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Spatial planning and its implementation in provincial China: A case study of
Jiangsu Region along Yangtze River Plan1
Lei Wang and Jianfa Shen
Abstracts: Spatial planning is considered as an important governance instrument to cope with
uncoordinated regional problems. This paper explores the underlying rationale and
mechanisms of spatial planning in provincial China through a case study of Jiangsu Region
along Yangtze River (JSYR) Plan. It reveals that the practice of the JSYR plan reflected the
changing strategic expression of provincial government on regional development and was
shaped by the contests between provincial and municipal governments. The planning policies
and provincial economic and political mobilizations formed as a spatial policy framework that
promoted plan implementation at municipal level. Although, it achieved development goals of
overall economic growth and infrastructural construction, the plan was ineffective regarding
development control and regional coordination. The case study also sheds lights on the
dynamic relationship between provincial and municipal governments, and the structural
problems of spatial governance under economic decentralization and political centralization
in China.
1 Lei Wang is assistant professor in Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. He earned his Ph.D. from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include regional planning and governance, planning system evolution in China. Jianfa Shen is professor and chairman in the Department of Geography and Resource Management, Director of the Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia – Pacific Studies in The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He earned his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. His research interests include urban and regional development, urbanization and governance. This research is supported by a South China Programme Research Grant, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK (No. 6903306) and Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 41071085). The authors can be reached by email at wanglei@niglas.ac.cn or jianfa@cuhk.edu.hk
1
Spatial planning and its implementation in provincial China: A case study of
Jiangsu Region along the Yangtze River Plan
1 Introduction
In the age of globalization, regions and cities are playing significant roles in the
economic growth and competiveness under the post-Fordist regime,2 and urbanized regions
are regarded as the functional space of economic planning and governance.3 Inter-city
cooperation and partnership are widely valued from the perspective of new regionalism, 4
even though it remains a great challenge for various governments to achieve economic
integration and collaboration at the regional scale. 5 Recently, there is growing literature that
discusses the issues and mechanisms of the regional formation process and corresponding
spatial planning responses in the Western countries. 6 It was argued that regional governance
mechanism is not pre-given but a result of changing political relations and scales to cope with
specific spatial transformation and problems. 7
Since the reform and open-up, the triple processes of marketization, decentralization and
globalization were considered as the principal forces underlying the rapid spatial development
and reconfiguration of China. 8 As noticed by some scholars, 9 China is also experiencing
regional renaissance. The state has paid increasing attention on regional planning. By 2012,
over 80 documents had been issued by central government suggesting the formulation of
2 Allen John Scott, Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3 M Keating, 'The Invention of Regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe', Environment and Planning C:Government and Policy 15((1997), pp. 183-398.
4 Mariona TomÀS, 'Exploring the Metropolitan Trap: The Case of Montreal', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36(3), (2012), pp. 554-567.
5 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, , 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.
6 Julie-Anne Boudreau, Pierre Hamel, Bernard Jouve and Roger Keil, 'Comparing Metropolitan Governance: The Cases of Montreal and Toronto', Progress in Planning 66((2006), pp. 7-59.
7 Andrew E. G. Jonas and Kevin Ward, 'Introduction to a Debate on City-Regions: New Geographies of Governance, Democracy and Social Reproduction', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31(1), (2007), pp. 169-178.
8 Y. D. Wei, 'Beyond the Sunan Model: Trajectory and Underlying Factors of Development in Kunshan, China', Environment and Planning A 34(10), (2002), pp. 1725-1747.
9 See Fulong Wu and Jingxing Zhang, 'Planning the Competitive City-Region: The Emergence of Strategic Development Plan in China', Urban Affairs Review 42(2007), pp. 714-740; Jiang Xu, 'Governing City-Regions in China: Theoretical Issues and Perspectives for Regional Strategic Planning ', Town Planning Review 79(2008), pp. 157-186.
2
various regional plans all over the country. Meanwhile, spatial planning in China is
undergoing transformation. In the pre-reform period under the state socialism, spatial
planning, introduced as a Soviet developmental model, was only a subordinating mechanism
in the planned economy, focusing on economic and social development.10 The central state
aimed to control completely economic enterprises, residents and authorities in local areas.11
After the reform, regional spatial planning gradually becomes an instrument employed by the
higher levels of government to realize relevant cross-boundary development purpose.12
Meanwhile, various spatial strategic plans were also formulated at local levels in order to
overcome the constraints of traditional statutory planning in development control, foster
competitive edges, and conduct place promotion.13 Subsequently, spatial planning in China
becomes a very complicated arena and the planning process is mixed by central control and
local initiatives with various levels of intervention.14 It seems that this transition is similar to
the experiences in the Western Europe. The function of regional planning should not be
limited to the spatial arrangement. It is a governance instrument to integrate various policies
in spatial development.15
Basically, there are two directions studying this emerging spatial planning boom since
the new millennium in China. At urban scale, following the urban transformation research in
10 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
11 Mee Kam Ng and Wing Shing Tang, 'The Role of Planning in the Development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities', Eurasian Geography and Economics 45(3), (2004), pp. 190-211.
12 Tinghai Wu, Regional Planning in Contemporary China (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006); Xiaogan Yu and Chuchai Wu, Study on Territorial and Regional Planning in Yangtze River Delta Region: Theory, Method and Practice (Beijing: Science Press (in Chinese), 1993).
13 Fulong Wu and Jingxing Zhang, 'Planning the Competitive City-Region: The Emergence of Strategic Development Plan in China', Urban Affairs Review 42(2007), pp. 714-740; Tingwei Zhang, 'Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai', Urban Affairs Review 37(4), (2002), pp. 475-499.
14 Cecilia Wong, Hui Qian and Kai Zhou, 'In Search of Regional Planning in China:The Case of Jiangsu and the Yangtze Delta', Town Planning Review 79((2008), pp. 295-329.
15 Bob Jessop, 'Towards a Schumpeteridn Workfare State? Preliminary Remark on Post-Fordist Political Economy', Studies in Political Economy 40(1993), pp. 7-39.
