an assessment of pak-afghan relations, since 1947...
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AN ASSESSMENT OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS,
SINCE 1947 UPTO 2001
BEING A THESIS PRESENTED
BY
ABDUL MANAN BAZAI
TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF BALOCHISTAN
QUETTA, PAKISTAN.
IN APPLICATION FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
2008
DECLARATION BY THE APPLICANT
I, Abdul Manan Bazai, do solemnly declare that the
Research Work under the Title “An Assessment of Pak-Afghan
Relations, Since 1947 Up to 2001” is hereby submitted for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and has not been submitted
elsewhere for any Degree. The said research work was carried
out by the undersigned under the guidance of Supervisor
appointed by the University of Balochistan, Quetta, Pakistan.
Abdul Manan Bazai
a
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that Mr. Abdul Manan Bazai has
worked under my supervision for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy. His research work is original. He fulfills all the
requirements to submit the accompanying thesis for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.
Prof. Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi Research Supervisor
& Dean of Languages University of Balochistan Quetta, Pakistan.
Prof. Dr. Seemi Naghmana Tahir Dean Faculty of State Sciences University of Balochistan Quetta, Pakistan.
b
DEDICATED
TO
THOSE AFGHANS, WHO BECAME THE VICTIMS OF UNDECLEARED
WAR ON AFGHANISTAN
The continent of Asia is made of water and clay is but one body in that
body the heart is the Afghan Nation the destruction of that nation will bring
about the prosperity of Asia as long as the heart remains free, the body
will be free otherwise it will become like a straw on the path of the wind :
(Allama Iqbal)
It is not difficult to conquer Afghanistan it is difficult to keep it
(Amir Abdur Rehman)
c
Acknowledgments
First of all, I own my deep gratitude to Allah Almighty for holding me strength to
complete this task. In the course of my last four years now and when I was registered as
doctoral candidate, I have incurred a considerable number of debts of warm gratitude.
Indeed I am grateful to more people that I can count.
I take pride in expressing my deep appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor,
Professor, Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi, -Dean faculty of languages and ex- Chairman
Department of International Relations University of Balochistan Quetta for his constant
guidance,interest and suggestion in the complation of this dissertation. No appropriate
words of thanks can express my feeling to him. He has been an unfailing source of
encouragement and aspiration to me at every stage of this study. He was keen to know
the progress of my research throught this period.His valuble suggestions helped me to
formulate my hypothesis. No appropriate world of thinks can express my feeling to him.
I express my special Thanks and gratituded to Prof Dr Ibrahim Shah Bukari Ex V.C of
Jamshoro UOS, who encouraged me at every step in this laborious work.I deserve my
greatest regard and respect for his valuable suggestion and guidance. His gentleness,
magnaimity and affection have always impressed me.
I am also thankful to DR.Azmat Hayat khan, Vice Chancellor (U.O.P) University of
Pashawer, a renewed scholar and writer who provdid me different types of books,
magazine, journals, and other related information which proved very useful in furnishing
me fruitful information.
In the course of my research various scholars and organizations helped me to the extent
without which this research would not have not been possible.I wish to acknowledge the
immense benefits I derived my fruitful discussion with some of my univirsity colleges
and friends, especially, Kaleemullah Breach Assistant professor department of history,
university of Balochistan, Quetta, who guided and assisted me through suggestion,
criticism. and advice in preparing this research work. I am very thankful to him for his
assistance whenever I required and asked for it his professionalism and deep source of
courtesy help me to complete my research work I would like to express my deep
d
appreciation to professor Dr, Zulfiqar Ali, ex Chairman department of International
Relations University of Balochistan, Quetta, his company gave me an unstinting help for
my research work.I am also thanks to the Chairperson Dr,Mussaret Jabeen Department
of International Relations, who always force me for the completion of my thesis.
I wish to offer my thanks to the library staff of the main library, University of
Balochistan, staff, and Command College Quetta, and Area Study Center of Peshawar
University, for eventually allowing me to the valuable library sources.
I am greatful for interviewes to that professor,s docrors, scholars, polatitions and
foreigners who enlightened me with usful informations.
I also express my warm sense of obligation to my family members, especially my
brothers and sisters, who always been a tower of strength and sport to me,And a large
number of my friends especially Muhammed Sharif kaker, M.Hussan A. Raziq and A.
Manan .k, which always encouraged me to fulfill my objectives. . My God Almighty
helps them all.
I must thank to my wife, who remained a continuous source of encouragement
throughout my studies.Her love, patience and devotion were invaluable in completing
this study. I express my deep appreciation to my sons and doughters who remained
aperennial source of motivation throughout my studies.
At last, the pains taken by Mohamme Yousf for undertaking the typing job without
pleading pleasure of time is also acknowledged.
e
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
ACBL Afghan Campaign to LAN dminesan
ACF Action Contra IA Faim
ACB Asian Development Bank
AIG Afghan Interim Government
AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIP Afghan Islamic Press
AKDN Agha Khan Development Network
AMOPH Afghan Ministry of Public Health
ANDA Afghan National Defense Islamic Front
ANF Afghan Narcotics Force
ANLF Afghan National Liberation Front
ASF Afghan Students ‘Federation
ASO Afghan Students’Organization
BBC British Broacasting Corporationd
BEMOP Bamyan Emergency Operation
CBR Central Board of Revenue
CID Crime Investigation Department
DP’s Displaced Person
DPS Demand for peace & Security
EC European Community
ECOSOC Economic and Social Conncil
EPC Eastern Provincial Council
HII Harkate Inqilabe Islami
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
f
ILO International Labor Organization
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
IUAM Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen
JI Jamaat-e-Islami
JMC Joint Minstrel Commission
MUC Muttahida Ulema of Pakistan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS National Directorate
NIF National Islamic Front
NSC National Security Council
OIC Organization of Islamic Conference
OSCA Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDPA People’s Democratic Party Afghanistan
PTI Press Trust of India
PTV Pakistan Television
RAWA Revolutionary Association of war in Afghanistan
SAIS School of Advanced International Studies
SCCI Shared Chamber of Commerce and Industry
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Officer Mission for Pakistan and Afghanistan
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNODC United Nations office on drugs and Crime
WIC World Islamic Council
WFP World Food Program
g
ABSTRACT
It’s make the most important issue after Soviet Union’s invasion on Afghanistan
in 1979, and event of 9/11/2001, Brought forth an entirely new situation not only for
Pakistan, s domestic and external policies but for all the regional countries and world. Its
impact on relations between the two historical, traditional friends and neighboring
Muslim countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The main purpose of the research is to explore and examine the key aspects and
interactions between the two countries by focusing attention on the political, economical
and other policies of the two countries. The study begins from the time of indepdence of
Pakistan in 1947 to 2001.
The central point of the study focuses upon the hypothesis that ‘’since 1978 Pak-
Afghan diplomacy have remained very successful in achieving their foreign policy
objectives.’’
The study analyses the different geo-strategic perceptions and conflicting interests on
the regional and global issue, which ultimately made these tradional friends and
immediate neighbors’ avirtualrivals and strong competitors. The purpose is to make a
good attempt to study the various aspects of Pak-Afghan relations in the context of
rapidly geo-strategic environment, and to explore the potentional areas that could
provide new avenues for improvement in the bilateral relations between these two
brotherly neighboring countries.
The study will also help to understand the concerns of the two countries under study
vis –a-vis various bilateral as well as multilateral issues that the figure in the overall
context of regional peace and stability. The impact of these relations would be analyzed
through the local, regional, and International dynamic. Moreover, various turns and
twists that Pak-Afghan relations have taken during the five-decad have been elaborate
h
upon
Different theories, approaches and methods have been used in order to examine,
analyze, and to access the depth and the nature of relationship between the two
countries.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE
a
DEDICATED
b
ACKNOLEDGMENTS
d
LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS
f
ABSRTRACT
h
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i
CHAPTER- O1:-
INTRODUCTION
1‐9
Introductions of thesis
1
Significance of the study
3
Objective of study
4
Hypothesis
4
Research procedure
4
Organization of chapters
5
References
9
CHAPTER-O2:-
Historical Perspective of Pak-Afghan relations since 1947-1979
10‐49
Durand Line
11
Historical Perspective of Durand Line
11
Border Demarcation conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan
17
The pashtunistan issue
20
j
Afghanistan claims and Pakistan counter claim over Pashtunistan issue
23
Pak-Afghan Relation in the context of Pastunistan issue 1947-1979-
24
Pashtunistan issue in new dimension
33
Daud’s visit to Pakistan...Further improved
34
Bhutto third visit to Afghanistan and its effects on Pak –Afghan relations
36
References
39‐49
CHAPTER-3:-
Saur Revolution and its impacts on Pak- Afghan Relations
50‐93
Background of leftist movement in Afghanistan up to PDPA.
51
Young Afghan
51
Wesh Zalmiyan
53
Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
54
Manifesto/Program
54
Constitution
55
Split in PDPA
57
KHALQ
57
PACHUM
57
Unification of PDPA
58
Role o f Soviet Unionin1979 Revolution
59
The Coup
61
Aims and Objectives of Saur Revolution 62
k
Major Reforms of Saur Revolution
65
Changing of National Flag
66
Banning of Private Loan Dealing
66
State Control of Marriage and Abolishing of vulvers
68
Land and Agrarian Reforms
70
Centralization of Tribes
72
Modernization of Afghan women
73
Establishing National Father Land Front
75
Official policy of PDPA in 1979
76
Impact of Saur Revolution on Pakistan
76
Political
77
Economical
79
Social
81
Weapons
83
Strategic
83
References
87‐92
CHAPTER 4:-
International involvement in Afghanistan and the ROLE of Pakistan
93‐119
Role of Pakistan
94
Policy options for Pakistan
97
The front line State policy and the US, Assistance
98
Pakistan’s Diplomatic Efforts 101
l
Role of Non Aligned Movement (NAM)
102
Role of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
102
Role of United Nations
103
The Geneva Accords
105
First Round
106
Second Round
106
Major Mujahedeen Groups
109
Hizb-Islami (Hi km atyar)
109
Hizb-Islami (Khalis group)
110
Jamiat-e-Islami
111
Attehad-e-Islami
111
Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan
112
Harakit-e-Inqilabi
113
Jabha-e-Nejat Milli Afghanistan
113
Iran Based Parties
114
References
117‐119
CHAPTER- 5:-
The withdrawal of soviet troops and Pakistan's Contribution in Peace Accords.
120‐145
Peshawar Accord 127
Islamabad Accord
133
Rabbani Government
136
m
Tension in Relations
138
References
143‐145
CHAPTER- 6:-
Emergence of Taliban and their Rule (1994-2001).
146‐166
Pre-Taliban Afghanistan
146
Emergence of Taliban
147
Shape and Scope of Taliban Administration
152
Imposing of Islamic Penal Code
154
Present one Party Political Situation
155
Implacable role of Taliban
155
Power struggle and Civil war
156
Foreign Policy of Taliban Administration
157
Pakistan’s Strategic interests
158
The Changing Relations with Taliban Government
162
International Community’s Attitude
164
References
165‐166
CHAPTER-07:-
The event of 9/11 war against terrorism and it impacts on Pak-Afghan Relation.
167‐192
Post 9/11 Phase and Pakistan
172
References
189‐192
CHAPTER- 8:-
CONCLUTIONS 193‐202
n
Future Suggestions
197
BIBLIOGRAPHY
203
Constitutions
208
Article and Journals
208
Articles in Newspapers
211
Newspapers
212
Magazines
212
Journals And Periodicals
212
Papers and Lectures
213
Personal Interviews
213
News Media
214
Reports
217
Maps
217
The Political Map of Pakistan.
The Political Map of Afghanistan.
CHAPTER: - 01
INTRODUCTION
1
Cordial and brotherly relations with all the Muslim countries have always been one of
the integral parts of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This policy did not change besides all
sorts of government changes. However Pakistan’s relations with its North-western
neighbor Afghanistan have constituted a problematic area in its foreign policy since its
inception in 1947. The foreign relations with Afghanistan are as complex as its
population. The geopolitical environment of the country is quite complex. Afghanistan
has been subjected to foreign political and military intrusions since long. Undoubtedly,
internal conflicts depending on their severity and connection of the internal political
parties with foreign actors, earn the attention of the outside powers 1
Historically, the county played an important role as a ‘Buffer State’ between British
India and the Czarist Empire.2 Great Britain for long exercised influence over the
external relations of Afghanistan (1879-1919) with the objective of preventing Kabul
from developing any strategic linkage with the former Soviet Empire.3
The exit of Britain from the sub-continent in 1947 and its declines as a global power
altered the traditional geopolitical balance in the region. Kabul’s disputes with the newly
born Pakistan over Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues added to its urgency to look for
political and material support from the Soviet Union. While Pakistan opted to is the ally
of USA and joined SEATO and CENTO to get military support to combat with her
neighboring states.4
Indeed, for all practical purposes the people of Afghanistan bore no ill will whatsoever
towards Pakistan. And neither did the Pakistan’s people harbor any hostility against
Afghanistan and its people. The emergence of Pashtoonistan issue was crushed by
Pakistan which further deteriorated the relations between both the states. When Sardar
Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah in July 1973. Observing the situation, their started a
struggle between progressive elements led by PDPA and Islamist to revolt against
Daud’s regime. Pakistan provided support to Islamist for bringing change in
Afghanistan. However, PDPA under the leadership of Noor Muhammad Taraki
remained successful in Afghanistan while Pakistan carried its support to Islamists and
Pakistan rendered hospitality to more than 3.5 millions refugees for more than two
decades, despite its crumbling economy and the consequences of involvement in conflict
2
with former USSR. Pakistan supported the Afghan cause at all levels and forums (UN,
OIC, NAM, EEC, etc).
This commitment was partly because of the religious and geographical affinity, which
Pakistan has with Afghans and partly because of its national, geographical and
geopolitical interests. Due to big threat Pakistan had refused to recognize the Soviet-
backed Communist regime which followed the “Sour revolution” and extended active
support of all sorts to different Afghan
Mujahedeen groups who had refused to accept the increasing Soviet influence in their
internal affairs. Pakistan’s close collaboration with the Afghan guerrilla leadership
continued to exist till the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However the post withdrawal
period is marked with an increased hostility between the Afghan groups as the scramble
for Kabul began. Thus as a consequence, Pakistan’s relations with certain Afghan groups
were strained, particularly with the ruling coalition under Burhanudin Rabbani.
Later on the Islamic movement of Taliban emerged in the South-western Afghanistan
and gradually captured almost the entire Pushtoon majority areas of Afghanistan.5 the
Rabbani administration had blamed Pakistan for supporting Taliban which has resulted
in the deterioration of relations. It was widely believed that Pakistan continued to extend
all kind of support to Taliban and, as a result they captured Kabul in September 1996, 6
Hence a Pakistan friendly government replaced the hostile Rabbani administration in
Kabul which has even attacked the Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul. The prospects of
peace, at least in the perception of decision makers in Islamabad, became brighter than
even before.7
However the struggle continued in the Northern part of Afghanistan where the ethnic
minorities live and which have been averse to the idea of Pushtoon dominated
government in Kabul 8. Although peace has been restored in more than two third of
Afghanistan that is under the effective control of Taliban yet they are facing stringent
opposition in northern Afghanistan.9 Despite the fact that Afghanistan is relatively more
peaceful in that time, Pakistan is being strongly criticized not only by the opposition
groups within Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also by Iran, Central Asian Republics
(CARs), India and Russia for its alleged sponsoring of the extremist taliban. 10
3
Pakistan’s Afghan relation ever since the Soviet intervention and even after the fall of
Taliban has been subjected to widespread criticism both at home and regionally. Critics
of the policy have been contending the Pakistan’s Afghan policy is a hostage to outside
interests and shortsighted. It does not reflect the best national interest of Pakistan. They
argue that Pakistan’s policy is made either in Washington or Saudi Arabia and is
implemented by Pakistan. Thus Pakistan’s policy regarding Afghanistan carries foreign
interests. As a result of this policy, Pakistan is being isolated in the region.
This scholarly work, however argues and demonstrates that Pakistan’s relations with
Afghanistan, has always remained complex as their always a conflict of interest between
western and other global powers with Pakistan. The USA and USSR using the land of
Pakistan but once they defeated USA, they left the region ignoring the destroyed
Afghanistan and did not settle the Issues related with Afghanistan. The post Russian
withdrawal era in Afghanistan was mostly managed by Pakistan, which is considered
suspicious by the rest of the world.
Significance of the Study
The main purpose of this study program is to analyze the two countries' relations
between 1978-2001.As the period from 1978 up till 2001 is one of the crucial ones not
only for Pakistan but also for the whole world. It was a period during which the whole
world remained divided into two blocs. Pakistan had retained its foreign relations
towards Afghanistan since 1978 under such parameter.
1. It is descriptive study based upon the evidence. A sleeping lion, a vital country
Afghanistan, had been part of the Central Asia and some time ruled by the Mughal
emperor enlarged to some parts of the Afghanistan. Historically Afghanistan is gateway
towards the South regional countries.
2. Modern history of Afghanistan as an independent state started with rise of declared it
as a buffer state i.e. a land between Russia and South Asia.
3. in 1979 white bear of North Pole once again extended their limbs with a great dream,
the access to hot water; it is yawning readjustment of the geo-Political status of
Afghanistan. This action posed a great threat to the security of world as well as to the
region.
4
4. Pakistan as neighboring country of Afghanistan was the first, which affected its geo-
Political security and integrity.
North West borders of Pakistan are interconnected with Afghanistan. The political
situation in Afghanistan has direct reaction on the people and government of Pakistan,
because people on both sides of the border have common Historical, Cultural, Social
inter relations. British in Subcontinent, they realized the importance of Afghanistan.
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The main objective of this study is to carry out an evaluation of Pakistan's Afghan
policy and to find its strength and weaknesses, its problems, achievements and to make
suggestion for improvements.
HYPOTHESES
The main hypotheses of the study are:
1. “From 1978-2001, Pakistan-Afghanistan diplomacy have remained very successful in
Achieving their foreign policy objectives”
2. “Pakistan has been failed in achieving her foreign policy objectives since 2001, vis-à-
vis frontline states Afghanistan.”
METHODOLOGY
The methods of inductive/qualitative patterns of research are proposed to be adopted
for this study. The relevant materials are expected to be found from the published or
unpublished sources. The interviews of the Scholor, Professor, s politicians and other
personalities will also be included and relied upon in the study.
Method of Research
The nature of research work is qualitative. It is based on the critical analysis of
the data gathered from the following sources.
1. In the theoretical discussion of the Pakistan foreign policy, I have drown extensively
from the core literature on the subject such as by Agha Shai, Shabzada Yaqoob Khan,
Star, Burk, Felix Gross, Hannan Kate, Charles Tilly, Walter Leuqur etc.
2. As for as the data on the Pakistan foreign Policy is concerned, I have collected many
information from the following sources.
5
3. The books which focused on the historical analysis on Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Such as by S.M Bark, Star, Louis Dupree, Ludwic Adamec, Dorn Bernard, Hassan M
Kaker,Musa Khan Jalalzai
4. The literature Published after the soviet invasion of Afghanistan and after the
withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan, which discussed the Afghan situation,
and Pakistan role in Afghanistan in detail. They include a long list of writing
Published during the period. Such as of Tahir Amin, Rasool Box Rais, Kamal
Mutuddin, George Arney, Salig Harrison, Fred Halliday, Thomas T, Richard etc.
5. A large numbers of articles dealing with the situation war also studied they included
those written by eminent writers, and published in the journals of international
reports.
6. A regular source of the world events was greatly helpful to me in the pursuit of my
research Kessing’s Contemporary Archives, Published by Kessing’s publications
7. I also counted upon newspapers and Magazines, Particularly the time, News
week. Dawn
8. Interviews with scholars, politician’s, policy makers, of both countries Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
9 Use of Internet.
Organization of Chapters
This thesis is consisted of Eight Chapters.
Chapter 01:-
Introduction of Thesis
Significance of the Study
Objective of the study
Hypotheses
Research Procdure
6
Chapter 02
The roots of Pak-Afghan Relations in Historical prospective.
The chapter will trace the historical roots of Pak-Afghan relations from 1947 to 1978.
Because the newly established country like Pakistan found its self in the shadows of
inherited problems left unresolved in the relationship between the British India and
Afghanistan. Pakistan was to find a way that could resolve the issue through peaceful
manners. The chapter is to focus on the period from the 1947 till 1978 as its inclusion
was necessary to understand the relationship under research. A lengthy reference to be
made to the restructuring of Pakistan's relationship, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with Afghanistan
under President Dawood 1975-78 with Iran playing the role of mediator. President
Dawood agreed to establish good relations with Pakistan by burying hatches over
Pashtunistan in return for massive development aid from Iran for its Helmand Vally and
other developments.
Chapter 03
Sour Revolution and its impacts on Pak-Afghan Relations.
The Afghan sour revolution of 27th April, 1978 led by People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan under Taraki created a new kind of atmosphere not only in the regional
politics but it also had a great impact on the international politics. As it was basically a
socialist revolution so, naturally USSR's strong support was behind it. While on the other
side the Islamists who were against the revolution were projected and supported by
U.S.A led coalition.
Pakistan being the next door neighbor of Afghanistan had to be affected by the changes
occurred in Afghanistan. Due to war, around 3 million Afghans migrated to Pakistan
although refugees’ camps were established in different places in the two provinces
namely NWFP and Balochistan but majority of them settled in different cities of
Pakistan which naturally had impacts on the social and economic life of the country. The
cities of Peshawar and Quetta became the centers for the so-called Mujahedeen who
were fighting with the support of USA led coalition against the sour revolution in
Afghanistan.
7
Chapter 04.
International involvement in Afghanistan and the Role of Pakistan.
The soil of Afghanistan became a battlefield for the biggest powers and their
companions to show their military and economic strength. The cold war was turned into
the hot war on the soil of Afghanistan. USA provided a huge amount of fund to the
Islamists and an undeclared war (Jihad) was started. The direct involvement of the USA
and USSR in the region let Pakistan, the close neighbor of Afghanistan most affected
from the situation. Pakistan was supposed to play an important role as Frontline State.
Chapter 05
The withdrawal of Soviet troops and Pakistan’s contribution in Peace Accords
The tussle between USA and USSR in Afghanistan ended by the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Afghanistan. The role of Pakistan in the peace Accords is most important
one. The Geneva Accords signed between involved parties in Afghanistan let the
Russian Army go out from Afghanistan. The same Accord might not have been
implemented properly if Pakistan would not have supported. Later on, during the ruling
period of Mujahedeen, Pakistan again facilitated to provide opportunities to the different
Afghan Mujahedeen groups to sign agreement in Islamabad and Peshawar and to form a
unanimous Government in Afghanistan after the resignation of Dr. .Najeebuallah's
regime.
Chapter 06
Emergence of Taliban and their rule (1994-2001).
The short period of Mujahedeen Government did not prove well because their
weak performance opened a way for civil war bringing a lot of destruction to
Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, particularly
Pakistan became fed up and lethargic from such situation. The people of Afghanistan
and state of Pakistan facilitated the way for the emergence of Taliban. Taliban emerged
on the Afghan scene in 1994 after they captured their stronghold in Kandahar and by
September,1997 they had controlled more than 75% of Afghanistan but their traditional
8
and rigid approach in the formation of Government isolated them from rest of the world.
The chapter will cover in depth the study of the emergence and the downfall of Taliban.
Chapter 07
The event of 9/11, war against terrorism and Pakistan.
The major challenge of Pakistan after 9/11 was the predicament of war against terrorism.
In the medium term after the military operation the US agenda became more complicated
bringing new challenges. Pakistan should spin on its head, discard the Taliban, discard
Islamic Jihad, discard Islamic fundamentalists, and became an accomplice in American
military intervention in Afghanistan or else face the consequences. President Bush had
made it clear that those who failed to join hands with them against terrorism were then
against them. The chapter will deal in detail the aftermath of September 9, 2001 in
Afghanistan and its impact on the relations of Pakistan.
Chapter-8
Deals with the Conclusion .of thesis and future suggestion and recommendations.
9
REFERENCES
1. Www/embassy of Pakistan.org/facts and figure.Php.
2. Thomas Barfield, the Afghan Morass’’, Current Affairs, July 1996.
3. Kamal Matim-u-Dins. Power Struggle in the Hindukush, Lahore: Wajid Ali
Publisher, 1991, p.38.
4. Tahir Amin, Afghan Crises: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran
and Pakistan. Islamabad: Institute of Studies, 1980.pp75-78.
5. Kamal Matim-u-Din, opcit. p.71.
6. Rais, War without Winners, London: Oxford University Press, 1994.p58.
7. B.Hilal’ Afghanistan, A Multi- Ethnic Society’’, Journals of Central Asian
Studies, (Area Study Center, Peshawar University) 1995.
8. Rais, opcit. p.51
9. TahirAmin, opcit. p.45
10. Ibid.p.46.
11. bid
CHAPTER NO:- II
HISTORICAL PRESPECTIVE OF PAK-AFGHAN
RELATIONS SINCE 1947-1979.
10
Before we attempt to study Pak-Afghan relations, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves of
the historical background of Pak-Afghan relations. Therefore, the present chapter
explains the historical perspective of Durand line and “Pashtunistan” issue.’ While
discussing the Durand line, the circumstances leading to signing of the Durand
agreement, the Afghan ruler’s reservation of the Durand line agreement as well as the
main objections raised by the Afghan rulers have been discussed. Similarly, while
discussing the Pashtunistan issue, various versions of the Pashtunistan raised government
and the repudiation of the Afghan claim by the Pakistani authorities also been discussed.
Movers ever, the Pak-Afghan relation in the context of Pashtunistan issue from 1947
to 1978 have also been elaborated.
There have been ups and down in Pak Afghan relations since 1947. During this period the
relations remained fluctuating from tense to peaceful at different occasion.
At few occasion the relation had deteriorated to the extent of closing borders and
stopping of Afghan trade through Pakistan territory.
The Pak Afghan issue has two dimensions. The first point of difference is over the
Durand line their common border, and the second point of difference is the Pashtunistan
identity inside Pakistan the Afghan argue that the Durand line being the product of the
British forward policy was imposed upon them under the Frontier forward policy of
divide and rule..
Since the Durand line, was the product of little thought as to the topography of the area,
it cut the Pashtun tribes into two further more, the question of the Pashtun territory had
always remained “disputed” between Afghanistan and great Britain. The Afghan agreed
that the boundary demarcation agreement (Durand line 1893) concluded between
Afghanistan and great British were applicable only for the duration of the British rule.
There fore the boundary question should be reopened between Pak and Afghanistan
solution as to settle the boundary conflict according to the desires of the people.
On the question of the Pashtuns identity in Pakistan, the Afghans contended that due
to their continuous agitation on the matter, the British had conceded Afghanistan's
interest in the welfare of the Pashtuns across the border in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of
1921, Signed between British India and Amir Amanullah Khan, Afghanistan, therefore,
wanted the right of self-determination for Pashtuns right up to the Indus. The Afghans
11
declared the referendum of 1947 as "sham and a trick" as the people were not given the
choice to remain independent or to merge into Afghanistan.1
DURAND LINE
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a common frontier of about 1, 200 miles known as the
Durand Line named after Mortimer Durand the Indian secretary of State. Amir Abdur
Rahman of Afghanistan and Mortimer Durand, on behalf of the British India, demarcated
this frontier between British India and Afghanistan on November 12, I893. 2 Though
initially both the sides expressed satisfaction, the later developments showed that the
Durand Agreement did not solve the frontier problems. The later Afghan rulers also
resented the Durand Agreement. The British could not persuade the Afghans to recognize
the legitimacy of the Durand Line and transferred the disputed area to Pakistan in August
1947. 3
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE DURAND LINE
Before 1747, Afghanistan was part of various successive empires in different historical
phases. History of the early empires is obscure. However, under Darius the great (500
B.C.), it formed part of Achacmenian Umpire. In 329 B.C. Alexander crossed the
country, then successively Morays (250 B.C.), Yuehchih (1, 75 B.C.), and Kushans (100
A.D.) ruled it. White Huns (400A. D.) and the Sassanid (600 A. D.) made Afghanistan
part of their empires. The Muslims came- to Afghanistan by the middle of seventh
century and various dynasties; Ghazanavids, Seljuk’s, Ghorids, Turks, Mongols,
Timurids and Mughal ruled this country.4
Although various scholars disagree over the origin of the Pashtuns, who are the main
inhabitants of Afghanistan. However, it is said that when Alexander armies passed
through (his area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. the Pashtuns had inhabited the
Eastern Highlands and mountains of modern Afghanistan. The long standing of the
Pashtun's residence in this area enabled them to command the principal passes of
strategic importance lying between central Asia and the rich plains in India. It gave them
control over military and trade routes.5
12
As a political entity, Afghanistan came into prominence with the decline of the two
great empires, the Safavids in the West and the Mughals in the East, 6 The decline of
both the empires created an opportunity,7 of which Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747-1773)
took advantage to establish the first Afghan kingdom. In 1747, Afghanistan became fully
independent under Ahmed Shah Abdali of Sadozai clan. His empire stretched as far as
Kashmir, Delhi, little-Tibet and the Arabian Sea, while Persian Khurasan to the west
became a tributary state. His regime resembled a convention of tribes.8 Modern
Afghanistan is the remains of the empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali. After the decline of his
empire Russian expansion in Central Asia southwards and British expansion northwards
started resulting in the creation of the present state of Afghanistan about the middle of
nineteenth century between the Oxus and the Durand Line.9
Afghanistan, though a landlocked country, occupies a strategic position between the
Middle East. Central Asia and South Asia. It is bounded to the north by the Central Asia,
to the west by Iran, to the East and South by Pakistan and to extreme North-East by
China. Its geographical position has exerted decisive influence on its political history,
composition and population.10 Afghanistan is watered by four major rivers-the Amu
Darya (Oxus) in the north, which rises from Lake Victoria (discovered by Captain Wood
in I83 8 ) and flows into the Aral Sea. The Hari Rud lies in the west, the Helmand in the
south and (the Kabul in the east. 11
Afghanistan has been rightly familiarized as a "highway of conquest" for migrant
peoples and expanding empires, a confluence of civilizations and religions, and a
"roundabout" for numerous trade routes connecting Europe with Far East and the Indian
Subcontinent,.12 Numerous factors had led to the external intervention in Afghanistan.
The most important were its landlocked character, its large and powerful neighbors and
its undefined and undefended borders. Afghanistan'; geographical position has also made
it insecure to raids from both Central Asia and the West. Insides it the strategic goals,
political interests and the ideological imperatives of its neighboring .Stales were also of
equal importance for consideration.13 Afghanistan's pivotal place in the strategies of
world powers is not a recent development. For more than a century and a quarter, it was a
sort of "No Man's Land' on the periphery of two Great empires- The landlocked stale was
like a bridge spanning central and southern Asia, It was a gateway, which opened on both
13
sides. 14
The Russian had coveted the warm water port in the Indian Ocean since Peter the
Great's reign (1628-1725). This ambition brought it into conflict with British imperial
positions in Persia and India in the 19th century. The two great powers hovered over
Afghanistan for nearly two centuries, fighting for position and the general outline of its
history is pertinent to the current controversy.15 To pursue their ambitions, the two
European powers in Asia, British and Russia, came face to face with each other in early
19th century. The desire to expand, led Russia to absorb Kirghiz and Turkmen and reduce
Khiva and Bukhara to the status of mere vassal states. While the British Empire in India
contended for the time being with the annexation of the Punjab, Sind and established its
supremacy in Kashmir, Chitral and Kalat. It also manifested its desire to control the
approaches to India located in Afghanistan. The Russian expansion to the South and
British expansion to the North were looked upon with mutual suspicion by the two
empires. To the British, any Russian advance in Central Asia was considered a potential
threat to India, whereas to the Russians, any British attempt to establish itself north of the
Hindu Kush was a clear signal to dislodge the former from its Central Asian possessions.
The mutual efforts to frustrate the real or perceived designs of the other came to be
known as the "Great Game.16
The rivalry between British in India and Russians in Central Asia started to manifest
itself in the soil of Afghanistan since 1815. Ensuring its own security was the major
concern of each power. Afghanistan was the focus of both the super powers for their
defense against another. The British policy towards Afghanistan alternated between
‘Close Door Policy' and 'Forward Policy' depending on the perceptions of the British
decision-makers regarding Russian designs over India.17 The 'Close Border Policy' meant
direct British rule only in the settled areas of the frontier region and leaving the tribes to
administer their own affairs. It also meant non-interference in Afghan affairs. The British
believed that stability in Afghanistan would obstruct Russian expansion. Therefore,
during 1890s the 'Close Border Policy' was replaced by 'Forward Policy.' Under the new
policy, the British look" the responsibility of administering certain areas and sent strong
military force into the other parts of the region.18 When the British reached the Pashtun
areas in the north-west, they had to stop at the "scientific frontiers" following the line that
14
ran between the cities of Kabul and Kandahar. Such a frontier would have brought the
entire Pashtun population under British control, but the Pashtuns were not in favor of
such a solution to British expansionism.19 However, the Russian expansion in central
Asia and its progress towards Afghanistan made the British worried who looked upon the
Russian threat as a real danger. Therefore the defense of India had to be planned and this
could be achieved by the occupation of the "scientific frontier" based on Kabul-Ghaziu-
Kandahar Line.20
Continued British intervention in Afghanistan compelled Amir Sher Ali to take
the Russian help. Sher Ali's acceptance of the Russian envoy and refusal to the British
mission resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80).21 As a result of the Second
Anglo-Afghan war the British not only had to control the Afghan foreign affairs but also
stationed the British agents in Afghanistan in return for the British support against
foreign aggression (Persian, Russian, or Bokharan intrusion).22 The war also led to the
removal of Sher Ali leaving the country to Sher Ali's son Yakub Khan who concluded the
Treaty of Gandamak with the British on May 26, 1879. The treaty granted internal
autonomy to Afghanistan but in foreign relations it was bound to follow British advice. A
false promise of non-interference in Afghan home affairs was also made. The British also
agreed to pay annual tributes to the Amir. Amir Abdur Rahman, (1880-1901) a cousin of
Amir Sher Ali Khan followed Amir Yakub Khan as Amir.23
However, the unruly nature of the Afghans, and the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars
(1839-1842), (1878-1880) convinced the British that "what was possible and practical
were considerably less than what was scientific and desirable." Constant British pressure
on Amir, on the one hand, and Amir's own reluctance to start war with the British on the
other, led to the signing of the Durand Line agreement between Afghanistan's Amir
Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of India on November
12, 1893.24 Two treaties were signed between the Amir and Durand, one about territory
north and south of Oxus and the other about those to the south and east of Afghanistan 25
The Kabul Convention or the Durand Line ran a hundred miles south of Kabul-Kandahar
divide. This line cut the Pashtun population into two: "Afghan" and the other "tribal"
with the latter only "marginally integrated" to British India.26 the main provisions of the
second agreement known as the Durand Agreement are as follows:
15
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side
or India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the government of India are
desirous or settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and fixing the limit of
their respective spheres or influence so that in future there may be no difference of
opinion on the subject between the allied governments. Il is hereby agreed as follows:
1. The government of India will at no time exercise interference in thes lying beyond
this line on the side of Afghanistan and His Highness the Amir will at no time
exercise interference in the territories lying beyong this line on th side of India.
2. The British government thus agreed to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and
the valley above it as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he
will not interfere in swat. Bajaur of Chitral, Including the Arnwai or Bashgal valley.
3. The British tract, who agrees to leave to his Highness the Birmal tract, who
relinquishes his claim to the rest of Waziristan coutnry and Dawar. His Highness also
relinquishes his claim to chagh
4. The Frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, whereas this
may be Practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners.27
The Afghans contended that while negotiating the Durand Line Agreement, Amir Abdur
Rahman was faced with many problems from various corners. They claimed that it was
obtained through duress, because at that time the British had the control of the foreign
affairs of Afghanistan, The Russians were also snapping away at Afghanistan's western
border. Internecine wars and rebellions were also going on in Afghanistan at full
vigour.28 Furthermore, the British having monopoly over commercial trade and arms
trade from India to Afghanistan had imposed arms embargo on Afghanistan. They were
also building a network of roads and railroads in the tribal areas leading to Afghanistan
in prosecution of their 'Forward Policy.29 It was also claimed that the British bribed the
Amir by payment of 18 lakh of rupees annually as "subsidy" for “signing” the
agreement, which corrupted the very nature of the agreement. 30 In addition, the Viceroy
of India also sent a letter to the Amir stating that "the Indian Government cannot wait for
your indefinite promises of uncertain dates and, therefore, after such and such a time,
will draw its own conclusions," He asked the Amir to conclude a demarcation agreement.
The Amir took the letter as warning and ultimatum. In fact, the British wanted the
16
demarcation and for that purpose they used every means to pressurize the Amir.31 Thus,
according to Afghanistan's sources. Amir Abdur Rahman was pressurized politically,
militarily and economically to accept the agreement. 32
Amir Abdur Rahman has described the Durand Line issue in his memoirs. According to
him a map concerning the Afghan frontier was sent to him by the Viceroy in which
certain areas inhabited by the fronted tribesmen were called as “Yaghistan” (the land of
the unruly) were shown as belonging to India. In the map sent to the Amir all the
countries of Yaghistan namely the New Chaman including the railway station there,
Chaghe, Bulund Khel Waziri, the whole of Mohmand, Asmar, Chitral, Bajaur, Swat
Buner, Dir, and Chilas were shown as belonging to India. The Amir wrote back to the
Viceroy asking him to let the people of theses areas stay with him. Because being of the
same faith, he would make the people of the areas fight against the enemy of the British
“in the name of Jihad”. If the areas were detached neither it would be of any use to the
British north the Amir. He further argued that the detachment of the areas [from
Afghanistan] would minimize his prestige in the eyes of the people, which in turn would
make him weak. He warned that his weakens would be dangerous to the British
government. 33 But the British did not accept his viewpoint and the boundary line were
concluded. The boundary line extended from Chitral and Baroghil pass to Peshawar and
thence up to Kohl Malik Siyah in this way that Wakhan, Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of
Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan were left to the Amir software Jurisdiction. The
Amir gave up claims to the railway station of new Chaman, Chaghe, and part of Waziri
Bulund Khel, Kuram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral as a result of
the Durand Line Agreement. 34
The next important matter was the subsequent ratification and renunciation of the
agreement by the succeeding Afghan rulers. The relevant documents in favor of
ratification are the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and
the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. These three documents show that the Durand Line
treaty had been ratified or at least accepted. 35 In addition, the letters exchanged between
the British Government and Afghanistan on May 6, 1930; June 30, 1950; and on 1s1
March 1956 also confirmed the Durand Line.36 Although Amir Habibullah in 1905, Amir
Amanullah in 1921 and King Nadir Shah in 1930 ratified the agreement. King Zahir
17
Shah did not accept it after the British withdrawal from India, 37
BORDER DEMARCATION CONFLICT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
The Afghans questioned the Durand Line when the partition plan of the Indian
Subcontinent was announced on June 3, 1947. The Afghan Government claimed all the
areas of Indian Subcontinent inhabited by the Pashtuns, but the Indian Government
rejected the claim.38
According to the authorities in Afghanistan, in the past, NWFP was part of
Afghanistan. Therefore, they demanded that after the departure of the British from the
Sub-continent, they should be allowed to join their kith and kin in Afghanistan. The
Afghans further hoped that the Pashtuns in NWFP would be given the option either to
join Afghanistan or to remain independent,39 Having this in mind, the Government of
Afghanistan approached the British to negotiate for regaining the areas inhabited by the
Pashtuns, which were now part of Pakistan after the British withdrawal.40 They tried to
persuade the British to return NWFP, Balochistan and the tribal areas on the grounds
that they were initially part of Afghanistan, and they be allowed to unite with
Afghanistan to form one Afghan state or to form independent Pashtunistan. However,
the British did not accept the Afghan claims.41 They rather insisted that the Pashtuns join
either India or Pakistan through referendum.42 Between 6 and 17 July 1947, a
referendum was held under the control of the army to find out whether the people of
Frontier want to join India or Pakistan. The Frontier Congressmen did not take part in
the referendum. Consequently, the Muslim League was victorious in the referendum.
The Frontier congressmen were told to give up their alliance with Patel and Ghandi and
join hands with the Muslim League in the reconstruction of the country. Nevertheless,
the Congressmen refused and termed the referendum as 'sham' and 'one-sided' affair.43
However, the Pashtuns decided in favor of joining Pakistan.44 Afghanistan rejected the
referendum results on the ground that the Pashtuns having the same links with British
India, as with other princely states, should have been given The third option of
remaining independent,45 An official press communiqué was issued in Kabul in 1947,
declaring that:....
18
In spite of the boycott of a great majority of the Afghans, the forced referendum was
enforced and carried out in Afghan Balochistan and the NWFP. Both were given to
Pakistan. But our claim stands as it was. And Afghanistan has already announced that
Afghanistan will not acknowledge the results of the above mentioned obligatory and
unjust referendum. 46
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar Organization who led the
freedom struggle in NWFP, while delivering a speech on the eve of observing
'Pashtunistan Day' on 1" September 1967, in Kabul, objected the referendum of July
1947 in the following words:
The force of Referendum was staged by the British government first, on the issues we
are not interested in; second, based on limited franchise,; third, with no supervision and
control of the ballots; fourth, rigging of votes and fifth, non-participation by majority of
Pashtuns.47
Even after the referendum of 1947, Afghanistan continued to challenge the Durand line
48 on three basic grounds.
1. The Durand Line had been concluded under duress therefore Pakistan couldn't inherit
a territory, which had never belonged rightfully to British.
2. That the majority of the Pashtuns had not voted in the referendum of July 1947 and
that they had not been given the option of remaining autonomous.
3. The Durand Line had divided the Pashtuns into two, The Afghan contended that the
Pashtuns should be given the right of self-determination to decide whether they want
to stay in Pakistan join Afghanistan or become independent.49
Having denounced the Durand Line, the Afghanistan Government made the following
demands from Pakistan:
1. Pashtunistan should be the name of the Frontier province along with certain areas of
Balochistan.
2. The tribal areas of Pakistan's side of the Durand Line should be declared the sovereign
state of Pashtunistan with the Frontier province and Balochistan being incorporated in
this new state.50
Thus, between 1947 and 1979, various Afghan Governments objected the Durand Line
on the grounds that it was a treaty between two unequal powers i.e. British Empire and
19
Afghanistan. They suggested the demarcation of new boundary between Pakistan and
Afghanistan so as to resolve the problem of Pashtun's ethnic purity. Such a frontier
would have completed the ethnic purity of Afghanistan by the re-union of the vast
majority of the Pashtuns. Afghanistan also presented another option of creating a self-
governing province of Pashtunistan or an independent country for the whole Pushtuns.51
Thus, Afghan claims can be summarized into three categories Historically, Afghanistan
argued that all the disputed areas had been controlled by Afghanistan but were usurped
by the British. Legally, Afghanistan argued that the Durand Line treaty had been
obtained by coercion and Pakistan cannot inherit the areas from an extinguished ruler,
namely British rule in India. Ethnically, the Afghans argued the Pashtuns are single
ethnic unit but had been divided by the Durand Line.52
Pakistan refused to accept the demands of Afghanistan. It contended that the Pashtuns
had never formed a single ethnic nation in history. Far from maintaining any unity there
had been continuous inter-tribal feuds. It further argued that Afghanistan only talks about
the inclusion of all Pashtuns across the border in Pashtunistan but denied the inclusion of
Pashtuns on its side. By so doing the Pashtuns would continue to remain divided into two
sovereign stales. Pakistan even rejected the Afghan argument of Pashtuns being a racial
group with common traditions, culture and language and added further that the Pashtuns
on eastern border have developed their own culture and connected themselves
economically and politically more with Peshawar than Kabul.53 It pointed out, that
Afghanistan's emotional attachment with the Pashtuns and its domestic and geo-.strategic
compulsions were responsible for its refusal to negotiate on the issue.54
Therefore, Pakistan considered the Durand Line as an internationally recognized
frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite its geographical and ethnic flaws,
Because Amir Abdur Rahman and all the subsequent rulers of Afghanistan had accepted
the Durand Line as obligatory upon them. Pakistan being the inheritor of British had
assumed the rights and obligation by virtue of various treaties concluded between
Afghanistan and the British Government. "The Durand Line has thus become the
international Boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.55
20
2 PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE
The colonies created by the Europeans in Asia and Africa during their rule have
left legacies of bitterness and often of war for the independent nations that emerged from
colonial rule- Afghanistan, though never colonized in a proper sense, was no exception.56
The Pashtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the legacy of the British
colonialism. The origin of the Pashtunistan issue dates back to the Treaty of Gandamak
concluded on May 26, 1878, and the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 between
Afghanistan and British India. The Durand Line rather than solving problems created
more complications for Afghanistan in the shape of division of the Pashtun tribes living
between Afghanistan and British India.57 Although at the time of partition, the Afghan
Government tried to persuade the British to give the Pashtuns two supplementary options
either lo merge with Afghanistan or to form an independent Pashtunistan, but the British
refused to entertain any of these demands.58
AFGHANISTAN'S CLAIMS AND PAKISTAN'S COUNTER CLAIMS OVER
PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE
The Afghan Government definition of Pashtunistan has been changing from time to
time. Afghanistan at one time wanted without reservation, the incorporation of large
territories from Khyber to Dera Gliazi Khan and from Giigit and Chitral to the Arabian
Sea. Yet at another time Afghanistan recommended the establishment of an autonomous
Pashtunistan. Though, Afghanistan was quiet on the incorporation of any of Pashtun and
Pashto speaking areas situated in Afghanistan.59 According to Afghan official sources,
Pashtunistan comprised of NWFP and Balochistan. In other words, it stretches from
Balochistan in the South to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, an
Afghan ambassadorial representative has also written that Pashtunistan includes Chitral,
Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah, Bajaur, Kohat, Pezu, Goirial, and
Bolan. And Malacad. According to the 'nationalist' Pakistani Pashtun leaders including
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, Pashtunistan meant only the renaming of the NWFP
conceding it autonomy within Pakistan.60
According to Arif Hussain 'Pashtunistan', as visualized by Afghanistan, would be
comprised of the tribal territory with its two million population, the former territory of
21
NWFP, with two million inhabitants, and a part of old Balochistan total amounting to
about seven million people. However, Afghanistan claim was a little larger and included
Balochistan and a few other states as well.61
Since the word Pashtunistan is used for the area inhabited by a majority of the Pashto
speaking people, 62 consequently the Pashtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan basically concerns the social and legal position and condition of several million
Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line. These people are called Pashtuns
because their main language is Pashto or Pakhto, Although the Pashtuns are divided into
several complex tribes and sub tribes but they have a common language, culture, custom
and history.63
The principal argument for creating Pashtunistan' was ethnological. The Afghans
argued that the Pashtuns are different from the rest of the people and should be given a
separate homeland of their own.64 The Pashtun areas in Pakistan were looked upon as
belonging to the Pashtuns by a shared history, race, language and culture.65 Accordingly,
the original Afghan propaganda was based on two themes: first, the Pashtunistan state
should be formed comprising only Pashtun areas across the border, totally independent
from Pakistan and secondly, the new 'Pashtunistan State' should be integrated with
Afghanistan due to ethnic, linguistic and other affinities. The major argument was that
"since there is no difference between us, there is no sense in our being disunited. 66
Strategic and economic reasons were also some of the factors for furthering
Pashtunistan claim. Afghanistan wished to acquire some territory to reach the Indian
Ocean and put an end to Afghanistan's landlocked status. Amir Abdur Rahman had
revealed this desire in unequivocal manner at the end of nineteenth century in these
words:
If Afghanistan had access to the ocean, there is no doubt that the country would soon
grow rich and prosperous ... if no favorable opportunity occurs in my life to bring about
this purpose my sons and successors must always keep their eyes on this corner, i.e.
