Spatial planning and its implementation in provincial China: A case study of

Jiangsu Region along Yangtze River Plan1

Lei Wang and Jianfa Shen

Abstracts: Spatial planning is considered as an important governance instrument to cope with

uncoordinated regional problems. This paper explores the underlying rationale and

mechanisms of spatial planning in provincial China through a case study of Jiangsu Region

along Yangtze River (JSYR) Plan. It reveals that the practice of the JSYR plan reflected the

changing strategic expression of provincial government on regional development and was

shaped by the contests between provincial and municipal governments. The planning policies

and provincial economic and political mobilizations formed as a spatial policy framework that

promoted plan implementation at municipal level. Although, it achieved development goals of

overall economic growth and infrastructural construction, the plan was ineffective regarding

development control and regional coordination. The case study also sheds lights on the

dynamic relationship between provincial and municipal governments, and the structural

problems of spatial governance under economic decentralization and political centralization

in China.

1 Lei Wang is assistant professor in Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. He earned his Ph.D. from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include regional planning and governance, planning system evolution in China. Jianfa Shen is professor and chairman in the Department of Geography and Resource Management, Director of the Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia – Pacific Studies in The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He earned his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. His research interests include urban and regional development, urbanization and governance. This research is supported by a South China Programme Research Grant, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK (No. 6903306) and Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 41071085). The authors can be reached by email at wanglei@niglas.ac.cn or jianfa@cuhk.edu.hk

1

Spatial planning and its implementation in provincial China: A case study of

Jiangsu Region along the Yangtze River Plan

1 Introduction

In the age of globalization, regions and cities are playing significant roles in the

economic growth and competiveness under the post-Fordist regime,2 and urbanized regions

are regarded as the functional space of economic planning and governance.3 Inter-city

cooperation and partnership are widely valued from the perspective of new regionalism, 4

even though it remains a great challenge for various governments to achieve economic

integration and collaboration at the regional scale. 5 Recently, there is growing literature that

discusses the issues and mechanisms of the regional formation process and corresponding

spatial planning responses in the Western countries. 6 It was argued that regional governance

mechanism is not pre-given but a result of changing political relations and scales to cope with

specific spatial transformation and problems. 7

Since the reform and open-up, the triple processes of marketization, decentralization and

globalization were considered as the principal forces underlying the rapid spatial development

and reconfiguration of China. 8 As noticed by some scholars, 9 China is also experiencing

regional renaissance. The state has paid increasing attention on regional planning. By 2012,

over 80 documents had been issued by central government suggesting the formulation of

2 Allen John Scott, Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

3 M Keating, 'The Invention of Regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe', Environment and Planning C:Government and Policy 15((1997), pp. 183-398.

4 Mariona TomÀS, 'Exploring the Metropolitan Trap: The Case of Montreal', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36(3), (2012), pp. 554-567.

5 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, , 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.

6 Julie-Anne Boudreau, Pierre Hamel, Bernard Jouve and Roger Keil, 'Comparing Metropolitan Governance: The Cases of Montreal and Toronto', Progress in Planning 66((2006), pp. 7-59.

7 Andrew E. G. Jonas and Kevin Ward, 'Introduction to a Debate on City-Regions: New Geographies of Governance, Democracy and Social Reproduction', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31(1), (2007), pp. 169-178.

8 Y. D. Wei, 'Beyond the Sunan Model: Trajectory and Underlying Factors of Development in Kunshan, China', Environment and Planning A 34(10), (2002), pp. 1725-1747.

9 See Fulong Wu and Jingxing Zhang, 'Planning the Competitive City-Region: The Emergence of Strategic Development Plan in China', Urban Affairs Review 42(2007), pp. 714-740; Jiang Xu, 'Governing City-Regions in China: Theoretical Issues and Perspectives for Regional Strategic Planning ', Town Planning Review 79(2008), pp. 157-186.

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various regional plans all over the country. Meanwhile, spatial planning in China is

undergoing transformation. In the pre-reform period under the state socialism, spatial

planning, introduced as a Soviet developmental model, was only a subordinating mechanism

in the planned economy, focusing on economic and social development.10 The central state

aimed to control completely economic enterprises, residents and authorities in local areas.11

After the reform, regional spatial planning gradually becomes an instrument employed by the

higher levels of government to realize relevant cross-boundary development purpose.12

Meanwhile, various spatial strategic plans were also formulated at local levels in order to

overcome the constraints of traditional statutory planning in development control, foster

competitive edges, and conduct place promotion.13 Subsequently, spatial planning in China

becomes a very complicated arena and the planning process is mixed by central control and

local initiatives with various levels of intervention.14 It seems that this transition is similar to

the experiences in the Western Europe. The function of regional planning should not be

limited to the spatial arrangement. It is a governance instrument to integrate various policies

in spatial development.15

Basically, there are two directions studying this emerging spatial planning boom since

the new millennium in China. At urban scale, following the urban transformation research in

10 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).

11 Mee Kam Ng and Wing Shing Tang, 'The Role of Planning in the Development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities', Eurasian Geography and Economics 45(3), (2004), pp. 190-211.

12 Tinghai Wu, Regional Planning in Contemporary China (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006); Xiaogan Yu and Chuchai Wu, Study on Territorial and Regional Planning in Yangtze River Delta Region: Theory, Method and Practice (Beijing: Science Press (in Chinese), 1993).

13 Fulong Wu and Jingxing Zhang, 'Planning the Competitive City-Region: The Emergence of Strategic Development Plan in China', Urban Affairs Review 42(2007), pp. 714-740; Tingwei Zhang, 'Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai', Urban Affairs Review 37(4), (2002), pp. 475-499.

14 Cecilia Wong, Hui Qian and Kai Zhou, 'In Search of Regional Planning in China:The Case of Jiangsu and the Yangtze Delta', Town Planning Review 79((2008), pp. 295-329.

15 Bob Jessop, 'Towards a Schumpeteridn Workfare State? Preliminary Remark on Post-Fordist Political Economy', Studies in Political Economy 40(1993), pp. 7-39.

