ideology in the afghan taliban - afghanistan analysts … in the afghan taliban 1. ... 1 abdulkader...

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AnandGopalandAlexStrickvanLinschoten

IdeologyintheAfghanTaliban

1. EXECUTIVESUMMARY

TheTaleban’sideologyishistoricallyrootedintheworldofthepre-1979,southernPashtunvillage.Thevillagecontainsvariousandcompetingethicaltraditions,oneofwhichlaidthebasisforthefutureTalebanmovement.KeyfeaturesofTalebanrepression,suchasrestrictionsonwomenorbanningmusic,havetheirantecedentsinthesouthernPashtuncountryside.

MorethanhalfoftheTalebanseniorleadership–includingnearlyallthekeyideologicalinfluencers–werebornbefore1965,whichmeansthattheyreceivedtheirprimaryeducationandformativechildhoodexperiencespriortothe1979upheaval.

TheclassictheoryoftheTalebanstatesthatthemovementistheproductofextremistPakistanimadrassas,butdatapresentedheresuggeststhatatleast60percentoftheleadershipreceivedasignificantportionoftheireducationinsideAfghanistan.

Theeducationofthecoreoftheseniorleadershiptookplaceinhujras,informalguestroomsinvillagemosques,andfeaturedacurriculumthatwasfarmoreeclecticandirregularthantheDeobandicurriculumfoundinmajorAfghanandPakistanimadrassas.

ThroughlinkstoDeobandismandindigenousreligiouspractice,theTalebanleadership,

particularlysupremeleaderMullahMuhammadOmar,weredeeplyinfluencedbySufism.

TheTaleban’sideologyhastransformedoverthepasttwodecades.Whilethemovementoncetypifieda‘traditionalist’Islam–thatis,itsoughttoarticulateanddefendaparticularconceptionofIslamfoundinthesouthernPashtunvillage–itisnow,duringitsinsurgencyphase,closertotheformofpoliticalIslamespousedintheArabworld.ThisdoesnotmeanthattheTalebanarelessconservativeorlessauthoritarian,butratherthattheobjectsoftheirrepression,andthewaytheyframetheirmission,haveshiftedinimportantways.

TheTaleban’sideologyisbasedonaparticularepistemology,atheoryofknowledge,intheircase,religiousknowledge.Inthepast,thisepistemologywasintimatelylinkedtocertainruralPashtuntraditionsofvirtue,butinthepresent,itismoresimilartothe‘modern’typeofIslamistreasoningfoundingroupsrangingfromtheMuslimBrotherhoodtoalQaeda.Thisshiftislargelyareflectionofthepragmaticconcernsofstatecraftandespeciallyofrunninganinsurgency.Astudyofthefoundationsofthisepistemologysuggestthatthegroup’sbeliefsandpracticeswereneversimplyamechanicalimitationofaliteralistreadingoftextsorablindattempttorecreatetheearlydaysofProphetMuhammad,butratherweretheresultofa

AANThematicReport01/2017

2 GopalandStrickvanLinschoten:IdeologyintheAfghanTaleban

sophisticatedinternallogicthatwasdeeplytiedtonotionsofhonour,virtueandrepressivepoweramongPashtunvillagers.

ThekeytransformationofTalebanideologywasashiftfromanemphasisonexteriorstates–throughtheknowledgeofrites,bodilycomportment,thePropheticlifestyle,prayertechniquesandschedules,andotheraspectsofeverydayritual–toonethattodayemphasisesinteriorstatesofbeliefandloyalty.Thedistinctionisbetweenactand

intentastheobjectsofTalebanrepression.Thisshift,whichisstrongestinsectionsoftheleadership,helpsexplainthemovement’sembraceofonce-forbiddenitemssuchasfilmandphotography.Thepragmaticexigenciesofwaginganinsurgencyspurredthisideologicalshift.

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3GopalandStrickvanLinschoten:IdeologyintheAfghanTaleban

TableofContents

INTRODUCTION 4

Preliminaries 6

THEAFGHANWORLDBEFORE1979 9

TalebanandSufism 16

THEANTI-SOVIET'JIHAD' 17

THEISLAMICEMIRATEOFAFGHANISTAN 21

TheCivilWarandtheRootsofAuthenticity 21

TheIslamicEmirateandtheRestorationofVirtue 23

Contradictions 27

IdeologuesoftheIslamicEmirate–Biographies 28

THEANTI-AMERICAN'JIHAD' 32

Downfall&Crisis 32

TheConsequencesofIslamism 35

Explanation 38

IslamistNationalism 39

CONCLUSION 43



1.INTRODUCTION

AnenduringfeatureofAfghanpoliticsoverdecadesofwararethefrequentfissures,reconfigurationsandshiftingalliancesthathaveplaguedthepoliticalspectrum.Allsignificantpartiesoftheanti-Sovietinsurgencyhaveundergonesplits;somehavefadedinimportancewhileothershavestayedrelevantonlybyradicallyrecalibratingtheirpoliticalposition:injustadecade,forexample,AbdulRasulSayyaf’sIttehad-eIslamiwentfromsupportingtheprogenitorsofalQaedatosupportingtheUSinterventiontooustalQaeda.Amidthisperpetualflux,theTalebanstandasaremarkablyconsistentforceinAfghanpoliticallife.Untilrecently,thegrouphadsufferednosignificantsplits,andmanyofthesameindividualswholedthe1990sgovernmentaretodayleadingtheinsurgency.Despitearrests,battlefieldretreatsandthedeathsofthousandsofitsrank-and-fileanddozensofseniorcadre–includingsupremeleaderMullahMuhammadOmar–thegroupappearswellpoisedtoremainthemostsignificantandinfluentialsinglepoliticalforcewithinAfghanistanformanyyearstocome.

WhataccountsfortheTaleban’slongevity?Formanyyears,therewerenoeasyanswers.Wheninpower,thegroupwasnotoriouslysecretiveandshunnedoutsiders—asruler,MullahMuhammadOmartravelledtoKabul,hisputativecapital,onlyonce;asaninsurgentmovement,interactionswiththegroupcarrygreatperilfortheoutsider.Still,inrecentyears,scholarsandresearchershavebeguntopiecetogetheraccountsofthemovement’sappealtoaparticularsegmentofthepopulation.TheyhaveshownthattheTaleban’sorganisationalcapacityvis-à-visotherPashtungroups,andtherepressivenatureofUSforcesandtheAfghangovernment,havehelpedensurethatthegroupcontinuestohaveahearingincertaincommunities.1

Acrucialpieceofthispuzzle,onethathasnotreceivedadequateattention,isideology:merelyharbouringgrievancesisnotsufficientforindividualstojoinamovement.Rather,organisationsmustarticulatethosegrievancesinawaythatspeakstoheartsandminds.Tomobiliseindividualsandcommunities,theTalebanmustbeabletopresentaworldviewthatlinksnotjustto

1AbdulkaderHSinno,OrganizationsAtWarinAfghanistanandBeyond,CornellUniversityPress2009,PaulStaniland,NetworksofRebellion:ExplainingInsurgentCohesionandCollapse,Ithica,CornellUniversityPress2014.AnandGopal,NoGoodMenAmongtheLiving:America,theTaliban,andtheWarThroughAfghanEyes,NewYork,Picador2015.

questionsofpower,buttotheemotionalandthepractical,theother-worldlyandthemundane.

ThisstudyaimstoanalysetheTaleban’sideologyandhowithaschangedoverthepastthreedecades.ThemainstreamviewofTalebanideologyisperhapsbestsuggestedbythefollowingpassage,fromAhmedRashid’sinfluentialandseminalworkTaliban:MilitantIslam,OilandFundamentalisminCentralAsia:2

“Manyof[theTaleban]hadbeenborninPakistanirefugeecamps,educatedinPakistanimadrassasandhadlearnttheirfightingskillsfromMujaheddinpartiesbasedinPakistan.AssuchtheyoungerTalibanbarelyknewtheirowncountryorhistory,butfromtheirmadrassastheylearntabouttheidealIslamicsocietycreatedbytheProphetMohammed1,400yearsagoandthisiswhattheywantedtoemulate.”3

TheimplicationisthattheTalebanare,inessence,aphenomenonalientoAfghansociety.TheirvisionarticulatesanidealfoundinPakistanimadrassas,notinthesouthernPashtunvillage.TheyarearesultofthepoliticisationandradicalisationofIslamunderPakistaniGeneralZiaul-HaqandSaudipatronage.Thisstrandofthoughthasfoundawideechoinacademiaandthepolicysphere.SomeauthorslinktheTalebantoWahhabism,theaustereversionofIslaminSaudiArabiathatseekstostripthereligionof‘innovation’(bid’a)andreturnittothe(imagined)practiceofthetimeoftheProphet.Indeed,theidentificationoftheTalebanwithWahhabismisperhapsthemostenduringcharacterisationofTalebanideologyinpolicyresearchandthemedia.4

Itturnsoutthatbothoftheseandmanyotherwidely-heldconceptionsarefalse.Totakeoneexample:ifmostTalebanwereborninPakistanirefugeecamps—whichonlycameintoexistencein1979—itwouldmeanthattheywouldhavebeenbetweentheagesof14and20,atmost,duringtheperiodofruleoftheIslamicEmirate(theTaleban’s

2AhmedRashid,Taliban:MilitantIslam,OilandFundamentalisminCentralAsia,Boston,YaleUniversityPress2010.3Rashid,Taliban,[seeFN2],23.4See,asexamplesofthis:ZacharyLaub,‘Backgrounder:TheTalibaninAfghanistan’,NewYork,CouncilonForeignRelations,http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.AgenceFrancePress,TalibanreligiousdoctrineinspiredbySaudiWahhabism,’24September2001.http://afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/september/sep24w2001.html.

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namefortheirgovernment).Whilethismayhavebeentrueforfootsoldiers,itwasunlikelythecaseforcommanders,andwascertainlynotthecasefortheTalebanleadership.Ofcourse,giventhegroup’sobscurantistnatureandthedearthofhistoricalrecords,itisunderstandablethatRashidandotherpioneersinTalebanstudiescouldhavedrawndifferentconclusions.Today,however,agrowingbodyofprimarysourcematerialandtheincreasingavailabilityofkeyTalebanfiguresforinterviewallowsustocriticallyre-examinemuchoftheprevailingnarrative.

ThisstudyusesahostofnewdatatoreassessreceivedwisdomontheTaleban’sideology.ThefirstdatasetisfromtheTalibanSourcesProject,acollaborativeefforttocollectandcurateTalebannewspapers,magazines,booksandnightletters,fromtheinceptionofthemovementin1994tothepresent.5ThebulkofthismaterialhasneverbeforebeenmadeavailableinEnglishandincludes1990s-erapublicationssuchas:Shariat,theTalebangovernment’sflagshipnewspaper;Tolo-yeAfghan,aKandahar-basednewspaperthatservedasakeyconduitfortheregime;theculturalmagazinesAnisandHewad;andtheTalebanMinistryofDefencenewspaperSangar.Alsointhecollectionarepost-2001insurgentpublications,includingthecompleterunofal-Somood,themovement’sbimonthlymagazine,andkeyitemsfromthegroup’snetworkofwebsitesthatexpoundonmattersoftheologyandjihad.Outsideofthiscollection,ourstudyalsousesanumberofmemoirswrittenbyTalebanfiguresorkeyparticipantsintheanti-SovietjihadinsouthernAfghanistan.WecombinedtheseprimarysourceswithextensiveinterviewsconductedoverthecourseofanumberofyearsspentlivingandworkinginAfghanistan.Inparticular,interviewsconductedinsouthernAfghanistan,PakistanandQatarwithkeyTalebanfigureshaveyieldednewdataontheeducationalandbiographicalbackgroundsoftheTalebanleadership.Ithasalsoproducedinsightsintotheirthoughtandpracticeduringthe1980sjihad,andclarifiedtheconditionsunderwhichtheycameofageasyoungreligiousstudentsinthePashtuncountryside.Thesesourceswereroundedoutwithavarietyofnon-Taleban

5TheTalibanSourcesProjectisajointeffortbyAnandGopal,AlexStrickvanLinschotenandFelixKuehn(inconjunctionwithThesigers)tocollate,digitiseandtranslateprimarysourcedocumentsassociatedwiththeAfghanTalebanmovement.Moreinformationcanbefoundattalibansourcesproject.com.NightlettersorshabnamehrefertoletterssentbytheTalebantoindividualstowarnthemawayfromtheirworkwiththegovernment,forexample.

sources,includingethnographicstudiesofpre-1979andcivilwar-eraAfghanistan.

Takentogether,theevidencesuggeststhreeimportantclarificationsandamendmentstoourunderstandingoftheTaleban,whicharethethreeoverarchingthemesofthisstudy:

-First,formanyyears,theTaleban’sideologywasrootedintheworldofthepre-1979,southernPashtunvillage.Althoughthisworldviewwouldbecomeamplifiedanddistortedinsomeimportantwaysduetotheyearsofjihadandcivilwar,itwasnotthecasethattheTaleban’sideologywasanalienphenomenon,orsolelyaproductofextremistPakistanimadrassas.

-Second,theTaleban’sideologyhaschangedoverthepasttwodecades.Whilethemovementoncetypifieda‘traditionalist’Islam—thatis,itsoughttoarticulateanddefendaparticularconceptionofIslamfoundinthesouthernPashtunvillage—itisnow,duringitsinsurgencyphase,closertotheformofpoliticalIslamespousedintheArabworld.ThisdoesnotmeanthattheTalebanarenecessarilylessconservativeorlessauthoritarian,butratherthattheobjectsoftheirrepression,andthewaytheyframetheirmission,haveshiftedinimportantways.

-Third,theTaleban’sideologyisbasedonaparticularepistemology,atheoryofknowledge,intheircase,religiousknowledge.Inthepast,thisepistemologywasintimatelylinkedtocertainruralPashtuntraditionsofvirtue,butinthepresent,itismoresimilartothe“modern”typeofIslamistreasoningfoundingroupsrangingfromtheMuslimBrotherhoodtoalQaeda.Thisshiftislargelyareflectionofthepragmaticconcernsofstatecraftandespeciallyofrunninganinsurgency.Astudyofthefoundationsofthisepistemologysuggestthatthegroup’sbeliefsandpracticeswereneversimplyamechanicalimitationofaliteralistreadingoftextsorablindattempttorecreatetheearlydaysofProphetMuhammad,butratherweretheresultofasophisticatedinternallogicthatwasdeeplytiedtonotionsofhonour,virtueandrepressivepoweramongPashtunvillagers.

Tobesure,theseshiftsandtrendsareuneventhroughoutthemovement;theymoreaccuratelydescribetheevolutionoftheleadershipthantherank-and-file,whichinsomecasesmaystillbeespousingtraditionalistviewpoints.TheshiftintheTaleban’sepistemologyissimilarlyuneven—suggestingthatthemovementisintheprocessof“modernising,”butalongroadaheadremains.Inthissense,thetransformationsthispaperexploresdescribesthetrajectoryoftheevolutionintheTaleban’sthinking,andisnotmeanttosuggestacompletedorhomogenousprocess.



Inwhatfollows,wewillfirstclarifyourguidingpremisesandthetermsweuseinthispaper,particularly“politicalIslam,”“traditionalism,”“modernism,”and“ideology,”and“Taleban.”Then,insectionone,weattempttoreconstructsomekeysocialpractices,villagenorms,andethicalconcernsofthepre-1979southernPashtunvillage.Sectiontwoexaminestheeffectofthe1980sjihadonsouthernruralsocialorganisationandthethoughtoffutureTalebanmembers.SectionthreeexplorestheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistan’sgovernmentandattemptstochartthecontradictionsof“traditionalism”asamethodofrule.Sectionfourdescribesthepost-2001Talebaninsurgency,showinghow,throughfirstdecadeofthiswar,themovement’sthoughtandpracticechangedconsiderablyfromthe1980sand1990s.Finally,theconclusionofferssuggestionsforhowtousethisstudy’sfindingstoanalysewhatwefearwillbethecomingyearsoftheAfghanconflict.

PreliminariesBeforewebegin,itwillhelptoclarifyourguidingpremises.ThefirstisthattheTalebanasapoliticalcategoryisrootedinacenturies-oldsocialcategoryofvillage-basedreligiousstudentsandmullahs.Thissocialphenomenon,likeanyother,hasundergonechangeslargeandsmalloverthecenturies,buttwoareparticularlyofinterestasdirectantecedentstothepresent.ThefirstoccurredbecauseoftheSovietoccupationandanti-Sovietjihad,whichthrustpoorreligiousstudentsandyoungmullahsinsouthernAfghanistanontothefrontlines.Forthepurposesofthispaper,wedenotethesemullahsandstudentsas“taleban.”ThesecondtransformationoccurredwiththeuprisingofKandahar-basedtalebanleadbymullahMuhammadOmaragainstlocalwarlords,whichculminatedintheformationoftheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistan.Werefertotheformalpoliticalgroupproducedbythisprocessasthe“Taleban.”Thecontinuitybetweenthesegroupsishigh;thecoreofthetalebanmujahedin,whoinsouthernAfghanistanwereorganisedintosemi-autonomousbandscalled‘talebanfronts’,wouldgoontoleadtheTalebanmovementandsubsequentlytheTalebaninsurgency.6Forthis

6Formoreonthetalebanfronts,see:AlexStrickvanLinschotenandFelixKuehn,AnEnemyWeCreated:TheMythoftheTaliban-AlQaedaMergerinAfghanistan,London,HurstPublishers2012;AbdulSalamZaeef,MyLifeWiththeTaliban,London,Hurst2010;SayyedMohammadAkbarAgha,IAmAkbarAgha:MemoriesoftheAfghanJihadandtheTaliban,Berlin,FirstDraftPublishing2014,OlivierRoy,‘DieTaliban-BewegunginAfghanistan’,Mahfel,1995,45,8-10.

reason,nostudyoftheideologyoftheTalebaniscompletewithouttracingthegroup’sthoughttothesepre-Emiratedays.Itwasinthequietpietyofpre-1979villagelife,thebone-rattlinglifeinthetrenchesoftheanti-Sovietstruggle,andthedissolutechaosofthecivilwarthattheTaleban’sidentitywasforged,anditsideologycoalesced.

ThesecondguidingpremiseisthatpoliticalIslamcomesinmanyvarieties,andthatthedistinctionwithinitthatismosthelpfultounderstand(intheAfghancontext)isbetween“traditionalist”and“modernist”politicalIslam.Togetabettergripofthisdistinction,andwhyitisrelevantforourpurposes,itwillbeusefultobrieflydescribetheearlyhistoryofpoliticalIslam.

ThedeclineoftheOttomanEmpireinthenineteenthcenturyandtheriseofWesternimperialismintheMiddleEastandSouthAsiapushedArabandMuslimintellectualstoarticulatearesponse.Manyoftheleadingfiguresofthisearlymovement,likeJamalad-Dinal-AfghaniandMuhammadAbduh,weredeeplyinfluencedbynationalistmovementsinIndiaandEgypt.Theleadingsecularnationalistswereoftendeeplycriticalofthebackwardnessoftheirowncommunities,andinparticularofIslam,vis-à-visthecolonisers.Inresponse,al-AfghaniarguedthattheproblemlaynotwithIslamitself,butwiththemyriadlocaltraditionsthroughwhichIslamwaspracticed,whichbredconservatismandsoiledMuslimpracticewithtribalandculturalmores.Theanswer,al-Afghanicontended,wastostripIslamofitslocalparticularitiesandeccentricinnovationsandreturnittoitsessence,whichcouldservetobindtheentireMuslimumma—which,inimitationofthesecularists,hedescribedasa“nation.”Al-AfghanithususedthenewWesternideaofnationalism—animaginedcommunityofsharedlanguageandculturethathasexisted,inthemindsofitsproponents,fromtimeimmemorial—toreinvigorateIslam.7

Toal-Afghaniandhisacolytes,itwasglobalIslam’spatchworknature,miredwiththedefectsoflocalcultures,traditionalismandsuperstition,thathadproducedsomany“innovations”—thatis,departuresfromIslam’s(imagined)essence.Thesedepartures,theybelieved,hadbroughttheoncegloriousMuslimsocietiesintodecline,allowingtheWesttocatapultindevelopmentandsubjugatetheEast.IntheMuslimworldatthattime,localclericsproducedrulingsinemulation(taqlid)oftheirforbears,andheldthatMuslimsshouldfollowtheserulingswithoutprooforjustification.Themodernistslikeal-Afghani,ontheotherhand, 7InAfghani'scase,thesharedlanguagewasIslam,nottheethnictonguesofsecularnationalism.

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arguedfortherationalinterpretation(ijtihad)oftheQuran’struemeaning.8Theimplicationwastoepistemologicallyprivilegereason;iftherewasacontradictionbetweenmodernscienceandIslam,itwasthelatterthatshouldbereinterpreted9tobetteralignwiththeformer.Allthiswas,intheend,inlargepartanattempttoformulateadefenceagainstWesterndomination.Butthiswasnotmerelyacaseofusingthemaster’stoolstodismantlethemaster’shouse,becausethesereformistsinsistedthatthesourceoftheirideascouldbefoundinIslamichistoryitself.AsTalalAsadhassaid:10

“WecanregardthecontemporaryIslamicrevivalasconsistingofattemptsatarticulatingIslamictraditionsthatareadequatetothemodernconditionexperiencedintheMuslimworld,butalsoattemptsatformulatingencounterswithWesternaswellasIslamichistory.”

AsNikkiKeddiewrites,ultimatelythegoalwasthatpan-IslamandIslamicreformwere“twosidesofaprogrammeofstrengtheningtheMuslimworldanddefeatingimperialism.”11Itisforthisreasonthatwesaythatal-AfghaniandhissuccessorsinauguratedapoliticalIslam—anIslamconcernedwith,butnotlimitedto,questionsofoppressionandpoliticalpower.ThispoliticalIslamusesmodernconceptsofstatehood,sovereigntyandnationalism;itrejectstaqlid,favoursrationalism,repudiateslocalism,spurns“tradition”intheabstractorculturalsense,embracesWestern-stylebureaucratic-legalnorms—allinanattempttoaddressthefundamentalimbalanceinpoliticalpowerbetweenEastandWest.

Theterms“traditionalism”and“modernistpoliticalIslam”areidealtypes;inpracticethecategoriesbleedintoeachother,soweshouldimagineaspectrum.12Still,itoffersausefullenswithwhich

8Thisdidnotmakethemdemocrats,however.LikePlatoandthelongtraditionofWesternphilosophers,themodernists(andtheirantecedentslikeIbnTaymiyya)believedthatthetaskoftherationaldivinationoftheQur’anrestedwiththeulemaandotherelites.9Inthecaseofsuchcontradiction,itwasnotIslamitselfthatwasincorrect,buttheinterpretationsofIslamthatrequiredupdating.10TalalAsad,‘InterviewwithTalalAsad:ModernPowerandtheReconfigurationofReligiousTraditions,’SEHR,Volume5,Issue1:ContestedPolities,27February1996.11NikkiR.Keddie,AnIslamicResponsetoImperialism:PoliticalandReligiousWritingsofSayyidJamālAd-Dīn"al-Afghānī”.California,UniversityofCaliforniaPress1983,43.12ForWeber,anidealtypeisatheorist’sconstructionthatcanaidinthestudyofsocialphenomenon,ratherthanatypologythatnecessarilyinheresinsocialrealityitself.Inourcase,thecategoriesoftraditionalismand

toviewAfghanistan.There,“traditionalistIslam”isatypeofreligiouspracticeorientedtowardruralculture.Itconcernsitselfwithissuesofvirtue,disputeresolution,ritual,and,intimesofstrife,defenceoftheproperwaysofliving—proper,inthiscontext,beingtheidealisedlifeofthepast,theimaginedwayinwhichthingshavealwaysbeen.Historically,thetraditionalists—embodiedinAfghanistanintheruralulema,mullahs,andtheirstudents—didnotseektorevolutionisesocietybuttopreserveit,todefendanddeepenthosepracticesandritualsoftheeverydayexperienceofIslam.