Balochistan. 67
Security factor was also one of the main considerations of Afghanistan in supporting
Pashtunistan claim. Pashtunistan's importance for Afghanistan was apparent for it lay on
the Afghan border. Afghanistan could not remain unaffected by the unrest in the Pashtun
22
areas, as it would be politically, economically, administratively and strategically. It was
more likely because Afghanistan is depended on its neighbors for trade with the outside
world. 68
Another major argument of Afghan Government was that the disputed territory was
neither composed on state-like basis nor absorbed with the rest of British India on the
eve of the departure of the British from India. Some areas were administered territories
while others remained as independent tribal areas but none of this formed part of any
state. According to Azmat Hayat, an authority on Durand Line, in international law,
alteration of such an area into a political body by the Pakistani authorities was an
innovation, formed by irregular means. 69
Afghanistan, therefore, considered it its duty to support and protect the right of self-
determination of the Pashtuns living on Pakistani side.70 It has always shown its concern
whenever they felt any danger to the Pashtun identity and culture. They made it clear to
the Pakistani Government that the future status of the tribal areas and the Pashtuns
should be divided in accordance with the desires of the Pashtuns. They threatened that
any thing decided against the wishes of the Pashtuns would not be acceptable to the
Afghanistan's Grand National Assembly.71
The incompatible nature of the Afghan claims often confuses modern researchers on
this distressing controversy. This confusion is the result of the failure to distinguish
between the official Afghan government position and the demands put forward by the
"unofficial propagandists, extreme nationalists, and political advocates of a Greater
Afghanistan." Governmental control or influence over the communication in Afghanistan
had made it difficult to decide, "When a certain claim is official, officially inspired, or
merely the opinion of the writer." But when we examine exactly only the official
pronouncement of the Afghan Government, three basic themes are repeated with
outstanding coherence. These are:
1. A demand for the Pashtuns living East of the Durand Line;
2. Insistent denial that Afghanistan desires any territorial expansion, and.
3. Repeated assurances that Afghanistan wants the dispute solved only by peaceful
means and that negotiations should take place between Pakistan and the leaders of
Pashtuns themselves.72
23
Pakistan has rejected Afghanistan's demand for the right of self-determination of the
Pashtuns on the ground that before 1747, there was no such state and the territories of
Pashtuns remained divided between the Safavi Empire and the Mughal Empire.
Moreover, the North West India remained part of Afghanistan for only Fifty years. After
it, it was taken by the Sikhs and from them it passed on to the British in 1849. It further
argued that if a territorial claim for such a short period nearly 150 years ago was to be
accepted for territorial change, "the world map would be liable to dramatic change,"
Thus Pakistan rejected Afghanistan's claim on the basis that the trans-lndus tracts had
been surrendered to Nadir Shah. After Nadir-Shah's death, Ahmad Shah captured it by
force and the area remained as part of Afghanistan for a short period.73 Pakistan further
argued that the question of self-determination has already been dosed by the referendum
lied in NWFP in which the majority of the Pashtuns had decided in favor of joining
Pakistan.74
Manzoor Qadir, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, even suggested the holding of a
referendum for the Pashtuns inside Afghanistan.75 The argument was advanced on the
ground that the Pashtuns are in majority in Pakistan than Afghanistan. There are seven
million Pashtuns in Pakistan while in Afghanistan their strength is not more than four
million. If the Afghan historical kinship is kept in view then the Afghan claim could be
rebounded on them by asking Afghanistan to hold referendum among the Pashtuns of
Afghanistan to find out whether they want to Join Pakistan or remain in Afghanistan.76 In
this way, Pashtunistan demand could have been dangerous for Afghanistan if Pakistan
would have recourse to active propaganda The very propaganda that the Afghans
themselves are not unified group could have created problems for them. According to
Arif Hussain, "it is no great trick to bring down a government in Kabul, it never has
been. 77 After some border raids, the Government of Pakistan in a White Paper issued on
September 3, 1961, pointed out:
If the frontier of a country has to be determined on linguistic and ethnic bases as
claimed by the Afghans. It will result in the disintegration of Afghanistan. There are
twelve million people in Afghanistan. Of these only 3.5 million speak Pashto and the rest
speak Persian. Turkish. Tadzhik and Uzbek. All these non-Pashto speaking parts of
Afghanistan should on this basis be integrated with neighboring counties. 78
24
Thus Pakistan opposed Afghanistan's hostile policy on Pashtunistan which it pursued
with backing from Russian and India. Indian involvement in the matter was because of its
policy to encircle Pakistan "which India had about to do by reasons of combination other
own frontier marching with that of West Pakistan, her occupation of Kashmir and the
maintenance of close relations with Afghanistan." Russia's interest in the matter was to
punish Pakistan for joining the Western Alliances.79
PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTESXT OF PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE:
1947-78
The Pashtunistan issue had been the main cause of often-tense relations between the two
countries since Pakistan's creation.80 The dispute took various forms of propaganda
warfare, border fighting, closure of consulates and interference with Afghan transit
arrangement for trade via Karachi.81
The Pak-Afghan discord surfaced with Afghanistan's casting negative vote on
Pakistan's admission into the United Nations on September 30, 1947 82 The Afghan
representatives, Hosyan Aziz, defended the decision in the United Nations, Genera!
Assembly in the following words:
We cannot recognize the North West Frontier as part of Pakistan solution as long as
people of North West Frontier have not been give an opportunity free from any kind of
influence and I repeat, free from any kind of influence to determine for themselves
whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Paksitan.83
Since then, the Afghan government demanded a plebiscite to be held in Pakistani side of
the Durand Line.84 Pakistan was not recognized as a complete state "with defined,
acceptable frontiers." In order to be accepted by international community, according the
Afghan accusations, Pakistan had to re-demarcate its border with its neighboring
country. 85 The Kabul radio and press frequently instigated the tribes on the Pakistani
side of the Durand Line to create an independent Pashtunistan. 86
In November 1947, the meeting’ between the special envoy of King Zahir Shah and
Pakistani statesmen in Karachi, to negotiate friendship treaty remained vague. But
despite mutual suspicion and skirmishes, diplomatic relations established between the
two countries in 1948.87 In February 1948, Afghanistan and Pakistan showed some
25
conciliatory signs including Afghanistan's withdrawal of its negative UN vote in the
United Nations and the exchange of ambassadors.88 The appointment of the first Afghan
Ambassador, Marshal Shah Wali Khan, the uncle of King Zahir Shah was regarded as a
gesture of goodwill. On May 8, 1948, Shah Wali Khan Chazi, the first Afghan
Ambassador to Pakistan presented his credentials to Quaid-i-Azam. The Quaid said on
this occasion:
Your Royal Highness has rightly referred to the natural bonds of friendship and
affection, which bind the people of our two countries. It could hardly be otherwise as
these bonds are based on ties of faith and culture. With such powerful bonds in our favor
we cannot. I feel, fail to bring the people of our two countries closure than they were
before the birth of Pakistan. 89
In 1948, the Pashtunistan propaganda was going on in full swing in Kabul. On May 26,
1948, King Zahir Shah in his inaugural speech in Shin-a-i-Milli referred to the
Pashtunistan issue in the following words:
… The Afghan nation welcomed and viewed with utmost gratification the establishment
of the dominion of Pakistan and India and the Afghan government did not fail in exerting
their best efforts to take up the matter of our Afghan brethren living in the government of
Great Britain and the newly set up government of Pakistan. Whilst we have openly
declared our desire to set up an embassy of Afghanistan in Karachi, with a view to
cementing the relations of friendship and “Bon Voisinage” with Pakistan. We earnestly
hope that assurances in this regard will be dully implemented.90 I
In June 1948, the Loyai Jirga (the Afghan National Assembly) rejected all treaties,
conventions and agreements signed between Afghanistan and the British Government
before 1947. It even challenged the Durand Line as an internationally recognized frontier
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.91 The Loya Jirga announced "it recognized neither
the imaginary Durand nor any similar Line" and declared all agreements as null and void.
An attempt was made to set up an independent Pashtunistan, which had secret Afghan
support, 92 The Loya Jirga also mentioned the separation of NWFP and other areas from
Chitral to Balochistan from the Pakistani government and promised help to the Afghan
Government in the achievement of freedom for the people of this areas.93
26
In March 1949, Afghanistan's activities of mobilizing its troops on the Pakistani side of
the border failed due to Pakistan's closure of its border in 1950, for three months, By
1950, the situation had aggravated to the extent of opening of Pashtunistan fund.94 and
Pashtunistan Assembly or first Pashtun Provisional Parliament, with a branch in Tirah
under the leadership of the Afridi clan and another branch at Gorweikht in Waziristan of
which the Faqir of 1pi Mirza Ali khan, the legendary freedom fighter became the first
President. A general assembly of all the Pashtun clans had declared their allegiance to it-
Its meetings were organized at different places in Afghanistan, which no doubt, had
secret Afghan support.95
In January 1950, Liaqat Ali Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan asked the British
Government to declare the Durand Line as an international boundary and encroachment
upon it as a violation of the Commonwealth border. On January 12, 1950, the British
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel Baker, told a conference in
Karachi that under international law, Pakistan was the lawful-inheritor of the rights and
duties of the old Indian Government of the regions on the Pakistan side of the Durand
Line". Later the British Parliament confirmed it on June 30, 1950. It declared, "The
Durand Line is the international frontier. 96
In early 1950, tribal uprising started against the Pakistani Government on the Question
of granting autonomy to the Pashtun territory. The uprising took a serious turn when the
Government of Pakistan sent off troops for repressing the subversive elements. From
March 17, 1950, to October 22, 1950 the Pakistan Air Force bombed some Pashtun
villages, killing men, women and children.97 in one of such bombing raids in June 1950,
the Pakistani Air Force plane bombarded a village across the frontier to put down the
tribal uprising. It produced feeling of resentment in Afghanistan.98 the Afghan
Government alleged that a Pakistani aero plane had bombed a village within its territory.
Though, Pakistan accepted the responsibility of the accidental bombing of the Pakistan
Air Force plane, and offered full payment, yet, the settlement of the issue could not help
lessen the Afghan propaganda. 99
A periodical journal Pashtunistan was published in 1951, in Delhi and distributed
internationally. The celebration of Pashtunistan Day' on August 31, became an annual
feature or rather a political ritual mixed with funfair at Kabul, Delhi and London. A
27
square in Kabul was renamed as 'Pashtunistan Square'. In September 1951, the semi-
official journal, Arif (Kabul) published a map showing the geographical boundaries of
Pashtunistan; it included Chitral, the NWFP and the Pashtun areas of Balochistan
extending from the Durand Line to the Indus. 100
The assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951 by
an Afghan citizen syed Akbar, living in exile in Pakistan, was another nuisance, Pak-
Afghan relations. However, Pakistani government accepted Afghanistan's refusal of any
involvement on its part.101
On March 27, 1955, large-scale demonstrations were staged in Kabul and other
cities of Afghanistan in response to the proclamation of emergency and creating 'One
Unit.' Kabul thought that the One Unit is an attempt to destroy the demand of the
Pashtuns for autonomy, thereby, jeopardizing the very idea of Pashtunistan. On March
30, 1955, not only a strong note was sent to the Pakistani Government but the Afghan
demonstrators also attacked the Pakistani embassy building in Kabul and torn the
Pakistani flag. In retaliation, demonstrations also took place in Karachi and other cities,
There were protests and counter protests. On April 2, 1955, fighting erupted on the
border. Pakistan argued that it was the result of Afghan attack on Pakistani territory but
Afghanistan took it as fighting between Pashtuns and Pakistani forces.102
On May 2, 1955, Pakistan ordered the closure of Afghan consulates and trade agencies
in Peshawar, Quetta, Peshawar and Chaman and banishment of Afghan staff from there
as a "first step against the Afghan government." On May 6, 1955, a Foreign Office
spokesman in Karachi warned of bitter consequences like severing diplomatic relations
with Afghanistan, closing the border and call for economic sanctions, if Afghanistan
failed to provide protection against attack on Pakistani consulate by May 15. The Afghan
Government, quite contrary to expectations, ordered the mobilization of its troops for its
country's defense, which in turn aroused strong counter-response in Pakistan. However,
tension was released when both the countries accepted the mediation offer from Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey.103
In September 1957, diplomatic relations were resumed, Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in
February 1958, and an agreement on the improvement of transit facilities through
Pakistan was signed in May 1958. During 1959, relations once again
28
deteriorated. In July 1960, the USA and UK embassies in Kabul excused keeping
Pakistanis any more in their staff due to Afghanistan's government refusal to renew their
visas.104
In 1955, when One Unit was promulgated, the ruler of Dir refused to surrender. He
apprehended about his own state, as the activities for One Unit were more visible now.105
In order to support the Nawab of Dir, Afghanistan concentrated its troops on the border,
West of Bajaur. In retaliation, Pakistan also airlifted some scout platoon to Dir. Border
clashes started between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which continued; from 1961 to
1963.106 both countries accused each other of creating trouble. According to Pakistani
intelligence sources, several hundred Afghan militias dressed as tribesmen entered
Pakistan, south of the Durand Line. Afghanistan denied the claims by saying that rather
Pakistani agents were creating trouble in the Pashtun areas. The Afghan Government
also accused Pakistan of following undemocratic and repressive policy towards the
Pashtuns, But the Pakistani press alleged that the Afghan Government, in order to
conceal the Afghan Lashkar’s failure to capture Pakistani territory, was propounding
such groundless propaganda.107 The Soviet media criticized Pakistan for using American
weapons against the Pashtuns in order to suppress their 'liberation movement.108
By May 1961, Pakistan and Afghan troops were fighting in Bajaur area. Eventually the
Pakistani Government ordered Afghanistan to close its consulates and trading agencies in
Pakistan by September 6, while announcing the closure of its own consulates in
Kandahar and Jalalabad.109
In August 1961, Pakistan informed the Afghan government that due to abnormal
circumstances on the border, normal diplomatic relations couldn't be continued. Pakistan,
therefore, closed its consulates in Afghanistan, and requested Afghanistan to follow suit.
The Afghan government quite contrary to expectation declared that Pakistan should
withdraw this policy within one week or Afghanistan would severe diplomatic
relations.110 The Afghan Government presented the following condition for the
resumption of diplomatic relations:
a) Pakistan should guarantee the right of self-determination of the Pashtun tribes,
b) Pakistani troops should withdraw from the tribal area east of the Durand Line;
29
c) Release of all the detained Pashtun leaders;
d) Afghan consulates and trade agencies should be reopened in Pakistan.
Pakistan rejected the above mentioned terms of the Afghan Government. 111 On
September 6, 1961, Afghanistan severed relations with Pakistan and closed border. This,
in turn, led to restrictions on the seasonal movement of the Afghan nomads into Pakistan,
Traffic between the two countries slopped. Two of Afghan major export crops were also
ready for shipment to India. The Soviet Union stepped in and offered to buy the crops
and airlift them from Afghanistan to India. Afghanistan Arianna Airline.1; airlifted the
remaining crops to India.112
Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan's foreign trade is dependent on transit rights
through neighboring countries. It has the shortest route to the sea through Pakistan to the
port of Karachi.113 But the closure of Pak-Afghan border in 1960 compelled Afghanistan
to seek different routes to the sea. One of these was through Iran to the port of
Khorramshehr on the Persian Gulf. The other was across Russia to the Baltic Sea. After
the re-opening of the Pak-Afghan border the shorter and less costly route through
Pakistan was brought back into use.114 Due to Afghanistan's provocation on the
Pashtunistan issue, Pakistan had imposed three times trade embargo on Afghan good115 in
1950, 1955 and 1961-63.116 but the embargoes were soon lifted on the Shah of Iran's
mediation.117
In 1961, the American spy U-2 plane used the Badaber base, near Peshawar, for
carrying out observation over the Soviet Union, Afghanistan protested against the over
flight of the plane. President Ayub Khan rather then dealing properly with the issue,
blamed Daud, then Prime Minister of Afghanistan for interfering in Pakistan's internal
affairs.118 During 1961-62, the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues were again renewed
so as to put pressure on Pakistan not to take advantage of India's difficulties during the
Sine-Indian border dispute of 1961-62.119 In 1962, Ayub Khan suggested a convention
between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran but Afghanistan did not give due importance to
the offer.120
The Shah of Iran's offer of mediation in July 1962, to settle the disputed issues between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, was rejected due to Daud's emotional commitment to
30
Pashtunistan.121 But the Shah continued his efforts and eventually succeeded in his
efforts. A meeting of the representatives of the two countries was held in Tehran and
thus Tehran Accord was signed in May 28, 1963.l22 A joint communiqué regarding the
Tehran Accord was issued simultaneously from Tehran, Rawalpindi and Kabul on May
30 1963. Its salient features include:
Pak-Afghan consulates in each other's capital would be reopened as soon as possible.
A. The Afghan consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would be re-opened as soon as
possible. But at the same time Pakistan reserved the right to establishing the consulates
at Kandahar and Jalalabad if necessary.
B. Afghan trade agencies would be established temporarily at Peshawar arid Chaman
until the projected railway from Chaman to Landikotal had been extended into
Afghanistan. Should more trade agencies be needed, this would be discussed between
the two governments.
C. Transit and trade arrangements would be regularized under the 1958 transit
agreement into account.
D. Both parties agreed that the duties and conduct of the representatives would be in
accordance with the recognized principles of international Law, usage and practice and
would be confined to the discharge of the official functions.
E. The two governments agreed to endeavor to create atmosphere of goodwill,
friendship and mutually expressed their deepest gratitude to the Shah, for his good office
had made the re-establishment of relations possible.123
F. The Afghan consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would be re-opened as soon as
possible. But at the same time Pakistan reserved the right to establishing the consulates
at Kandahar and Jalalabad if necessary.
G. Afghan trade agencies would be established temporarily at Peshawar arid Chaman
until the projected railway from Chaman to Landikotal had been extended into
Afghanistan. Should more trade agencies be needed, this would be discussed between
the two governments.
H. Transit and trade arrangements would be regularized under the 1958 transit
agreement into account.
31
I. Both parties agreed that the duties and conduct of the representatives would be in
accordance with the recognized principles of international Law, usage and practice and
would be confined to the discharge of the official functions.
G. The two governments agreed to endeavor to create atmosphere of goodwill,
friendship and mutually expressed their deepest gratitude to the Shah, for his good office
had made the re-establishment of relations possible.123
Relations were again normalized and borders were reopened in May 28, 1963. The
reopening of the border solved the economic problems of Afghanistan to some extent.124
the seasonal migration of 200,000 Afghan powindahs was restored by September 1963.
The Dir issue, which was supported by Afghanistan to highlight the Pashtunistan issue
internationally, was solved by the integration of Dir with West Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, who represented Pakistan in the negotiations, declared the
Pashtunistan issue, 'a completely closed and a dead issue.125
In 1963, the Afghan Government announced that the Pashtunistan dispute was "the only
point of difference with Pakistan and would be settled peacefully. 126 In March 1965, a
five-year transit trade agreement was signed. Then in mid 1966, talks between the two
countries began on measures to establish rail links between them, 127 despite its
differences with Pakistan on Pashtunistan issue, Afghanistan remained sympathetic
towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war in 1965. It resisted the Russian pressure to
exploit the situation. Ayub visited Kabul in January 1966, and King Zahir Shah visited
Pakistan in spring of 1967. However, there was no progress in resolving the remaining
"point of difference.128
During 1969-71, Pak-Afghan relations remained normal. In May 1970, Pakistan's
Finance Minister Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash visited Kabul. An agreement was
signed to utilize the possibilities of increased economic co-operation between the two
countries.129 The economic co-operation visualized multiple fields, ranging from the use
of Afghanistan's iron or deposits of Haji Gak, to investment of Pakistani assets in
industrial projects in Afghanistan.130 Afghanistan also accepted the Pakistani offer of
technical assistance, in the form of training facilities in medicine, engineering,
irrigation.131
Afghanistan's foreign policy under Zahir Shah was less hostile towards Pakistan
32
despite having good relations with Russia. However, the issue of Pashtunistan was not
abandoned; Zahir Shah had moderate views on international issues. While referring to
Dir issue (1960-63) and border clashes between the troops of both countries, he said that
"we were partly to blame for the incidents, but the Pakistanis were not without guilt and
that Pakistan with rapidly expanding army equipped with American arms, posed a threat
to Afghanistan.132 Afghanistan remained neutral in the Indo-Pak war of December 1971.
On December 30, 1971, the Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman extended its message of
goodwill, non-interference and support to the territorial integrity, to the Pakistani
Government during the Indian aggression on Pakistan.133
To sum up, the Durand Line was concluded between the British India and Afghanistan
under duress. After the partition of India, the Afghans refused to accept the validity of the
Durand Line and raised the Pashtunistan issue. However, they were not unanimous in
(heir demand for Pashtunistan. Some time they contended that the Pashtuns of the North
West Frontier should be given the right of self-determination to join Afghanistan. At
other time they demanded an autonomous Pashtunistan separable from Pakistan, but
united with Afghanistan. The Pakistani government refused to accept the Afghan
demands on the plea that the right of self determination had been given to the Pashtuns in
the referendum of 1947 and the majority of the people had decided in favor of Joining
Pakistan. However, from 1947-71, Pak-Afghan relations remained hostile due to
Pashtunistan issue.
PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE: NEW DIMENSION
Pakistan's two important nascent decisions, firstly, the acceptance that a dispute exists
between Pakistan and Afghanistan and secondly, recognition of Afghanistan's right to be
concerned about the fate of the Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line opened
the door to the kind of negotiations that Afghanistan had wanted. Now, Afghanistan
could discuss the accomplishment of their aspirations with the Pakistani government134
Daud wished to settle the Pashtun dispute that had for so long ruined the relations
between the two countries.135 One of the reasons of Daud's changing his stance on
quarter-century old Pashtunistan cause, in addition to Iranian and other foreign insistence
was an obvious cooling of the Soviet altitude. The cooling had begun in the
33
middle of 1960s when the Soviet Union decided to soften its attitude towards Pakistan in
order to contend the new Chinese influence in Pakistan.136
Presdient Daud warned that the deterioration of the situation could be detrimental
to the security and well being of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said that there were
countries, without precisely naming them "but clearly referring to the USSR" that did not
want Pakistan Afghanistan rapprochement. He said that now the main concern of
Afghanistan government was the improvement of economic conditions, for without
economic prosperity the very existence of Afghanistan as an independent entity would be
in danger. He further said that economic progress needs peace and tranquility in the
region.137
During Bhutto's second visit to Afghanistan, Daud raised the point that Afghanistan
can never drop its interest in the well being and protection of the rights and identity of
Pashtuns. At this point Bhutto interrupted Daud and said, "The government of Pakistan
recognizes as legitimate the interest of Afghanistan in the welfare and preservation of the
rights of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan." He then smilingly supplemented, "we want you
to be interested in the welfare of all the peoples of Pakistan, not only in that of Pashtuns,"
To this Daud replied without break, "please let me first be concerned about the welfare
of our kith and kin. The turn of other Pakistani nationalities will come later.138
During the same visit Daud also raised the issue of the NAP leaders who had been
accused of secessionist designs. He said, "While nobody can know what is in a man's
heart, to us none of the ones with whom we have spoken, including Wali Khan, said that
they wished to separate from Pakistan." Daud told Bhutto that Pashtuns and Baluch's
acceptance of the Pakistani Constitution and participation in the national elections is a
demonstration of their desire to achieve their rights within the setting of Pakistan. He
went on to say that the victory of Pashtun and Baluch leaders in the provincial elections
is the indication that they enjoy the support and confidence of their people.139
President Daud stated that, Afghanistan had no intention of seeing Pakistan destroyed or
weakened. The existence of strong Pakistan was in Afghanistan's favor. The informed
Bhutto that "when you assumed presidency of Pakistan and visited Kabul in January
1972, you yourself conveyed to the King, Pakistan's appreciation for Afghanistan
34
restraint in 1965, and 1970, and informed him of your commitment of the establishment
of cordial relations between our countries." Daud objected that Pakistanis had never
made any serious effort to comprehend the Afghan claim, which had always been slipped
out of hand as harmful to Pakistan's integrity. New areas of agreement between the two
governments could have been found, provided an effort had been made. He said that a
bold and novel approach was required for the abdication of the nationalistic near
sightedness and Bhutto at last succeeded in overcoming it.140
By 1975, however, the enthusiasm for the Pashtunistan issue had subsided and in
1976, Afghanistan did not celebrate "Pashtunistan Day.141 Due to improved relations the
traditional occasion for "hostile anti-Pakistan campaigning and misinformation" passed
in Kabul almost without public notice.142
DAUD'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: RELATIONS FURTHER IMPROVED
At the invitation of the President of Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime
Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Daud, Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, paid a
four day official visit to Pakistan from August 20, to 24, 1976.143 Daud along-with his
delegation arrived Pakistan on August 20, 1976. The first round of talks started between
the delegates of the two countries in Rawalpindi. They started the discussion by linking it
up with Kabul discussion’s.144 Further talks were held between the two leaders (Bhutto
and Daud) and their delegates in Islamabad, Lahore and Murree in a "friendly
atmosphere.145
After the first round, the delegates were asked to finalize a formula for the
simultaneously package agreement. From Rawalpindi, the two leaders went to Lahore.
Daud was given a warm reception at Shalimar Gardens. Thousands of Lahore citizens
had gathered there to honor him. Daud addressed the Shalimar gathering. He said:
.... The wish of the government of Afghanistan and my person is that our political
difference is rushed, and our relations are brotherly and friendly, and permanently based
on good will. The government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan have the
means or resolving this difference at then disposal. For the realization of this we have no
way but understanding and serious and direct negotiations through peaceful means. I am
certain that on this path the grace of God will be with us. One cannot solve all difficulties
35
in one or several talks even negotiations with good will and seriousness can be
expected to take us one step closer to our objective.146
Eventually, the delegates reached a formula. It necessitated for Afghanistan the
recognition of the Durand Line as the international frontier in return for Pakistan's
acceptance of the release of the NAP leaders and declaring of a general amnesty, Aziz
Ahmad, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, brought the written formula to the
Governor House of Lahore for Bhutto's ratification. Bhutto studied the formula and said,
"I am satisfied" and so was President Daud, 147
For the normalization of relations with Afghanistan, Bhutto at this stage also
emphasized on reaching an agreement with the Baluch’s and Pashtuns, He said that
though Daud has left the matter of agreement, to the Pakistani government and Pashtun
and Baluch leaders, his government would be happy to involve the Afghan government
in the agreement. Daud responded by saying that Afghanistan wants the will-being of all
the parties involved in the discussion. He said that Afghanistan would publicly announce
the ratification of the agreement once the Pashtun and Baluch give their willingness and
approval for the agreement. He even offered to join the tripartite declaration of the
approval provided that parties involved wish so.148
Daud's visit for the normalization of Pak-Afghan relations was fruitful- On the one
hand, it stopped the Afghan mass media propaganda against Pakistan. On the other hand,
in 1977, he was about to reach an under landing with Bhutto for the expulsion of the
Pashtun and Baluch leaders who had taken refuge in Afghanistan and were involved in
subversive activities in Pakistan.149
On the whole the visits of heads of the two countries brought visible improvement
in Pak-Afghan relations.150 Transit trade started flowing smoothly. Overland
transportation of India's surplus wheat was allowed from India to Afghanistan. On March
2, 1977, Afghanistan and Pakistan resumed air service, which had been stopped since
early 1974.151 Along with the easing of restrictions on Pakistani tourists visiting
Afghanistan no more anti Pakistan propaganda was broadcasted from Radio Kabul,
Besides it, Afghanistan representation from the past two years had been through a
charged affair, but now Afghanistan ambassador was ported at Islamabad, 152 Pakistan
also stopped propaganda against Kabul. After bitter relations of thirty years, Pakistan-
36
Afghanistan relations never appeared friendly than in 1977.153
BHUTTO’S THIRD VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN AND ITS -EFFECTS ON PAK-
AFGHAN RELATIONS
Daud and Bhutto had decided in Lahore that a formal ceremony for signing the
draft agreement of August 1976 would be held in Kabul.154 According to the terms of the
draft agreement, both sides had agreed that Bhutto would visit Kabul in October or
November 1976, to conclude the formal agreement with the Afghan President.155 On
January 6, 1977, it was decided that Bhutto would visit Kabul at the end of March 1977,
a week or two after the general elections in Pakistan, However, due to subsequent
changes in the political scenario of Pakistan the visit to Kabul could not materialize.156
Bhutto visited Afghanistan for the third time on June 9, 1977. While returning from
Tehran, Bhutto stopped at Kabul during the night to see Daud. Due to the rigging of 1977
national election, Bhutto was in deep trouble but despite to that he had meeting with
Daud during dinner. Bhutto tried to reduce the impact of turmoil that had surfaced in
Pakistan as a response to his rigging of the elections. He apologized for the appearance
of abnormal situation in Pakistan due to which he had not yet succeeded in releasing the
political prisoners. Daud listened to him carefully and at the end advised him not to stall
on liberating the Pashtun and Baluch leaders. Bhutto replied that he had not forgotten
this most important issue and that he would cope with it on a right of way basis once the
confused situation returned to normal.157 the moment Bhutto found a chance to restore
normalcy. General Zia-ul-Haq removed him in a coup, on July 5, 1977, and martial law
was imposed in the country.158 Bhutto's further talks with Afghanistan stopped with the
imposition of martial law.159
Daud hoped that after Bhutto's removal. General Zia-ul-Haq, the new President would
settle Afghanistan's dispute with Pakistan in just and honorable manner, Zia-ul-Haq
visited Kabul in October 1977. During the discussion, Daud affirmed that the divergence
between the two countries would be abridged and finally do away with through mutual
efforts.160 on his return from Kabul. Zia freed the NAP leaders from Hyderabad jail.161
About Zia's visit to Afghanistan, Bhutto slates that, Zia was more of a beginner in
37
the art of statecraft and foreign affairs when he went to Kabul than he is today. The
experts stood to one side and let him to talk to crafty Afghan diplomat (Daud). It was not
a surprising end.162 He further added that Pak-Afghan relations are back to beginning.
This is very sad, as the period of strained relations was about to be finished.163
In March 1978, Daud visited Pakistan. In one of his speeches, Daud pointed out that
the "political problem" with Pakistan had still to be resolved. There was no joint
communiqué when Daud visited Pakistan. Possibly there was a fresh secret agreement on
the quid pro quo, which was finalized when Zia went to Kabul or when Daud came to
Pakistan in March 1978. Perhaps this was such a big achievement that joint
communiqués were not dispensed with, 164 However, they described the talks useful and
productive on bilateral issues, particularly on "political differences" that had fogged up
the relations with distrust and uncertainties for thirty years. The developments during
those two years showed that the very old differences over the future of the Pashtuns and
Baluch tribesmen had ceased to be the main issue. However, it did not cease, forever as
the Afghan leaders repeated the necessity of resolving it.165
There after, on April 27, 1978, radical changes took place in Afghanistan, Daud regime
was overthrown and he along with most of his family members was killed- The new
Afghan leaders declared that the Pashtun and Baluch problem stay alive and that they
want the problem with Pakistan to be solved by peaceful means.166
To conclude, Bhutto wanted to solve the Pak-Afghan problem. With this end in view he
undertook three visits to Afghanistan. His first visit was a good will visit aiming at
thanking Zahir Shah for his being netural in Indo-Pak war of 1971. In his second visit he
succeeded in concluding draft agreement according to which, Afghanistan would accept
the Durand Line in return of the release of NAP prisoners by Pakistan, His third visit to
Afghanistan took place in very abnormal circumstances because of PNA agitation in
Pakistan after 1977 general election. Due to it, he could not implement the draft
agreement. However, the coup of July 5, 1977 dashed all the hopes of the
implementation of the agreement to the ground. Yet, about the draft agreement Bhutto
has written that it was the most important achievement of his career.
As a result exchange of visits between Daud and Bhutto took place. Bhutto agreed to
release the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders, assumed supporting the Pushtunistan
38
demand while the Daud agreed to recognize the Durand line as the frontier between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, before the agreement could be signed Bhutto was
overthrown in the July 1977 coup. A similar agreement was reached between Gen Zia-ul-
Haq and Daud during the latter’s visit to Islamabad in March 1978. But before this
agreement could be finalized Daud was murdered in a coup by promarxi revolutionaries
and soviet influence in Afghanistan increased further. 167
39
REFERENCES
1. ‘Sangat Sigh, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; An Appraisal (London: Asia Publishing
House, 1970), pp 27-28.
2. Mujtabad Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan: A study of Frontier Problems in
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971), P. 143.
3. Kulwant Kaure, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surrender Chopra, ed., Perspective
on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev university, 1983), P.
312.
4. W.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan: A study of Political Development in Central
and Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 17-22.
5. Leon B. Poullands, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
Pakistan”, in Ainsilie T. Embree, ed., Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, The
Transportation of a Political Order (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977),
pp. 129-130. Popular tradition attributes the Pashtuns to Jewish origin, the Beni
Israel, come down through Qais from Saul, King of Israel whose off spring’s were
carried into custody and re=settled in Khurasan, Kabul and Ghazni. They
embraced Islam when Afghan Qaiswas invited by Khalid Bin Walid to visit
Mecca. He later returned to Afghanistan to propagate the new faith. But except
certain facial resemblance, a number of biblical names and some other minor
characteristics Aramaic language. Tyler, Afghanistan, pp. 48-49. Scientific study
of their physics characteristic shows the Pashtuns to be, of Turko-Iranian type
with a substantial mixture of Indian blood among the eastern tribes. This study
couples with the fact the Pashto, the language of the Pashtuns belongs to the
Aryan par to the Indo-European group of languages, suggests the possibility that
the Pashtuns are of Aryan origin, but have mix together with is now the Indo-
Afghan border. Syed Weqar Ali Shah Ka Ka Khel, “Origin of the Afghans” in
Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat and Syed Weqar Ali Shah, Afghanistan and the Frontier
(Peshawar: Embay Book International, 1993), pp. 155-156. The word Pashto in
Tajik Persian stands for the back of a mountain range. Solution according to
Revert the Pashtuns copied their name from the fact that they were people who
lived at the back of the edges of the Suleiman Range. Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 49.
40
According to H. W. Bellew the term Pakhtun, its plural Pukhtana means
“Highlander, and Pakhto or Pashto “the language of the Higher Landers.”
H.W.Bellew, Afghanistan and the Afghans (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications,
1979), p. 216.
6. M. Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan: A study in International Political Developments
1880-1896 (Kabul: n.p. 1971), p.5.
7. Vartan Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform
and Modernization, 1880-1946 (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p.
44.
8. Kakar, Afghanistan, p. 5. The Ghilzais and the Abdalis were the most important
divisions of the Afghans in Afghanistan. These two powerful tribes had been
taking advantage of the weakening power of the Empires of Persia and India to
presume practical autonomy at the end of seventeenth and the beginning of the
eighteenth centuries. Among the Abdalis the important divisions were the
populazais, of which the most important families were the descendants of Sado
and Mohammad. The Sadozais were the first to assume power for in Ahmad Shah
the Afghans found a leader. Soon after his arrival to Kandahar he was elected as
first King o f the Afghans. He assumed the name of Dur-i-Durran, or ‘Pearl of
Pearls’, that’s why the Abdali tribe became usually known as the Durrani. Tytler,
Afghanistan, pp. 61-62.
9. M. M. Juniad, the Resurgence of Pakistan (Rawalpindi: National Book
Foundation, n.d.), p. 115.
10. Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World,
Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), p. 26.
11. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p 12.
12. Ibid. p. 11.
13. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition
after the Cold War (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1994), p.9.
14. Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistan at the Crossroads (Karachi: Royal Book company,
1985), p.353.
15. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
41
Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’ s Western Borderlands, p.130
16. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An international Law
Perspective (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp. 49-50.
17. Amin, Afghanistan Crisis, pp. 27-28. The main feature of the policy was to
protect the border closely with a view to keep attack and consequent reprisal by
military expedients to the slightest. The recognized objects of this policy were
non-aggression and non-interference in the tribal affairs, Lal Baha, N.W.F.P.
Administration under British Rule: 1901-1919 (Islamabad: National Commission
on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p.5.
18. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan”, in K.P. Misra, ed.
Afghanistan in Crisis (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), p. 84.
19. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The continuing Search for nationhood (Oxford:
West view Press, 1991), p. 196.
20. Lal Baha, N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule, p.6.
21. Bellew, Afghanistan and the Afghans, pp. 175-176.
22. Kakar, Afghanistan, p. 12.
23. G.No. Moles worth, Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operation in the Third
Afghan War (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 15; Pakhtunistan: The
Khyber Pass and the Focus of the New State of Pashtunistan, An Important
Political Development in Central Asia, (n.p. n.d.). p. 72..
24. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, P. 158.
25. Kakar, Afghanistan, P. 111
26. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, P. 158.
27. Kakar, Afghanistan, pp. 286-287.
28. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. Embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderland, p. 136.
29. Mir Munsi Sultan Mahomed Khan, Ed. The life of Abdur Rahman Amir of
Afghanistan, Vol. 11 Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 136-137).
30. Ibid. p. 161.
31. Ibid. p. 156
32. Ibid. p. 136.
42
33. Ibid. p. 157-158.
34. Ibid. p. 161.
35. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, p 139.
36. Fazal Haque Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal book Company,
1976), p. 192.
37. Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing search for Nationhood, P. 196.
38. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review (Islamabad: National
Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992), p. 190.
39. Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The communist Coup. The
soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Colorado: West view Press, 1984), p. 24.
40. Raja Anwar, the Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London: Verso,
1988), P. 31.
41. Ibid. PP. 30-31
42. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan, p. 24
43. Syed Weqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the
North-West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2000) p. 226.
44. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan, p. 24. For further details on referendum
see Shah Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism, pp. 226-227.
45. Sally Ann Baynard, “”Historical Setting”, in Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M.
Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a Country Study (Foreign Area Studies: The American
University, 1986). P. 54.
46. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, an
Important Political Development in Central Asia, P. 117.
47. Azmat Hayat Khan, the Durand Line: It’s Geostrategic (University of Peshawar:
Area Study Centre, 2000), p 186.
48. Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhry, Pakistan and World Security (Karachi: Royal
Book Company, 1987), p. 101.
49. Mehrunnisa Ali, “The Attitude of the New Afghan Regime Towards its
Neighbors”, in Kemal A. Faruki, ed. Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXVII, No. 30, third
43
quarter, 1974, pp. 47-48.
50. W. Howard Wriggins, “The Balancing Process in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in
Lawrence Ziring et al. eds. Pakistan: The Long View (Durhan: Duke University
Press, 1977) p. 297.
51. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the making (London: West view
Press, 1986), pp. 185-186.
52. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective on
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 315-316.
53. Khan, the Durand Line, p. 203.
54. Ibid. p. 207.
55. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan” in K. P. Misra, Ed.
Afghanistan in Crisis, P. 89.
56. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting”, in Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M.
Seeking, Eds, Afghanistan: a Country Study, P.51.
57. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and growth of Communism in
Afghanistan (1917-79): An Appraisal (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), pp.
269-270.
58. Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1999), p. 186.
59. Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan, P. 147; Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not
Master: A Political Autobiography (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), P.
175.
60. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations” in Surrender Chopra, ed. Perspective on
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, PP. 45-46.
61. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass and
Concentration. 1966), P. 114.
62. Ibid. p. 114.
63. Leon b. Poullada, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
Pakistan”, in Ainslie t. Embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. P. 126.
64. Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan, P. 148.
65. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet domination: 1964-83 (London: The
44
Macmillan Press, 1984), P. 45.
66. Zulfiqar Khalid, Pakistan in the Pamir Knot: Gestrategic Imperatives (Lahore;
Vanguard Books Ltd. 1987). P. 114.
67. Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan, Ed. The Life of Abdur Rahman, P. 212.
68. Kulwant Kaure, Pak-Afghanistan Relations (New Delhi: Deep and Deep
Publication, 1985), P. 50.
69. Khan, the Durand Line, PP. 190-191. The British divided the area which they
had acquired from the Afghanistan into British Administrative Border into two
main parts. The region between the River Indus and the Administrative Border,
Which was later combined with Punjab for a short period of time, was known as
the North West Frontier Province, while the land between the Administrative
Border and the Durand Line was given the name of “Independent Tribal
Territory”. The British administration was limited to administrative Border and
the tribal territory remained an independent zone between Afghanistan and British
India. Thus as a result of the Durand Agreement one part of the territory separated
from Afghanistan came under the political influence of the British government.
Some writers declared the independent tribal territory as “Yaghistan” which
means “the land of those who could not accept any yoke”. The status of this
territory, according to British historians, was that of a British protectorate.
Pashtunistan. The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan. An
important Political Development in Central Asia, pp. 101-102. For further details
on administration of N.W.F.P. See Lal Baha, N.W.F.P. Administration under
British Rule, chapter 2 and 3.
70. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective on
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, P. 316.
71. Khan, the Durand Line. P. 189.
72. Leon B. Poullada, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with
Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. P. 127.
73. Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, pp. 60-61.
74. Khan, the Durand Line, p. 198.
75. Syed Salalhuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Study (Karachi:
45
Comprehensive Book Service, 1996). P. 88.
76. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and foreign Policy, P. 116.
77. Ibid.
78. Razvi, the Frontier of Pakistan, P. 148.
79. A Group study, “The fundamentals of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Hamid A.K.
Rai, ed. Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Aziz Publishers,
n.d.)p. 36.
80. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan. P.88.
81. Hyman, Afghanistan Under soviet Domination. 1964-83. P. 46.
82. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, Eds.
Afghanistan: A country Study. P.55.
83. Ahsen Chaudhry, Pakistan and World Security, P. 101. Pashtunistan: The
Khyber pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, An important Political
Development in Central Asia, P. 118: Khan, The Durand Line. P. 187.
84. Ibid.
85. Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in The making, P. 186.
86. Richard Symonds, the Making of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Book
Foundation, 1976), P. 171.
87. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, P. 191.
88. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan:
a country study. P.55.
89. Government of Pakistan, “Presentation of credentials to the Quaid-e-Azam by
Sardar Najibullah Khan, Special Representative of His Majesty the Afghan King.
F. 125 (11)-GG/47.
90. Marwat, the Evolution and Growth of Communism, PP. 277-278.
91. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, p. 191.
92. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan:
A country study. P. 55.
93. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, P. 191.
94. Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan, P. 193.
95. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan,
46
An Important Political Development in Central Asia, pp. 123-124.
96. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58. P. 192.
97. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, an
Important Political Development in Central Asia, PP. 119-120.
98. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan:
a Country Study. P. 55.
99. Symonds, the Making of Pakistan, p. 171.
100. Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan. P. 194.
101. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan:
a Country Study. P. 55.
102. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, In Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective
on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, PP. 319-320.
103. Ibid.
104. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and foreign Policy, P. 120.
105. Dir’s feudal ruler, the Nawab refused to merge his state with the unified West
Pakistan. He also did not send his representative to the National Assembly
established under the constitution of 1956. Hafeez Malik, Soviet Pakistan
Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics. 1947-92 (London: The Macmillan Press,
1994), p. 125.
The Nawab of Dir remained the central government of its earlier assertion that “he
North West Frontier Province states will not be merged into the proposed West
Pakistan unit since they are being treated as ‘special areas. However, Dir State
was merged with unified West Pakistan as a “special area’ that the executive
authority of West Pakistan was empowered to act in the area subject to the
president’s concurrence. “Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, P. 106.
However, the Nawab was removed from his position in September 1960.
Afghanistan involved itself in the conflict of Dir state that lasted from 1960-63.
Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post –Soviet Dynamics. P. 125.
106. Ibid.
107. Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, P. 109.
108. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relation Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics. P.125.
47
109. Ibid.
110. Anees Jillani, “Pak-Afghan Relations, 1958-1988” in Mehrunnisa Ali, ed.
Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy, 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2001), p.377.
111. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, p. 126.
112. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting”, in Nyrop and Seekins, eds.
Afghanistan: a Country Study, p. 16.
113. During the British rule in India, the Afghan goods transit through the
British Indian Territory took place on the basis of 1921 Treaty and the 1923
Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention. The two treaties did not deal exclusively with
the question of transit. After the creation of Pakistan these two treaties continued
to govern trade relations between the two countries till May 29, 1958, when the
new transit agreement was signed between Pakistan-Afghanistan for transit
facilities across each other’s territories. Later on additional trade agreements were
also signed. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, P. 154.
114. Syed Abdul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: a Geopolitical Study
(Lahore: Ferozsons, Ltd. 1982) p. 57.
115. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Study, p. 88.
116. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 155.
117. Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush: Afghanistan
(1978-1991) (Lahore: Wajidalis Pvt. Ltd. 1991). P. 21.
118. Anwar, the Tragedy of Afghanistan, p. 36.
119. Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush, p. 25.
120. Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet dynamics, pp. 128-129.
121. Government of Pakistan, Background Information and Analysis: Pak-
Afghan Relations (A General Survey) 1947-73 (Islamabad Bureau of
National Research and Reference, n.d.) p. 4.
122. Ibid. p.8.
123. Ibid. p.4
124. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, P. 130.
125. Harvey H. Smith et Al. Area Handbook for Afghanistan (Foreign Area
48
Studies: The American Universities, 1973), p. 223.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. The New Times, 17 May 1970.
129. The Pakistan times, 21 May 1970.
130. The New Times, 29 May 1970.
131. Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, pp. 129-130.
132. Government of Pakistan, Background Information and Analysis: Pak-
Afghan Relations (A General Survey) 1947-73, p.19.
133. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 134.
134. Ibid.,- 127,
135. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 63.
136. Ghaus. The Pall of Afghanistan, p. 127.
137. Ibid. 128.
138. Ibid, p. 129..
139. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-party communism: Purchum and
Khalq (California: Hoover institution Press, 1983), p. 45.
140. Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, pp. 63-64.
141. Government of Pakistan, Joint Communiqués, 1947-1976 (Islamabad:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p, 416.
142. Bhutto, "If I am assassinated . . .” p. 128.
143. At the talks, the Afghan delegation included Wahid Abdullah, Deputy Foreign
Minister, Abdul Samad Ghaus, Director General, Afghan Foreign Ministry, Rahim
Sherzoy, Afghan Charged' Affairs in Pakistan, Mohammad Gul Jahangiri,
Director Afghan Foreign Ministry and Abdul Ahad Nasir Ziayee, Deputy Chief of
the Foreign Minister's office. The Pakistan delegation was comprised of Aziz
Ahmed. Minister of State for defense and Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, Foreign
Secretary, S. Shah Nawaz, Additional Foreign Secretary, Ali Arshad, Pak-Afghan
Ambassador in Afghanistan and A.A Farooq, Director General, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Government of Pakistan, Joint Communiqués, 1947-1976, p. 416.
144. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, v. 135.
49
145. Bhutto, "if I am assassinate. . . “p. 129
146. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 136.
147. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics,’ Economics and Society:
Revolution, Resistance, Intervention (Colorado: Lyimc Rienner Publishers
inc., 1986), p. 23.
148. Government of Pakistan, Wada our Efai Wada, Pakistan Peoples Party ke
1970 intakhabi manshor par amal dar amad ke report, (Urdu) (Islamabad:
Directorate of film and Publications, 1977). p. 17S-
149. Ghaus, the fall of’ Afghanistan, p. 140.
150. Government of Pakistan, Wada our Efai Wada, Pakistan People’s Party ke
1970 ke intakhabi manshor par amal dar amad ke report, p. 178.
151. Burke and Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy,p.126
152. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell, p.31.
153. Ibid.
154. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 140.
155. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell, p. 32.
156. Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots, p. 221.
157. Kulwant Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations (Mew Delhi: Deep and Deep
Publications, 1985), pp. 52-53.
158. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter. A Letter from the Death Cell, p. 35.
159. Bhutto, if I am assassinated…….p. 120.
CHAPTER NO:_III
Saur revolution in Afghanistan
And it’s impacts on Pakistan.
50
The Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 by a group of military and air force officers
was the ultimate result of the underground struggle by the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) against the Daud government. The PDPA was led by a group of
progressive leaders who believed in the control of power for rapid socio-political changes
in the Afghan state and social structure. Afghanistan had been traditionally a tribal
society with a nomadic trend amongst its people. The state of Afghanistan being
controlled by the central government through a provincial government under a Wali
(Governor) in fact experienced little interference by the central government.
The control of the central government was not beyond Kabul and the provincial
capitals. The existence of a centuries old monarchial setup might have apparently bred
the crisis of participation and representation; nonetheless, there were no signs of
dissatisfaction against the government. The unruly nature of the state of affair has in
Afghan society had posed no threat internally or to the regional peace. Afghanistan
enjoyed a peaceful policy of co-existence with its neighbors. The only neighbor state
with which it had enveloped a strained relationship was Pakistan over “Pashtunistan” (a
border dispute) issue; however, it never resulted in a hot war.
Afghanistan’s growing relationship with the Soviet Union had made it more
dependable on the former for military, economic, and political support make it one.
Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan, had been in power for almost 40 years. He
allowed a number of political activities in the last decade of his rule by permitting a
number of political groups to carry their political activities. The PDPA was established in
1965, whose members were young, and school/college students. A larger number of
them came from the educated class of Kabul, and other major cities in Afghanistan. .
The storm, which eventually broke over Kabul on the morning of 27 April 1978,
leaving behind the dead bodies of President Daud and his family, brought with it a
socio-economic system, which was alien to the deeply conservative Afghan society. A
small group of devoted Marxists took upon themselves to turn Afghanistan from an
illiterate, poverty stricken and tribal ridden religious society into a modern socialist
state.
51
BACKGROUND OF LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN UP TO PDPA
The origin of leftist goes back to the times of the Bolshevik revolutions of 1917 1 It
was then that the seeds of socialism were brought back by some members of an Afghan
delegation, headed by Mohammad Wali Badakshi, who went to Moscow in 1919 to
attend the October celebrations. Abdul Rehman, a young Afghan, full of progressive
and radical ideas propagated them amongst his group members on his return 2. Mahmud
Tarzi (1865-1931), an adviser and mentor of King Amanullah, was also convinced that
the Muslims must ‘modernize or perish’ 3. He advocated the two themes of ‘anti-
colonialism’ and ‘modernization’ through his bi-weekly paper ‘Seraj ul Akbar’ 4 His
writings influenced the youth of his country who began to demand a change in the
existing tradition bound Afghan society. He also influenced King Amanullah who had
introduced a number of radical social reforms for which his country was not prepared.
The Russians also took advantage of King Amanullah’s anti-British stance and
encouraged him to establish closer relations with Moscow. V. I. Lenin wrote a letter to
the Afghan monarch expressing appreciation for the desire of the Afghan people to
follow the Russian example which had given them strength and independence 5 The
Soviet Union agreed to grant Afghanistan monetary assistance annually, construct the
Kuska, (on the Soviet border) - Herat – Qandahar – Kabul telegraph line and to provide
technical experts.
When Nadir Shah banned the activities of the anti-establishment Afghan Youth
Organization it went underground and continued to participate in debates and
discussions on the socio-economic problems of its country.
YOUNG AFGHAN:
The origin of the PDPA peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan can be traced back
to Young Afghan, movement in 1930, started by a group of young progressive
intellectuals namely. Mohammed Beg Tarzi, Mohammed Nabi Charkhi and others.
There is little known about the social and political policies of the Members of the
Young Afghan movement. However, the fact remains that many of its membership were
recruited from the middle and lower middle classes and were the faithful supporters of
Amanullah Khan Reforms.
52
To understand the circumstances that led to the emergence of the PDPA, it will be
pertinent to probe the past. Despite the monarchist and authoritarian regimes that ruled
Afghanistan, Wider of progressive thought and liberalism did blow occasionally to ease
the suffocation. Reformist rulers like Amir Sher Ali and Amanullah, and scholars like
Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani stood out for their pioneering efforts to usher in reforms and
modernize the country's medieval society.
Organized progressive political activity, however, took long to materialize, owing to
official constraints and absence of ideal conditions. But once the start was made, such
activity picked up fast. Even before occupying the Kabul throne, Amanullah under the
inspiration of his enlightened father in - law, Muhammad Beg Tarzi, was active along
with other young Afghans in a secret Mashruta (constitutional) group that sought ways
and means of modernizing Afghanistan. 6. Called the "young Afghans”, this was
Afghanistan's first underground political grouping. Though the party disappeared after
Amanullah seized power, it had blazed a trail that attracted many adventurous young
Afghans in later years.
In the early 1930s, an organization prone to violence claimed itself to be a direct heir
to the earlier group of the same name that had been nurtured by Amanullah. It called
itself the "Young Afghans" and aimed at "subversion of the existing government and it
if basis, the Islamic code", justifying its revolutionary position on an alleged secret
British manipulation of the Afghan government of Nadir Shah. 7. The violence was
directed both against the British and the royal family, the motivation being a blend of
local politics and personal revenge. The assassinations, which also claimed the life of
Nadir Shah, ushered in a brief era of politics of violence. The execution of Ghulam Nabi
Charkhi, the faithful supporter of Amanullah. The assassin in each case was either a
student or a former student of the German School (Nejat) in Kabul, set up by
Amanullah. Thus it was clear that Amanullah's shadow still loomed large over the
Afghan horizon. The term "Young Afghans" carried so much romanticism it was heard
once more when in a bloodless palace coup, Sardar Dauod and his brother, Sardar
Naeem, climbed up the power ladder to replace their hitherto dominant but aging
53
uncles, it was labeled, somewhat oddly, as the "Young Afghan" revolt. 8.
WEESH ZALMIYAN
Progressive and liberal Afghan elements finally cam into their own with the
advent of the "Weesh Zalmiyan" (Awakened Youth) movement in 1947.
The founder of Weesh Zalmiyan is reported to be Mohammed Rasul Pashtun; while
its active members included Abdul Hadi Dawi, Gul Bacha Ulfat (President and vice-
president, respectively, of the Seventh National Assembly), Ghulam Mohammad
Ghubar, Dr. Abdur Rehman Mahmudi, Khial Mohammad Khaistan, Abdul Awal
Qureshi, Kabir Ghorbandi, Karim Nazihi, Nazar Mohammad Nawa, Abdul Haye
Habibi; Noor Alam, Abdul Rauf Benawa, Syed Mohamad Dehqan, Sarwar Goya, Faiz
Mohammad Angar, Ghulam Hasan Safi, Gul Shah Safi, Taj Mohammad Paghmani, Mir
Ali Asghar Shua, Mohammad Alam Basarkay, Baraat Ali Taaj, Mohammad Ibrahim
Khwakhugay, etc. Two familiar names of recent origin- Nur Mohammad Taraki and
Babrak Karmal- have also been described as Weesh Zalmiyan activists 9.
Though having a Pashto name (in the soft Kandahari dialect, which was proclaimed
later as Afghanistan's national language in preference to the hard Pashto dialect) and
despite the fact that its headquarter was in the Pashtun city of Kandahar and its founder
was himself a Pashtun, the movement’s appeal transcended religious, ethnic, regional
and language barriers, it particularly, aroused the Imagination of the intelligentsia.
While the movement's adherents in parliament for the first time in Afghanistan raised
issues concerning the common man, the Weesh Zalmiyan activists outside were busy
lending voice to the muted aspirations of the masses through the fledgling press. During
its brief survival until 1952, when the government decided to crush the movement prior
to the next parliamentary elections by closing down all non-government news papers
and arresting about 25 of the " liberal" leaders, Weesh Zalmiyan was able to sow the
seeds of dissent. Most of the outspoken latter-day Afghan newspapers and political
parties owed their origin to the members of Weesh Zalmiyan.
However, the abrupt termination of the experiment in liberalism was an important
factor in the radicalization of the men who later established the PDPA. 10 The
revolutionary movement in Afghanistan had its roots in the Weesh Zalmiyan period. As
54
outspoken political movements, notably the PDPA. Earlier, the Weesh Zalmiyan had
itself become a successor organization to the Young Afghan. But with the progress of
time and increase in repression of the opposition, the progressive force became more
radicalized, culminating eventually in the founding of left and ultra-left political parties,
among them the PDPA.
THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA)
Taking advantage of the provision of the new constitution, which came into effect on 1
October 1964, permitting, at least in theory, the formation of political parties, a number
of unofficial groupings began to emerge. The most important was the Peoples
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a party that was later to play a crucial role in
the history of contemporary Afghanistan. Even before the new constitution came into
being Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and a few other like-minded
revolutionaries began to organize discussion groups among the literate Afghans in
Kabul 11 As their numbers grew more practical steps to achieve their objective began to
be planned. The PDPA was, however, formally formed at Nur Mohammad Taraki’s
residence on 1 January 1965. Thirty young men gathered at his house and unanimously
elected him as a member of the Central Committee and the Secretary General of the
Party 12
MANIFESTO / PROGRAM
As secretary general of the PDPA, Taraki was primarily responsible for drafting the
party manifesto. The draft was first adopted by a committee set up for the purpose by
the central committee and subsequently by an unspecified party conference. 13 The party
charter was then published in the first two (joint) issues of Khalq in April 1966. The
PDPA's Maraam (manifesto) in its preamble lamented the disgusting socio - economic
situation prevailing in 20th century Afghanistan despite the 'liberation' of the country in
1919. It vowed that PDPA would fight for the snatched rights of the Afghans and fulfill
the aspirations that had been aroused following complete independence 47 years ago. 14
The preamble said Afghanistan's woes had resulted from its feudal economy,
55
exploitation by the ruling classes and the bureaucracy, and the designs of the
imperialists. It criticized the poor performance of Loya Jirgah for failing to achieve its
targets since being convened in 1955. The preamble, citing the considerable politico-
economic changes and the collapse of colonial system that had occurred since World
War II, argued that socialism was the answer to Afghanistan’s misery and
backwardness. It felt the circumstances warranted the emergence of a Jabha (party)
which would bring together the farmers, laborers, workers and progressive writers.
The manifesto divided its objectives under different sub-headings. The nine-point
political objectives of the PDPA aimed at
(i) bringing social and economic equality;
(ii) providing for people's sovereignty;
(iii) laying down democratic organization of the state through universal adult
franchise; establishing the rule of law;
(iv) guaranteeing liberty of though; eradicating ethnic differences;
(v) finding legal and democratic solution to linguistic, cultural and economic issues;
(vi) derecognizing the Durand Line; and
(vii) Following a policy of neutrality and forging links to fight imperialism. 15
(viii)
CONSTITUTION
The Assasnamah (constitution) of the party was framed in early 1967, cyclostyled and
distributed amongst the members. It was spread over 10 chapters and 52 articles. Article
1 of the constitution proclaimed that the PDPA was founded on the philosophy and
concepts of Marxism and Leninism.
Membership was open to all who agreed with the party's line except those "who had
harmed the national liberation movement". The party hoped to extend its branches all
over the country and to enroll members at the Hoza (village unit) level; each
membership was required to be endorsed by two existing members with at least one-
year stay in the party, and new members had to spend a probation period of a year. The
central committee could take decisions by majority vote and was also authorized to
make nominations in certain cases. The Kangra-e-Hizb (congress) was the highest
56
advisory body of the party, composed of the provincial delegates, and required to meet
every four years. The central committee, which was next to the congress, performed its
functions through sub-committees of workers, cooperatives, lower grade clerks,
students, youth, culture clubs, and sports and arts clubs. The plenum of the central
committee, required to meet thrice annually, was composed of the members of central,
standing and enquiry committees. The provincial branches of the party were expected to
hold a conference every two years while those in the cities and districts once every year.
The Hoza as the basic tier of the party, with at least three members in each, was
directed to hold a meeting every fortnight. The Hoza served as a link between the party
secretariat and the public, with authority to collect subscriptions and enlist new
members. Membership fee, to be determined by the central committee, and donations
and income from the PPA publications constituted the visible income of the party. The
members were to be issued party cards by the central committee, which was also
authorized to select candidates for elections and issue them with party tickets. 16
Newspapers have been the precursors to all political movements in Afghanistan. The
parties in most cases owed their names to the newspapers published by them; but it can
also be said that these newspapers were actually named after the political parties whose
cause they espoused. Though newspapers could conceivably have little effect on a
nation with a literacy rate of less than 10 per cent, their political impact was expected to
be significant on the increasing urban literate population, particularly on the
impressionable students. In principle, the 1964 constitution had provided for freedom of
the press, but the press law, with its eight chapters and fifty-five articles, became
effective after its promulgation in July 1965.17 Six private journals sprang into existence
after the promulgation of the press law, as if they had been waiting in the wings.
Wahdat, Payam-I-Emroz, Afghan Melat, Khalq, Mardum and Masawat, all weeklies,
appeared in that order in the first half of 1966. Khalq ("The Masses") was the organ of
the pro-Moscow PDPA
SPLIT IN PDPA
As happens with most political parties in third world countries differences between
their leaders arise soon after they begin enunciating their ideas of how they
57
intend to achieve the objectives earlier agreed upon. Same it was with the party divided
into two groups.
KHALQ (The people)
PARCHAM (The flag)
KHALQ
The Khalq lead by Noor Mohammad Taraki and Amin were more radical then the
parchamites. They wanted to bring about, political, economic, and social changes even
if it meant throwing out the present system lock, stock and barrel.18
The first major issue dividing the party was the stand to be adopted towards the Zahir
Shah monarchy, but the actual split came over the proper response to the Government
action of banning Khalq. Subsequent disagreement related to the interpretation of the
party Program as it applied to the formation of a" national united front". Taraki, far-
sighted man believed in peaceful means to achieve the final end but, under the influence
of Amin, he was impelled to take host steps, which led to their eventual failure inthe
long run.
PARCHAM
The Parchamities headed by Babrak Karmal believed in gradual changes in the face
mounting
challengenes , There was sharp division among them along ethnic lines also . The
Khalqs were die-hard Pushtuns, committed to the uplift of the Pushtuns, cause and come
from the lower middle class, and were less educated. The Parcahamities mainly
consisted of non –pushtoon draw from the upper strata of society and urbanities. So that
s why there existed a wide chasm between them, which caused a split among them.
there is no doubt, that the spilt in the PDPA was personality oriented also, as Bebrak
Karmal refused to recognize the leadership of Taraki and Amin,s but latter on these
differences assumed an ethnic and religious dimension also there is no doubt that both
factions were committed to pursue the Marxist lenist ideology but the khalq were
committed to take an independent decision, while Karmal was amenable towards
Moscow But Moscow did not approve of the growing rift between the two factions of
PDPA. At least, the Soviets succeeded in bringing a transitory unity between them, thus
58
clearing the ground for a decisive coup against the strongly entrenched government of
Sardar Daud Khan20
The armed forces were under the influence of the communists as large number
of Khalq s and Parchamities were holding important position. The notable Khalqis
officer were Major Aslam watanjor and air force Lieutenat syed Muhammad
Gulabzai.While the parchimities officer Nur Ahmed, Muhammed Rafi and Lieutenat
Colonel Abdul Qader. The Parcham faction, were instrumental in bringing Sardar Daud
to power in 1973. This taking advantage of their close link with Sardar Daud, the
perchamities, further increased their influence in the military and bureaucracy. The
incising influence of the communists alarmed Sardar Daud, though Daud Khan
perceived the growing influence of the communists with great concern but it was too
late and the communists were successful in over throwing Daud in oct.1978.
UNIFICATION OF PDPA:
Daoud’s domestic and Foreign policies greatly led the unification of the PDPA.
Although it is often argued that the Soviet Union played a central rule in bringing about
a rapprochement between Khalq and Parcham in 1977, the domestic political scene is
conveniently ignored. Given their wide contacts the Soviet might have exercised their
influence over the Afghan Marxist to forge unity,
The Communist party of India consulted Parcham and Khalq to patch their differences
and close their ranks. This did help the initiation of a dialogue between them.21 but in
the final analysis, it was their commons fear that Daud with the support of Iran by
Turning to oligarchic elite was preparing for a final move to destroy the leftist
movement.
The hostile political environment forced Parcham to return to the fold, and PDPA was
reunited in July 1977 after a decade of split. 22 Like an erring child, the Parchamis were
presently accommodated in a spirit of forgive and forget. But having betrayed one
another’s trust in the past, Khalq and Parcham could never again rise above fictional
considerations. Various intermediaries are credited with patching up the Khalq Parcham
differences. They include Ajmal Khattak of Pakistan, the communist party of India and
the Soviets.23 However, this much is sure that the sympathies of all
59
three conciliators mentioned above were closer to the well-dense to the view that it was
Babrak Karmal who had initiated the unity proposal through these friends in
neighboring countries. But it must be kept in mind that important considerations which
must have speeded up unity were due to threats/fears from Dauod.
According to Taraki’s biography, unity was achieved without taking into
consideration the party strengths, popularity and organizational experience. Civilian and
military organizations of both factions were to be dealt separately. On the civilian side
unity was to be achieved on a strictly equal, power-sharing basis, while on the military
side the merger was to be delayed 24. Because the Khalqist felt they outnumbered the
Parchamis, hence unity on an equal footing was not possible. From the very outset, the
unity looked fragile, even artificial, the mistrust remained and the Khalqi’s later blamed
Parcham for keeping both their civilian and military organizations intact even after the
merger. They even charged that unlike the Khalqi military officers who were moving to
wrest power from Dauod, the Parchami officers were still willing to defend the Dauod
regime. 25 But without being influenced by the Khalqi accusations, it seems that each
faction kept its won separate organization intact though professing unity in the same
breath. Once PDPA emerged as a single entity, its old central committee was replaced
by a politburo of eleven with Taraki retaining the secretary - general ship. The
remaining ten positions were equally shared by Khalqi and parch, which meant that
together with Taraki the Khalqi still had a numerical majority, it was a pointer to the
fact that Parcham had eventually conceded the ore-eminence of Khalqi PDPA called
itself "National Democratic" its communist character could not be hidden.
ROLE OF SOVIET UNION IN 1978 REVOLUTION.
Unlike the 1973, the Soviet Union was actively involved in 1978 coup-data. The
rampant of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan through direct and indirect means such as
moral and political support for the PDPA; the presence of a larger number of the Soviet
personnel and a huge military and economics and did give the Kremlin a position to
cripple the administration in Kabul. The Soviet Union which had supported Dauod in
his power struggle against the Zahir Shah during his days of Prime Minister Ship and
after, and had backed his policy of Pashtunistan as a bonafide right of Afghanistan
60
believed in making his regime totally biddable to Moscow.
The changing polices of Dauod in the last two years of his rule where he attempted to
curb the activities of the leftists in order to legitimize his rule and reduce it regime
dependence on the Soviet Union were embarrassing for the Soviets. Dauod stretched his
hand of friendship to other Muslim States; Saudi. Arabia, Pakistan, Iran etc.
They all assured him to provide economic assistance. The Shah of Iran, having
secured a lion's share of the petrodollars by quadrupling the oil prices in 1973, promised
Dauod a grant US$ 10 billion aid for the development of Afghanistan’s economy. The
Shah in return was believed to have received commitment from Dauod to limit its
relations with the Soviet Union and bury belches with Pakistan by withdrawing it claim
over-Pushtunistan. The Moscow perceived Shah's ambitious schemes in Afghanistan a
threat to the Soviet influence in the area, as shah was a strong ally of America, for
furthering the US interests in the area 26 The Soviet Union being alert on the Dauod's
independent policy of Moscow condemned it as a imperialist and aberrant.
In April 1977, CPSU, Communist party of Soviet Union General, Leioned Brezhnev "
apparently gave him a Tongue- Lashing over his exclusion of leftists from his
Government and his eagerness to find non-Soviet sources of economic and military
aid.27 In response, Daoud ignoring any future repercussions of his defying the soviet
union claimed that Afghanistan would go for own policy as it was an independent
country and not a satellite like the Eastern European States.
The drift in the Daud’s policies trying for an independent policy of Moscow and the
purging of the Pro-Soviet Factions in Afghanistan antagonized Kremlin. The Soviet
Sought the replacement of Daud as early as it was possible. The Soviet concentrated in
patching the differences between the two factions of the PDPA for the future strategy of
toppling Daud. Ralph. H. Magnus in his article quoting Karmal's interview which an
Indian correspondent, claim that once after the PDPA united, the Soviets "wanted that
there should be revolution". 28
The April coup was pre-planned and Moscow knew about it. The PDPA infiltration
into defense forces during the past years by gaining the loyalties of the top ranks backed
by the Soviet Union had made them in a position to lead a successful coup
61
against Dauod no matter at the cost of how much causality. According to the post
revolutionary news Media, once Khalqi and Parcham appeared to patch up their
differences, they were more confident of their networks in the military and their
capability to launch a coup. Each week Amin gave oral progress reports to the Central
Committee which included list of reliable officers in the PDPA. 29
The PDPA underground cells in the month of April remained busy in planning the
coup as Daud appeared more repressive towards its leaders.
At the time of coup, many top leader including Amin and Taraki were under detention
and house-arrest. The coup was launched on April 26, 1978 by colonel Abdul Qadir
(acting Brigadier and deputy Commander in the Chief of the Air Force) Abdul Qadir
was also among the leading figures who played an active role in the 1973coup.
The action entailed two divisions an armored brigade involving near about 600
officers. The final raid on the place resulted in many causalities as the place's Security
showed armed resistance the place guard, however, being cut off from the out side and
being surrounded were unable to convey signal, for any out side help.
They soon seemed succumbing to the insurgents. The coup was successful. President
along with many of his family members and place entourage was killed in action. A
revolution was made and powers were handed over to. PDPA in 27 April 1978.
THE COUP
On 17 April 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, co-editor of the Daily Parcham, and a prominent
communist ideologue, rated higher than even Babrak Karmal, was assassinated. Drew an
unexpected angry crowd of 10,000 to 15,000 raising anti-imperialist and anti-government
slogans. A numbers of well-known PDPA personalities addressed the gathering inciting
them to take revenge. Daud was surprised and shocked to learn that the PDPA, which he
had been able to organize such a large procession united against him. 30
27 April was a Saturday, the first working day in many Muslim countries. At the peak
hour in Kabul when the streets were crowded with buses, cars and pedestrians, forty to
fifty tanks led by major Aslam Watanyar, who was at that time the deputy
62
commander of the 4th Armored Brigade stationed outside Kabul, moved out of their
barracks. Their presence on the streets was not considered very unusual. The traffic
policemen are reported to have motioned the tanks to pull over to curb so as to let the
vehicles flow smoothly. By 11 a.m. the tanks had reached the Minister of Defense.
Watanyar then took nine tanks and proceeded towards the Arg (presidential palace), a
complex within Darulaman, and ten kilometers southwest of Kabul and isolated from the
rest of the city. A cabinet meeting under Daud was in progress. Lieutenant General
Ghulam Haider Rasuli, the Minister of Defense, left the cabinet meeting and went out to
try and stop the rebels from moving any further but could not rally enough loyal troops
around him. He never returned as he met with an accident and was immobilized.
According to some reports he was caught by the communists on 29 April and executed 31
The storm, which eventually broke over Kabul on the morning of 27 April 1978,
leaving behind the dead bodies of President Daud and his family, brought with it a socio-
economic system, which was alien to the deeply conservative Afghan society. A small
group of devoted Marxists took upon themselves to turn Afghanistan from an illiterate,
poverty stricken and tribal ridden religious society into a modern socialist state.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVIES OF SAUR REVOLUTION
Revolution follows a complete overthrow of an established political order of a country
by a class or a group of a people (revolutionaries) who previously being subject to it
were against its very existence and believed its replacement by a new one. 32 In many
cases, the post-revolutionary period is followed by a rapid policy of reforms in social,
economic and political structures of state/society. The direction of changes in these
components of state system affirms a long held two-fold belief of revolutionaries.
First, men are capable of altering the conditions of society and can replace one regime
with another. Second, revolutionary’s zest for a future ideal society with a time of
more happiness and prosperity for everyone a millennium movement. This sense of
disentanglement with the old system and future remedy by bringing rapid changes
leads the incumbent revolutionary regime to adapt an abrupt policy of reforms for the
transformation of state and social systems. Thus revolutionaries believe that a true
revolution is one which not only bring changes in the political structure of society, but
63
also involves changes in social, economic and cultural values of a society. In Leiden
and Schmitt’s definition.
“A prominent feature of the post-revolutionary trouble is the tendency to embrace all
sorts of programs or adventures as achievement of revolution and after sour revelators
and his reforms and decrees aspects of revolutionary goals. This may result in
implementation of innocuous reforms or others Meddling. They now own a government
and opportunity to do the many things long dreamed or have at hand, and it would be
remarkable indeed if revolutionary leaders did not engage in plethora of Experimentation
(after revolution.)” 33
The similar situation happened in Afghanistan after the Saur revolution where the
Revolutionaries once having stepped into power were found experiencing a number of
reforms to bring Economic and socio-political changes in the country. They, from the
first day of the revolution, perceived the replacement of old order with a new one. The
succeeding of April revolution was hailed as a major Landmark and a victory of toiling
people of Afghanistan against a tyrant regime towards the setting up of a just society and
its glorification.34
Making the first announcement of the triumph of revolution by the revolutionary
Command on radio, they proclaimed:
For the first time in the history of Afghanistan the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny,
Despotism and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended and all powers
of state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan. The power of state fully rests with
the Revolutionary Council. 35
Few hours later in another announcement, they said: Dear Compatriots, your popular
state which is in the hands of the Council of the Revolution (Revolutionary Council)
informs you that every Anti-revolutionary element who would venture to defy
instructions and rulings of the Council of revolution shall be submitted immediately to
the revolutionary military centers for severe punishment. 36
The armed revolutionary council existed for few days after the revolution. After it ceded
power to the PDPA controlled revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of
64
Afghanistan. The revolutionary council consisted of 35 members. It included the leading
members of the PDPA, defense forces, and civil bureaucracy. The membership on the
revolutionary council was later raised to 53. The revolutionary council was presided
over by Noor Muhammad Taraki. A decree was issued by the revolutionary council
stating:
Afghanistan from the viewpoint of the state is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
and that the government business regarding the future planning for state and society
would be conducted through decrees and regulations of the Revolutionary Council.
The PDPA leadership being adamant to its belief for mobilizing changes in all leading
sectors of Afghan society announced issuing of a long radical program known as the
Basic Line of revolutionary Duties of the Government of Afghanistan”. The program
was regarded as a charter containing essential principles of the state’s policy to infuse
new zeal among strata in society towards the future ramification of Afghan state. The
important provisions of the Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties Were:
a) Democratic land reforms would be implemented in the interests of the oiling
farmers. Land reclamation program would be instituted. A program of irrigation
and solution of the grazing problem will be made. Abolition of old feudal and pre-
feudal relations. Adoption of measures of ensure that domestic and foreign trade
be conducted in the interest of the people.
b) Strengthening of the public sector of the economy with scientific planning and
other measures and democratization of social life in the machinery.
c) Rejection of imperialism and those related to it in various spheres and democratic
solution of national issues.
d) Weeding out from the state machinery anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic
elements.
e) Strengthening and building of the national-liberation and heroic army of the
democratic republic and Afghanistan which defends the revolution and its results;
ensuring of full and just rights to patriotic officers and soldiers in particular,
defend the right of wide participation, without any discrimination and privilege,
shoulder with all patriots, in the life and political activities of the country.
65
f) Guaranteeing democratic rights for all, including workers, peasants, officers and
soldiers, patriotic clergy, toiling nomads, small and medium classes and (other)
strata.
g) Promulgation and acquisition of all democratic laws and abrogation of all previous
laws and regulations and disbanding of all institutions which contradict the
aspiration and the principles of the revolution of Sour revolution.
h) Ensuring the equality of rights of women with men in all social economic,
political, cultural and civil aspects.
i) Democratic solution of the nomad issue.
j) Protection of domestic industries against foreign competition of products,
encouragement, protection, control and guidance private investments in industries,
and small medium-sized enterprises.
k) Expansion of relations and cooperation with friendly countries.
l) Ensuring universal, compulsory, free education to all children of school age
creation of all essential provisions for effective struggle against illiteracy.
m) Establishment of relations of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with
all neighbors of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, consolidation, widening
and all round expansion of friendly relations with our great northern neighbor: the
Soviet Union, expansion of friendly relations with India, and ensuring friendly
relations with Iran, Pakistan and China.
N) Solution of the national issue of Pashtun and Baluch people on the basis of their own
will and on the basis of historical background, solution of this issue through
understanding and peaceful political talks between the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 37
MAJOR REFORMS OF SAUR ROLUTION
The following changes-cum-reforms, delineating the PDPA’s aims of revolutionary
lines, were adapted after the revolution
66
CHANGING OF NATIONAL FLAGE.
The first major change occurring just after the revolution symbolizing the spirit of
revolutionary fervor was the government decision to change the national flag of
Afghanistan. The previous traditional tricolor flag was replaced with a solid red colored
flag, with an emblem of wheat sheaves, a star and the letters “Khalqi” inside. The new
flag was designed to embody the revolutionary red color by rectifying the symptoms of
conservation represented by the old flag. The red color flag waved on flagpoles in all
areas of Afghanistan for the first two years of revolution after it was abandoned in favor
of another tricolor flag (tricolor were same as in old traditional flag with an inclusion of
an industrial wheel, having sheaves of corn around it.) The change in flag by Babrak
Karmal was mainly due to growing opposition to the PDPA government over
implementing its revolutionary policies by people in large. The policy of recharging the
flag by Babrak was a mediating effort to allay the persisting trouble among Afghan
people over rapid enforcement of revolutionary steps by the PDPA government. The
Afghan population feared the future socialization of Afghan society; the existence of a
red flag testified it.
In his speech, on the occasion of flag recharging, Babrak Karmal appealed to Afghan
people to strengthen their unity and support Saur revolution under the new tricolor flag:
Let us declare with confidence and confection that the national and state flag and
emblem of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will soon turn into a symbol of unity
and solidarity for defense of the glorious revolution of Sour and their revolutionary
achievements more than ever under the flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,
which we hoist today. 38
BANNING OF PRIVATE LOAN DEALING
In July 1978, the revolutionary council announced decree six, which banned all private
loan dealing as well as the practice of mortgages (Garau) in Afghanistan. According to
the decree, all mortgages debts of agricultural laborers, tenants and small landowners
(possessing less than two hectares of land) prior to 1973 to April 1978.
The system of private loan-dealing like in many underdeveloped countries where
67
system of bank-loans is not facilitated for a common man and practice of private loaning
is rampant, was in practice in Afghanistan since the advent of modern Afghanistan in the
18th century. The Afghan society having an entrenched rural set up, divided
approximately into 15,000 villages with a population of 13.3 million (85% of the total
Afghan population) 39, conveniently or inconveniently was adapted to the methods of
private loan-dealing. There were three major kinds of private loan dealings in
Afghanistan: cash seeds and livestock loans the cash loan takings absorbed largest
portion of private loan business practice. The cash loan taking there were three major
kinds of private loan dealings in Afghanistan: cash seeds and livestock loans. The cash
loan takings absorbed largest portion of private loan business practice. The cash loan
taking was not only limited to the rural area, but also existed in the urban area. The
method of cash loaning was easy to follow. In case of cash loan, the borrower had to pay
a fixed amount of money (surplus to the original money), which in many cases was to be
decided by the lender. The interest rates on money lending varied from case to case
involving personal relations. There were no fixed rules regulating interest rates on
borrowed money, except found necessity of the borrower and the personal interests of
lender. The repaying of loans was burdensome in a situation where a higher demand on
interest rate was initiated by the lender. In case of personal relationship, the proposed
conditions for repaying loan could be lenient. Traditionally, in many of the areas, the
lender expected future support by the borrower; he did not expect the return of his money
rather the borrower agreed to support the lender (who usually was notable of the area) in
the local election and disputes 40
In case of the seed loans, the borrower had to pay a fixed quantity of crop to the lender
along with the value of seeds borrowed. The practice of seed loans was frequent in rural
areas with the agricultural sectors where residents were engaged in cultivation of land
and orchards. The principal implied in repaying the seed loans was that it could only be
made through crop with a possible concession in time period. In case of the flood or
drought, causing damage to the borrower’s crop, the repayment had to be
reconsidered/rescheduled the livestock loan system existed in Afghanistan since very
long. Loaning on livestock was common in the far-flanged rural areas. The repayment on
68
livestock loan, more or less, required the same method as of seed loans. The borrower
had to return a fixed number of livestock as decided at the time the lending was made.
For example, if person A borrowed 10 sheep from person B at the rate of two sheep per
year, at the end of two years, person A had to return the person B 14 sheep. The ratio of
livestock loan taking was higher in areas with nomad population. The nomad people,
which major source of livelihood was by growing cattle, were apt to borrow livestock in
cold areas with scarcity of grazing land during winter. They would then migrate to the
warm areas where plenty of pasture was found. The system could benefit the poor, hard-
working rural cattle-raisers, especially the nomad people.
Similarly, under the “Gerau” system, which was also the target of decree six, a person
would accept a loan at the value of his immovable property such as land, house, orchard
etc. for a specific period with fixed interest rate/conditions. Again, the conditions
decided for repayment varied in each case. In case of mortgage on land, orchard, the
interest rate was in shape of the yield of two-third or three-forth of the land until the
original debt was paid back. Other than crop producing items, the interest on mortgage
could possibly be in form of cash/physical support. A person failing to return the
payment under the system would get his property forfeited under mortgage.
After the proclamation of decree six, the revolutionary government appointed
“Woluswali” (regulating) committees at the districts level in all the provinces of
Afghanistan to deal with the cases arising out of the breach of decree 6. The Woluswali
committee appointed sub-committees at smaller levels and exercised control over them.
They all worked collectively as a team of state-appointed agents. A good number of them
were spread all over the areas to report secretly in case there was any violation of
decree 6. They were empowered to report to police against anyone found suspicious of
violating the decree. Violators could be arrested and penalized.41
STATE CONTROL OF MARRIAGE AND ABOLISHING OF VULVERS
One of the major social changes made by the PDPA government, pertaining to its aims
of social engineering in Afghanistan, pertaining to its aims of social engineering in
Afghanistan, was the implementation of marriage reforms. The marriage reforms were
designed to regulate marriages and abolish Vulvars (bride-price), and fix the amount of
69
(Jahiz) dowry. The reforms were one of the leading principles of the Revolutionary
Lines, whose stated purpose was to ensure “equal rights of women with men by
removing the unjust patriarchal feudalistic relations between husband and wife for the
consolidation of sincere family ties”42. The proclamation of decree regulating the
marriage and dowry affairs specified six principles:
A No one shall engage a girl or give her in marriage in exchange for cash or
commodities.
B No one shall compel the bridegroom or his guardians (parents) to give presents to the
girl or her family.
C The girl or her guardians shall not take cash or commodities in name of dowry in
excess of ten-dirham (Arabic coinage equal to 500 Afghanis).
D Engagements or marriages shall take place with full consent of parties involved:
E No one shall force marriage and
f No one shall prevent the free marriage (with the consent of both: bride and groom)
because of family relations or patriarchal ties.
g Engagements and marriages for women under sixteen and men fewer than eighteen are
not permissible.
H Violators shall be liable to imprisonment from six month to three years:
Cash or commodities accepted in violation of the provision of this decree will be
confiscated.43
The marriage reforms were similar to the reforms introduced by late King Amanullah
of Afghanistan in 1928. The reforms were to make firm state control over family affairs
by facilitating both: male and female to choose their own mates without any patriarchal
interference. The revolutionary regime, from the very beginning, finding fault with the
marriage affairs denounced them as unethical and immoral, hindering the future of a
happy family order in Afghan society. The existing system of bride price, as the
revolutionary government proclaimed, was un Islamic and burden some for the majority
of men: “Because of high bride-prices, men must work for five to ten years in order to
earn sufficient economic resources to obtain a bride”.44 The situation could be rather
worst in case of low-income men from whom a handsome amount of vulvar was
70
demanded. For them marriage making at cost of vulvar appeared a hard nut to crack. On
the contrary, a man affording to pay vulvar to bride’s guardians, irrespective of his age
and match, could go for more than one marriage.
The PDPA regime believed in complete annihilation of traditional marriage
system involving complications of bride price and dowry. The government announced
immediate penalization, to arrest and possible confiscate property of all those violating
marriage rules.
LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORMS
Land reforms are regarded one of the major changes taking place in the wake of
many of the leftist revolutions. No socialist revolution in an agrarian society, demanding
socioeconomic changes in society, is deemed complete without any major land reforms.
It (land reforms) involves changes in the political, social and economic Power positions
of several groups within a society.
Land reform has an essential core meaning which concerns significant and purposeful
changes in land tenure – changes in ownership and control of land and water resources.
Specific measures may include: expropriation of large estates and the distribution of land
among the tillers, either an individual ownership and operation or for collective use;
abolition or improvement in tenancy conditions by converting tenants into owners or by
reducing rental payments; issuance of land titles to the tillers to provide them with
greater security; and transformation of tribal and other traditional forms of tenure in the
interests of cultivators of the land. Land reform is often viewed as an instrument
primarily for the achievement of greater equity and social justice. Land reforms in a
feudal state, if shrewdly planned, play a role in setting down economic imbalances.45
The PDPA revolutionary council declared that its policy of land reforms is a cornerstone
of its overall planning of bringing changes in economic and social strata of society. The
peasant-landlord relationship, the PDPA perceived, was to be restructured by bringing
massive land reforms. This would help fixing the landownership and taking away the
land in excess --- essential to the elimination of big land lordship in Afghanistan. The
government also announced the settlement of water distribution: They announced:
Measures for abolition of feudal and pre feudal relations through democratic and just
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solution of land and water matters in favor of hard working peasants, is the major
essence of the democratic revolution, and is one of the main and urgent revolutionary
tasks propounded by the PDPA. Within the framework of national democratic revolution
and relying on the knowledge and nature of this historical movement, the progressive
land policy of the PDPA is aimed towards abolition of the backward feudal and pre-
feudal relations, growth of agricultural productive forces, application on agricultural
mechanization and establishment of mechanized agriculture centers, provision of land
and water for the peasants, rehabilitation of the irrigated systems for the benefit of the
toiling peasants.46
In November 1982, the government issued decree 8 for the implementation of land and
agrarian reforms. The decree 8 entailed many provisions defining the land distribution. It
modified the earlier settlement on land distribution, in 1975 by President Daud, by
reducing the ownership of all irrigated land from 20 hectares (one hector equivalent to
five jaribs) to only six hectares. The limit on the holdings of less irrigated or rain-
irrigated land, however, remained higher, between 35 to 40 hectares. The land exceeding
the limit of ownership was to be confiscated by the government without any
compensation. Unlike the 1975 land reforms by the Daud regime making compensation
to those from whom land was confiscated in excess, no compensation was allowed by the
PDPA. The land confiscated in excess was to be distributed among the landless. 47
An order of priority for the distribution of land was made. According to the priority
order, the first were landless peasants, farmers and sharecroppers already working on the
land. The neighboring farmers with two or less hectors of land were given second
priority. Nomads and cattle-raisers with no land were given third priority, provided they
assured the Land Reforms Committee of their readiness to utilize the land. Allotters were
eligible for loans from the district and local agricultural banks to buy seeds and other
required equipments necessary for the cultivation of land.48
Regarding the settlement of water distribution, the government announced the
nationalization of all canal and Karaz (underground natural irrigation network existing in
Afghanistan and Pakistani Balochistan) system in the country, 49 and put it under the
provincial irrigation departments. The management of irrigation network and distribution
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of water supply for cultivation purpose was now the responsibility of each provincial
government regulating through district offices. Previously, taking care of these affairs
was bifurcated between the district government and tribal committee/Jirga. The members
of the tribal committee were nominated by the tribal people in consent with the district
administration. In case of a breach or mishap, the matter was to be resolved jointly.
However, in case of a financial need, the major contribution was made by the
government.
Following the announcement of the decree 8, the government appointed committees all
over Afghanistan. The members of committees, majority of them being the PDPA
members, were to report the district administration and the departments concerned about
the violation of land reform rules. The principal violation of the rules was to defy the
rules/decrees of the revolutionary government i.e., not leaving the land confiscated in
excess by the government, or conspiring against the government by supporting the
elements that resisted the government policy of land reforms. 50 Committees undertaking
to supervise the affairs of new landowners (those allotted out of confiscated land) were
appointed to ensure the above authorities that the Allotter is utilizing land and loan
effectively, and is not allowing the land go out of cultivation. Violators war subject to
penalization varying from case to case, including the loss of allotted landownership.
According to the government report, a total of 373,000 hectares of land was taken by the
government in excess after the 1978 land reforms. Later on, the land was distributed
among 300,000 landless peasant families. 51
CENTRALIZATION OF TRIBES
another leading change resulting after the Sour revolution was the government decision
of regulating the affairs of tribes in Afghanistan by bringing them under a centralized
system. The Afghan society was primarily a tribal society divided into hundreds of
tribes. Afghanistan had not experienced a centralized system of government. The
jurisdiction of central government was mostly limited to the urban areas, and the areas
with military bases. The tribal areas in Afghanistan, unlike many developing countries,
like Pakistan and Turkey where they are federally administered or controlled by the
provincial government, disclaimed the control of state jurisdiction. The tribes in
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Afghanistan enjoyed a complete autonomy.52
Entrenching the area of state jurisdiction all over the country, important to succeed the
government policy for the centralization of tribes, major changes in the government
structure were made by the revolutionary regime. Afghanistan was divided into 29
provinces (Wilayats). The provinces were further divided into districts (Wuluswalis), and
districts into sub districts (Alaqadaris). Governors were appointed for each province. A
governor was the chief executive of a province. He was appointed by the PDPA
revolutionary council. He was responsible for the smooth, efficient administration in the
province. The PDPA Government, needing the support of defense forces to break down
any armed resistance from tribal people to the implementation of its tribal policy,
decided to divide Afghanistan into seven military districts.53 each military district was
under the supervision of PDPA Political Officer acting on behalf of the central
government. A Political Officer was not necessarily to be a military man, albeit many of
them were. After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet officers were also
appointed in those districts to monitor the resistance movements against the government.
They worked in collaboration with the Political Officers providing them guidelines for
future action.
In pursuance of centralizing the tribal structure, the government nullified all tribal codes
and privileges. Many tribal norms, regulating the day-to-day conduct of a tribe and
defining its relations with other tribes, were canceled. They were declared contrary to the
revolutionary spirit and process of national integration. The offices of tribal chiefs were
abolished and all privileges, states, and allowances enjoyed by them thus ceased to
exists.
MODERNIZATION OF AFGHAN WOMEN
The PDPA, following the footprints of its predecessor reformist: King Amanullah Khan
necessitated the importance of the modernization of females in Afghanistan. The policy
of female modernization, the PDPA believed, was essential to revolutionary aims of
social changes. Soon after the revolution, Democratic Organization of Afghan Women
(DOAW) was established. The main object of the DOAW was to encourage Afghan
female participating in public and working side by side with men. On the eve of the
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inauguration of the DOAW, Taraki, highlighting the importance of female participation
in Afghan public affairs, said “without the participation of toiling women no great
movement relating to toiling classes has achieved victory, because women constitute half
of the (Afghan) society”.54
The DOAW was a huge organization working under the leadership of its central
committee. The members of the committee were elected. Offices of the DOAW were
opened in all major cities of Afghanistan by claiming more than ten thousands permanent
members; and many more as supporters. An official notification regarding the
membership of the DWOA said:
The Democratic Women’s Organization of Afghanistan, under the leadership of its
central council, has mobilized 14,000 permanent members in its 29 provincial and district
councils, and 450 primary precincts. The pioneer’s organization, under the leadership of
its central council has mobilized 40,000 pioneers in its 7 Pioneer places, 513 Pioneer
Units, 3,500 Pioneer Groups, and has convened 12 Pioneer camps. The characteristics of
the current revolutionary process (DWOA) are aimed to bring harmony in mass
organization and integration of their activities with party and state organizations. 55
The attainment of primary education was made compulsory for girls above the age of
five in all areas of Afghanistan. The attendance of schools was declared compulsory, and
inspection teams belonging to the DWOA were appointed to report on the progress of
female attendance. The DWOA teams worked in collaboration with the Education
Departments, and reported the matters relating the female education to higher authorities.
The PDPA, in one of the pamphlets, imbibing the teachings of Jamal-uddin Afghani, a
great Afghan scholar and philosopher, described the necessity of achieving female
education thus:
A society can hardly progress where the attainment of knowledge is limited to men only,
and female population is deprived of it. The first cradle of learning for a child is his
association with mother. If mother is without knowledge or learning, how can children
learn? The deficiencies will remain with them through out their lives an irreparable loss.
