,and Zeng Xisheng
Figure 1: Provinces with Special Promotion of First Party Secretary
38
Tab
le2:
Su
mm
ary
Sta
tist
ics
Sta
tist
icN
Mea
nS
t.D
ev.
Min
Max
Nat
ura
lL
ogof
Med
ian
Ter
rain
Rel
ief
Inte
nsi
ty223
139.0
0114.0
06.0
0496.0
0N
atu
ral
Log
ofM
ean
Exce
ssD
eath
Rate
(1959-6
1)
223
1.1
01.2
0−
2.3
03.4
0N
atu
ral
Log
ofG
DP
per
cap
ita
2010
223
0.6
00.6
5−
0.9
12.8
0F
irst
Sec
reta
ryis
Li
(SC
),W
u(H
N)
or
Zen
g(A
H),ILW
Z=
1223
0.2
20.4
10
1S
pec
ial
Pro
mot
ion
ofF
irst
Sec
reta
ryin
1956,I1956
=1
223
0.5
00.5
00
1S
pec
ial
Pro
mot
ion
ofF
irst
Sec
reta
ryby
1959,I1959
=1
223
0.7
20.4
50
1C
omm
un
alD
inin
gH
alls
Par
tici
pati
on
Rate
by
the
En
dof
1959
223
77.0
021.0
00.0
098.0
0O
utp
ut
Infl
atio
nR
ate
by
Loca
lO
ffici
als
in1958
223
139.0
066.0
00.0
0308.0
0
39
Table 3: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality (1959-61)
ln(Excess of Death Rate (1959-61))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.284 0.308∗∗∗ 0.108 0.284(0.185) (0.109) (0.0843) (0.178)
Binary indicator for province classification:I1959, Special Promotion of First Secretary by 1959 4.747∗∗∗
(0.940)I1956, Special Promotion of First Secretary in 1956 5.454∗∗∗
(0.671)ILWZ , First Secretary is Li (SC), Wu (HN) or Zeng (AH) 4.940∗∗∗
(0.659)TRI × Binary indicator province classification:
I1959 -0.408∗∗
(0.200)I1956 -0.608∗∗∗
(0.139)ILWZ -0.519∗∗∗
(0.146)Categorical indicator of province classification:
Special Promotion by 1959 1.687(1.103)
Special Promotion in 1956 3.954∗∗∗
(1.119)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically 5.725∗∗∗
(0.960)TRI × Categorical indicator of province classification:
Special Promotion by 1959 0.0386(0.226)
Special Promotion in 1956 -0.450∗∗
(0.220)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.695∗∗∗
(0.213)
Obs. 223 223 223 223Province FE X X X XAdj. R2 0.523 0.555 0.542 0.555
Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
40
Table 4: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on GDP per capita in 2010 and Examination of FamineMortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism
ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI -0.176∗ -0.145 -0.265∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.145(0.106) (0.104) (0.0632) (0.0643) (0.0487) (0.0472) (0.103) (0.102)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.109 -0.134∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.109(0.0673) (0.0580) (0.0436) (0.0661)
Binary indicator of province classification:I1959 -1.483∗∗∗ -0.749
(0.540) (0.552)I1956 -2.192∗∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.439)ILWZ -1.863∗∗∗ -0.629
(0.381) (0.500)TRI × Binary Indicator for:
I1959 0.0890 0.0352(0.115) (0.112)
I1956 0.269∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(0.0807) (0.0825)ILWZ 0.203∗∗ 0.0718
(0.0843) (0.0890)EDR × Binary Indicator for:
I1959 -0.0760(0.0823)
I1956 -0.000224(0.0795)
ILWZ -0.179∗
(0.0980)Categorical indicator of province classification:
Special Promotion by 1959 -0.383 -0.222(0.640) (0.633)
Special Promotion in 1956 -1.955∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗
(0.649) (0.657)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -1.900∗∗∗ -0.583
(0.557) (0.646)TRI × Categorical Indicator for:
Special Promotion by 1959 -0.142 -0.105(0.131) (0.134)
Special Promotion in 1956 0.142 0.106(0.127) (0.125)
Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically 0.211∗ 0.0612(0.124) (0.127)
EDR × Categorical Indicator for:Special Promotion by 1959 -0.102
(0.135)Special Promotion in 1956 0.0775
(0.0959)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.181∗
(0.109)
Obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223Province FE X X X X X X X XAdj. R2 0.447 0.487 0.474 0.497 0.461 0.499 0.473 0.505
Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
41
Table 5: The Differential Effect of a Categorical Measure of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDPper capita in 2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.108(0.0674)
Categorical indicator of TRI percentile:ln(Mean Terrain Relief Intensity), Medium 0.688∗ -0.105 -0.0301
(0.385) (0.220) (0.217)ln(Mean Terrain Relief Intensity), High 1.346∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.230
(0.485) (0.278) (0.283)Categorical indicator of province classification:
Special promotion by 1959 2.223∗∗∗ -1.026∗∗∗ -0.642∗
(0.629) (0.360) (0.373)Special promotion in 1956 2.734∗∗∗ -1.270∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.341) (0.353)Li, Wu, Zeng, specifically 3.997∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗ -0.287
(0.470) (0.269) (0.355)Special promotion by 1959 × TRI category:
Medium relief -0.545 0.0644 0.0281(0.592) (0.339) (0.330)
High relief -0.632 -0.0867 -0.0425(0.658) (0.377) (0.383)
Special promotion in 1956 × TRI category:Medium relief -0.740 0.480 0.403
(0.515) (0.295) (0.288)High relief -1.683∗∗ 0.0538 -0.109
(0.648) (0.371) (0.369)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × TRI category:
Medium relief -1.456∗∗∗ 0.326 0.0345(0.488) (0.280) (0.281)
High relief -2.451∗∗∗ 0.396 -0.0617(0.599) (0.343) (0.355)
EDR × Province classification:Special promotion by 1959 -0.158
(0.135)Special promotion in 1956 0.0590
(0.0957)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.174
(0.108)
Obs. 223 223 223Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.554 0.485 0.522
Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1. The categorical variable for terrain relief intensity(TRI) is defined as follows: districts for which the TRI ∈ percentiles (0, 33) comprise the base level, Low relief. The two otherTRI categories are Medium relief ∈ [33, 66) and High relief∈ [66, 100).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
42
Tab
le6:
Th
eD
iffer
enti
alE
ffec
tof
Ter
rain
Rel
ief
on
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inati
on
of
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty(1
959-6
1)
asa
Cau
sal
Mec
han
ism
wh
enP
rovin
cial
-lev
elP
oli
tica
lId
eolo
gy
isC
ap
ture
dth
rou
gh
Sp
ecifi
cG
LF
Poli
cies
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rate
)ln
(GD
Pp
erca
pit
ain
2010
)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
ln(T
erra
inR
elie
fIn
tensi
ty),
TR
I0.
760∗∗
0.58
3∗∗∗
-0.3
40∗
-0.2
25-0
.294∗∗
-0.2
02∗
(0.3
19)
(0.2
09)
(0.1
84)
(0.1
81)
(0.1
21)
(0.1
20)
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e(1
959-
61))
,E
DR
-0.2
05-0
.133
(0.1
41)
(0.0
901)
Com
mu
nal
Din
ing
(%in
1959
),C
DR
0.36
7∗∗∗
-0.1
32∗∗∗
-0.0
778∗∗∗
(0.0
433)
(0.0
249
)(0
.029
1)C
DR×
conti
nu
ous
vari
able
:T
RI
-0.0
106∗∗∗
0.0
0310
0.00
151
(0.0
0401)
(0.0
023
1)(0
.002
28)
ED
R0.