“ModernistpoliticalIslam,”ontheotherhand,wasarticulatedbyurban-based,Afghanintellectualsinthe1960sand70s.InfluencedbytheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,AfghanpoliticalIslamsoughttorevolutionisesociety,overturningoldsocialrelationswhileemphasisingsocialjustice.13Theleadingproponents—menlikeGhulamMuhammadNiaziandBurhanuddinRabbani—hadstudiedinal-AzharinCairoandwereclosetotheMuslimBrotherhood.(Rabbani,afuturemujahedinleader,isbelievedtobethefirsttohavetranslatedSayyedQutbfromArabicintoPersian).14HistorianHassanKakarwritesthat“Inanearly1970spamphletpublishedbyJam’iyyat[Jamiat-e-Islami],‘WhoAreWeandWhatDoWeWant?’itwasstatedthatthemovementwasnothingbutanattempttoliberatethepeopleofAfghanistanfromtheclutchesoftyrannyandtobringaboutarenaissanceinreligion.”15Thus,theAfghanIslamistswereanimatedbyverysimilarconcernsastheirrivals,thecommunists:overcomingthecountry’sperceived“backwardness,”fosteringtechnologicalandinstitutionalprogress,andlevellingsocialinequalities.ThismeantthatfortheAfghanIslamists,thenatureofsocietywas,asOlivierRoywrites,“predeterminedbythenature

modernismarestarklydelineatedpriorto1979,butblurredtosomeextentinthe1980s(asurbanIslamistsmadeallianceswithruralclergyandtribalelites)onlytore-establishitselfmorestarklyagaininthe1990sonaglobalscale.13TheEgyptianMuslimBrotherhoodwerethemostprominentproponentsofmodernistpoliticalIslam,anditwasthroughanacquaintancewiththeirideas—notdirectlywithearliertheoristslikeal-Afghani—thatAfghanpoliticalIslamistsdevelopedtheirviews.14AdnanMusallam,FromSecularismtoJihad:SayyidQutbandtheFoundationsofRadicalIslamism,Praeger2005,172;SteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryoftheCIA,Afghanistan,andBinLaden,FromtheSovietInvasiontoSeptember10,2001,NewYork,Penguin2005,Kindlelocation2299.15MohammedHassanKakar,Afghanistan:TheSovietInvasionandtheAfghanResponse,1979-1982,UniversityofCaliforniaPress1997.



ofthestate.”16TheirtaskwastolayclaimtothestatemachineryandputittotheserviceofallAfghans—which,theybelieved,couldonlybedonethroughIslam.

FortheAfghantraditionalists,ontheotherhand,thenatureofthestatewaspredeterminedbythenatureofsociety—whichmeanttheyplacedaheavyemphasisonritualandlifestyle.Tobesure,modernistpoliticalIslamistswerealsoconcernedwithaspectsofritualandlifestyle—particularlyinthedomainofgender—butwhatdistinguishedthetraditionalistswastheiremphasisonlifestyletotheexclusionofotherconcernslikeegalitarianismoreconomicmodernisation.Inshort,whiletheIslamistssoughttorevolutionisesocioculturalpracticebymanagingthestate,thetraditionalistslookedtopreservethatpracticebymanagingsociety.ThesociologistCharlesKurzmanexplainsthat:17

“Islamistsmaintainthattherearemultiplewaysofbeingmodern,andthatmodernityisnotlimitedtoWesternculture.IslamistsmayallythemselvesonoccasionwithtraditionalistIslamicmovements,andtheymaysharecertainsymbolsofpiety,buttheyarequitedistinctinsociologicalterms.TraditionalistssuchastheTalibanofAfghanistan,bycontrastwithIslamistssuchasBinLaden’sAlQaedanetwork,drawonlesseducatedsectorsofsociety,believeinmysticalandpersonalauthority,andareskepticalofmodernorganizationalforms.”

Thispaperwillshowthatpriorto1979andduringtheanti-Sovietjihad,thosewholaterbecametheTalebanweretraditionalists,butthatby2015theyhavecometobehave,inmanyrespects,likeamodernistIslamistmovement.TheperiodoftheEmiratemarkedatransition,inwhichthegroupsoughttoregulateritualandpersonalcultivationontheonehand,andmanagetheexigenciesofmodernstatecraftontheother—acontradictionthathadnoreadysolution.

Thethirdguidingpremiseofthisstudyisrelatedtoouruseof“ideology.”Thetermisoftenappliedpejorativelyasawayofdescribing(usuallyotherpeople’s)self-interestedbelief.Itistypicallycontrastedto“knowledge,”whichisusuallytakentomeanbeliefthatisbothtrueandjustifiedthroughreasonorempiricaldata.Finally,itisusuallyunderstoodasadeliberate,all-encompassingworldviewthatreferencesorespousesapoliticalprogramme.

16OlivierRoy,IslamandResistanceinAfghanistan,CambridgeUniversityPress1990.17CharlesKurzman,‘WhoAretheRadicalIslamists?’InGoodwin,J.andJaspersSocialMovementsReader.

Theseusualapproacheshaveanumberofproblems:first,byviewingideologyassimplyamisperceptionorfailuretoreason,theseviewsemphasisepsychologicalstatesattheexpenseoftheconditionsthatenablepeopletoholdtheviewsinquestion.Inthepolicyworld,forexample,studiesofIslamicgroupstendtoportrayactors’beliefsasafixedoressentialiseddoctrines.18Second,countingonlythoseviewsthatonedisagreeswithasideologicalrunstheriskofmissingtheimportantbiasesandassumptionsthatcolourone’sownviewofthesubjectsunderstudy,therebymisapprehendingthesubtletiesoftheirthought.Third,restrictingideologytoaformalpoliticalprogrammerisksmissingavarietyofbehaviourthatcouldbefruitfullyanalysedasideological.

Inthispaper,wefollowtheapproachofTerryEagleton,whoofferedadefinitionofideologyasa“complexofempiricalandnormativeelements,withinwhichthenatureandorganisationoftheformerisultimatelydeterminedbythelatter.”19Atitscore,ideologyisamoralinterpretationoftheworld,asetofbeliefsabouthowpeopleoughttobehaveandhowsocietyoughttobeorganised.Thisframingispowerfulenoughtoshapethewayindividualsperceivehowtheworldis.Ultimately,beliefsabouthowsocietyoughttobeorganisedarerootedinanindividual’ssocialposition,herclass,andhowembeddedsheisinparticularnetworks—sostudyingideologyrequiresgroundingamovement’sthoughtandpracticeinpowerrelations,materialconditions,andhistoricalcircumstances.Seeninthislight,practicing“tradition,”isasideologicalanexerciseasattemptstobreakfromittocreateaneworder.Therefore,inordertoproperlydescribeandunderstandtheTaleban’sideology,wetakethehistoricalapproachandbegininthebygoneeraofpre-1979Afghanistan.

18LisaStampnitzky,DisciplingTerror:HowtheExpertsInventedTerrorism,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress2013.19Eagletonoffersthisdefinitioninthefirstofsuccessiverefinements,whichintroducequestionsofclassandthedominantpower.TerryEagleton,Ideology:AnIntroduction,London,VersoBooks1991,28.

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THEAFGHANWORLDBEFORE1979

InDataaboutpre-1979villagelifeisdifficulttocomeby,althoughhereandtherewefindcluesofthetypeofworldfirst-generationTalibslikemullahOmarmusthavegrownupin.Figure1depictsthedistributionofbirthyearsamongtheleadershipoftheIslamicEmirate.Thedatacomesfromthe

Figure1:BirthYearFrequencyofTalebanLeadership

UnitedNationsTalebansanctionslistpursuanttoResolution1988.20Theaccuracyofthedatesisunclear;however,forasubsetofaboutfiftyindividualswewereabletoconfirmthattheUN-listedbirthyearsweregenerallyprecisetowithinonetofouryears.BearinginmindthatbirthyearsinAfghanistan,wheretherearefewformalrecords,aresubjecttomis-remembrances,Figure2suggeststhatmorethanhalfoftheTalebanseniorleadershipwerebornbefore1965—whichmeansthattheyreceivedtheirprimaryeducationandformativechildhoodexperiencespriortothe1979upheaval.

Figure2:CumulativeDistributionofBirthYear

(Note:Inacumulativedistributiongraph,theyaxisgivesthe

percentageofdatapointslyingatorbelowthecorresponding

20UnitedNations,“TheListestablishedandmaintainedbythe1988(2011)Committee.”https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/1988.htm(accessed11April2016).

pointonthexaxis.Forexample,thegraphshowsthatabout

75%ofindividualswerebornatorbefore1970.)

Thisisevenclearerwhenweexaminethebirthyearsoftheindividualsregardedasthekeyideologicalinfluencersinthemovement(Figure3).TheworldthesemengrewupinwasradicallydifferentfromthatconfrontedbysubsequentgenerationsofTaleban.

RuralAfghanistanwastraditionallythedomainofaneclecticformofIslam,whichmixedtribalpracticewithelementsofSufism,Deobandism,andindigenousfolklore—theverytypeofparochialtraditionalismthatreformersandmodernisingIslamistsrailagainst.21Inthesoutheast,villagersusuallysettleddisputesthroughtribalcouncils,whereasinthesouth,triballaw(underthepreponderantinfluenceofkhans)competedwithvariousformsoflocally-flavouredreligiouslaw.Inthe1880s,AfghanrulerAmirAbdurRahmanbegantheprocessofrationalisingtheinstrumentsofstateauthoritybyimposingshariaastheuniform,formallegalcodeofthelandandemployingulamatoadministerreligiousjurisprudenceinhisname.Islam,inotherwords,becameatoolformodernisationandstateformation.22LikesomethingfromthefutureTalebangovernment’srulebook,theIronAmirmandatedthatthieves’handsshouldbesevered,adulterersstoned,andthosewhomissedprayersgivenafineandsubjectedtocorporalpunishment.Itisuncleartowhatextenttheseregulationswerecarriedout,especiallyinthehinterlandswherethestatehadlittlepresence,butitpointstotheextentthatthepunitiveaspectsofthisinterpretationofshariawereapartofmainstreampoliticaldiscourse.TheuseofIslaminrationalisingsociallifehadthepositiveeffectofallowingforfairerdisputeresolution,butitalsoservedasavehicleforexercisingexploitativestatecontrol.23State-issuedreligiouscredentialingbroughtthousandsofmullahsontothegovernmentpayroll,andtheamirfrequentlypressedtheulamatosanctionhismilitaryambitionsas‘jihad’andcasthisenemiesasinfidels.24Hedispatchedrovingmullahstothecountrysidetoeducatevillagersanddecreethatzakatandotherreligioustithesbelongedtothestate.HespecifiedthatreligiousobservancesonFridaysshouldbeonlyheldinsanctionedcitymosques,partofhisintentionto“putastoptothe

21Roy,IslamandResistance,[seeFN16].22AstaOlesen,IslamandPoliticsinAfghanistan,Routledge,1995.23E.g.,AshrafGhani,‘DisputesinaCourtofSharia,KunarValley,Afghanistan,1885-1890’,InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,15(03),1983,353-67.24Previousleaders,suchasDostMuhammad,alsomadeuseof‘jihad’tolegitimisetheirmilitaryambitions.

0

10

20

30

40

<1960 1965-1970 1975-1980

BirthYearFrequency

0.25

0.44

0.63

0.82

1.01

1958 1965 1973 1980 1988

CumulauveDistribuuon



gatheringsofthepeopleatlargevillages,”accordingtoareportatthetime,“soastolessentheopportunitiesfordiscussion.”25

Theincreasedpresenceofthestateinvillagers’liveswasfrequentlymetwithresistance—notbecauseofsomepreternaturalortimelessantagonismbetweentheAfghanstateandsociety,butbecause,asinearlymodernEurope,stateinterventionwasoftendeeplyexploitative,amountingattimestolittlemorethanthediscriminatoryextractionoftaxesorconscriptionofable-bodiedmenforwar.26Yetatthesametime,statepatronagetoruralkhansandmalekswasakeyorganisingfeatureofcountrylife,asthoselocalelitesreliedongovernmentlargesstoaccruefollowersanddispensefavourstosupplicants.Thisdualdynamicofresistanceandpatronageshapedthedominantdiscoursesoftheera.Theideaofarationalised,state-legitimated‘Islam,’whichwasnewtothenineteenthcenturyAfghanistan,existedalongside—and,sometimes,incompetitionwith—popularandhome-grownrituals,practicesandbeliefscollectivelythoughtofasIslam.Thedistinctionhereisnotsimplyoneofform,butalso,asOlivierRoynotes,adifferenceintheway“religionstructureseverydaylife,thewayitconstitutesalanguage,ameaningfulexperience,aculturalidentity.”27

Fromthelatenineteenthcenturyon,governmentmadrassasproducedulemawhoseprimaryrolewastolegitimisestaterule.Butinthecountryside,

25Quotedfrom:MohammadHassanKakar,GovernmentandSocietyinAfghanistan:TheReignofAmirAbdAl-RahmanKhan(ModernMiddleEastSeries,No.5),UniversityofTexasPress1979.26ThomasBarfield,Afghanistan:ACulturalandPoliticalHistory(PrincetonStudiesinMuslimPolitics),PrincetonUniversityPress2012,chapter4.27Roy,IslamandResistance,[seeFN16],31.

outsidethedirectreachoftheCrown,mullahscontinuedtoadministeratypeofIslamheavilyattunedtolocalneeds,throughamixofcustomary

practicesandSufism.28Mostchildrenwhoreceivedaneducationdidnotattendstate-sanctionedmadrassas—ofwhichtherewerefewerthanadozencountrywide—butratherwereeducatedinhujras,boardingroomsorannexesofvillagemosques.29Thesewereinformal,eclecticschoolsthatfunctionedasthemainformofeducationinthecountryside.Aslateasthe1970s,secular,Western-styleeducationwaslimitedtothecities.Typically,achildstudiedforafewyearsbeforeleavingschooltohelponthefarm,butsomefamilies—particularlythepoorerones—wouldallowonesontocontinuestudies.Themostindustrioushujrastudentstookpartinhalaqat-edaira,oreducationalcircles,inwhichtheylearnedatthefeetoflocalmawlawisandSufisheikhs.Instructorsdependedondonationstooperate,oftenleavingtheirstudentsbehindandrelocatingtoanewvillagewhenalmsrandry.Similarly,studentscouldmovefromoneinstructortothenext.30AnofficialTalebanbiographyofmullahMuhammadRabbani,formerdeputyleaderoftheIslamicEmirate,describesthearrangementthisway:

28Olesen,IslamandPolitics,[seeFN23].29PiaKarlssonandAmirMansory,’IslamicandModernEducationinAfghanistan:ConflictualorComplementary?’,InstituteofInternationalEducation,StockholmUniversity,2008,http://www.netreed.uio.no/articles/Papers_final/Karlsson_Mansory.pdf.30ThedescriptionofhujrasarefrominterviewswithTalebanfiguresinKabulandKandaharin2013-14,andtheunpublishedmemoirofaTalebanmember,whichcontainsachapteronhujras.

BirthYear Position Source

MullahMuhammadOmar 1960 SupremeLeader TalebanBiography

MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi 1940s KandaharFatwaOffice Interviews

MawlawiPasanaiSahib 1940s KandaharFatwaOffice Interviews

MawlawiMuhammadWali 1968 MinisterofViceandVirtue TalebanBiography

MullahNuruddinTurabi 1959 MinisterofJustice Interviews

Figure3:TalebanIdeologicalInfluencers

June2017


Effectively,thepursuitofShari’ahlearninginAfghanistanwasnottaughtingovernmentschools,ratheritwassoughtfromsheikhsofShari’ahknowledgeintheircirclesinthelocalmosquesorschoolsfarfromgovernmentsupervision.Thestudentswouldgatheraroundasheikhorsheikhswhowouldinstructthemonroteknowledgesuchasgrammar,syntax,rhetoricandsemantics.ThentheyaretaughttheShari’ahsciences,suchastafseer,Hadith,jurisprudenceanditsroots,‘Aqidahandothers.

Thismethodhadbeenacceptedsincetheyear202H[817CE]whenitwasstartedbyeminentscholarsofKhorasan[theAfghanistan-Pakistan-Iranregion],suchasImamAbuDaudalSajistani,Sheikhul-IslamMuhammadbinMuhammadbinBakral-KhalmiandImamAbual-Leithal-Samarqandial-Balkhi.Eventhoughthismethodofpropagatingshari’ahscienceshadnotattractedtheattentionofgovernmentsinrecentcenturies,itstillretaineditsimportanceinproducingpiousscholarsandextraordinaryleadersoftheMujahideenwhoplayedaworthypartinspreadingShari’ahknowledgeandleadingJihadistmovementsthroughoutthehistoryofAfghanistan.31

InsouthernAfghanistan,hujrastudents--knowninPashtoastaleban--andtheirteachersweredeeplywovenintovillagelife,fromtheFridaysermontotheircollectionofalmsfromthecommunitytotheirweeklySufi-inspireddrummingcircles.Thehujratalebsformedtight-knit,itinerantcirclesand,upongraduatingasmullahs,functionedalmostasaprofessionalcaste.32

ItisfromthisnetworkofhujrasthatthemodernTalebanmovementemerged.Figures4and5list 31AhmedMukhtar,‘MenWhoMadeHistory:MullahMohammedRabbani,’al-Somood,Issue39,September2009:https://archive.org/details/Al-Somood-39-PDF(original)andhttps://ugandi.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/men-who-made-history-mullah-muhammad-rabbani/(translation).32ThiswascommonelsewhereintheIslamicworld;anthropologistDaleEidelmanwritesoftalebsinMoroccothat,“[t]heQuranicteachers,liketheirpredecessors,werealreadyclusteredintoinformalnetworksoftrustandcooperation,andhadawideknowledgeoftheregionsinwhichtheyworked…Manystudentssimplydriftedfromencampmenttoencampment[similartohujras],muchaswasthepatterninmedievalEurope,livinginapicaresqueexistenceandremainingwherevertherewassufficientlargessetomaintainthem.Tojoinanencampment,astudentapproachedamosqueatwhichafqih[Quranicteacher]wasconductinglessonsandaskedforpermissiontojointhem.Hospitalitywouldalmostalwaysbeoffered.”DaleFEickelman,KnowledgeandPowerinMorocco,PrincetonUniversity1985,69.

theeducationalbackgroundoftheleadershipoftheIslamicEmirate,definedhereasthosewhoheld(a)aministerialordeputy-ministerialpositionintheTalibangovernment’s20ministries(105individuals)(b)ajudicialpositionatthe“chiefjustice”ordeputylevel(9individuals)(c)apositioninorassociatedwiththeofficeofsupremeleaderMullahMuhammadOmar(15individuals)and(d)amilitarypostatthelevelofzonecommanderorhigher(16individuals,a“zone”beingroughly

Figure4:TalebanLeadershipEducationTally

(Placeofeducation,definedassitewheremajorityofeducationtookplace.ThoseindividualswhosplittimeinahujraandPakistanarecodedasbeingeducatedinPakistan.)

equivalenttoaU.S.armycorpsinsize).33Inthefigure,the“darul-ulum”categoryreferstothoseindividualswhoseprimaryeducationalexperiencewasatamajorPakistanimadrassa,an“institutefortheshariasciences”inthelocalargot.Successfullycompletingeducationintheseinstitutesamountedtosomethingakintoapost-graduatedegree,withthetitleofmawlawiawarded,whichconferredtheabilitytointerpretthehadithandissuefatwas.ExamplesofleadershipinthiscategoryincludethemajorityoftheEmirate’sulemashuraanditssupremecourt.Someindividualssplittimeinbothcountries,attendinghujrasuntilthejihad,afterwhichtheymovedtoPakistanforhigherstudy(duringthe1989-94period).ExamplesinthiscategoryincludeMawlawiAkhtarMuhammadOsmani,animportantfrontlinecommanderwholaterbecameoneoftheleadersoftheinsurgency,andmullahMuhammadHassanRahmani,whoservedontheleadershipcounciloftheEmirate.

Butbyfarthemostimportantcategory,intermsofinfluence,comprisedthosewhoseeducationprimarilytookplaceinAfghanhujrasandonthe

33Thisdatawascompiledfrominterviews,memoirs,Talebanbiographies,andothersources,andisdescribedmorefullyinAnandGopal,‘Rents,Patronage,andDefection:State-buildingandInsurgencyinAfghanistan’,PhDdiss,ColumbiaUniversity,2017.



frontlinesoftheanti-Sovietjihad—atleast60%oftheleadership,accordingtoFigure4.Tobesure,someoftheseindividualssometimestravelledtoPakistanischools,butthecentreoftheireducationalactivitiesremainedinAfghanistan.34

Thissuggestthattheoft-repeatedstoryoftheTalebanassimplyaproductofmadrassasinPakistanirefugeecampsisinaccurate.Moreimportantly,itcastsdoubtonthethesisthattheTalebanleadershipwerealientoAfghanvillagelife.Itistruethat,after1994,theTaleban’sranksswelledwithfreshrecruitsfromsuchcamps,buttheseindividualsrarelyreachedpositionsofinfluence.

MuchhasbeenmadeoftheinfluenceofDeobandism(particularlyitsPakistanivariety)on

34Asonereviewerremarked,“TalebanleaderswhoseeducationincludedastintortwoinPakistanwithachosenteacherwerestillverymuchrootedintheKandaharvillagemilieu”.

theTaleban,butcloserinspectionsuggeststhatthelinkisfarmorecomplicatedthanusuallyportrayed.Historically,thedirectorsofthefamousDarul-UlummadrassainDeoband,India,soughttocultivateamiddlepathbetweengovernment-run

educationalinstitutesandtheinformalhujrasprevalentthroughoutthesubcontinentbyformalisingthecurriculum,accreditinginstructorsandholdingentranceexams,whileremainingindependentofstatepower.35Bycontrast,inthetypicalAfghanhujratherewasnoformalisedsystemofentryorexit,noofficial,state-sanctionedgrantingofcredentials,onlyaninformalprocesswhichculminated(usuallyinabouttenyears)withaturban-tyingceremonythatmarkedthestudent’sgraduationtoamullah,atypeofvillage-basedimamwhocanteachstudentsofhisownand

35BarbaraD.Metcalf,IslamicRevivalinBritishIndia:Deoband,1860-1900(PrincetonLegacyLibrary),PrincetonUniversityPress1982.