3
China,16 Wu and Zhang17 argued that the rise of urban strategic planning is no more than a
flexible way to express the long term pro-growth vision of the local political elites, further
increasing the original complexity of planning landscape in China. As argued by Xu and
Yeh,18 in the process of decentralization, local elites are responsible to economic development
under their jurisdictions, and there is an appointed cadres system based on the performance in
economic development. These are the reasons why local careerist officials are ambitious in
pursuing GDP growth in their terms of office. Consequently, spatial planning is employed as
a new strategy by local governments for place marketing to attract mobile capital and
resources and enhance local competitiveness.19 Besides, through constructing great image-
lifting projects which could be easily deemed as achievements of local development, local
officials may be appreciated by upper-level leaders and subsequently considered for political
promotion.20 Moreover, under the ‘soft budget constraint’ institutions in urban development,21
it is easy to understand why local governments have keen interests in planning and building
large projects.
At the regional scale, on the other hand, it is argued that entrepreneurial city is under
crisis because of the no-win situation due to the intense competition, exacerbating redundant
infrastructure construction, urban land sprawl and ecological degradation, as well as social
inequalities.22 Moreover, the changing production mode in the globalizing economy needs
16 Laurence J. C. Ma, 'Economic Reforms, Urban Spatial Restructuring, and Planning in China', Progress in Planning 61(3), (2004), pp. 237-260; Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.
17 Fulong Wu and Fangzhu Zhang, 'China's Emerging City Region Governance: Towards a Research Framework', Progress in Planning 73(1), (2010), pp. 60-63.
18 Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, 'City Repositioning and Competitiveness Building in Regional Development: New Development Strategies in Guangzhou, China', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29(2), (2005), pp. 283-308.
19 Fulong Wu, 'The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question', Urban Studies 40(9), (2003), pp. 1673-1698.
20 Jun Zhang and lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).
21 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.
22 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Emergence of Centrally Initiated Regional Plan in China: A Case Study of Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan', Habitat International 39(0), (2013), pp. 137-147; Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.
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regionally integrated development and competitiveness.23 In order to address fragmented
policies, Wu and Zhang24 argued that three major responses have been presented in current
China: ‘spatial strategic plans, administrative annexation and the development of regional soft
institutions’. The emerging boom of regional spatial planning in latest years illustrates that
central government has recognized the problems of fierce inter-jurisdiction competition.25
Subsequently, central government has centralized some key governance tools, such as annual
land supply and major function-oriented zoning plan.26 Spatial planning is thus understood as
state restructuring process to address the place-specific governance issues of regional
coordination.27
Generally, most studies related to Chinese spatial planning and governance focus on the
planning process and plan texts analysis. The outcomes of these new spatial governance
mechanisms have not been assessed with a few exceptions,28 due to the short term impacts of
plan implementation and the complexity of plan evaluation itself. Especially, rather than
planning discourses, it is the governance tools developed by various levels of government
during the plan implementation that vehicles the establishment of regional governance
mechanism. Besides, although the central-local relation has been emphasized in the spatial
planning and governance, the local government usually referred to urban government.
Actually, local government in China includes governments at various levels below central
government. Therefore, the role of provincial government was ignored to some extent. With
23 Allen John Scott, Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
24 Fulong Wu and Fangzhu Zhang, 'China's Emerging City Region Governance: Towards a Research Framework', Progress in Planning 73(1), (2010), pp. 60-63.
25 Jie Fan, Wei Sun , Zhenshan Yang , Peng Fan and Dong Chen 'Focusing on the Major Function-Oriented Zone: A New Spatial Planning Approach and Practice in China and Its 12th Five-Year Plan', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 86-96.
26 Jiang Xu and James Jixian Wang, 'Reassembling the State in Urban China', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 7-20.
27 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Transformation of Regional Governance in China: The Rescaling of Statehood', Progress in Planning 78(2), (2012), pp. 55-99; Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, 'Re-Building Regulation and Re-Inventing Governance in the Pearl River Delta, China', Urban Policy and Research 30(4), (2012), pp. 385-401.
28 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217; Jiang Xu, 'Governing City-Regions in China: Theoretical Issues and Perspectives for Regional Strategic Planning ', Town Planning Review 79(2008), pp. 157-186.
5
land related governance issues downscaled to municipal level, it general assumed that there
was a tendency of weakening provincial government,29 regardless of China has employed a
spatial asymmetric decentralized reform. However, there was also an argument that provincial
government still matters regarding regional strategic formation.30 Under these theoretical
debates, how has provincial government played in regional spatial planning and governance
remains ambiguous in contemporary China.
This study attempts to fill the above theoretical and empirical research gaps through a
case study of Jiangsu region along the Yangtze River (JSYR) plan. Based on the perspective
of regional governance, it aims to explore the following four inter-related questions. What
was the rationale that the plan was proposed? What was the role of spatial planning in
establishing regional governance mechanism? What were the roles of provincial and
municipal governments in the practice of spatial planning? How had the contest between
provincial and municipal government influenced on the spatial plan making and
implementation? In order to answer these questions, we collected data from several sources,
including interviews of some officials and planners, relevant government documents, Jiangsu
Statistics Yearbooks (2000-2011), as well as scholars’ publications and news report on JSYR
to trace the process of spatial plan making and implementation. The plan-making process was
traced to explore the underlying politics between provincial and municipal governments on
the place-specific governance issues and to establish a process-event analysis over the success
and failure in fulfilling the development goals of the JSYR plan.
The paper is divided into six sections. After this introduction, the next section introduces
a conceptual framework for analyzing spatial planning and governance in provincial China.
Then the case study of the JSYR plan is introduced. The following section focuses on the
plan-making process to illustrate the rearticulated spatial policy framework. The fifth section 29 Jane Duckett, 'Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese-Style: The Lessons of Market Reform and
State Entrepreneurialism in the People's Republic of China', World Development 29(1), (2001), pp. 23-37; Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu, 'Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China', Economic development and cultural change 49(1), (2000), pp. 1-21.
30 Roger C. K. Chan and Shi Xian, 'Assessing the Incentives in Regional City-to-City Cooperation: A Case Study of Jiangyin–Jingjiang Industrial Park of Jiangsu Province in the Yangtze River Delta Region', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 56-69.