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China,16 Wu and Zhang17 argued that the rise of urban strategic planning is no more than a

flexible way to express the long term pro-growth vision of the local political elites, further

increasing the original complexity of planning landscape in China. As argued by Xu and

Yeh,18 in the process of decentralization, local elites are responsible to economic development

under their jurisdictions, and there is an appointed cadres system based on the performance in

economic development. These are the reasons why local careerist officials are ambitious in

pursuing GDP growth in their terms of office. Consequently, spatial planning is employed as

a new strategy by local governments for place marketing to attract mobile capital and

resources and enhance local competitiveness.19 Besides, through constructing great image-

lifting projects which could be easily deemed as achievements of local development, local

officials may be appreciated by upper-level leaders and subsequently considered for political

promotion.20 Moreover, under the ‘soft budget constraint’ institutions in urban development,21

it is easy to understand why local governments have keen interests in planning and building

large projects.

At the regional scale, on the other hand, it is argued that entrepreneurial city is under

crisis because of the no-win situation due to the intense competition, exacerbating redundant

infrastructure construction, urban land sprawl and ecological degradation, as well as social

inequalities.22 Moreover, the changing production mode in the globalizing economy needs

16 Laurence J. C. Ma, 'Economic Reforms, Urban Spatial Restructuring, and Planning in China', Progress in Planning 61(3), (2004), pp. 237-260; Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.

17 Fulong Wu and Fangzhu Zhang, 'China's Emerging City Region Governance: Towards a Research Framework', Progress in Planning 73(1), (2010), pp. 60-63.

18 Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, 'City Repositioning and Competitiveness Building in Regional Development: New Development Strategies in Guangzhou, China', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29(2), (2005), pp. 283-308.

19 Fulong Wu, 'The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question', Urban Studies 40(9), (2003), pp. 1673-1698.

20 Jun Zhang and lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).

21 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.

22 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Emergence of Centrally Initiated Regional Plan in China: A Case Study of Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan', Habitat International 39(0), (2013), pp. 137-147; Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.

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regionally integrated development and competitiveness.23 In order to address fragmented

policies, Wu and Zhang24 argued that three major responses have been presented in current

China: ‘spatial strategic plans, administrative annexation and the development of regional soft

institutions’. The emerging boom of regional spatial planning in latest years illustrates that

central government has recognized the problems of fierce inter-jurisdiction competition.25

Subsequently, central government has centralized some key governance tools, such as annual

land supply and major function-oriented zoning plan.26 Spatial planning is thus understood as

state restructuring process to address the place-specific governance issues of regional

coordination.27

Generally, most studies related to Chinese spatial planning and governance focus on the

planning process and plan texts analysis. The outcomes of these new spatial governance

mechanisms have not been assessed with a few exceptions,28 due to the short term impacts of

plan implementation and the complexity of plan evaluation itself. Especially, rather than

planning discourses, it is the governance tools developed by various levels of government

during the plan implementation that vehicles the establishment of regional governance

mechanism. Besides, although the central-local relation has been emphasized in the spatial

planning and governance, the local government usually referred to urban government.

Actually, local government in China includes governments at various levels below central

government. Therefore, the role of provincial government was ignored to some extent. With

23 Allen John Scott, Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

24 Fulong Wu and Fangzhu Zhang, 'China's Emerging City Region Governance: Towards a Research Framework', Progress in Planning 73(1), (2010), pp. 60-63.

25 Jie Fan, Wei Sun , Zhenshan Yang , Peng Fan and Dong Chen 'Focusing on the Major Function-Oriented Zone: A New Spatial Planning Approach and Practice in China and Its 12th Five-Year Plan', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 86-96.

26 Jiang Xu and James Jixian Wang, 'Reassembling the State in Urban China', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 7-20.

27 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Transformation of Regional Governance in China: The Rescaling of Statehood', Progress in Planning 78(2), (2012), pp. 55-99; Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, 'Re-Building Regulation and Re-Inventing Governance in the Pearl River Delta, China', Urban Policy and Research 30(4), (2012), pp. 385-401.

28 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217; Jiang Xu, 'Governing City-Regions in China: Theoretical Issues and Perspectives for Regional Strategic Planning ', Town Planning Review 79(2008), pp. 157-186.

5

land related governance issues downscaled to municipal level, it general assumed that there

was a tendency of weakening provincial government,29 regardless of China has employed a

spatial asymmetric decentralized reform. However, there was also an argument that provincial

government still matters regarding regional strategic formation.30 Under these theoretical

debates, how has provincial government played in regional spatial planning and governance

remains ambiguous in contemporary China.

This study attempts to fill the above theoretical and empirical research gaps through a

case study of Jiangsu region along the Yangtze River (JSYR) plan. Based on the perspective

of regional governance, it aims to explore the following four inter-related questions. What

was the rationale that the plan was proposed? What was the role of spatial planning in

establishing regional governance mechanism? What were the roles of provincial and

municipal governments in the practice of spatial planning? How had the contest between

provincial and municipal government influenced on the spatial plan making and

implementation? In order to answer these questions, we collected data from several sources,

including interviews of some officials and planners, relevant government documents, Jiangsu

Statistics Yearbooks (2000-2011), as well as scholars’ publications and news report on JSYR

to trace the process of spatial plan making and implementation. The plan-making process was

traced to explore the underlying politics between provincial and municipal governments on

the place-specific governance issues and to establish a process-event analysis over the success

and failure in fulfilling the development goals of the JSYR plan.

The paper is divided into six sections. After this introduction, the next section introduces

a conceptual framework for analyzing spatial planning and governance in provincial China.

Then the case study of the JSYR plan is introduced. The following section focuses on the

plan-making process to illustrate the rearticulated spatial policy framework. The fifth section 29 Jane Duckett, 'Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese-Style: The Lessons of Market Reform and

State Entrepreneurialism in the People's Republic of China', World Development 29(1), (2001), pp. 23-37; Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu, 'Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China', Economic development and cultural change 49(1), (2000), pp. 1-21.

30 Roger C. K. Chan and Shi Xian, 'Assessing the Incentives in Regional City-to-City Cooperation: A Case Study of Jiangyin–Jingjiang Industrial Park of Jiangsu Province in the Yangtze River Delta Region', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 56-69.

6

evaluates the plan implementation and its underlying mechanisms. Section six is the

discussion and concluding remarks.

2 Conceptualizing spatial planning as a process of governance in provincial

political economic context

2.1 The relation between market and the state

In the era of globalization and changing scalar relations, it is widely assumed that the

role of state is declining and restructuring.31 Many scholars also discussed a similar trend of

state rescaling in Chinese context.32 The state has transformed from resource distributor in the

planned economy to regulator and increasingly to market actor in the post-reform period.33

But economic reform should not be understood as a total retreat of state power from economic

and social life in China. By constructing state guidelines, policies and projects of economic

development, the state restores its roles in the market.34 Besides, acted flexibly in the context

of economic globalization, local government has introduced many policies and institutional

innovations so as to enhance competitiveness in attracting investment and to promote

economic growth.35 The interactions of the state and market in current China are complicated

and dynamic, which should be put into local historical political economic context to

understand. Generally, the state still plays an important role and spatial planning is an

important mechanism to regulate and coordinate economic development.