Role Influence Education Source

MullahMuhammadOmar SupremeLeader Ideological,Military hujras interviews

MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi KandaharFatwaOffice Ideological Darul-UloomDeoband

(India) interviews

MawlawiPasanaiSahib KandaharFatwaOffice

Ideological,Historical Nurul-Madaris(Ghazni) Interviews

MawlawiMuhammadWali ViceandVirtueMinister Ideological hujras;Darul-Uloom

HaqqaniapostSovietTalebanBiography

MullahNuruddinTurabi JusticeMinister Ideological hujras Interviews

MullahBeradar DeputyDefenseMinister Military Madrassa–KandaharCity Interviews

MullahObaidullah DefenseMinister Military hujras Interviews;memoir

MullahDadullah Commnder Militaryhujras;inPakistanpost-SovietunderMawlawi

Deobandi

TalebanBiography

MullaFazlAkhund Commnder Military hujras Interviews

MullahMuhammadSadiq talebanFrontCommander Historical hujras Interviews

FailzullahAkhundzada talebanFrontCommander Historical hujras Interviews

MullahHajjiMuhammad talebanFrontCommander Historical hujras Interviews

Figure5:EducationalBackgroundofKeyTalebanInfluencers

June2017


administerliturgicalservices.TheDeobandicurriculumincludedjurisprudence,logic,tafsir(interpretationoftheQuran),andtajwid(Quranicpronunciationandrecitation).Thehujracurriculum,whichdifferedwidelyfromoneschooltothenext,couldincludesomeoftheseelementsbutusuallyincorporatedawidevarietyofothersubjects,frompoetrytohumananatomytoherbalmedicinetoinstructiononsexualmoresandtaboos.TheDalul-UlumDeobandcurriculumtookeightyearstocomplete,withthefinalyeardevotedtothestudyofthehadith,particularlycollectionsfromearlyIslamichistory.Inhujras,ontheotherhand,therewasnosetschedule,andstudents’progresstowardscompletionwasmeasuredbythenumberofbookstheyhadmastered;sincemanyworkedparttime(or,duringthejihad,interruptedtheirstudiestofight),itcouldtakeatalebtenyearsorlongertocompletehisstudy.ThebooksinquestionwerenotrestrictedtotheearlythinkersfavouredbytheDeoband,butincludedabroaderretinueofhadithicscholars.Itwas,infact,thestate-linkedmadrassasandmajorregionalseminaries,liketheNural-MadaresinAndar,Ghazni,thatmostcloselyfollowedtheDeobandmodel—andmuchofthecountry’sofficialulema,includingtheheadoftheroyalmadrassainKabul,hadstudiedattheDarul-UlumDeobanditself.36

WhenlocalhujraseclecticallyborrowedfromDeobandicurriculum,itwasnotbecauseofmechanicalideologicalimitation,butbecausecertainfeaturesoftheschoolresonatedwiththepre-existinglogicofculturalpracticewithinAfghanistan.First,Deobandism’sintimatelinkwithSufism(seeboxbelow),whichemphasisedthepersonal,verticalrelationshipbetweentheworshipperandGod,wassimilartotraditionsofIslamicworshipindigenoustoAfghanistan.

Second,theDeobandiemphasisonthehadithcapturedakeyelementoftraditionalistIslam’sepistemology.Deobandischolarshadexpandedthedars-enezami,thetraditionalcurriculum,byemphasisingthehadith,andbydoingso,arguedfortheincorporationofquestionsofritual,dressandeverydaybehaviourintothenotionofsharia.ToWesterneyes,thetraditionalruralAfghanviewofritual,dressandeverydaybehaviourmayhaveappearedasanintransigent,mechanicalapplicationofreligion,butinthelocalcontext,therewasinfactasophisticatedinternallogicatwork.ThisbecomesclearerwhencomparingittothehistoryofwesternChristianity.AsTalalAsadandothershavesuggested,todayinWesternChristianitytheacceptanceofChristisa

36Kakar,Government,[seeFN26].

preconditiontoachievingknowledgeofmoralandcosmicontologies—thatis,youmusthavefaithinChristinordertoknowhowtoact,togainknowledgeofgoodandevilandapprehendexistentialtruths.FaithinChrististhepreconditiontoallotherknowledge.Thismeansthattheepistemologicalemphasisisontheprimacyofourinteriorstate,andtheroleitplaysinguidingourexteriorstates.InmedievalChristendom,however,thisformulawaspreciselyreversed:knowledgeofhowtoact—throughritualisticpractice—wasaprerequisiteforbelief.ThuswhenPascalmadehisfamouswager—itisalwaysbettertobelieveinaGodthatmightnotexistthannotbelieveinonethatdoesexist—itwasbasedonthenotionthatoneshouldactinsuchawayastobringaboutbelief.ThephilosopherIanHackingwritesthat“Ifyougoalongwithpiouspeople,giveupbadhabits,followalifeof‘holywaterandsacraments’intendedto‘stupefyone’intobelief,youwillbecomeabeliever.”Similarly,whencriticsofPascal’swagerarguedthatonecannotsimplychoosetobelieveinGod,thatonemustfirsthavefaith,Pascalretorted:“Kneelandprayandyouwillbelieve!”37

IfinmodernWesternChristianitybeliefproducesknowledge,inpre-war,rural,southernAfghanistanknowledgeproducedbelief.“Knowledge”inthiscasewastheknowledgeofrites,bodilycomportment,thePropheticlifestyle,prayertechniquesandschedulesandotheraspectsofeverydayritual.Becauseattainingbeliefinheredinritualisticpracticeitself,virtuewas(andcontinuestobe)linkedtopersonaldress,groomingandothereverydaybehaviour.Ritualisticpracticewasawayofcultivatingmoraldispositions,awayofattaintingtruth.Inmainstream,modern,Westernepistemology,thementalstatedeterminesactions;intheIslamofsouthernAfghanistanactionsconstitutedthementalstate.

Knowledgeofritualwasameansofformingavirtuousself,andthereforeitwasalsoaformofculturalcapital,whichreligiousstudentsandtheir

37Žižekarguesthatthismeansthatwemustpossessrepresentationsoftheworldbeforebeingawareofthem.Beliefisalreadypresentinanindividualthroughtheinfluenceof“ideologicalstateapparatuses”—institutionssuchasthefamilyorthechurchwhichservetolegitimatethesocialorder.CfSlavojŽižek,MappingIdeology,London,VersoBooks2012.Ineffect,thedistinctionisbetweenactandintent.Someauthors(egMichaelFoucault)havearguedthattheshifttomodernityaccompaniedashiftintheobjectofsurveillanceandcontrolfromtheacttotheintent.Socialactscouldbemonitored,whereasintentcouldnotbemonitoredwithoutthedevelopmentofahostofsocialandphysicaltechnologies.



teachersconvertedintolivelihoodsthroughtheprovisionofliturgicalservices,thedispensationofamulets,and,importantly,theadjudicationofdisputes.Asaproviderofsuchservices,themullahusuallyoccupiedalowpositioninsociety,butthenotionsofvirtueheembodiedwerelinkedtothewiderethicaldiscourseofthecommunity.Inthiscontext,virtuewasnotmerelyrelatedtoself-actualisationoraddressingexistentialissues,butwasdirectlylinkedtocommunitynorms.Thesenorms,asinanysociety,werethemselvesintimatelytiedtoquestionsofpower:whoauthorisescertainpracticesasethicalorvirtuous,andproscribesothers.Inurbancentres,itwastheinstitutionsofthestate—oftenspeakingthroughtheulema—whichplayedapreponderantrole,butinthecountrysidethisrolewastakenupbykhans,maleksand,toamuchsmallerextent,theruralclergy.Withthismultiplicityofpowertherewerecompetingnormativeframeworks,suchasthePashtuns’tribalcodeofhonour,pashtunwali,ontheonehand,andshariaontheother.38Usually,tribalnormsdominated,butthisdependedontimeandgeography:inareaswheretribalsystemswerehierarchical,andtheruleofthekhansmorepredatoryorbiased—suchassouthernAfghanistan—ruralclergyenjoyedgreaterappeal.39

Tosummarisethisdiscussion,therearethreeimportantpointsthatwillhelpexplaintheTaleban’ssubsequenttrajectory:first,theepistemologyofbeliefintraditionalistAfghanIslamemphasisesritualisticpractice,bodilydisposition,andthecultivationofpersonalmoresasameansofproducingvirtue;second,thisnotionofvirtueexistedalongsidecompetingconceptionsofvirtue(suchastribal),allofwhichcountedasexamplesofauthenticethicalpracticesinvillagelife;andthird,likenormsanywhereelse,thenormsguidingthisconceptionofvirtuewererootedinmaterialconditionsandpowerrelations.

Thislastpointbecomesclearerwhenweconsiderthepositionofwomenatthetime.ThePashtunbelttypifiesa‘cultureofhonour,’asystemofpracticesemphasising,amongotherthings,generosity,retributionandgendersegregation—whichiscommontorugged,Spartanareas

38Cf.Barth,Fredrik.PoliticalLeadershipAmongSwatPathans,London,AthlonePress1959.39ThereforethereisadirectlinkbetweenruralstateintegrationandtheriseoftheTaleban:thoseareaswheretribalstructureswere“verticallyintegrated,”suchasKandaharorZurmatdistrictofPaktia,wereanaturalconstituencyfortheTaleban.ComparetotherestofPaktia,whichfeaturedegalitariantribalstructuresandlittlestateintegration,anddidnothaveastrongtalebanhistory.

worldwidewherethestatehaslittlereach.40Thesocialcontrolofwomenwas,andstillis,indissolublylinkedtoruralnotionsofthevirtueandthemaintenanceofanethicalorder—notonlyforyoungtalebs,butforvillagesocietyingeneral.Whileintellectualsandactivistssucceededinwinningwomen’srightsreformsinthetwentiethcentury,thesegainsweremostlyrestrictedtoKabul.AnAmericannursevisitingnorthernBaghlanprovinceintheearly1970swrote:

Fewwomengooutsidethecompoundwallwithoutthechadri[burqa](…)andfewerstillshopinthebazaar.Afghanmenareveryjealousoftheirwomenfolk.Inmostcasespermissionfromthehusbandisnecessarybeforethewoman,ortheolderdaughters,maygooutsidethecompoundforanypurpose.41

Attemptstospreadreformtothecountrysidewerefrequentlymetwithfierceresistance,suchasthe1959Kandaharriotsthatwere,atleastinpart,aresponsetorumoursofagovernmentdecreebanningveiling.42(Rioters,possiblyincludingthefollowersofaleadingSufipir,burneddownthecity’sonlycinema.43)Women’seducationhardlyexistedinthesoutherncountryside,andwhentheHafizullahAmingovernmentattemptedtointroducethenotionin1979,villagersreactedangrily.OnestudyinterviewedaresidentofaKandaharvillagewhorecalledatthetime:

No,wedon’thaveagirls’schoolinthisvillage.SalihMohammadfromKulchabad…hurledEng.Zarif[agovernmentofficial]outbyasandalwhenhesuggestedagirls’schoolforthevillagers.ThenEng.Zarifkilled60or70eldersofthisvillagebutthesevillagersstilldidn’taccepthissuggestion.Finally,thegovernmentdidn’tletourvillagersgotothebazaarsotheyhadtotraveltothecitybyotherroads.TheGovernmentcameafterSalihMohammadwiththeirtanksbutwhentheyarrestedhimtheirtankswerenotallowedtomove.ThentheofficialsletSalihMohammadgo.Thenext

40RichardE.NisbettandDovCohen,CultureofHonor:ThePsychologyofViolenceintheSouth(NewDirectionsinSocialPsychology),WestviewPress1996.41MarySimpson,‘WiththePeaceCorps,HalfaWorldAway,’TheAmericanJournalofNursing,August1974,74-8,1464-66,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/449528942Thereisevidence,however,thatatrootthiswasananti-taxriot.SeeW.K.Fraser-Tytler,,Afghanistan:aStudyofPoliticalDevelopmentsinCentralandSoutheasternAsia,London,OxfordUniversityPress,45.43BetteDam,‘DeathofaSahebzada:AStoryofDifferentStrandsofThoughtintheTalebanMovement’,2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/death-of-a-sahebzada-a-story-of-different-strands-of-thought-in-the-taleban-movement/.

June2017


dayahelicopterlandedneartoSalihMohammad’shomeandtookhimanduntilnowheislost.Sonooneacceptsgirls’schoolsinthisvillage.44

Music,too,wasanobjectofmuchcontroversy.WhileKabulandcertainprovincialcentreslikeHeratwerehometovibrantmusiciancommunities,musicnonethelesscontainedahintofsubversion—andperhapsperversion.“ThereisacommonlyheldbeliefamongHeratisofallclassesthatmusicwaswrongfromthereligiouspointofview,”wroteethnomusicologistJohnBailyaboutthe1970s.45“Musicmightbedescribedasbadorbadkar,(“bad”),ghalat(“wrong”)orharam(“forbidden”).Itwasoftensaidthatmusiqigonahdare(“musicincurssin”).Thewordsdamanddalakreferredtogroupsoflowsocialstatus,likebarbers,butwerealsoappliedtomusiciansandentertainers.Inlargepart,thiswasbecausetheethicaldiscourseofvillagelifelinkedmusictosuchcorruptingactivitiesasdrinkingandadultery.Writingin1976,ethnomusicologistLorraineSakatadescribesaperformancetheatreinHerat:

Themalesingers…areallTajikandconsideredamateurmusicians.Thefemalesarequiteanothermatter.AlthoughIdidnotreceiveanyspecificinformationconcerningthem,theyareallconsideredprostitutes.Thefactthattheysing,danceandactinpublicforaprimarilymaleaudienceisreasonenough.TheydressinaflashymannerinbrocadeorsequineddressesandPakistani-stylebloomerswithwideanklecuffs,wearnoveil,andoftenhaveacosmeticgoldtooth.Outsidethetheater,theywearthemodestchaderilikeotherwomen.

Andofthetown’sothertheatre,shewrites:

Nowomanworkedatthetheaterandwomen’spartswereplayedbymales.FollowingKabul’sexampleandinanefforttoimprovethestatusofwomeninmusic,danceandtheater,theHeratInformationandCultureDepartmentintroducedfemaleactresses,singersanddancers,withtheresultthattheybecamethemainattraction.Thetalentsofthesefemaleswerequestionableandthe

44AdamPain,‘AfghanistanLivelihoodTrajectories:EvidenceFromKandahar,’2010,http://areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1010E-AfghanistanLivelihoodTrajectories-EvidencefromKandaharCS2010.pdf.45JohnBaily,MusicofAfghanistan:ProfessionalMusiciansintheCityofHerat(CambridgeStudiesinEthnomusicology),Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress1989.

theaterbecameanadvertisingarenaforlocalprostitutes.46

Music’sstatuswasnotaresultsimplyofaliteralreadingofIslam—afterall,thereexisthadithsbothapprovingandforbiddingmusic,sothequestionwouldbewhycertaininterpretationsorhadithswerefavouredoverothers.Normsconcerningmusichelpedenforce—andjustify—theprevailingformsofsocialorganisationconcerninggender.Controllingmusicwas,inlargepart,ultimatelyaboutcontrollingwomen.Aswewillsee,theissuesofmusic,gendersegregation,andwomen’soppressionwouldbecomeacuteduringtheintra-mujahedincivilwarofthe1990s.

Thepurposeofthistourofthepre-1979socio-religiouslandscapeistohelpreconstructthecognitiveworldofthetaleb.FortheyoungreligiousstudentofthesouthernPashtuncountrysideofthe1960sand1970sstudyingininformaleducationalcirclesandlocalhujras,virtuewasattainedthrougheverydayritualisticpractice,throughactivecultivationofcertaindispositionsandthroughimitationofthesunna.Itisimportanttoemphasisethat,asamodeofvirtue,thesewereidealsthatwererarelymetinpractice.Evenasmusicwaswidelyagreedinruralsocietytobesinful,forexample,itcouldsimultaneouslybeenjoyedasaguiltypleasure.Similarly,theparticularformofritualandpersonalcultivationthatrepresentedavillageidealcoexistedalongsidecompetingnorms,suchastribaletiquette.Thepoint,nonetheless,istwofold.First,thepracticesforwhichtheTalebanbecamenotorious—therigidmonitoringandenforcementofoutwardappearance(includingstylesofdressandbeardlength),theproscriptionofmusicandtelevision,thestipulationsdemandingthatwomenremainintheprivatesphereandthemonitoringandregulationofdailyreligiouslife(suchasenforcingthefive-timesdailyprayer)—allhaverootsinpre-1979villagenorms.Second,thesenormswerelinkedtoaparticularepistemologythatlinksoutwardbehaviourtoinwardbelief,andwhichregulatestheactovertheintent.Yetevenwiththeirpre-1979origin,however,thesepracticeswouldundergoprofoundshiftsduringthecomingtumultofrevolution,occupation,andcivilwar.

46HiromiLorraineSakata,MusicintheMind:TheConceptsofMusicandMusicianinAfghanistan,SmithsonianInstitutionScholarlyPress2002.



TheTalebanandSufism

AlthoughpresscommentatorsusuallylinktheTalebantoWahhabism,inrealitythegroupholdsadeeprelationshipwithoneoftheWahhabis’targetsofire,SufiIslam.Thisconnectionarisesfromthreefactors.First,SufismisakeyfacetofthesouthernAfghanculturalheritage,linkedtotraditionsofpoetryandfolklore,andembodiedinaruralshrinenetworkthatstretchesacrosstheborderintoPakistaniBaluchistan.TraditionallyinKandahar,TalebandrumcircleswouldgatheronFridays,thestudentssometimeswhirlingthemselvesintoadancingfrenzy—oftentheonlyformofentertainmentforthepoormadrassastudent.ItwascommonforruralAfghanstodrawinsightonmattersasdiverseasweddingarrangementstowarfaretoeschatologyfromtheirdreams;mullahMuhammadOmarwasfamouslyguidedbyhisdreams,inthemannerofSufipirs.47Infact,asachild,mullahMuhammadOmarreceivededucationfromSufiteacherssuchasHajiBaba;later,astheTaleban’ssupremeleader,hewouldvisithisoldteacher’sgravealmostweekly.48BetteDam,indescribingtherelationshipbetweenmullahMuhammadOmarandaprominentSufipir,writes

When[Omar]wasinpower,healsodidnotprohibitmostoftheSufitraditionshegrewupwith—somethingconsideredun-Islamic,forexample,inSalafism.LikesomanyAfghans,MullahOmargrewupwiththesehabitsinAfghanIslam,includingthebeliefintaw[amuletsortinyscrollscontainingKoranicverses]orvisitinggravestoprayforthedead.UntildaysbeforetheU.S.andBritishbombingsstartedon7October2001,asareactiontothe9/11terroristattacks,MullahOmarcontinuedtovisitshrinesinKandahar.Buthewasagainstwhathesawasamisuseofthem—likesellingtawiz[akindofprotectiveamulet].49

TheSufithemesofthedreamworldandmysticismwouldremainTalebanpreoccupationsthroughouttheEmirateperiod.Thefollowingisanexamplefromaninterviewforum(almostlikeaTalebanadvicecolumn)withtheinfluentialTaleban‘alimMawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi,oneofmullahOmar’smosttrustedideologicaladvisersonthequestionoftheintercessionofsaints:

[Question]Howaboutpeoplewhosaythatholypersonsarepresentandwatchingus.Doholy

47IanR.Edgar,‘The‘truedream’incontemporaryIslamic/Jihadistdreamwork:acasestudyofthedreamsofTalebanleaderMullahOmar,’ContemporarySouthAsia,15(3),September2006,263–72.48Dam,‘DeathofaSahebzada’,[seeFN44].49Dam,‘DeathofaSahebzada’,[seeFN44].

personageshearusandareawareofeverythingwedo?

[Answer]O’BabSahiborPawMikhorPadshahAgha[ImportantKandahariSufiSaints].Whenoneusesthesekindsofexpressionsitisbecausetheyareofthebeliefthatholypersonagesarepresentandwillhelphim.Theyaredeadandcan’tbepresent.Butyoucanpraytothemandaskthemtohelpyouwithblessingoftheprophetsandsolveyourproblems.50

Second,thepir-murid(teacher-follower)relationship,andthepreponderanceofSufiholymen,mendicants,anditinerantpreachers,meantthateverydayreligiouspracticeinthecountrysidewasdeeplyintertwinedwithSufiritesandbeliefs.InsouthernAfghanistan,theseritescontinuedunabatedduringTalebanrule.

Third,SufismisitselfanintegralpartoftheDeobandiheritage.AsBarbaraMetcalfoutlinesinherstudyonthesubject,SufipirswereamongthefoundersofDarul-UlumDeoband.51Thetheologyoftasawuf(ie,‘doingSufism’)waskeytotheearlycurriculum,andbookslikethepanjketab,amainstayoftheeducationimpartedtosmallermadrassasacrossAfghanistanandPakistan,wererepletewithSufiphilosophyandliterature.Decadesaftertheschool’sfounding,conservativeslaunchedabacklashagainstthisSufitendency,buttheoriginalcurriculaandsystemsurvivedinAfghanistanandotherareasfarfromDeoband.52

WithintheTaleban,anumberoffirst-generationleadersbelongtoSufiorders.MullahMuhammadOmarisbelievedtohaveheadedaNaqshbandigroup,accordingtotwoformercolleagues,andothertopfigureshadoncebeenpirsormurids.MullahAbdulSalamZaif,afoundingTalebanmember,wasamuridintheearly1990sinZabulandKandahar.53ThepivotalmomentinTalebanlore,whenmullahMuhammadOmarheldaloftthecloakbelievedtohavebelongedtoProphetMuhammadtoacrowdinKandahar,consecratinghispositionasCommanderoftheFaithful,issteepedinSufiiconography—thekherqa,along-

50MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi,‘Thewayofdeliverance:AnswersPreparedbyMawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi’,Tolo-yeAfghannewspaper,17September1997.(TalibanSourcesProjectCollection).51Metcalf,IslamicRevival,[seeFN36].52SeealsoKennethP.Lizzio,EmbattledSaints:MyYearWiththeSufisofAfghanistan,QuestBooks2014.53ThiswasnotrecountedinhisautobiographyMyLifeWiththeTalebanoutofabeliefthatanyreligiousblessingsaccruedthroughsuchactivitywouldbevoidedifboastedabout.