6
evaluates the plan implementation and its underlying mechanisms. Section six is the
discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Conceptualizing spatial planning as a process of governance in provincial
political economic context
2.1 The relation between market and the state
In the era of globalization and changing scalar relations, it is widely assumed that the
role of state is declining and restructuring.31 Many scholars also discussed a similar trend of
state rescaling in Chinese context.32 The state has transformed from resource distributor in the
planned economy to regulator and increasingly to market actor in the post-reform period.33
But economic reform should not be understood as a total retreat of state power from economic
and social life in China. By constructing state guidelines, policies and projects of economic
development, the state restores its roles in the market.34 Besides, acted flexibly in the context
of economic globalization, local government has introduced many policies and institutional
innovations so as to enhance competitiveness in attracting investment and to promote
economic growth.35 The interactions of the state and market in current China are complicated
and dynamic, which should be put into local historical political economic context to
understand. Generally, the state still plays an important role and spatial planning is an
important mechanism to regulate and coordinate economic development.
2.2 Economic decentralization and political centralization
Apart from the market-oriented reform, China also has been undergoing a gradual
economic decentralization process since 1978. Economic decentralization was regarded as
31 Neil Brenner, 'Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-Scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', Urban Studies 36(3), (1999), pp. 431-451.
32 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316; Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
33 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
34 Fulong Wu, 'The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question', Urban Studies 40(9), (2003), pp. 1673-1698.
35 Shiuh-Shen Chien, 'Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China', Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25(2007), pp. 269-290.
7
one of the most important forces that have facilitated the unprecedented economic growth in
urban China. Local governments at various levels are empowered with discretions of
administrative power on many dimensions of economic activity, such as land use, finance,
investment and banking.36 In particular, in 1994, the introduction of tax-sharing system has
far-reaching influences on Chinese economic landscape. Various self-raised extra budgetary
revenues were used to implement strategies of local development priority with no need of
approvals from the central government.37 Subsequently, local governments have been playing
a critical role in governing the territory-based development.
On the other hand, alongside economic decentralization, the Communist Party-state at
various levels are in control of local economic and political affairs, as ‘ the ultimate decision-
maker, regulator, and participant’.38 Politically, local officials are appointed through the
appointed cadres system in line with the Chinese administrative hierarchy. Consequently the
higher level officials could intervene in local economic development through political
influence. Therefore, there is double-role of local careerist officials in place-specific
development. Local officials are both participants in promoting economic growth for
economic rationality and in political competition for political promotion and political capital
accumulation.39 However, the incentives for local officials of political promotion often
outweigh the economic rationality.40 Spatial planning is an important project in which local
officials can play important role for both economic and political benefits.
36 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.
37 Shiuh-Shen Chien, 'Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China', Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25(2007), pp. 269-290.
38 L. J. C. Ma, 'Urban Transformation in China, 1949 - 2000: A Review and Research Agenda', Environment and Planning A 34(9), (2002), pp. 1545-1569.
39 Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 'Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China', Journal of Public Economics 89(9–10), (2005), pp. 1743-1762; Cartier C, 2001, "'zone fever', the arable land debate, and real estate speculation: China's evolving land use regime and its geographical contradictions" Journal of Contemporary China 10 445-469.
40 Jun Zhang and Lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).
8
2.3 Interactions between tiers of governments in spatial planning
The relationship between central and local state became much more dynamic and
complicated in post-reform period.41 The decentralized reform loosed once rigid-vertical
control over local states. Local government has been mobilized and directly involved in urban
development. Nonetheless, policies and investment practices from central government are still
important variables for local development as central government is still in control of a large
number of capital and resources.42 Moreover, a vertical controlled goal and quota
management system evolved from planned economy is still in operation, such as the amounts
of newly-added construction land and the basic farmland and environmental protection goals.
Besides, economic decentralization is not completely to downscale the power to urban
government. Various government levels are empowered with different discretional power on
economic administration, such as the project approval right and land use permit.
Consequently, the policies and investment practices remained at provincial level are also
important factors for urban development. Additionally, as there is absence of regional
government in China, provincial government usually serves to coordinate the conflicts and
competitions among cities.
Spatial planning is regarded not just as a technical tool for project proposal and
construction, but a social process through which all stakeholders are mobilized to shape the
plan and develop strategic agendas within the power-relation context.43 In the Chinese context
of political economy, spatial planning has become a more policy-based approach, through
which hierarchical governments struggle to achieve local interests. Spatial plans at higher
levels, i.e., national and provincial levels, have special strategic importance in China. Higher
level governments employ the spatial plans as governance instruments to guide economic
41 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
42 Mee Kam Ng and Wing Shing Tang, 'The Role of Planning in the Development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities', Eurasian Geography and Economics 45(3), (2004), pp. 190-211.
43 Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
9
activities and control the undesired spatial development projects.44 Various regulatory tools
and practices, such as taxation, ordinances, examination and approval system, quota system
and government official promotion system, are employed to facilitate the implementation of
spatial plan. Meanwhile, local governments are more actively struggling to upscale their
spatial plans to become strategies of a higher level government in order to capture the top-
down benefits. For example, after being incorporated into spatial plans of upper levels, local
development projects could be approved smoothly. Besides, employing such upscale-strategy,
local municipal governments could bargain for investment and preferential policies supported
by higher level governments.
At the meso-scale, provincial spatial plan plays a much more complicated role compared
with national and municipal ones. It manifests both upscaling for national strategy and
downscaling to cope with municipal upscaling strategy. Correspondingly, on the one hand,
provincial officials are mobilized by the center for political promotion. On the other hand,
they serve as mediators and coordinators of local conflicts and competitions at provincial
scale. Besides, provincial government is limited in land development compared with
municipal government. Actually, it draws up spatial plans, but relies on municipal
government for plan implementation through various mobilizations.
These arguments have been useful to develop a conceptual framework proposed for
analyzing the contest between provincial and municipal governments in spatial planning in
China (Figure 1). The analysis is built on the local context of political economy in spatial
planning. The main purpose of provincial government to formulate regional spatial planning
is to integrate the fragmented territorial policies by various economic and political
mobilizations. The development goals of planning including social economic development,
land use regulation, environmental protection and infrastructure building, etc., which are
manifested in the governance relation restructuring during the planning process. On the one
hand, spatial plan is used by the provincial government to guide and control regional
44 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Transformation of Regional Governance in China: The Rescaling of Statehood', Progress in Planning 78(2), (2012), pp. 55-99.
10
development. On the other hand, it is a contested arena where municipal governments are
lobbying and bargaining for their own interests. Both the two processes can significantly
influence the ways in which spatial plan is implemented. In this paper, the contests between
provincial and municipal governments over those governance issues, the planning
administration and mechanisms are our key variables for analyzing the JSYR plan making
and implementation. Consequently, rather than only discussing the roles of provincial or
municipal governments in the development of spatial planning in JSYR, the paper tries to
explore the ways in which the contestation between the two levels of government have
influenced the outcomes of the JSYR plan.