2.2 Economic decentralization and political centralization

Apart from the market-oriented reform, China also has been undergoing a gradual

economic decentralization process since 1978. Economic decentralization was regarded as

31 Neil Brenner, 'Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-Scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', Urban Studies 36(3), (1999), pp. 431-451.

32 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316; Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).

33 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).

34 Fulong Wu, 'The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question', Urban Studies 40(9), (2003), pp. 1673-1698.

35 Shiuh-Shen Chien, 'Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China', Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25(2007), pp. 269-290.

7

one of the most important forces that have facilitated the unprecedented economic growth in

urban China. Local governments at various levels are empowered with discretions of

administrative power on many dimensions of economic activity, such as land use, finance,

investment and banking.36 In particular, in 1994, the introduction of tax-sharing system has

far-reaching influences on Chinese economic landscape. Various self-raised extra budgetary

revenues were used to implement strategies of local development priority with no need of

approvals from the central government.37 Subsequently, local governments have been playing

a critical role in governing the territory-based development.

On the other hand, alongside economic decentralization, the Communist Party-state at

various levels are in control of local economic and political affairs, as ‘ the ultimate decision-

maker, regulator, and participant’.38 Politically, local officials are appointed through the

appointed cadres system in line with the Chinese administrative hierarchy. Consequently the

higher level officials could intervene in local economic development through political

influence. Therefore, there is double-role of local careerist officials in place-specific

development. Local officials are both participants in promoting economic growth for

economic rationality and in political competition for political promotion and political capital

accumulation.39 However, the incentives for local officials of political promotion often

outweigh the economic rationality.40 Spatial planning is an important project in which local

officials can play important role for both economic and political benefits.

36 Jianfa Shen, 'Scale, State and the City: Urban Transformation in Post-Reform China', Habitat International 31(2007), pp. 303-316.

37 Shiuh-Shen Chien, 'Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China', Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25(2007), pp. 269-290.

38 L. J. C. Ma, 'Urban Transformation in China, 1949 - 2000: A Review and Research Agenda', Environment and Planning A 34(9), (2002), pp. 1545-1569.

39 Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 'Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China', Journal of Public Economics 89(9–10), (2005), pp. 1743-1762; Cartier C, 2001, "'zone fever', the arable land debate, and real estate speculation: China's evolving land use regime and its geographical contradictions" Journal of Contemporary China 10 445-469.

40 Jun Zhang and Lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).

8

2.3 Interactions between tiers of governments in spatial planning

The relationship between central and local state became much more dynamic and

complicated in post-reform period.41 The decentralized reform loosed once rigid-vertical

control over local states. Local government has been mobilized and directly involved in urban

development. Nonetheless, policies and investment practices from central government are still

important variables for local development as central government is still in control of a large

number of capital and resources.42 Moreover, a vertical controlled goal and quota

management system evolved from planned economy is still in operation, such as the amounts

of newly-added construction land and the basic farmland and environmental protection goals.

Besides, economic decentralization is not completely to downscale the power to urban

government. Various government levels are empowered with different discretional power on

economic administration, such as the project approval right and land use permit.

Consequently, the policies and investment practices remained at provincial level are also

important factors for urban development. Additionally, as there is absence of regional

government in China, provincial government usually serves to coordinate the conflicts and

competitions among cities.

Spatial planning is regarded not just as a technical tool for project proposal and

construction, but a social process through which all stakeholders are mobilized to shape the

plan and develop strategic agendas within the power-relation context.43 In the Chinese context

of political economy, spatial planning has become a more policy-based approach, through

which hierarchical governments struggle to achieve local interests. Spatial plans at higher

levels, i.e., national and provincial levels, have special strategic importance in China. Higher

level governments employ the spatial plans as governance instruments to guide economic

41 Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony G. O. Yeh, Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space: Taylor & Francis, 2007).

42 Mee Kam Ng and Wing Shing Tang, 'The Role of Planning in the Development of Shenzhen, China: Rhetoric and Realities', Eurasian Geography and Economics 45(3), (2004), pp. 190-211.

43 Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

9

activities and control the undesired spatial development projects.44 Various regulatory tools

and practices, such as taxation, ordinances, examination and approval system, quota system

and government official promotion system, are employed to facilitate the implementation of

spatial plan. Meanwhile, local governments are more actively struggling to upscale their

spatial plans to become strategies of a higher level government in order to capture the top-

down benefits. For example, after being incorporated into spatial plans of upper levels, local

development projects could be approved smoothly. Besides, employing such upscale-strategy,

local municipal governments could bargain for investment and preferential policies supported

by higher level governments.

At the meso-scale, provincial spatial plan plays a much more complicated role compared

with national and municipal ones. It manifests both upscaling for national strategy and

downscaling to cope with municipal upscaling strategy. Correspondingly, on the one hand,

provincial officials are mobilized by the center for political promotion. On the other hand,

they serve as mediators and coordinators of local conflicts and competitions at provincial

scale. Besides, provincial government is limited in land development compared with

municipal government. Actually, it draws up spatial plans, but relies on municipal

government for plan implementation through various mobilizations.

These arguments have been useful to develop a conceptual framework proposed for

analyzing the contest between provincial and municipal governments in spatial planning in

China (Figure 1). The analysis is built on the local context of political economy in spatial

planning. The main purpose of provincial government to formulate regional spatial planning

is to integrate the fragmented territorial policies by various economic and political

mobilizations. The development goals of planning including social economic development,

land use regulation, environmental protection and infrastructure building, etc., which are

manifested in the governance relation restructuring during the planning process. On the one

hand, spatial plan is used by the provincial government to guide and control regional

44 Yi Li and Fulong Wu, 'The Transformation of Regional Governance in China: The Rescaling of Statehood', Progress in Planning 78(2), (2012), pp. 55-99.