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standingSufisymbol,appearsofteninmysticalpoetry.54

DuringtheEmirate,oneofthemostsignificantpointsofdiscordbetweentheTalebanandalQaedawasthequestionofSufishrines—thelatterbelievingthatgraveworshipwasanun-Islamic“innovation”andanaffronttotheirWahhabisensibilities.TheissueprovedcontentiousenoughthatalQaedaideologuesYusufal-AyiriandAbuMusabal-Suriwerecompelledtoaddresstheissuepubliclyinthelate1990sintheirwritings(latercompiledtogetherasareportentitled“AretheTalebanfromAhlas-Sunnah?”),selectivelyusinganecdotesandanti-SufiquotesattributedtoPakistan-educatedulema.Nonetheless,theissueremainedaconsistentcritiqueinalQaedacircles.55

THEANTI-SOVIET'JIHAD'Theearlyyearsofthejihadmarkedastaggeringdisjunctureintheruralwayoflife,astheCommunistgovernmentimprisonedandexecutedthousandsoflocalnotables.MillionsweredisplacedtoPakistaniandIranianrefugeecampsandfurtherabroad,andentirevillagesvanishedovernight.Theinvasionandjihadoverturnedgenerationsofsocialrelations:khanswerekilledorfled,malekswereforciblydisappearedand,asthestateeffectivelydeclaredwaronthecountryside(wherethemujahedinhadstrongholds),agriculturalproductionplummetedandlong-standingmigratoryandsettlementpatternsbecameseverelydisrupted.56InsouthernAfghanistan,thetribalhierarchywasupendedpracticallyovernight;thearistocratictribeslikethePopalzaisandBarakzais,whichhadownedthechoicelandandgovernmentpostsintheancienregime,weregreatlyweakened.Theperiodmarkedtheriseof“achievedstatus”notables,individualsoflowsocialrankwhoclimbedtoprominencethroughtheirabilitytosecureCIAandISIpatronageforweaponsandfunding.

54Seealso,BetteDamandFabrizioFoschini,‘UndertheCloakofHistory:TheKherqa-YeSharifFromFaizabadtoKandahar,’2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/under-the-cloak-of-history-the-kherqa-sharif-from-faizabad-to-kandahar/.55VanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN6],chapter6.56VanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN6],44-48.AfghanistanJusticeProject.WarCrimesandCrimesagainstHumanity:1978-2001(DocumentationandanalysisofmajorpatternsofabuseinthewarinAfghanistan).Online,2005,41ff.UnitedNations,MappingReport,Online,2010,119,http://www.flagrancy.net/salvage/UNMappingReportAfghanistan.pdf.

Inthiscontext,ethicallifealsoshifted.Certainnorms,suchasthoselinkedtotribeandstate,declinedinimportance.Intheirplace,ritualisticpracticebasedonthesunnabegantomonopoliseethicaldiscourse.AymanSabrial-Faraj,anEgyptianwhofoughtinKandaharduringthe1980s,recountedinhismemoirthefollowing:

Inreality,theAfghansandespeciallytheKandaharpopulationrespectedtheSunnatothefarthestextent.Therefore,everythingaroundthemwaseither“Sunnat”or“non-Sunnat”.Theythusworewhitepantswhosewidthinthemiddleshouldbeequaltothewidthoftheiropenarms.ThatisSunnat.EventhespecialropeinthepantshadparticularstandardsthatshouldberespectedtobeSunnat.Theturbansshouldbesevenmeterslongandthetailoftheturbanfiveincheslong.Theturbanshouldbecompletelyblackwhileblackturbanswiththinwhitestripesarerejectedodditiesonlywornbytheneglectingyouth…AsfortheshirtwhichtheycalledkamiislikeinArabic,itwasdifferentinKandaharthaninalltheothercitiesofAfghanistan.OutsideofKandahar,itreachedthekneesandtheopeningsonthesidesreacheduptothethighs.ThisaccordingtothepeopleofKandaharisnotSunnatandisalsoshameful.AsfortheSunnatkamiisinKandahar,itreachedthemiddleofthelegifnotloweranditssideopeningswerenolongerthanoneinch.Theyworeavest[waistcoat]whichtheycalledsariandwasalsodifferentfromtheoneworninalltheotherstates.Indeed,thisvestwasalwaysthickanddarksincetheypreferredtoweardarkcoloursatalltimes.57

Aswithanyotherethicalinjunctions,itwasnotthecasethatmostmujahedinfollowedthiscode,butratherthatritualandthesunnabecameawidelyagreeduponmeansofattainingvirtue(thoughitwasrarelyachievedinpractice).Inthemujahedinspectrum,theonetypeoffighterthatcameclosesttoactinguponthisconceptioninpracticewasthetaleb.Following1979,theyinterruptedtheirhujrastudiestotakepartintheinsurgency,butinsteadofjoiningtheestablishedmujahedinpartiesasindividuals,manyoptedinsteadtoformclosely-knit‘talebanfronts’—ineffectcontinuingtheclose-knitcollectivitiesthathaddefinedtheirpre-1979hujraexistence.Thesegroupswerenominallyalignedtoestablishedparties(usuallyHezb-eIslamiKhalesortheclerically-influencedHarakat-eInqelab-eIslami)butoperatedwithadistinctidentityandsetofpractices.SeeFigure6foralistofprominenttalebanfrontsandtheindividualsassociatedwiththem.

57AymanSabriFaraj,DhikrayatArabiAfghani(AbuJafarAl-MisriAl-Qandahari)[MemoirsofanArabAfghan],Daral-Shuruq2002.



Inaworldofupheaval,thetraditionalisttalebanwereguardiansofritualisticknowledge.Asdefendersofthesunna,theycarvedoutadefinitivespaceintheKandaharimoraluniverse,earningthetalebanfrontsesteem—eveniftheirabilitytoattractfunding,andthereforetheirmilitaryprowess,paledincomparisontotheofficialmujahedinparties.Throughaprogrammeofself-discipline,theysoughttocultivatecertaindispositions—humility,asceticism,learnedness,etc.—whichbroughtthemmoralstatusonthefrontlines.MullahZaif,whofoughtinmullah

MuhammadSadeqAkhund’sfrontinPashmul,Kandahar,writesthat:

[F]ightingalongsidetheTalibanmeantmorethanjustbeingamujahed.TheTalibanfollowedastrictroutineinwhicheveryonewhofoughtalongsideushadtoparticipate,withoutexception.Wewokebeforesunrisetoperformthefajrormorningprayerinthemosque,andafterwardssattogetherbeforereturningtothecamp.WewouldreciteSuratYasinSharifeverymorningincaseweweremartyredthatday.Somewouldthenleavetostrengthensomefrontorother,ortocarryouta

Front Location ProminentMembers IEAPosition

LalaMalangArghandab

/Pashmul

MullahMuhammadHassanRahmani KandaharGovernor;SupremeCouncil

MawlawiMuhammadWali MinisterofViceandVirtue

MullahAbdulRazaq MinisterofCommerce

AkbarAgha None

MullahDadullah Commander

MullahNuruddinTurabi MinisterofJustice

MullahFaizlullahAkhundzada Sangesar

MullahMuhammadOmar SupremeLeader

MullahBeradar DeputyMinisterofDefence

GulAgha Treasurer,MullahOmarOffice

MawlawiMuhammadWali MinisterofViceandVirtue

HafezMajid KandaharChiefofPolice

MawlawiAhmadullahMuti"Nanai" MinisterofTelecommunication

MullahHajjiMuhammadAkhund Pashmul

MullahMuhammadHassanAkhund KandaharGovernor;SupremeCouncil

MullahAkhtarMuhammadMansur MinisterofCivilAviation

MullahMuhammadAbbasAkhund MinisterofPublicHealth

MullahBurjanAkhund Commander

SaniMullahSamad HeadofKandaharBank

AbdulRaziq Arghestan

MullahMuhammadRabbani PrimeMinister

MullahMuhammadGhaus MinisterofForeignAffairs

MullahKhaksarAkhund HeadofSecurity-InteriorMinistry

YarMuhammadAkhund GovernorofHerat

MullahMuhammadSadiq Nelgham

MullahAbdulSalamZaeef AmbassadortoPakistan

MullahObaidullah MinisterofDefence

MullahMadad ZabulAmirKhanHaqqani Commander

EhsanullahEhsan GovernorofCentralBank

Figure6:TalebanFrontsinthe1980s

June2017


raid,whileotherswouldtendtoprisoners,thewoundedorspendsometimestudying.EventhoughalargenumberofcommonpeopletookpartinthejihadalongtheTaliban’sfront,allhadtofollowthegroup’sbasicprinciples.Apartfromdireemergenciesduringoperationsorenemyassaults,theywereengagedinstudy.

SeniorTalibanmemberswouldteachtheyoungerseekers,andtheseniormawlawiwouldinstructotherolderTalibanmembers.Inthisway,acommonandilliteratemujahedcouldbecomeatalibwithintwoorthreeyears.Icarriedoutbothdutiesonthefront;IwouldlearnfrommyinstructorandIwouldteachothersthebasicsofreadingandwriting.58

Suchbehaviourwasafarcryfrommanyother,‘free-wheeling’mujahedingroupslocally,whowererapidlytransformingunderthefloodofCIAandISI-sourcedweaponsandfunds.59AkbarAgha,whofoughtinatalebanfrontinArghandab,Kandahar,undermullahAkhtarMuhammadAgha,andlateronhisownwiththerenownedLalaMalang,recallsinhismemoirthat:

Wetriedourbesttokeepsomesortofordertoourfrontandtoourdailyduties.Weregisteredalltheweaponsthatwedistributedtothemujahedeenandtriedtokeepthemingoodshape.Everyonewasresponsiblefortheirownweapon…Weorganisedascheduleofduties.Mujahedeenwererequiredtopraytheirfiveprayerseachdayandanybodywhoviolatedthiswasassignedanadditionaltwo-hoursofworkorduties.Nobodywasallowedtofireasingleshotwithouttheexpressedandpriorpermissionofthecommanderorheadofthefront.Violationsweresubjecttopunishment.Weconsultedeachotherforanydecisionthatneededtobemadeconcerningthefront,majororminor.Wehadameetingtocalculateouraccountsattheendofeachmonthandhelpedthefamiliesofthemujahedeenwhowereextremelypoorifwecould…Theuseofdrugswascompletelybannedforourfront.Teenagersweren’tabletobepartofourfront,either.Nomujahedwasabletotravelintothecity(ortostaythere)withoutourpriorpermission.60

Theseself-appraisalsareundeniablyself-servingandselective,butnon-talebanobserversfromtheperiodcorroboratethatthethemesofasceticism

58Zaeef,MyLife,[seeFN6].59ThemarkeddifferencesbetweentalebanandothermujahedinseeningreaterKandaharmayhavebeenspecifictothatarea.Othergroupselsewhere,forexamplesomeHezb-eIslamiunits,alsohadstrictroutines,includingreligiousstudy,duringthisperiod.60Agha,MemoriesoftheJihad,[seeFN6].

andritualpuritydominatedthefronts.61Thebondsformedthroughstudyandfightingwereprofoundandenduring—thetight-knitsolidaritynetworksmarkingthefutureTalebangovernmentweretheresultoflifeinthetrenchesduringjihad,notbecauseofattendanceinPakistanimadrassas.

Thetalebanroleasritualguardiansinaworldofupheavalendowedthemwithculturalcapital,particularlyasitrelatedtothecrucialarenaofdisputeresolution.TheerosionintribalauthoritybecauseoftheCommunistcampaignagainstlocalnotablesandtheinfusionofCIApatronagesparkedabreakdowninlawandorder.Asaresult,shariabecamethefavouredmethodofdisputeresolution,bothforsquabblingmujahedinandforthepublicatlarge;aspurveyorsofsharia-basedknowledge,thetalebanandtheirteachersbecamethemainprovidersofjusticeinKandaharandsurroundingareas.Inthe1980s,thereweredozensoftalebancourtsthroughoutKandahar(seeFigure7).Thesecourtsbannedmusic,drugsandpederasty,amongothervices,andwerewidelyrespectedeveninpopularcirclesoutsidethemujahedin.Themostrespected(andfeared)ofthese,inallofsouthernAfghanistan,wasthecourtofMawlawiPasanaiSaheb.62HeenjoyedamoralauthoritynearlyunparalleledinKandaharduringthejihad,onethattranscendedtribalandregionaldivisions.63Inlargepart,thiswasbecausehiscourtseeminglyadjudicateddisputesfairlyandsolelyonsharia,withoutbiasordeferencetopoliticalfactionsorpersonalities.64In1984,forexample,PasanaiorderedTuran(Captain)MirAlam,awell-knownHezb-eIslamicommander,tobestonedtodeathonchargesofadultery.65TheKandaharShura,acouncilofleadingmujahedincommandersactingasasortofshadowguerrillagovernment 61Forexample,Faraj.DhikrayatArabiAfghani,[seeFN58]Alsointerviews,Kandahar,2006-10.62MawlawiPasanai,fromGhazni,isbelievedtohavestudiedinNurul-Madares.HewasenormouslyinfluentialinKandahargenerallyandinparticularwiththefuturetaleban.Thegroupsoughthisimprimaturbeforestartingtheirmovement,andlaterheworkedintheKandaharfatwaofficeduringtheIslamicEmirate.HisrelationshipwithmullahMuhammadOmarisbelievedtohavefrayedovertheyears,however,andthesupremeleaderpreferredtherulingsofMawlawiDeobandi(seebelow)overPasanai.HediedsometimeshortlyafterthefalloftheTaleban(followingabriefimprisonmentbyforeignforces).63Interviews,Kandahar,2008-10;Seealso,forexample,UNHCRBackgroundReport,KandaharProvince,1989,http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/handle/azu/3480.64Inparticular,thiswasshariaasunderstoodintheHanafilegaltradition.65TLOPanjwayiDistrictProfile(Kandaharprovince),December2009(unpublished–authorcopy).



(whichdidnotincludeanytalebs),referredalmostallseriouscasestothePasanaicourt.66(Manyofthecommanderswhoreliedheavilyonthetalebancourts,likeHajiLatifandhissonGulAghaSherzai,wouldlatersidewiththeAmericansagainsttheTaleban,indicatingthatpost-2001divisionshadlesstodowithideologicalornormativedifferencesandmoretodowithpowerandresources.)

Theriseofthecourtsfittedneatlywiththetaleban’sroleasguardiansofritualisticknowledge,anditwouldmarkthefirststepinrationalisingthat

1 Thepigitself

2 Pork

3 Pigfat

4 Objectsmadeofhumanhair

5 Naturalhumanhair

6 DishAntennas

7 SetsforCinematographyandsoundrecordingprojectors

8 SetsforMicrophotography,incaseitisusedinthecinema

9

Allinstrumentswhichthemselvesproducemusic,suchasthePiano,theHarmonium,theFlute,theTabla,theTanbur,theSarang

10 Billiardtablesandtheiraccessories

11 Chessboards

12 Caromboards

13 Playingcards

14 Masks

15 Anyalcoholicbeverage

16

Allaudiocassettes,videocassettes,computersandtelevisionwhichincludesexandmusic

17 Fermenteddrinks(possiblyreferringtoenergydrinks)

18 Lobsters*

19 Nailpolish

20 FireCrackers

66UNHCRBackgroundReport,KandaharProvince,1989:http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/handle/azu/3480.

21 Fireworks(forchildren)

22 Allkindsofcinematographicfilms,eventhoughtheymaybesentabroad

23 Allstatuesofanimatebeingsingeneral

24 Allsewingcatalogueswhichhavephotosofanimatebeings

25 Publishedtableaus(photos)

26 Christmascards

27 Greetingcardsbearingimagesoflivingthings

28 Neckties

29 Bowties

30 Necktiepins

source:TheOfficialGazette,Sept.42001,Vol.799.p.80

Figure7:ProhibitedItemsintheIslamicEmirate

(*Editorialremark:Thisisatypo,aswasconfirmedtoAANbyaformerTalebanofficialinvolvedinthedraftingofthelist.Itshouldhavebeen"lipstick”.)

knowledgeinthedevelopmentofsystematicdisciplinarypractices.Jurisprudencewouldtakeitsplacealongsideasceticismandself-regulationasessentialtothetaleb’sidealself,and,asweshallseebelow,wouldunderliethecontradictionsinherentintheirunderstandingofpoliticalIslam.

Insummary,theanti-Sovietjihadcausedshiftsinpoweratthevillagelevel,whichproducedimportantchangesinthesystemofnormsandmores:questionsofrightandwrong,oftheproperwaytoconductone’slife,ofthecorrectguidelineswithwhichtoadjudicatedisputes.Intheseareas,stateandtribalnormsdiminishedinimportance.Intheirplace,normsrelatedtotheethicallifeasconceivedinthePashtunvillage—anemphasisonoutwardacts,behaviouranddressandtheritualsassociatedwiththem—grewinsignificance.Thisincludedanemphasisonthepropheticlifestyle,asunderstoodthroughthesunnaandhadith.Aswehaveseen,ritual-basedframeworksforanethicallifehavealwaysexistedinruralAfghanistan;whatthejihaddidwasamplifytheseframeworksattheexpenseofother,competingsystemsofvirtueliketribalmores.Thesocialgroupthatwasmostwell-placedtoarticulatethisshiftingreaterKandaharwerethetalebanfronts,andforthesamereason,theywouldbethemostwell-placedtostandabovethechaosofpost-SovietAfghanistanandinstallaneworder.

June2017


THEISLAMICEMIRATEOFAFGHANISTANTheCivilWarandtheRootsof

Authenticity

ManyTalebanfrontscontinuedtooperatefollowingtheSovietretreat,takingpartinsignificantbattlesthroughoutKandaharandinneighbouringprovinceslikeZabul.67WhenthecommunistgovernmentinKandaharfellin1992,themujahedingroupscapturedanddistributedtheimportantspoilsamongthemselves,includingkeymilitaryandgovernmentinstillations,butawardedthetalebantherelativelyunimportantoldSovietfamilybarracksontheedgeoftown.68Uninterestedinstatepower,thetalebsretreatedtotheirhomevillagesormovedtoPakistantocontinuetheirstudies.69Astheprovincedescendedintointernecinebloodshed,theyremainedneutral.Theoldwaysoflifeappearedgoneforever,andthecountrywasplungingintomoralcollapse.Themarkerswereapparentnotonlyinthebehaviourofcheckpointcommanders—whorobbedtravellers,rapedwomenandboys,andgenerallyterrorisedtheroadsofKandahar—butalsobytheirveryappearance.Zaif,forinstance,recallswhen

[A]tMeelbridgewearrivedatShahBaran’scheckpoint.Hewasaninfamousthiefandconman,andMeelbridgewaswhereallthethievesfromZangalrefugeecamphadcometogetherunderShahBaran’sbannertorobtravellersandmerchants.Theylookedrough—evennotquitehuman—withlongunwashedhairfallingacrosstheirfaces,blackwithdirtandtheirthickbrownlipsandteethstainedfromtobacco,hashishandsnuff.Envelopedinhugewoollencloaks,theysquattedintheroadwithalargechelam[pipeforsmokinghashish].Eachwouldtakehisturn,walkingovertothepipetotakelongdeepdrags.Theirgazewouldlosefocusandtheysoonstartedtotalkgibberish.

Wehadstoppeddirectlyinfrontofthecheckpoint,buthismendidnotnoticeusatfirst.Noneofmyfellowpassengersinthecardaredtogetoutandletthemknowthatwewerewaiting.Therewashardlyanytrafficsowesatinthecaranxiouslywatchingthemensmokingandchatting.Ittook

67Agha,MemoriesoftheJihad.Zaeef,MyLife,[seeFN6].68Zaeef,MyLife.Agha.MemoriesoftheJihad,[seeFN6].69VanLinschotenetal,AnEnemy,[seeFN6],87.

themmorethanfifteenminutestonoticeus.ShahBaranlookedoveratourcarandthenathismen.

“Goandallowthesehusbandsofourmotherstogo!”hetoldhismen.Wehadbeenverylucky.OftenShahBaranandhismenwouldpullpassengersoutoftheircars,shavetheirbeardsormakethembreaktheirfast.Attimestheywouldevenkidnapyoungboys.70

Noticeherethelinkbetweenpersonalcultivation(“longunwashedhairfallingfromtheirfaces”,“thickbrownlipsandteethstainedfromtobacco”),bodilydisposition(“squattingintheroadwithalargechelam”)andthelackofvirtue.Thecheckpointcommanders’outerappearanceandtheirapparentdisdainforritual(“hismenwouldpullpassengersoutoftheircars,shavetheirbeardsormakethembreaktheirfast”)waslinkedtotheirinnerstate—preciselytheepistemologicallinkinginherentinthetraditionalistIslamoftheKandaharicountryside.Itwascommonatthetime,infact,forstoriestocirculateofarmedgangsforciblyshavingtravellers,anactofemasculationthatwassimultaneouslyaformofsexualpower(theclean-shavenwerethussymbolicallytransformedintoyoungboys,objectsofsexualcontrol)andanaffronttoaformofvirtueintraditionalsociety.

Importantly,itwasnotonlythetalebanwhotookoffenceatthisstateofaffairs,butvillagesocietyingeneral.Amongthenon-talebmujahedin,too,therewereprominentcommanderswhoreactedstronglytothebreakdowninsocietyandsoughttorestorevirtue.Forinstance,the‘districtgovernor’ofPanjwayi,amujahedincommandernamedMa’alimFedaMuhammad,succeededineliminatingthievesandpederastsinhisareabymonopolisingforceandenactingharshjudicialmeasures.71InArghandab,ajournalistvisitingtheterritoryofmullahNaqib,amajornon-talebancommander,wrotethat

InanindicationofwhatmayunfoldinAfghanistan,twoelderlymaulavijudgesappointedbythemujaheddinhavesentoutedictstorebelcommandersurgingthemtoexercisemorecontroloverciviliansbycurbingsuchexcessesas‘theplayingoftape-recordedmusic.’Music,likemurderandtheft,is‘un-Islamic.’Onerebelcommanderin

70Zaeef,MyLife,[seeFN6],59.71InterviewswithtribaleldersinPanjwayi,2010;seealsoZaeefandAgha,[seeFN6].