Figure 1 Conceptual framework of analyzing the contest between provincial and municipal governments in spatial planning in China
3 The emergence of JSYR planning
3.1 Introduction of JSYR plan
The JSYR plan covers the cities and counties along the Yangtze River in Jiangsu
province. Near to Shanghai, the region is in the center of lower Yangtze River Delta,
including six central cities and 15 county-level cities or counties (Figure 2). The south part of
the region is one of the most developed areas in Jiangsu province. JSYR has been a provincial
development strategy for a long time. As early as 1990s, when the territorial plan was popular
11
in China, Jiangsu government formulated the first regional plan in JSYR.45 It first put forward
the idea to construct provincial industrial belt along the Yangtze River, although the old plan
failed to implement due to many reasons.
Figure 2 Location of JSYR
The JSYR plan was initiated by Jiangsu provincial government and drafted by provincial
economic plan commission (predecessor of current provincial development and reform
commission, PDRC) with the contributions by relevant non-governmental planners. The plan-
making began in early 2002 and was completed in June 2003 with a planning horizon from
2003 to 2010.
The JSYR plan is a hybrid form of economic plan and land use plan in order to develop
an integrated strategy for this region. It includes all aspects of the development coordination,
such as industries, water front utilization zoning, environmental protection, regional disparity
and cooperation, regional infrastructural construction, major functions of ports and cities. It
proposes to construct four industrial clusters of equipment manufacturing, chemical industry,
metallurgic industry, and logistics industry.46 The plan clearly presents the important role of
developing JSYR for enhancing province’s international competitiveness and promoting
45 Xiaogan Yu and Chuchai Wu, Study on Territorial and Regional Planning in Yangtze River Delta Region: Theory, Method and Practice (Beijing: Science Press, 1993).
46 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Notice of Provincial Government About Promulgating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development Plan’ (Nanjing, 2003).
12
regional industrial upgrading and coordinated development. Generally, the main body of the
plan could be divided into three parts.
(i) Guiding function. The plan stated the following primary growth goals towards the end
of plan period in 2010: GDP surpasses 1,280 billion RMB with annual growth rate around
12% (the figures in 2002 were 514.4 billion RMB and 12.7% respectively), industrial
structure of primary, secondary and tertiary industry adjusts to the ratio of 4:53:43 (6:54:40 in
2002), industrial value added comes to 674 billion RMB (242.2 billion RMB in 2002), and
urbanization level increases to 65% (51.6% in 2001). The plan also recommends developing
port-centered industries with big freight volume and big throughput. It prescribes strategies
and locations of various development subjects, such as industries and urban system.
(ii) Binding function. The plan has regulations on water front utilization zones;
environmental regulations on sewage treatment and the Yangtze River water environmental
protection target, etc.
(iii) Action plan. The plan stated the total investment in fixed assets (TIFA, 2.1-2.5
trillion RMB.) and a construction plan of infrastructure projects related to comprehensive
transportation system, port facilities, energy supply and ecological environmental protection
measurements.
In order to answer the proposed research questions, this paper will analyze the case
within the normative conceptual framework through two analytical lines, the process and
factors, to examine the driving forces, institutions, stakeholders network, as well as impacts
and outcomes of JSYR plan.
3.2 Driving forces of plan formulation
(i) There was increasingly fierce competition within the cities of Yangtze River Delta
(YRD). It is widely recognized that YRD is restructuring to a polycentric region with the rise
of new dynamic cities of Suzhou and Wuxi.47 Competition for mobile capital of global
47 Xiangming Chen, 'A Tale of Two Regions in China Rapid Economic Development and Slow Industrial Upgrading in the Pearl River and the Yangtze River Deltas', International Journal of Comparative Sociology 47(2-3), (2007), pp. 167-201; Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-
13
industrial transfer and for resources and policies from central government was intensified at
that time. Due to similar natural conditions, cities in JSYR competed with each other through
the race-to-bottom price strategy of land leasing and tax relief48. Although Jiangsu and
Zhejiang indicated their wishes to strengthen the connections with the dragon head: Shanghai,
the competitions among the three provincial areas have got worse steadily due to local
interests. For example, in early 2003, Shanghai planned 173 km2 areas in the suburbs and
offered corresponding preferential tax and land leasing policies to attract investment of
‘global top 500 enterprises’. Later in June 2003, Zhejiang also proposed an industrial
development strategy for Hangzhou Bay by setting up considerable investment preferential
policies for modern manufacturing industries. As a traditional competitor within YRD,
Jiangsu province was also engaged in the game. Thus setting up the development strategy of
JSYR reflected such inner and inter region competition.
(ii) There was emerging cross-river development led by the market forces. Before 2000,
due to the limitation of cross-river infrastructures, the connection between south and north
was considered not important. Nevertheless, some cross-river cooperation projects have
already started at firm level stimulated by complementary factors of the two riversides since
200049. The developed south side was rich in capital and technology, but was nearly running
out of land use quota for construction (the amount approved by upper level government).
Besides, the production cost in some developed southern cities, like Wuxi and Suzhou, was
rising significantly. In contrast, the developing north was rich in land quota and water front
resources, but was scarce in capital. Therefore, some enterprises in the south set up their
branches or relocated to the cities of north riverside.
Besides, local city to city cooperation also started by jointly building industrial park with
the arrangement that the north part provides the land and the south part provides capital.
Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.
48 Jun Zhang and lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).
49 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.
14
Jiangyin-Jingjiang Park is a typical case, which is co-sponsored by two county-level cities of
Jiangyin and Jingjiang. The project was deemed as a development model by the provincial
government. Afterwards, Jiangsu provincial government considered to spread such experience
over the whole province50. The interaction and cooperation between cities in the two
riversides is regarded by provincial officials as an important way of reducing regional gap.
(iii) It was also a regional project initiated by municipal officials. In 2002, the mayor of
Yangzhou submitted an internal report to Jiangsu provincial government to present the
importance of developing JSYR, suggesting provincial government to give preferential
policies to support the region.51 Before that, Yangzhou had already set preferential policies for
investment in its jurisdictional region along Yangtze River in February 2002.52 Some other
cities in JSYR also followed up by formulating their spatial polices. The report from the
mayor of Yangzhou got immediate attention of the provincial leaders.