10

development. On the other hand, it is a contested arena where municipal governments are

lobbying and bargaining for their own interests. Both the two processes can significantly

influence the ways in which spatial plan is implemented. In this paper, the contests between

provincial and municipal governments over those governance issues, the planning

administration and mechanisms are our key variables for analyzing the JSYR plan making

and implementation. Consequently, rather than only discussing the roles of provincial or

municipal governments in the development of spatial planning in JSYR, the paper tries to

explore the ways in which the contestation between the two levels of government have

influenced the outcomes of the JSYR plan.

Figure 1 Conceptual framework of analyzing the contest between provincial and municipal governments in spatial planning in China

3 The emergence of JSYR planning

3.1 Introduction of JSYR plan

The JSYR plan covers the cities and counties along the Yangtze River in Jiangsu

province. Near to Shanghai, the region is in the center of lower Yangtze River Delta,

including six central cities and 15 county-level cities or counties (Figure 2). The south part of

the region is one of the most developed areas in Jiangsu province. JSYR has been a provincial

development strategy for a long time. As early as 1990s, when the territorial plan was popular

11

in China, Jiangsu government formulated the first regional plan in JSYR.45 It first put forward

the idea to construct provincial industrial belt along the Yangtze River, although the old plan

failed to implement due to many reasons.

Figure 2 Location of JSYR

The JSYR plan was initiated by Jiangsu provincial government and drafted by provincial

economic plan commission (predecessor of current provincial development and reform

commission, PDRC) with the contributions by relevant non-governmental planners. The plan-

making began in early 2002 and was completed in June 2003 with a planning horizon from

2003 to 2010.

The JSYR plan is a hybrid form of economic plan and land use plan in order to develop

an integrated strategy for this region. It includes all aspects of the development coordination,

such as industries, water front utilization zoning, environmental protection, regional disparity

and cooperation, regional infrastructural construction, major functions of ports and cities. It

proposes to construct four industrial clusters of equipment manufacturing, chemical industry,

metallurgic industry, and logistics industry.46 The plan clearly presents the important role of

developing JSYR for enhancing province’s international competitiveness and promoting

45 Xiaogan Yu and Chuchai Wu, Study on Territorial and Regional Planning in Yangtze River Delta Region: Theory, Method and Practice (Beijing: Science Press, 1993).

46 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Notice of Provincial Government About Promulgating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development Plan’ (Nanjing, 2003).

12

regional industrial upgrading and coordinated development. Generally, the main body of the

plan could be divided into three parts.

(i) Guiding function. The plan stated the following primary growth goals towards the end

of plan period in 2010: GDP surpasses 1,280 billion RMB with annual growth rate around

12% (the figures in 2002 were 514.4 billion RMB and 12.7% respectively), industrial

structure of primary, secondary and tertiary industry adjusts to the ratio of 4:53:43 (6:54:40 in

2002), industrial value added comes to 674 billion RMB (242.2 billion RMB in 2002), and

urbanization level increases to 65% (51.6% in 2001). The plan also recommends developing

port-centered industries with big freight volume and big throughput. It prescribes strategies

and locations of various development subjects, such as industries and urban system.

(ii) Binding function. The plan has regulations on water front utilization zones;

environmental regulations on sewage treatment and the Yangtze River water environmental

protection target, etc.

(iii) Action plan. The plan stated the total investment in fixed assets (TIFA, 2.1-2.5

trillion RMB.) and a construction plan of infrastructure projects related to comprehensive

transportation system, port facilities, energy supply and ecological environmental protection

measurements.

In order to answer the proposed research questions, this paper will analyze the case

within the normative conceptual framework through two analytical lines, the process and

factors, to examine the driving forces, institutions, stakeholders network, as well as impacts

and outcomes of JSYR plan.

3.2 Driving forces of plan formulation

(i) There was increasingly fierce competition within the cities of Yangtze River Delta

(YRD). It is widely recognized that YRD is restructuring to a polycentric region with the rise

of new dynamic cities of Suzhou and Wuxi.47 Competition for mobile capital of global

47 Xiangming Chen, 'A Tale of Two Regions in China Rapid Economic Development and Slow Industrial Upgrading in the Pearl River and the Yangtze River Deltas', International Journal of Comparative Sociology 47(2-3), (2007), pp. 167-201; Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-

13

industrial transfer and for resources and policies from central government was intensified at

that time. Due to similar natural conditions, cities in JSYR competed with each other through

the race-to-bottom price strategy of land leasing and tax relief48. Although Jiangsu and

Zhejiang indicated their wishes to strengthen the connections with the dragon head: Shanghai,

the competitions among the three provincial areas have got worse steadily due to local

interests. For example, in early 2003, Shanghai planned 173 km2 areas in the suburbs and

offered corresponding preferential tax and land leasing policies to attract investment of

‘global top 500 enterprises’. Later in June 2003, Zhejiang also proposed an industrial

development strategy for Hangzhou Bay by setting up considerable investment preferential

policies for modern manufacturing industries. As a traditional competitor within YRD,

Jiangsu province was also engaged in the game. Thus setting up the development strategy of

JSYR reflected such inner and inter region competition.

(ii) There was emerging cross-river development led by the market forces. Before 2000,

due to the limitation of cross-river infrastructures, the connection between south and north

was considered not important. Nevertheless, some cross-river cooperation projects have

already started at firm level stimulated by complementary factors of the two riversides since

200049. The developed south side was rich in capital and technology, but was nearly running

out of land use quota for construction (the amount approved by upper level government).

Besides, the production cost in some developed southern cities, like Wuxi and Suzhou, was

rising significantly. In contrast, the developing north was rich in land quota and water front

resources, but was scarce in capital. Therefore, some enterprises in the south set up their

branches or relocated to the cities of north riverside.

Besides, local city to city cooperation also started by jointly building industrial park with

the arrangement that the north part provides the land and the south part provides capital.

Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.

48 Jun Zhang and lian Zhou, Growth from Below: The Political Economy of China's Economic Growth (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007).

49 Xiaolong Luo and Jianfa Shen, 'Why City-Region Planning Does Not Work Well in China: The Case of Suzhou-Wuxi-Changzhou', Cities 25(4), (2008), pp. 207-217.

14

Jiangyin-Jingjiang Park is a typical case, which is co-sponsored by two county-level cities of

Jiangyin and Jingjiang. The project was deemed as a development model by the provincial

government. Afterwards, Jiangsu provincial government considered to spread such experience

over the whole province50. The interaction and cooperation between cities in the two

riversides is regarded by provincial officials as an important way of reducing regional gap.