It cans society to darkness and chaos. 56
In November 1980, an All-Afghanistan Women’s Conference was held in Kabul. The
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conference lasted for one week. It was participated by 2,000 Afghan female delegates
representing all spheres of life. Beside them, many guest female delegates from 19
countries also participated in the conference. The major purpose behind organizing this
conference was to highlight the revolutionary endeavors for the promotion of female
welfare in Afghanistan; the female population which long had been deprived of their
right of participation in national deployment.
ESTABLISHING NATIONAL FATHER LAND FRONT
Relevant to the (PDPA) policy of mobilizing a collective massive support to achieve the
revolutionary spirit in favor of glorious Afghanistan, Afghan National Fatherland Front
(NFF) was established. The formation of the NFF, a directive of Fundamental
Revolutionary Policies, represented “widest possible strata of national life in the building
of the country” 57 And “propagate an explain on a broad scale the policy of the PDPA,
the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan” 58 The inaugurating session of NFF was participated by 900 representatives
of all leading sections of Afghan society. The membership of the NFF included
representatives from the PDPA, trade unions, unions of agricultural cooperatives, the
DOAW, unions of Poets and writers, union of journalists, union of artists, peace
solidarity and friendship organizations, Economic Consultative Council (ECC), and
Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth (DOAY) and Afghan clergy. The
Government declaration on the formation of the NFF stated:
The National Fatherland Front has a vast social organization acceptable to all the
toilers of Afghanistan and has expanded its activities countrywide in its 24 Provincial
Councils, 13 City Councils, 8 Country Councils, 15 mass social organizations and large
number of national and patriotic elements with a total figure of more than half a million
people are mobilized in the National Fatherland Front such level of mobilization is
realized first time in the country. As a whole during the years of the revolution and
specifically after the new and revolutionary sovereignty in compliance with national
democratic essence of the revolution is systematized. 59
Although, the existing status of the NFF, as the PDPA defined, was of free-front line
independent of any government control. The fact, however, remained that its activities
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and funds were under the direct control of the PDPA revolutionary council, including the
publication if its newspapers.
OFFICIAL POLICY OF PDPA in- 1978.
The objectives of the PDPA were to build a socialist society founded on the voluntary
union of the progressive people of Afghanistan.
The declared policy of the PDPA was based on,
I. The Sacred Religion of Islam.
II. Ensuring democracy
III. Active and Positive neutrality.
IV. Good Neighborliness.
V. Peaceful Coexistence and respect for the U.N Charter. 60 ,
The main Features of the PDPA at the time of the April 1978 coup were following
1. Introduction of democratic land reforms which involved taking away land from
the wealthy land owners and distributing it amongst the landless without giving
compensation.
2. Abolishing the existing feudal-tenant relationship.
3. Censuring Women's equality in Afghan society,
4. Salving the nationalities problem by giving them greater autonomy in the use of
their local languages.
5. Strengthening the public sector, increasing investment in industry:
a. Enlarging education and public health sector:
b. Expanding relation with the Soviet Union:
c. Supporting national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin
America and opposing establishment of military bases 61
IMPACTS OF SAUR REVOLUTION ON PAKISTAN
The impact on Pakistan of the Saur revolution in Afghanistan was direct, ranging
and far reaching. It had both negative and positive repercussion. Afghanistan crisis, in
general, and the large concentration of refugees on Pakistani soil in particular, have
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given birth too many complex problems linkage; economical, political, social, strategic,
and, weapons. .
ECONOMICAL.
According to one source the cost of maintaining the registered refugees is little
over a million dollars a day. This, of course, is the minimum version of the cost entailed
as this does not take into account the new-comes and the unregistered refugees.
However, most sources agree that almost half the cost involved in the maintenance of
Afghan refugees is borne by Pakistan and the other half is met by many donor states,
agencies and international organization. 62 While it may be true that almost 50% of the
cost is borne by the donors but when invisible expenditures are added it would seem
reasonable to assume that Pakistan is sharing the major burden of the cost involved.
Another dimension of the economic problem was the issue of providing fodder to the
animals and cattle that came along with their masters. The provision of grazing grounds
and water for the Afghani livestock caused consistent headaches for the Pakistani
officials. In both provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, the grazing lands are somewhat
limited. In NWFP most of it belongs to private land-owners but in Balochistan part of the
green pastureland belongs to the Government. Obviously the private owners guard their
land with all the care they could muster while the government land is not sufficient
enough to cater for all the cattle. Consequently the pressure on land compelled the
Pakistani authorities to disperse them to other provinces; a necessity not particularly
favored by the Government as such dispersal would make the eventual repatriation of
refugees rather difficult. The large concentration of refugees in certain areas also caused
ecological problems. Many forests suffered because most of the refugees used the wood
for cooking and heating purpose. 63 Most of these refugees are poor and not familiar with
the use of modern cooking and heating gadgets that were provided to them and in
consequence not only opted but preferred the traditional methods of using wood.
Recognizing the inadvertent damage being done to environmental and ecological
resources particularly in NWFP and Balochistan, the Government took many remedial
measures including portable water supplies, digging of tube-wells and open surface
wells, mono pump and hand pump, etc. in order to alleviate the situation. 64 More
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affluent and wealthier Afghan refugees, after their arrival, began to invest their wealth in
varied types of commercial pursuits including the real estate and transport business. The
purchase of immovable property caused a boom in real estate business especially in and
around the areas of refugee concentrations. Realizing the dangerous implications of such
a trend the Government expressed its determination to curb this development 65 Although
the Afghan refugees were not allowed to purchase the immovable properties, the shrewd
Afghans continued to manage to evade the operative rules and regulations either through
employment of unfair means. 66 They found ways to get around the law restricting their
right to purchase property by obtaining National Identity Cards, Domicile Certificates,
and at time even Passports through agents who charged handsome fees for such
procurements.67 these developments not only raised the property prices but also
encouraged corruption. In addition, the house rents have also soared in cities mainly
because city dweller Afghans were willing to pay higher rent which, in turn, pushed the
rent ceiling beyond the capacity of the local lower middle and lower classes. 68 A small
number of refugees also started to participate in transportation system of NWFP and
Balochistan gradually took over part of the transport business. The Afghan transporters
not only offered relatively less rates in order to secure a portion of this business but also
operated without immunity. It is also alleged that since the Pakistani treated them more
like guests and they were given facilities that were not available to the local transporters,
the Afghanis were able to soon establish a foothold in this business. 69 Besides, the
presence of a large number of refugees also increased the unemployment problems. 70
Not only the refugee concentration areas had already their own unemployment problems,
the arrival of many young refugees looking for jobs and willing to work for lesser
payment escalated the local unemployment problem. Many Afghanis managed to secure
unemployment in agriculture and construction industry, which implied that those
opportunities would have been available to the locals in the absence of the refugees. In
addition, the Afghanis have also secured a reasonable position of odd jobs in urban
centers. Since the Afghanis were and still are willing to work for lower wages and an
employer is likely to give preference to the Afghanis over the locals, the friction became
somewhat inevitable
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POLITICAL
The presence of a large number of Afghan refugees has also caused many political
problems in Pakistan. Pushtoon tradition of ‘Panah’ and Pakistanis know hospitality is
now confronted with a dilemma. Two factors seemed to have taxed their patience, the
number and the time. The number of refugees has patience, the number and the time. The
number of refugees has swollen to four million and the time span has already covered 28
years. The dilemma is how to continue offering them the best of our traditional
hospitality and cope with the already surfaced dangerous implications effectively.
The political problems that are in some way directly connected with the refugees and
need to be highlighted are the growth of terrorism, and a sharp cleavage among the
political parties regarding the Afghan refugees and their eventual return. Until the advent
of the 80’s, organized terrorism was virtually never experienced by the Pakistanis. Acts
of terrorism are varied and many. The NWFP has been particularly at the receiving end
of terrorism. The Kabul regime has managed to penetrate into the great reservoirs of
resistance; namely the refugee camps. In fact, it is commonly believed in Pakistan that
many Afghan saboteurs have come into Pakistan in the guise of refugees with the object
of spying and creating tension between the refugees and the locals. Two factors seemed
to have contributed considerably towards the increasing terrorism. First, the agents of
Afghani intelligence service have been extremely active in creating not only the potential
for riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism between the refugees and the
locals but have also been responsible for periodic bomb blasts in areas of civilian
concentration as well as attempts to destroy targets of tactical importance. Both Pakistan
Government and Mujahideen sources firmly place the blame on the KHAD Agents for
causing various successful acts of terrorism. 71 Perhaps that’s time KHAD had been
promoted for its good performance and elevated to cabinet level as the Ministry of State
Security. 72 In fact, KHAD has grown as large as the Afghan army and works in close
collaboration with KGB 73 second the internal feuds between various resistance groups
and factions have also manifested in the forms of irresponsible terrorist acts. 74 Perhaps
that was one of the major considerations to influence the Government’s decision to order,
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in August 1984, all Peshawar-based resistance groups to move out Peshawar. 75
Perhaps the most serious political problem arising from the continuing presence of a
large number of refugees in Pakistan is the impact on domestic politics. Normally most
external crises tend to have a unifying effect on domestic politics but in case of Pakistan,
the impact of Afghanistan crisis has sharply divided political opinion about the refugees
and the eventual settlement of the crisis. It all started when one of the political parties
gained access to the refugee camps mainly through the Peshawar-based Afghan
resistance groups. 76 The humanitarian work of that particular party created goodwill
among the ‘cultivated refugees’ which, in turn, generated apprehensions among the other
political parties and they began to wonder what would happen if the refugees did not
leave and formed a large vote bank for the privileged political party.77 Besides, it is not
all that difficult, as stated above, to obtain Nation Identity Cards, or Domicile
Certificates, enabling the cultivated refugees to form a strong political base for the
involved party. This simmering fear surfaced in 1986 when the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy (MRD) passed a resolution alleging the growing involvement
of the Afghan refugees in the politics of Pakistan. In addition, it was also alleged that the
refugees were being made an instrument to create dissension and disorder in academic
institutions to serve the political objectives of a particular section.78 indeed these were
very serious charges. Some political parties also disagreed with Government’s approach
towards the Afghan crisis and insisted that direct talks with the Kabul regime should be
initiated. 79
Another sensitive political problem relates to the augured ethnic imbalance in
Balochistan that may result provided the Afghan crisis continues to persist and the flow
of refugees into Pakistan does not stop. Assuming that no change takes place in the
operative rate of refugee’s influx and the conflict remains unresolved for a few more
years, the concentration of the refugees could gravely disrupt the socio-economic life in
provinces bordering Afghanistan. Not only the refugees have increased the population of
those areas by 10 to 15% but in case of Boluchistan the inflow of Pusthoon refugees
could begin to erode the Boluchi predominance. Many Baluch leaders have already
expressed fears that the continuous inflow of the refugees could up-set the existing
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delicate balance between the Boluchis and the Pashtoons, and might even cause a
situation in which the Boluchis may find themselves in a minority in their own Province
80 Politically the Bolochistan situation could be quite easily exploited by the Soviets if
they so decide. Not only Balochistan had remained a troubled province especially during
the last regime which resulted in the flight of many dissidents who took refuge in
Afghanistan, but the Boluch minority problem is extremely sensitive and capable of
being exploited. The Soviets have many compelling reasons to play the Baluch card in
order to coerce, if not undermine, the Pakistani Government. Among the reasons that
seemed to have annoyed the Soviets are Islamabad’s linkage with the U.S. and China, the
use of Pakistani territory for sanctuary purposes by the Afghan resistance groups, the
supply of men and material for the resistance force from and via Pakistan, Pakistan’s
repeated refusal to talk directly to Kabul regime, and most recently no-response Russian
initiative. 81 In fact, according to an American writer, the Soviets have already carefully
and actively cultivated support among the Boluchis to increase their leverage against the
regime in Islamabad.82
Finally among the political circles many questions are repeated debated. Would all the
refugees go back if the Geneva process is able to produce a settlement? What would be
the status of those refugees who did not to go back to Afghanistan? Will they be allowed
to become Pakistani citizens if no settlement is agreed upon in the near future, would the
aid be stopped? What would happen if the refugees refused to accept the settlement?
Would Pakistan force them out? Would there be a war within the bordering provinces
between the refugees and the Pakistanis? Such questions not only reflect the
apprehensions of those who are directly affected by the presence of the refugees but also
at national level, indirectly, communicate fears for future harmony, stability and peace
for Pakistani society
SOCIAL
Many economic issues are, in many ways, linked with the social problems and have
contributed enormously towards the existing tension. For example, transport, grazing
land, property purchase, deforestation, and unemployment have all contributed
considerably towards the initial birth and later increasing of the tension between the
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natives and the foreigners. In urban centers not only the increased rent ceilings caused
frictions but also the ‘privileged position’ of the refugees for whom the refuges
administration systematically provided all sorts of facilities raised many questions
among the local population. 83 Since many poor Pakistanis do not enjoy most of the
facilities that had been extended to Afghan refugees and government is unable to provide
similar facilities to all the Pakistanis, tension becomes a natural outcome of such
situations. In some areas the refugee’s settlements have upset the existing sectarian
balance. The increasing tension in Kurram Agency is, in some ways, a byproduct of the
altered sectarian balance. 84
Another significant social problem that was, hitherto, nonexistent in Pakistan, is the
drugs problem. Until the advent of the 80’s drug addiction was relatively unknown to
most Pakistanis. Although poppy was never cultivated on a very large scale in Pakistan
and General Zia’s concerted efforts further reduced Pakistan’s opium harvest from a
1979 high 800 tons to a low of 45 tons in 1948, yet in Afghanistan even after the advent
of civil war, poppy remained the most attractive cash crop. 85 Before the Khomeini
revolution in Iran, most of the poppy crop was exported to Iran but with the advent of the
new regime export to Iran altogether stopped. With the virtual vanishing of Iranian
market, the growers began to set up labs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan with the
objective of the making more profitable heroin for export to the western countries.86
With Pakistan welcoming the Afghan refugees and Iran depriving the poppy growers of
its market, the obvious route to west became through Pakistan. One dangerous by
product of heroin smuggling through Pakistan was that a massive increase of heroin
consumption among the Pakistanis was noticed within a short span of time. In 1986 it
was reported that out of 1.3 million addicts in Pakistan, roughly about 100,000 were
heroin-hooked and in 1996 the number of heroin addicts exceeded 450,000.87 Since the
advent of the crisis, the number has been steadily on the rise despite government’s
earnest efforts to curb its consumption and to retrieve the hooked persons. However, it
must be asserted here that addiction to such a dangerous drug cannot be solely assigned
to the Afghans. Perhaps the increased consumption could also be attributed to the
shifting centers of heroin activities and its easy availability in local markets.
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WEAPONS
Another social problem confronting the Pakistanis is the enormously increased crime
rate during the last many years. It is alleged that the easy availability of smuggled and
unauthorized large quantities of weapons and ammunitions has contributed substantively
towards the increased rate of crimes. 88 Three factors seemed to have caused tremendous
increase in weapons inside the country. First, the Afghan rulers have continuously
supplied arms to certain tribes in Pakistani territory with a view to establishing a
sympathetic tribal militia that would act as a restraint on resistance activities in and
around the tribal belt. 89 Second, since both Pakistani territory and the Afghan political
leaders are serving as a conduit for weapon supplies to resistance field commanders, it is
alleged that Pakistani official are involved and Afghan political leaders are peddling
weapons for personal profit. 90 Third, in a crisis situation, it is inevitable that local arms
manufacturer would inevitably increase its production in order to generate sufficient
profit. Conscious of increased smuggling of arms that flooded the market, the indigenous
producer was left with limited options; either to employ the economy of scales principles
or indulge in smuggling. A combination of these factors has not only increased the
availability of weapons but has also reduced the prices. Thus cheap weapons are now
easily available which, in turns.
STRATEGIC
Strategically threats emanating from the Afghanistan crisis did not acquire threatening
proportions until the Soviets introduction of its own combat troops in Afghanistan. The
Soviet invasion has dramatically complicated the security situation on the western
border. Afghanistan, on its own, has never been able to pose much of a problem, as
Pakistan’s military strength was regarded more than sufficient to cope with Afghan
threats. It is the Soviet-backed and protected Afghanistan which has adversely affected
the security scenario for Pakistan. For Pakistan, the invasion has introduced many
disturbing elements, in its security environment. The danger, of course, is manifold.
First, the invasion has generated fears and apprehensions among many Pakistanis that
their country would be the next target. Many Pakistanis believe that after having
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consolidated its position in Afghanistan, Moscow will then try to extend its influence
beyond Afghan borders.91 The argument that the Soviets are likely to use Afghanistan as
a spring-board to destabilize Pakistan in order to gain much-desired access to warm
waters of the Indian Ocean, is still held valid by a sizable section of Pakistanis.
Sandwiched between Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and Soviets ally, India, such anxieties
do not seem too far-fetched, especially if viewed within the context of past Soviet
attitudes towards Pakistan.
Second, because of the presence of a large number of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani
soil and the continuing Afghan Civil War, it can not be overruled that Pakistan may be
drawn into Afghanistan cauldron will nilly. Given the nature if the Afghan resistance’s
disunity and the on-going Civil War, it is difficult to say that it would be a short war.
Assuming that the civil war persists and the Soviet casualty rate registers a dramatic
increase over time, there may come a point where the Soviets might seriously
contemplate active hot pursuits and sanctuary busting operations. Once this happens,
Pakistan perforce would be dragged into the Afghan crisis. Such eventualities look real
when one realizes that the Soviet leaders and officials already regard Pakistan in a state
of undeclared war with the Soviet Union.92 Undoubtedly the Pakistanis are involved in
the Afghan crisis but not the way the Soviets are interpreting it. The day Pakistan
decided to accommodate large numbers of refugees on compassionate grounds; it
became involved, though this involvement is of a very different nature. What the Soviets
appear to have, so far, failed to recognize, is the fact that the massive refugees influx has
presented the Government of Pakistan with an irreconcilable dilemma. If it organizes
help and provides the bare minimum facilities to these refugees on humanitarian
grounds, then Moscow begins to accuse Pakistan of aiding, abetting and encouraging
what it terms as counter-revolutionary elements. If it does not look after them, then the
danger of refugee’s camps becoming the hot beds of intrigues appears even more
threatening.
Third, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit the internal problems arising from the
activities of the dissident elements in the provinces of Balochistan and N.W.F.P. More
than once the substantial internal security capacity of Pakistan’s military has been tested
85
in these turbulent provinces. It has been often reported that the Baluchi feel ‘they never
had a fair deal and are still not getting one.’93 Punjabi-dominated army and bureaucracy
is unable to understand the gravity of Baluchi problems. Similar kind of feelings also
exists in other smaller provinces. The problems of NWFP and Balochistan have been
further compounded by the influx of the Afghan refugees. The dangers of a possible fall-
out of Afghanistan’s political instability and re-emergence of subversion by the dissident
elements cannot be under-rated. There exists sufficient evidence to support the
contention that in the past, the subversive activities were actively encouraged and
materially supported by the Afghans as well as by the Soviets. The situation as it exists
today is much more prone to Soviet-inspired subversion primarily because of the
presence of a massive number of refugees in these provinces and the on-going civil war
in Afghanistan than what was the case in the past.
The final major source of threat to the security of Pakistan primarily emanates from the
internal situation but has been exacerbated by continuing Afghan crisis and the age-old
unfriendly state of relationship with India. When there threats on borders, the internal
threats often assume alarming proportions. Because of Soviet involvement in the Afghan
crisis and its extremely friendly and stable relationship with India, the emergence of a
dangerous Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis could not just be brushed aside. Even if they
decide not to directly invade Pakistan individually or collectively, the exploitation of
internal problems could sufficiently weaken Pakistan.
Among the host of domestic problems that seem to have haunted the minds of scholars
and leaders alike, are the continued search for a viable political system, lack of national
cohesion and the operative inequalities and disparities among the federating units that
from Pakistan. The continued inability of the Pakistanis to evolve a viable political
system in which the political legitimacy is ultimately sought by a reference to the people
of Pakistan, have not only consistently impeded the development of nation-building
institutions, but have also generated a number of complex problems. Excessive political
experimentations at various periods of Pakistan’s history by different leaders have not
yet conclusively provided a panacea for the political problems of Pakistan. Equally
potent problem is the lack of national cohesiveness. While the cultural and linguistic
86
heterogeneity of federating units of Pakistan is frequently referred to by many outsiders,
the two main motivational and referred to by many outsiders, the two main motivational
and binding forces that hold Pakistan together are often relegated to secondary level:
namely the religion of Islam and the common aspiration for a future. Many Indian
scholars have often argued that Islam does not have any binding appeal and in this
connection they often quote the example of separation of East Pakistan and insist that the
two-nation theory that produced Pakistan died with the birth of Bangladesh. 94 The two-
nation theory stipulated that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations of the
subcontinent. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh has in no way invalidated
this theory, as Bangladesh is a separate independent Muslim entity. As far as the creation
of Bangladesh is concerned, it needs to be mentioned here that it was the product of a
peculiar set of circumstances in which not only the above-mentioned major internal
problems contributed their share but the effective exploitation of geographical
remoteness of the eastern wing of Pakistan coupled with active India and Soviet
involvement did the trick. However, this does not mean that heterogeneity does not exit
and is not taking the toll. The third and perhaps the most important source of tension is
the presence of economic disparities. Because of the ill-advised and badly planned
Harvard Group’s developmental strategies, the economic disparities were allowed to
grow unnecessarily. These disparities were much more visible in the regional distribution
of industrialization programmes over the years.95 despite the rectification processes
undertaken in recent years, the effective removal of these social inequalities and
economic disparities are likely to take some time to fade into oblivion. The current
regime’s five-point programme certainly seems to be a timely and useful step in the right
direction.
87
REFERENCES
1. Ghaus, A.S the fall of Afghanistan, Pergamon Brassy, International Defense
2. Publisher, Washington DC.1988.p.194...
3. Taizi, S.Z Saur Revolution, an unpublished Ph.D., thesis at the University of
Peshawar, Pakistan 1989, p. 10: Other instances of Afghans attending communist
meetings were: Afghans representatives attend the Eastern Communist Central
Committee Meeting at Berlin in 1991; Two Afghans attended a Congress in Baku in
1920; between 1920 and 1933 a number of Afghan socialist visited USSR.
4. Hyman, A. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination-1964-1981, The Macmillan Press
Ltd., London, UK, 1982, p. 24.
5. Ibid.
6. Amstutz, J.B. Afghanistan – The First Five years of Soviet Occupation, National
Defense University, Washington DC, USA, 1986, p.11.
7. In Dari (modified Persian) the PDPA is called Janiat-e-Democratiqi – Khalq-e-
Afghanistan.
8. Arnold, A. Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalqi, Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford, CA, USA, 1983, p. 25.
9. Hyman, P. 55; Also see Arnold, P. 25 or details Five members were elected to the
Central Committee of the newly found PDPA. Four became alternate members. Other
full members were Taher Badekshi, Sultan Ali Kheshtmand, Ghulam Dastgir
Panjsheri Shahpur and Dr. Saleh M. Zeary.
10. Ibid, p. 19.
11. Amstutz, P. 34.
12. Interviewed by the author at Peshawar, 7 May 1990.
13. Bradsher, H.S. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Duke University Press, Durham,
USA, 1985, P. 41.
14. Ibid, P. 41.
15. Ibid. p. 43
16. Ibid, P. 45.
17. Ibid, Appendix B, PP.149, 150.
88
18. Interviewed by the author at Peshawar, 7 May 1990.
19. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Volume XXV, P. 29641, 1 June 1979.
20. New Times, Moscow, 21-28 May 1978, PP. 8, 9.
21. Babrak karmal mentioned the help of international supporters and brothers, world
Marxist review (Prague) vol, 23.No4 April, 1980, p 35.
22. Current Digest of the Soviet press (CDSP) vol, 28 No 08, 25 February 1976, p
13Arnold. .
23. Nayar, K. Report on Afghanistan, Allied Publishers Pvt, Limited, New Delhi, India,
1981, P. 19. Also see Ghaus, P. 200.
24. A short information about PDPA op-cit delaits provided in Tariq-ul-Shaab - articles
and the Dari documents about the establishment of the Marxist -Leninist party in
Afghanistan.
25. Louis duprce op cit 34
26. Ibid. Also in Beverly male. Op. cit. p.46.
27. Dr. Anwer "the third Afghan constitution (part VII) central Asia, winter
1982, op- cit, p.1.
28. Ibid.
29. Louis duprce, op- cit. pp. – 115, 18.
30. From the original issues "Parcham".
31. Lous Dupree, Op-cit p608.
32. Afghanistan, “Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1934. pp. 131-34.
33. Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern
World, Cliffs, N.J Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 68.
34. The Kabul Times, April 29, 1978.
35. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Annual, 1979 published in Kuldip
Nayar’s Report on Afghanistan, New Delhi: Allied Publisher, 1980, p. 19.
36. Ukherjee, Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph, Karachi: Pakistan
Publishing House, 1984, p. 85.
37. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit. p. 20.
38. “Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,
89
“published in S. Muherjee’s op.cit. pp. 160-62.
39. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), South Asian Service (SAS), April
22, 1980, de/10.
40. Alexander Dastarac and M. Levant, “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan, “Merip
Report, No. 89, 1980, p. 12.
41. Louis Depree, “Red Flag over Hindu Bush: Leftist Movements in Afghanistan,”
American Flag Staff Reports, No. 44, 1979, P.5.
42. Ibid. p.7.
43. Nazif M. Sharani and Robert L. Canfield, ed. Revolutions and Rebellions in
Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984, p. 332.
44. Ibid, P. 33.
45. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekings, Afghanistan: A Country Study, ed.
Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1986, p. 122.
46. Peter Dorner, Land Reform and Economic Development, Ringwood, Victoria:
Penguin Books, 1972.
47. Afghanistan: Multifaceted Revolutionary Process, Kabul: Government Printing
Press, 1980, p. 11.
48. Louis Dupree, “Red Flag over Hindu Kush: Rhetoric Reforms or Promises,
Promises, “American Field Staff Reports, No. 46, 1980, p. 8.
49. The Kabul times, January 2, 1979.
50. George Arney, Afghanistan: The Definite Account of a country at Crossroads,
London: Cax & Wyman Ltd. 1989, p. 92.
51. See John Fullerton, “Too Much at Stake to quit”, Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 1982, pp 101.
52. Mukherjee, op.cit. p. 180.
53. Antony Hyman, “Afghanistan’s Unpopular Revolution: Reforms Zeal Fails to
enthuse the People, “The Round Table, 27, 1979, p. 223.
54. Richard F. Nyrop, op.cit. p. 266.
55. Louis Dupree, 1980, op.cit. p. 17.
90
56. Afghanistan Multifaceted Revolutionary Process, op.cit. p. 65.
57. Appeared in one of the pamphlets defining the revolutionary aims. The idea was
actually derived from: Jamal ud Din Afghani: A Political Biography, by Nikkie, R.
Kiddie, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 160-62.
58. S. Mukeerjee, op.cit. p. 160.
59. See “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” by David B. Edwards in George E.
Delury. Ed. Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties, Vol. 1, New York: Facts
on File Publications, 1986, p. 3.
60. Afghanistan: Multifaceted Revolutionary process, op.cit. p. 67.
61. Richard F. Nyrop, op.cit. p. 268. 230
62. The administrative cost of 2.4 million registered refugees was put around a million
dollars a day in 1985. Neither the flow of refugees has stopped nor have the
unregistered refugees been taken into consideration when the above mentioned figure
was quoted. It is quite safe to assume that the cost of maintaining those refugees is
more than a million dollars a day. See along Afghanistan’s War-Torn Frontier by
Debra Denker in National Geographic, June 1985 p. 788.
63. Ibid. Among the donors, most external sources, UNHCE, WFP, UNICEF, WHO,
FAO are the prominent international organizations. The other group of external
donors is individual states that have been giving aid for the refugees. See Afghan
Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications by Hasan-
Askari Rizvi in Pakistan Horizon Vol. XXXVII, NO. 1, 1st Quarter 1984, pp. 40-61.
Also see Malik, op. cit., pp. 41-43. Also see Arabic: The Islamic World Review, Ap.
1982. An official summary of financial outlay for upkeep of 3 million refugees during
the year 1984-85 was as follows:
64. SOURCES AMOUNT PERCENTAGE
Government of Pakistan $ 205 million 49%
External Sources $ 209 million 51%
91
See Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan a
publication of the Chief Commission erate for Afghan Refugees, Government of
Pakistan, July 1984, p. 17.
65. See ‘The Afghan Refugee: The Human Aspect’ by Zafar Samdani in Pakistan and
Gulf Economist Oct. 9-15, 1982, pp. 24-25.
66. Malik, op. cit., p. 46
67. See South Oct. 1982, p. 24.
68. Rive op. cit., p. 54.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid, p. 52.
71. See ‘A Tiger by the Tail: Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees’ by Beverly Male in
Refugees; Four Political case studies. By Milton Osborne, Beverly Male, Gardon
Lawrie, and W.J.O’ Malley (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1981)
p.39.
72. Malik op. cit., p. 46.
73. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 53.
74. Denker, op. cit., p. 788.
75. Ibid. Also see The Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1986.
76. The Muslim, March 1982. Also see ‘Pakistan’s Heroin Problem’ by Yameen
Mitha in The Muslim, Aug. 14, 1986.
77. See Inspector General’s (Punjab Police) statement in Jang (Urdu Daily), Nov. 7,
1986.
78. O’Ballance, op. cit., p. 80.
79. Time, Dec. 9, 1985.
80. Denker, op. cit., p.785. Also see ‘Hazards of the Afghan Crisis’ by Khalid
Akhtar, The Muslim, July 20, 1986.
81. See ‘The war in Afghanistan by Craig M. Karp in Foreign Affairs, summer 1986,
pp. 1026-47.
82. Ibid.
83. Denker, op. cit., p. 785.
92
84. Ibid. Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
85. Ibid. It was also reported that large number of refugees already managed to enlist
themselves as regular voters of Pakistan’s electoral roll. See Jang (Urdu Daily),
June 28, 1986.
86. See The Muslim, Feb. 4, 1986.
87. Ibid.
88. Both Wali Khan and Asghar Khan had been supporting this view. See The Muslim
May 7, 1985.
89. See South, op. cit., p. 24.
90. See ‘In Afghanistan’s Shadow’ by Arthur Ross in The Washington Quarterly,
autumn 1982. Also see Soviet Ambassador Smirnov’s speech to the Press Club in
Karachi on 18th Nov. 1984, The Muslim 19th Nov. 1984. Also see Times of India
Ap. 13, 1984.
91. Ibid, Ross.
92. See ‘Pakistan: Nation on Tightrope’ by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in
Reader’s Digest Oct. 1982, pp. 22-25.
93. See Selig S. Harrison In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).
94. See Pakistan and the Islamic World’ by O.N. Mehrotra in Strategic Analysis
(Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi), Vol. V., No. 1-2, April-
May 1981, pp.32-33. See also other articles in the same issue.
95. See Khalid Bin Sayeed Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of The Change
(New York: Praeger, 1980) pp. 113-36.
Chapter IV
External Involvement in Afghanistan
And the Role of Pakistan
93
Afghanistan a landlocked country with its tragic history has never been let in peace and
prosperity. The country with its strategically important location has usually been under
the influence and attack of regional and global power.
The past history of Afghanistan shows that in early 19th century when the British
completed the occupation of India sub-continent turned their eyes towards Afghanistan
as they were afraid of Russian influence on Afghanistan and their approached to the
warm water of Arabian Sea. Since then their started a kind of cold war between the
British and Russian. In order to be away from each other and to have no direct link to
each other they declared Afghanistan a buffer zone.
The British empire at that time wanted to install a friendly government in Afghanistan
and for this purpose it had three wars with the Afghanistan by the end of each war they
had occupied the land of Afghanistan as in the first Anglo Afghan war of 1838-40 they
occupied Peshawar and the surrounding areas which used to be the capital of
Afghanistan in the Second Afghan Anglo War of 1878-80 the British were successful in
occupying the Quetta and surrounding areas of Afghanistan declaring it as British
Balochistan and in 1893 divided the Afghanistan in half by marking the Durand line in
the heart of Afghanistan. In this entire episode the British remained successful in getting
the support of so called religious leaders and the war lords to oppose and resist the
patriotic Afghan leaders and to fight for the cause of British Empire. With the end of
Second World War (1939-1945) there emerged two big super powers one headed by
USA and the other by the USSR. Both powers were in cold war rivals. Pakistan and
Afghanistan the two close neighboring Muslim have mixed bilateral relationship which
in large have been unfriendly. Afghanistan was the first country to oppose Pakistan’s
membership in UN in 1947. Pakistan after achieving independence in 1947 tried her best
to develop good relations with Afghanistan over the past colonial problems particularly
the Durand Line, and it adjacent Pashtunistan issue.
The turning phase in relations of both the states came to the fore when there came a coup
led by the (PDPA)in Afghanistan provide an opportunity to both super power to start a
hot war on the soil of Afghanistan.
The soil of Afghanistan became a battlefield for the biggest powers and their companions
94
to show their military and economic strength. The cold war was turned into the hot war
on the soil of Afghanistan. USA provided a huge amount of fund to the Islamists and an
undeclared war (Jihad) was started. The direct involvement of the USA and USSR in the
region let Pakistan, the close neighbor of Afghanistan most affected from the situation.
Pakistan was supposed to play an important role in the conflict.
Afghanistan soon became a Pawn on the chessboard of superpowers rivalry in which
Pakistan became a frontline state whose supportive role was in dire need of the U.S led
Western Powers to make Soviet struck in Afghanistan. The invitation to USSR’s
Army to Afghanistan by Babrak Kormal the then the President of Afghanistan to defend
himself and his government was a pretext to USA to start a tragic and sever war in
Afghanistan. The USA in order to combat the USSR projected the so called religious
leaders by announcing a JIHAD against the USSR. The USA had also taken the
immediate neighbors in confidence and provided a huge amount of money and
ammunitions to the JIHADi group through Pakistan as the country used to be the base
camp.
ROLE OF PAKISTAN
Pakistan didn’t want a confrontation with the regime of the People Democratic Party of
Afghanistan. (PDPA) after it sized power in Kabul. No doubt it disappointed Pakistan
because Daud, realizing that the Soviet embrace had turned into a ‘bear-hug’, had
decided to improve relations with Pakistan, Iran and other Islamic countries. But at that
juncture Pakistan was itself in disarray. The country’s economy was bled white by the
prolonged agitation against ZulfiqarAli.Bhutto following the 1977 election, and Gen. Zia
ul Haq’s military government was unpopular for reneging on his promise to hold election
within 90 days after Bhutto was toppled. Making the best of a bad situation, President
Zia-ul-haq went Kabul to meet President Tarakai in the hope of securing mutual
accommodate.
The government of Tarakai strengthened Afghan relations with the former USSR,
which was alarming for Pakistan. The Soviet-Afghan 20 years “Friend-Ship Treaty” was
concluded in early December 1979 during Tarakai visit to Moscow, bringing the two
sides closer to each other. The change in the political set up in Afghanistan was taken
95
with surprise in Pakistan. The “Detente” achieved with Dauod was no more. The Tarakai
government revived with more tenacity the issue of “Pushtoon and Baluch” rights. The
massive refugee’s exodus from Afghanistan to Pakistan added more bitterness to
Islamabad. Kabul accused Pakistan of helping the government rebels. However, a way of
hope appeared at Havana Non-Aligned summit conference (September 1979) when
President Zia-ul-Haq and President Tarakai met each other. But the government of
Tarakai was toppled and Hafizullah Amin seized the power. He showed his interest to
solve the outstanding issues with Pakistan. He offered to remove his country’s
misunderstanding with Pakistan in friendly negotiations. He renewed invitations to
Pakistani leaders to visit Kabul. It was felt that Pakistan’s concentrated efforts during the
last three decades have brought the two countries near to the goal friendly neighbors
during Amin’s era in Afghanistan.
But Soviet leaders regarded the leadership style and nationalist orientation of Amin’s
Communism as serious obstacles in their efforts to guide and direct the domestic reforms
policies of Afghanistan. But Amin had become totally weak by Oct. 1979 due to inner
fighting in the PDPA government and the question was, ‘who would replace him’; the
Mujahideen or the Soviets. The Mujahideen lacked proper organization, unity and
acceptable leadership and did not present a real alternative to the fast deteriorating Amin
government. This situation compelled the USSR to intervene. When Amin became aware
of Soviet plans of intervention, he made attempts to seek help from Pakistan. He had
been trying since long to revive contacts with Pakistan and eliminate misunderstandings.
Pakistan did agree to help Amin but it was too late. In December 1979, Soviet forces
entered Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan. As a
result, a large majority of population rose up against the intervention of Soviet Union.
The persecution and resistance that followed led the mass migration of men, women and
children to the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.
The Soviet invasion of a defenseless country was not shocking only for Pakistan or this
regions but for international community through out the World. The intervention
provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. The ‘buffer’ was disappeared, and if the
Soviet rule was consolidated in Afghanistan, they could use it as ‘spring board’ for a leap
96
down the Bolan and Khyber passed to fulfill their historical ambition for access to the
warm waters of the Arabian.
China perceived the invasion of Afghanistan towards its enercirclement by a rival
Communist power. Pakistan thus decided a middle course avoiding confrontation by
raising a low-pitched voice of concern and protest. The “Induction of foreign Troops”
was described as a “Serious violation” of norms of peaceful Co-existence and the
principles of the UN Charter1 rather defensively, the statement explained, Pakistan’s
“gravest concern” in the context of its links of Islam, Geography and non-aligned policy
with Afghanistan.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought forth an entirely new
situation not only to Pakistan, but for all the region's countries. The invasion was the
culmination of two and a half years of intra-People Democratic Party conflicts, distrust,
three successive coups and political anarchy. Babrak Karmal took over as the president
Eager not to appear an atheist he began his speeches with name of Allah. But at the same
time the color, form and emblem of the Afghan flag were changed and "the red star", the
symbol of communism, added. Civilians were given a major share in the central
committee of the PDPA. Only 7 out of 36 members were from the army.2 In the presence
of factionalism, corruption, indiscipline and the narrow base of the Marxist Regime, the
Soviet realized that violence would not salvage the situation. They, therefore, attempted
to promote an integrative political strategy, combining restructuring coercion and co-
option, and urged the new regime to go beyond rhetoric and take practical action.
In order to appease the inflamed population the Soviets advised Karmal to backtrack on
the issue of reforms and religion, and project a non-Marxist image. As a consequence he
began stressing that his party's goal was to develop society, not socialism. He induced
non-party technocrats and influential Afghans to join his regime. He announced changes
in the land reform laws. Attempts were made to gain the backing of the ulema. A new
constitution was promised that would respect and adhere to the sacred religion of Islam,
guarantee private ownership and political, economic and social rights of the people. To
give a humane face to his regime a large number of political prisoners was also released.3
Unification, organization and strengthening of the PDPA and the regime, however, were
97
the inherent objectives.
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on the one hand created opportunities for
Pakistan. It could redress its security concerns by neutralizing the previous bitter
experiences with Afghanistan. But on the other it created challenges: to tactically face
and engage an ideologically hostile super power standing right on its doorstep. This was
a testing time for Pakistan to demonstrate and increase its strategic salience and
indispensability at the height of the cold war, as well as not let any other party directly
intervene and exploit the situation for its own advantage. According to Mr. Abdul Sattar,
the ex Foreign Minister, “the Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm
in Pakistan. Suddenly the status of buffer disappeared and if the Soviet rulers
consolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as spring board to reach the
warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could neither afford to acquiesce in the Soviet
intervention,, nor it could it afford a confrontation with a super power. Islamabad
therefore decided on the middle course, avoiding confrontation but raising a low pitched
voice concern and protest.4
Policy Options for Pakistan
Pakistan had three immediate options in December 1979 to deal with the Afghan issue
: 1. It could acquiesce and accept the fait accompli.
2 It could, if it was a big power like India, provide all-out military support to the
freedom fighters and achieve its objective of eliminating an adversary by force of arms.
3 It could bring political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union along with covert
assistance to the Mujahideen. 5
Considering the first option, Pakistan would never have been comfortable with Russian
soldiers deployed along the Pak-Afghan border; even if it was assured that they would
not attack Pakistan. Indirectly it could still become a target country of the KGB, which
could instigate an insurgency within Pakistan easily by using dissident elements and
exiled politicians to raise ethnic issues and territorial connotations. With the Indo-Soviet
treaty of 1971 in its hand India could use Soviet controlled Afghanistan to stir up trouble
on Pakistan's western borders thereby forcing it to weaken its eastern frontier defenses.
Regarding the option of military involvement Pakistan and certain limitations. These
98
included
1 Soviet troop was well within Afghanistan and military confrontation could have
threatened the security of Pakistan.
2 There was no guarantee of security/protection from big powers like USA or China.
3 Pakistan itself was dependent on foreign assistance to be able to sustain even a low
intensity conflict for a long period.
4 Internal disunity meant that a military adventure might not have had the support of the
entire Pakistani nation.
The Front line State Policy and the US Assistance
The only viable option left, which was adopted, was to use all possible diplomatic
pressure to build up world opinion against the soviet union for having violated the
principles of the UN charter, and thereby force it to leave Afghanistan. At the same time
Pakistan would provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees and the freedom
fighters.6
The following can be considered as the main reasons for Pakistan's decision to become
immediately involved in the issue.
A Defend the integrity of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.
B Mitigate the severity of the soviet military and political thread to Pakistan.
C Enhance access to the political, military and economic benefits offered by alliance
with the west. 7
The other determinants of this policy were Islamic brotherhood neighborhood and
humanitarian concern, the desire to crush Pushtoon nationalism, modernize its own army
with western assistance, divert public opinion from domestic problems and
ensure/prolong at the Zia regime. Pakistan played a critical role by not only
mobilizing international support but also in equipping and training its own forces.
Givens the complex economic, political and security problems confronted by Pakistan
this role was not an ordinary foreign policy response to a crisis in the region8 According
99
to Gen. Kamal Matinuddin, the positive aspect of the Soviet invasion was the renewed
interest of the US in befriending Pakistan. Pakistan was the only country which could
serve the US interests. Gen. Zia was well aware of the situation when the told the
Americans in March 1980 that " you take Pakistan out of this region and you will find
that you have not one inch of soil where American can have influence". He made use of
the new situation on his border to strengthen his armed forces and in the process to
ensure his own survival. Pakistan therefore once again became ready to act as a pawn in
the supper power rivalry in the south Asian region, albeit for its own national interest
.The American forgot their previous allegation of human rights volitions Pakistan and
put the non-proliferation issue on the back burner. Their earlier title towards the largest
democracy in the world, India, was now balanced by giving equal importance to
Pakistan security. The US arms embargo was lifted. The 1959 Karachi Agreement was
reaffirmed binding the US to come to Pakistan's aid if the USSR moved further
southwards. A debt of 85.1 billion was also rescheduled. Considering Pakistan's
precarious situation since Soviet invasion in Afghanistan China also declared its full
support for Pakistan. So too did Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some other Muslim countries.
UN relief agencies and several NGOs began relief operations for the Afghan refugees to
lessen Pakistan's burden9
In 1982 President Regan believed that President Carter was wrong in not giving full
support to Pakistan and signaled his desire to make amends a $ 3.2 billion aid to
Pakistan was provided for five years (1982-86). Zia got what he want-F-16s from the
USA, Kalashnikovs from Egypt, and hand-held surface-to-air missiles from China.
Blowpipes from the UK, and money from Saudi.10
Under the leadership of Gen.Akhtar Abdul Rehman support for the Jihad was
gradually stepped up. By the mid 80s tens of thousands of arms and ammunition were
being distributed by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Afghan Mujahideen via
their party warehouses. It is no secret that tens of thousands of Afghan guerrillas with
their commanders came to Pakistan for training. From 1980 until 1987 Pakistan Army
teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan to advise and assist the Mujahideen in their
operations. All resistance commanders in inside Afghanistan were required to join one
100
of the seven Peshawar-based parties (Hizbs) as it was only through these parties that
arms were distributed. There was no arms supply to individuals. Among the seven
recognized parties, some were close to the Pakistani establishment than others. About 70
percent of the logistical support was given to the fundamentalist parties but no single
party got more than 20 percent.
The Saudis matched every US dollar given to the CIA's arms buying fund with their
own. In total hundreds of millions of dollars were given by Saudi Arabia. Tarki -al-
Faisal (the then official representative of the Saudi Government for Afghan Jihad) paid
secret visits to Pakistan to accelerate the Afghan resistance. It was generous Saudi
assistance that kept the Afghan warlords in field. 11
The role of the ISI increased between 1983-86, leading to marked improvement in the
performance of the Afghan resistance. The ISI was operating the supply line, which was
moving large quantities of arms and ammunition to the resistance groups. The most
significant role the ISI played was in the establishment of the seven-party alliance in
Peshawar in 1984. This considerably reduced the disunity and chaos in the guerrilla
operations inside Afghanistan.
Many crities of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy claim that the CIA was in control of the
strategic aspect of Islamabad's foreign policy. This is a very simplistic view. In fact it
was the ISI which was in the forefront while the CIA usually played the role of a junior
partner. The CIA's involvement did not assume prominence until 1984 when its Director
visited Pakistan and after meeting the DG ISI, doubled the military budget for the
Afghan war in 1985-86. The CIA and US government officials were constantly trying to
take control of the war and insisted on being involved in strategic planning and decision
making. But the ISI continued to be in control of the operation. The CIA usually relied
on the ISI and based its information on ISI intelligence units; it also allowed ISI to play
a big role in policy formulation12
Gen Zia-ul-Haq reconstituted the Afghan Cell in 1978. Its initial purpose was to collect
current information and keep the government updated and to help it formulate
101
policies about Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion the scope of the Cell was
magnified and all the top civil and military personnel were included: VCOAS, the
Foreign Minister, the MLAs of NWFP and Balochistan. Secretaries SAFRON,
Information, Finance and Interior, Director Ml and DG ISI. There were two power
structures (the formal and the real) in operation during the Zia era. The formal power
structure included the civil bureaucracy and the Cabinet while the real power structure
was limited to key Lt. Generals including governors, Corps Commanders, DG ISI and
VCOAS. The only civilian members were the finance Minister and later the President
(Ghulam Ishaq Khan) and the Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. During Prime
Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo's government, there was no change in the Foreign
policy of Pakistan. The martial law regime's policy was pursued and the same decision-
makers continued to call the shots on the Afghan crisis.
PAKISTAN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
At the same time Pakistan continued its diplomatic efforts to get the conflict resolved.