Helmandprovinceseizedmorethan700taperecordersandradiosanddestroyedthem.72

Theyearsofjihadhadblurredthepre-1979distinctionsofIslamistandtraditionalist;university-educatedIslamistsforgedallianceswithtribalelitesandruralulema,resultingintraditionalistideasincreasinglypoppingupinIslamistcircles.Duringthesocietalbreakdownofthecivilwar,someIslamistforcessoughttorestorevirtuebylinkingoutercultivationtoinnermoralcultivation.Forinstance,JohnBaily,whovisitedHeratin1994duringthecivilwar,recountslifeunderIsmailKhan,aprominentIslamist(andsoontobeanti-Taleban)mujahedincommander:

HeratunderIsmailKhanwasacityinastateofdeepausterity,althoughtheeconomywasboomingwiththereturnofwealthybusinessmenfromexileinIran.Seniorreligiousfigureshadanimportantsayinhowthecitywasrun,andan‘OfficeforthePropagationofVirtueandthePreventionofVice’wasestablished.Variousedictsaffectingthedaytodaylivesofordinarypeoplewereissued.Forexample,Heratiswerekeenpigeonfanciersandmanymenkeptpigeonloftsontheroofsoftheirhousesintheoldcityandwouldflytheirflocksofbirdsasahobby,catchingthemagainwithlargenets.Thisactivitywasbanned,onthegroundsthatitcouldleadtomenspyingintothecourtyardsoftheirneighbours’housesandobservingtheirwomenfolkunveiled.Whenthebanwasannouncedonlocaltelevisionthepointwasemphasisedbyseveralpigeonshavingtheirneckswrunginfrontofthecamera:awarningofwhatwouldhappentothebirdsofanyoneapprehendedindulginginthisillicitsport.Likewise,therewasabanonflyingkitesfromtherooftopsincaseyoungmenwereonthelookoutforgirls.73

Heratauthoritiessignificantlycurtailedtheperformanceofmusic.Bailywritesthat:

[A]greatdealof…music,suchaslovesongsandmusicfordancing,couldnotbeperformed.Thelicensealsostipulatedthatmusiciansmustplaywithoutamplification…Musiccouldbeperformedbymalemusiciansatprivatepartiesindoors,butprofessionalwomenmusicianswereforbiddentoperformandseveralwerebrieflyimprisonedfortransgressingthisregulation.Whilstmalemusiciansweretechnicallyallowedtoplayat 72JonAnderson,‘MenaceofMullahsWhoHateMusicandMercy’,TheSundayTimes,12February1989.73JohnBaily,‘MusicandCensorshipinAfghanistan,1973-2003’inMusicandthePowerofPlayintheMiddleEast,NorthAfrica,andCentralAsia,edsbyNooshinLaudan,London,Ashgate2009.

weddingparties,ofteninsuchcasesagentsoftheOfficeforthePropagationofVirtueandthePreventionofVicewouldarrivetobreakuptheparty.74

TheOfficeforthePropagationofVirtueandPreventionofVicementionedherealsoexistedinKabul,whereitwasestablishedbytheregimeofBurhanuddinRabbani.ItwaslinkedtotheSupremeCourt,whichdecreed:

Womenarenottoleavetheirhomesatall,unlessabsolutelynecessary,inwhichcasetheyaretocoverthemselvescompletely;arenottowearattractiveclothinganddecorativeaccessories;arenottowearperfumeorjewellerythatmakesanynoise;arenottowalkgracefullyorwithprideinthemiddleofthesidewalk;arenottotalktostrangers;arenottospeakloudlyorlaughinpublic;andtheymustalwaysasktheirhusbands’permissiontoleavethehome.75

InBadakhshan(theonlyprovincetocompletelyevadeTalebantakeoverduringtheEmirate),thescenewassimilartoHerat—tothepointwhereBruceKoepke,visitingin1998,couldwrite:

[A]generaltrendtowardsconservativeIslamisnoticeableinBadakhshanamongthelocalpopulationandcommandersalike.Indirectresponsetothisreligiousorthodoxy,expressivetraditions,suchasmusicperformances,occurrarelyandhavebeendrivenunderground.Priortothecivilwar,Badakhshan’sleadingmusicianswereabletotravelfreelythroughoutthemaincitiesinAfghanistan.SomewereevenselectedforappearancesonKabultelevision.Currently,entertainment,eitherprivateorpublic,occursonlyifthelocalcommanderorcommunityleadercondonessuchnon-religiousperformances.However,uponhearingofmyresearch,localmusiciansinmoreremoteregionsofBadakhshanwouldnotinfrequentlyarriveunannouncedatmyresidenceandproudlydisplaytheirinstruments,beingdelightedtoperformifthesituationallowed.Withthestrictinterpretationofsharia,theprofessionofmusicianseemstohavevirtuallydisappeared.EveryperformerIinterviewedisnowprimarilyoccupiedasasubsistencefarmer,workingoneitherprivateorleasedland.76

ThemajorAfghanIslamistwritingsoftheearlyseventies(ortheirEgyptiancounterparts)didnot

74Baily,“MusicandCensorship”,[seeFN74].75Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN1],59.76BruceKoepke,‘ResearchingPerformingArtsinBadakhshan,’ISIMNewsletterno.5,Leiden,2000.

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focussoobsessivelyonoutwardappearanceofmenoronritual.Thisisnottosay,however,thatmodernistsareunconcernedwiththesequestions,especiallyasitpertainedtowomen.Instead,theyweighedthoseconcernswithothers,suchaseconomicadvancementandpoliticalequality.Kurzmanwrites

WesternbiastendstolumpKhomeini'sIranandtheTaliban'sAfghanistaninthesamecategory,andindeedbothclaimedtobebuildinganIslamicstate.However,oneisamodernstateandtheotherwasnot.Perhapsthemostvividdistinctioninvolvedgender.WhiletheTalibanbarredgirlsfromattendingschool,theIslamicRepublicofIranmorethandoubledgirls’educationfrompre-revolutionarylevels.WhiletheTalibanbarredwomenfromworkingatmostjobs,Iranianwomenenteredthelaborforceinunprecedentednumbers,astelevisionanchors,parliamentarydeputies,governmenttypists,andsalesclerks—evenwhiledressedinheadscarvesandlongcoats.IranianleaderswereasoutspokenasWesternfeministsincondemningTalibanpoliciesongenderandothersubjectsandfelttheTalibanweregivingIslamabadname.TheTalibanreintroducedtradition;KhomeiniandotherIslamistsreinventedit.77

Inotherwords,thedesiretopolicecertainmoralandsocialbehaviourofothersisnotuniquetotraditionalism;itisfound,invariousguises,inmanyreligiousandnon-religiouspoliticalmovements.WhatdistinguishestraditionalismfrompoliticalIslamasanidealtypeis1)thewayinwhichthelattereasilysubordinatesorenmeshessuchpolicingwithinthelargergoalsofbureaucraticstateruleandeconomicdevelopmentand2)thewayinwhichmodernistsuseoutwardappearanceandbehaviourasawindowintoinnerbeliefandloyalty.Whensuchoutwardbehaviourisinsteadunderstoodtoconstitutebelief,thestrictand—fromthepointofviewofoutsiders—bizarrestricturesoftheIslamicEmiratetakeroot.78

77CharlesKurzman,‘WhoaretheradicalIslamists?’,inTheSocialMovementsReader:CasesandConcepts,edsbyJeffGoodwinandJamesM.Jasper,London,JohnWileyandSons2014.78EventheIslamicState,themostdraconianofIslamistmovements,doesnotcomeclosetotheIslamicEmirateinitsattemptstoregulatebehaviour.Forexample,theIS’shisba,orreligiouspolice,regulatewomen’sandmen’sappearances,andoutlawcigarettesandalcohol.Butthevarietyofotherbanneditemsonpurelyreligiousgrounds,suchastelevision,computers,imagescontainingthehumanform,orpigeonflying,wouldlikelystrikeeventheIslamicStaterulersasnonsensical.See,forexample,RashaAlAqeedi,HisbainMosul:SystematicOppressionintheNameofVirtue,Occasional

TheIslamicEmirateandtheRestoration

ofVirtue

Intheautumnof1994,talebangroupsmobilisedagainstthechaosofwhatwascalledtheruleofthepataks,orcheckpoints,wherearmedmenwouldpreyontravellers.BeginninglocallyinKandahar,theTalebanmovementrapidlystartedspreadingacrossthedesperate,war-wearycountry.Therallyingcrywaspeace,security,andIslam.WhereasformuchofsouthernAfghanistantheanti-Sovietjihadhadbeenadefenceofthetraditionalwaysoflifefromanexternalthreat,thethreatpeoplenowfeltwasfromwithinAfghansocietyitself.ThusthenascentTalebanmovementfacedthetaskofreconstructingtradition,ofreturningvirtuetoalandofanomie.AnearlyTalebaneditorialstated:

[O]urdownfallstartedfromthedaywhentheMuslimsstartedtotaketheirfaithandtheirreligiousobligationslightly.ItstartedwhentheMuslimsloosenedaroundtheropeoftheirIslamicfaith.OurdownfallstartedwhenMuslimsstartingignoringtheirdutiesanddidn’ttaketheirfaithseriouslyanylonger.79

Therewere,ofcourse,multipletraditionsandcompetingethnicalframeworks(eg,tribe,state)inpre-1979rurallife;theTaleban’sappealtotraditionwasanappealtoIslamictradition,whichtheyimaginedtobecloselyattunedtoIslamicessenceaspracticedfromthetimeofprophetonwards.80Asaresult,intheTaleban(andpopular)imaginationthepropheticlifestylewasinfactanauthentictraditionallifestyle.Inotherwords,theybelievedthatthereligioustraditionsofthePashtunvillagewereinfactanimitationofthelifeandtimesoftheProphet.Bycontrast,whenSalafistscallforareturntotheIslamoftheProphet,theybelievethatthetraditionsofthe Paper,ProgramonExtremism,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,February2016.79Tolo-yeAfghan,4Jawza1374(25May1995).[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].80BecausetheTalebanwerenotaloneinthisappeal—triballeadersappealedtotribaltradition,forexample—wecannotlooktotheTaleban’sideologyasanexplanationfortheirsuccessin1994-96.Instead,organisationalfactorsappeartohavebeenkey.See,forexample,thedescriptionsoftheTaleban’sriseinHelmandprovinceinMikeMartin,AnIntimateWar:AnOralHistoryoftheHelmandConflict,HurstPublishers2014;CarterMalkasian,WarComestoGarmser:ThirtyYearsofConflictontheAfghanFrontier,OxfordUniversityPress2013.SeealsoSinno’sargumentthatontheTaleban’scapacitytomobilise:Sinno,Organizations,[seeFN1].



villagearefarremovedfromthoseinplaceduringthetimeoftheProphet;theythereforecallforareturntothe‘Prophetictradition’bybreakingfromthevillagetradition.TheTalebanbelievedthattheirsocietyhadalwayslivedinaccordancetothePropheticlifestyle,untiltheinterruptionoftheSovietinvasion.Here,forexample,isanexcerptofaninterviewwithTalebanministerofhighereducationQariDinMuhammad:

[Q]Youhavesetcertainstandardsformen'sappearance,likeabeard,forexample.Isthisappearanceoneofyourconditionsforadmissiontouniversities?

[Hanif]WehaveanIslamicsystem.WeseektoapplyIslam.GrowingabeardisaconfirmedpracticebyprophetsandourProphetMuhammadandhiscompanions.Weordergrowingbeards.Besides,allAfghansareMuslims.GrowingabeardhasbeenatraditionintheMuslimAfghansocietyforalongtime.MostAfghansarebearded.

[Q]Doyouhaveaconceptofobservingreligionbasedonappearance?Ordoyouhaveaspecificphilosophy?

[Hanif]IhavetoldyouthatAfghansarebearded.OurdemandnowistoemulatetheProphet'smanners.Afghanshaveemulatedthemannersoftheprophet,God'speaceandblessingsbeuponhim,inallaspects.81

Similarly,anearlydecreefrommullahMuhammadOmarstated:

ThetraditionandcustomoftheTalebanandthescholarsofIslamforcenturieshavebeenthattheirattire,moralityanddeedswereinaccordancewiththeShariaofProphetMohammad(MayAllah’speacebeuponhim)bothintermsofappearanceandbehaviour.Eveniflewdpeopleweretobringanewcustom,they[theTalebanandscholars]wouldrefrainfromit.However,itisregrettablethatnowsomeoftheTalebanandmembersofthegeneralpublicfastentheturbans,likethelewdpeople,insuchawaythatnotonlyisithatedbytheTalebanandMullas,butalsobythepublic.Therefore,myrecommendationtoyouisthis—adaptyourselvesintermsofappearanceandbehaviourtothesacredShariaofProphet(MayAllah’speacebeuponhim),anddonotfastenyourturbaninany

81‘TalebanMinisterCommentsonEducationSituation,TiesWithU.S.Colleges,’Al-Watan,15March2001.

othermannerlestyoushouldresemblelewdpeople,whichAllahforbids.82

Toenforcetherestitutionoftradition,DavidEdwardswritesthattheTaleban

consistentlydownplayedtribalorregionalidentitiesinfavorofwhatmightbecalled‘villageidentity’...InidentifyingpuristcultureandtraditionwiththeIslamofthevillage,theTalibanwereindirectlycondemningtheIslamofthepartiessincemostofthepartyleaderswereproductsofKabulUniversityorhadworkedforstate-sponsoredinstitutions.Theywerealsoputtingthemselvesonaparwiththepeoplewhosesupporttheyhadtoenlistiftheirmovementwasgoingtobesuccessful.83

TheTaleban’sprogrammetorescuetraditionhadthreecomponents:epistemological,disciplinaryandstrategic.Wewillexamineeachofthesecomponentsinturn.Epistemologically,fortheTalebantheactconstitutedbelief,soitwasoutwardbehaviour—ritual,dressetc—whichbecametheobjectsofstatesurveillance.Thiswasenforcedthroughpublicspectaclesofdiscipline—thenotoriouswhip-wieldingreligiouspolice,thepublicexecutions,thejailingofindividualsforinadequatebeardlength.

TheTalebanepistemologyisoneofthekeyreasonswhythegroupreactedsostronglyagainstmodernistpoliticalIslam—oftengoingtoabsurdlengthstolimittheinfluenceof“Wahhabism”andSalafism.84WahidMuzhda,whoworkedintheEmirate’sforeignministry,recallsinhismemoirthefollowingstory:

OnedayIreferredtothesecretariatofthechiefjusticetoresolveamatter.Therewasapersontherewhowasbeggingasecretarytoallowhimtoseethejudgewithalongletterofclaiminhand.Heneededafatwa(religiousdecree)concerningavisittoadentist.Hewantedarulingondentalfillings.

82TheOfficialGazette,Sept.4,2001.Vol.799,54.(TalibanSourcesProjectarchive).83QuotedinRobertD.CrewsandAminTarzi,TheTalibanandtheCrisisofAfghanistan,HarvardUniversityPress2009,76.84OneintervieweerecallshowthefledglingAfghanjihadigroupings(inthelate1970s)gatheringinPakistanevenhadseparatesub-groupsdevotedto“anti-Wahhabi”preaching.OtherintervieweesfromwithintheKandaharitalibanandmujahedinfrequentlyusedtheword“sensitive”todescribetheirrelationshipwith“Wahhabiideas”(Interviews,Kandahar/Kabul,summer2012).

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Thepetitionersaid,“Iaskedanexpertspiritualleaderaboutfillingteeth.Hesaidthereisnoproblemwithit.Butlater,theImamofourmosque,whoisaTaliban,toldmeitwillmakemyprayersandablutionsinvalid.Iaskedthedentisttopullmyfilledteeth.ThedoctorsaidhewillonlydosoifIbringhimareligiousdecreefromthejudiciary.”

Thesecretaryaskedtheman:“Whogaveyouthefatwatofillyourteeth?”Theapplicantanswered:“AmanwhoisafriendofthedoctorandisareligiousexperteducatedinEgypt.”

Thesecretaryanswered:“YouhaveacteduponthefatwaofaWahabiormemberoftheMuslimBrotherhoodanddrownedyourself!”HethenturnedtotwoMaulanaSahibsthatwereintheofficeandaskedfortheiropinions.Theytooagreedwithhim.Theapplicantbeggedandpleadedwiththesecretarytowritehisopiniononapieceofpapersohecouldgethismoneybackfromthedentist.Heanswered:“Onecannotwritethesekindsoffatwasonpaper,becausetheywillcausequarrelsamongMuslims.”85

Beyondtheabsurd,anti-Islamism-permeated,Talebandecision-makinginthefieldsofeducationandpropaganda.Muzhdawritesthat:

AlltheTalebanleadersbelievedthatRabbani,SayyafandHekmatyar,whowereinfluencedbytheideologiesoftheMuslimBrotherhoodofEgyptandMaudoodi[aninfluentialSouthAsianIslamist]weremisledandtheproductoftheiraberrationwasthechaoticpostcommunistauthorityandthesituationitcreatedinAfghanistan.IwasinvitedtoameetingheldbytheMinistryofInformationandCultureconvenedtodecideontheprohibitionofcertainbooksenteringAfghanistan.MyassumptionwasthatthelistofbannedbookswouldincludethosethatcontradictedIslamicteachingsbutthelistwentbeyondthelimitsIpresumed.InthefirststageallbooksbyAbu-l-AlaMaudoodiandtheMuslimBrotherhoodwereonthelist.ThesevolumesweresubsequentlyabsolutelyprohibitedinAfghanistan.86

And:

There’salsoaninterestingstoryaboutthebookHalalandHaramby[leadingIslamist]SheikhYusufQaradawi.ThebookwasonsaleinKabulbookstoresforalongtimeuntilonedayafriendof

85WahidMuzhda,AfghanistanwaPanjSal-eSultah-eTaleban[AfghanistanandtheFiveYearsofTalebanRule],Kabul,Unknownpublisher2003.86Muzhda,Afghanistan,[seeFN87].

MullahNuruddinTurabi,ministerofjustice,noticedinapageofthebookthatQaradawihadconfessedhewasnotafollowerofaparticularschoolofthought.HebroughtthepointtoMullahTurabi’sattentionwithhisowninterpretationandexplanation.Turabiissuedanorderforallcopiesofthebooktobecollectedandburned.TheissueintensifiedandwasdiscussedintheCouncilofMinisters.ThecouncilsuccessfullybeseechedTurabitodispensewiththeburningofthebookbutitdidbecomeprohibited.87

Thebookinquestion,byaMuslimBrotherhoodideologue,oneoftheArabworld’smostinfluentialIslamistpreachers,detailsitemsandactswhichtheauthorconsiderslawfulandprohibitedinIslam.Amodernandstate-orientedwork,itdiffersfromTalebanthoughtinfourimportantways.Firstisthepervasiveconcernwithpoliticaloppression,aresultoftheseculardictatorshipsthatgaverisetomodernArabIslamism.ThusQaradawiarguesthatonereasonwhywomenshoulddressconservativelyisthatmorallaxityaidsthoseinpower–“itisthewayofrulerstokeeppeoplepreoccupiedwiththeirpersonaldesiresandlustssothattheyhavenotimetothinkaboutpublicaffairs.”88Talebandecreesrarelymentionedpoliticaloppressioninthisway;rather,insteadofafocussolelyoncommunistelites,theemphasiswasonthemalaiseofvicethathadinfectedallofAfghansocietyduringthecivilwar,includingthosemujahedinwhohadfoughtinthenameofIslamagainsttheSoviets.Itwasinternalcorruption,notexternaloppression,thatwastheTaleban’sfocus.

ThesecondkeydifferenceistheoverarchingconcernwithsocialjusticeandequalityfoundinQaradawi.Indiscussingaprohibitionagainstmenwearinggoldandsilk,forexample,Qaradawiincludesasjustification,“FromtheQuranicpointofview,luxuriouslivingleadstoweaknessamongnationsandtotheireventualdownfall;theexistenceofluxuryisalsoanexpressionofsocialinjustice,asonlyafewcanaffordluxuriousitemsattheexpenseofthedeprivedmassesofpeople.”89Ontheotherhand,Talebancondemnationsofluxuryoftenfocusedonitsinherentcorruptingquality,irrespectiveofitsdistributioninsociety.“ExpensiveandneedlesspartiesaregivenintheIslamicEmirate,”atypicaldecreewent,“whichbyitselfisextravagantand

87Muzhda,Afghanistan,[seeFN87].88YousufA.Qaradawi,Al-HalalWalHaramFilIslam[theLawfulandtheProhibitedinIslam],IslamicBookService,1982.89Qaradawi,Al-Halal,[seeFN90].



unlawfulaccordingtotheSharia.Everyoneinthefutureshallavoiddoingso.”90

Third,Qaradawi’sepistemologyoverlapswithWesternscientificformsofreasoning,sothatwhileheultimatelysupportshisguidelinesbydrawingexamplesfromtheHadithsandtheQuran,healsofrequentlybuttresseshisargumentswithreasoningexternaltothelogicofPropheticimitation–sometimesevenwithexamplesfromscientificresearch.(Hecites,forinstance,aGermanscientist’sresearchclaimingthatdogsareespeciallypronetocarryingwormsasapartialexplanationforHadithicinjunctionsagainstkeepingthemaspets.)WhileTalebannewspaperslikeShariatandTolo-yeAfghanfrequentlydiscussedprohibitions,theyreliedfarlessonextra-hadithicandextra-Qur’anicjustification—exceptforthenotablecaseofinvokingAfghancultureortradition.

Fourth,andperhapsmostimportantinpractice,isQaradawi’sepistemologyofbelief,whichisclosertoWesternChristianunderstandingthantheTaleban’s.Regardingphotographyandart,forexample,hewritesthatstrictlyprohibitedfiguresanddrawingsarethose“whicharenotmeanttobeworshippedbutwhichareintendedtoimitateAllah’screation.IftheartistclaimsthatheoriginatesandcreatesasAllahdoes,heisanunbeliever.Thismatterpertainssolelytotheintentionoftheartist”(emphasisadded).91Itistheartist’sinteriorstate,hisorherbelief,thatissubjecttoregulation.TheTaleban,ontheotherhand,devotetheirauthoritytotheact,whichtheyunderstandtoconstitutebelief.Henceallphotographyandartisticrenderingsofthehumanandanimalformwerecategoricallybanned,irrespectiveoftheintentoftheartist:

TheOrdinanceofIslamicEmirateofAfghanistanaboutthebanonprintingofanimals’pictures,crossorsacredversesontheindustrialproductsofthecountry:

(1)Hadith:AccordingtoAbdullahbinMasud,heheardfromtheProphetofGodsaying,“Theartist(picturemaker)willunderthemostintensivepunishmentofGod.”(2)AccordingtoIbnAbbas,onceheheardfromtheProphetofGodsayingthateverypicturedesignerwouldbeinhell.Hewillbepunishedforeverycreatedpicture.IbnAbbassaid“Ifyoucannotavoidthecreationofpicturethencreatethepictureofatreeorsomeinanimate

90TheOfficialGazette,Sept.4,2001.Vol.799,45.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].91Qaradawi,Al-Halal,[seeFN90].

thing.”(3)WithreferencetoIbnAbbas,theProphetsaidonthedayofjudgementthatpersonwouldbeundertheseverestpunishmentthatkillsaprophet,orishimselfkilledbyaprophet,orhewhokillsoneofhisparents.Picturedesignersandthosescholarswhodonotutilisetheirknowledgewouldalsobeincludedinthiscategory.92

Thedistinctionherebetweenintentandactisnotatrivialone,becausefortheTalebanitwaspreciselythelatterthatwastheobjectofsurveillanceanddiscipline.UnlikeinIslamismorWesternliberalism,interiorstateswerelargelyirrelevantundertheIslamicEmirate;instead,thejurisdictionofTalebandisciplinewastheexteriorstate,theact—andthepublicspectacleofdisciplinewasitselfaperformativeact,away(inthemindsoftheTaleban)ofcollectivelyreconstructingvirtueforanentiresociety.Whentheagentsinchargeofrestoringtraditionwerealsotheagentswiththemonopolyofforce,itbecameveryeasy,asJuanColeargues,forthisdisciplinaryprogrammetoalsobeawayofprojectingstatepower:

Shariadoesnotrequire,andperhapsevendiscourages,punishmentasspectacle.TheTalibanwerenotmerelyaffirmingtheirpietyortheirimplementationofIslamiclawastheysawitbytheir…[publicexecutions]atthestadium;theywereengagedin“stagedpublicity”thatrituallyaffirmedtheirpowerandlegitimacy.Forthisreason,watchingthespectaclesofpunishmentwasnotvoluntary,andwasevenafamilyaffairthatexposedyoungchildrentothebrutality.Ayoungwomanmemoirist,Zoya,reports,“Nearthestadium,wesawtheirpatrolsorderingshopkeeperstoclosedownandgowatchtheritual.Iwassurprisedtoseewomentakingtheirchildrenwiththem,but[myfriend]Zebaexplained,‘Theywanttheirchildrentorealisewhatwillhappentothemiftheyeverstealanything.Theythinkscaringthemisagoodwaytoeducatethem.’”93

ThethirdcomponentofTalebanthoughtwasthat,indeterminingwhethertoregulateanact,theimperativewastominimisetheriskoftheworstcasescenario.Suchanattitudeappearedtobeadirectreactiontothehorrorsofthecivilwar,areturntoanomieandsocietalcollapse.Ingametheory,thisstrategyisknownasthe‘theMinimaxImperative’.Actinginawaytoavoidtheworstpossibleoutcomemeansthatifanobject—say,achessboard—couldbeusedforsin(gambling),

92RasmiJarida799,decree9.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].93Crewsetal,Taliban,[seeFN85],129.