(iii) It was also a regional project initiated by municipal officials. In 2002, the mayor of

Yangzhou submitted an internal report to Jiangsu provincial government to present the

importance of developing JSYR, suggesting provincial government to give preferential

policies to support the region.51 Before that, Yangzhou had already set preferential policies for

investment in its jurisdictional region along Yangtze River in February 2002.52 Some other

cities in JSYR also followed up by formulating their spatial polices. The report from the

mayor of Yangzhou got immediate attention of the provincial leaders.

4 JSYR plan: a rearticulated spatial policy framework

4.1 JSYR plan-making procedure: contested subjects

(1) Formulation of development strategy

In the early 2002, Jiangsu provincial government proceeded to formulate the new JSYR

plan. Afterwards, a plan-making working group was established, consisting of government

officials in Jiangsu economic plan commission, experts from national economic commission

and Nanjing institute of Geography and Limnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

(NIGLAS).

Still in the plan-making period in the early 2003, the new provincial governor, Liang

Baohua, said in his government working report: “We should speed up formulating the JSYR

plan and studying relevant supporting policies”.53 The report also hypothesized that there

50 Roger C. K. Chan and Shi Xian, 'Assessing the Incentives in Regional City-to-City Cooperation: A Case Study of Jiangyin–Jingjiang Industrial Park of Jiangsu Province in the Yangtze River Delta Region', Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53(1), (2012), pp. 56-69.

51 Interview of a former government official in Jiangsu PDRC, 2012122852 No. 40 joint document of Yangzhou municipal government and communist party committee in

200253 Baohua Liang, ‘Government Work Report of Jiangsu Province’, (Nanjing: Gazette of Jiangsu

Provincial People's Government, 2003).

15

would be a transfer of international industries towards YRD. Therefore, Jiangsu should not

miss the opportunity to develop itself and embark in the global economy. JSYR was regarded

as a right base to accommodate international industrial transfer. During the period of planning

studying and consultation, some experts suggested to provincial leaders that the development

experience of Rhine Valley could be useful reference to Jiangsu province for industrial

transformation. The two great rivers have similar advantages to develop river-ocean joint

transportation by ships of 10,000 DWT (Deadweight tonnage).54 Thus, comparing with other

southeast coastal areas in China, they thought such a significant advantage of JSYR should be

considered for further industrial development and strategy-making. That was why the plan put

forward the strategy of developing heavy industries.

(2) Bargaining for resources: the interaction between municipal and provincial

governments

In the JSYR plan-making process, the top provincial leaders had great influence in the

formulation of main development strategies and goals. The planners functioned as consultants

and mediators between municipal governments and provincial government. Provincial and

municipal governments had intensive interactions on the planning subjects. The water front

utilization zoning and regional infrastructure location (cross-river pathways, highways, ports

and power stations along the Yangtze River) were the most controversial arenas where most

municipalities were keen to compete with each other and to bargain with provincial

government for their own interests.55

Here the water front zoning process was used as an example. The initial plan was drafted

by the planners in NIGLAS. By evaluating water front’s natural and economic conditions, the

planners formulated function zones of water front utilization including zones of public port

terminals, industries, cross-river pathways, living, tourism, ecological protection, and water

intake and future reserve. However, for fearing of restricting their economic development, all

municipal governments asked for allocating more productive water front instead of ecological

54 Interview of local planner A, 2012072855 Interview of local planner A, 20120728

16

protection zones. Municipal governments spent lots of time and efforts to bargain with the

PRDC. At last, except sticking to the major principles of function location such as water front

nearby drinking water intake and national ecological protection areas, PDRC had to

compromise and revise the water front function zoning plan to satisfy the requests of

municipal governments. Thus the planners could not play their professional roles completely.

Sometimes, they only translated the bargaining results of different tiers of governments into

professional rhetoric and maps.

After the plan was drafted, the plan-making working group conducted several meetings

and forums for intensive plan consultation among different provincial departments,

governments of cities and counties, industrial parks and big enterprises. Through this

approach, the plan-making process incorporated some voices of different stakeholders,

reflecting the regional overall interests of pro-growth development. After the consultation, an

expert team from several professional planning institutions engaged in plan suggestion and

argumentation. Finally, the revised draft plan was submitted to the Standing Committee of

Provincial Government and Provincial People’s Congress for approval successively. From

then on, dominated by political elites and technical experts, the JSYR plan formulation was

officially completed. It shows the general politics of plan-making in provincial China that

general public had little participation in the plan-making process.

The main objective of the plan was to stimulate economic growth at different levels, and

the actual coordination efforts in the plan-making process was to mitigate the bottleneck of

competitions blocking the regional growth, rather than focusing on the coordinated and

balanced development. For example, it was an urban-bias plan while the vast rural areas were

ignored, let along the dynamic relationship between the urban and rural areas.

During the plan-making process, officials from various levels of government had

common interest in developing JSYR’s urban economy. Firstly, the new leadership of the

provincial government proposed that the JSYR should become a new growth pole with high

competiveness to lead the development of whole province. On the other hand, it could

17

enhance the economic connection of the two riversides and thus reduce the development gap

between them. Secondly, each city had its own ambition of developing local economy. Cities

in south side were under the pressure of industrial restructuring and shortage of land resource.

In contrast, cities in the north side were trying to find a new way of developing their

backward economy. Upscaling their development strategies of local areas along the Yangtze

River into provincial agenda was widely welcome. Therefore, the timely provincial JSYR

strategy was highly supported by municipal governments.

However, it does not mean there was no difference in spatial visions held by two levels

of government. For example, except to promote economic growth, the provincial government

also wanted to assert the functional importance to control the uncoordinated development on

behalf of the regional interest. In the context of economic decentralization, municipal

governments were much more interested in the local economic growth and revenue increase.

The conflict between them was reflected vividly in the water front zoning process. Even

though the conflict was obvious, the common interest of developing economy brought them

together. Besides, the conflict may also be eased by provincial government’s mobilizations

and relevant regulations, which were supposed to guarantee the plan implementation in some

subjects.

4.2 Mobilizations of plan implementation by various agents

(1) Mobilizations from provincial government

In order to facilitate cities and counties to implement the plan, except the infrastructural

construction plan, the provincial government also introduced several top-down political and

economic mobilizations. Combining the plan and these mobilizations, a provincial top-down

spatial policy framework was formed.