It called upon the UN, SC, to condemn the Soviet invasion but the resolution was vetoed
by the USSR. This resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in January
1980 by 104 votes. Pakistan realized that the world community was overwhelmingly
against the Soviet invasion. From then on in became a test of Pakistan's informational
credibility to keep the number of votes at each session. The number of vote
rose to 123 in 1987.13 Mr. Agha Shahi requested the UN Secretary General to appoint
his special representative as mediator. Pakistan proposed that Iran should be involved in
the negotiations and Iran in turn insisted that unless the Mujahideen were included it
would not participate. Finally the format of the talks was evolved and Mr. Kurt
Waldheim appointed Mr. Perez de Cuellar as the special representative to act as a
mediator between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad refused to recognize the post-
invasion Afghan regime and did not want to negotiate directly since that would imply
recognition and confer legitimacy on it. The basis of negotiations was the four principles
drawn up by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in May 1980. These were:
1 Preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political Independence and non-
alleged character of Afghanistan.
102
2 The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and
choose freely their own political, economic and social system.
3. Immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
4 Creation of the necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return to their
homes in honor and safety.14
ROLE OF NON ALIGNED MOVMENT (NAM)
In the Non Aligned Movement's meeting in New Delhi on 9-13 February 1981,
reiterated the points included in the UN resolution. The Indian and some pro-Soviet
countries tried to play down the Afghan crisis during this meeting while, Pakistan and its
friends succeeded in making the NAM express grave concern for the continuing foreign
armed intervention in Afghanistan. Agha Shahi insisted on the insertion of a call for the
withdrawal of Soviet forces in the text of this final declaration of the conference.
Countries out of the 96 present supported Pakistan. 15
Role of organization of Islamic countries (O.I.C)
The first extraordinary session of foreign minister of organization of Islamic countries
meeting was held in Islamabad soon after one month of the invasion on 22 May 1980.
Mr. Habib Chatty, the Secretary General of the organization urged all members to up to
an end to the soviet intervention. The conference condemned the invasion on the basis of
following principles. First, in pursuance of the principles and objectives of the
organization of the Islamic conference emphasizing the common objectives and destiny
of the people of the Islamic nation. Second, recalling, the particular the basic principles
of the Non Aligned Movement of which Afghanistan is a founding member. Few
months later in May 1980. The Levant Islamic conference of foreign ministers meeting
in Islamabad was held. The meeting unanimously expressed its conviction for solidarity
with Afghan nation attacked by a foreign aggressor. The statement stated that:
termination of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and respect for the political
independence, sovereignty and non-aligned status of
103
Afghanistan and for the inalienable nation right of the Afghan people to choose their
own political and social economic system and form of government without outside
interference of coercion. Are imperative for bringing about Conditions of peace and
stability in the region and for defusing current international tension .The conference
resolutions seriously condemned the sufferings of the Afghan people and at the
continuing influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran. Reaffirmed the
determination of the Islamic states to pursue a policy of non-alignment and to oppose
superpower interference in the affairs of Islamic countries. The conference which
expressed deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan urged
all the independent nation-states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of Afghanistan as well as the non - aligned status of that country
and its Islamic identity.
A wide opposition was shown to the invasion from Islamic countries. Among the
Islamic nations only south Yemen condoned the soviet action describing it a
countermove to CIA supported counterrevolution in Afghanistan, every Islamic country
condemned the aggression. The Saudi Arabia became the first country which on January
6, 1980 announced to boycott the Olympic Games. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince
Saud al Faisal, said on January 10 in a statement in the talks that the international
community had an obligation to respond to the soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but
the states of the region did not want foreign troops in the area, no matter what are the
reasons. 16 Egypt reacted to the situation by from over 50 persons to only seven, and a
handout issued by the foreign ministry said that severance of relations with Moscow
would-be considered in near future. It’s asked a number of soviet experts to leave the
country. The public reaction to invasion was won in Turkey where the Soviet consulate
in Istanbul was attacked on January 19 by a group of youth who protested against the
invasion. A number of people were killed by Turkish grads. A Similar incident took
place in Sudan after 5,000 students marched on the Soviet embassy in Khartoum.
ROLE OF UNITED NATION
As the Security Council resolution was passed on January 5, 1980 condemning
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the Soviet military intervention. More than 50 the UN the Security Council to Examine
the situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for peace and international security, It
included ten Islamic countries, Bahrain, Bangle, Dash, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, The Security council met on January
5 and after two days of debate voted on January 7 to adapt a resolution which was
sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia, Deeply
deplored the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of soviet forces, Following a debate in which Afghanistan and
Vietnam expressed support for the Soviet position. The resolution was approved by 13
Security Council members. They included four of the permanent members of the Security
Council: United States, France, China, and United Kingdom. Although, the resolution
was vetoed by the Soviet Union, nonetheless, it tabled a discussion against the invasion.17
The Resolution was followed by another resolution in the Security Council. The
Resolution was approved by 12 votes to two of Soviet Union and East Germany, Zambia
being absent. The resolution had demanded the moving of Afghanistan question in the
General Assembly.18 The Resolution 462 Calling for an emergency session of the
General Assembly, concerned at the aggressive actions taken in Afghanistan, The
resolution was mindful of the purpose and principles of the Charter and of the
responsibility of the general Assembly under the relevant provisions of the charter and of
Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of November 3, 1950 which focuses on the four major
principles for the promotion of world peace against such a naked aggression resulted in
Afghanistan.
In this session the Security Council unanimously issued this statement.
1 Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every state is a fundamental principle of the charter o the United
Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and
purposes,
2 Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is
inconsistent with that principle,
105
3 Appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any
interference in his internal affairs of threat country,
4 Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops
from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of
government and choose their economic political and social systems free from outside.
5 Intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.
Urges all parity concerned to assist in bringing about speedily and in accordance with
the purpose and principles of the charter. Conditions necessary for the voluntary return
of the Afghan refugees to their homes,
6 Appeals to all states and National and international organization to extend
humanitarian replied assistance with view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan
refugees in co-ordination with the United Nations High commissioner for Refugee,
7 Requests the Secretary General to keep member states and the Security Council
promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the
present resolution,
8 Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in
the implementation of the present resolution.19
During the debate, Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi, he Afghan deputy permanent representative
to the UN resigned in protest against the Soviet invasion by saying, the violation of the
sovereignty and independence of my country by our close neighbor, the soviet Union
leaves me with the only choice of doing it 20
THE GENEVACCORDS.
After nearly six years of indirect negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan an
106
agreement was signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988, for the settlement of the situation
relating to Afghanistan under the following points.
1 Unconditional withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan.
2 International guarantees by the USA and USSR.
3 Non interference and non intervention in each other, of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 21
4 Return of Afghan. Refugees to their home
5 The accords also provided for the monitoring of the implementation of the agreement
by the United Nation.
The Agreement (Which came in to force on 15 May, 1988) were signed by Mr. Abdul
Wakil, the Afghan foreign minister and Mr. Zain Noorani the Pakistan Minister of state
for foreign affairs, signing the documents as guarantors were Mr.-Georg Shultz the US
secretary of state, and Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign Minster
THE FIRST ROUND:-The first round of the Geneva Talks was held during June 16-24,
1982, where an understanding was reached on the scope and content of a comprehensive
settlement, interrelationships between withdrawal and non-interference and non-
intervention, return of refugees and international guarantees.
SECOND ROUND The second round was held during April 11-22 and June 12-24,
1983 where it was acknowledged that the final settlement would be an integrated package
and would only, be completed when all four elements had agreed upon it. The final
settlement was to include the consultation of refugees and endorsement of the
international guarantors was also to be obtained. The third round was held during August
24-31, 1984 where the
107
format changed from indirect to proximity talks, The Agenda underwent a change. Kabul
had disapproved of the settlement which was being negotiated as a single document,
Pakistan agreed and the four separate instruments, The Provisions concerning non-
intervention and non-interference were given the form of a bilateral agreement. 22
The fourth, fifth and sixth round were held during June 22-25, August 27-30 and
December 16-19, 1985, In the fourth round the two instrument relating to non-
intervention / non-interference and return of the refugees were finalized. The instrument
of international guarantees was prepared and sent to the USSR and the US. Then the
problem of format was raised by Kabul which insisted on direct talks in order to discuss
the fourth and final instrument of withdrawal and the interrelationship between the
instruments. In the fifth round indirect talks were resumed and both the US and USSR
agreed to act as guarantors. The time-table for withdrawal to be given by Kabul was held
up because it insisted on direct talks; the sixth round was inconclusive due to the
deadlock cover the change in format.
The seventh round of talks continued for two years and was held during May 05-23 and
July 31- August 8, 1986 and Feb. 25- March 9 and September, 7-10, 1987. All these four
sets of talk were related to the issue of withdrawal and a definite time-table to be given
by Moscow and Kabul. In the first set Kabul resumed the indirect format but there was
disagreement over the time-table (Kabul proposed four years which Pakistan put forth
four months). In the third set the differences over time-table were reduced Kabul offered
18 months and Pakistan Proposed 7 Months. In the fourth set the time-table gap was
reduced Kabul Proposed 16 months and Pakistan offered 8 month.23
The year 1988 witnessed many stops and starts as each side wanted more concessions
from the other mostly the US and Pakistan pressing the USSR and Kabul for a hard
bargain. Pakistan had maintained that the four negotiated instruments including that on
withdrawal should be signed even if the agreement of an interim government remained
unsettled. It was the Soviet Union which had linked withdrawal to an afghan consensus
on the transitional government, Moscow dropped its insistence on an interim government
and de-linked the withdrawal from it while Pakistan reversed its position and
108
insisted on a nexus. Moscow came forth with another concession that it would withdraw
its forces within 10 Months of the date of the signing of the Geneva Accords, and that the
withdrawal would be front-end loaded i.e. greater portion of forces to be removed in the
first phase24
The last and final round to talks was held on March 2, 1988 where a nine month time-
table was agreed on and the withdrawal was to be front-end loaded (50% troops were to
be pulled out by August 15th 1988). The negotiations were stymied? By Pakistan
insistence on an interim regime and the US demand of symmetrical cessation of arms
supplies by the US and the USSR to their respective Afghan allies. By April, the US and
the USSR had agreed to positive symmetry in which the US and the USSR retained the
right to arm their respective allies as long as the other side continued to do so. Finally on
April 14th, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed. Pakistan and Kabul signed there
instruments non-intervention / non-interference, return of refugees, withdrawal of troops
and the US and USSR signed one instrument as international guarantors. This was the
only time that Pakistani delegates met face-to-face with their Afghan counterparts at
Geneva. Islamabad claimed that this fulfilled the Afghan demand for direct negotiations
which had been raised by Kabul since the fourth round of Geneva Talks. 25 The Accords
left unresolved difference about the nature of a future Afghanistan Government.
The Geneva Accords have aroused considerable controversy and there were an equal
number of proponents and opponents claiming that it was a victory and a sellout.
According to W.Harrsion who represents the proponents of the Accords, says that the
agreement to withdraw resulted from a combination of military pressure and seven years
of farseeing and determined UN diplomacy, the Geneva Accords offered a face-saving
escape to the USSR from the growing costs of a (Politic0-military) dead-lock.26. On the
other hand the opponents of the Accords were of the view that the accords were rushed to
completion and signed in a few-weeks, after six years of glacial progress and stalemate.
The Afghan refugees who had been excluded from the negotiations were against the
Geneva process, right from their onset in 1982.
109
MAJOR MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS.
The Major Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan, later on were joined under a
seven-party alliance based in Peshawar and Quetta, of them in Peshawar. They were (1)
Hizb-e-Islami of Hikmatyar, (2) Hizb-e-Islami of Younis, (3) Jamiat-e-Islami of Rabbani,
(4) Ittehad-e-Islami of Sayyaf, (5) Harakat-e-Inqilabi of Nabi, (6) Maha-e-Milli by
Gilani, and (7) Jabha-e-Milli by Mojadded. Both of groups of Hizb-e-Islami, and Ittehad-
e-Islami were fundamentalists. The remaining three, Harakat-e-Inqilabi, Mahaze-e-Milli,
and Jabha-e-Milli were moderates.
1 HIZB-E-ISLAMI (HIKMATYAR)
It was led by Gulbadin Kikmatyar. The Hizb was a strongest resistance group and
was traditionally rooted in Pashto speaking provinces of Paktia, Konarha, Badakhshan,
Nangarhar, and Baghlan. The major areas where this organization was operated were in
Kabul, Bamiyan, Konduz, Balkh, Paktika, Farah, Helmand, Qandahar, and Uruzgan.
Gulbadin Hikmatyar, a Pashto speaking karoot from the province of Kunduz, had been
active in Kabul politics as a student leader of Kabul University, and formed an Islamic
movement called the Muslim Youth Organization. In 1972 he was alleged of murdering a
student of which he was not directly accountable he was arrested and was released in
1973. After release he started opposing president Daoud’s policies more fiercely. Before
he could be purged by the Dauod Government for his anti-government policies he fled to
Pakistan. He lived in Pakistan from 1973 to 1975. He established contacts with Jamat-e-
Islami in Pakistan during the period. The fall of Daoud in 1978, and the resistance
movement to the PDPA regime in aftermath provide him ideal opportunity for
establishing his leadership. He exploited the situation in his favor amongst Pashto
speaking population; a larger number of them were living as refugee in Pakistan. He
recruited fighters for this Hizb-e-Islami from these people. Hikmatyar is a fundamentalist
whose largest support came from Saudi Arabia and western world. He is the most rigid
leader of all fundamentalists, and believed in the formation of a pure Islamic government
without any coalition with any party with leftist orientation. He opposed grant of vote for
any one with the PDPA affiliation in any such planning for the future settlement of
110
Afghanistan where elections were held and refused to treat the Afghan Shies as a
separate political entity.27 The Hikmatyar’s Hizb found support from a strong religious
party Jamat Islami of Pakistan after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar
while seeing all against the Soviet Union, showed least inclination towards the United
States and blamed the United States for not fully cooperative with the Islamist causes.
The United States because of his attitude was less than willing to support his party for a
major role in events after the Soviet withdrawal. The biggest disappointment for the
American Government was Hikmatyar’s refusal to see president Regain during his visit
to America
2 HIZB-E-ISLAMI (KHALIS GROUP)
The Hizb-e-Islami was indeed an offspring of Hizb-e-Islami under Hikmatyar.
Because of the rigid attitude of Hikmatyar and his intolerance to other parties, from the
very beginning of resistance, Maulvi Yunis decided to form his own group instead.
Maulvi Yunis is himself a fundamentalist, and was not prepared to compromise on the
two basic objectives of the Islamic struggle. All destruction of PDPA, and the
establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. Under the
context of his ideology, his differences with Hikmatyar were less ideological and more
conceptual about how to achieve an Islamic state. Also, they differed on strategic
policies they had adapted from struggle against the Soviet Policies. Maulvi Yunis is a
Pashtoon from Qazian village in the province of Nangarhar He remained a student of a
religious institution in Peshawar in 1939. He opposed the rule of Zahir Shah and Dauod
in Afghanistan. Because of purges against his group president Dauod forces, he was
forced to seek asylum in Pakistan until 1978. The Saur revolution, like many other,
provided him an opportunity to establish his leadership in exile. Yonis Khalis was
appointed as interior Minister in the Afghan Interim Government under Mojadde. Hizb-
e-Islami was / is mainly composed of Pashto speaking people from eastern and
northeastern Afghanistan. The Majority of those who joined the organization were those
who resisted against the PDPA regime, and their relatives had taken refugee in Pakistan.
Hizb-e-Islami was considered the most effective resistant group from the very beginning
because those who joined it were traditionally trained in warfare. The Hizb was stronger
111
in important cities such as Kabul, Qandahar, and Jalalabad. Later on, because of specific
training which the resistance groups received at the hands of inter Services intelligence
(ISI) and Pakistan armed forces made them more forceful in attacks against their targets.
3 JAMIAT-ISLAM
The Jamiat was active in waging a guerrilla was against the Kabul regime even before
the Saur revolution. The party was founded n 1967. In 1974, it carried a number of
operations in Panjsher valley against the government. The party leader Burhanuddin
Rabbani is a Tajik. Born in Raizabad of Badakshan province, he received his early
education in a religious institution. He graduated from college of Theology at the Kabul
University. He studied at Al Azhar and worked on his doctoral thesis on the life of
Afghan mystic Abdul Rehman Jami he worked as a lecturer in the college of Theology
where his lecturers attracted adherents to his organization. He is a strong advocate of the
Islamic principle the politics and religion are strongly mixed. He was elected the party
leader in 1972. He opposed the policies of Dauod as dictatorial and anti-Islamic.
Because of his continual opposition to Dauod his party came under purges by the
government. He fled to Pakistan and lived in exile for a number of years. He is a
fundamentalist, but less rigid than others. Because of his less orthodox views, his
comparatively less rigid attitude and a more humane approach to the members of his
group he was able to attract a large number of defectors from other parties. 29
Rabbani emerged as an important leader soon after the Saur Revolution. He
reactivated his party offices, which had already existed, in Iran and Pakistan a Rabbani
and Hikmatyar had closer relationship and both strong individual following for
“Akhwanul Muslimeen” His differences with Hikmatyar developed during the Dauod
period over the strategy and intensity of resistance to his government.
4 ITTEHAD-E-ISLAMI
The party was conservative Islamic party led by Abdu Rib Resool Soyaf is a piston
leader from Panhuman near Kabul. He, like Rabbani also studied at Theology Institute
of Kabul University in 1967, and Later on taught there for two years. He
112
received his Master’s in “Ilm-ul-Hadis” (sayings and traditions of Holy prophet PBUH)
from Egypt. He for his anti-government activities was arrested by president Dauod in
1973 spending six years in prison until 1979, including one year under the PDPA
regime. After he was released from position he left for Pakistan for only. It was there he
organized his party with the support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
supported Sayyaf in large. Unlike the first three resistant groups his party us not very
well organized.30 His political party had not showed any considerable guerrilla resistance
to Soviet forces although Sayyaf was believed to have been supported by 20.000
fighters. He is a fundamentalist and believed in struggle against a unislamic government
in Afghanistan of PDPA. He was elected as Prime Minister in the Interim
government in 1989. His party was militarily stronger in Zabul, Baghlan, and Lowgar
provinces. The famous character of Afghan resistance, Mulla Salam Khan, Known as
Mulla Rockety, belonged to his party.
5 MAHAZ-E-MILLI I ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN
The party was strongest in Paktia, Ghazni, and heart with around 20,000 men under the
command of Amin wardak. The party leader, Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani was a descendant
of a well known religious family of Afghanistan, he had served as an adviser to king
Zahir shah. His relationships with the president Dauod were always marked with
differences. Pir Gailani was very rich persons because of his wide - spread business
around the world; His is a graduate of Kabul University Theology institute in 1964. Pir
Gailani Supported the Saur revolution in the beginning, but soon because of its rapid
reform policies, Dis-alignment with the PDPA regime, and life Kabul for Pakistan. He
organized a resistance movement from outside by establishing a National Islamic Front
with its headquarters in Peshawar. National Islamic front was not a very successful
military alliance, and it received very little military and financial help from the west, no
matter its leader Pir Gailani widely traveled in the west and had face to face contacts
with many heads of governments.
113
6 HARAKAT-E-INQILABI
It, like the National Islamic Front, is a moderate party with its head office in Peshawar.
The party was actually funded in Quetta in 1978 by Maulvi Mohammed Nabi
Mohammedi. He was a pashtoon from Logar Province near Kabul. He was a theologian
and had early education in religious madrasa; however he denied exclusion of traditional
ideas from modern. He established his “madrasa” (academy) in Helmand in 1973 to
propagate Islam based on combination of conservative and modern ideas. He enjoyed
popularity both among traditional and educated people, and was elected to Afghan
parliament in 1969 under the King Zahir Shah. Maulvi Nabi was also purged by Dauod
forces because of his opposition to his government. He was arrested in 1973 but was
released after few moths for his modern ideas. He fled to Pakistan soon after Saur
revolution when the PDPA government started a crack down on clergy. The party was
strong in Heart, Ghazni and Kabul provinces. The party had an approximately of 20,000
fighting force which continued a guerrilla warfare under their commanders in Quetta and
Peshawar in Pakistan. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Maulvi Nabi
forwarded the idea of a common cooperation among resistance groups to oust
Najibullah, but did not insist on a military conflict. He has opposed to conflicts among
resistance groups after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.
7 JABHA-E-Nejat MILLI AFGHANISTAN
The party was the brainchild of Sibghatullah Mojeddidi, an Afghan leader who
was jailed in 1953 by President Dauod for taking an active part in political activities
against his government. Born in 1926 in Kabul, Mojeddidi completed his religious
education from Al Azhar in Cario. He was a professor of political science at the Kabul
University. Upon his release from prison, he went to Beirut and then to Saudi Arabia
where he served in the Rabeta-e-Islami. From there he flew to Denmark where he
opened an Islamic Center. He founded the party eight months after the Saur revolution in
December 1978.
The Jabha-e-Milli Afghanistan was not very organized and regular in guerrilla
114
fighting; nonetheless, it considerable commands around Qandahar and the northern
provinces of Farah and Baghian Provinces. Estimate strength of the party was not more
than 20,000.
Mojeddidi is considered to be independent of other fundamentalist in an establishment in
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces and collapse of the PDPA regime. He
was against the formation of seven different Afghan poetical parties in Peshawar, and
advocated one party instead. He showed differences with President Zia-ul-Haq and his
lieutenants involved in the Afghan war.
IRAN BASED PARTIES
A number of resistant groups, in all nine, were based in Iran. These included
(1) Shura-e-Ittefaq-Islami, (2) Dawat-e-eIttehad-Islami: (3) Sazman Nayroye-Islami (4)
Nuzhat-e-Islami, (5) Harakat-e-Islami: Javed: (6) Hizb-Ullah, and jabbha-e-Muttah (7)
Muttahid-e-Islami. The most important among them who showed fighting spirit to Soviet
forces during the resistance were Shura, Saman-e-Nasr, and Harkat Islami. They received
support from Shia Population in the central part of Afghanistan, known as Hazarajat. The
resistance of Mujahideen to the revolution was highly supported and patronized from the
beginning. As a part of the great game to be revisited, a huge military and financial aid
from the west soon assured for their for its support after they knew Zia was supporting
the resistance a part of Pakistan’s forward defense against the Soviets 31 Zia in return
needed the US support for legitimizing his own rule against a popular support by hanging
the ex-Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, banning Political parties, and putting a large number
of political dissidents into prisons. The major support for the resistance groups was
channelized through Pakistan by the ISI. A special bureau was established in the ISI to
control and monitor the overall activities of Mujahideen. The support for them started
Soon after the Soviet invasion, nonetheless it was I 1984 when they were put into a seven
party Alliance based in Pakistan. It was through the joint decision of president Zia-ul-Haq
and his trusted general Akhtar Abdur Rehman General Akhtar was personally chosen by
the president soon after the Afghan resistance began in 1979 to head the organization as
its Director General. It was a need of time that an alliance of the resistance groups is
115
formed. The decision was important in many ways for the successful monitoring and
controlling the operations of Mujahideen. First, the number of Mujahideen leader existed
after huge funds and arms poured into their hands number of incidents of corruption was
reported to the ISI where leaders and officers were involved in the System could not have
run successfully with the multiplicity of small groups where opportunities for corruption
for each were many. Third, there were growing rivalries among the Mujahideen leaders
which could undermine the support and unities among them for each were many. Third,
there were growing rivalries among the Mujahideen leaders which could undermine the
support and unity among themselves for holy struggle. And fourth, without bringing them
into an alliance, the role of ISI was less effective in supervising and monitoring their
activities regarding military, logistic and tactical operations. 32 The task of brining them
together was not easy. Because of the growing differences the Mujahideen had showed to
each other, it was necessary to unite them together under an alliance. The task of brining
the, together was Not easy. Each Mujahideen group had reservations about joining an
alliance. The fundamentalists. A number of leaders supporting their cause, such as prince
Turkie, the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence services, which backed full support to
the Mujahideen, struggle were called / as head to settle the differences among them for a
united cause. 33 Before the efforts failed to bear a fruitful result, President Zia-ul-Haq
interfered by using his directive that they al must unite under the alliance. To him, a party
falling to join the alliance will not be provided any military and the financial aid. The
policy worked because of the affect no party could have survived without the protection
and help they enjoyed from Pakistan to carry its activities successfully.
Each resistance group in the alliance was headed by its leader, had a number of
Mujahideen commanders who commanded in the field. The field commanders were the
backbone of the movement. They received regular instructions from their leader, most of
them came from the ISI Afghan bureau military committee specifically designed to
monitor and guide the guerrilla activities. The money and arms to the guerrilla fighters
reached through the commanders, actually provided by their leaders and ISI. 34 The
Success of the Mujahideen movement against the Soviet forces depended on the quality
and quantity of arms, and the training and tactics to be used more effectively. They
116
Mujahideen were provided training and Tactics Afghan bureau wing of the ISI. The
army men, from a rank of non-junior commissioned officer to an officer, were posted
from all branches, particularly from infantry, to the bureau for training and tactics
purpose to Mujahideen in two of the camps established inside Pakistan for the purpose.
The process of training t the Mujahideen accelerated as the war inside Afghanistan
intensified. The number of trainees could exceed to 1,000 a week few years after the
invasion. The number of training camps had reached seven, five in Peshawar and two in
Quetta. By the time Soviet Withdrew from Afghanistan. 35 The first stock of the weapon,
supplied in huge quantity to Mujahideen, was supplied through Pakistan from the US.
They were actually taken from Egypt, supplied to them by he USSR during the heyday of
the friendship between the two countries under Nassar later on, a larger quantity of the
weapon was imported from China. Similarly, al large quantity of “Kalakov” a semi-
automatic weapon was available to Mujahideen.
117
REFERENCES
1. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy, Progressive Publisher, Lahore,
1988. pp. 6-10.
2. Kamal Maitiuddin. Power Struggle in Hindu Kush (1978-1991, Wajidalis Lahore,
1991, p.18.
3. President Zia in NCB-TV "Face the Nation" Interview with Walter Cronkite.
Documents-ed. Arif, 18 May 1980. p.394.
4. Kessing’s contemporary Archives, volume 32-1980. P. 51. .
5. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, War without Winners, Oxford University press, 1994.pp.140141
6. Abdus Sattar, Afghanistan; Past, Presentand Future. From jihad to civil War. The
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1997, pp.462-63Z
7. Kamal, op.cit. p121. 8 ibid,
8. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan. P.88.
9. Dr.Fazal Rahim Marwat, ‘’Pakistan s Strategic Role in the Afghan Crisis’’, in journal
of Pakistan Study Center, University of peshwer.Vol.Spring autumn 1993, No27-28,
p.37.
10. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, op.cit. p.236.
11. Kamal, op.cit. pp.120-1. , .
12. Abdul Stattar, op.cit. Pp.415-17
13. Marwat, op.cit. 37
14. Ibid.
118
15. Ibid...
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Kamal, op.cit. p.192
19. Marwat, op.cit. p.47
20. Kamal op.cit. Pp207-8.
21. Kamalop.cit.pp215-16...
22. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, op.cit. Pp.119-21.
23. Hyman, Afghanistan Under soviet Domination, 1964-81, Macmillan Press Ltd,
London. P. 101.
24. Guardian, 31March, 1979.
25. Urban, pp.31-32.
26. Amstutz, p.46.
27. Roy, A.Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, p.20.
28. New yorkTimes, 13March, 1990.
29. Amstutz, p.
30. Mohammed Yousif and Mark Adkin, the Dear Trap Afghanistan Untold Story,
Lahore Jung Publisher 5th Edition, 1983, P.37 .
31. Kamal Maitiuddin. Power Struggle in Hindu Kush (1978-1991, Wajidalis Lahore,
1991,p.18.
119
32. Ibid.
33. Guardian,31March,1979.New Times,Vol.17,No,80,April,1980,p.23.
34. New yorkTimes, 15March, 1991.
35. Ibid.
Chapter. V
The withdrawal of soviet troops
From Afghanistan: Pakistan contribution
in peace accords
120
The completion of the Soviet withdrawal was not a new dran for the Afghan people.
The Soviet withdrawal was the first step of implementation of the Geneva Accord. This
resided the hope that the other three instruments of the policy; enhancement of security
return of the Afghan refugees; and formulation of a friendly Afghan government would
also be achieved once the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its troops.
The Afghan Mujahideen had declared in Jan. 1989 that the moment the last Soviet left
Afghanistan, it would be a matter of weeks to topple the PDPA regime and to fulfill their
cherished dream of offering prayers in Kabul. But these expectations were not easy to be
achieved. During this period, it had become very clear that no single group could gain
outright victory in Afghanistan. If the regime of Najibullah was too weak to eliminate the
Mujahideen, the collective forces of the Mujahideen too were not capable of ousting
Najib’s government.
When the stigma of Soviet intervention was removed, Najibullah took initiative to
promote national reconciliation. His efforts began to earn credibility. He demonstrated
flexibility and struck deals with some Tribal chiefs and certain internal commanders. He
also showed some inclination to change the basic character of his regime and his party. 1
He changed the name of the country back to republic Afghanistan, changed the name of
the party (PDPA) to the Witan (Homeland) Party. For the first time in Afghanistan, he
declared Islam as a state religion. By renouncing Marxism he abolished single party rule
and opted for Pluralism and market economy. 2
Najibullah made an effective control over the major cities and access to the main roads.
To counter the Mujahideen onslaughts, he delegated more power to the local
commanders. He also established local militia, the largest and most important among
them was an Uzbek Juzjani, led by Rashid Dostum. This militia was guarding the road,
linking Afghanistan with Soviet Union in the Northern part of Afghanistan. The KGB
(Intelligence Agency of Soviet Union) has trained the Juzjani militia in the guerilla
warfare in the tough terrain of the Siberia. 3 Local commander Ghulam Muhammad laid
the foundation of this militia in his quest to take revenge from the Mujahideen for the
massacre of his family during the Jihad days. While the USSR was employing various
tactics to prop up the dwindling Kabul regime, the ‘Western Powers’ were losing interest
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in Afghanistan. The most glaring example was the fall in the supply of Stinger Missiles
to the Mujahideen, which undermined the operations against the urban centers.
Many quarters believed that the fall of Kabul to the Mujahideen would result in utter
chaos in the absence of a well-organized Mujahideen Council or Shoora capable of
administering the affairs of the country. 4 So the Mujahideen leaders in active
consultations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia decided to evolve a mechanism of
government through a Shoora or Council. The Iran based Shia Mujahideen groups
boycotted the proceedings as their demands for 100 out of 519 Shoora seats were rejected
by the Peshawar based Mujahideen Parties who were prepared to give only 70 seats to
them. Each of the seven parties of the Peshawar based Mujahideen were given 60 seats
each. The offices were divided among them according to the votes; they could secure
from the Shoora. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi emerged with the highest votes, followed by
Sayyaf Mohammadi, Hekmatyar, Khalis, Rabbain and Gillani. As a result, Mujaddedi
was named head of the State, Sayyaf as Prime Minister, Mohammadi as Defense
Minister, Hikmatyar as Foreign Minister, Rabbani as of Reconstruction and Gillani as
Chief Justice. 5
Contrary to the expectations, Najib government continued to survive against the onslaughts for
the Mujahideen. Pakistan was still facing the problem of returning the Afghan refugees.
However, the return of the refugees was not possible in isolation of two very important and inter-
related factors, which were, the cession of hostilities, and the formation of a truly representative
government in Kabul. Pakistan had accepted the terms and conditions of the Geneva Accord
contrary to its desire that the issue of an in term government should be resolved first. Pakistan
could not resist the pressure to sign the accord. Had the Afghan Mujahideen been included in the
Geneva talks, the situation would have been different. 6
Anticipating weak position of the Najibullah government, Pakistan embarked upon the
‘military option’s to win war on the battlefield. But this policy failed miserably. Despite
Soviets withdrawal, Najib’s government survived as he succeeded in presenting his
regime as ‘defender of Afghanistan’s integrity. There were certain factors responsible for
the Mujahideen failure;
The massive Soviet military and economic aid to the Kabul regime;
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The failure of the western countries improvising such aid to the Mujahideen; 7
The Kabul regime played ethnic an sectarian card very effectively;
The establishment of local militias by the Kabul regime, greatly lead to the
neutralization of Mujahideen military powers; and
The attempts of regional powers to boost the position of their ‘favorites’ elements
in the Mujahideen. 8
In order to deal with post Soviet withdrawal situation, the Mujahideen, after a great
deal of wrangling had finally succeeded in forming an Afghan ‘Interim Government’
(AIG). The AIG was recognized as the sole representative of Afghanistan by the OIC
Foreign Ministers meeting held on March 16, 1989 and elevated to a ‘government in
exile’ by giving them the vacant seat of Afghanistan in the OIC. Saudi Arabia and Sudan
recognized the AIG. Malaysia followed later. The United States did not recognize the
Mujahideen government, as the USA was of the view that:
The AIG did not have the ability to go into international agreements;
It did not control any territory;
It did not govern the people it controlled; and
It was not a functioning government. 9
The Pakistan government, which was instrumental in formation of the AIG, did not
accord formal recognition because of its fragile nature. The recognition by Pakistan
would have meant interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, which was avoided due
to the guarantee given in Geneva Accord. Pakistan fully supported the Mujahideen
against the struggle the Najib’s regime. But they failed to topple Kabul regime. 10 These
failure were the result of some hard factors:
Internal conflicts among the Afghan Mujahideen groups. The rivalry of Iran and
Saudi Arabia weakened the strength of the resistance as they fought for their own
influence in the area by playing with their favorites;
Absence of the Iranian based Shia parties;
Dissatisfaction of some of the commanders in the battlefield;
Low representation of the various tribes;
123
Mujahideen were trained for guerrilla warfare and they had no experience of the
regular army operations;
Pakistan’s influence over the Mujahideen groups had decreased after the death of
Zia;
Decrease in arms supply by USA also limited Mujahideen s capability; and
India was now also in active support of the Najib government and provided
diplomatic and material support to the regime. 11
The United States, a major weapon supplier to the Mujahideen,/ emphasized on
Pakistan to stop military aid to Mujahideen. 12 The American authorities made it clear
that their aid to Pakistan would be stopped it there were no progress towards a political
settlements. In September 1991, both the superpowers concluded a mutual aid cut-off
agreement to Afghan groups from June 1992 and stressed for a political settlement. 13
The ‘Islamist group’ of Afghanistan during the Gulf War had supported Iraq against
USA and Arabs which alienated Saudi Arabia from the Mujahideen cause.
Internal pressure form some political circles in the country, ANP an ally of the
Nawaz Sharif Government and Benazir Bhutto as the opposition leader, advocated a halt
to the military aid to the Afghan resistance. In Jan 1992, Pakistan finally went along the
contrary lines by declaring its intention to end military support for the Mujahideen.
Pakistan pressed openly for the acceptance of the UN peace plan and declared that peace
would not be held hostage. But On March 18, 1991 Najib dramatically had announced
that he would step down once an understanding was reached through the UN for
establishment of an interim government. He pledged to transfer all powers and executive
authority to interim government from the first day of the transition period. 14
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the main supporter of the Kabul regime was no
more on the international scene. On the other hand, the United States who was backing
most of the Mujahideen factions showed lack of interest due to her own compulsions.
The external supporters of the respective Afghan factions seemed to be seriously
working for a political settlement of the Afghan crisis. The two sides decided to cut off
all military assistance to their respective allies from January 1, 1992 marking the end of
the superpower competing role in Afghanistan. Pakistan also agreed to accelerate efforts
124
for a peaceful political settlement of the Afghan problem.
The UN Secretary General outlined a peace plan to derive as the basis for a peaceful
settlement of the Afghan issue. He also called on Afghan leaders to resolve their
difference through political dialogue. The plan envisaged composition of a grand
assembly of more than 100 leaders of all-political shades and interests and creation of an
interim government to supervise elections in the country. The United Nations peace plan
had received the support of all the regional powers and majority of the Mujahideen
which outlined five points as the basis for settlement. These points came into effect in
May 1992. They were:
The necessity of restoring territorial integrity, political independence and non-
aligned and Islamic character of Afghanistan;
The recognition of rights of the Afghan people to determine their future;
The need for credibility and important transitional mechanism to be worked outs
and agreed upon through intra-Afghan dialogue. Political arrangements in the
transition period would lead to a broad-based government and an end to hostiles;
A halt to arms supplies to all Afghan sides by all; and
Reconstruction of the war-ravaged country and a rehabilitation of Afghan
refugees. 15
Just when the United Nations plan was supposed to go into effect for evolving a
power sharing mechanism for the transfer of power, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
at that critical stage utterly transformed the regional and international significance of
Afghanistan. With dissolution of the USSR, one super power has disappeared, the other
had to disengage and thus co-operation between them became moot. In the absence of a
hegemonic power, security dilemmas emerged both for regional states and for the ethnic
coalitions with Afghanistan. 16
The Personal representative of the UN Secretary General, Benon Sevon, met with the
various leaders of the Mujahideen group, but without an encouraging response. Pakistan
and the United State were putting intense pressure on Sevon to force Najibullah to leave.
They claimed that an explicit public commitment by Najibullah to resign would allow
them to pressurize the ‘rejections’ in the Mujahideen. After several long sessions with
125
Sevon in Kabul, Najibullah presented his list and agreed to announce his intention to
resign. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah addressed the nation on Television and Radio,
and announced his resignation, which he said, would take effect once the United Nations
had established an ‘interim government. 17
The hard line factions out-rightly rejected the proposed plan. One of the leaders,
Gulbadin Hikmatyar, claimed that the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was planned by the
Americans in agreement with Moscow and a major part of this Jirga would be picked up
by the US and Pakistan, leaving very little for the Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistani officials
tried their best to find a reasonable solution of the conflict but it also turned fruitless.
However, before there could be any progress on the UN plan, Najib’s hold on power
rapidly decreased. The cut-off aid, the dissolution of Soviet Union and his own
announcement that the ‘would leave’ before the establishment of an alternative
government to replace him, reacted a ‘vacuum of power’ in Kabul in to which the
regional and ethnic coalition rushed. 18
Najibullah agreed to resign once the interim government was formed. Seeing the
departure of Najib, many of his army officers began to negotiate their defection with the
resistance groups Najibullah while recognizing the dangerous course of events, moved to
assert his authority over Northern command, located around the largely ethnically Uzbek
city of Mazar Sharif by putting Pukhtoons Officers who were loyal to him, at key posts
and particularly replacing General Momin, the leading Tajik officer in the region. This
conflict led to the dissidence of non-Pukhtoon officers headed by Gen. Rahsid Dostum
and Gen. Momin.
The overthrow Najib’s regime, they concluded an alliance with the Mujahideen groups;
Jamiat-I-Islami, Hizb-I-Wahdat and other Northern resistance groups notably with
Ahmed Shah Masud, ethnically a Tajik. While in cities, the military defection occurred
against and background of division in supplies of food and fuel. The crisis was so acute
that Pakistan, the US and others had to ship wheat to Kabul, intended on one side to
stave off hunger and on other hand to maintain the regime long enough to administer an
orderly transition of power. However, when the Mujahideen closed on and Najib was
observed trying to flee in a UN plane, government forces across the country gave up0 the
126
fight and the regime collapsed. 19
After Najibullah’s sudden departure, an ill-defined group of the former President
claimed power in Kabul. They immediately began to seek allies among the Mujahideen
and dispatched foreign Minster Abdul Walkil to meet Ahmad Shah Masud. By last week
of April, 1992Masud forces had captured government’s main-air base of Bagram, some
35 miles outside Kabul. Meanwhile, forces loyal to Masud’s fieriest rival Gulbadin
Hekmatyar closed in on the capital’s South side. 20
After the collapse of Najibullah, four principal armed groups fought for power in
Kabul. These groups had different ethnic compositions and different sources of foreign
support, according to the regions in which they were based. Each group, to some extent
also enjoyed income form local taxes or customs, as well as from the drug trafficking and
other enterprises. Abdul Rashid Dostum, former commander of the Afghanistan Army’s
Jauzjani division, led a largely Uzbek group of former government militias that also
included member of Parcham, including Babrak Karmal, Joined him in Mazar-I-Sharif.
He received support form the Karimov government in Uzbekistan and perhaps forms
Russia. Masud and Rabbani led mainly Tajiks, with members of some other
Northwestern ethnic groups; they were allied to one small but well-organized Shia party.
Hikmatyar led a main Pukhtun group that consisted of Hezb recruits from the refugee
camps and Eastern Afghanistan, and former government militias. Finally Hizb-I-Wahdat,
which had a base in the Hazarajat, organized the Shia of Kabul city that was armed by
the Iranians and Parchamis during Najib fall.
The ethnic structure of the conflict changed over time as the domestic and international
balance of power shifted. Suggesting that the conflict was fundamentally a struggle for
power rather than an ethnic war fueled by “ancient hatreds”. At first, Masud Dostum, and
Hizb-Khalq coalition. This conflict seemed to pit resurgent non-pukhtoons against
Pushtuns, who had long dominated the Afghan state. It was also a clash between
coalition backed by Iran, on the one hand, and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the other.
But by the end of 1992 the ethnic alignment had shifted. By the start of 1994,
Hikmatyar’s Hizb, Mujaddidi’s Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), the Shia
Hizb-I-Wahdat, and Dostum’s Junbish, allied in a Co-ordination council.
127
The predominance of Masud and Rabbani in Kabul alienated first Hizb-I-Wahdat and
then Dostum. Furthermore, the political situation in the newly independent states of
Central Asia set formerly allied Uzbeks and Tajiks of Northern Afghanistan against each
other. Dostum’s backer, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, worked with Russia to
restore to power in Tajikistan a coalition of former communists and other including
Uzbeks. Masud, meanwhile, gave refuge to the supporters of the opposition, which
included Islamists. Tajik nationalists and democrats. Karimov apparently wanted Dostum
to block Masud’s access to the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. 23
With the Peshawar leaders still unable to reach to an agreement, the forces of Masud
and Dostum, all ready in control of the airport, entered the city to pre-empt a coup by
Hekmatyar. The non-Pukhtoon Parchamis, assisted by the Iranian embassy, had also
armed the Shia of Kabul city. Hekmatyar portrayed his strategy as a “defense against a
coup by the Northern Alliance”. After several days of hard fighting, the forces of Masud
Dostum forces and the Shia expelled the Hizb-Khalqi forces. As the time came for the
Mujahideen forces to take power in Kabul, Islamabad was losing grip on the Peshawar
based Afghan leaders. Intense round of talks started at Peshawar to arrange a transitional
government for the peaceful transfer of power. Saudi Prince, Turki-al-Faisal, who was
deeply involved in these talks, joined Pakistan’s efforts.
At the same time, Mir Hamad Musavi, a former Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, was
sent to assure that the deal to form a new government incorporated Iranian interests.
After hectic efforts by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Peshawar based leaders agreed to
formula, manly out of fear that if they delayed any further, the field commanders like
Ahmad Shah Masud would take the matter into their own hands. Thus, they concluded an
accord on April 24, 1992 at Peshawar, called Peshawar Accord.
THE PESHAWAR ACCORD
The transitional Mujahedeen Council was formed in Peshawar on April 26, 1992. The
majority of Mujahedeen’s heads formed a 50 members Council with unspecified
responsibilities, made up of 30 field commanders, party and religious leaders. This was a
complicated arrangement for the transfer of power and the promise of national elections..
128
It should be remembered that Hekmatyar refused to take part in the proceedings of the
accord. His argument was that as the Mujahideen had already controlled the Capital thus
the accord holds no importance. According to the accord, Sibghatullah Mujaddedi was
made head of the 50 member ruling council to supervise the transition arrangements.
After two months, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani was to become head of the state for four
months and responsible for holding general elections.
Gulbadin Hekmatyar was given the charge of Prime minister who instead of himself,
nominated Ustad Farid as Prime Minster. The portfolio of Defense Minster was given to
Ahamed Shah Masud. The United Nation Secretary General’s special envoy on
Afghanistan, Benon Sevon, played a very vital role in persuading Najib to agree to
resign. This caretaker set-up was a part of a five-point peace plan presented earlier by the
UN. Pakistan, Iran had already welcomed the peace plan and agreed to coordinate their
efforts to seek an end to the bloodshed, ensure territorial integrity and secure peaceful
transition of power in Afghanistan.
Pakistan extended full diplomatic and political recognition to the transitional
Mujahideen Council and pledged to provide all possible cooperation for undertaking him
gigantic tasks of national reconstruction’. When the leaders of the interim government
were taken to Afghanistan, an armed Pakistan escort assured their security on April 29,
1992. Prime Minster of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif flew to Kabul together with Asif Nawaz;
Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, ISI chief Gen. Nasir and the Saudi Prince to demonstrate
Pakistan’s backing for the interim government. Nawaz Sharif, after having recognized
the 51-member interim council, confirmed Islamabad’s official recognition of the new
Islamic interim government in Afghanistan. He was the first and the last ahead of
government who visited Afghanistan since the Mujahideen formally took over power.
During the visit, he presented a cheque of $10 millions to the Afghan interim
government for reconstruction of the war-torn country.24
Hekmatyar had refused to accept the Peshawar Accord. It not only created problems for
the new interim government, but also for peace in the region. A Pakistani food convoy of
130 trucks, each carrying about 12 tons of food supplies was blocked by the Hezb-I-
Islami forces in order to show their resentment for any settlement imposed form outside.
129
25 Gulbadin major demand was that Dostum must be pulled out from Kabul as he was the
remnant of the Communists. On the other hand, it was hard for the ‘Interim government’
to lose an ally which had played a very significant role in the ouster of Najib government
26 However Gulbadin refused to accept his allegiance to the Mujahideen as he had fought
the Afghan Mujahideen for over a decade as mercenaries of the Soviet installed
government. Among the three most powerful factions; Hekmatyar, Dostum, and Masud,
the later was the weakest one. So Ahmed Shah Masud needed the help of Dostum to stay
in contention of Power. To that end he has forged a desperate coalition, which included
some of the die-hard of the Najibullah government, most of whom were of Uzbek and
Tajik origin.
The interim President Mujaddedi paid at two-day official visit to Pakistan in May 1992.
It was his first visit to Pakistan since the assumption of office as interim President of
Afghanistan. Addressing a press conference in Islamabad, Mujaddedi supported the sight
of self-determination of the people of Kashmir and stressed that the Kashmir problem
should be resolved according to the UN resolutions. He also showed his willingness to
join Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) along with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and
the other Central Asian states. 27 but soon on 26 April sever fighting erupted between the
forces of Hekmatyar and Masud who was the Defense Minister in Mujaddedi
government. By controlling Kabul with the help of Uzbek and Tajik Generals of the
former regime, Masud had over maneuvered Hekmatyar.