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thentheprudentcourseforthestateistoprohibitit.Liketherecoveringaddict,forwhomthesafestcourseistotalabstinence,notmoderation,thesocietyemergingfromcompletemoralcollapseshouldacttominimisethepossibilityoftheworstcasescenario—areturntoanomie.Figure8listssomeprohibitedobjectsundertheTalebanregime;themajorityoftheseitemsareassociatedwithpracticesthathadlongbeenmorallycontroversialinthecountryside.WahidMuzhdarecountsinhismemoirthat:

Mullah[Rabbani]Akhundasprimeministerwouldgetextremelyagitatedatthesightofnewspapersthrownonthegroundand(forhim)disrespected.Hebelievedthattheactwoulddrivethecountrytowardsdestruction.OnoneholidaywhenIvisitedhim,hewasveryupsetthatpagesofthenewspapersHewadandAniswereusedinwrappingbakery-madecakes.HealsonotedthataftertheholidaywhenhewenttoKandahar,hewoulddiscussthebanningofnewspaperprintingwithMullahOmar.

AccordingtohimwiththemajorityofAfghansbeingilliterate,theVoiceofShariaradioservedthemwellenough.Healsoobserved,“AllmylifeIhavenotreadevenonenewspaperarticle.InsteadofwastingmytimeatthatIreadpagesoftheQuran.”InthesamegatheringsomeonesaidhehadreadinabookthatdisrespectinglettersofthealphabetwasinfactdishonouringtheQuranbecauseQuranicverseswerewritteninalphabets.ThatstatementwasmadeinaffirmationofMullahHassan’sopinion.94

InacountrythathadbarelysurvivedaterrifyingdescentintoHobbesiananarchy,theTalebanbelievedtheirrolewastonotonlyeliminatevice,buttoeliminatetheenablingconditionsofvice.IfapagebearingthewordsoftheQurancouldbemisused,andiftheact,nottheintent,wasthesubjectofdiscipline,thenitfollowedthatthemostjustandsafestcoursewastoremovetheconditionsunderwhichtheactcouldoccur—bybanningnewspapersaltogether.

Contradictions

TheparadoxoftheTalebanisthattheywerenotarevolutionarymovementbutwereforcedtotakerevolutionaryactioninclaimingstatepower.WhereasfoundersoftheprogenitororganisationstotheIslamicStateofIraqandSyrialikeAbuMusabal-Zarqawihadspentyearsorganising,plotting,scheminganddreamingofanIslamic

94Muzhda,Afghanistan,[seeFN87].

society,therewasnosuchTalebanpre-history.Tobesure,theDeobandi-Sufinetworksthattalebswereembeddedinfeaturedalonghistoryofulemaactivism—especiallyinPakistan,whereclericshaveplayedaroleinanti-colonialstruggles.SomeprominentPakistaniDeobandischolars,suchasMuftiRasheed,hadattemptedtoarticulatetheoutlinesofanidealIslamicstate.Moreover,themainstreammujahedinpartiesthatthetalebanfrontswerelinkedtohadalsoplottedandtheorisedanIslamicstate.95ButamongtalebstherewaslittleorganisedorformalthinkingaboutanIslamicstatebeyondthebarestoutlines—andmanytalebsinfactexpectedareturnofthekingaftertheendofthejihad.96Asaresult,inoverthrowingtheoldorderandforginganewstate,theTalebanwasnotonlyconfrontedwithnewproblemsbutwerethrustintoaprocesspushingfarbeyondtheirearlierconceptions.Theexigenciesofstate-makingwouldbegintoshiftTalebanthinkingawayfromatraditionalist,ritual-orientedideologytowardsmodernistIslamism,whichisprimarilyconcernedwiththestate—ashiftthatbeganintheIslamicEmirateandcontinuestothisday.

Themostimmediatechallengethenewgovernmentfacedinattemptingtoreconstructtraditionwas:whichtradition?IslamictraditionasexperiencedandpracticedinthesouthernPashtunvillagewasaworldremovedfromurbancentresorotherpartsofAfghanistan.WhileoppositiontotheTalebanhadmoretodowiththeiroppressivedisciplinaryprogrammeandreluctancetosharepower,counter-narrativesoftraditionalsoplayedanimportantrole.EveninsouthernAfghanistan,theTalebansidelinedtraditionalelites,excludingthemfromstateofficeandlimitingtheirinfluenceingovernance—therebyminimisingauthentic,village-based,ethicalframeworkslinkedtotribe.Thismeantthatcertainlong-practicedtribalcustoms,suchasbaad(givingwomentoanenemyfamilytoendabloodfeud)ortheuseofkhanstoadjudicatedisputeswereproscribed.Here,forexample,isanexcerptfroma1997radioaddressofMawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi:

[Question]Cansomeonecontrarytothewishesofawidowmarryhertosomeoneelseornot?

[Answer]Sheasawidowisofsomeage.Butnotevenayounggirlcanbemarriedtosomeoneby 95Thisisaccordingtointerviewswithnumeroustalebanandnon-talebanmujahedin.ItisperhapsforthisreasonthattheydidnotengageinthebitterpowerstrugglethatensuedaftertheSovietwithdrawal.96InterviewsinKandaharwithnearlyadozenparticipantsofthetalebanfronts,2011-14.



herfatherwithoutherwishes.AwomancametotheProphetMohammad,MayAllahblessingbeuponhim,andshesaidtohim,O’ProphetofAllahmyfatherhasmarriedmetosomeonewithoutaskingme.HedidnotconsultmeandIalsodonotlikethathousehold.TheProphet,MayAllah’sblessingbeuponhim,saidthismarriageisvoid.Itisnotcorrectifyouarenothappywithit;yourfathercannotmarryyou.97

Moreover,onlythosecustomsspecifictosouthernAfghanistantendedtoreceiveofficialimprimatur.Talebanideologuesoftenviewedthosefromfurtherafield,suchasthenorthoreast,ascontradictorytoIslam:

[Question]Inoursocietyitisthecustom,whenanillnessofpatientcontinues,thattheybringtheheartorthedustofthenestofabird,washitinwaterandgivethewatertothepatient.Theysay,ifheistorecovermayhegetwellandifheisdyingthenmayhedie.WhatdoesIslamsayaboutsuchacustom?

[Deobandi]Somecustomsandhabitsthatarelefttousfromlongagoareverywrongandarenotwholesome.Thesecustomsandtraditionbelongstootherpeople,itispartofthecustomsofforeigners,whichhasnoplaceinIslamoranIslamicsociety.Whensomeoneloseshismindtheyusesomemeanswhichisun-naturallikebringingapieceofgreenclothandplacingthederangedpersononit.Theyareofopinionthatsuchapersonwillquicklydie.Ifthispersonreallydies,thentheMuslimwhopracticedthistraditionwillhavetakenpartinkillingthepersonandwillhavetoanswerforit.Inthesamewaythenestorheartofthebirdcannoteithermakeonebetterorcankillbyitself.Thosewhosayiftheyeatdustthatwillcurethem,thisiscompletelywrongastheeatingofdustisharam.Thishasbeenforbiddenbytheprophet,peaceandblessingbeuponhim.Butsomeulemahavesaid,thatthedustshouldbewashedinapotandwhenthedustsettlesinthepot,thenthewatercanbegiventothesickpersonandwiththekindnessofGodAllMighty,thesickpersonmaygetbetter.Inthiswaythenestofthebirdorthesoilgivingittothesickpersonisofnouse.98

97MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi,‘Thewayofdeliverance:AnswersPreparedbyMawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi’,Tolo-yeAfghan,12October1997.(TalibanSourcesProjectCollection).98MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi,“Thewayofdeliverance:AnswersPreparedbyMawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi”,Tolo-yeAfghannewspaper,20August1997.(TalibanSourcesProjectCollection).

ThequestionofwhichtraditionqualifiedasauthenticbecameacuteinurbanareaslikeKabulorinculturallydistinctareaslikeHazarajatorLoyaPaktia.Itwasinthelatterregion,forexample,thattheTaleban’sprohibitionofthelocally-popularegg-fightinggame(aregionalnewyearcustomwhichcouldinvolvegambling)ledtoalocal,short-liveduprising.99

ThechallengeofmultipletraditionswasintimatelyrelatedtotheTaleban’suseofcoercion.Theprimaryapparatusofinternalcontrol,theviceandvirtuepolice,didnotevenoperateinmostofruralsouthernAfghanistan—itwasonlyinthenorthandinurbancentreswhereitsmembersarrestedorbeatlocals.ThefollowingareexcerptsofinterviewswithwomenfromHelmandprovincefroma1999MercyCorpsreport,oneofthefewstudiesofrurallifeundertheTaleban:

"[Wehaverestrictions]becauseofourcultureandtraditioninthevillage.InAfghanistanyoucanseedifferentculturesinthecityandruralareas."—Azmat

“[SincetheTaleban’sarrival,life]isthesameinthevillagebutinthecityitismoredifficultnow.Lifeinthevillageandlifeinthecityisverydifferent.[Purdah]isstrictinourcultureinthevillage...[Iwore]aburqawhenIwasyoungorwhenIgooutofthevillage,achadar[headscarf]now."—Nadia

"Thesituationisverybad.Everybodysaysnorightsforwomen,butevenbeforethewarwehadthesameconditionforwomeninthevillage.[Whatis]differentfrombeforeisthatrestrictionsareforwomeninthecitiesfoo."—Nadira

Thereportadded:

Punishmentsregardinginappropriatedressarerumouredaboutbutveryfewinthesouth,whowerespokento,havebeensubjecttoanydisciplinaryactioninthisregard.InthefewcasesthatwomenhadheardofsomeonebeingreprimandedbytheTaliban’sDepartment(laterMinistry)forPromotingVirtueandPreventingVice,itwasthemalerelativesofawomannotdeemed

99DavidB.Edwards,BeforeTaliban:GenealogiesoftheAfghanJihad,UniversityofCaliforniaPress2002,299.AntonioGiustozzi,DecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsFromtheAfghanField.London,Hurst2009,73.Crewsetal,Taliban,[seeFN85],265.

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appropriatelydressed,whowerepunished,notthewomanherself.100

Butthestorywasverydifferentinthenorthandincities—andbecausetheseareasweremostpronetoresistingTalebanrule,theprogrammeofrestoringvirtuebecameinexorablylinkedwithextendingstatepower.Thepowerofthewhipsoonbecamealogicuntoitself,asthewell-staffedMinistryofthePropagationofVirtueandProtectionofViceandMinistryofJusticetransformedintothetwomostimportantministriesinthecountry.Theheadsoftheseministries,andparticularlymullahNuruddinTurabi,thejusticeminister,wereactuallyfrequentlyatoddswithmullahMuhammadOmarandtheKandahar-basedleadership.Manyoftheactionsofthereligiouspolicehadnosanctionineithershariaorlocaltradition—theideaofpubliclybeatingwomenonthestreet,orjailingreligioustransgressorswithouttrial,wasananathematomullahMuhammadOmar.KabirMohabbat,whoasatemporaryenvoyfromtheUnitedStatesspentaconsiderableamountoftimewiththeleadership,recalledthat:

IhadhopedthatIhadn'tbeeninthecountrylongenoughtodrawTorabi'sattention.But-therewasmyrefusaltogrowabeard!...[MullahAkhtar]Osmanileanedoverandgrinnedatmylookofdistress,"Wetookyourcomplaint,thathewaspersonallylashingpeopleonthestreets,veryseriously.WewenttoMullahOmarandtoldhimthattheViceandVirtuePoliceweretooforceful;peoplearestartingtohateusbecauseofthem."Osmanismiledatme,butIwasn'tsurewhatthatsmilemeant.

"LastDecemberMullahOmarwarnedtheministrytostopbeatingpeopleonthespot.Hewarnedthem,onemorecomplaintandtheministerwouldbesummonedtoKandahar.SometimeinFebruary2001,MullahOmarcalledTorabitoKandahar,gavehimatonguelashingandorderedhimtositathomeforthenextthreemonths."

ApparentlyTorabihadbeenorderedtorelaxhiszealousdistributionofthelaw(atrueunderstatement)andtostophittingpeopleinpublic.OfcourseIslamcallsforpublicpunishment,butthatshouldberenderedbyajudge.MullahOmartoldTorabi,"ThejoboftheMinistryofViceandVirtueistoimplementthelawandtakeoffenderstothenearestpolicestationsotheycan

100AnnaM.Pont,BlindChickens&SocialAnimals:CreatingSpacesforAfghanWomen’sNarrativesUndertheTaliban,MercyCorps,2001.

beputbeforeajudge.Ifthejudgedecidesthattheyrequirepublicpunishment,thensobeit."Itwasastart.Hittingpeopleinthestreets,forwhateverreason,hadtostop.Inoddedmyapproval,butrealisedthatitwouldtakeyearsofpublicrelationsworktochangethenegativeworldwideimagesthattheTalibanhadcreated.101

Butdespiterepeatedattempts,thesupremeleaderwasunabletoswayTurabiordislodgehimfromhispost,becauseTurabihadbuiltanindependentpowerbaseamongpolicelinkedtotheMinistryofJustice.102(Turabi,forhispart,hadafraughthistorywithmullahMuhammadOmar;BetteDamreportsthatTurabipressedOmartonegotiatewiththeNorthernAllianceduringthe1995siegeofKabul;whenOmarrefused,Turabiattemptedtohavethesupremeleaderremoved).103

TheresultofthisimpasseandthesweepingindependentpowerofthereligiouspolicewasthattheTaleban’sdisciplinaryprogrammeincreasinglystrayedfromwidelyaccepted(insouthernAfghanistan)attemptstorestoreIslamictraditiontoonethatwassubjecttothewhimsofthewhip.Thereligiouspolicebecamenotonlyameanstoenforceandregulateoutwardappearance,butawaytocontrolrebelliousindividualsandpopulations.104Inthiscontext,theTalebanincreasinglyusedexpostfactojustificationsandreinterpretationsoftheiroriginalmandate.JuanColerelaysthat

DespiteTalibanclaims,thepublicexerciseofviolencebytheTalibanhadmoretodowithpowerthanwithpiety.PunishmentswereappliedquiteapartfromtherequirementsofIslamiclaw.Latifa,ayoungAfghanwoman,sawagroupofwomeninlongblackveilsbeingbeatenbloodybyTalibaninthestreet.Bewildered,shelatermadeinquiries.“Theywerebeatenbecausetheywerewearingwhitesocks....ThatisthecoloroftheTalibanflag,andwomendonothavetherighttowearwhite.Itmeanstheyaredefilingtheflag.”105

Religiouspolicingwas,ineffect,anintegralpartofstatebuilding,wherethestateprojectedits

101M.KabirMohabbatandL.R.McInnis.DeliveringOsama,GoogleBooks,2011,163.102InterviewswithTalibanPoliticalCommitteemember,2015.103Dam,‘DeathofaSahebzada’,[seeFN44].104Thereligiouspolicealsobecameapowerful(andcorrupt)entityintheirownright,causingfrequenttensionsbetweentheministryandmullahOmar.105JuanR.I.Cole,“TheTaliban,Women,andtheHegelianPrivateSpace,"inCrewsetal.,Taliban,[seeFN85],130.



authorityintothedailylivesofcitizens,asthisexcerptfrominterviewswithHumanRightsWatchinthe1990ssuggest:

TheTalibanaskedmycustomers,“Whyareyougoingtoherhouse.Areyougoingtogatherandmakeplansagainstus?"Ihadaboardoutsidewhichread,“Tailoringforwomenandchildren.”Threetimestheycameandwarnedme,andItoldthem,“Iamawidow,whatshouldIdo?”ThethirdtimetheytookmyboarddownandsaidthatifIdonotstopthisworktheywillkillme.TheyaccusedmeofmakingplansagainsttheTaliban.Theysaid,“Everyoneshouldsewtheirownclothes;ourwivessewtheirownclothes.Godwillassistyou,ifyoudoeverythingasGodwishes.”ItwastheReligiousPolice,andIwasforcedtoclosefourmonthsagoandleaveforPakistan.

Inadditiontotherepressivemightofthereligiouspolice,theregimedeployedsoftpower:inaseriesoffalteringsteps,theTalebanbegantoreimaginetheirroleasleadersoftheAfghannation,animaginedcommunityinwhichmemberswereboundnotonlybyreligion,butbytheirgeographiclocationwithinaterritorially-definedunit.Likeallnationalisms,thisimaginedcommunitystretchedfarbackintothepast,therebybindingAfghansintimeaswellasspace.ThegroupincreasinglyappealedtoAfghanhistory—asdistinctfromvillagetradition—asameansoflegitimisingtheirrule.Atkeypoliticaljunctures,inparticular,theregimeharkenedbacktomotifsofAfghanhistory;forexample,whenmullahMuhammadOmarcrownedhimselfamirul-mumenin,orCommanderoftheFaithful—atitlethatledmanyoutsiderstobelievehewasproclaiminghimselfasthenextcaliph—itwasinfactanodtoaformoflegitimacywithprecedentinAfghanhistory.ChristineNoellewritesabout19thcenturyAfghanrulerDostMuhammadKhan:

ThesonofMirWa’izplacedtwoorthreebladesofgrassin[DostMuhammad’s]turban,proclaimedhimpadshah[king]withthetitleAmiral-Muminin,andexhortedthosepresenttocontributetotheplannedjihadagainsttheSikhs…DespitehisattempttoharkbacktothebeginningsofAfghanstatehood,DostMuhammadKhandepartedfromAhmadShah’sexampleinchoosingthetitleAmiral-Muminin.HisallegiancetoSabirShahnotwithstanding,AhmadShahwasgiventhetitleofdurr-idarn,‘pearloftheage’.Ratherthangivingreligiouslegitimacy,thistitlereflectedhisclaimstoroyalleadershipamonghisfellowtribesmen,who,henceforthassumingthename‘Durrani’,weretransformedintoastatesupportingelite.DostMuhammadKhan,ontheotherhand,desperately

neededthesupportoftheulamaofKabulinhisattempttosecurehisruleandwidenhismaterialbaseofsupport.106

Similarly,whenOmarhoistedaloftthecloakofProphetMuhammadtoadeliriousKandaharcrowd,hewasfollowingaprecedentfirstsetbyKingAmanullah,whodidthesametorallyKandaharistobackhisattempttorecapturethethronein1929.107TheregimeevenjustifiedthedestructionoftheBuddhastatuesofBamiyan,asnakedasanattempttoeraseabitoflocalheritageasonecouldimagine,withanappealtoAfghanhistory—thehistoryofsmashingidols:

Thesestatueswouldhavebeenconsideredsacredduringtheirtime.Theymusthavebeenworshiped.ButIslamconsidersalltypesofinfidelity,polytheismandsignsofidolworshipdisgustingandillegal.Allprophetshavefoughtagainstit…Probablythedestructionofstatuesalonewillnotscruboutallofourhistoricalrecord.Wehavemanyotherthingswhichbelongtoourancestors.Thesethingshavenotonlyahistoricalbackgroundbuttheyarethesymbolsofourpride.Oneofthesesymbolsisthetraditionofdestructionofidols.Forexample,SultanMahmudGhaznawiisstillrememberedasaniconoclast.108Alongsidesuchare-conceptualisation,theTalebanwereforcedtoconfronttheprosaicrealitiesofstatecraft.What,forexample,wastobedonewithtaxcollection?Wasitdistinctfromzakatandushr,religioustithes?Andifso,didthisrenderseculartaxationillegitimate?AseniorTalebanfigurewritesinanunpublishedhistoryoftheTalebanthat“Mostoftheulemabelievedthatcustomsandtheirrevenuesaregratuitousfinance(andsoareillegitimate)butothersregardedthecollectionofcustomstaxes—andspendingthatmoneyonsecurity—asaservicetothepeopleandthereforelegitimate.”109Theregimefellbeforethisissuecouldberesolved,althoughinpractice,thegovernmentregularlycollectedcustomsdutiesandvariousformsof“excisetaxes”oncarsandothersuchluxuries;in2001,forexample,theNangarhar

106ChristineNoelle,StateandTribeinNineteenth-CenturyAfghanistan:TheReignofAmirDostMuhammadKhan(1826-1863),Routledge1997,16.107BetteDamandFabrizioFoschini,‘UndertheCloakofHistory:TheKherqa-YeSharifFromFaizabadtoKandahar’,2014,https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/under-the-cloak-of-history-the-kherqa-sharif-from-faizabad-to-kandahar/.108‘IsthePreservationofIdolsNecessary?’Shariat,2February2001.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].109Authors’copy.

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taxofficereportedarevenueof148billionAfghanis.110

Similarly,theregimeinitiallytookahardlinestanceagainstmodernbanking,whichitbrandedasusury.ModernistIslamistshadlongsince

110‘Nangarhartaxdepartmentrevenueincreased’,Tolo-yeAfghan,9May2001.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].

addressedtheissue,rulinginfavourofbanking—ideologuesasearlyastheSalafistMuhammadAbduharguedforthepermissibilityofinterest—andtheTaleban’sCentralBankgraduallytooktointerest,althoughonlythroughloopholes.

IdeologuesoftheIslamicEmirate–Biographies

MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandi

MawlawiAbdulAliDeobandiwasborninthe1940sandeducatedatDarul-UlumDeoband(India).Thoughhedidn’thaveaformalpositionintheTalebangovernment,hewasoneofmullahMuhammedOmar’smosttrustedideologicaladvisors.HehostedapopularradioprogrammeduringtheEmirate,andwasknownfordispensingadviceonthemostintimatematters—likesex—inapublicforum.After2001,heisbelievedtohavefledtoPakistan,wherehediedofnaturalcauses.

MawlawiMuhammadWaliHaqqani

MawlawiMuhammadWaliHaqqani(born1968,Alizaibytribe)wasoriginallyfromSiachoyvillage,PanjwayidistrictofKandaharprovince.Hewaseducatedinhujraspriortoandduringthe1980s,whenhealsofoughtontalebanfrontsinKandahar,includingthoseofLalaMalang,AkbarAgha,andmullahFaizullahAkhundzada—wherehecametoknowmullahMuhammadOmar.AfterthejihadhestudiedintheDarul-UloomHaqqania,returningtoAfghanistanduringtheriseoftheTaleban.HeservedasMinisterforthePropagationofVirtueandthePreventionofVice,andreportedlyearnedtheireofmullahOmaratvarioustimesduetohisharshmeasures.HereportedlyquittheTalebanin2001,butshortlythereafterdiedinaU.S.bombing.