(i) Setting preferential policies to promote the implementation of plan’s strategy of

developing cities in north side. Before publishing the plan openly, the provincial government

and Party committee issued two important documents to support JSYR plan. The first policy

18

package was issued on 30 June 2003.56 It documented provincial government’s huge financial

reward on the infrastructural building of different categories in north side, and industrial parks

in north side those who finished their development goals (5 million RMB per year of reward),

and cities in south sides who co-build industrial parks with north side (8 million RMB of

reward and 50% added-value tax exemption for new projects). Moreover, it also exempted

provincial government’s land tax on new added construction land in north side.

(ii) Setting annual development goals for local governments’ plan implementation. On

15 July 2003, provincial government and Party committee jointly issued a document named

Opinions on Accelerating JSYR development from Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and

Government.57 It documented the significance of the JSYR plan implementation and ordered

local officials of cities and counties to take active parts in it. Afterward, the provincial

government set annual development goals for local officials to fulfill. It included six

economic indicators of GDP, local fiscal revenue, value of total export, etc. These indicators

were generated from development goals in the plan document and divided into local goals

annually. Besides, although not officially documented, provincial government would reward

some money and reputations directly to local officials and cities or counties who overfilled

their development goals, respectively.58 It was highly manipulated by provincial government

through the political centralization mechanism.

(iii) Setting up plan coordination leading group and working office at various levels. The

provincial governor was the group leader at provincial leading group, followed by members

of 2 vice provincial governors, 15 directors of relevant provincial departments, mayors of

prefecture-level cities. This high level leading group was unprecedented in the provincial

strategies. The working office was under PDRC, in charged by the director of PDRC. Except

the daily work assigned to working office, it was decided that, rather that the department of

56 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Notice of Provincial Government About Promulgating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development Plan’ (Nanjing, 2003).

57 Jiangsu Provincial Government, ‘Opinions on Accelerating Jiangsu Region Along Yangtze River Development from Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Government’, (Nanjing, 2003).

58 Interview of a government official at PDRC 20120728

19

regional coordination, the department of foreign investment and trade in PDRC was in charge

of the tasks assigned by coordination leading group. The purpose of this arrangement was that

the department specializing in foreign investment and trade affairs who could help the

working office to hold investment promotion conferences and promote JSYR export-oriented

economy.59 Afterwards in 2007, the duties were shifted to the department of regional

coordination in PDRC.

Moreover, the provincial government also asked prefectural cities, county-level cities,

counties and industrial parks to create their own plan coordination leading groups and

corresponding working offices. Thus, it formed a hierarchical leadership of plan

implementation. One of the most important functions of provincial working office was to

organize the JSYR development conferences to assign annual developing goals to cities,

counties, and industrial parks, and reward those officials and departments who reached well

above the development goals. During the conferences, those rewarded officials and

department were invited to report their local experiences of developing JSYR. Basically, the

conference functioned as an institutional setting-up for learning, conversation and interaction

among cities.

(2) Mobilizations from municipal governments

Meanwhile, cities and counties also set their own strategies under provincial framework.

Their activities included the following four aspects: (i) setting up additional policies and

regulations to attract investment and mobilize their officials to complete a more detailed list

of pro-growth goals; (ii) formulating their detailed local plans to guide the development and

cater for investors; (iii) increasing local construction land quota for the region; (iv) increasing

local fiscal expenditure on infrastructure construction.

Since the region became the focus of a provincial strategy, competitions among cities

have intensified for attracting outside investment. In contrast, the coordination work lagged

behind even though the provincial government provided many incentives for north-south

59 Interview of a government official at working office of the JSYR plan implementation 20120618

20

cooperation. For example, as reported by newspapers of Jiangsu Economic News and Money

China about their relevant strategies, the mayors in Nanjing and Yangzhou both emphasized

the importance of attracting investment, the earlier the better, and the earlier the stronger

competitive advantage. Thus, they took the plan as an opportunity for attracting investment.

The mayor of Nanjing said: “We think provincial strategy of developing JSYR is a great

opportunity for Nanjing’s development. As long as we seize the opportunity earlier and make

corresponding actions quickly, we will get advantages compared with other cities”, interview

reported in Shi et al.60 The mayor of Yangzhou said: “attracting investment is the most

important agenda in our city. Our officials have annual quotas of attracting investment. If an

official cannot complete the quota in two consecutive years, he or she should better have a

reasonable excuse. Otherwise he or she may need to leave the current term of office”,

interview reported in Cui.61

(3) Mobilizations from mass media

During the JSYR plan-making, the mass media was also used by various governments as

mobilization instrument. In order to attract investment, the government invited major mass

media in the country to report the business opportunities in JSYR. As a big strategy of an

important province in China, Chinese media paid a great attention to the plan. By searching

for the key word of “developing JSYR or JSYR plan (in Chinese)” in Wisenews, it shows that

there was a peak of news report of developing JSYR in 2003 when the plan was released to

the public (Figure 3).

60 Jiwei Shi, Lingmei Wang and Rui Chen, ‘The Reports from Cities in Jsyr’, Jiangsu Economic News, 10 June 2003.

61 Ronghui Cui, ‘The Jsyr Development Strategy in Jiangsu Province’, Money China, March 2004.

21

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20120

200

400

600

800

Figure 3 Number of news reports on developing JSYR in the major media in China

5 Assessing plan implementation

According to the development goals outlined in the planning discourses, we assess the

plan implementation through the following four aspects.

5.1 Regional disparity

There was a huge increase in the TIFA in both riversides at the early plan

implementation period from 2003 to 2005. The increase rate of TIFA in JSYR in 2003 was

65.81%, and the figures in south and north were 75.14% and 40.59% respectively. It indicates

that cities in the south were much more competitive in attracting investment than their

counterparts in the north at the early stage of plan implementation. The TIFA ratio of the two

riversides was relatively stable. But the unbalanced FDI distribution in the two riversides was

eased significantly in this period as the south to north ratio decreased from 7.35 in 2002 to

1.86 in 2005. The coefficient of variation (CV) of GDP per capital in JSYR based on county-

level units enlarged from 0.51 in 2002 to 0.58 in 2005. The CV of JSYR was much higher

than that of the south or north. Thus the major contribution of regional disparity was due to

the enlarged disparity between the two river sides.