The rivalry between the two warlords was not new. They had always been each other
foes and suspicious of each other since the breakup of the Islamic movement of
Afghanistan in 1978. Even during jihad against the Soviet, the forces of the two had
many clashes. They were opposed to each other on a member of ideological and ethnic
lines. The allied forces of Masud and Rashid Dostum drove out forces of Hekmatyar out
from the city of Kabul. The reason of Hekmatyar hostiles towards Masud was that the
latter did not take into confidence any of the Peshawar-based parties, perhaps not even
his own party leader, Rabbani, before entering into alliance with Dostum and other
Communist commanders of the Afghan Army. 28 Hekmatyar was not willing to share any
power with the former communists and asked to remove the forces of Dostum form
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Kabul.
Immediately Pakistan appealed for the cease-fire. During his visit to Kabul on April 29,
1992 Nawaz Sharif tried touring about a rapprochement between them. On May 25
Masud and Hikmatyar met in the presence of Saudi Prince Najaf and Pakistani Federal
Minister Ejaz ul Haq. The two rivals put their signature on a cease-fire accord and an
agreement, which called for the election within six months. But as usual, the accord was
not honored and soon fighting erupted again after a few weeks. It was because of these
reasons that Ustad Farid, a nominee of Hekmatyar of Premier was not allowed to assume
his office. Moreover, Hekmatyar did not like the continued presence of Dostum in Kabul
and also objected to the portfolio he was holding (Chief of Afghan Army).
After two months of stay in power, Mujaddedi handed over the office to Burhan-ud-Din
Rabbanbi. According to his mandate as per Peshawar Accord, Rabbani’s immediate
action included the setup of a commission for holding election: by convening the widest
possible representation of Afghan commanders, Ulema and other people with
representative status. He appointed Syed Noorullah Emin of his own party (Jamait-I-
Islami) as its chairman. There could be no further progress with regard to delegates for
Shoora. The Rabbanbi tenure came to an end on Oct. 28, 1992. On this occasion
Leadership Council held an extra-ordinary meeting in Kabul on Oct, 31, 1992 and
reluctantly approved 45 days extension in Rabbani’s tenure. The reason was that the
continued fighting with Hekmatyar made it impossible for him to summon the Shoora in
the time designed. Rabbanbi was to convene the proposed Shoora by December 15, 1992
after which the leadership council was to elect the new president for the following
eighteen months.
However, Rabbani’s performance in the extended tenure of 45 days remained
precarious as well. There were growing differences over the shape of Shoora. Fighting
between Hekmatyar and Masud forces continued during the period. The period also saw
the crystallization of a new force under the leadership of Gen. Rashid Dostum, ethnically
an Uzbek. He formed his own party, the Janbish-e-Milli-Islami Afghanistan, which was
broad-based consisting of political and military representatives of the Northern areas,
mostly Uzbeks making 12 per cent of the total Afghan population. Dostum demanded a
131
seat for himself in the ‘leadership council’ and adequate representation in the ‘Jehad
Council’. This period also saw the growth of ethnic alignments in Afghanistan.29
Jamiat-I-Islami was representing mainly the Tajiks, while Dostum represented the
Uzbek, Hezb-e-Wahdat represented the Shia’s while Hizb-I-Islami of Hekmatyar and
Khalis represented the Pushtoons. Ethnic factor now played a greater role in the politics
of Afghanistan. Pushtoon nationalist (ANP) on the Pakistani side of border, who never
concealed their sympathy for the Marxists regime objected to the composition of the
Mujahideen government, alleging that Pushtoons were being denied their legitimate
share of power. 30
Unlike Mujaddedi, Rabbanbi refused to resign power own his term expired. Fighting
again broke out. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran joined to promote another accord
among the Afghan leaders. In December 1992, the Peshawar Accord finally ended
starting a new phase of rivalries. Just One day before the end so his tenure, President
Rabbanbi issued a statement that he would transfer power only to a Council of Nationally
elected representatives.
His opponents demanded that he should step down immediately and hand over power to
the Vice President Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi to avoid a showdown. Rabbanbi managed
to hold the Shoora on December 1992 comprising 1335 delegates which re-elected him
as President of the ‘transitional government’ for a period of two years. The representative
character of the Shoora was questioned by many. Five groups of Mujahedeen’s including
Hezb-I-Islami and Hezb-I-Wahdat did not support the newly elected Shoora thus
initiating a fresh round of fighting around Kabul. 31
The crux of the problem was the lack of agreement between the two major resistance
parties; Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I-Islami and Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-I-
Islami on basic power-sharing formula. 32 The Najibullah regime’s remnants, to save
their skins, have accentuated the hitherto dormant ethnic rivalries within the Afghan
resistance. 33 The first interim Afghan President Sibghatullah Mujaddedi’s regime,
appointed for two months under the Peshawar agreement, quickly realized the capability
of Dostum militia to make or break any regime. He appointed Dostum as chief of Afghan
132
Army, thus further aggravating the differences between the two major parties.
Rabbani took over as President in June, 1992, and agreed to disband the Uzbek militia
from Kabul, which was the major point of contention between him and Hekmatyar.
However, after a brief period of uneasy truce with the Hizb-I-Islami, during which
Hekmatyar’s Tajik representative, Ustad Farid served as the Prime Minister, Rabbani
like his predecessor, preferred to rely on the support of Dostum’s Uzbek militia to
maintain his fragile regime. Rabbani extended his tenure of President ship through a
hand-picked Shoora Hal-o-Aqad (council of wise mend) in December, 1992, further
alienating Hekmatyar’s group. 34
The external parties to the conflict, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States,
lack effective coordination of policies and have complicated the situation further.
Pakistan, in the process of shifting its support away from Hekmatyar’s group, has failed
to evolve any alternative policy, thereby losing its earlier effective clout to influence the
events in Afghanistan.
To improve its relationship with the Central Asian states, Pakistan decided to bypass
Hekmatyar in January, 1992, and proceeded to make a coalition of all other elements
within the Afghan resistance, which was formalized under the Peshawar Agreement,
signed among the various Mujahideen groups in March, 1992. 35 However, this led to the
exclusion of the major Pushtoon groups, which constitute more than 45% of
Afghanistan’s population and have traditionally been the ruler of the county.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been more interested in promoting their sectional interests
by supporting smaller groups, thus further complicating the process of reconciliation. 36
Iran has been arming Hizb-e-Wahdat consisting of shias from Hazarajat while Saudi
Arabia has been financing Itihad-I-Islami, and extremist Sunni group led by Abdul
Rasool Sayyaf, which has led to severe Shia-Sunni clashes inside Kabul since the
Mujahideen’s takeover of Kabul. The United States either appears to have lost its interest
in Afghanistan since the disintegration of the Soviet Union or perhaps prefers to work
through its proxies such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. 37
The United Nations and most of the international community had by this time virtually
133
dropped Afghanistan from the political agenda. In these circumstances, Pakistan was
again active in brokering a political settlement among the warring sides. At the urging of
Islamabad, Tehran and Riyadh, the warring Afghan factions were asked for another
peace accord in Islamabad. After a few days of intense, often tangled negotiations piloted
by Pakistan’s’ Prime Minster and his team with the help of Iranian and Saudi envoys
managed to reach a new peace accord on March 7, 1993 known as the Islamabad Accord.
Iran too agreed to back the Islamabad Accord whole heartedly as now the Hizb-I-Wahdat
was a signatory along with the smaller Harkat-I-Islami of Sheikh Asif Mohsin, another
smaller Shi’ite Party.
The Peshawar Accord was mainly maneuvered by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia leaving
out both Iran and their Pro-Tehran Shi’ite parties. This time more homework was done to
conclude and draft the Islamabad Accord and an effort was made to define the powers of
President of Prime Minister, the absence of which had led to the collapse of Peshawar
Accord. The accord also gave a time for the formation of the cabinet, implementation of
the electoral process and formation of the country’s constitution.
Apart from the conscious efforts to define the powers of the President and Prime
Minister, there was vagueness especially in the formation of cabinet. Hezb-I-Islami was
again given the portfolio of Premiership as was done in the Peshawar Accord, but with
more powers. This time Hekmatyar decided to become the Prime Minister, contrary to
his earlier decision of nominating Ustad Farid one of his commanders for this post. The
Islamabad Accord was an effort to keep some balance between the Jamiat-I-Islamai and
the Hizb-I-Islami.
THE ISLAMABAD ACCORD
Following were the key features of the Islamabad Accord:
A new government will be formed for 18 months. Cabinet shall be formed in two
weeks by the Prime Minster in consultation with the President and other Afghan
leaders. President Rabbani would remain in office and Gulbadin Hekmatyar or his
nominees would assume the office of Prime Minister. The accord also detailed the
powers of the Prime Minster, the President and the cabinet;
134
An electro process would be started in a period of not more than 18 months, with
effect from December 29, 1992. This would include formation of an independent
‘Election Commission’ immediately. The election commission shall hold elections for
a grand Constituent Assembly within eight months and the Constituent Assembly
would formulate a constitution;
A ‘Defense Council’ comprising two members from each party will be formed. This
council will retain the operational control of the Armed forces. Also the council with
look into the collection of all heavy weapons. 38
After the conclusion of the accord, there was some hope that normalcy would return to
Afghanistan but this could not happen. The ‘two executives’ were unable to agree on the
post of Defense Minister as Hekmatyar wanted to replace Masud while Rabbani insisted
to keep him. The two could not reach a power-sharing agreement and they accused each
other for violating the accord. 39 At the same time Pakistan became engulfed in its own
domestic political crisis. With the removal of Nawaz Sharif from the Premier ship, the
Accord lost its most enthusiastic supporter. The subsequent talks among Mujahideen
parties could not produce any result. 40
Islamabad has always been mindful of the necessity to ‘cement’ the troika Islamabad,
Tehran, Riyadh – efforts at ending the factional fighting in Afghanistan. The Iranians too
tend to view this accord with some hope. Deputy Foreign Minister Alauddin Broujerdi
pointed out that the participation of all the Afghan groups indicated that “They recognize
their problems can no longer be resolved through military means”. He added, “Every
group is a part of the Afghan scene…Hekmatyar too is a reality…Both we and the
Pakistan has told them that you are no longer fighting a jihad, you are fighting with your
own brothers.” Broujerdi appreciated Islamabad’s efforts. Referring to Nawaz Sharif’s
five-day-long personal participation, he said, “No Prime Minister in the world would
have done this. 41
At the signing of the accord, all the leaders left for Mecca to perform Umra. As a
gesture of acknowledging Iran’s significance as an important member of the ‘external
Trioka-Islamabad, Riyadh and Tehran’, working on Afghan peace making, Islamabad
proposed to the entire entourage to stop in Tehran on its way back from Madina. 42 The
135
Islamabad Accord; successor to the Peshawar Accord, essentially provided broad
guidelines for peace-making in strife-ridden Afghanistan. 43
Nevertheless, the Islamabad Accord was significant in some respects. Firstly, for the
first time in many years’ most warring factions of Afghanistan has moved away from
gunpowder language and has sat down for dialogue. Secondly, the three most influential
countries demonstrated a genuine interest in bringing peace to Afghanistan. 44 While the
major portion of the accord deals with power sharing issues, it was also an attempt to
reestablish the state. Immediate and unconditional release of all Afghan detainees held
by government and different parties during the armed hostilities was agreed upon.
Properties occupied by different armed groups during hostilities were to be returned to
their original owners.
Although the Islamabad Accord was again signed by the Afghan leaders during there
visits to Saudi Arabia and Iran, but it could not be implemented. The cabinet to be
‘formed through consolation with the President’ could not be agreed upon. The Prim
Minister Hekmatyar wanted to remove Masud from the office of Defense Ministry while
President Rabbani was not ready to endorse his proposal. Thus, the accord broke down.
Hekmatyar attacked the capital and though he was repulsed, the attractive city, which
had long escaped destruction during Jihad, was severely damaged.
The Islamabad Accord promised to achieve a peaceful political settlement in
Afghanistan. The Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar succeeded to enter the suburbs of
Kabul with the help of its new ally, Hezb-I-Wahdat. A stalemate between Prime Minister
Hekmatyar and President Rabbani over the crucial Defense Ministry annihilated the
chances for any functioning of the government. Hekmatyar tried to form a cabinet in
which he gave Masud the post of Deputy Prime Minster but President Rabbani refused to
endorse the cabinet on the basis that he was not consulted. Although Masud had
announced to cooperate with the new government of Hekmatyar, he never relinquished
the de-facto control of Kabul to the ‘defense council’ as envisaged in the Islamabad
Accord. Within two months after the signing of the accord, fresh fighting erupted in
Afghanistan.
136
The installation of an interim Mujahideen government represented at least partial
achievement of the decades-long quest of Islamabad for a friendly Afghanistan. The
possibility of a Russian or Indian exercise of any influence in this strategic backyard of
Pakistan was essentially eliminated. This does not mean that Pakistan’s relations with
Afghanistan were necessarily smooth with out irritants. Pakistan now faced the dilemma
of how to react to the ongoing power struggle among Afghanistan’s new leaders.
Pakistan’s active involvement to promote reconciliation could be branded as undue
interference, while indifference to the infighting might cause further fragmentation
Afghanistan. The most important development was internal political fragmentation. The
Mujahideen parties were driven with fierce political and personal differences, which
might further complicate the process of maintaining a stable governing coalition. The
instability in turn contributed to ongoing instability in relations with other states
ofregion.
RABBANI GOVERNMENT
On assumption of power, President Rabbani’s immediate actions were the setting up of
a commission for holding elections, convening the widest possible representation of
Afghan commander s, Ulema, intellectuals, elders and those who held representative
status. But the holding of election was a difficult task. With millions of refugees yet to be
repatriated, it posed the problem of how the delegates were to be chosen and on what
population basis. The latest census in this connection was the one held by the UN in
1987. This was proposed s the basis but failed to muster unanimous support.
The convening of the Loya Jirga (Gargagr and Gathering) invited further controversy
over its terminology. The proposed Shoor-e-Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd (The Council of Wise Men)
was denounced as a non-Afghan improvisation. There were demands for convening the
more traditional Afghan Loya Jirga. This Shoora versus Jirga issue deepened as
Rabbani’s four-month tenure was to expire by the end of October 1992.
The ‘Grand Gathering’ could not be convened because of Rabbani’s expiry of tenure,
remained as distant as before. The infighting between Hekmatyar and Rabbani continued
Rabbani, however, had managed to build up sufficient credibility, so that when his four-
month tenure ended, the Leadership Council held an extraordinary meeting in Kabul on
137
31 October 1992, and approved an extension of 45 days in his tenure.45But, Rabbani failed
to fulfill his agenda. The Hizb-e-Islami criticized him on the ground that his four months tenure
was a complete failure in all direction and he could not honor his commitments to the Leadership
Council with regard to the pull out of militia, removal of Communists, formation of the Ahle-
Hal-o-Aqd Shoora, setting up a Commission of Islamic army and holding of meetings of the
leadership Council.
But unfortunately he did not do so. Either Rabbani was not interested in it or he
wanted to extend his tenure one-way or the other.46 there was continued criticism of the
suggested Hal-o-Aqd Shoora. Most people, it was argued, were not even familiar with
this name. The Loya Jirga as an Afghan institution, was preferable because the majority
of the Afghan demanded it and were familiar to its functions.47
By October 30, a fresh exchange of fire broke out between the Masud and Hekmatyar
forces. As one observer lamented, the two had a great constructive and destructive
potential. A greater understanding between the two could have brought the Tajiks and
Pukhtoon together, some thing that Afghanistan desperately needed.
Around this lime there were reports of General Dostum's un-official visit to Pakistan
and then onwards to Saudi Arabia.48 Through out these developments, Pakistan was in
the forefront of media attention for its speculated, actual, potential or planned. Roles.
Islamabad was perceived to play this role because of the comings of various Mujahideen
leaders either to Peshawar and Islamabad or via Islamabad to other countries.49
Rabbani's extended tenure of 45 days remained precarious and was marked by "rowing
differences over the shape of Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd Shoora. Afghans expressed skepticism
over the possibility of any Shoora or Jirga being convened, given the ongoing conflicts
between Masud and Hekmatyar. Also, there seemed no apparent consensus over a
Presidential candidate to be selected unanimously or possible candidates lo contest
elections. At Leadership Council important leaders were always missing. It indicated that
none of them was serious to Share power and pull Afghanistan out to the civil war.50
This led to hostilities followed by cease-fires. Hekmatyar’s opposition had extended
support to include Dostum as welt. Dostum had meanwhile established his own party-the
Jumbish-e-Milli Afghanistan, represent entirely of Northern areas and demanded a seat
for himself in the 'Leadership Council' and adequate representative in the 'Jihad
138
Council.51 Rabbani also announced that he would relinquish power only if the
Leadership Council agreed to his successors and insisted for holding Shoora's meeting to
select his successor.52
On 19 December 1992, Radio Kabul announced that 1000 Shoora members met and
began their deliberations in Kabul amidst light security measures. Shoora members were
hopeful of fruitful results. President Rabbani appealed to the opposition to help make the
Shoora a success by honoring their earlier promises. As per Shoora’s decision Rabbani
was re-elected President of the transitional government for a period of two years. It
looked that the Afghans were at least, agreed upon one point; to displace one another.
Kabul which had been spared any fighting during the war between Soviet backed regime
and Mujahideen was devastated by power-hungry Afghan Mujahideen. Much of the
city's population, swollen with earlier refugees, fled and 25000 were believed to have
died as the result of the fighting. A stalemate ensued in which neither side was able to
dislodge the other. In an attempt to break the deadlock, Hekmatyar cut a deal with Uzbek
Leader Dostum in January 1994, who once again bet yard his former allies to join the
opposition, which he hoped would be the winning side. But this odd couple', the most
fundamentalist Mujahideen commander and the former communist general, failed to
bring down Rabbani'-s Government.53
TENSION IN RELATIONS
When fighting between Rabbani and Hekmatyar intensified, Rabbani became
suspicious that Pakistan is tilling towards Hikmatyar. The situation in Afghanistan has
become quite complicated with changing alliances and shifting allegiances. Hikmatyar
who had been extremely critical of Rabbani's alignment with the 'remnants of the
Communist rcgime.54 Rashid Dostum, has now teamed up with Dostum to take on
Rabbani. And one reason cited for Rabbani's reluctance to agree to the evacuation of
Najibullah from Kabul, where he was in the custody of the United Nations, was
Rabbani's fear that Najib would end up Joining hands with Hikmatyar in a demonstration
of 'Pushtoon Unity. 55
Tehran, which was almost a passive participant of the Peshawar Accord, had now
increased its influence in Afghanistan mainly over the Persian speaking Tajik of
139
Afghanistan. In order to broaden its influence from merely Shiite population of
Afghanistan to the Sunni also, it signed in late 1991 an agreement with Tajikistan and
Afghanistan's Jamit-I-IsIami for increasing cultural interaction between Persian speaking
Iranians, Afghanistan and Tajiks. Iran also made efforts to unite non-Pushtoons of
Afghanistan against the Pushtoons.
When Islamabad Accord was coming to a formal end, the Pakistan's Foreign Minister
remarked that things happening in Afghanistan after 28 June would have no legitimacy.
It was interpreted by Kabul as a pronouncement from Pakistan challenging the
legitimacy of the rulers. After the Foreign Minister's statement, six Pakistani were shot
dead by the forces loyal to President Rahhani while seven other Pakistani was arrested.
In a statement issued by the Afghan embassy in New Delhi on 29th June. These
Pakistani's were branded as mercenaries.56
But the sudden unexpected rise of Taliban changed the whole scenario in Afghanistan.
The Taliban who had emerged in November 1994, reached the outskirts of Kabul
conquering many provinces. Rabbani who had earlier welcomed Taliban, us long they
were there Likening the position of his rival, Hikmatyar. But as they came closer to
Kabul, Rabbani started criticizing Pakistan strongly that it was behind Taliban. The
emergence of Taliban suddenly escalated the regional tension. Iran also severely
criticized Pakistan of playing the US game; they regarded Taliban as 'the creation of
America, sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and guided by Pakistan. 57 But Pakistan officially
denied these charges. However, the stories published in the press indicated that the
Taliban were being supported by Pakistan with the backing of UK, USA and Saudi
Arabia.
Pakistan has expressed its great out-rage at the undue involvement of India in the
Afghanistan domestic affairs. India in a bid to create complications for Pakistan extended
military and economic assistance to Masud. He, contrary to all expectation willingly
accepted Indians friendship and forgot the lurking truth that it was India who had stood
by the side of the Communist regime, and during that era, the Panjsher Valley was
subjected to aerial strikes by the Indians pilots causing large scale human and material
damages.58
140
Contrary to all diplomatic norms and the support and hospitality, which Professor
Burhan-ud-din Rabbani and Ahmad shah Masud enjoyed during the days of Jihad,
directed their vengeance against that very country, at the behest of inimical forces. The
Taliban militias, after a series of spectacular victories, were closing on Kabul. Masud in
a desperate move organized a protest march against Pakistan. But the protest turned into
mob and attacked the Embassy of Pakistan.
A group of Pushtoon Islamic Students and their leaders based in Kandahar, began to
seize power from local warlords accused of criminal activities. They opened the region's
roads to free transit and brought a high degree of order to the territories they took under
their control. Processing a. more conservative Islamic state than the other parties, their
small successes snowballed into a movement that quickly took control of almost all the
Pushtoon provinces in the South, often without fighting. By March 1995 they were at the
gates of Kabul. Rabbani government did little to resist their move in North, anticipating
that Taliban were a greater danger to their rival Hikmatyar because they shared the same
Pukhtoon base.59 upon the arrival of Taliban, however Hekmatyar’s Hezb-I-Islami troops
quickly abandoned their positions from which they had shelled the capita for so long.
Relations between Kabul and Islamabad suffered a severe blow after the Islamic state of
Afghanistan accused Pakistan of interfering in its internal affairs. This was demonstrated
by-setting on fire the Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul. The Afghan government accused
Pakistan's ISI which executed the Afghan policy of Islamabad and was planning to bring
to power in Kabul certain Mujahideen leaders.60 at the start, Pakistan supported
Hikmatyar against the stale and then put her weight behind the coalition formed by
Dostum, Mazari and Hikmatyar. When they failed to topple the government in Kabul, it
created a new group namely Taliban.61
According to’ the Afghanistan government press, the first hostile act of Pakistan against
the Islamic state at the start of the year 1995 was the imposition of restrictions on Afghan
transit goods. This action resulted in open criticism of Pakistan's policy by President
Rabbani during ECO summit in March 1995. According to the Afghan press, Pakistan
continued to serve as the base of political and propaganda activities of the Afghan parties
involved in the armed struggle against the state.62 When Pakistan became disappointed of
141
military victory of the Afghan opposition forces, it invited Sardar Abdul Walli, the
cousin and son-in-law of the former King, to Launch a campaign for the return of the
King. This move was considered by Afghanistan yet another example of Pakistan’s
interference in their internal affairs of Afghanistan.
The Rabbani regime argued that Taliban's defeat in Farah and Helmand provinces at the
end of August 1996. Alarmed Pakistan-Islamabad advised Gulbaddin and Dostum to
support Taliban and rushed with ammunition, fuel and advisors to the battle field in order
to prevent the fall of Helmand to the state. Pakistan's support enabled them to defeat
Ismail Khan and capture Herat. This support of Pakistan to the opposition forces resulted
in anti-Pakistani demonstrations in Kabul, who wounded the staff of Pakistan's Embassy
and .set on fire the Embassy building.63
The Rabbani government accused that the embassy incident provided an excuse for
Pakistani leaders to carryout their anti Afghan state campaign more openly. It united the
opposition parties by providing them fund and other resources to remain engaged in war
against the Kabul government. In retaliation to attack on its Embassy in Kabul Pakistan
expelled dozens of Afghan diplomats. The Rabbani regime said that against all the
accepted diplomatic norms, Islamabad opened its Embassy in the Eastern city of
Jalalabad, the province under Taliban control.64
In nutshell, the situation in Afghanistan continued to challenge Pakistan's security and
economic interests even after the cessation of the Cold War. Throughout the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained center for Afghan resistance movement. It
fully supported Afghan people in their struggle against foreign intervention and provided
shelter to Afghan refugees who entered Pakistan affected by the situation in their
country.65
After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, hostilities broke out among
various Afghan groups, trying to maintain their hold in the country. Their quest for power
not only. Shattered the Afghan society itself but hindered all the efforts made by its
neighboring countries to develop the region as an economic bloc. Being any immediate
neighbor, Pakistan was adversely affected by the internal turmoil of Afghanistan. It had
to face the problems of terrorist activities of hostile Afghan groups, drug trafficking, arms
142
smuggling and presence of a large number of refugees. These problems further
aggravated when the US which provided massive aid to Pakistan during the Afghan war
against former Soviet Union, declared to suspend all economic and military aid to
Pakistan.66
Besides these problems, intra-Afghan war also hampered Pakistan's efforts to develop
its economic relations with the newly emerging Central Asian states. These landlocked
states could not have the shortest and most economical outlet to the Arabian Sea via
Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the continuing war in Afghanistan. The civil war also
made it impossible to implement the accords signed between Pakistan and Central Asian
states for building pipelines to transport oil and gas as well as other projects to promote
development in the context of ECO.67
Pakistan declared its policy of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan and made alt-out efforts to develop reconciliation among various Afghan
factions. It supported the efforts of the UN and the OIC for peace and security in the
region- Pakistan made contacts with all Afghan warring factions and offered to host a
regional peace conference to develop a national consensus among them so that peace
could be maintained.
Despite Pakistan's efforts to maintain peace in Afghanistan, it had to face hostile acts
from the Afghan government. In February 1994, the incidents of hijacking of a school
bus from Peshawar and ransacking of the Pakistan embassy in Kabul further created the
tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Three Afghan gunmen hijacked a school bus
from Peshawar carrying children and teachers and reached the Afghan Embassy in
Islamabad.72 during the negotiations with Pakistani officials, they demanded the safe
passage of 2000 truck loads of food supplies to Afghanistan and 15 million rupees. They
also demanded that Pak-Afghan border should be reopened because thousands of
Afghans were facing serious problems due to war and they should be allowed to cross
into Pakistan. The hostages would not be released till their demands were accepted.
However, the Pakistan Army Commandos gunned down the three Afghan hijackers and
rescued the hostages. Protesting against the killing of the Afghan hijackers by Pakistan, a
mob of Afghan demonstrators ransacked the Pakistan's Embassy in Kabul.7
143
REFERENCES
1 Bernett R. Robbin, the Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Collapse in the
International System, Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1996, p. 45.
2 Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 1988. p.3.
3 Khlass Rossane, “Afghansitan: The Accords”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No.5,
summer 1988, pp. 922-930.
4 Ibid.
5 The News, December, 20, 1991.
6 Ibid..
7 Ibid.
8 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994,
P. 159.
9 Ibid. pp. 160-165.
10 “Pakistan and the Gulf”, Economist, March 12, 1992, p.9.
11 Muhammad Islam, Pak-US Relations- the Afghan Factor, and Raziullah Azmi (ed.)
Pak-America Relations, the Recent Past, Karachi: Royal book Company, 1994, p. 92.
12 The Muslim, Auguest, 1991.
13 Defense Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 7-8, 1995, p. 12.
14 The Muslim, December 13, 1992.
15 James South, “Afghanistan imbrioligo”, Asian Affairs, Vol. Xx, No. III, June 1991, p.
10.
16 Ibid.
17 Bernett R. Robbin, the Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Collapse in the
International System, Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1996, p. 48.
18 Nawa-I-Waqt, “Exit of Najibullah”, Special Report, April 24, 1994.
19 Ibid.
20 Bernett R. Robbin, opcit, pp. 45-48.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 45, No.3, July 1992, p.2.
144
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 B. Rais, op. cit. p. 224.
27 Ibid.
28 Pakistan Horizon, opcit.
29 Rais, opcit.
30 Defence Journal, Vol. XXI. No. 7-8, 1995, pp. 10-12.
31 Rahimullah Yousafzai, “More Troubles Ahead for Afghans”, the News, Islamabad,
January 2, 1993.
32 Tahir Amin, “Pakistan and the Central Asian States”, Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No.
4, 1994, p. 17.
33 Ibid.
34 The News, Islamabad, December 31, 1992.
35 Ibid.
36 Tahir Amin, opcit. P. 18
37 “Shift in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy”, The News, Islamabad, January, 28, 1992.
38 Tahir Amin, opcit.
39 The Nation, July, 3, 1994.
40 Ibid.
41 Defence Journal, opcit.
42 The News, March 10, 1993.
43 Ibid
44 The Nation, September 1994.
45 Ahmad Rashid, the Herald, Oct 1995.
46 Ibid.
47 The Nation, opcit.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 The Frontier Post, March 31, 1996.
51 Ibid.
145
52 Anthony Spaeth, “Kabul’s New Islamic Rule”, Time, Vov. 148, No. 15, October 7,
1996, P. 25.
53 Ibid.
54 The Nation, opcit.
55 Herald, Oct. 1995.
56 Ibid p17
57 Ibid. p22
58 Karamullah, “No About Turn on Afghanistan”, the Nation, September 3, 1997.
59 Ibid. p17
60 Ibid. p21
61 Ibid. p24
62 Herald opcit. September 24, 1999. P 24...
63 Mushahid Hussain “Taliban Pak. And The Nation, Region, 31, 1996. Reference
which are in other Page NO. 137.
64 .Pak. Strategic Aims in Pipelines” The Nation, Islam Dec, 23 1999 p 16…
Chapter no- VI
Emergence of taliban and its
Impact on pak-Afghan relations
146
PRE TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN: -
The ethnic crisis in Afghanistan grew intense over Rabbani’s refusal to quit the
presidential office. This civil war pushed Afghanistan into anarchy endangering the life
and property of everybody. Former Mujahideen commanders, with huge military
hardware in their possession had become sovereign in their respective areas. In Southern
Afghanistan the situation was more pathetic where looting killing kidnapping and rape
were rampant.1
It is unreliable that Afghanistan at this time was acutely suffering from leadership
crises. This was the worst period in Afghanistan history after the Russian withdrawal, a
time when the state society relationship had completely broken down. There was no
central rule, no state mechanism and no security. The entire country was in the hold of
numerous warlords with their respective systems of administration.
Kabul and area to its North - East were under the control of Rabbani and Ahmed Shah
Masood. Hearts with Ismail Khan, Mazar-e-Sharif with Dostum, and the South Eastern
districts were control by the Hikmatyar and so on. The country was turning in to a
collection of city republics like those of ancient Greece. With indigenous economic
resources almost extinct, the only viable course of action left to the local commander
was to extract it form the local people, using all sorts of foul practices. The fighter
militiamen were not getting, paid by their respective commanders many indulged in
corruption, looting, drug trafficking and rape. While traveling through even a small area
it was as if one was moving from state to state, after every few kilometers one come
across a new check post with new people and new question. Along just one stretch of
road from chaman to Kandahar, there were around 71 check posts. Money extortion
and humiliating travelers were common every where, whether passenger, transporters or
trader, all were equally victimized,
This diminished further the already slim commerce and economy of the war ravaged
country. The transformation of a meaningful jihad / war of liberation into a civil war and
Turning of heroes into rubbers, drug dealers, and rapists made common Afghan felt
highly scared and vulnerable. 2
The cities acquired a deserted look and no body dared leave home after sunset
147
tried out after long days of work people then had to guard their home in the night, even
in broad day light people did not take their wives , sisters and daughters out of their
homes for fear of their honor being looted3
Kabul which remained unaffected during the soviet occupation became the center of
war. Similarly Kandahar and its environs were also one of the most effected areas. The
extent of immorality and lawlessness can he gauged from the fact that a marriage
between two boys ware celebrated around Kandahar with great jubilation. And Similarly
a Hearty family events.
Now the actual faces of almost all the Afghan leader were exposed to their nation they
saw their leaders making and breaking alliances overnight. They were either incapable
of unwilling to put things, back on the right track. No one proved trustworthy, failing
even to fulfill the promises made in the precincts of the Holly Kaaba. Afghanistan had
almost become a failed state. With its boundaries intact, it had the status under
international law of an independent and sovereign country but in reality the writ of the
Government did not extend even with in the capital. 4
EMERGENCE OF TALIBAN
Taliban is the plural of Talib the term commonly used in Pushto for religious student,
studying in a religious school/Madrasa. .
Education in religious seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban did not first
out of the blue as some commentators thought. They had always been an integral part of
Afghan society, living in madrassa attached with masques, knocking from door to door
to collect food for their meals, and entirely dependent on the generosity of the faithful of
their education and upkeeps5.
The name of Taliban first came to public notice, both inside and out side of Afghanistan
in October 1994 when some Mujahiddin commanders in Kandahar area hijacked a 30
trucks of Pakistani convey with tempting load of food, Medicines, and gifts for central
Asian States of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, dispatched by Pakistan interior minister major
General Nasirullah Khan Baber (Retd) In two weeks the Taliban recaptured the convoy,
killed the commanders and opened the road to central Asia. They also replaced the
Mujahiddin appointed governor in the province of Kandahar Kabul and Helmand.
148
Other incident was the rape of three Hearty women, the confinement of two young boys
dressed as girls in bases belonging to notorious Mujahiddin Commanders like Nadir Jan
Saleh Jan and Daro Khan. such incidents exhausted the patience of Mullah Umer and his
colleagues .As a stator of total 55 Taliban headed by Mullah Umer seized areas, where
the rapes were committed. They started cleaning the road blocks set up by the Afghan
commanders to open the highway to the normal vehicular traffic. According to Taliban
sources in this process, the Pakistan trade caravan was released. Nearly 1500 Taliban
form Afghan madrassa (religious school) joined their colleagues in Kandahar.
The slogan of Taliban was”Surrender we are coming”. After the Hereti family
incident, Mullah Umar who had returned from his studies, after the Russian withdrawal,
decided to work towards bringing peace and introducing Islamic values in Afghanistan.
With the help of some Taliban he “found (Tehrik- Islami - Taliban Afghanistan.
With the following objectives,
To disarm all the rival militias.
To, fight against all those who did not accept their request to give up arms.
To enforce Islamic law in the areas they liberated, and.
To retain all the areas they captured.
The Taliban rose with these objectives and made spectacular6. .
But the girl’s plight moved him to act. Gathering 30 former guerrilla fighters, who
distributed among them 16 Kalashnikov rifles, 7 were led by him to attack on the
checkpoint, freed the girls and tried the checkpoint commander by a noose to the barrel
of an old Soviet tank. 8
This single episode is now part of Afghan folklore. Barely 30 months after taking up
his rifle, Mullah Umar was the supreme ruler of most of Afghanistan. The Mullah, 40
years old, who had lost his right eye in the war against the Russians, is known his
followers as Prince of all believers. Although he is universally known in Afghanistan as
Mullah, (giver of knowledge) he is a shy man who still calls himself a Talib (seeker after
knowledge). He has met only once with a foreign reporter, Mr. Rahimullah Yusufzai,
whom he told that “we were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong, and how
could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women, and
149
the poor”.
With each new action against the warlords, Taliban’s manpower, and arsenal grew. The
new recruits also included many men who had served in crucial military positions as
pilots, tank commanders and front-line infantry officers in the Afghan Communist forces
that fought under Soviet control in the 1980’s.
In June 1994, Pakistan decided to establish rail and road links to the Central Asia in
order to tap the region resources. On September 14, 1994 Gen. Nasirullah Babar, the
Interior Minister announced that the following week he would travel to Central Asia via
Kandahar and Heart to negotiate the transit of a Pakistani convoy. Meanwhile Benazir
Bhutto paid a visit to Turkmenistan to attend its independent day celebrations. The two
powerful Afghan warlords, namely Rashid Dostum and Ismail-Khan, heads of the Shuras
in Mazar-I-Sharif and Heart also took part in the Turkmenistan’s national day celebration
at the invitation of the President. There Benazir Bhutto held long parleys with both the
Afghan warlords who controlled Afghanistan’s borders with Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. An agreement was reached and both the leaders assured full co-operation to
Benazir Bhutto to facilitate the transportation of humanitarian convoys to Turkmenistan
via Heart and Mazar-I-Sharif.
On getting go ahead from Dostum and Ismail Khan, a convoy of thirty trucks loaded
with food, cloths, and medical supplies left Quetta for Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted
access to the Muslim Central Asian states so that to counter their isolation in ‘Post Cold
War era’. Washington and other Western and Muslim states were no more interested in
Afghanistan. For this purpose a friendly and stable Afghanistan would mean a potential
economic bonanza for Pakistan and a strategic-depth which was cherished by Pakistan
for a long time. It was also in the interest of Central Asian states to have an opening to
the sea; otherwise, they could never be free from Russia.
But outside the American-built airport at Kandahar, a Mujahideen commander, guarding
one of the thousands of checkpoints, seized the convoy, demanding ransom. Once again,
Taliban intervened, freeing the convoy, and hanging again from a tank barrel, the
commander who had hijacked it. This event produced great enthusiasm in Pakistani
official circles for Taliban on one hand and on the other, it gave rise to the
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widespread belief that Taliban were created by Pakistan and Nasirullah Babar was the
man behind the scene. On the other hand, regional powers like Russia, India, Iran and
other were bent upon to out-maneuver Pakistan in the Afghan affairs. Indian offered
extensive cooperation on economic field to Afghanistan. She also offered assistance in
the training of the Armed Forces, including supply of defense hardware. . There were
also reports that the Ahmed Shah Masud was receiving ‘Technical Assistance’ from
India. Various reports indicated that Indian planes have been clandestinely flying into
Afghanistan to provide material support. 9
It was ironical that Rabbani who had enjoyed support and hospitality from Pakistan
during the days of Jihad had directed his vengeance against that very country. The
Rabbani- Ahmed Shah Masud forces organized a mob that attacked Pakistan’s embassy
including Pakistan ambassador, one of the embassy staff succumbed to his injuries later
in the hospital. 10 Pakistan lodged a protest note with the Kabul government and
demanded strong action against the alleged hooligans, and demanded due apology and
compensation. But the Kabul government turned down the protest in a most scornful
manner, and warned further more serious consequences, if Taliban did not stop rocketing
Kabul. As a result, the relations between the two governments touched its lowest ebb,
and as a protest, the government of Pakistan closed its Embassy at Kabul. 11 Against this
back-drop, Pakistan had no other option but to support Taliban Movement and counter
the interference of regional powers in Afghanistan and her subsequent isolation in the
region.
The restoration of order by Taliban was also in the interest of Pakistan. In December
Pakistani workers were repairing the airport in Kandahar and the Kandahar Heart
highway. Pakistan also sent three more convoy to the Central Asia and thus there
emerged big prospects of having close commercial relations with the newly merged
states, which could serve as a strategic depth against India.
The Taliban movement has produced a fear among the regional states. The Iranians see
Taliban as ‘Sunni fundamentalists’ who are essentially anti-Shia and who could spread
their revolutionary message among the Sunni minorities the Baloch Turkmen and
Hazara-who inhabit the Iranian side of the Iran-Afghan border. The Pushtuns have never
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ruled before Heart. And Iran was clearly not willing to let them do so now.
Mean while, the Indian connections with Rabbani has been pains-taxingly cultivated by
R, A, W, in its old strategy, to keep creating problems for Pakistan. The move was part
of the proxy war that India was waging in Karachi and other places to counter Pakistani
support for the Kashmiri liberation fighter. To his end, India has rebuilt Masuood’s air
force from the ground up, supplied advanced avionics and radar equipment to MIG
fighter, helped modernize the key Bagram airbase outside Kabul and, in all probability,
has also equipped Masud’s planes and heavy artillery with key munitions which they
were lacking.
Russia, for its part, has long enjoyed close links with Ahmad Shah Masud. In the mid-
eighties, Soviet troops had negotiated two cease-fires in the Panjsher Valley with Masud.
At that time, these moves had aroused the suspicions of General Zia as well as the
Pushtun Mujahidin. Even after the fall of Kabul, Russia had continued to print currency
notes for Afghan government and provide them ammunition through circuitous routes.
On August 3, a Russian Iluyshin-76 cargo plane was forced to land in Kandahar Taliban
jets. It was carrying 3.4 million rounds of ammunition had been bought from Albania,
flown to Dubai and was on its way to Kabul when it was intercepted Taliban were
convinced that Russia had funded and organized this purchase. 12
The Saudis, meanwhile, have obviously opted against playing a direct major role in
Afghanistan. They are still smarting from the betrayal of their protégées, such as
Hekmatyar, during the Gulf War. Almost all Saudi backed factions in Afghanistan
decided to back Saddam Hussain during the war, despite the hundreds of millions of
dollars these commanders had received from Riyadh in the eighties. 13
For Pakistan it will take years to reverse this change in the regional power balance on
ties borders. Indian and Russian animosity aside, incurring Iran’s ire has been the biggest
blow to the foreign policy establishment. 14 Although there are various Versions about
the birth, organization, composition and successes. But many of the states and people
think that they were the product of Pakistan because Pakistan was the first to recognize
Taliban and supported and projected their ideas.
The question of their funding is again a mystery. How do they get the money to
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maintain their fighting forces and run their administration in a war torn country with very
meager resources its is a real question?
It is believed, as well as the Pakistani religious entities mentioned, they get handsome
financial support from the Gulf States and some other Muslim countries. But many
blames Pakistan for organizing training and arming the Taliban give no solid evidence to
substantiate his claims.
Ijlal Haider Zaidi and Rehimullah Yousafzai believe smuggling is a source of their
funds. 15 Ahmed Rashid ads yield from poppy cultivation added to these sources of
income of the opium dealer and transporter goes straight to the Taliban war chest. 16.
SHAPE AND SCOPE OF TALIBAN ADMINISTRATION
The Taliban were a military force. It is a myth that they came to power with a
shot being fired. They did not originate from a standard military training programme,
but from a complex mixture of social and political contexts which went some way
towards explaining their character17. The Taliban were not simply an example of
villagers coming to the cities. Their values were not the values of the village, but the
values of the village as interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or Madrassa students who
typically had not known normal village life. They were a pathogenic force, whose view
of the world conspicuously omitted the pragmatic moderation, which historically had
muted the application of tribal and religious codes in Afghan society. Taliban were not
at all representative of Afghanistan’s social complexities: they were an overwhelmingly
Sunni Pushtoon group, and many of them were fiercely hostile to Afghanistan’s ethnic
and Shiite minorities.
Beware of the beggar who becomes king, runs a well-known Afghan proverb. The
undisputed leader of the Taliban, from its inception to its collapse, was Mulla
Muhammad Umar. He had little mass charismatic appeal, and was a poor speaker, but
was respected for his piety by the top leadership of the movement. He had lost an eye as
a combatant during the war against the Soviets, and plainly found his injury mortifying:
he did not allow himself to be photographed, and in a meeting with one senior visitor
kept twisting his head to hide his disfigurement. On March, 4th 1996 in a gathering of
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Ulema at Kandahar, took the title of Amir- ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful),
and to legitimate his authority, appeared in public with one of Afghanistan’s most sacred
treasures, the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad (Khirqa-I Mubarak). Following this
nomenclature, the Taliban re-titled their country ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’.
The deployment of this title was symbolically significant: it marked a claim to absolute
authority, and a decisive repudiation of power sharing, or indeed of politics. When one
knows one is right, there is no reason to give scope to others to propagate error.
Shura meetings are no longer held, and the Kabul ministers are rarely consulted about
key decisions. Mullah Umer has become much more isolated. The core group around
him includes some Kandahari Ulema and judges of the Supreme Court of Kandahar (who
are all above 70 years old, have never traveled outside Kandahar, and are extremist and
simplistic in their views); a few powerful, hard-line individuals from the Taliban
structure such as Mullah Nuruddin Turabi, Minister of Justice and head of the Religious
Police, Chief of Army Staff Mullah Mohammad Hasan, and Commander Dadullah;
individual Afghans working in Umar’s office who were educated in Pakistani Madrassas
and who have a strongly expansionist and Jihadist view of the Taliban’s role in the
Muslim world; Usama Bin Ladin and other Arabs who advise Umer on foreign policy
(some Afghans from Qandahar even claim that Bin Ladin is consulted on domestic issues
such as the Buddhas); and Pakistani ISI officers18.
With in the Taliban, there were a number of distinct groups. The leaders were not
young students, but like Mulla Umar himself had typically been combatants in Mujahidin
party, most commonly the Hezb-e Islami of Khalis, and the Harakat Islami of Mawlavi
Muhammadi (who strongly supported the Taliban). The Madrassa students who gave the
movement its name, on the other hand, were often too young to have fought against the
USSR. Many were orphans from refugee camps who had been recruited into Madrassas
and had lacked any normal family or home life. To a large extent they were victims of
the Soviet-Afghan war, and their inadequate socialization in significant measure
accounted for their ability to do things which would have been unthinkable in traditional
Afghan society, such as rain blows on women in the street. The movement also
contained Khalqis who had joined the Taliban out of ethnic solidarity, whom the
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prominent Talib Mulla Muhammad Masum Afghani described as ‘communists …. Who
have abandoned their old ideas19 In addition, as the Taliban continued to spread through
the country, a large number of people prudentially switched to their side, providing them
with an ostensibly large, but in fact rather fragile support base.
Once the Taliban has controlled on all the important provinces of Afghanistan including
its capital Kabul. The central authority formed administrative team for each of the
province. Governors for each province were installed and for each district in the
provinces were appointed (Olus Wall) or District Head. The head of the provinces,
districts with other respective departments used to be very much loyal to the central
authority. They were to obey the order of the ‘Amir ul Momeineen’.
Most of the governors and head of the different departments were not necessarily to be
educated. They were to hold their offices by implementing the orders by any means.
IMPOSING OF ISLAMIC PENAL CODE
The Taliban’s ‘answer’ to the issue of security was rigorous application of Islamic law
(Sharia). Their conception of law was a simple one: rather than seeing law as a complex
tradition or discourse subject to evolution and reinterpretation, they viewed it as a rigid
code of rules including penalties to be enforced. The message that there should be no
compulsion in religion, contained in the Koran (Sura al-Baqarah, 2: 256) carried no
weight with them.
The agency for the enforcement of law was the religious police, or to give it its full
title, Amr bil-Maroof WA Nahi An il-Munkir, the department responsible for ‘the
Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice’, an expression derived from the
Koran. The religious police proved to be one of the best organized of the Taliban’s
agencies, and also one of the most vicious. The combination of police powers and
religious zealotry is a frightening one, under the Taliban the mere existence of such an
agency served the purpose of deterring resistance, rules were obeyed by fear. The
Religious Police had no concept of due process, let alone a sense that accused persons
were innocent until proved guilty. Those who fell into their hands could to be treated
abominably.
In common with most totalitarian movements, the Taliban recognized no such thing as
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‘private’ sphere of life, lying beyond the reach of public authorities. The period of
Taliban rule was one in which, for once, the absence of a state-building agenda might
actually have been a blessing in disguise.