0006
37
(0.0
0179
)O
utp
ut
Infl
atio
n(1
0,00
0to
ns
in19
58),
OI
0.07
70∗∗∗
-0.0
270∗∗∗
-0.0
151∗∗
(0.0
0919
)(0
.005
33)
(0.0
0601)
OI×
conti
nu
ous
vari
able
:T
RI
-0.0
043
6∗∗∗
0.00
130∗
0.0
00604
(0.0
0133
)(0
.000
769)
(0.0
00773)
ED
R-0
.000149
(0.0
00579)
Ob
s.223
223
223
223
223
223
Pro
vin
ceF
EX
XX
XX
XA
dj.
R2
0.52
90.5
380.
450
0.48
60.4
530.4
87
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
43
Tab
le7:
Th
eD
iffer
enti
alE
ffec
tof
Ter
rain
Rel
ief
on
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inati
on
of
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty(1
959-6
1)
asa
Cau
sal
Mec
han
ism
wh
enP
rovin
cial
-lev
elP
oli
tica
lId
eolo
gy
isC
ap
ture
dth
rou
gh
Gra
inP
rocu
rem
ent
Rate
s ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rate
)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ln(T
erra
inR
elie
fIn
tensi
ty),
TR
I0.
0918
-0.0
543
-0.1
85
-0.2
11
(0.1
05)
(0.1
23)
(0.1
16)
(0.1
34)
Net
Gra
inP
rocu
rem
ent
Rat
ioD
ecline
Follow
ing
Sm
all
Lea
pF
orw
ard
(1955-
56)
0.4
29∗∗∗
(0.0
680)
Rat
ioD
ecline
(195
5-5
6)×TRI
-0.0
282∗∗
(0.0
141)
Net
Gra
inP
rocu
rem
ent
Rati
oU
pti
ckfo
rG
LF
(1956
-59)
0.4
87∗∗∗
(0.0
697)
Rati
oU
pti
ck(1
956-5
9)×TRI
-0.0
00736
(0.0
0702)
Diff
eren
cein
Net
Gra
inP
rocu
rem
ent
Rati
o:G
LF
&Sm
all
Lea
pF
orw
ard
(195
9&
55
-0.9
68∗∗∗
(0.1
20)
Rat
ioD
iffer
ence
(195
9&
55)×TRI
0.0
138
(0.0
105)
Net
Gra
inP
rocu
rem
ent
Rati
oD
ecline
Follow
ing
GL
F(1
959-
62)
1.6
86∗∗∗
(0.2
41)
Rat
ioD
ecline
(195
9-62
)×TRI
0.0
133
(0.0
104)
Obs.
222
222
222
222
Pro
vin
ceF
EX
XX
XA
dj.
R2
0.523
0.5
13
0.518
0.5
17
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
44
Table 8: Analysis at the Boundary of Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan Provinces: The Differential Effect ofTerrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in 2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality(1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.0606 -0.0874 -0.0802(0.129) (0.0793) (0.0758)
ILWZ × TRI -0.490∗∗∗ 0.154 0.0334(0.167) (0.103) (0.105)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.119(0.0789)
ILWZ × EDR -0.146(0.114)
ILWZ 4.822∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ -0.409(0.753) (0.464) (0.553)
Obs. 122 122 122Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.661 0.519 0.563
Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which LWZ = 1 (Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan) and provinces for which LWZ = 0. Coefficients arereported with classical standard errors in brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Analysis at the Boundary of Provinces for Which the First Party Secretary Received a SpecialPromotion in 1956: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.190 -0.140∗ -0.110(0.125) (0.0736) (0.0694)
I1956 × TRI -0.632∗∗∗ 0.177∗ 0.0196(0.169) (0.0990) (0.0976)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.156∗∗
(0.0653)I1956 × EDR -0.133
(0.0950)I1956 5.438∗∗∗ -1.680∗∗∗ -0.312
(0.763) (0.448) (0.506)
Obs. 150 150 150Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.572 0.496 0.566
Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which 1956 = 1 and provinces for which 1956 = 0. Coefficients are reported with classical standard errorsin brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
45
Table 10: Analysis at the Boundary of Provinces for Which the First Party Secretary Received a SpecialPromotion by 1959: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.173 -0.178∗ -0.160(0.185) (0.107) (0.101)
I1959 × TRI -0.407∗ 0.193 0.110(0.214) (0.124) (0.118)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.103(0.0728)
I1959 × EDR -0.174∗
(0.0994)I1959 4.654∗∗∗ -1.775∗∗∗ -0.735
(0.971) (0.563) (0.579)
Obs. 138 138 138Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.601 0.537 0.594
Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which 1959 = 1 and provinces for which 1959 = 0. Coefficients are reported with classical standard errorsin brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
46
Tab
le11
:T
he
Diff
eren
tial
Eff
ect
ofT
erra
inR
elie
fon
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inati
on
of
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty(1
959-
61)
asa
Cau
sal
Mec
han
ism
wit
hth
eIn
clu
sion
of
Ad
dit
ion
al
Cov
ari
ate
s
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e)ln
(GD
Pp
erca
pit
ain
2010
)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
ILW
Z2.