4 JSYR plan: a rearticulated spatial policy framework
4.1 JSYR plan-making procedure: contested subjects
(1) Formulation of development strategy
In the early 2002, Jiangsu provincial government proceeded to formulate the new JSYR
plan. Afterwards, a plan-making working group was established, consisting of government
officials in Jiangsu economic plan commission, experts from national economic commission
and Nanjing institute of Geography and Limnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
(NIGLAS).
Still in the plan-making period in the early 2003, the new provincial governor, Liang
Baohua, said in his government working report: “We should speed up formulating the JSYR
plan and studying relevant supporting policies”.53 The report also hypothesized that there
50 Roger C. K. Chan and Shi Xian, 'Assessing the Incentives in Regional City-to-City Cooperation: A Case Study of Jiangyin–Jingjiang Industrial Park of Jiangsu Province in the Yangtze River Delta Region', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 56-69.
51 Interview of a former government official in Jiangsu PDRC, 2012122852 No. 40 joint document of Yangzhou municipal government and communist party committee in
200253 Baohua Liang, ‘Government Work Report of Jiangsu Province’, (Nanjing: Gazette of Jiangsu
Provincial People's Government, 2003).
15
would be a transfer of international industries towards YRD. Therefore, Jiangsu should not
miss the opportunity to develop itself and embark in the global economy. JSYR was regarded
as a right base to accommodate international industrial transfer. During the period of planning
studying and consultation, some experts suggested to provincial leaders that the development
experience of Rhine Valley could be useful reference to Jiangsu province for industrial
transformation. The two great rivers have similar advantages to develop river-ocean joint
transportation by ships of 10,000 DWT (Deadweight tonnage).54 Thus, comparing with other
southeast coastal areas in China, they thought such a significant advantage of JSYR should be
considered for further industrial development and strategy-making. That was why the plan put
forward the strategy of developing heavy industries.
(2) Bargaining for resources: the interaction between municipal and provincial
governments
In the JSYR plan-making process, the top provincial leaders had great influence in the
formulation of main development strategies and goals. The planners functioned as consultants
and mediators between municipal governments and provincial government. Provincial and
municipal governments had intensive interactions on the planning subjects. The water front
utilization zoning and regional infrastructure location (cross-river pathways, highways, ports
and power stations along the Yangtze River) were the most controversial arenas where most
municipalities were keen to compete with each other and to bargain with provincial
government for their own interests.55
Here the water front zoning process was used as an example. The initial plan was drafted
by the planners in NIGLAS. By evaluating water front’s natural and economic conditions, the
planners formulated function zones of water front utilization including zones of public port
terminals, industries, cross-river pathways, living, tourism, ecological protection, and water
intake and future reserve. However, for fearing of restricting their economic development, all
municipal governments asked for allocating more productive water front instead of ecological
54 Interview of local planner A, 2012072855 Interview of local planner A, 20120728
16
protection zones. Municipal governments spent lots of time and efforts to bargain with the
PRDC. At last, except sticking to the major principles of function location such as water front
nearby drinking water intake and national ecological protection areas, PDRC had to
compromise and revise the water front function zoning plan to satisfy the requests of
municipal governments. Thus the planners could not play their professional roles completely.
Sometimes, they only translated the bargaining results of different tiers of governments into
professional rhetoric and maps.
After the plan was drafted, the plan-making working group conducted several meetings
and forums for intensive plan consultation among different provincial departments,
governments of cities and counties, industrial parks and big enterprises. Through this
approach, the plan-making process incorporated some voices of different stakeholders,
reflecting the regional overall interests of pro-growth development. After the consultation, an
expert team from several professional planning institutions engaged in plan suggestion and
argumentation. Finally, the revised draft plan was submitted to the Standing Committee of
Provincial Government and Provincial People’s Congress for approval successively. From
then on, dominated by political elites and technical experts, the JSYR plan formulation was
officially completed. It shows the general politics of plan-making in provincial China that
general public had little participation in the plan-making process.
The main objective of the plan was to stimulate economic growth at different levels, and
the actual coordination efforts in the plan-making process was to mitigate the bottleneck of
competitions blocking the regional growth, rather than focusing on the coordinated and
balanced development. For example, it was an urban-bias plan while the vast rural areas were
ignored, let along the dynamic relationship between the urban and rural areas.
During the plan-making process, officials from various levels of government had
common interest in developing JSYR’s urban economy. Firstly, the new leadership of the
provincial government proposed that the JSYR should become a new growth pole with high
competiveness to lead the development of whole province. On the other hand, it could
17
enhance the economic connection of the two riversides and thus reduce the development gap
between them. Secondly, each city had its own ambition of developing local economy. Cities
in south side were under the pressure of industrial restructuring and shortage of land resource.
In contrast, cities in the north side were trying to find a new way of developing their
backward economy. Upscaling their development strategies of local areas along the Yangtze
River into provincial agenda was widely welcome. Therefore, the timely provincial JSYR
strategy was highly supported by municipal governments.
However, it does not mean there was no difference in spatial visions held by two levels
of government. For example, except to promote economic growth, the provincial government
also wanted to assert the functional importance to control the uncoordinated development on
behalf of the regional interest. In the context of economic decentralization, municipal
governments were much more interested in the local economic growth and revenue increase.
The conflict between them was reflected vividly in the water front zoning process. Even
though the conflict was obvious, the common interest of developing economy brought them
together. Besides, the conflict may also be eased by provincial government’s mobilizations
and relevant regulations, which were supposed to guarantee the plan implementation in some
subjects.
4.2 Mobilizations of plan implementation by various agents
(1) Mobilizations from provincial government
In order to facilitate cities and counties to implement the plan, except the infrastructural
construction plan, the provincial government also introduced several top-down political and
economic mobilizations. Combining the plan and these mobilizations, a provincial top-down
spatial policy framework was formed.
(i) Setting preferential policies to promote the implementation of plan’s strategy of
developing cities in north side. Before publishing the plan openly, the provincial government
and Party committee issued two important documents to support JSYR plan. The first policy
18
package was issued on 30 June 2003.56 It documented provincial government’s huge financial
reward on the infrastructural building of different categories in north side, and industrial parks
in north side those who finished their development goals (5 million RMB per year of reward),
and cities in south sides who co-build industrial parks with north side (8 million RMB of
reward and 50% added-value tax exemption for new projects). Moreover, it also exempted
provincial government’s land tax on new added construction land in north side.