MawlawiPasanaiSaheb

MawlawiPasanaiSaheb(borninthe1940s,Ismaelkhelbytribe)wasthesenior-mosttalebjudgeinthejihadfollowingthedeathofMawlawiNazarMuhammad.OriginallyfromShahJuy,Zabul,hewaseducatedatNurul-MadarisinGhazni.Despitehisstatureduringthejihad,hedidnothaveahighpositionduringtheEmirate—heworkedintheKandaharfatwaoffice—reportedlyduetodifferenceshehadwiththeregime.Nonetheless,heremainedthemostwell-knownandrespectedoftheoldergenerationofTalebanjudges.After2001,hewasreportedlydetainedbyU.S.forces,untilGulAghaSherzaiconvincedtheAmericanstoreleasehim.Hediednotlongafter,mostlikelyofnaturalcauses.

MullahNuruddinTurabi

MullahNuruddinTurabi(Achekzaibytribe)wasoriginallyfromTirinKot,UruzganandfoughtasacommanderofasmalltalebanfrontinKandaharinthe1980s.Hewaseducatedentirelyinhujras.OutsideofmullahOmar,Turabiperhapshadthelargestday-to-dayideologicalinfluenceontheTalebanmovement,byvirtueofhisappointmentasMinisterofJustice.After2001,hesurrenderedtotheAfghangovernmentandattemptedtoswitchsides,butwasforcedtofleetoPakistanunderAmericanthreats.Later,hewasarrestedbyPakistanforanumberofyears.HeisnowreleasedandisreportedlylivinginPakistan.

MullahMuhammadOmar

MullahMuhammadOmar(Hotakbytribe)wasborninKandaharbutgrewupinDehRawud,Uruzgan.HisfamilyhailsfromZabulprovince.Hewaseducatedentirelyinhujras.Duringtheanti-Sovietjihad,hefoughtinatalebanfrontundermullahFaizlullahAkhundzada,beforeseparatingandforminghisowngrouptowardstheveryendofthe1980s.HewasreportedlyselectedasheadoftheTalebanmovementduetohispietyandlackoftiestooutsideforces.Omar’sreligiouscredentialswerenotstrong;hedidnotfinishhisstudies,althoughtherearereportsthatheattendedtothisafter2001.Nonetheless,hispositionassupremeleaderand“CommanderoftheFaithful”gavehimimmenseideologicalswayoverthemovement.Hediedin2013.



Thepoint,however,isnotwhethertheTalebanpursuedthisorthataspectofmodernstatecraft,butratherthatthenatureofthestatetookanincreasingimportanceinTalebandeliberations.111Intheirinternalandexternaldealings,intheirstriveforlegitimacy,andintheirquesttomaintainpower,theTalebanwereincreasinglyoperatingfromtheabstractprerogativesofstate-making,drawinguponIslamassystemofmeaningsandsignifierstointerpretandlegitimisetheseprerogatives.

Butatnopointdidtheyfullyabandontraditionalism.Theiradherencetoritualisticpracticeandtraditionalismwasincreasinglydifficulttoaccommodatewithinthemodernstatesystem,andchallengestolegitimacycroppedupwithgrowingfrequency.Underfirefromabroad,facingdroughtanddisaffectionathome,theregimetookincreasinglyhardlinemeasures,includingtheBuddhadestructionandthearrestofChristianmissionariesin2001.Perhapsthemostgrievousmovewastobanopium,whichplungedmillionsoffarmersintopenury.ItwasinthiscontextthatmullahMuhammadOmarrefusedtosurrenderOsamabinLaden,precipitatingthedownfallofhisregime.

THEANTI-AMERICAN'JIHAD'DownfallandCrisis

TheTalebanprovedincapableofrulingtheircountry.Itwasnotonlyresistanceinthenorth,butgrowingangerwithintheirbase—overconscription,thebanonopiumcultivation,anddrought—thatallowedforthegroup’srapiddownfallinthefaceofUSbombs.Veryfewwerewillingtodefendtheregime,andmostAfghanswelcomedthecomingoftheneworderwithopenarms.Talebancadreswitnessingtheircountryturnagainstthemplungedintocrisisandselfdoubt.MawlawiMuhammadHaqqani,adeputyministerduringtheEmirate,recalled:

Myfather,brother,andfamilywereatMansehra[atowninnorthwesternPakistanthatishometoseveralAfghanrefugeecamps].ButIrealizeditwouldn'tbewisetomoveinwiththem.ToomanypeopleknewwhoIwas,andsomehadnolovefortheTaliban.InsteadIfoundaplacetostayatamosquenearby.Ihadtosneakoveratmidnightjusttoseemykids,likeathief.WhenIwasvisitingmydaughteronenight,sheaskedmeaboutourKabulhome,whywedidn'thaveacar 111ItshouldbenotedthattheTalebaninheritedthebare-boneinfrastructureofastatefromthePDPAapparatus,includingarudimentarycivilserviceinKabul.

anymore.Shecomplainedthatitwastoohotintherefugeecamp,andthatshewantedtomovebacktothecoolclimateofKabul.Icouldn'tanswerher.ButshecouldtellfrommyeyeshowsadIwas.Iwasawreck—nervous,worried,andalmostpanic-stricken.112

FormanyTalebanleaders,theseeventswouldhelpaccelerateaprocessthathadbegunduringtheEmirate.Overthenextdecade,restoringtraditionorregulatingritualandpersonalcultivationwouldnolongerbetheprincipalpreoccupationofthemovement.Instead,Talebanthinkingbegantofocusheavilyonquestionsofsovereigntyandnationalism,andsoughtIslamasawayofachievingtheseends.WhiletheywouldnevercompletelyabandontheirrootsinvillageIslam,theywouldbegintodrawclosetothestandardconcernsofmodernistIslamism(recallNikkiKeddie’sdescriptionofthephenomenon:“aprogrammeofstrengtheningtheMuslimworldanddefeatingimperialism”).

Thereweremanyreasonsfortheacceleratingchanges.WhentheTalebanmobilisedasaninsurgencyin2003-2004,theydidsoforverydifferentreasonscomparedwiththeirinitialmobilisationtenyearsearlier.Theywerenolongerfacedwiththetotalbreakdownofsocietyfromwithinorashockingdescentintoanomie.Inotherwords,unlikethe1990s,thethreatwasnolongerinternal;itwasexogenoustoAfghansociety.Inthissense,thepositionseemed,onthesurface,similartotheSovietoccupation.Butinfact,beneaththissurfacesimilaritylayaworldofdifference.TheSovietinvasionwastheculminationofarevolutionaryprocessdatingtothecommunistcoupd’étatof1978andoppositionpoliticspriortothat.PDPAcadressoughtaviolentandradicalbreakfromAfghantradition,aimingtothoroughlyrevolutionisesocietyanditssocialrelations,downtothevillagelevel.Thisincludedsuchcontroversialmovesasattemptingtoenforcewomen’seducationinthecountryside,mandatoryliteracyprogrammes(inwhicheldersweremade,humiliatingly,toattendclasseswithchildren),blatantatheism(intheveryearlystagesaftertheputsch,atleast)andafiercelyrepressivepolicyagainsttheulama,maleksandkhans.Inthiscontext,defenceagainstthisexternalthreatwasintimatelytiedtointernalwell-being;thusthetalebanfrontswereguardiansoftraditioninaworldofprofoundupheaval.

112SamiYousafzai,‘TheTaliban’sOralHistoryoftheAfghanistanWar’,Newsweek,26September2009,http://www.newsweek.com/talibans-oral-history-afghanistan-war-79553.

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TheUSoccupationdifferedinthatitwas,atitsessence,aninterventionaimednotatrevolutionisingAfghansocietybutreversingittothestatusquoanteTaleban.Tobesure,therewereattemptstointroducewomen’srightsandotherliberalreforms,butthisunfoldedgraduallyandinsuchawayastonotprofoundlyalterthesocialorderofthevillage.TherewasnoattempttocombatIslamandnorepressiveactionstakenagainsttheulamaasagroup.WhattheAmericaninterventiondidaffect,however,wasthedistributionofpoweratthedistrictlevelandhigher;American-andstate-directedviolenceinthe2001-04periodwaslimitedtoparticularcommunitiesandconductedalongspecificlinesofpatronageandexclusion;thosewhoenjoyedaccesstotheforeignforcesheldthepower,andthosewholackedsuchaccesswereliabletobetargeted.Asaresult,certaincommunitieswerewinnersinthepost-2001order,andcertaincommunitiespredatedupon.Forexample,asystematiccampaignoftheU.S.andKandahargovernorGulAghaSherzaitotargetleadingfiguresoftheIshaqzaitribeinwesternKandaharresultedinthemajorityofthatcommunitybeingeffectivelyexcludedfromthepost-2001order.Similarly,Americantargeting(withstrongmenMirWaliandAmirDado)incentralandnorthernHelmandforcedtheexclusionofsubsetsoftheAlizaicommunitiesofKajakiandBaghrandistricts,andtheIshaqzaicommunityinSangin.113

Intheselattercommunities,theTalebanbegantoreorganiseandrecruit.Ifthemainvillagegrievanceofthe1980swastheoverwhelmingSovietrepressionandthecommunistattempttoerasethetraditionalwayoflife,andinthe1990sitwastheinternalcollapseofsociety,inthe2000s,thegrievanceinthesesamecommunitieswasUSrepressionandthecorruptionandbrutalityoftheirproxies,thecommanderswhomtheAmericanshadreturnedtopower.TheTaleban’ssolutionwastorecaptureAfghansovereigntybycombattingtherepressionoftheforeignforcesandresistingthecorruptionoftheAfghanstate.Tobesure,intheeyesoftheTaleban,theWesternimperialistsweretramplingonAfghancultureandtraditionandaimingtodestroythecountry’sIslamicsystem,butdefendingtraditioninthiscasemeant,ineffect,defendingnationalsovereigntyandresistingtheabusive‘puppet’regime.OnestudyofinsurgentsandtheirconstituentsinWardakandKandaharprovinces,forinstance,determinedthat

Manyrespondentstalkedofawestern‘crusade’againstIslamandAfghantraditions–withreligion

113Martin,AnIntimateWar,[seeFN82];Gopal,NoGoodMen,[seeFN1].

andculturepresentedascomplementaryandinterdependent.Religiousmessagesthereforedidhaveresonanceforthemajority.However,ourassessmentisthatthisisprimarilybecausetheywerecouchedintermsofrespondents’twomorepragmaticgrievances:thecorruptionofthestateandtheoccupationbyforeignforces.ThewayinwhichreligionwasfrequentlyenfoldedintooneorbothofthesedeepergrievancesisreflectedinthewordsofaHizb-iIslamicommander:‘Thisisnotanordinarywar,itisaholywar(jihad)–itstartedindefenceofourculturalvalues,ournationalidentityandourliberty.Soifitcostsourdevelopment,evenourblood,wewillcontinuefightingit’.Jihad,inthesenseusedhere,isnotaboutfightinganinfidelenemysimplybecauseheisaninfidelbutrathertoregainandretrievesomethingthattheenemyhasdenigratedandtakenaway,i.e.thevalues/identityofAfghancitizensandthecountry’slibertyandsovereignty.Thismessagehadmassappeal,whetherrespondentswereparticularlyreligiousornot.114

Ineffect,post-2001Talebanideologywasstructuredaroundthegrievancesofthegroup’sconstituents.ThisiswhythedichotomyofthoseTalebanwhojoinedfor“pragmaticreasons”—intheWesternimagination,theso-calledten-dollarTaleb,amongAfghans—andthosewhojoinedfor“ideological”reasonsisafalseone.Talebanrespondedtoreal-worldevents,suchastheabusiveandexclusionarynatureofthepost-2001regime,bypickingupthegun;theygavemeaningtothisdecision,however,bydrawingupontheprevailingrepertoireofsocialcritique:Islam,jihad,anti-Imperialism.Therefore“pragmatic”concernscouldleaveinsurgentswiththeconclusionthattheyhadnooptionbuttofightandyetsimultaneouslyleadthemtobelievethatthefightwasadivinely-ordained‘jihad.’

AlongsidethereorientationawayfromthereconstructionofvirtuetothedefenceofIslamicandnationalsovereignty,theTalebanunderwentanumberofprofoundsociologicalchangesinthepost-2001years.First,thisperiodmarkedanerainwhichAfghanhorizonswerebroadenedlikenoother.Whiletelevisionhadlittleimpactoutsideofmajorurbancentres,theadventofmobilephonesandtheinternetexposedalargerpercentageofAfghanstoforeignideas,includingforeignIslamicideas,thaneverbefore.Atthesametime,massive 114SarahLadbury,‘TestingHypothesesonRadicalisationinAfghanistan:WhyDoMenJointheTalibanandHizb-IIslami?HowMuchDoCommunitiesSupportThem?’,2009,http://d.yimg.com/kq/groups/23852819/1968355965/name/Drivers%20of%20Radicalisation%20in%20Afghanistan%20Sep%2009.pdf.



demographicshifts,withmillionsreturninghomeaftertimeasrefugeesabroad,helpedbreakdownsomeoftheparochialismandinsularitythathadruledthevillagesofpre-1979Afghanistan.TheTalebanandtheirsupporterswerenotimmunefromthesechanges.

Second,theAfghaninsurgencydevelopedundertheinfluenceofdevelopmentsinpost-2003Iraq.ThemethodsandrhetoricoftheIraqiinsurgencyintroducedanewsetofconceptualcategoriesforglobalIslamistmilitancy.115Thisincludedthevenerationofmartyrdomtoheightsnotseeninpre-2001Afghanistan.(Although1980smujahedinoftenspokeoftheiryearningformartyrdom,itwasonlyafter2003thatsuicidebombingcameintoregularusebyAfghaninsurgents;aswewillseebelow,anentiresystemofjustificationssprungintoplacetotheorisesuicideattacks,whichfurthermarkstheevolutioninthegroup’sthoughtawayfromtraditionalism.)116

Third,thepost-2001yearsmarkedthefirsttimeinthelivesofmostTalebanleadersthattheylivedoutsideAfghanistan.Onestudy,whichinterviewedindividualsinandassociatedwiththeTalebaninsurgency’spoliticalcommittee,statedthat:

Interpretationsborneoutofarudimentaryunderstandingoftheirreligion[i.e.,hujraeducation]andthetraditionalstricturesofvillagelifehavebeenchallengedbytherelativelycosmopolitanworldofPakistanandtheGulf,andtherelativebreadthofreligiousreasoninganddebatefoundintheseareas.Forexample,manyoftheintervieweeshaveinrecentyearsbeenexposedtoalternativeIslamistdiscoursesforthefirsttime,andtheyoftenhavefoundthisliteraturerichandwellargued.Inthewordsof[apoliticalcommittee-affiliatedTaleb]:“Theenvironmentofthe[1990s]Emiratewastypicallyonewhichwastightlyclosed.Thereusedtobeverylittleornocloseinteractionswithnon-jihadiIslamistgroups.TheideologicaldebateswereonlyrevolvingaroundwhatsomeDeobandiulemawroteorsaid.Beyondthat,ideologiesofIslamicgroupsdoingpoliticalstruggle,suchas[thePakistan-based]Jamaat-eIslami,wereclassifiedasunorthodox.”Thusinthe1990stheTalibantookaharshviewtowardsgroupsliketheMuslimBrotherhoodandJamaat-eIslami.117

115Strictlyspeaking,weshouldsaythattheIraqwar,andthe9-11attacks,popularisedalatentdiscourseinafringeelementoftheIslamistmovement.116ThesuicidebombtacticwascontroversialamongtheTalebanleadership,however.Seebelow.117BorhanOsmanandAnandGopal,‘TalibanViewsonaFutureState,’CenteronInternationalCooperation,NewYorkUniversity,2017.

AlmostnomembersoftheIslamicEmirateleadershipapartfromthesupremecourtandulemacouncilhadcompletedtheirmadrassaeducations;mullahMuhammadOmarhadneverproperlyearnedthetitlemullah,whilethosewhobrieflyattendedPakistan-basedseminarieslikeMawlawiMuhammadWali,chiefofthereligiouspolice,hadtheirstudiescutshortbytheemergenceoftheTaleban.This,andthegenerallycloisterednatureofpre-2001Afghanistan,meantthatTalebanhadlittleexposuretootherformsofIslamismorotherinterpretationsofIslam.Thestudycontinues:

[APakistan-basedinsurgentleader]explainedsomeofthefactorsbehindtheevolution:“Thisispartlyduetotheembracing[bymanyTaleban]ofinformationtechnologyandthefreemedia.Now,mostoftheeducatedmembersofthemovementread,hearanddiscussabouttheplightsofHamasandoftheMuslimBrotherhood;andthestatementsofMunawwarHassan[leaderofJamaat-eIslami2013-14]andideasofQaradawi,ZakirNaik[Indiancomparativereligionscholarandorator]andevenSalafiandSunniIranianscholars.ThecirculationofthediverseideasismadepossiblebyCDs,televisions,newspapersandinternet.”HesaidthoseinPakistan,whethertheywerethereforawinterrecessorbasedpermanently,hadmuchbetteraccesstothemediaoutlets,books,andtheinternet,andhadmoretimeforideologicaldiscussions,whichhasinevitablyopenedthemuptothenon-Deobandischoolsofthoughts.118

DuringtheIslamicEmirate,booksbasedonnon-Hanafijurisprudencewerebanned;intoday'sinsurgencyreligiousreasoningdrawsfromavarietyofschools.119Thefollowingisfromaseriesofguidelinesforproperconductinjihad:

Seekinginfidels’helpduringjihad:

Intherenownedbooks“FatehalQadeer,4/327,KashafalQinaa3/48andIbnalAabdeen3/235”HanafiandHanbalischolarshavementionedthatwhenitisnecessaryduringawartheseekinghelpfromnon-Muslimsispermissible.ThescholarsofShafi’ischoolputsomeconditionsforseekingthiskindofassistance.TheysaythattheMuslimleadermustbesatisfiedthattheinfidelswillnotdeceivethem.SecondthattheMuslimsmustmaintainsufficientpower.IncasetheassistinginfidelsjointheenemylinestheMuslimsmustbeabletomaintainthebalanceofpowerandcarryontheirresistance.ThescholarsofMalikischoolalso

118OsmanandGopal,TalibanViews,[seeFN119].119Despitetheban,influentialindividualssometimescitedHanbalischolarsinpublicpronouncements,althoughthiswasrare.

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considerthatseekinghelpfromnon-Muslimsispermissibleprovidedtheyconsent.120

AlthoughShafiiandHanafischolarsofferdifferentguidelinesonthequestion,theauthorsdonotinstructthereaderonwhichtofolloworwhichispermissible,suggestingthatindividualsarefreetochoose.Themajorityofthejihadguidelinesarepresentedinthisway,drawingfromanumberofschools.121

WhereasthemovementhadoncebannedbooksbyQaradawiandtheMuslimBrotherhood,itnowactivelypromotedworksfromthesesourcesandregularlydefendedIslamistgroupswithinthegeneralcontextofanti-Imperialism.IssuessuchastheIsraelioccupationofPalestine,towhichtheyhadpreviouslypaidlittlemorethanperfunctorynotice,nowbecamepartofageneralkufr-MuslimstrugglethattheTalebansawthemselvesaspartof.122FollowingtheMuslimBrotherhoodelectoralvictoryinEgypt,forexample,anofficialTalebanstatementdeclared:

EgypthasapivotalroleintheMiddleEastandtheelectionofDr.MuhammadMursi,thecandidateoftheIkhwan-ul-Muslimeen[MuslimBrotherhood]asthepresidentisagreatchangeontheMiddleEasternlevelandgenerallyontheinternationallevelwhichcarrythehopesofpositivechangesfortheIslamicEmirate.ThesuccessoftheIslamicGovernmentinEgyptisconsideredtobethestrongestblowintheMiddleEastandthewholeworldtotheAmericanandZionistexpansionism.MaytheMuslimNationofEgyptandtheirnewlyelectedgovernmenttakegoodadvantageofthisimportantoccasionandhistoricalvictoryinthedefenseandachievementoftheinterestsoftheIslamicUmmah.123

120AbuMohammadHaqqani,‘RequestingHelpfrominfidelsforthesakeofjihad,’Talibanjihadportal,11April2014.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].121Thismaybeborneoutofnecessity,astheTalebaninsurgencycontainsasmallnumberofforeignersinitsranks.122Al-SomoodmagazinefrequentlypublishesarticlesrelatingtoPalestine.See,forexample,thearticleentitled‘WhatishappeningtoAl-Aqsa?’publishedon19January2007,ortheeditorialentitled‘SupportofthePalestiniancauseisareligiousdutyandanIslamicresponsibility’publishedon28December2008.123’DeclarationoftheIslamicEmirateRegardingtheSuccessoftheCandidateofthe‘Ikhwanul-Muslimeen’’Alrahmah.com,30June2012,http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2012/06/30/21311-declaration-of-the-islamic-emirate-regarding-the-success-of-the-candidate-of-the-ikhwan-ul-muslimeen.html.ThattheTalebansawthemselveswithinthebroadercontextofWesterndominationandIslamistresistancedoesnotmean,however,thattheir

TheConsequencesofIslamism

WithIslamicsovereigntymovingtotheforefrontoftheTaleban’spreoccupations,aseriesofideologicaltransformationstookplacethatwouldcarrythegroupclosertotheworldofmodernIslamism.Tobesure,thesetransformationsareunevenwithinthemovement—particularlywhenconsideringthedifferencesbetweenrank-and-fileandtheleadership.Moreover,thesetransformationsarenowherenearcomplete.Inthissense,thetransformationsweexplorebelowdescribethetrajectoryoftheevolutionintheTaleban’sthinking,andisnotmeanttosuggestacompletedorhomogenousprocess.

TheideologicalevolutionbecomesclearwhenanalysingtheTaleban’sevolutionwithrespecttothethreecomponentsofitsprogrammeoutlinedabove:epistemological,disciplinaryandstrategic.Recallthatinpre-2001Talebanepistemology,theoutwardstate,theact,constitutedtheinnerbelief.Intheinsurgency,innerbeliefandintentionalitytookoverwhelmingimportance:forexample,aneditorialentitled“TheImportanceofIntentioninJihad”stated

Injihadfortherightreasons,forthepureofheart.Thepurposeofactionsisforthehighermoraltargetofjihad…IfsomeonewantstojoinjihadwithillintentionsitmeanshisstruggleisnotforthesakeofAlmightyAllah,butheisfightingforthesakeofplunder,gloryandrevenge.Hewillachievethewordlygainsbuthewillnotreceiveanymoralrewardinthelifeafterdeath.124

Inemphasisingtheintentovertheact,certainactivitiesthathadbeenprominentlybannedundertheEmiratecouldbere-examined—suchasphotographyormovingimages,wheretheartists’intent(asexpressedthroughitscontent)nowdeterminedwhetherthematerialwaspermittedorproscribed.Theshiftwasawaytoendowmeaningtothepragmaticadaptationtotheneedforrecruitment:Theinsurgencyregularlyusesvideoinitspropaganda,andithasnocompunctionsagainstpublishingphotographsofitsfighters.Infact,themovementhastakenpainstotrytorewriteitspasthistorytokeepinlinewiththisnewstateofaffairs.Al-Somood,thegroup’sflagshippublication,offeredthisrevisionistaccountasanexplanationforthetelevisionbanonthe1990s:

strategicorientationwasinternational.Aswewillseebelow,unlikealQaedaandothertransnationalIslamistgroups,theTalebandefendedaformofIslamicnationalism.124MawlawiAhmadGulRayyan,‘TheImportanceofIntentioninJihad,’TalibanJihadportal,3January2015.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].