211∗∗∗
4.9
40∗∗∗
5.5
13∗∗∗
4.8
47∗∗∗
5.92
6∗∗∗
-1.1
16∗∗∗
-1.8
63∗∗∗
-2.1
36∗∗∗
-1.6
68∗∗∗
-2.0
99∗∗∗
-0.6
93(0
.565)
(0.6
59)
(0.9
50)
(0.6
84)
(1.0
66)
(0.2
90)
(0.3
81)
(0.5
40)
(0.3
91)
(0.5
87)
(0.6
77)
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e(1
959-
61))
,E
DR
-0.0
739∗
(0.0
421)
ILW
Z×
ED
R-0
.224∗∗
(0.0
941
)ln
(Ter
rain
Rel
ief
Inte
nsi
ty),
TR
I0.
237∗∗∗
0.1
080.0
925
0.0
941
0.0
565
-0.2
66∗∗∗
-0.1
68∗∗∗
-0.1
50∗∗∗
-0.1
48∗∗∗
-0.1
03∗∗
-0.0
992∗∗
(0.0
627)
(0.0
843)
(0.0
849
)(0
.085
5)
(0.0
869
)(0
.029
9)(0
.048
7)
(0.0
483)
(0.0
488)
(0.0
478
)(0
.0463
)IL
WZ×
TR
I-0
.218∗
-0.5
19∗∗∗
-0.4
94∗∗∗
-0.5
36∗∗∗
-0.4
60∗∗∗
0.20
3∗∗∗
0.2
03∗∗
0.2
28∗∗
0.194∗∗
0.18
1∗
0.0
560
(0.1
29)
(0.1
46)
(0.1
69)
(0.1
54)
(0.1
69)
(0.0
657
)(0
.084
3)(0
.095
9)
(0.0
881
)(0
.092
9)(0
.096
1)
ln(A
verg
age
Agr
icult
ura
lSuit
abilit
y),
Ag.
Suit
.0.1
70
0.328∗
-0.2
38∗∗
-0.4
25∗∗∗
-0.4
01∗∗∗
(0.1
66)
(0.1
82)
(0.0
948)
(0.0
999)
(0.0
977)
ILW
Z×
Ag.
Suit
.-0
.386
-0.6
65
0.31
30.4
02∗
0.27
7(0
.374
)(0
.437)
(0.2
14)
(0.2
40)
(0.2
35)
ln(P
opula
tion
Den
sity
(195
8)),
Pop
.D
ens.
-0.1
25
-0.1
97∗∗
0.1
40∗∗∗
0.23
4∗∗∗
0.2
19∗∗∗
(0.0
868
)(0
.095
2)(0
.0494
)(0
.052
4)
(0.0
513)
ILW
Z×
Pop
.D
ens
0.14
60.
317
-0.0
510
-0.1
38-0
.087
4(0
.199)
(0.2
33)
(0.1
13)
(0.1
28)
(0.1
25)
Obs.
223
223
223
223
223
296
223
223
223
223
223
Pro
vin
ceF
EN
oX
XX
XN
oX
XX
XX
Adj.