Compared with the enlarged regional gap at the early plan implementation period, the

JSYR strategy has promoted economic growth in north riverside significantly and reduced the

regional gap between the two riversides to some extent since then (Figure 4). The TIFA ratio

of south to north decreased form 3.18 in 2005 to 2.41 in 2010, while FDI ratio of south to

22

north in the same period was in table. The north has surpassed the south in terms of GDP

growth rate since 2006. However, the economic gap was still significant. The CV of GDP per

capital in this region was still very large in 2010. The GDP ratio of south to north was 2.47 in

2010, which was same as that of 2001. Therefore the development strategy of reducing

regional disparity has not been realized yet.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

500

1000

1500

2000

0

5

10

15

20

25North South JSYR

GD

P (b

illio

n R

MB

)

GD

P gr

owth

rat

e (%

)Figure 4 GDP growth in JSYR (constant price)

Data Source: Jiangsu Statistic Yearbook (2002-2011)

5.2 Environmental protection

Although the increase rate of TIFA in JSYR was 65.81% in 2003, the money spent on

environmental management and protection was very little in 2003 (1.69 billion RMB) and

2004 (4.91 billion RMB), compared with the adjacent years, 4.81 billion RMB in 2002 and

11.19 billion RMB in 2005. In contrast to investment boom of industries, the relatively

lagging investment in environment affected the pollution treatment capacity and environment

governance in this region. As reported, some factories just discharged sewage into the

Yangtze River without any treatment.62 Thus, during the early plan implementation period,

local officials neglected the corresponding environmental protection.

62 Qiujun Deng, ‘Can We Take Yangtze River as Discharge Pipe: The Pollution Investigation of Jiangsu Taixing Chemical Industrial Park’, Modern Express, 2007; Yufang Li, Yan Yan and Jie Gao, ‘How to Cope with the Secret Discharges by Enterprizes?’, China Environment News, 21 October 2008.

23

As the result, the environmental protection goals were not achieved very well (Table 1).

The planned goal of water quality of the Yangtze River was grade two of national standards,

but actually it was grade three in 2010. Besides, according to the investigation of Provincial

Department of Environmental Protection, only 26 control sections met the planned goals of

water quality among the total 45 provincial control sections for monitoring branch river water

quality of Jiangsu Yangtze River.63 Some other indicators such as the control rate of industrial

waste water and the control rate of acid rain failed to reach the targets.

5.3 Regulation on water front utilization

For the development control over the water front utilization, it was not so effective

either. According to the development strategy, one of the most important functions of the

JSYR plan was to enhance the coordinated development of water front utilization. However,

even introduced relevant governance instruments to cope with the low efficient and

disordered utilization, the regulatory practice in the plan was not effective. In order to attract

investment, the utilization rate increased significantly. Some water front utilization, leased by

local cities and counties to developers, was not in line with the zoning plan. According to the

land use cover map interpreted from TM image, water front utilization rate in main stream of

the Jiangsu Yangtze River increased from 27.8% in 2002 to 53.5% in 2008, an increase of

25.7%64, while the figure was only 22.1% in 1997. Besides, some planned water front for

ecological protection and future reservation was occupied by industrial projects, and deep-

water front was misused by 28.6%.

5.4 Economic goals and infrastructure construction

In contrast to the above frustrated results, the economic growth goals and infrastructure

construction plan were implemented very well. As early as in 2008, JSYR had already

surpassed its planned economic growth goals, including the total GDP, annual GDP growth

63 Yao Guo and Xiao Chen, 'Outcome Evaluation of Regional Plan Implementation: A Case Study of "Regional Development Plan of Yangtze-Riverside Area in Jiangsu"', Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin 22(4), (2013), pp. 405-411.

64 Yao Guo and Xiao Chen, 'Outcome Evaluation of Regional Plan Implementation: A Case Study of "Regional Development Plan of Yangtze-Riverside Area in Jiangsu"', Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin 22(4), (2013), pp. 405-411.

24

rate (Figure 4) and industrial value added. Most planned infrastructures were built

successfully in the plan period as well (Table 1). The comprehensive transportation system

and industrial infrastructures in this area were improved greatly. In particular, the

construction of JSYR expressway has contributed to the development of logistics industry

significantly.

Table 1. Assessing the JSYR plan implementation in terms of development goals

Planned subjects Implementation assessment

Economic and social

development

GDP (1280 billion RMB) and GDP growth rate (12%) Realized (2060 billion RMB, 18.1%)

Industrial value added (674 billion RMB) Realized (1017 billion RMB)

Industrial structure of primary, secondary and tertiary industry, 4:53:43 -(3.1:54.4:42.4)

Urbanization level 65% Failed (63%)

Environment protection

Control rate of industrial waste water (100%) Failed (80%)Water quality of Yangtze River in grade 2 Failed (Grade 3)Acid rain control rate (15%) FailedUrban household wastes hazard-free treatment rate figure (100%) NA

Green rate of urban built-up area (40%) Realized

Infrastructure building

Total length of highway (km) RealizedTotal length of railway (km) RealizedNumber of cross river pathways (10) Failed (8)Number of berths for ships of ten thousand tons RealizedPower stations and cross river transmit electricity RealizedSewage treatment plants Realized

Source: Jiangsu Statistic Yearbook 2011, JSYP plan (2011-2020) and Preliminary Study of 12th FYP in Jiangsu Province

To conclude the assessment, it found that the development of JSYR in the period of early

plan implementation was out of control, ignoring the environmental protection and regional

coordination. Afterwards, except economic growth and infrastructural construction, the other

development goals were not implemented very well.

Rapid economic growth was the most successful part in the implementation of JSYR

plan. It was contributed by various governments’ promotion and the advantages of developing

heavy industries along the Jiangsu Yangtze River.

“Besides local municipal officials’ initiatives, the reasons why economic achievements

in JSYR were so significant include provincial government’s preferential policies of

25

investment and land use, the opportunities of heavy industrialization tendency of China since

2000 and the comparative advantages of the Yangtze River transportation in this region.”

(Interview of an official in working office of the JSYR plan implementation, 20130618)

Compared with economic development goals, there were complicated spatial governance

issues of environmental protection because it is planted in the internal provincial politics.

“Economic goals outweighed environment goals, as economic goals were still the most

important components for assessing their performance in term of office.” (Interview of local

planner B, 20130524)

Local officials were more active in promoting economic growth with the method of

government investment in infrastructures to facilitate economic growth or directly setting

guidance for local SOEs to developing high profit industries. “Building infrastructures could

show local officials’ achievements quickly. On the other hand, local projects could get

provincial financial support through intensive bargaining with provincial officials, squeezing

into provincial investment agenda and development priority.” (Interview of local planner C,

20130528)

Moreover, we could not take the planned infrastructure for granted as the projects only in

JSYR plan. Actually, some planned infrastructure projects, such as cross river pathways and

railways in the JSYR plan had also been scheduled in other plans, such as national or

provincial transportation plan and local urban master plans. The JSYR plan just incorporated

these projects and promoted their construction paces. This reflects the nature of spatial plan in

China that it is more likely a big basket carried by higher level government, into which local

lower level governments struggle to put their development projects. The mobilizations by

various agents accelerated the pace of project construction for their respective purposes.