The policies of the Taliban have also aroused controversy because of their particularly
detailed and onerous restrictions on how women and men should dress and behave. On
6th December 1996, the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice
announced that it had punished 225 women the previous day, in accordance with the
Shari’s, for violating its rules on clothing. It stated:
As the dignity and honor of a Muslim woman is ensured by observing hejab [seclusion
from society] as requested by Shari’s all honorable sisters are strongly asked to
completely observe hejab as recommended by Shari’s. This can be achieved only if our
dear sisters wear burqas, because full hejab cannot be achieved by wearing only a chador
[a large piece of material that envelops the body and covers the head but leaves all or
part of the face uncovered, at the discretion of the wearer]. In cases of violation, no one
will have the right of complaint.
Men have also been required to conform to a strict dress code, avoiding Western
clothing and abstaining from shaving20.
PRESENT –ONE PARTY POLITICAL SITUATION
Since the Taliban did not recognize any realm of legitimate political contestation,
political freedom did not exist in the areas over which they held sway. Media of
communication were equally subject to control. Television broadcasts were
discontinued, and Television sets banned. Radio broadcasts were limited to prayers and
propaganda. Reporters sans Frontiers accurately described Afghanistan under the
Taliban as ‘a country with no news or pictures’The Taliban’s early promises to withdraw
from public life had long been forgotten.
During the whole period of Taliban, the regime never tolerated any one to stand against
them if any group would try to resist Taliban they were labeled against the Afghanistan
even against the Islam. The one party system during the Taliban regime did not let any
opposition to emerge in Afghanistan21.
IMPLICABLE ROLE OF TALIBAN The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was unique,
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their approach to the inhabitants of the country and to the rest of the world was difficult
to understand and not easy to handle. Their implacable role was based on old traditional
values, which did not permit the people ruled by them to go and spend their Lives with
the passage of the time. Their policy of isolation created problems not only for them but
also to those states that recognized them and projected them.
Though the emergence of Taliban no doubt brought peace and stability to the areas
under their control, but they failed to provide a viable political and administrative system
for the country at large, capable of reflecting popular sentiments.
Their premature drive to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic Shariah by denying
freedom and imposing various curbs on the people especially women, greatly
undermined their standing, and thus arrested their long cherished march towards the
northern Afghanistan, where the people are opposed to the Taliban style of government.
But the Taliban, despite their inherent short comings are capable enough to bring the
whole country under their rule, as the anti-Taliban alliance comprising, Gen Dostum,
Hezb-I-Wahdat and Ahmad Saha Masud have failed to maintain much needed unity
among their ranks, and bogged down in internal infighting.
But the Taliban are not a viable force to be reckoned to ensure permanent peace in the
country. They might remain on national horizon for few years, till they are replaced by
another force.22
In short the masses disillusioned with the prevalent conditions, have pinned their hopes
on Zahir Shah, who is the only non-partisan personality capable enough to put the
country on the track to peace and reconstruction. Moreover, the regional as well as the
big powers are also in favor of bringing Zahir Shah back to the country to play his
historic role.
POWER STRUGGLE AND CIVIL WAR
The rapid achievement of Taliban in the Southern provinces of Afghanistan and in
those areas which are linked to Pakistan borders encouraged Taliban to go ahead.
Taliban in very less time occupied the capital of the country and tried to push the forces
opponent to them, but with the fall of Kabul, the situation was not as easy for Taliban as
it was in Southern Province.
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The period from 1996 to the fall of Taliban in Oct, 2001, had left the country in a very
critical situation as their started a civil war between Taliban and the Northern alliance.
The Taliban in order to occupy Kabul, Mazar –e-Shrif, Heart and other main province in
the Northern parts had to face a very strong opposition, both the groups did not hesitate
to massacre those whom they defined as enemies, when the Taliban occupied Mazar-e-
Sharif on 8th Aug. 1998, they embarked on three days massacre which can be described
as ‘genocidal in its ferocity’ in response the Uzbeks led by Abdul Rashid Dostum and
Malik Pehlawan killed hundreds of Taliban when they recapture Mazar-e-Sharif.
The civil war continued till the fall of Taliban. Ahmed Shah Masood who was
assassinated just two days before the 9/11th tragedy had proved him undefeatable and
was successful to maintain Panjshir valley independent from Taliban. Taliban in order to
defeat him took all measures but was not successful. During the rule of Taliban the
Hazara tribes who are mainly Shia in Bamian were the main target of Taliban. In open
massacre hundreds of the people were killed.
As the identities of the communities and the meanings of the lives of their members
often are much too cultural practices and cultural property. The Taliban were prepared
to disrupt the former and destroy the letter if they thought it necessary to do so. One
manifestation of this was the prohibition of music, but much the most spectacular
episode, which earned the Taliban world wide condemnation, was the destruction on
10th March, 2001 of Afghanistan two greatest archaeological treasures, the giant states
of Buddha crushed in the cliffs above Bamiyan and smashing way the historical Kabul
Museum. Such measures further extended the gulf and prolong the civil war which
ended with the fall of Taliban.
FOREIGN POLICY OF TALIBAN ADMINISTRATION
In this modern era, The world has become a global village where each and every state
tries to find friends and creates good relations with other countries there are about two
hundred countries connected with each other in different spare of life and they in order to
have close links have formed International organizations such UNO, NATO, European
Union, OIC, SAARC, ASEAN etc. Different states have membership in different
organizations; the purpose is to be able to preserve their interests.
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Afghanistan, one of the important country too have membership in different world
organization and played an important role in affairs but unfortunately, since the Taliban
came to power, the country was isolated as due to civil war in Afghanistan and mainly
because of Taliban’s rigid and traditional approach to world problems. They were not
accepted in any organization.
Taliban’s Administration only became successful in getting reorganizations by three
countries namely Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate but the rest of the
World did not recognize them although they had about 90% of area in their control. The
Taliban Administration tried its best to find friends and get reorganization from them,
but their suspicious role in the internal affairs, their behavior towards women, ill
tolerance to opposition, harsh attitudes with foreigners and closing of educational
institutions, a new brand of Islam did not let the world community to have confidence on
them. In the external and foreign affairs, their strong links with all those organizations
who were either declared terrorist or wanted in different states, their links with Osama
Bin Laden, the most wanted person by USA, his presence in Afghanistan, and
Afghanistan as his base camp23, all such measures did not let the Taliban regime to be
recognized by the world. Instead of them Rabbani was considered as a legal
representative of the country and he during this period used to take the seat of
Afghanistan in different occasions even Ahmed Shah Masood, the stanch enemy of
Taliban used to visit other states, particularly his speech in European parliament.
The tragic event of 11th September 2001 further isolated the Taliban and the attack of
USA on Afghanistan washed out the Taliban. So, the foreign policy of Taliban
Administration was not a successful one. They were not able to find friends. Those
three states that earlier recognized them dropped them after 11th September tragedy and
Taliban’s regime ended with no feeling of sorry from any country of the world, even
from Pakistan.
PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Moderates in the Pakistani Foreign Policy establishment argue that the focus of
Pakistan policy on its North - Western border should be opening of trade route to new
states of central Asia. Naseerullah Khan Babar is reported to have argued that
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Afghanistan would not be stable or a united country, for a long time, and that Pakistan
could not afford to wait until then to expand its links with Central Asia. Instead of
relying on the dubious claims of Hakmatyar, that he would soon take over Kabul and
stabilize Afghanistan Pakistan should directly deal with whatever power existed on the
ground to facilitate the development of ground trade to central Asia. If the route from
Peshawar through Kabul and salang pass was blocked due to war in Kabul, Pakistan
should seek to open the south-western route from Quetta through Kandahar to Heart to
Turkemanistan, In June 1994 the Banzair Bhutto cabinet decided to proceed with
building rail and road links to central Asia. The World Bank promised $ 1.5 m for the
feasibility study. (25)
After the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan was faced with two policy
choices, either:
It could have tried seriously to broker peace and to form a coalition government in
Afghanistan regardless of whether the Afghan Pashtun were to emerge as the leading
force in Kabul thus, placing Pakistan as the critical power at the crossroad of Central
Asia,
It could continue supporting the Afghan Pushtuns in their bid for power in Kabul,
with the knowledge that access to Central Asia would remain blocked until this was
achieved. 26
Pakistan, with its strong domestic Pushtuns lobby and the belief that the Afghan
Pushtuns would quickly emerge victorious in Kabul, opted the second option and thus
missed its economic opportunities in central Asia. A part of geo-political and geo-
strategic interests of Pakistan in supporting Taliban, following are some of the perceived
interests:
Pakistan is trying to salvage some or its bigger strategy and is working on the premise
that if the whole of Afghanistan can not be secured then at least Taliban south can be
used to create an opening to the Central Asian states;
Pakistan’s keen desire to implement gas and oil pipe line projects through
Afghanistan is linked roots most important strategic aim to become a major trade and
business conduit for Western companies dealing with Central Asia. Pakistan
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is determined to be a major export route for Central Asian energy. With US sanctions
on, it continues to hold out for Afghan pipeline routes. 27
The pipeline project could force the Afghan warlords into a kind of peace, save
Pakistan’s economy form massive energy shortages in the next decade and even help
improve relation with India. From Karachi, the pipeline could feed Asian markets
Hungary for energy at far cheaper price than Middle East oil. 28
Pakistan wanted to involve USA in the region particularly in Afghanistan,. In an
attempt to place Pakistan as a significant ‘geo-strategic’ ally of the US in the Post
Cold war era.
Since 1950, Islamabad’s close relationship with US, in particular the relationships
between their two militaries, were based on Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union,
China and the Persian Gulf, and its role as a key player in west Asia. The Pak-US
relationship was also helped by the fat that India was allied with the Soviet Union.
However, at the end of the Cold War, Pakistan’s strategic value for the US has
diminished considerably, while its nuclear weapons program forced the US
administration to cancel all military and economic aid in 1990. After Kabul feel to the
Mujahideen, in 1992, the US also turned its back on Afghanistan. More recently India
has begun to court Washington. Pakistan is concerned that US Business interest in India
May leaden her to a tilt toward New Delhi. Pakistan thus sees Unocal’s gas and oil
pipeline projects as a unique opportunity to re-establish itself in Washington’s eyes as a
key strategic partner in Central Asia, for which a friendly Government in Afghanistan is
a must.
The need for energy is Pakistan’s final objective to access cheap energy supplies
particularly gas. Pakistan has proven gas reserves of 22 trillion cubic feet (tcf).
Current consumption is 0.7 tcf/year with an annual increase in demand estimated at
0.07 tcf/year. Oil companies also estimate that there is presently a 0.4 tcf/year
suppressed additional demand for gas. Gas accounts for 37 percent of Pakistan’s
energy consumption and the largest fields at , Balochistan, are in the process of being
depleted. By the year 2010, Pakistan will face between 5 and 8 bcf/year shortfall in
gas. Islamabad’s other options – a gas pipeline from Iran and another
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from Qatar, have been stalled for lack of funding and political problems. Pakistan has
a comprehensive gas pipeline infrastructure that could feed Turkmen gas to major
cities with little new investment. 29
Pakistan is keen to substitute gas for fuel oil, especially for industry and new power
generation projects. Pakistan imported US $ 2.24 billion of oil In 1996-97, equivalent to
19 per cent of its total imports and 20% of its exports. Local production of oil, which
was 70.000 b/d in the early 1990s, has dropped to 58,000b/d in 1996-97. Substituting gas
for fuel oil would dramatically reduce the country’s oil import bill;
The US, UNOCAL and parts of the Pakistani business lobby want to see the gas
pipeline extend to India, a move that would link the two warring neighbors in an
economic partnership. The Nawaz Sharif government has initiated talks with India on
the common disputes over Kashmir and other issues. 30
India is unwilling to discuss the Kashmir dispute, while Pakistan refuses to discuss
economic and trade links with India until Kashmir is put on top of the agendas. Both
governments face implacable domestic political foes if they are seen to be conceding too
much to the other side. In this state of freeze, the US is arguing that foreign trade and
economic ties before racking thorny political issues like Kashmir, would build
confidence between the two nationals. All these interest and objectives could not be
achieved until a stable, friendly, neutral, cooperative and non-hostile government is
installed at Kabul. 31
Pakistan’s strategic agenda and its economic problems are still dwarfed by the crisis in
Afghanistan, as far as the pipeline projects are concerned. The future course of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy remains critical to the projects. Pakistan has consistently based
its Afghan policy on backing the Afghan Pushtuns as opposed to the other Afghan ethnic
minorities, as Pushtuns straddle the pours border between the two counties and
dominates the North West Frontier Province and the Northern part of Balochistan
Province. Thus the influential Pakistani Pushtuns within the military, bureaucracy and
political leadership, strongly influence Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which is based on
Pushtuns factor.
Pakistan’s predicament is that it can not abandon the pro-Pushtuns
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policy because of the sever political repercussions such a move may have in the NWFP.
The loss of Kabul to the Tajiks has angered, hurt and dismayed Pakistani Pushtuns who
have performed several political some results to keep up with events in Afghanistan.
When, even Wali Khan has become a supporter of Pushtuns fundamentalist leaders like
Hekmatyar, because the Pushtun can not stand to see Kabul being ruled by the Tajiks. 32
The last 23 years of war has forever altered the ethnic balance in Afghanistan. For better
or for worse, the war has crushed the Pushtuns predominance and reduced them to just
one more ethnic factor in the vicious fragmentation that is threatening to rent the very
fabric of the Afghan State. An equitable sharing of powers among all ethnic groups in
Afghanistan is vital for peace in the region. 33 The Pushtuns have to wake up to this
reality and so does the Pakistan foreign policy establishment
Changing Relations with the Taliban Government
The Taliban claimed to have established an Islamic state during their six years rule in
Afghanistan, However, in reality, what they made practice was any thing but not Islam.
The ultimate good of a progressive state is to establish peace in the country, harmony
among different people. Both were found missing during their six years of tenure.34
Pakistan was disappointed from Taliban when its efforts did not succeed in moderating
Taliban’s policies on socio-cultural issues, the demolition of the Buddha statute, and the
treatment of the volunteer of international welfare and relief agencies. The outside world
too had a very poor impression of the way they behaved towards women and the non-
Muslim minorities. The demolition of Buddha’s statues was enough to antagonize the
world at large. They also turned down Pakistan’s request for not granting refuge to
Pakistanis involved in acts of terrorism in Pakistan, maintaining that these were no such
people in Afghanistan. Taliban’s image as hardliner and traditionalist and their biased
attitude against women provoked the world and gave their opponents a chance to launch
combined opposition by arming the Northern Alliance. 35
Afghanistan unfortunately once again fell prey to outside meddling. India kept its
distance from Taliban in-order to be able to get allied with anti-Taliban forces at the
opportune moment. Taliban’s diplomatic relations were confined to three countries only,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Most of the countries had yet to
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recognize them. The USA Russia and Central Asian republics were opposing them. This
provided India the opportunity to out plank its archrival Pakistan and it joined hands with
Russia in strategic partnership on October 3, 2000 against the Taliban threat. 36 The West
in general and the US in particular was getting restive at the presence of Osama bin laden
and his followers in Afghanistan. Though the American policy towards the Taliban was
initially ambivalent later the bombing of two US embassies in Kenya (Nairobi) and
Tanzania (Dar-e-Salaam) in August 1998 changed the situation. It turned America
against the Taliban as bin laden and his AL- Qaeda organization were held responsible
for attacks37.
The Taliban leadership was of the views that there was no evidence that Bin laden was
responsible for such activities. 38 Their perception was that the rules of Islamic hospitality
ruled out their expelling him or that he be handed over per trial. The US government has
declared Osama a terrorist and on August 20, 1998 launched cruise missiles against
suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan. 39 The US also asked Pakistan to use its influence
over Kabul for the extradition of Osama bin Laden. 40 The Pakistani government also
asked the US government to make direct contact with the Taliban over the Osama
issue41. the United Nations Security Council through a resolution asked the Taliban to
hand over Osama bin Laden to the countries affected by his terrorism by November 14,
1999 otherwise sanctions would be imposed against it.42 Saudia Arabia too wanted Bin
Laden handed over for trial there. When the Taliban leadership refused to handover laden
and did not comply the instructions of the Security Council the economic sanctions
against Afghanistan became effective with effect from November 15, 1999 43
These sanctions prevented Afghan’s Air Service Arianna from flying outside the
country. The UN sanctions could cause under hardship to the Afghan people because
discontinuation of supply of food stuffs and food stuffs and medicine could play havoc
with the whole population. 44 these sanctions could also force a new wave of Afghan.
Refugees into Pakistan and consequently Pakistan have so far continued the supply of
foodstuff to Kabul on humanitarian grounds. Pakistan slightly pulled back from Taliban
in 2000 but its policy makers, especially the ISI personnel dealing with Taliban, did not
want to turn their back on them and they were stuck with the outdated concept of
164
strategic territorial depth. That the existence of a pro-Pakistan government in
Afghanistan would provide territorial depth to Pakistan in any military conflict with
India. This argument was premised on the assumption that the Taliban Government
would share Pakistan’s regional security perceptions.
Pakistan was soft paddling on Taliban and militant Islamic groups because the
Pakistani military authorities, especially the ISI were using some of these groups for
advancing their goals in Indian-administrated Kashmir. The ideologically motivated
Islamic volunteers strengthened the insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan adopted a dual-
track policy on Afghanistan. It began to deny any undercover or special linkages with
and influence over the Taliban administration but quietly continued to help the Taliban
government. What made these denials unsustainable was Pakistan’s defense of Taliban at
the international forums. Pakistan lobbied with a large number of countries for
recognition of the Taliban government and it advocated that Afghanistan’s seat in the
UN should be given to the Taliban government plea was not accepted by the UN
members. At times Pakistan was the only country that maintained favorable disposition
towards the Afghanistan government. This naturally created the impression that Pakistan
was a supporter and sympathizer of the Taliban government.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S ATTITUDE
As far as the international community is concerned the basic question is that of their
acceptability. The international community is not convinced of the administrative model
they follow, and has concerns about their hard-line attitude particularly towards women.
Coupled with this Afghanistan has, thanks to anarchic state of affairs over the past 23
years, become a hub of drug production and smuggling. The Taliban support Jihad
whether in Chechnya or Kashmir, such factors have given the world community many
excuses to distance themselves from Afghanistan, The Taliban have to realize that
Afghanistan has to move in the contemporary world and it needs massive foreign aid for
reconstruction and rehabilitation, If they do not pay heed to the concerns of the outer
world the question of their recognition and foreign assistance will remain unresolved.
This will mean continuation of problems both for the Afghan nation and the Taliban
themselves. .
165
REFERENCES
1 Kamal Matinuddin henceforth matin, the Taliban Phenomena, oxford University press,
1999, P.P. 24 - 26.
2 Naqib Ullah can Taliban Unite Afghanistan. The frontier Post August, 5, 1999.
3 Danayal Saleem Gillani, who are Taliban, the frontier post August –28 1999.
4 Ibid. P. 141.
5 The Nation, Islamabad, 18-09-2000.
6 Matin, OP.Cit, PP. 171-172
7 Ibid.180
8 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban exporting extremism world Affairs, November, December 1999-
P. 139.
9 Matin OP. Cit, PP- 50- 57.
10 Abdul Satter, Afghanistan, Past, present and future from Jihad. To civil war, the
institute of Regional studies, Islamabad, 1997, PP, 462-3.
11 No change in Afghan policy say sattar. The News, March 13, 2000.
12 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban and the great Game in Afghanistan Vanguards, publishers,
1999, P. 107.
13 Kamal Op. Cit P, 121
14 Ibid p, 127
15 Dr. Fazle Rehman merwat, Pak. Strategic role in the Afghan crisis, journal Pakistan study
center University of Peshawar vol. Spring Autumn 1993. No 27, 28. P. 37.
16 Matin, op, cit PP 133, 40, 41.
17 No change in Afghan Policy say satter the News. March 13 2000.
18 US. Russian getting closer on Afghanistan policy report. The News June 5, 2000.
19 Maitiuddin Kamal, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush Afghanistan 1978-1991. P.64.
20 Boris Pethov, Afghanistan Today Impressions of Journalist, New Delhi, Sterling,
Publishers, Privet Led. 1985, P.71
21 Mohammed Yousif and Mark Adkin, The Dear Trap Afghanistan Untold Story, Lahore
Jung Publisher 5th Edition, 1983, P.37.
22 The Pipline War in Afghanistanistan .Musa Khan Jalalzai Mobile Institute of
166
International Affairs Lahore Maktaba Jadeed Press ,2000.p,65-67.
23 Khalid Akhter, “Pakistan can turn to be the biggest looser”, The Muslim, Islamabad,
Oct 26, 1992.
24 The News, Islamabad, Nov. 2, 1992.
25 Dostum demands share in power”, The Frontier Post, Lahore, Nov. 13 1992.
26 Amera Saeed, op. cit. P. 144.
27 Thomas Barfeild, “The Afghan Morass”, Current Affairs, July 1996, p. 47
28 Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold
War (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1994), p.9.
29 The Muslim, Islamabad, Oct 28, 1992.
30 Khalid Mukhtar, OP.cit, Oct 23, 1992.
31 Mushahid Hussain, “Reversal in Afghanistan” The National, July3, 1994.
32 The News, 30 December, 1994..
33 MushahidHussain.op.cit.
34 Dr Qazai Shakil Ahmad,’’Reconstruction of Afghanistan. Problims and Prospect,’’
Current Affairs, Lahore, AUGUST 2002, P33.
35 Rahimullah Yusafzai’’Anti Taliban Block’’The News, Islamabad, December
5,2000..
36 Dawn. Karchi Oct 4,2000.alsoGurmeet Kanwal.Afghanistan Imbroglio’’ The States
ManDelhi,November9,2000 .
37 Amin Saikal,’’The role of outside Actors in the Afghanistan Conflict;’’ in Afghanistan.A
Country with out a State Christine Neoele. Karim (eds)Islamabad Vangauard Books,
2002 p225.
38 Dawn,Karachi.June 6,1998 to August 31.1998.
39 The News Islamabad, August21,1998.
40 The Washington Post,Wshting, DC,August 25, 1998.
41 The Nation, Lahore August30,1998.
42 The New York Times, New York,September.10.1999.
43 The News,Islamabad ,Nov 16, 2004.Dawn.
44 The Nation . Lahore December 10,2004.
Chapter- VII
The event of 9/11 and
War against terrorism:
its impect on Pak –Afghan relations
167
There accord some of the historical events in the history of the world which brought
changes to the political, social and economical order of the world. Such events demark
the relations between the States and People. The tragic event of the 11th September,
2001, the day when the two twin towers of World Trade Center in New York USA and
the building of Pentagon, Washington were attacked by Airplanes hijacked by some
suicide attackers, killing thousands of the people and demolishing the World Trade
Centre brought a very rapid changes to the world.
The post 11th September scenario let the world to think seriously about such events,
which used to be happening since long particularly the USA took it very serious as their
people, buildings and country was under attack. The USA without prior investigations
blamed AL-QAIDA of Osama Bin Laden responsible for the attack. Osama who had
taken shelter in Afghanistan with Taliban was to face consequences. Surely with such
blame on Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan was to face the threat of USA and other
countries.
The. Pakistan’s decision to join the US led coalition against its former ally Taliban for
combating terrorism after the terrorist attacks on the symbols of the US financial (World
Trade Centre, New York City) and military powers (Pentagon, Washington DC)on
September 11, 2001was a major shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. By abandoning its
support to the Taliban government Pakistan lost support among the Pushtuns, while it
had already alienated the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazras grouped in the Northern
Alliance, who now became the allies of the US. Importance of Afghanistan for Pakistan
can hardly be under estimated. It is certainly Pakistan’s last line of defense from the
north. Pakistan is directly facing political, economic and strategic consequences of
present Afghanistan situation and crisis the impact of 9/11 on Pakistan’s domestic and
external policies towards Afghanistan would be the focal point of discussion in this
chapter.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the symbols of US financial and military
power and the consequent tragic destruction of human life may well signify a new kind
of world war in the twenty first century and instantaneously changed the political
168
landscape of the world.1. President Bush immediately put the US military on a global
high alert and vowed to hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.
He delivered his message to the world on September 20, 2001: “Either you will us, or
you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (US) or with
barbarism and evil (Them). Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly, beware2.
This message of us Bush to the world (voice) has become the animating concept of
American foreign policy, transforming the entire focus of his administration. After
resisting for while, the US finally announced on September 23, 2001 that it was willing
to go public with evidence against Bin Laden.3 The announcement though did little to
dispel the world wide cynicism regarding the FBI ability to conclusively link the attacks
to Bin Laden. Most of this cynicism appears to have emanated from the conflicting
statements issued by the FBI itself4. These terrorist attacks have dramatically changed
the political landscape of the world and terrorism has emerged as great threat to the
international peace and security.5 In this changed environment the world seems to be
behind the US in its war against terrorism where as inwardly various under currents are
gradually shaping up the strategic dynamics of the world in general and Asia in
particular.6
The Taliban administration became the focus of the world attention especially for
hosting the controversial Arab guest Osama bin Laden the Bush doctrine “either you are
with us or against us” left no third option for those who were once supporters of the
Taliban. Different countries are trying to adjust to the changed situation by participating
in this war effort in a manner and extent that suit to their respective regimes. Stunned by
attacks upset and desperate the US has apparently succeeded in having all and sundry to
be on its side against what it terms ‘war’ against ‘terrorism’ against those whom it
declares terrorists or accuses of harboring terrorists. 7 These terrorist attacks laid the
foundation for emerging new world order, to which both Pakistan and India reacted in
haste. At times, Pakistan was the only country that maintained favorable disposition
towards the Afghanistan Government. This naturally created the impression that Pakistan
was a supporter and sympathizer of the Taliban government. The terrorist attacks made it
impossible for Pakistan to continue pursuing the dual-track approach on Afghanistan.
169
Pakistan asked the Taliban administration not to support Osama bin Laden and to hand
over him to some international organizations (i.e. the OIC) or a neutral country for
investigation into his role in global terrorism.
On September 15, 2001, Pakistan announced that it would extend full co-operation to
the international community in its fight against terrorism without involving its forces in
any action beyond its geographical boundaries8. On September 19, 2001 Gen Musharraf,
in his famous “Lay off”, speech said, they have offered all military facilities to America
and are on their side. The objective is to get rid of Pakistan declared as a terrorist state
and harm our strategic interests and the Kashmir cause”.9. Through he did not mention
who they were but it was obvious he was referring to India. In India on the other hand
apprehension was mounting as summed up in the Hindu’s editorial of September 18,
that contours of a possible coalition are still far from clear.10 Again on September 20, the
Hindu pointed out that “regardless of tacit American assurance that present tie-up
between the US and Pakistan need not destabilize peace and politics elsewhere on the
international stage, the plan of forming the nucleus of a globalize alliance against
terrorism does not yet seem to have crystallized” 11 However, Pakistan’s unequivocal
support-including logistical and intelligence assistance-against global terrorism. Its.
(after the latter’s intransigent attitude towards Islamabad’s medication to defuse
controversy over Laden’s extradition to the US), the Bush Administration’s priority to
remove the Taliban government politico-economic stabilization of Pakistan in an effort
to prevent latter’s nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of militants in India’s perspective
had prima facie4prevented US from declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. 12 Pakistan joined
the US led coalition against its former ally Taliban regime in Afghanistan to safeguard its
national interest in a radically altered international scenario. 13
Secretary of State Colin Powel confirmed that Pakistan had agreed to all US requests
made in connection with any planned military action against Osama Bin Laden, whom
President George W Bush named as prime suspect in September 11 attacks 14.
Addressing the reporters at Camp David President Bush thanked the government and
people of Pakistan for their offer of unconditional support. He declared the war against
terrorism and said that the US would do “whatever it takes” to hunt down “Terrorist 15.
170
After the unfortunate acts of terrorism on September 11, the UAE and Saudi Arabia
withdrew their recognition of the Taliban government. By the time American military
action resumed against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 Pakistan was the only country
that had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. 16 The Government of Pakistan argued
that it was only serving diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in order to continue with
the ongoing dialogue with the Taliban government and to provide the international
community with a contact-point for interacting with the Taliban government in
Afghanistan.17 However Pakistan made it clear from its policy statement and actions that
it did not support the Taliban Government.
A quite obvious change in the attitude of the government since the beginning of attacks
on Afghanistan was felt at all levels. It seemed as Pakistani President and officials have
become the spokesmen for the US in threatening Taliban and want to convey that our
cooperation in the US led effort is unconditional and that we would not even let our
national interests and integrity come in way of this cooperation 18. Innocent people are
being killed in the massive air bombing that is going on in the name of destroying
training camps and defense system of Taliban. The Government and its media are calling
these attacks on terrorist’s camps.19. Quite contrary to his otherwise careful attitude the
president himself subscribed to this view in his press conference20.
The US forces were allowed unrestricted use of at least three of Pakistan’s airbases.
The Government at first denied such reports even though international media was
reporting such news ceaselessly but at last had to admit the fact21. The United States was
seeking full and practical cooperation from Pakistan to hunt down the suspects involved
in the attacks on the world trade center in New York and the Pentagon22. President
Pervaz Musharraf again assured US President George Bush of Pakistan’s unstinted
cooperation” in the fight against terrorism Musharraf had already conveyed the
assurance of Pakistan’s unstinted cooperation” in the fight against international terrorism
Colin Powell the American Secretary of State was happy with the response from
Islamabad23. In this American-led war against terrorism. Pakistan decided to abandon the
Taliban and side with Washington. As a result of this decision the basic assumptions of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy that a Taliban controlled Afghanistan was in the interest of
171
Pakistan was discarded Pakistan had successfully broken out of its isolation by agreeing
to provide unstinted support to the United States in its war against terrorism24. It was no
longer a pariah state and could respond to India’s moves with greater confidence. Having
made a U-turn on its Afghan policy it did not have to worry about the concerns of the
international community about Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. Pakistan itself was
suffering from domestic violence and terrorist activity. Musharraf was also assured of
full support by the US to solve the Kashmir dispute and provide economic aid to
Pakistan25.with a major shift in its Afghan policy, Pakistan has lost whatever influence it
had in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Pakistan’s foreign
policy towards Afghanistan has been centered on three major issues. Early
First, the massive refugee influx that began in 1980s tied Pakistan and US together
much more closely than they had ever been in past.
Second, Pakistan became frontline state in the last great battle of the cold war, which
meant that it enjoyed an unprecedented closeness with the United States during the
1980’s and became the major patron of the Afghan Mujahideen (holy warriors) fighting
against the Soviet army and Afghan government forces.
Third, thus, by the 1980’s Afghanistan had come to be seen no longer as a minor
neighborhood problem but as a major national security issue for Pakistan 26.
In his effort to take the nation in confidence, president Musharraf spelled out
Pakistan’s main concerns that had substantially contused towards the policy formation at
this critical juncture of Pakistan history. Four concern were highlighted which included
Four concern were highlighted which included Pakistan’s
1 Security, revival of economy
2 Defense of strategic
3 Nuclear missile assets, and the
4 Kashmir cause.
Even cursory glance at them clearly reveals that each of these concerns deserves
considerable attention27 but we feel that Pakistan totally fail to get any objective. The US
openly at official level started to pressure Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism and
blame for the transformation of nuclear technology to North Korea. US policy toward
172
Pakistan is fast bordering on the absorbed the realities of power not with standing. On
the one hand US relationship with Pakistan has degenerated in to a one way traffic of
punitive measures which are being dished out almost on a daily basis or so it would
seem, and there the perception is as important as the reality on the ground on the days
that there is no negative action against Pakistan by the US administration, there will be
news of some US based study or the other, which condemns Pakistan for all manner of
ills28. The official media and analysts favored Musharraf policy and argued that if
military government had opposed the United States it could not have prevented punitive
action against Afghanistan, which could have been launched from elsewhere, more ever,
Pakistan could have been declared a terrorist state and that would have meant an end of
this country, over Taliban policy was so isolated in character that it had even begun to
create distance between US and to our best, time tested friends, via China and Iran.29
Post 9/11 phase and Pakistan
In the chequered history of Pak- Afghan relation the post 9/11 phase is complicated
by a new version of (great game) that engaged the major powers in the 19th and 20th
centuries for the control of earth land of Asia30, the US was believed to have decided to
more against Taliban regime any way, in the autumn of 2001, but the terrorist attacks on
US provided an ample justification and Pakistan found itself obliged to join the global
war against terror, this is the third time in history a world super power has intruded in
Afghanistan, great Britain, in the 19th century, and the Soviet Union, in the late 20th
century both had a bitter experience in their Afghan expedition, in the post-military
operation, Pakistan was flooded with refugees, multiplying Pakistan’s problems caused
by the Afghan refugees that are already in Pakistan military action in Afghanistan
condemned in Pakistan by all the major sections of public opinion, this had triggered a
country wide street agitation in the form of anti America frenzy,31. . Under the Bonn
accord an Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai has been appointed has the interim head of
Afghanistan who was latter elected president of Afghanistan, the Bonn conference,
attended by four Afghan groups, agreed on setting up a 930 member council to run the
administration, the next step was the convening of Loya Jirga which endorsed Hamid
Karzai’s administration set up for .Afghanistan.
173
Pakistan expressed the hope that the agreement signed in Bonn on –interim
authority in Afghanistan would usher in area of peace and stability in the war-ravaged
country32, Pakistan also extended its felicitations to the Afghan people and the united
nations on the agreement, ministry of foreign affairs spokes man said that Pakistan
would continue to extend full support and assistance UN mediated political process for
the restoration of durable peace in Afghanistan, we have faith in the wisdom of Afghan
people and believe that the new interim authority would establish the foundation of
stable and prosperous Afghanistan friendly to all its neighbors,33 .Pakistan Foreign
minister Abdul Sattar told Reporters that news of the Del the step up an interim authority
for post-Taliban Afghanistan was broken to President Pervez Musharraf at a cabinet
meeting and we are delighted to hear the news, 34. Pakistan analyst remarked as:” while
the US can take solace that a fluent English speaking America loving Afghan will
replace the non English speaking compulsive anti Mullah Omar as the head of the
government in Kabul, it is no less a miracle, under the present geo-strategic situation, for
Pakistan to have fluent Urdu speaking Pakistan friendly Afghan citizen getting ready to
lead the first post Taliban government in Afghanistan, 35. President Perez Musharraf
telephoned Hamid Karzai and congratulated him ,36 .the president’s contact with Karzai
was going to follow Pakistan’s recognition of the new Afghan set up as it assumed office
on December 22, 2001, Islamabad had withdrawn diplomatic recognition to the Taliban
government a few weeks back, Karzai was full of praise for the whole hearted support of
Pakistan for millions of refugees for decades, on December 2001, US defense secretary
Donal Remsfeld said that he was convinced that Pakistan did not fly any aero planes or
helicopters in to Afghanistan to evacuate any Pakistani prisoners from there, 37 in an
interview with MBS’s ‘’meet the press ‘’ Rumsfeld, who was asked to respond to the
charges by the north alliance about Pakistani planes flying into Jalalabad to evacuate
Pakistanis, said ‘’ according to my information neither Pakistan nor any other country
flew any plains into Afghanistan to evacuate any body and Pakistan was cooperating
fully with the US in its campaign against terrorism as it had deployed crack troops on the
border with Afghan to stop any one from escaping into Pakistan,.38 Pakistani delegation
visited Kabul to attend an impressive ceremony on December 22, 2001, marking the
174
assumption of office by the interim administration. The delegation, including foreign
minister Abdul Sattar Edhi, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Rustum Shah Mohammad, Khadim
Hussain Changezi and additional secretary Aziz Ahmed Khan, was received with
kindness and respect on its arrival a Bagram airport,39. the delegation meet with different
Afghan officials, foreign minister also conveyed to the Chairman, Hamid Karzai
Pakistan’s offer to participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, the
Afghan leader welcomed the decision, in their speeches at the ceremony, all Afghan
leader expressed their determination to put an end to strife, bring peace and begin
construction in development of the country which, they said, would be a blessing for
Afghanistan and its neighbor’s specially Pakistan,. the spokeman of ministry of foreign
affairs Anwar Mohammad said on December 21, 2001that the government would issue
an advisory to the central bank to freeze the assets and accounts of Ummah Tamer-e-Nau
(UTN) accused by Washington of helping accused terrorist Osama bin Laden.40 Bush
said that UTN had provided nuclear arms data to bin Laden the alleged mastermind of
September 11, 2001 attacks in new York and Washington.41. Pakistan delivered notice to
Washington on December 28, 2001 that it may note be able to provide crucial logistical
support to US and British troops operating in Afghanistan in the face of possible conflict
with India.42 two division of Pakistan troops are in north west frontier and Balochistan
provinces, bordering Afghanistan to prevent Osama bin Laden in his AL Qaida fighter
from entering Pakistan and provide support for the US led coalition forces more than
2,000 US troops are stationed in Pakistan which has also essentially handed over three
air bases to the US forces. The military official said that Pakistan particularly needed the
Jacobabad air base in southern Sindh provinces, where the concentration of India troops
is largest. 43 Pakistan and Afghanistan have decided to enhance political cooperation
aimed at benefiting the people of both countries. Speaking at a joint news conference
with finances minister and Shaukat Aziz on January 10, 2002 Afghan finances minister
Hidayat Amin Arsla said ‘’ I have come here to meet Pakistani friends and I gave a
general picture of the problems that we are facing in our country and my hopes is that we
will have productive relationship in future which should mutually benefit the people of
both the country, 44 Pakistan and Afghan border authorities agreed to exchange criminals
175
wanted by each side and would take joint operation against the member of AL Qaida
group, 45 The decision was taken at a meting held at the Chaman border, in Balochistan
which was attended by governor of Kandahar Gul Agha, US official and Pakistani
officials, Pakistan began formal moves to resurrect its relationship with Afghan on
January 14, 2002 when it’s reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul, 46. Pakistani
diplomats told the newsmen in Kabul they were confident that hostility between two
countries over. Islamabad’s sponsorship of Afghanistan’s former ruling Taliban regime
would be replaced by mutual self-interest Pakistan’s diplomatic mission in Afghan
capital was abandoned shortly after the US led bombing campaign in Afghan began on
October 7,2001,47
Foreign minister Abdul Sattar said that Pakistan had committed to contribute an
amount of $100 million to the Afghanistan’s rehabilitation program and it also included
a credit line of US $50 million, he was talking to Ms-Sadak Ogala, Japanes Prime
Minister’s special representative for Afghanistan’s assistance who called on him in
Islamabad, 48 Afghan leader Hamid Karzai that he has forgotten about Pakistan’s support
for Taliban in the past and he has best of intension for Islamabad based on Afghanistan’s
national interest, he was interviewing with CNN, 49 CNN’s Wolf Blitzer asked him if he
was confident that Musharraf would help Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai responded that
Musharraf was the first president of a country to call him, even when he was away from
Kabul in the control Afghanistan and he called to congratulate him and to extend his
cooperation, 50 Afghan interim leader Hamid Karzai visited Pakistan in February 2002
and discussed bilateral relations whit president Musharraf both leaders acted
pragmatically and prudently, when they announced , amid visible and touching signs of
warmth and friendship at their joint news conference that they had already buried the
past51. Both leaders demonstrated great good will for each other. The memorable scene,
which lent spontaneity and genuineness to the show, was foreign minister Abdullah
Abdullah cheering the two leaders when they talked of friendship between Pakistan new
Afghanistan a known close friend of India52. The offer of sending two other known
Indian friends to Pakistan defense minister general Faheem and interior minister Yunus
Qanooni, was another positive gesture. By making his first official trip to Islamabad and
176
not to New Delhi, Karzai has also demonstrated diplomatic finances as his
administration was already being accused of packing a lot of anti Pakistan’s elements.
Some wrong perceptions have to be quickly removed and the Karzai visit has done just
that simultaneously it has also addressed the domestic sensitivity of calming down
Pakistan concerns and apprehensions on both sides of the Durand Line. With Karzai
building a dependable bridge with Pakistan majority of Afghan Pashtun will stay
reassumed and confident that they would not be bulldozed by other partners in a fragile.
General Musharraf has given his complete assurance that Pakistan will remain with
Afghanistan in all its endeavour’s to improve its lot. Pakistan is extremely interested in
heaving a peaceful stable united and prosperous Afghanistan as its brotherly neighbor.
Pakistan has handed over to Kabul a list of its 877 citizens being held by various Afghan
warlords since the fall of Taliban and demanded their immediate repatriation. Sources in
the interior ministry confirmed that the list was given to Hamid Karzai during his visit to
Islamabad 53
The Northern Alliance (NA) commanders had sent letters to the families of the
detainees demanding $5000 to 10,000 for the release of each prisoner. These Pakistanis
had gone to Afghanistan in October 2001, to fight the US forces along with the Taliban.
President Musharraf had raised the issue the release of 877 prisoners with the visiting
Afghan ruler and asked him to resolve the issue as it was creating serious problems for
the families of the detainees. It was also pointed out that the detainees mostly belonged
to poor families and could not afford to meet the inhuman demands of the (NA)
commanders. The Afghan ruler has told the Pakistani authorities that he would conduct
an investigation into the matter and try to get the detainees released by the end of
February 2002.
Hamid Karzai paid two days sate visited India on February 26 and 27, 2002
putting to some extent at rest speculation that he is not too enthusiastic about India. No
major political or security agreements were signed with Afghanistan during his visit nor
were there any declarations of profound policies about bilateral relations or regional
developments54. There was criticism and concern in some circles in India that despite the
unqualified support which India gave to the campaign against the Taliban and the
177
promptitude with which India extended developmental assistance to Afghanistan Karzi
has not given sufficient attention to India. As usual the irrelevant Indian lament was he
went to Pakistan but he had not given any final dates for visit to India 55 President
Musharraf visited Afghanistan on April 2, 2002 and held formal talks with Chairman
Karzai. He was warmed welcome and received at the Kabul airport by Karzai. He was
the first head of a country in the region who visited Kabul after the Karzai’s interim
government took over in December 2001. Gen Musharraf was accompanied by a 10
member delegation 56
Mr. Karzai told the news briefing that they had discussed the prevention of
sanctuaries of terrorists on both sides of Afghan Pakistan border and they had fruitful
discussion on various issues including refuees transit trade start of air flights between
various cities of the two countries and the war against drugs and terrorism 57 Gen
Musharraf said “He was extremely glad that he saw Kabul in the hands of a new
government. Which was trying to bring new conditions to Afghanistan to bring
normally back into Afghanistan and to bring the general grandeur of this place back to
Afghanistan and to Kabul and we will assist him (Karazai, all the way in whatever he
wants to do in Afghanistan”58 President Musharraf recalled the centuries old ties between
two countries and said: “we have common history geography our rivers and mountains
are common we have common religion and there was no scope whatsoever for doing
anything other than being brothers and for working in mutual interests 59 He expressed
the hope that the visit of Gen. Musharraf will further promote the brotherly links
between the two countries, besides paving the way for more economic activities in this
region and there is no misunderstanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He
announced that he will look into the release to those Pakistani prisoners who have no
links with Al Qaida. This was the first formal state visit by a head of state after the fall of
Taliban regime. Mr. Hamid Karzai had paid an official visit of Pakistan on February 8,
2002 at the head of a 20 member high level delegation along with foreign minister and
finance minister. The former Afghan King Zahir Shah returned to Kabul on April 18,
2002 after nearly thirty years in self exile. Pakistan welcomed and hoped that his return
will see the reunification of all Afghan people which should lead to successful Loya
178
Jirga 60 In the past Pakistan had not favored the return of Zahir Shah through at one time
during the first government of Benazir efforts had been made to contact him, and
emissaries from Islamabad had met the king. It was Pakistan’s point view that Zahir
Shah as has been emphasized by him will be returning more as an elderly statesman
rather than a monarch. India also welcomed the return of the former King Zahir Shah.
The foreign office spokesperson said in a statement that we look forward to the former
king playing unifying role as the new Afghanistan emerges from the clutches of
fundamentalism obscurantism and terrorism and the former monarch and his family had
maintained excellent relations with India and we also remained in contact over the past
decade as various efforts were made to bring Afghanistan out of the conflict situation 61
Thirty Pakistanis who had gone to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban in October
2001 arrived Peshawar after being freed by the interim government. A special Pakistani
plane was sent to Kabul to bring the freed prisoners of war to home. Except two injured
young men the other Pakistanis were all old and weak. An Islamic group Tanzime Nifaz-
e-Shariat Muhammad that had been banned by the government had taken the men from
Malakanmd to Afghanistan to fight what it called jihad against the US troops. Talking to
reporters at the Peshawar airport the freed men said they do not regret going to
Afghanistan to take part in the holy war 62 They said all of them were released more than
two months ago by Afghan deputy defense minister Abdul Rashid Dostam from the
Shibergham prison due to their old age but were rearrested on Kabul while in their way
to Pakistan. They blamed the Hamid Karzai led interim government for re-arresting
them and locking them up in Kabul. They were all praise for Rasheed Dostam for his
kind behavior and releasing them honorably, but came hard on Karzai government which
put them behind the bars. Hundred of Pakistan is still being held in different jails in
Afghanistan. Another group of 49 Pakistanis imprisoned in Shabarghan headquarter of
Jauzjan province in the Northern Afghanistan was airlifted to Peshawar from Kabul on
May 13, 2002. There are part of those thousands of people dispatched by banned Tahrik
Nifaz Shirt Muhammadi to Afghanistan in October and Nevember 2001 and are mostly
between 40 and 50 years. With the arrival of these 49 prisoners, the number of total
detainees sent back from Afghanistan was reached 25363 Hamid Karzai Chairman of
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Afghanistan’s interim government has said that he completely husts President Pervez
Musharraf presumably politically. However, he insists that New Delhi help was crucial
in Afghanistan’s future economic stake in the Central Asian hydro carbon reserves63. He
told the newsmen that once a gas pipeline comes through from Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan to Pakistan, India’s cooperation would be important and has already briefed
New Delhi on the pipeline proposal. 64 Pakistan minister for Labor an Manpower Owais
Ghani and others arrived in Kabul on May 21, 2002 by the inaugural PIA flight from
Islamabad marking the resumption of air link between Pakistan minister for Labour and
Manpower Owais Ghani and others arrived in Kabul on May 21, 2002 by the inaugural
PIA flight from Islamabad marking the resumption of air link between Pakistan and
Afghanistan after 23 years. The delegation called on Afghan interim administration
chairman Hamid Karzai, and discussed with him bilateral relations, including
enhancement of trade between the two counties65 Owais Ghani corrveyed the warm
regards of Pervez Musharraf to Hamid Karzai, and apprised him of the rising tension
following unprovoked shelling by India across the line of control. Expressing his
concern over the situation, Hamid Karzai called on Pakistan and India to solve the
dispute through negotiations and war is not a solution to the problems. He also
welcomed the first PIA flight to Kabul and remarked that it would strengthen the trade
bond between the two countries besides contributing to the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. He also spoke of the close fraternal ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan
and recalled the support given by Pakistan in the Jihad in his country.