R2
0.2
19
0.54
20.
542
0.54
00.
546
0.22
40.
461
0.4
78
0.4
72
0.5
17
0.54
8
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
47
Tab
le12
:T
he
Diff
eren
tial
Eff
ect
ofA
lter
nat
ive
Mea
sure
sof
Top
olo
gic
al
Irre
gu
lari
ties
on
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inat
ion
ofF
amin
eM
orta
lity
(195
9-61
)as
aC
au
sal
Mec
han
ism
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rate
)ln
(GD
Pp
erca
pit
ain
201
0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng
4.94
5∗∗∗
5.2
33∗∗∗
7.278∗∗∗
2.8
69∗∗∗
-1.8
59∗∗∗
-0.6
22-2
.003∗∗∗
-0.9
05-2
.554∗∗∗
-0.5
04-0
.978∗∗∗
-0.3
29
(0.6
60)
(0.8
48)
(1.5
16)
(0.3
70)
(0.3
82)
(0.5
00)
(0.4
94)
(0.6
08)
(0.8
74)
(0.9
85)
(0.2
16)
(0.2
86)
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e(1
959-
61))
,E
DR
-0.1
13∗∗
-0.1
24∗∗∗
-0.1
21∗∗∗
-0.1
27∗∗∗
(0.0
437
)(0
.0445
)(0
.0433
)(0
.044
4)
ILW
Z×
ED
R-0
.177∗
-0.1
06-0
.193∗∗
-0.1
27(0
.0981
)(0
.098
3)
(0.0
961)
(0.0
973)
ln(T
erra
inR
elie
fIn
tensi
ty),
TR
I0.
109
-0.1
67∗∗∗
-0.1
55∗∗∗
(0.0
844)
(0.0
488)
(0.0
472)
ILW
Z×
TR
I-0
.521∗∗∗
0.202∗∗
0.0
706
(0.1
46)
(0.0
843
)(0
.0891)
ln(M
ean
TR
I)0.0
743
-0.0
965
-0.0
873
(0.1
04)
(0.0
605
)(0
.058
8)IL
WZ×
TR
I(m
ean
)-0
.532∗∗∗
0.235∗∗
0.1
21
(0.1
80)
(0.1
05)
(0.1
09)
ln(M
edia
nT
erra
inR
ugg
edn
ess)
0.0
510
-0.1
49∗∗∗
-0.1
43∗∗∗
(0.0
807
)(0
.046
5)(0
.044
5)IL
WZ×
Ru
gged
nes
s(m
edia
n)
-0.3
99∗∗∗
0.1
34∗
0.018
5(0
.136)
(0.0
783)
(0.0
806
)ln
(Mea
nT
erra
inR
ugg
edn
ess)
0.008
36-0
.084
3-0
.0833
(0.0
967
)(0
.056
4)(0
.054
4)IL
WZ×
Ru
gged
nes
s-0
.396∗∗
0.158
0.0580
(0.1
64)
(0.0
955)
(0.0
981)
Ob
s.222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
Pro
vin
ceF
EX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XA
dj.
R2
0.54
20.