(ii) Setting annual development goals for local governments’ plan implementation. On
15 July 2003, provincial government and Party committee jointly issued a document named
Opinions on Accelerating JSYR development from Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and
Government.57 It documented the significance of the JSYR plan implementation and ordered
local officials of cities and counties to take active parts in it. Afterward, the provincial
government set annual development goals for local officials to fulfill. It included six
economic indicators of GDP, local fiscal revenue, value of total export, etc. These indicators
were generated from development goals in the plan document and divided into local goals
annually. Besides, although not officially documented, provincial government would reward
some money and reputations directly to local officials and cities or counties who overfilled
their development goals, respectively.58 It was highly manipulated by provincial government
through the political centralization mechanism.
(iii) Setting up plan coordination leading group and working office at various levels. The
provincial governor was the group leader at provincial leading group, followed by members
of 2 vice provincial governors, 15 directors of relevant provincial departments, mayors of
prefecture-level cities. This high level leading group was unprecedented in the provincial
strategies. The working office was under PDRC, in charged by the director of PDRC. Except
the daily work assigned to working office, it was decided that, rather that the department of
56 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Notice of Provincial Government About Promulgating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development Plan’ (Nanjing, 2003).
57 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Opinions on Accelerating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development from Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Government’, (Nanjing, 2003).
58 Interview of a government official at PDRC 20120728
19
regional coordination, the department of foreign investment and trade in PDRC was in charge
of the tasks assigned by coordination leading group. The purpose of this arrangement was that
the department specializing in foreign investment and trade affairs who could help the
working office to hold investment promotion conferences and promote JSYR export-oriented
economy.59 Afterwards in 2007, the duties were shifted to the department of regional
coordination in PDRC.
Moreover, the provincial government also asked prefectural cities, county-level cities,
counties and industrial parks to create their own plan coordination leading groups and
corresponding working offices. Thus, it formed a hierarchical leadership of plan
implementation. One of the most important functions of provincial working office was to
organize the JSYR development conferences to assign annual developing goals to cities,
counties, and industrial parks, and reward those officials and departments who reached well
above the development goals. During the conferences, those rewarded officials and
department were invited to report their local experiences of developing JSYR. Basically, the
conference functioned as an institutional setting-up for learning, conversation and interaction
among cities.
(2) Mobilizations from municipal governments
Meanwhile, cities and counties also set their own strategies under provincial framework.
Their activities included the following four aspects: (i) setting up additional policies and
regulations to attract investment and mobilize their officials to complete a more detailed list
of pro-growth goals; (ii) formulating their detailed local plans to guide the development and
cater for investors; (iii) increasing local construction land quota for the region; (iv) increasing
local fiscal expenditure on infrastructure construction.
Since the region became the focus of a provincial strategy, competitions among cities
have intensified for attracting outside investment. In contrast, the coordination work lagged
behind even though the provincial government provided many incentives for north-south
59 Interview of a government official at working office of the JSYR plan implementation 20120618
20
cooperation. For example, as reported by newspapers of Jiangsu Economic News and Money
China about their relevant strategies, the mayors in Nanjing and Yangzhou both emphasized
the importance of attracting investment, the earlier the better, and the earlier the stronger
competitive advantage. Thus, they took the plan as an opportunity for attracting investment.
The mayor of Nanjing said: “We think provincial strategy of developing JSYR is a great
opportunity for Nanjing’s development. As long as we seize the opportunity earlier and make
corresponding actions quickly, we will get advantages compared with other cities”, interview
reported in Shi et al.60 The mayor of Yangzhou said: “attracting investment is the most
important agenda in our city. Our officials have annual quotas of attracting investment. If an
official cannot complete the quota in two consecutive years, he or she should better have a
reasonable excuse. Otherwise he or she may need to leave the current term of office”,
interview reported in Cui.61
(3) Mobilizations from mass media
During the JSYR plan-making, the mass media was also used by various governments as
mobilization instrument. In order to attract investment, the government invited major mass
media in the country to report the business opportunities in JSYR. As a big strategy of an
important province in China, Chinese media paid a great attention to the plan. By searching
for the key word of “developing JSYR or JSYR plan (in Chinese)” in Wisenews, it shows that
there was a peak of news report of developing JSYR in 2003 when the plan was released to
the public (Figure 3).
60 Jiwei Shi, Lingmei Wang and Rui Chen, ‘The Reports from Cities in Jsyr’, Jiangsu Economic News, 10 June 2003.
61 Ronghui Cui, ‘The Jsyr Development Strategy in Jiangsu Province’, Money China, March 2004.
21
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20120
200
400
600
800
Figure 3 Number of news reports on developing JSYR in the major media in China
5 Assessing plan implementation
According to the development goals outlined in the planning discourses, we assess the
plan implementation through the following four aspects.
5.1 Regional disparity
There was a huge increase in the TIFA in both riversides at the early plan
implementation period from 2003 to 2005. The increase rate of TIFA in JSYR in 2003 was
65.81%, and the figures in south and north were 75.14% and 40.59% respectively. It indicates
that cities in the south were much more competitive in attracting investment than their
counterparts in the north at the early stage of plan implementation. The TIFA ratio of the two
riversides was relatively stable. But the unbalanced FDI distribution in the two riversides was
eased significantly in this period as the south to north ratio decreased from 7.35 in 2002 to
1.86 in 2005. The coefficient of variation (CV) of GDP per capital in JSYR based on county-
level units enlarged from 0.51 in 2002 to 0.58 in 2005. The CV of JSYR was much higher
than that of the south or north. Thus the major contribution of regional disparity was due to
the enlarged disparity between the two river sides.