Foreign office spokesman, Aziz Ahmed Khan said that Pakistan is investigating into the
reporters of nearly 30 Pakistanis who had airlifted from inside Afghanistan and flown
through a Central Asian State to New Delhi. He was talking to News in Islamabad on
July 5, 2002. He said that we have taken up the reporters about these Pakistanis both
with the Hamid Karzai government and with the official of the US. Both countries have
denied that such an incident has occurred. But we have still urged the Afghan
government to be more alert 66. Officials in Islamabad are surprised how it was possible
for aircraft to come into Afghan air peace or leave it without the American’s knowledge.
Islamabad feared that if New Delhi resorts to use its relations with the Northern Alliance
180
and certain central Asian states not friendly to Pakistan, then these Pakistanis are likely
to be used by India for its allegations of cross border terrorism. Earlier before the Hamid
Karzai government was in place there were also reports of such of Pakistanis to India
Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and finance minister Dr, Ashraf Ghani
visited Pakistan in August 2002 and held talks with a number of officials including
Pervez Musharraf. They stressed the need for the two countries to boost cooperation in
their efforts to stamp out terrorism and rooting out drug trafficking 67. Pervez Musharraf
offered his government’s full cooperation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s
infrastructure, which has been badly battered following years of war, fratricidal fighting
and strife. The just concluded visit to Pakistan by two high ranking Afghan ministers
was a reassuring sign that relations between the two neighbors are back on an even keel,
following the fall of the Taliban regime.
An India analyst wrote “Ordinary people in Afghanistan are quick to express their
positive sentiment for India while hold Pakistan responsible for the civil wars. But India
is determined to avoid any impression that its activism in Afghanistan is in any way tied
to its own problems with Pakistan the long broader between Afghanistan and Pakistan
makes Islamabad always an important player in Afghanistan. The current distrust
between the two countries is deep and Pakistan has no one to blame but itself Islamabad
looks at its own long-term interests and sheds its barely concealed hostility to Kabul, it
could more towards liberal trading arrangements between land-locked Afghanistan.
Pakistan and India All three nations and the region will stand to gain from such an
arrangement” 68
Pakistan reiterated that it would not allow its territory to be used by anyone to
destabilize Afghanistan. The assurance was given by foreign minister Khurshid
Mahmood Kasuri during a meeting with visiting US presidential envoy to Afghanistan
and Iraq Zalmay Khalilzada69 Kasuri underlined Pakistan’s continued support to
president Karzai government in Afghanistan and agreed that stable prosperous
Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest. Some Afghan officials have used suspected
Taliban and Al-Quaeda extremists of a spate of attacks on the US and pro-government
militia in southern and eastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. Afghan foreign minister
181
Abdullah said that recently there has been some security incidents which of course have
been a cause of concern for the government of Afghanistan for the people of Afghanistan
and for the international community and most of those activities were planned outside
Afghanistan without naming any county.
Afghan president Hamid Kazzai arrived in Islamabad on April 20, 2003 for two days
official visit to Pakistan and held talks with President Musharraf Prime Minister Mir
Zaffar Ullah Jamali and the other Pakistan officials. They had discussed several
contentious issues including refugees transit trade cross border security terrorism and
drug trafficking. Afghan President Hamid Karzai told the newsmen that his government
favors the resolution of the Kashmir issue in accordance with the UN Security Council
resolutions. He was talking to the news reporters at a joint news conference with prime
minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali at the Prime Minister House after their talks 70. Mr.
Karzai said “we support the UN resolutions and in accordance to that we seek a
resolution of the difficulties between India and Pakistan”. He gave this statement in
response to a question about how his government would help the people of occupied
Kashmir to attain their right of self determinations as granted to them by the UN Security
Council resolutions number 91 and 122.
The Afghan Interior Minister Ali Amjad visited Pakistan in July 2003 and discussed the
security situation in Afghanistan with Pakistani officials. At a press conference at
Islamabad on July 25, 2003, Pakistan interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat and his
Afghan counterpart agreed that neither side would allow subversive elements to use its
territory for creating trouble in the other 71 The Agreement came in the wake of a
number of unpleasant incidents including the attack on Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul the
anti Pakistan demonstrations in number of Afghan cities and the Hamid Karzai
government’s own complaints against Islamabad. At the press conference Mr. Jalal
claimed that some elements were using Pakistan territory to carry out sides into
Afghanistan72. On its part Islamabad feels that there has been a menacing rise in anti
Pakistan activity since the Kabul government allowed India to establish consulates in
cities closer to Pakistan. The Afghan minister denied that India was involved in any anti-
Pakistan activity, but given the state of Indo Pakistan relations Kabul must listen to
182
Pakistan’ concerns. The Afghan interior minister’s visit to Pakistan seems to have ended
on positive note’ with the two sides agreeing on number of points. The proceedings of
the press conference gave ample reason for all is believed that the two sides seem keen
to sort out the differences and control the activities of those bent upon harming their
bilateral relations. The situation has been complicated by the fact that there are certain
influential elements in the Afghan government who do not hold a very charitable view of
Pakistan and its government. Some of them hold important positions in Karzai’s
administration and wield considerable influence in regions outside capital. Especially
hostile to Pakistan is the Punjsheri group, which has often tended to follow an
independent line in foreign policy that goes not only against that of the Karzai
administration but is also against the spirit of the Bonn Accord. Meanwhile Mr. Jalali’s
suggestion that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan be given special permits to travel
freely across the border needs to be looked at cautiously because it could be easily
misused by the very subversive elements the two countries want to stamp out. For the
fourth time since the Soviet withdrawal in which Pakistan played a day role the embassy
of Pakistan was ransacked in Kabul by a mob of students on July 8, 2003 73 The factions
in the Northern Alliance, which dominate the interim government were apparently
involved, in what was an outrage that could not have been perpetrated without official
connivance or complicity. Indeed the governor of the state bank was reported to have led
one of the demonstrations. Afghan interior minister Mr. Jalali during his visit to
Islamabad assured Pakistani leaders that his country was eager to have cordial relations
with Pakistan. After the Pakistan ambassador announced the closing of the mission as a
mark of protest President Karzai spoke to President Musharraf expressing regret for the
violation of diplomatic premises and offering to make good the losses. For all the
resentments that exist in “Afghanistan against Pakistan, the maintenance of a working
relationship is essential for this land locked county with a neighbor having the longest
border as well as the most crucial transit facilities74.
Leading English daily wrote in his editorial “One can hardly over emphasize the need
for Pakistan to build a mutually rewarding relationship with Afghanistan. Our dealings
with our western neighbor one must admit” have often been based on misreading of the
183
Afghan situation and on a failure to comprehend the dynamics of political change taking
police in that country. As a result we have often faced disappointments and frustrations
in managing our relations with Kabul. It is of very great importance that we follow the
complex changes currently under way in Afghanistan with great care and not allow our
earlier assumptions to colorful understanding of the intricacies of the Afghan reality.
Some Afghan dignitaries, including President Karzai have been quite outspoken in
articulation their concerns with regard to Pakistan Afghanistan relations. We need to
formulate proper responses to these Afghan concerns75.
Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani visited Pakistan in August 2003 to attend the
meeting of the joint economic commission of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Islamabad. In
the meeting the Afghan minister asked Pakistan to do away with the negative list of the
1965 trade pact and extend financial support to Afghanistan the way India was soing. By
enforcing the negative list he said Pakistan has forfeited its right to have free trade with
Afghanistan76 Referring to the broader question of bilateral economic relations, he
bluntly told Pakistan to compete with India for competition was the spirit of the times.
As the Afghan minister pointed out India had given the county 400 buses and was
helping with establishing a fiberglass factory. New Delhi was also involved in several
construction and educational projects across the county. We also know that India is
helping Afghanistan in training its civil aviation staff and has given it three passenger
airliners. In sharp contrast Pakistan seems to have concentrated on the political side of
the relationship and paid far less attention to the economic dimension of their bilateral
ties. It is true Pakistan has committed 100 million dollars to Afghanistan’s post war
reconstruction, and the Afghan minister appreciated this gesture. The foreign minister
Khurshid Mehmood Kassuri visited Afghanistan in August 2003 and discussed with
Afghan officials on further cooperation between the two countries and to narrow the rift
caused by on the recent attack on the Pakistan embassy in Kabul. The issues that have
grabbed the headlines relate to better military and intelligence cooperation along the
troubled Pakistan Afghanistan border. Mr. Kasuri said over 600 Pakistani held in Afghan
jails would soon be repatriated to Pakistan where they would remain in custody pending
a through screening. Many of them may turn out to be innocent victims of the ringing
184
calls for Jihad by some of our religious parties other may be ideologically committed and
trained fighters whose release might pose a great dilemma77 Spurred no doubt by the
blunt remark of the Afghan finance minister earlier August 2003, when he had more less
asked Pakistan to stop complaining about what India was doing and instead do more on
its own part. Mr. Kasuri has also reported on new measures of economic and social
cooperation. PIA flights to Kabul are due to be increased and Pakistani banks will start
operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan will also build secondary schools and medical clinics
and it is in these fields where Pakistani help can most usefully improve the quality of the
people of Afghanistan. Mr. Kasuri’s suggestion for more people to people exchanges
should help to overcome some of the mistrust and misgivings dating back to Taliban era.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai on July 25, 2004 abruptly and unexpectedly postponed
a visit to Pakistan a day before the deadline for the nomination of the presidential
candidates in Afghanistan’s upcoming election in October 2004. Mr. Karzai had been
scheduled to fly to Pakistan for a two day visit on July 206, 2004 and the trip has been
postponed because it coincided with the deadline for the presidential candidacy
nominations78. Both Karzai and Musharraf agreed to reschedule the trip in the near
future. President Musharraf said that Pakistan had arrested a top AL-Qaeda suspect
wanted by the US. The suspect was arrested on July 29, 2004 but declined to name him79
Al Arabia news channel quoted that the arrested person is Tanzanian who is married to
an Uzbek women may be Ahmed Khalfan Ghalani who is on the FBI’s most wanted
terrorist list for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzada praised Pakistan for
preventing cross border attacks during the Afghan election and said Islamabad played a
useful and important role in ensuring peace at that critical stage. He told in a briefing at
the Pentagon that I have to take advantage to the opportunity to say Pakistan played a
useful important rule to cooperate to present as much as possible cross border operation.
This display of good will from an envoy that is otherwise known for his blistering
attacks on Pakistan was rare and short. He stopped abruptly while searching for more
words to praise Pakistan and then moved on to other subject80. Afghan president Hamid
Karzai paid a state visit to Islamabad on March 22, 2005. He met President Pervez
185
Musharraf Prime Minister Shaoukat Aziz and the other Pakistani officials81. He also
attended the armed forces parade on Pakistan day and was the Chief Guest which
showed the importance Islamabad attaches to the relations with its western neighbour.
The Karzai visit was of great significance and he discussed bilateral relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The visit helped both Pakistan and Pakistan identify the areas
of cooperation in the coming year. Pakistan realizing the future prospects agreed to
cooperate in sectors like education health public transport82. A land locked county
Afghanistan has traditionally relied on Pakistan for its trade with the outside world it has
also depended on Pakistan for essential supplies including food oil and pharmaceuticals.
On August 30, 2005 Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s spokeman Karim Rahimi said
that Pakistan should not put pressure on Afghan refugees to return home83. He said on
the eve of a Pakistani deadline for camps to close in remote region where troops have
been battling Islamic militants. About 2.5 million Afghan refugees have returned home
from Pakistan since the Taliban government was overthrown in late 2001, but more than
million remain in Pakistan. The spokesman further said that the government of
Afghanistan wanted that there should be no pressure on refugees and they should not be
displaced by forced and return of refugees should be voluntary. Pakistani says that
repatriation from camps in its Kurram and Bajour agencies is voluntary and it wants the
100,000 (one lac) refugees home and the camps closed by the end of August 2005.
Pakistan has doubled the aid it offered to Afghan in 2002 to 200 million in 2005 and has
provided extensive assistance in the humanitarian sphere by rebuilding hospitals and
donating ambulance and other equipment 84
The situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized and the number of the US casualties has
mounted steeply since the beginning of 2005. Despite the deployment of over 70,000
troops in the tribal area Pakistan is still facing occasional accusations of “not doing
enough against the Taliban85 The US and Afghan official often complaint that Pakistan’s
lawless tribal belt acts as a spring board for Taliban insurgents to launch attacks inside
Afghanistan and have urged Islamabad to do more to stop militant incursions86 As the
Bush administration wants to make Afghanistan a show piece of progress and
democratization to divert attention from the setback it has been facing in Iran. Having
186
relied mainly on the Northern Alliance and giving sought to eliminate the Taliban who
have close ethnic ties with tribes on the Pakistan side of the border the US has demanded
firm and resolute action from the government of Pervez Musharraf in the counter
terrorist operations87. Indeed the support and cooperation of Pakistan is critical to the
war against terror in Afghanistan that spills over into Pakistan itself. This role involves
having to move against elements in the tribal area that have ties with the Pushtoon
population of East and South Afghanistan from which the Taliban had derived their
support. It is also the largely Pushtoon militias of the Taliban who suffered the heaviest
casualties during the US led attacks on Afghanistan. As such the resistance of the
Taliban has a major component of the pushtoon tradition of revenge against those who
shed their blood. In launching their operations in the tribal belt, the Pakistan army has
sustained sizable casualties in killing or capturing Al Qaeda militants 88. Who have been
given sanctuary by the local tribes whose traditional code requires that they must defend
those under their protection? As wanted persons keep trickling in from Afghanistan
across a porous border the Pakistan armed forces have to remain engaged in region that
was not even open to them under the traditional agreements with the tribal leader going
back to British times. The problem is complicated by the fact that most of the terrorists
are not only well armed but also take advantage of the mountainous terrain rendering the
task of apprehending them extremely difficult and dangerous. As some of them keep
returning into Afghanistan, there have been allegations by Afghan Government leaders
and even some American personalities (Like the former Ambassador Zulmay Khalalzada
an American of Afghan descent) that Pakistan has been less than diligent in dealing
effectively with Afghan militants seeking shelter on its territory. Under these
circumstances Pakistan told US Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice that it was will
to fence its border with Afghanistan to dispel allegations that Islamabad was not doing
enough to stop cross border infiltration89. Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri told the
Journalists in New York “we are fed up with these allegations and we have offered to
fence the border but so far Afghanistan has not responded to our proposals” 90. He
further said “There are people who say that President Musharraf wants to stop
infiltrations but some is the ISI do not. We want all such allegations to stop. That is why,
187
we have proposed this fence. The US secretary of state said “This was a pleasant surprise
for her and Pakistan had a vested interest in peace and stability in Afghanistan and three
years ago our trade with Afghanistan was only $30 million a year now with
improvement of peace in Afghanistan it has increased by 40 times”91. Mr. Kasuri said
that peace in Afghanistan did not suit Afghan warlords and drug traffickers and they
stirred trouble and put blame on Pakistan. He acknowledge that the proposed fence could
create problems inside Pakistan where as a report suggested local Pashtoons Might
oppose the proposal and we will deal with these problems when we come across them.
Losing one’s patience and then seeking a brick and mortar solution to a political
problem is just what we do not need if the rocky Pakistan Afghanistan relationship is to
be stabilized Peaceful Afghan citizens have traditionally come `down to Pakistan to
Pakistan’s plains during winter to earn a living and then go back How will a fence effect
the life pattern on both sides of the border? Then there is the daunting physical task of
erecting a fence along a 2500 km border. And even after we do that will that stop
infiltration from either side? We have seen how those Benton trouble can make a
mockery of the most stringent border controls. The question should be calmly thought
through by both sides. It is ultimately the responsibility of the two governments to isolate
militants through the political and economic development of the tribal areas.
An English Daily Dawn criticized the proposal of border fencing and wrote “Are we for
bringing down walls and barriers between countries and people or are we in favor of
erecting new barricades? First this issue has to be resolved before the problem connected
with the proposal to fence the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can be taken up”92 Political
parties have opposed president Gen Pervez Musharraf’s offer to fence the Pakistan
Afghanistan border to curb cross border infiltration. The Awami National Party (ANP)
an opponent of the Durand Line agreement suggests that both governments should
resolve issues through political means instead of fencing the border. Secretary
Information ANP Zahid Khan said the party never recognized Durand Line as
international border between two countries and would never support such a more93. He
further said that Durand Line divides Pushtoon living on both side of the border and the
party opposes the fencing proposal. The Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) termed the offer is
188
tantamount of officially accepting the Afghan government that Islamabad facilitated
cross border terrorism in the region Senator Professor Mohammad Ibrahim Khan of the
JI said that Gen Musharraf has become approver by offering to erect fence along the
border. He said that the offer is unethical unnatural and impossible. On the one hand the
government is talking about globalization and on the other it offers to demarcate the
border wire. He further said that the Afghan government was leveling baseless charges
of infiltration from this side of the border and that Pakistan was facilitating Taliban and
other elements. 94 PPP spokesmen Senator Farhatullah Babar said that parliament due on
September 18, 2005 Pakistan has found it necessary to increase its forces along the
border with Afghanistan substantially adding 5,000 troops on the frontier of the NWFP
and 45,00 along the border of Balochistan. This has raised the total number to 80,000
which is far higher than the combined forces of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) now mainly drawn from NATO and the US, and the Afghan security
forces. These forces have been deployed to prevent Pushtoon dissidents and Al Qaeda
remnants from interfering with the Afghan elections on September 18, 2005.
The Corps commander Peshawar Lt. Gen Safdar Hussain said that fencing of the
border with Afghanistan was not Pakistan’s problem and infiltration was Afghanistan’s
problem and let the Afghan fence the border themselves.95 Emphasizing that security in
Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest and he was deploying another 5,000 troops to
completely seal the borders and reinforce the ongoing military operation in North
Waziristan. .
Pakistan forces tightened security along the long porous border with Afghanistan to
prevent Taliban militants and their allies from disrupting Afghan parliamentary
elections. The army spokesmen said that some 50 new check points had been set up
along the border to plug all possible infiltration routes and frontier road traffic has also
been suspended. Security forces backed by helicopter gunship also hunted Al-Qaeda
militants believed to be hiding village in North Waziristan tribal region near Afghan
border. An intelligence official told newsmen that five suspected militants had been
arrested and their identity was still being ascertained.96 but US are not satisfied and
demanding from Pakistan do more.
189
REFERENCES
1. Khalid Rehman, Terrorism: Challenge and way out pre- and post September 11
2. Senario, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2001, pp. 47 -48.
3. The New York Times, New York. September 24, 2001.
4. www.whitehouse.gov/ news
5. The Washington Times, Washington DC, September 21, 2001.
6. Dr. Moeed Pirzada, “Kashmir”: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and
imperative for US policy in the Region”, IPR Journal, Volume 11 number1,
Winter 2003,Islambad Policy Research Instutite,p.126
7. The News, Islamabad, September 16, 2001.
8. Dawn, Lahore, September 20, 2001.
9. The Hindu, Delhi, September 18, 2001.
10. Ibid. September 30,2001
11. Gaurave Kampani, “Placing the indo Pakistani standoff in perspective”, Centre
for Non Proliferation studies, Monterey institute of International Studies, March
2002, P.8 also see Dan Balz, Bob Wood ward and jeff Himmel man,
“Afghanistan Campaign Blue Print Emerges: Part 3 September 13”, the
Washington Post, January 29, 2002, p. A01.
12. Dr Moeed Pirzada Kahmir: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and imperative
for US policy in the Region” opcit, p 126.
13. Dawn Karachi, October 8, 2001.
14. The news, Islamabad, October 10, 2001.
15. Dawn Lahore, September 15, 2001 to November 15, 2001.
16. Nawa-i-waqat (Urdu) Multan, January 10, 11, 12 13, 14-15 2002
17. The Nation Lahore January 20, 2002.
18. Ibid, September 21, 2001.
19. Dr. Shireen M.Mazari, “Comment”. Strategic Studies, winter 2001, p.3
20. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, “State of Relations with kabul”, Dawn, Lahore ,
September 15, 2005
21. The Nation, Lahore October 10, 2001.
190
22. Dawn , Islamabad , December 12, 2001.
23. The News Isamabad, December 6, 2001.
24. The Nation, Lahore, December 6, 2001.
25. Kamran Khan , “Karzai: a unique US-PAK Candidate” The News, Isamabad,
December 6, 2001.
26. The NEWS, Islamabad, December 7, 2001
27. Dawn, Islamabad December 3, 2001.
28. The New York Times, New York December 3, 2001
29. Dawn Karachi, December 23, 2001.
30. The Nation, Lahore, December 23, 2001
31. The News Islamabad December 22, 2001
32. The Wahington post Washington Dc, December 20, 2001.
33. The News, Islamabad, December 29, 2001.
34. ibid.
35. Dawn, Islamabad, January 11, 2002.
36. Ibid, January 13, 2002.
37. The News, Islamabad January 15, 2002.
38. The Nation, Lahore, October 8, 2001.
39. The News, Islamabad, January 9, 2002.
40. Ibid, January 30, 2002.
41. Ibid.
42. Dawn, Karachi, February 9, 2002.
43. The News, Islamabad, February 9, 2002.
44. Ibid, Feburary, 11, 2002.
45. The Hindu, Delhi, February 28, 2002.
46. J.N Dixit, “A Matter of Relationship”, The Telegraph, Calcutta. March 12, 2002.
47. Dawn, Islamabad, April 3, 2002.
48. The News, Islamabad April 3, 2002.
49. The Nation Lahore April 3, 2002.
50. Dawn Islamabad april 3 2002.
191
51. The News Islamabad April 19 2002.
52. Hindu Dehli April 19 2002.
53. The Nation Lahore april 26 2002.
54. The New Islamabad April 26 2002.
55. Dawn Karachi April 26 2002.
56. The News Islamabad May 14 2002.
57. The Nation Islamabad May 14 2002.
58. The Indian Express New Delhi May 3 2005.
59. Dawn Islamabad May 4 2002.
60. The Nation Islamabad May 22 2002.
61. The News Islamabad July 6 2002
62. Dawn Islamabad August 29 2002
63. C. Raja Mohan India’s Forward Policy the Hindu Delhi February 22 2003.
64. The News Islamabad April 18 2003.
65. Dawn Islamabad April 23 2003.
66. the Nation Islamabad April 23 2003.
67. Dawn Islamabad July 26 2003.
68. The Nation Lahore July 26 2003
69. Dr Hassan.Askari Rizvi. Afghanistan and The United States and Pakistan
foreign policy; Current Affairs, Lahore, November 2001,p 14. .
70. Muhammad Ishaq fani, Pakistan Relation with China, Following the Collapse of
Soviet Union; Ph D Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Pakistan
Studies,Bahuddin Zakariya University,Multan P,222.
71. Ibid p,224.
72. ibid p,34,35
73. Dr Hassan.Askari Rizvi. Afghanistan and The United States and Pakistan
foreign policy; Current Affairs, Lahore, November 2001,p 16. .
74. stephen Tanner Afghanistan a military history from Alexander the great to the
fall of Taliban Da Capo Press New Yark 2002 p,206.
75. ibid p,210-11.
192
76. ibid p,225-227.
77. david j. whittaker terrorists and terrorism in the contemporary world
Routledge taylor&Erancis Group London and NewYork 2004 p,145.
78. Muhammad Ishaq fani, Pakistans Relation with China, Following the Collapse of
Soviet Union; Ph D Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Pakistan
79. Studies,Bahuddin Zakariya University,Multan P,228-29.
80. ibid p,235-36
81. The News Islamabad ,August 18. 2003.
82. Dawn Islamabad, August 23 . 2003.
83. The Nation Islamabad ,August 23. 2003.
84. Dawn Islamabad, July 26 .2003.
85. The Nation Lahore ,July 26 2003
86. Imtaz Gul Theunholy Nexus Pak-Afghan Relations under Taliban Maktaba
Jadeed Press-9-Rawelpandi Road, Lahore.2002.p 190- 92.
87. Ibid p.201-2.
88. Dr Riffat Hussan ,J,N.Dxit,Julie Sirrs The Anatomy of aConflict Afghanistan and
9/11.Paul Press,Okhla, new Delhi-2002 p.185-86.
89. ibid p.190
90. Ibid p.198-99.
91. Ibid Muhammad Ishaq fani, .235-36.
92. Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Pakistan,s policy towords Afghanistan andCentral
Asia,inIjaz khan and Nasreen Ghufran,eds.Pakistan foreign policy regional
perspective; Critique (Peshwer; Deportment of International Relations,
University of Peshawer,p.105.
93. Ibid. p 92
94. Dr.Baber Shah,’Geo-Strategic Patterns of a post-Taliban Afghanistan, Strategic
Studies (Islamabad) Spring 2002,p.45.
95. Ibid p 48
96. Dr. Riffat Hussain. J.N.D xit,Julie Sirrs, The Anatomy of Confilifct Afghanistan
and 9/11, Paul Press, Okhala, New Dehli-2002 p. 188-190.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
193
Pakistan’s foreign policy seriously lacks initiatives, strength and effectiveness. It
is primarily due to the chaotic political situation in Pakistan that the decision makers are
constrained to take any bold action. So the decision makers in Pakistan could not
formulate an effective Afghanistan Policy. Pakistan,s Afghan relation throughout the
whole time of their history but particularly in the time of Soviet Union invasion (1979)
until the advent and Fall of Taliban (1994-2001) has been one of a war time ally rather
then one of an honest broker. The strength of foreign policy is inextricably linked with
the stability of the domestic structure. Domestically political situation in Pakistan like
Pakistan is grave.
Pakistan could not formulate an effective Afghanistan policy from (1947 up to 2001).
Making an overall evaluation of Pakistan’s Afghan relations, from 1947 to 2001.
Durand Line and Pashtunistan issue had always remained a thorn in Pak-Afghan relations
since Pakistan's creation. Allegations and counter allegations, propaganda and counter
propaganda marred their relations. These issues and propaganda had several times led to
the closure of border and consulates in each other's countries. The cool and apathetic of
the leaders of both the countries towards Pak-Afghan relations was the main cause of
hostile relations since Pakistan,screation.
In fact, no sincere efforts had been made from any side to solve the long –understanding
dispute and eliminate the differences.
Coupled with it, the attitude of foreign countries, particularly neighboring countries
also contributed to the matter. Soviet Union assisted Afghanistan in it hostility towards
Pakistan because it did not like Pakistan’s alignment with the west. India, the arch-rival
of Pakistan followed the theory of national intrest. They extended every kind of moral
and material support to Afghanistan to pressurize Pakistan for the Durand Line and
Pashtunistan issue.
The United States on its part did not want the expansion of Communism in Asia.
Pakistan, being US ally in cold war, got the US support in opposition to Pashtunistan. In
this way, the Pashtunistan issue became an issue of cold war between the two Super
powers. Communist elements had deepened it roots in Afghanistan and its next intended
target was hot water of Gawader’s Pakistan. This being the main reason that the US
194
refused to supply arms to Afghanistan, but it did finance several other developmental
projects in Afghanistan. Ex-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after accession to power,
in December, 1971 undertook a visit to Afghanistan. He wanted to thank Zahir Shah for
remaining natural in Indo- Pakistan war. He also wanted; Afghanistan not to recognize
Bangladesh. Along with it, he wanted to silence Afghanistan, support for National
Aawami Party (NAP). To some extent his visit was successful. Though, he wanted to
maintain friendly relation with Afghanistan in the coming years. However, the removal of
NAP governments in Balochistan and NWFP created problems for both countries.
Afghanistan never liked the use of force by the Pakistan Army against the Baloch and
Pushtuns insurgent.Daud raised the issue of Baloch and Pushtuns question on
international forums such as the United Nations, the Algiers Conference and Islamic
Conference. Moreover, he gave asylum to the Pashtun and Baluch ‘Nationalist.’ Daud
actually wanted the “right of self determination and autonomy for the Pashtuns. Though,
Bhutto on his part extended recognition to Daud’s government in 1973, but he made it
clear that he would not tolerate interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. He was actually
following the policy of ‘Persuasion’ and intimidation’ against Daud. Bhutto as a counter-
measure against Daud’s interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs used the dissident’s
elements, the Islamists, in Afghanistan against Daud’s government. They made some
coup attempts against Daud and finally succeeded in mobilizing the Panjsher uprising to
destabilize Daud’s government. Though Daud succeeded in suppressing the coup and
uprising, but he stopped interference in Pakistan’s internal matter furthermore.
In Pak-Afghan relations, the role of the Shah of Iran had remained as an arbitrator. In
Bhutto’s time, the Shah of Iran once again used his influence to create rapprochement
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran jointly applied “carrot and stick”
policy. Pakistan had to apply the stick and the Shah of Iran had to wield the carrot. The
Shah of Iran’s interest in the matter was due to the US dictation. He was working as a
policeman in the region on behalf of the US. The US wanted to detach Afghanistan from
the Soviet Union. On the other hand, aid as well as Pashtunistan issue had made
Afghanistan heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. The US used the Shah of Iran for the
purpose by sponsoring him. The Shah of Iran generously gave the US money and aid to
195
Afghanistan for developmental projects to the extent that it exceeded the total Soviet’s
aid. Afghanistan’s dependence on Soviet trade routes was also stopped by opening
alternate trade routes through Iran and to a lesser extent in Pakistan.
Besides it, the Soviet stance on Pashtunistan issue has also cooled down since 1960s due
to new changes in the region. Afghanistan did not like this cool attitude of the Soviet
Union on Pashtunistan. As a result the pendulum of Afghanistan started tilting towards
Pakistan and Iran’s side. United States had also serious efforts to normalize the relations
between Pakistan and Afghanistan before Afghan Sour Revolution. There were exchange
of visits between the head of the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. But there happened
big change in the political affairs of both the countries. The removal of Bhutto from
government by general Zia in Pakistan and the Sour revolution in Afghanistan in April
1978 changed the atmosphere and created new opportunities and challenges for both the
countries and also for superpowers.but1979 was the year that brought new challenges and
opportunities for Pakistan on its North-Western Frontier. Opportunities to neutralize the
pre- 1979 bitter experiences and challenges to face Soviet troops knocking its border.
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy during this period, up to the soviet withdrawal, can be
called a thorough success. On one hand it adopted the policy of bringing political
pressure on the USSR along with providing covert assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen,
who effectively organized Afghan resistance and ultimately forced the USSR leave
Afghanistan. On the other hand it cashed in on its position as a front-line state to gain
military aid and modernize it army. Funds were available for economic development too
but much of these were not properly utilized i.e. for long term, infrastructural
development. The Geneva Accords have been criticized for failing to provide for an
interim set-up, but bearing in mind the extraordinary pressures under which they were
agreed upon, they were a remarkable achievement.
On the negative side hosting millions of Afghan refugees has put Pakistan under great
pressure. This directly affected Pakistan’s internal social and economic developments.
Creating a drugs menace, smuggling, social violence and a Kalashnikov culture. On the
Afghan side perpetual war conditions gave birth to warlords and religious militancy.
U.S.A and her ally left Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal without considering
196
and planning for the reconstruction of infrastructure and of political solution. Pakistan
handled the internal affairs in its own way to fulfill her of having friendly government in
Afghanistan for recognizing the Durand line, to have smoothes access to Central Asia
and to create conducive environment for the repartition of Afghan refugees.
The objectives that had looked clearly achievable were put in disarray. Like the other
regional countries Pakistan had to rethink its policy in the renewed environment. In this
Pakistan demonstrated lack of understanding of the Afghan character. Rather than rely
on just one or two figures, it should have cultivated interests in Afghanistan in the long
run.
The emergence of the Taliban at this juncture proved a welcome change for Pakistan.
Seeing their achievements and the mass support, they enjoyed, Pakistan felt they had the
potential both to bring peace and stability of Afghanistan and achieve its own objectives.
Pakistan, therefore, recognized the Taliban government. This widened the gap between
Iran and Pakistan and even with the West. It is alarming that Iran has gained more from
the situation and has isolated Pakistan on its Afghanistan policy. Iran seems to have
taken over as leader of the regional anti-Taliban alliance. (I.e. Russia, CARs India etc).
The tragic event of 9/11 brought a new diplomatic, Military and political approach to
deal with Afghanistan. Pakistan understanding the seriousness of this tragic event
urgently derecognizes the Taliban Government and was compelled to cooperate fully
with UN backed Afghan government. Pakistan provided logistic support to NATO to
fight against Osama and His AL-Qaida and also to topple down the Taliban Government.
A huge number of Al-Qaida and Taliban fugitives took shelter in the tribal areas of
Pakistan as a large number of them were already residing here. These elements carried its
activities in Afghanistan. The Afghan government as well as the NATO blamed Pakistan
for such ill activities. It also resulted in deteriorating the relations not only with
Afghanistan but also with the West. The NATO forces even did not hesitate to attack
them in Tribal areas of Pakistan. The use of military of Pakistan against them in tribal
areas extended the resistance in different areas of Pakistan and it is now knocking the
door of Capital of the Country.
197
Future Suggestions.
o There is a great need of closer interactions between the leaders of the two
countries. Moreover, the frequent exchange of visits at the ministerial and
secretarial level may be encouraged between the two countries. Such interactions
will provide both the sides with an opportunity to remove miner irritants and
misunderstood in their mutual relationship, and to give them meaningful,
substantive and strategic dimension.
o It is strongly suggested that non-interference in the internal affairs of both the
countires should be strictly observed as the ill relations between two countries is
mainly due to it.
o The media of both the countries and international one should ply positive role and
promote harmony and good gesture.
o Joint efforts by the two countries to make OIC more strong and effective in order
to resolve the outstanding problems confronting the Muslim countries,
particularly, Iraq, Palestine, and Kashmir. In this regard, the cooperation of other
Muslim countries, especially, Saudi Arab, is essential.
o The agreements, deals, protocols concluded between the two countries from time
to time, for the purpose of expansion of political and diplomatic relations may be
enforce and properly implemented.
o The post Taliban political and security situation in Afghanistan will create a
greater need for high degree of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan
because both the countries share borders with each other. The coordination and
cooperation between the two countries will be important for bringing complete
peace and stability in Afghanistan. In fact, the convergence of interest and policies
of the two countries will serve a strong basis for their future security cooperation.
If the two countries fail to response the emerging strategic challenges in the
region, they will find their legitimate interests undermine by the powers who do
not view favorably the improved relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
198
o The government of Pakistan may take concrete measures for the safety and the
security of Afghanistan diplomats, nationals, and students, and businessmen living
in Pakistan.
o Collective efforts on the part of the two governments to root out the germ of
Ethnicaland,sectarianism extremism once for all, and to bring complete peace and
harmony between the different Ethnical and sectarian factions.
o There is a great need for closer cooperation and collaboration between the two
countries in Central Asia. Such cooperation will be vital from the economic point
of view, which will provide both the countries with the opportunity for the
expansion of their economic cooperation. For example, Gwader Port can be linked
with Central Asia through the way of Boluchistan,s Chaman border and
Afghanistan,s railway network .
o Both the countries can mutually help each other to solve their problems at the
regional and global level. Pakistan can play an active role in bringing better
understanding between Afghanistan and USA. Similarly, Afghanistan can mediate
in harmonizing Pakistan's relations with India.
o Realization by both sides that they are by no mean locked in a zero-sum game
and, given good faith, ways can always be found for both to benefit without other
having to pay the cost.
o There is a great need to institutionalize interaction at track II, level i.e. at the level
of civil society to evolve better understanding and a new mode of conflict
resolution.
o An executable strategy between the two countries to exchange security
information with each other in order to boost their securities.
o The organization of an efficient, trained, and effective Task Force to access the
level of smuggling and drug trafficking between the two countries.
o The defense cooperation between the two countries must be flourished. The
benefit of defense cooperation can help the two countries to emerge as a strong
199
Asia Block. The promotion of defense ties is necessary in the view of
determination the security environment in the region. Secondly; such cooperation
will help to explore the possibility of joint production in the different military
projects.
o There is a need to improve culture relations between the two countries, as it can
help create mutually psychological perceptions towards each other. Pakistan and
Afghanistan can organize annual art exhibition to each other's countries.
o Exchange program between various universities and research institutions can be
established. In addition, the universities of both the countries may arrange the
visits of professors, scholar's intellectuals for the purpose of holding seminars,
workshops, and conferences for the enhancement academic activities between the
universities of the two countries the governments of the two countries shall
provide maximum facilities regarding their transportation and logging. The
procedure of visa for the scholars, intellectuals and professors may be relaxed. In
this regard, the cooperation of Afghan Consulate is essential.
o Efforts on the part of the two countries upgrade air links between Kabul and the
major cities of Pakistan, particularly, Quetta. Direct flight between Kabul and
Quetta can be established. Similarly, the railway track between Quetta and
Qandahar can be improved in order to provide more facilities to the passengers
and to people to people contacts.
o Both the sides may take necessary measures to encourage tourism by exchanging
information and by providing necessary facilities to tourist's i.e. to relax
formalities for the visit of the tourists. In addition, the study tours may be arranged
between the students of the two countries for the enhancement of their academic
activities.
o Both sides may provide necessary facilities for the promotion of sports through
the exchange of books, publication, films, and participation in sport seminars. The
two sides may also encourage sport festivals held on a different occasions in two
countries.
200
o They're a need of close cooperation between the News Agencies of the two
countries. Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and the Kabul Republic of
Afghanistan Broadcast should cooperate in the various fields through the
exchange of documentary films, microfilms and photographs.
o There must be close interactions of professionals, experts and technician,
especially doctors and engineers between the two countries.
o Both the countries may encourage activities by exchanging information in
Museums and hold exhibition of photographs of the historical places and
traditional dresses and art.
o The government of Afghanistan is requested to open Pakistani Culture Centers at
least in Kabul and Qandahar for further expansion of social and cultural
interaction between the two countries
o Both the sides may encourage academic linkages between the selected
universities. The number of scholarship for the university scholars at M.Phil and
PhD level to each other's country annually may be increase. There is a great need
to reduce the tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to expand the trade between the
two countries.
o The government of Afghanistan must review her import policy, which adversely
affected Pakistan's export to Afghanistan.
o Both the sides may take drastic measures for encouraging the chamber of
commerce and industries. Economic planning in the two countries should be done
in such a way that the interdependence between the two countries grows further.
o The organization of trade fairs and industrial exhalations for the expansion of
trade relations between the two countries must be encourage.
o Both countries must promote the exchange of commercial information as well as
the exchange of commercial magazines, journal, periodicals, newspapers and etc.
o There shall be an exchange of information between the two countries on the trade-
related laws, regulations and procedure.
201
o There is a need of increased interactions between the two countries in banking
institutions through the periodic seminars, conferences and workshops.
o Both the countries may review the ways and means to rationalize their border
trade. The border points at (Washe) in the Qandahar province of Afghanistan and
(Shorawake) in Noshki or any other mutually agreed place at Pak-Afghan border
may be open in order to promote trade and people to people contacts. The need for
closer cooperation and interaction between the traders,
o businessmen and trade delegations between the two countries which will enable
the traders and businessmen to understand each other's point of view, issues and
problems relating their bilateral trade and to evolve a common strategy for their
solution.
o The Afghanistan’s businessmen should take the opportunity to invest in the
different sectors of Pakistani economy, which has become more profitable due to
the ongoing privatization procession Pakistan.
o The number of commercial visits at the ministerial and secretarial level may be
increase in order to find out the ways and means to remove hurdles existing in
their mutual commercial relations.
o Closer cooperation between the public and private sector institutions dealing with
regional trade and commerce with a view to eradicate impediments in their trade.
o Collective efforts on the part of the two countries to reactivate ECO. Pakistan and
Afghanistan will utilize ECO to enhance their bilateral economic cooperation.
Both the countries can initiate a fast tract process for bringing about a regional
preferential trade along with the member countries under the umbrella of ECO.
o Both the countries should contribute greatly towards the expansion,
modernization and diversification of the state's economic base through the inflow
of capital and technological resources.
o Both the countries should emphasize the need for the construction of Pak, Afghan
& India gas pipeline, which would be advantageous to both countries form, the
202
economic and political point of view. The construction of trilateral gas pipeline
would prove an ideal platform to set off regional economic interdependence. The
materialization of this project will provide a natural benefit of all the three
countries. In addition, this project will be proving as valuable asset particularly in
the wake of improvement of relations between Pakistan and India.
o Joint efforts by the two countries to construct Quetta Qandahar-Ashakabad
railway line and Gawader Sea port.
o There is urgent need to make Pak-Afghan joint Ministerial Commission more
strong and powerful to review and mentor the effective implementation of its
various decisions.
o Joint ventures in industries, science and technology which have already
formulated between the two countries may be flourished.
o There is a great need for the continuing process of dialogue between the experts in
the fields such industries, agriculture and infrastructure. Exchange of media
experts along with entrepreneurs would play a vital role in bringing the economic
gap.
o Afghanistan government may be persuade to encourage their government sector
agencies to import wheat, rice, sugar, corn, paper, surgical goods, sport goods,
gasoline and toys from Pakistan which, at present in not in the considerable
volume and value.
o Pakistan should to increase its export to Afghanistan in order to maintain the
balance of trade, which has been greatly in Afghanistan favor.
o There is a great need to form a rational and executable strategy for the
improvement in trade relations.
o Both the sides can form an appropriate trade strategy, in which both the countries
should adjust each other's interest.
203
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NEWS PAPERS
1. The Wahadat
2. Jang (Urdu)
3. Mashriq (Urdu)
4. London Time.
MAGZINES
1. The Economist
2. Wall Street Journal
3. Insight
4. globe
5. New Times
6. Spot Light, Pakistan
7. Press Review
8. Herald International
9. Financial Times
10. News Week USA
11. ar Eastern Economic
12. eview, Hong Kong
Journals & Periodicals
1WUFA (Writers Union of free Afghanistan) Peshawar. P.I.I.A.
1. Pakistan Horizon, Karachi.
2. Strategic Studies, I.S.S.I. Islamabad.
3. Strategic Perspective.
4. Defense Review, G.H.Q. Rewalpindi.
5. Defense journal Karachi,
6. Foreign Affairs, USA
7. Current History. USA
8. Third world Quarterly. USA
9. The world Today.UK.
10. International Affairs, Royal institute of international Affairs.
213
11. Obis, USA.
12. Foreign Affair Pakistan, Islamabad.
13. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Villanova, USA
14. Current Affairs (Monthly) Pakistan
15. National Geographic
16. he Middle East
17. ational Foreign Assessment, USA.
18. Royal Asian Journal.
Papers and Lectures
Zehra, Nasim,’ Pak-Afghan Relations: Condations and Compulsion for strategic
Relationship; Paper presented at the institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
December 5, 2004.
Zaheer, Nigar Sajjad.;Pak-Afghan Relations(1947-1979);Paper delivered at
thedepartment of History, University of Peshawer March 4 2004.
Mazari Shireen M., ;The Emerging Anti-Terrorism Coalition: Implications for
Pakistan And the Muslim World; Paper delivered at the Institute of St ratgic
Studies
, Islambad, September 21, 2003.
Sarwar, Adnan,Pak-Afghan Relations After Sauer Revolution; Paper presented at
Department of International Relations,University of Peshawer, March52004.s
Wazarat, Talat Dr., US War of Terror; Implications for Pakistan South Asia;
Paper presanted at The Department of History , University of Kara chi. March 4
,2005.
Personal Interviews
Bukhari.Ibrahim Shah Dr., The Ex-Vice Chancellor,University of jamshoro,
Hyderabad Sind Personal Interview Marchio,2006.,
Ahmad,MunirDr.,Director of Area Study Center for Middle East and Arab worlds
Unvirsity of Balochistan,Quetta.Personal Interview, September 5,2006.
Lubna,Dr., Assistant Professor,Deparment of International Relations, Quaid-e-
Azam University Islambad, Personal Interview, October 10, 2004
214
Marwat,Fazal-ur-Rahim Dr., Associat Professor, Pakistan study Center,University
of Pashwawer, Personal Intervie,December 5,2007.
Sarwar,Adnan Dr., The chairman of the Department of International Relations,
University of Pashawer, personal Interew, January 10,2007.
Brach, Kaleem professor Deportment of ,History University of Balochistan
personal Interew Quetta.March,5 2007.
NEWS MEDIA
A-Television
1. BBC.
2. VIRA, (Voice of Islamic Revolution Afghanistan).
3. PTV
4. GEO News
5. CNN
6. ARY One
7. Independent Television Netwerk
8. Indus Network
9. Khyber AVT
10. N.E.T.Network
11. P.T.V Bolan
12. PTV National
13. PTV World
14. WNDT, New York
B. Radio
All India Radio
BBC Monitoring Service
The Voice of Iran
Radio Kabul
Radio Tehran
Radio Pakistan
Voice of America
215
C News Agenices
Associated Press OF Pakistan
Kabul News Agency
Middle East News Agency
New China News Agency
Tass
D. Press Digest
Asian Recorder
BusinessRecorder
Government of Pakistan Handouts
News Recorder
Monthly Current Affairs Digest
Survey of Mainland China
E. Newspapers
Asia Time
Balochistan Times
Daily Telgraph
Daily Times
Dawn
The Econmic Ties
Finanical Time
Frontier Post
Guardian
Hindu
Indian Express
International Herald Tribute
Khyber Mail
Morning News
Muslim
Nation
216
National Herald
Naw-e-waqat
The News
News Recorder
New York Times
Observer
Outlook
Pacific News Service
Pakistan Times
Pashawer Times
Siyat-e-Ruz
Statesman
Sunday Times
The Washing Post
217
Reports
Annual Report (1967-68), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India,New Delhi:1968.
Government of Pakistan Report,Islamabad:ENIPublication,2000.
Pak-Afghan Collaboration, Foreign Affairs Report, Vol.22,No.5, May,,1976.
Pak-Afghan Trade 1997,A Country Report, Ministry of Commerce,
Government of Pakistan.
Government Docments
Afghan Foreign Relation 1964-65, Kabul:Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1964.
Pak-Afghan Joint Communiqe,Pakistan Horizon, vol.24,No.1, January-
march 1972.
Pakistan Chronology (1947-97),Islamabad: Press and Information
Department, Government of Pakistan,1998.
Parliamentary Document
Pakistan National Assembly Debates,vol.4,No . 3 ,1966.
Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debate,vol.1,No.2March 1950.
India Lock Sabha Debate.vol.40,No.15 20December1965.
United Nations Documents
United Nations General Assembly Official Record (GAOR) sess.25,plan
Mtg,2204,December.1972.
Message/Speeches/ Addresses
President Bush, George, Message to the World, Washington DC September
20,2001.
President Bush, George, State of Union Adress, January 29 2002.
President Musharraf,Pervez,Foreign Policy of Pakistan’’ an Adress delivered
at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs Karachi,june 23,2002.
Maps :