535
0.536
0.5
31
0.4
58
0.497
0.440
0.4
73
0.4
54
0.501
0.4
35
0.4
73
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
48
Tab
le13
:T
he
Diff
eren
tial
Eff
ect
ofT
erra
inR
elie
fon
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inati
on
of
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty(1
959-
61)
asa
Cau
sal
Mec
han
ism
Aft
erR
emov
ing
Dis
tric
tsw
ith
Extr
eme
Ter
rain
Rel
ief
Inte
nsi
ty
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rate
)ln
(GD
Pp
erca
pit
ain
2010
)
Om
itT
op
4O
mit
Top
8O
mit
Top
12
Om
itT
op
16O
mit
Top
4O
mit
Top
8O
mit
Top
12
Om
itT
op16
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng
4.76
5∗∗∗
4.7
97∗∗∗
4.8
54∗∗∗
4.7
52∗∗∗
-1.7
53∗∗∗
-0.5
42
-1.7
71∗∗∗
-0.5
23
-1.7
34∗∗∗
-0.3
97
-1.8
43∗∗∗
-0.5
15
(0.6
63)
(0.6
70)
(0.6
80)
(0.6
93)
(0.3
83)
(0.5
03)
(0.3
89)
(0.5
15)
(0.3
97)
(0.5
30)
(0.4
04)
(0.5
35)
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rate
(1959
-61)
),E
DR
-0.1
09∗∗
-0.1
11∗∗
-0.1
07∗∗
-0.1
09∗∗
(0.0
435)
(0.0
440
)(0
.0445)
(0.0
452)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng×
ED
R-0
.188∗
-0.1
91∗
-0.2
14∗∗
-0.2
12∗∗
(0.1
02)
(0.1
03)
(0.1
05)
(0.1
06)
ln(T
erra
inR
elie
fIn
ten
sity
),T
RI
0.1
00
0.0
934
0.0
887
0.0
660
-0.1
50∗∗∗
-0.1
40∗∗∗
-0.1
51∗∗∗
-0.1
41∗∗∗
-0.1
49∗∗∗
-0.1
39∗∗∗
-0.1
73∗∗∗
-0.1
66∗∗∗
(0.0
850)
(0.0
852)
(0.0
854
)(0
.0900)
(0.0
491)
(0.0
476)
(0.0
495)
(0.0
479)
(0.0
498)
(0.0
481
)(0
.052
5)
(0.0
506)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng×
TR
I-0
.471∗∗∗
-0.4
82∗∗∗
-0.5
00∗∗∗
-0.4
78∗∗∗
0.1
76∗∗
0.0
556
0.1
81∗∗
0.0
537
0.1
71∗
0.0
296
0.196∗∗
0.0
564
(0.1
47)
(0.1
50)
(0.1
53)
(0.1
56)
(0.0
849)
(0.0
889)
(0.0
870)
(0.0
915)
(0.0
895)
(0.0
947)
(0.0
912)
(0.0
962
)
Ob
s.220
217
213
208
220
220
217
217
213
213
208
208
Pro
vin
ceF
EX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XA
dj.
R2
0.549
0.5
46
0.545
0.5
50
0.4
57
0.494
0.455
0.4
93
0.4
51
0.4
910.4
560.4
96
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
49
Tab
le14
:T
he
Diff
eren
tial
Eff
ect
ofT
erra
inR
elie
fon
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
tyan
dG
DP
per
cap
ita
in2010
an
dth
eE
xam
inati
on
of
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty(1
959-
61)
asa
Cau
sal
Mec
han
ism
Aft
erR
emov
ing
Dis
tric
tsw
ith
Extr
eme
Fam
ine
Mort
ali
ty
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e)ln
(GD
Pp
erca
pit
ain
2010)
Om
itT
op2
Om
itT
op4
Om
itT
op6
Om
itT
op8
Om
itT
op
2O
mit
Top
4O
mit
Top
6O
mit
Top
8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng
4.94
5∗∗∗
4.90
4∗∗∗
4.76
2∗∗∗
4.69
6∗∗∗
-1.8
59∗∗∗
-0.6
22-1
.839∗∗∗
-0.6
24
-1.7
62∗∗∗
-0.5
65
-1.6
89∗∗∗
-0.4
80
(0.6
60)
(0.6
70)
(0.7
06)
(0.7
36)
(0.3
82)
(0.5
00)
(0.3
89)
(0.5
10)
(0.4
07)
(0.5
15)
(0.4
25)
(0.5
28)
ln(E
xce
ssD
eath
Rat
e(1
959-
61))
,E
DR
-0.1
13∗∗
-0.1
13∗∗
-0.1
13∗∗
-0.1
13∗∗
(0.0
437)
(0.0
439)
(0.0
437)
(0.0
438)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng×
ED
R-0
.177∗
-0.1
74∗
-0.1
81∗
-0.1
90∗
(0.0
981
)(0
.101)
(0.1
01)
(0.1
02)
ln(T
erra
inR
elie
fIn
tensi
ty),
TR
I0.