Compared with the enlarged regional gap at the early plan implementation period, the
JSYR strategy has promoted economic growth in north riverside significantly and reduced the
regional gap between the two riversides to some extent since then (Figure 4). The TIFA ratio
of south to north decreased form 3.18 in 2005 to 2.41 in 2010, while FDI ratio of south to
22
north in the same period was in table. The north has surpassed the south in terms of GDP
growth rate since 2006. However, the economic gap was still significant. The CV of GDP per
capital in this region was still very large in 2010. The GDP ratio of south to north was 2.47 in
2010, which was same as that of 2001. Therefore the development strategy of reducing
regional disparity has not been realized yet.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
500
1000
1500
2000
0
5
10
15
20
25North South JSYR
GD
P (b
illio
n R
MB
)
GD
P gr
owth
rat
e (%
)Figure 4 GDP growth in JSYR (constant price)
Data Source: Jiangsu Statistic Yearbook (2002-2011)
5.2 Environmental protection
Although the increase rate of TIFA in JSYR was 65.81% in 2003, the money spent on
environmental management and protection was very little in 2003 (1.69 billion RMB) and
2004 (4.91 billion RMB), compared with the adjacent years, 4.81 billion RMB in 2002 and
11.19 billion RMB in 2005. In contrast to investment boom of industries, the relatively
lagging investment in environment affected the pollution treatment capacity and environment
governance in this region. As reported, some factories just discharged sewage into the
Yangtze River without any treatment.62 Thus, during the early plan implementation period,
local officials neglected the corresponding environmental protection.
62 Qiujun Deng, ‘Can We Take Yangtze River as Discharge Pipe: The Pollution Investigation of Jiangsu Taixing Chemical Industrial Park’, Modern Express, 2007; Yufang Li, Yan Yan and Jie Gao, ‘How to Cope with the Secret Discharges by Enterprizes?’, China Environment News, 21 October 2008.
23
As the result, the environmental protection goals were not achieved very well (Table 1).
The planned goal of water quality of the Yangtze River was grade two of national standards,
but actually it was grade three in 2010. Besides, according to the investigation of Provincial
Department of Environmental Protection, only 26 control sections met the planned goals of
water quality among the total 45 provincial control sections for monitoring branch river water
quality of Jiangsu Yangtze River.63 Some other indicators such as the control rate of industrial
waste water and the control rate of acid rain failed to reach the targets.
5.3 Regulation on water front utilization
For the development control over the water front utilization, it was not so effective
either. According to the development strategy, one of the most important functions of the
JSYR plan was to enhance the coordinated development of water front utilization. However,
even introduced relevant governance instruments to cope with the low efficient and
disordered utilization, the regulatory practice in the plan was not effective. In order to attract
investment, the utilization rate increased significantly. Some water front utilization, leased by
local cities and counties to developers, was not in line with the zoning plan. According to the
land use cover map interpreted from TM image, water front utilization rate in main stream of
the Jiangsu Yangtze River increased from 27.8% in 2002 to 53.5% in 2008, an increase of
25.7%64, while the figure was only 22.1% in 1997. Besides, some planned water front for
ecological protection and future reservation was occupied by industrial projects, and deep-
water front was misused by 28.6%.
5.4 Economic goals and infrastructure construction
In contrast to the above frustrated results, the economic growth goals and infrastructure
construction plan were implemented very well. As early as in 2008, JSYR had already
surpassed its planned economic growth goals, including the total GDP, annual GDP growth
63 Yao Guo and Xiao Chen, 'Outcome Evaluation of Regional Plan Implementation: A Case Study of "Regional Development Plan of Yangtze-Riverside Area in Jiangsu"', Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin 22(4), (2013), pp. 405-411.
64 Yao Guo and Xiao Chen, 'Outcome Evaluation of Regional Plan Implementation: A Case Study of "Regional Development Plan of Yangtze-Riverside Area in Jiangsu"', Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin 22(4), (2013), pp. 405-411.
24
rate (Figure 4) and industrial value added. Most planned infrastructures were built
successfully in the plan period as well (Table 1). The comprehensive transportation system
and industrial infrastructures in this area were improved greatly. In particular, the
construction of JSYR expressway has contributed to the development of logistics industry
significantly.
Table 1. Assessing the JSYR plan implementation in terms of development goals
Planned subjects Implementation assessment
Economic and social
development
GDP (1280 billion RMB) and GDP growth rate (12%) Realized (2060 billion RMB, 18.1%)
Industrial value added (674 billion RMB) Realized (1017 billion RMB)
Industrial structure of primary, secondary and tertiary industry, 4:53:43 -(3.1:54.4:42.4)
Urbanization level 65% Failed (63%)
Environment protection
Control rate of industrial waste water (100%) Failed (80%)Water quality of Yangtze River in grade 2 Failed (Grade 3)Acid rain control rate (15%) FailedUrban household wastes hazard-free treatment rate figure (100%) NA
Green rate of urban built-up area (40%) Realized
Infrastructure building
Total length of highway (km) RealizedTotal length of railway (km) RealizedNumber of cross river pathways (10) Failed (8)Number of berths for ships of ten thousand tons RealizedPower stations and cross river transmit electricity RealizedSewage treatment plants Realized
Source: Jiangsu Statistic Yearbook 2011, JSYP plan (2011-2020) and Preliminary Study of 12th FYP in Jiangsu Province
To conclude the assessment, it found that the development of JSYR in the period of early
plan implementation was out of control, ignoring the environmental protection and regional
coordination. Afterwards, except economic growth and infrastructural construction, the other
development goals were not implemented very well.
Rapid economic growth was the most successful part in the implementation of JSYR
plan. It was contributed by various governments’ promotion and the advantages of developing
heavy industries along the Jiangsu Yangtze River.
“Besides local municipal officials’ initiatives, the reasons why economic achievements
in JSYR were so significant include provincial government’s preferential policies of
25
investment and land use, the opportunities of heavy industrialization tendency of China since
2000 and the comparative advantages of the Yangtze River transportation in this region.”
(Interview of an official in working office of the JSYR plan implementation, 20130618)
Compared with economic development goals, there were complicated spatial governance
issues of environmental protection because it is planted in the internal provincial politics.
“Economic goals outweighed environment goals, as economic goals were still the most
important components for assessing their performance in term of office.” (Interview of local
planner B, 20130524)
Local officials were more active in promoting economic growth with the method of
government investment in infrastructures to facilitate economic growth or directly setting
guidance for local SOEs to developing high profit industries. “Building infrastructures could
show local officials’ achievements quickly. On the other hand, local projects could get
provincial financial support through intensive bargaining with provincial officials, squeezing
into provincial investment agenda and development priority.” (Interview of local planner C,
20130528)
Moreover, we could not take the planned infrastructure for granted as the projects only in
JSYR plan. Actually, some planned infrastructure projects, such as cross river pathways and
railways in the JSYR plan had also been scheduled in other plans, such as national or
provincial transportation plan and local urban master plans. The JSYR plan just incorporated
these projects and promoted their construction paces. This reflects the nature of spatial plan in
China that it is more likely a big basket carried by higher level government, into which local
lower level governments struggle to put their development projects. The mobilizations by
various agents accelerated the pace of project construction for their respective purposes.