Subsequently, the plan was a top-down policy and development projects oriented.

However, the actually spatial problems of fragmentation were not important from the

views of municipal governments. For example, the governance issue of water front utilization

is highly fragmented and beyond the governance capacity of Jiangsu provincial government.

26

First, the governance of water front utilization is a complicated affair as it is related to the

Yangtze River flood control, environmental protection and land use. Currently, there is no

mechanism at provincial level to integrate these spatial subjects, let alone the capability of

JSYR plan. Second, the responsibility of water front governance is fragmented into several

departments at various levels, including the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission at

central level, various departments at provincial level, and the actual users of municipal

governments and enterprises. But the ultimate approval power for water front utilization and

function change is controlled by the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission. Thus

provincial government is not the final mediator and regulator in the planned subject. Some

municipal governments successfully lobbied the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission

to change the water front zones in their jurisdiction bypassing provincial government.65

Consequently, the success and failure of implementing the development goals of the JSYR

plan were contingent on the internal politics of spatial planning between provincial and

municipal governments in Jiangsu province.

6 Conclusion and discussion

This paper highlights the roles of the two-tier governments in the development of spatial

planning in regional China. It also emphasizes the influences of the contests between

provincial and municipal governments on the outcomes of spatial planning. The JSYR plan is

employed as a case study to review and reflect the regional governance mechanism. It is

found that the development process of the JSYR plan was highly embedded in local context

of political economy, reflecting the complicated and decentralized regional governance

mechanisms in provincial China. The plan formulation was not only shaped by the top-down

provincial guide and control, but also was moulded by the bottom-up municipal lobbying and

bargaining. The implementation of spatial plan was sensitive to local political-economic

context that varied spatially and generated place-specific spatial governance problems such as

environmental protection and water front utilization. The success and failure of implementing

65 Interview of local planner D, 20130617

27

development goals of spatial plan were contingent on the internal politics between provincial

and municipal government.

The provincial strategy of JSYR development was initially sprouted by the market forces

of cooperation between enterprises, subsequently shaped by the interactions between

provincial and municipal governments. During the process of plan implementation, Jiangsu

provincial government introduced a top-down policy framework to mobilize local cities and

counties to implement the plan. The framework includes political mobilization (allocating

development goals and local official assessment indicators), economic mobilization (top-

down preferential policies on investment, finance and taxation, etc.), and mass media

mobilization (news reports about the business opportunities of the JSYR plan and

development from official media). Specifically, the provincial government led the whole

plan-making process, and created institutional arenas for interaction and cooperation among

cities and counties through the JSYR plan implementation meetings to discuss annual

development goals and share development experiences.

On the other hand, in the era of decentralization, provincial government was constantly

lobbied and bargained by municipal governments for their respective development interests

and strategies. Municipal governments, fighting for capital and resources both from market

and the provincial government, attempted to maximize their own interests, which were

opportunity-led in the plan-making process. The outcomes of spatial plan were subject to the

complex politics between the two-tier governments, it was because at last the provincial

government had to rely on municipal governments for plan implementation. As evidenced in

assessing plan implementation, it shows that development goals of economic growth and

infrastructure building were the most successful, while the development control and reducing

regional disparity were not effective. Clearly, although Jiangsu provincial government had

introduced a spatial policy framework in the JSYR plan to integrate the fragmented territorial

policies, the plan was implemented selectively by municipal governments because municipal

governments regarded investment as a major approach for plan implementation and had their

28

own development priorities on economy. In order to attract investment, the competition,

outweighing the supported cooperation by JSYR plan, had become even fiercer among cities

in JSYR. Consequently, the development process of the JSYR plan reflects a localized urban

entrepreneurialism in the provincial power-relation context. It manifests that the inter-scale

contestations which are based on conflicting development priorities among different levels of

government would have a significant influence on the practices of regional spatial planning.

Previous studies have claimed that there is a tendency of weakening provincial

government in spatial governance in the context of decentralization.66 However, based on the

above analysis, rather than weakening power in spatial governance, provincial government

still matters with transformed governance approach. In contrast to the Western countries

where regional government power is hidden within relevant laws,67 the power of provincial

government in China is still very significant through political centralization and controlling of

production factors such as land and capital. For example, in the JSYR plan, Jiangsu provincial

government set many regulations to make sure municipal governments enforce the plan. By

controlling power and resources, the provincial government resorted to political and

economic mobilizations to deliver its visions. It translated the political centralization into the

process of planning administration to cope with the impact of economic decentralization. In

contrast, in order to strive for development opportunities and show their economic

achievements, municipal careerist officials took part in the provincial pro-growth strategy

with provincial officials actively. On the other hand, they also tried to break through

regulatory practices of the plan to gain more economic growth opportunities. Unfortunately,

due to the absence of regional planning laws and inadequate enforcement of relevant

ordinances, the planning control and regional coordination promotion could not be effective.

66 Jane Duckett, 'Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese-Style: The Lessons of Market Reform and State Entrepreneurialism in the People's Republic of China', World Development 29(1), (2001), pp. 23-37; Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu, 'Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China', Economic development and cultural change 49(1), (2000), pp. 1-21.67 Louis Albrechts, Patsy Healey and Klaus R. Kunzmann, 'Strategic Spatial Planning and Regional Governance in Europe', Journal of the American Planning Association 69(2), (2003), pp. 113-129.

29

Compared with the Western counties, the political economy of spatial governance in

China is more complex due to asymmetric decentralization: the structural problems of

economic decentralization and political centralization. Although the mode of spatial

governance could be formed very quickly by provincial top-down mobilizations at first, it

could also collapse easily due to municipal economic autonomies and their own development

priorities. Rather than serving as an institutional arena for inter-jurisdiction interaction and

regional cooperation, spatial plan and its implementation incentives may only function as an

instrument to develop new projects for capital accumulation. However, the actual

sustainability of spatial development was ignored, and thus this development mode is in

question in the long run.

30