109
0.1
090.
109
0.1
09-0
.167∗∗∗
-0.1
55∗∗∗
-0.1
67∗∗∗
-0.1
55∗∗∗
-0.1
67∗∗∗
-0.1
55∗∗∗
-0.1
67∗∗∗
-0.1
55∗∗∗
(0.0
844)
(0.0
844)
(0.0
847)
(0.0
849)
(0.0
488)
(0.0
472)
(0.0
489)
(0.0
475)
(0.0
488)
(0.0
473)
(0.0
490)
(0.0
474)
ILi,
Wu
&Zeng×
TR
I-0
.521∗∗∗
-0.5
21∗∗∗
-0.5
02∗∗∗
-0.4
95∗∗∗
0.20
2∗∗
0.07
060.
202∗∗
0.0
708
0.1
87∗∗
0.0
585
0.1
75∗
0.0
458
(0.1
46)
(0.1
47)
(0.1
50)
(0.1
54)
(0.0
843
)(0
.089
1)(0
.0851
)(0
.0903)
(0.0
867)
(0.0
910)
(0.0
888)
(0.0
927)
Obs.
222
220
218
216
222
222
220
220
218
218
216
216
Pro
vin
ceF
EX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XA
dj.
R2
0.54
20.
533
0.52
10.
510
0.45
80.4
970.
457
0.4
94
0.4
61
0.4
99
0.4
61
0.5
00
Note
s:C
oeffi
cien
tsare
rep
ort
edw
ith
class
ical
stan
dard
erro
rsin
bra
cket
s.∗p<
0.1
0,∗∗
p<
0.0
5,∗∗
∗p<
0.0
1
50
Table 15: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in 2010 and theExamination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism when Provincial-level Political Ideologyis Captured High Excess Death Rates
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI -0.0893 -0.0302 -0.0419(0.0892) (0.0501) (0.0482)
ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.131∗∗∗
(0.0439)Indicator for Provinical EDR ≥ 4, IHigh EDR 2.732∗∗∗ -0.382 0.258
(0.675) (0.379) (0.409)IHigh EDR × TRI 0.0666 -0.188∗∗ -0.182∗∗
(0.147) (0.0826) (0.0794)IHigh EDR × EDR -0.113
(0.0867)
Obs. 222 222 222Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.514 0.457 0.500
Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
51
Table 16: Examining the Differential Effect of Terrain Relief When the Group of Most Radical Provinces isSet as the Base Level
ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Median Terrain Relief Intensity) in in AH, HN, & SC -0.411∗∗∗ 0.0353 -0.0840(0.117) (0.0680) (0.0750)
ln(Excess Death Rate) in in AH, HN, & SC -0.290∗∗∗
(0.0873)Categorical indicator of province classification:
Ordinary promotion -5.725∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 0.583(0.962) (0.557) (0.647)
Special promotion by 1959 -4.038∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗ 0.361(0.847) (0.491) (0.581)
Special promotion in 1956 -1.762∗∗ -0.0477 -1.082∗
(0.868) (0.503) (0.608)TRI × Province classification:
Ordinary promotion 0.695∗∗∗ -0.211∗ -0.0612(0.214) (0.124) (0.127)
Special promotion by 1959 0.734∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.167(0.181) (0.105) (0.114)
Special promotion in 1956 0.247 -0.0670 0.0464(0.174) (0.101) (0.105)
EDR × Province classification:Ordinary promotion 0.181∗
(0.109)Special promotion by 1959 0.0796
(0.146)Special promotion in 1956 0.254∗∗
(0.112)
Obs. 222 222 222Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.555 0.471 0.504
Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The base level is ILWZ = 1 and the other threecategories are (1) Secretaries who were promoted the ordinary ways, I1959 = 0, (2) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, and (3) I1956 = 1and ILWZ = 0, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1. The natural log of terrain relief intensity (TRI) is a continuousvariable∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
52
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