Subsequently, the plan was a top-down policy and development projects oriented.
However, the actually spatial problems of fragmentation were not important from the
views of municipal governments. For example, the governance issue of water front utilization
is highly fragmented and beyond the governance capacity of Jiangsu provincial government.
26
First, the governance of water front utilization is a complicated affair as it is related to the
Yangtze River flood control, environmental protection and land use. Currently, there is no
mechanism at provincial level to integrate these spatial subjects, let alone the capability of
JSYR plan. Second, the responsibility of water front governance is fragmented into several
departments at various levels, including the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission at
central level, various departments at provincial level, and the actual users of municipal
governments and enterprises. But the ultimate approval power for water front utilization and
function change is controlled by the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission. Thus
provincial government is not the final mediator and regulator in the planned subject. Some
municipal governments successfully lobbied the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission
to change the water front zones in their jurisdiction bypassing provincial government.65
Consequently, the success and failure of implementing the development goals of the JSYR
plan were contingent on the internal politics of spatial planning between provincial and
municipal governments in Jiangsu province.
6 Conclusion and discussion
This paper highlights the roles of the two-tier governments in the development of spatial
planning in regional China. It also emphasizes the influences of the contests between
provincial and municipal governments on the outcomes of spatial planning. The JSYR plan is
employed as a case study to review and reflect the regional governance mechanism. It is
found that the development process of the JSYR plan was highly embedded in local context
of political economy, reflecting the complicated and decentralized regional governance
mechanisms in provincial China. The plan formulation was not only shaped by the top-down
provincial guide and control, but also was moulded by the bottom-up municipal lobbying and
bargaining. The implementation of spatial plan was sensitive to local political-economic
context that varied spatially and generated place-specific spatial governance problems such as
environmental protection and water front utilization. The success and failure of implementing
65 Interview of local planner D, 20130617
27
development goals of spatial plan were contingent on the internal politics between provincial
and municipal government.
The provincial strategy of JSYR development was initially sprouted by the market forces
of cooperation between enterprises, subsequently shaped by the interactions between
provincial and municipal governments. During the process of plan implementation, Jiangsu
provincial government introduced a top-down policy framework to mobilize local cities and
counties to implement the plan. The framework includes political mobilization (allocating
development goals and local official assessment indicators), economic mobilization (top-
down preferential policies on investment, finance and taxation, etc.), and mass media
mobilization (news reports about the business opportunities of the JSYR plan and
development from official media). Specifically, the provincial government led the whole
plan-making process, and created institutional arenas for interaction and cooperation among
cities and counties through the JSYR plan implementation meetings to discuss annual
development goals and share development experiences.
On the other hand, in the era of decentralization, provincial government was constantly
lobbied and bargained by municipal governments for their respective development interests
and strategies. Municipal governments, fighting for capital and resources both from market
and the provincial government, attempted to maximize their own interests, which were
opportunity-led in the plan-making process. The outcomes of spatial plan were subject to the
complex politics between the two-tier governments, it was because at last the provincial
government had to rely on municipal governments for plan implementation. As evidenced in
assessing plan implementation, it shows that development goals of economic growth and
infrastructure building were the most successful, while the development control and reducing
regional disparity were not effective. Clearly, although Jiangsu provincial government had
introduced a spatial policy framework in the JSYR plan to integrate the fragmented territorial
policies, the plan was implemented selectively by municipal governments because municipal
governments regarded investment as a major approach for plan implementation and had their
28
own development priorities on economy. In order to attract investment, the competition,
outweighing the supported cooperation by JSYR plan, had become even fiercer among cities
in JSYR. Consequently, the development process of the JSYR plan reflects a localized urban
entrepreneurialism in the provincial power-relation context. It manifests that the inter-scale
contestations which are based on conflicting development priorities among different levels of
government would have a significant influence on the practices of regional spatial planning.
Previous studies have claimed that there is a tendency of weakening provincial
government in spatial governance in the context of decentralization.66 However, based on the
above analysis, rather than weakening power in spatial governance, provincial government
still matters with transformed governance approach. In contrast to the Western countries
where regional government power is hidden within relevant laws,67 the power of provincial
government in China is still very significant through political centralization and controlling of
production factors such as land and capital. For example, in the JSYR plan, Jiangsu provincial
government set many regulations to make sure municipal governments enforce the plan. By
controlling power and resources, the provincial government resorted to political and
economic mobilizations to deliver its visions. It translated the political centralization into the
process of planning administration to cope with the impact of economic decentralization. In
contrast, in order to strive for development opportunities and show their economic
achievements, municipal careerist officials took part in the provincial pro-growth strategy
with provincial officials actively. On the other hand, they also tried to break through
regulatory practices of the plan to gain more economic growth opportunities. Unfortunately,
due to the absence of regional planning laws and inadequate enforcement of relevant
ordinances, the planning control and regional coordination promotion could not be effective.
66 Jane Duckett, 'Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese-Style: The Lessons of Market Reform and State Entrepreneurialism in the People's Republic of China', World Development 29(1), (2001), pp. 23-37; Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu, 'Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China', Economic development and cultural change 49(1), (2000), pp. 1-21.67 Louis Albrechts, Patsy Healey and Klaus R. Kunzmann, 'Strategic Spatial Planning and Regional Governance in Europe', Journal of the American Planning Association 69(2), (2003), pp. 113-129.
29
Compared with the Western counties, the political economy of spatial governance in
China is more complex due to asymmetric decentralization: the structural problems of
economic decentralization and political centralization. Although the mode of spatial
governance could be formed very quickly by provincial top-down mobilizations at first, it
could also collapse easily due to municipal economic autonomies and their own development
priorities. Rather than serving as an institutional arena for inter-jurisdiction interaction and
regional cooperation, spatial plan and its implementation incentives may only function as an
instrument to develop new projects for capital accumulation. However, the actual
sustainability of spatial development was ignored, and thus this development mode is in
question in the long run.
30
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