Inregardtothenon-existenceoftelevisionchannels,itwasduetomanyproblemsandcrisesthatpreventedtheopeningofsuchchannelsatthetime.Therewasforexamplethejurisprudentdisputebetweenthescholarsoftheregionandtheunavailabilityofspecialistsandtechnicians,becausetheTaliban–aswehavepreviouslymentioned–wascomposedofstudentsfromschoolslocatedinthesub-continent,andtheseschoolsdidnotteachtheneededsubjects.Therefore,thestudentsdidnothaveanymediabackgroundanddidnotknowhowtoproduceTVshows,nottomentionthelackoftoolsandequipmentusedbytelevisionnetworks.Inthemeantime,theworldwasnothelpingtheIslamicEmirateatthislevel,ratherplacingobstaclestopreventitsprogressandkeepitinthecorner,farawayfromtheworld,inthehopethatthesedifficultiesandthisisolationwillpushittoabandonitsIslamicrootsanditsrulingsthataredrawnfromtheQur’anandtheSunna.Apartfromthat,theIslamicEmirateregulationsstresstheimportanceofthemediaanditsefficientroleinspreadingIslam,servingthecommunitiesandbuildingagreatIslamicedifice.However,thecircumstancesmadeitfocusontheavailablemeans,asitcouldnotopenorequipinternationalchannels,suchastelevisionamongothers,inordertoairitsshows.125

DuringthecreationoftheEmirate,theTalebandeterminedwhetheranindividualadheredtoIslambyjudginghisorheroutwardbehaviour—beginningwiththeperson’sroleinthejihadandcivilwar,butmoregenerallywiththesetofsignifiersthatlinkedtheoutertotheinner:grooming,adherencetoprayerschedulesandsoon.Thismeantthatthesesignifiersbecame,ineffect,proxiesforpoliticalallegiancetotheregime,andassuchtheybecameobjectsofdiscipline.After2001,however,suchsignifierswereinsufficienttoestablishpoliticalallegiance—andtherefore,inTalebaneyes,insufficienttodemonstratevirtue.126InsouthernAfghanistan,

125ShahabuddinGhaznawi,‘CorrectingtheConcepts,’Al-Somood(19),7February2008.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].126Liketheotherideologicalchanges,therootsofthisshiftlieintheIslamicEmirateperiod,althoughittooktheshockofthepost-2001yearsforthetendencytoreachfullexpression.A2000bookpublishedbythePakistaniclericMuftiRasheed(headoftheRasheedtrust),whichwasreportedlyfavouredbymullahMuhammadOmar,containedthefollowing:“Obeytheamir.Dohijratanddojihadinthepathofgod.Hewhostraysfromthecongregation/communityeventhedistanceofahand-span,hehascastofftheyokeofIslamfromhisneckuntilsuchtimeashehavingrepentedreturns.Andhewhohasraisedtheslogansofbarbarism,forexampletribalismorfactionalism,thenheisfromthe

localeliteswhosidedwiththeAmericansorthenewregimeadheredtotheverysameoutwardsignifiersasthoseinopposition.Inthiscontext,thesubjectofTalebandisciplineshiftedfromtheoutertotheinner—topoliticalallegianceasaninternalstate,aformofIslamicbelief.Thefollowingisfromaquestion-answerforumontheTalebanwebsitewithaspokesman:

[Question]:TheTaleban’streatmentofcivil-servicegovernmentemployeesinWardakprovinceisverybad;theyaddressthemwiththetitle‘infidel.’Mr.Mujahed,inyouropinion,isthiskindoftreatmentnotagainsthumanitarianandIslamicprinciples?Lookingforwardtoyourreply-HamdardWardak

[Answer]:Dearbrother,allthosepeoplewhoserveinthepresentgovernmentareinfactactiveagainstourreligion,people,valuesandnationalinterests.Asaresultoftheirworkandemploymentthedurationofoccupationprolongsfurtherandbenefittheforeigninvaders.Forthisveryreasontheirsalariesarepaidbythebudgetoftheforeigninvaders.Theforeignersarenotinsanetogivemoneytosomeonewithoutanyobjectives.Infacttheywanttoachievetheirnegativeobjectives.Alltheseniorandjunioremployeeshavebeenappointedbytheforeigners.SothesepeopleareunforgivablewhethertheyworkinoneparticularbranchofKabuladministration.Youalsomustnotpleadtheircase.However,asusualthemujahidin[theTaleban]arebusyinfightagainstthearmedforces,theydon’tbothertowastetheirtimeandtakeactionagainstthecivilianemployees.Butitdoesnotmeanthatthesecivilemployeesareinnocent.AstheprophetofIslamsays:whensomeoneincreasethenumberaparticulargroupheiscountedpartofit.

InthelightoftheaforementionedHadith,ifsomeoneworkswithKabuladministrationordirectlywiththeoccupyingforces,infactheincreasethenumberoftheenemiesofIslamandcountry.Sobydefaultheisalsoreckonedtobeanenemy.Ihopeyouwillnotseekinnocenceforthiskindofpeople.127

Civil-serviceemployeeswerejudgedtobeworking“againstIslam”bysolevirtueofthefactoftheiremploymentwithastatebackedbyforeigners.Ofcourse,evenundertheIslamicEmiratepolitically

groupsgoingtohell.Someoneasked,Evenifheisattentivetohisprayersandfasting?AReply:Evensohewillbefromthegroupsgoingtohell”emphasisadded.FromObediencetotheAmir:ExplorationofanearlytextontheAfghanTalibanbyMuftiRasheed,’translatedandeditedbyMichaelSempleandYameemaMitha,Berlin,FirstDraftPublishing2016.127TalibanQuestionandAnswerOnlineForum,7April2012.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].

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opposingtheTalebancouldmeandeath,butthegroupalsodealtwithuprisingsinKhostandelsewherethroughconcessions(inPashtunareas,atleast).Rather,resistancewasgreatestinareasmostdissimilartothesouthernPashtuncountryside,sodiscipliningoutwardbehaviourandappearance—thatis,punishingthosepracticesmostdissimilarto‘authenticIslam’ofthePashtunvillage—became(fromtheTaleban’sview)themosteffectiveformofpopulationcontrol.Now,withtheobjectofTalebandisciplineshiftedinwards,theirrepressivereachwentmuchfurther—countlessulemaandtribaleldershavebeenassassinatedbytheTalebanforthesolereasonthattheypoliticallysupportedthegovernment,eveniftheydidnotdrawanofficialpaycheckorhaveacivilservicejob.Virtuehereisalmostcompletelydecoupledfromanyoutwardsignifier,andinsteadislinkedtopoliticalallegianceandother“mattersoftheheart.”

Figure8listslocalnotables—khans,maleksandtribalelders—fromDehrawudandMaiwanddistrictswhohavebeenassassinatedbytheinsurgencysince2001.Manywerekilledbecauseoftheirmembershiponthegovernment-sanctioneddistrictshura,butsomelosttheirlivessimplyforhavingmetgovernmentofficialsorhavingcordialrelationswiththem.Totakeoneexample,MuhammadFaqir,aprominentNurzaielderfromtheGarmabakregionofMaiwand,hadbeenasub-commanderofthekeyTalebanfinancierHajiBashar.Assuch,hewasaprominentlocalsupporteroftheIslamicEmirate.After2001,whentheUSandKandahargovernmentdroveHajiBasharfromMaiwand,FaqirMuhammadretiredtohishome.Bymanyaccountshewasapiousman,animagebefittinghisroleasprominentmujahedandTalebansupporter.Buthetooktoinformallymeetingwithgovernmentofficialsandsoonlosthislifebecauseofit.

Atitsextreme,thisideologyvergesontakfirism,thelabellingofotherMuslimswiththewrongpoliticalloyaltiesasapostates.ThiswasthecaseevenifthoseMuslimsopenlyprofesstheirfaithinIslam,andthereforereligiouslysanctionedtokillthem,asthefollowingexcerptfromaTalebanarticlesuggests:

Theunworthylady,FatimaGilani,divorcedtwohusbandsandnowliveswithherthirdhusband,Anwar-ul-HaqAhadi,whoisanAmericancitizen.HowisitpossibleforAnwar-ul-HaqAhadi,thechairmanofAfghanistanBank,totrustthisladywhohasexchangedherpietyforsecularismandisalsotheholderofAmericancitizenship?IftomorrowsheisfedupwithAhadishewilleasilygetdivorcefromhimtoo.Thislady,whohasdisregardedherspiritualposition,isthecauseof

evildeeds.Ifsheclaimsthatshedivorcedherformerhusbandbecausehehadbecomeanapostate,wewillnotgiveanyvaluetothisclaimofher.RatherwebelievethatFatimaandAhadibothareapostates,becausebothofthemareincludedintheAmericanloyaltylist[emphasisadded].128

Thenewepistemologyislinkedtothedisciplinaryprogrammethroughastrategy—butitisnottheMinimaxapproachofold.Instead,thegroupdecreesactionsandobjectsasharamorhalalsolelywithrespecttowhethertheyaidthefightagainsttheAmericansandtheAfghangovernment.ThisisreminiscentofOlivierRoy’sconceptualisationofmodernistpoliticalIslam,inwhichIslamistsusedrelevantpassagesfromtheQuranandthehadithstoimbuetheirpoliticalambitionswithmeaning.129Forexample,afterIraqiinsurgents’successfuluseofsuicidebombing,thepracticebeganspreadingtoAfghanistan.Atfirst,theissueprovedcontentiousamongTalebanleadership.MullahMuhammadOmarwasreportedlyinitiallyopposed,andIslamcontainsprohibitionsagainstsuicide.Butothers,includingprominentcommandermullahDadullah,defendedthetacticascrucialinafightinwhichtheirsidewasclearlyoutgunned.Eventually,themovementmadevirtueofnecessity,goingsofarastoattackgovernment-backedulemawhoopposedthetacticonreligiousgrounds.ItwasnotlongbeforetheTaleban’sulemacouncilissuedafatwadeclaringthat“therearefrequentproofsinfavourofmartyrdomattacksintheHolyQuran,traditionsoftheHolyProphet(peacebeuponhim),[and]sayingsanddeedsoftheholycompanions.Variousbookshavebeenwrittenonthistopic.”130ThestatementgoesontociteanumberscholarsfromtheArabworld,fromhardlineSalafiststoYusufQaradawi—whosebookstheTalebangovernmenthadbannedinthe1990s.Theevidenceitselfwasoftenflimsy,withambiguousQuranicpassagespressedintoservicetojustifyastanceborneoftheexigenciesofasymmetricconflict:AbuDardaatellsthattheProphetsaid,“Allahlovesthreekindofpersonsandgivesthemtheaugerofsuccess.First:whensomeone’scomradesfleethebattlebuthestaysbackandcontinuestofightagainsttheenemy.Allahwillhelpandprotecthimfromthe

128TorLuwangSuleimankhel,‘WomaninIslam,’DaMujahedZhag,1383(2),17June2004.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].129WedonotmeantoimplythatTalebanstrategiesforregainingpowerexistindependentlyofreligiousreasoning.Rather,itisthecasethatwhichtypesofreligiousreasoningtheTalebanusedwasdependentonitspoliticalgoals.130IttehadUlemaAfghanistan,Fatwa,7July2013.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].



enemy,orhewillbecomeamartyr.Allwilladmirehispatience.Second:Supposeamanhasabeautifulwifeandacomfortablebed,butinthemiddleofthenighthegetsupandworshipsAllahanddoesnotbotheraboutlustandsleeping.Third:Supposethereisamanwhotravelswithagroupofothertravellers,andaftercoveringalongdistance

theyfindaplaceandsleep.ButwhiletherestareasleephegetsupandworshipsAllahinthelaterpartofthenight.

ExplanationTheabovementionedthreepointsprovethatthelossoflifeisthebestpartofjihad.131

Tobesure,someofthenewmodesofthoughthaveantecedentsinAfghanhistory.TheTalebancameclosetolabellingpoliticalopponentsas

apostates,forexample,whentheybrandedtheirNorthernAllianceopponents“sharwafisad”(evilandcorruption);andinthe1980sjihad,mujahedin 131AbuAbdullahMukhlis,‘SuicidalattacksandSharia(part2),’TalibanJihadportal,2November2014.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].

TribeIslamicEmirateallegiance Post-2001activities

DehRawud

MalekAbdullahJan Nurzai Neutral DistrictShura

Majeed Nurzai Neutral Metwithgovernment

HajjiJananAka Nurzai Neutral Metwithgovernment

MalekIsmail Nurzai Neutral DistrictShura

MalekJilani Nurzai Neutral DistrictShura

MuhammadAkbarKhan Nurzai Neutral DistrictShura

Hamkar Nurzai Neutral ANP

MamoorMirJan Babozai Opposed DistrictGovernment

HajjiPayindAka NurzaiSupported,thenopposed DistrictShura

MalekKalandarAka Nurzai Opposed DistrictShura

HajjiBahadar Popalzai Opposed DistrictShura

HajjiAhmadKhan Popalzai Supporter DistrictShura

HajjiMuhammadNaeemAka Popalzai Supporter DistrictShura

MalekBariGul Nurzai Neutral Metwithgovernment

Maiwand

HajjiSanamGul Ishaqzai Supporter DistrictShura

HajjiLandu Nurzai Neutral DistrictShura

AghaShah Barakzai Opposed SherzaiMilitia

HajjiAbdulWali Achekzai Opposed SherzaiMilitia

KhiruAka Nurzai Neutral Metwithgovernment

MuhammadFaqir Nurzai Supporter Metwithgovernment

Figure8:LocaleliteskilledbyTaleban,2001-14,DehRawudandMaiwand

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groupsacrossthespectrumhadlabelledAfghanMuslimswhoworkedwiththeSovietarmyorthegovernment(suchasAfghanarmyrecruits)asapostates.132Certainly,thetalebanfrontsofthe1980swouldhaveagreedwiththischaracterisation,butitwasnotatthattimethekeyfactorconfiguringtalebanself-identity;instead,itwasthefronts’rolesasislandsoftraditioninaseaofupheaval,whereyoungtalebancontinuedtheirstudieswhilespendingtimeinthetrenches,thatprovedtobeessentialtothenotionofataleb.Buttoday’sfighterslookverydifferentfromtheirpredecessors.Gonearethedaysofenforcedasceticismandritualpurityonthefrontline—theinvolvementwithcriminalnetworks,theopiumtrade,extortionandkidnappingthatmarksthecurrentinsurgencywouldhavebeenunthinkableintheself-disciplined1980stalebanfronts.Tobeamemberofatalebanfrontatthattimemeantacommitmenttostudyalongsidejihad;evenunschooledandilliteratemujahedinreceivedinstructionwhenjoiningthetalebanranks.MullahZa’ifwritesofthetalebanfronts:

IwouldlearnfrommyinstructorandIwouldteachothersthebasicsofreadingandwriting.Weallstudied,andsoIwasabletocontinuemyreligiouseducation.Peoplewhodidnotwanttostudywenttofightunderothercommanders.Notallthefrontsworkedthisinthismanner,butwewereTalibanandthiswasourway.Wewantedtostayclean,toavoidsinning,andtoregulateourbehaviour.133

Bycontrast,intoday’s“Talebanfronts”—localinsurgentgroupsfightingundertheTalebanbanner—fightersdonotengageinstudy,andveryoftentheydonothavereligiouseducationatall.InMichaelSemple’sstudyoftherhetoricandorganisationoftheTalebaninsurgency,hefoundthataboutaquarterofTalebanshadowgovernorsataparticularmomentlackedareligiouseducation.134ThistoowouldhavebeenunthinkableduringtheEmirate,wherethereisnorecordofaprovincial-levelfigurewithoutsomelevelofreligioustraining.Thetrendundoubtedlyintensifiesasonegoesfurtherdowntheranks;ina14-manKandahar-basedTalebanunit(adelgai)thatoneoftheauthorsmetwithin2008,onlyoneindividualhadreligioustraining.

132UnitedNations.MappingReport.Online,2010,172-6.http://www.flagrancy.net/salvage/UNMappingReportAfghanistan.pdf.133Zaeef,MyLife,27,[seeFN6].134MichaelSemple,‘Rhetoric,Ideology,andOrganizationalStructureoftheTalibanMovement,’UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,PeaceworksNo.102,2014.

IslamistNationalism

Inrecentyears,theTalebanhastriedtodistanceitselffromitsmostnotoriouspracticesofthe1990s.ThefollowingexampleisfromthequestionforumontheTalebanwebsite:[Question]:MyquestionisthatiftheIslamicEmirateonceagainformsitsgovernmentinAfghanistan,willitrevivethedepartmentofviceandvirtue?Ifyes,willitagainimplementitsordersbyforce?

Regards.LonglivethemujahidinoftheIslamicEmirate!

[Answer]:Peacebeuponyou!TheIslamicgovernmentwillformthecountrywithallitsessentialdepartments.ThedepartmentofviceandvirtueisanessentialpartofanIslamicgovernmentanditisobligatoryonallMuslimstofollowitsinstructions.However,thistimeitsproceduresandmethodswillcompletelyreviewed.Inasofterwaythepeoplewillpersuadedtowardstheestablishmentofvirtueandlikewisetheywillpreventedfromvicewithwisdom.Inthisconnectiontheuseofunnecessaryforcewillbeavoided.135

Similarly,astudyoftheTalebanleadershipcontainsthefollowinginterviewexcerpt:

Imet[ex-MinisterofJusticeNuruddin]TurabiinPakistanlastyear.Hewaswittilymakingfunofhispastextremebehaviors.InretrospectofpracticessuchasstoppingpeopleinpublictochecktheirbeardfortrimmingandviolentlycrushingmusictapecassettesonstreetsofKabul,Turabiasked:‘wasn’titsodumbofustoengageinsuchtrivialacts?’Iwasamazedhowhehadrealisedhismistakes[givenhischaracterasastubbornpersoninthepast].Hesaidtheprison[forseveralyearsinPakistan]taughthimalotabouttheerroneousbehaviorsoftheTalibanandmadehimrealizetheextremeharshpracticeswerenotonlyinaccordancetoSharia,butalsothemainsourceofpeople’snegativeperceptionoftheEmirate.136

135TalibanQuestionandAnswerOnlineForum(4April2012).[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].136OsmanandGopal,TalibanViews,[seeFN118].



Inthesamevein,thenewepistemologyanditsassociateddisciplinarystrategieshaverecastthecontroversialobjectsofyearspast;theredonotappeartobesignificantattemptstoenforceaparticularauthentictradition(Islamofthe

southernPashtunvillage)onothercommunities,whichaccountsfortheremarkablyvariedexperienceofTalebandisciplineinthisregardcountrywide;whenoneoftheauthorsvisitedinsurgent-heldvillagesinWardakprovincein2008,forexample,themajorityofTalebankeptshortbeardsornoneatall,andprayerscheduleswereirregular.137

137AntonioGiustozzi,Nation-BuildingIsNotForAll:ThePoliticsofEducationinAfghanistan,Kabul,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2012,http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/AAN-Politics-of-Education.pdf;AntonioGiustozzi,andClaudioFranco,TheOngoingBattleforEducation:Uprisings,NegotiationsandTalebanTactics,2013,Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/20130610_AAN_Taleban_and_Schools_FINAL.pdf;MichaelSemple,TheoFarrell,AnatolLievenandRudraChaudhuri,TalebanPerspectivesonReconciliation,London,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,2012,https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Taleban_Perspectives_on_Reconciliation.pdf.

TosayallthisisnottoclaimthattheTalebanhavegrownlessauthoritarianorrepressive,however.

Rather,tospeakoftheTaleban’sjourneyfromtraditionalismtowardsaformofmodernist

IslamismistohighlightthechangingwaysinwhichaTalebimagineshimselfandIslaminrelationtopower.Thegroup’swidely-notedconservatismhasnotdiminished;rather,theshiftliesinthewaysthisconservatismisexpressedandinthedisplacementoftheveryobjectofdiscipline.ItsuggestsachangefrompunctiliousattentionofoutwardactionstodirectlyregulatingtheinnermorallifeofAfghans.Inmostcases,thiscollapsestostandardculturalconservatism.Whereasbefore,theTalebanbannedtelevisionentoto,nowtheyexpendmucheffortdecryingthespecificcontentoftelevisionandadvocatingthatthemediumbeputtoproperIslamicusage.Thuswhenthefollowingal-SomoodeditoriallambastsWesterninfluencesintelevision,itsoundsreminiscentofculturalconservatismtheworldover,Islamicorotherwise:

[A]mongthesocialrepercussionsisthepublicdisplayofprohibitedactswithoutanyregardforwhetherornottheothersarelookingandcanseewhatthepersonisdoing.Thisphenomenonisincreasingbythedayandwhoeverisclosetotheyouthcandetectitfirst-hand.Indeed,thesignsareseenonvariouslevels,sincetheyouthare

Figure9:Ideologicalvariationsamongdifferentgroups

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becomingaccustomedtosmokingcigarettesbecausetheyareseeingthatonTV.Moreover,devianttrendsandbehavioursarestartingtoemergeinthewaytheydress,andyouwillalsonoticetheirinclinationtohaveprohibitedrelations.Theyarethusestablishingcompaniestocatchwhoevertheycanandpracticeobsceneactivities,thusemulatingthehundredsofscenestheyhavebeenwatchingandhavemadethemconstantlyarousedandseekingtheirpleasurebyanymeansnecessary.138

ThisallsuggeststhatthestandardmetricsformappingIslamicmovementsisinadequate.Insteadoftheusualconceptionofasingleaxiswhichrangesfrom“extremist”to“moderate,”or“fundamentalist”to“modernist,”itisperhapsbettertoreconceptualiseIslamicpoliticsalongtwodimensions.Figure9isaschematic,roughfirstattempttomapgroupsalongtheseaxes.

Revolutionarygroupsseektooverthrowtheexistingorder,whilereformistgroupsaimtograduallytransformthestate(andsociety)throughcapturingitsinstitutionsthroughelectionsorotherpeacefulmeans.TheTalebanmovementisnotlikelytoremainstationaryonthismap,becausetendencieswithintheorganisationcanexertapulltokeepitwithintherevolutionarycamporgraduallymoveittothereformistcamp(whichis,inthecurrentcontext,arealityonlyintheeventofanegotiatedsettlement).

Eveninsuchanevent,however,revolutionaryIslamismdoesnotnecessarilymeantransnationaljihad.Infact,whatcontinuestouniteallwingsoftheTalebanmovementisacommitmenttoAfghansovereignty—whichis,ineffect,aformofnationalism.

TherearethreeimportantfeaturesoftheTaleban’snationalism.First,theirparticularformofIslamistnationalismmightseemlikeacontradictionintermsbecausenationalismisnormallyasecularphenomenon.However,asWilliamCavanaughandothershavepointedout,thedistinctionbetweenthesecularandthereligiousisamodernwesternone,andinsecularcountries,nationalismtakesonfunctionspreviouslyperformedbyreligion,foritenables“acountry’scitizenstoinscribetheirexistenceinatotalitythattranscendsthem”—atimelessnation,animaginedcommunityofsharedpracticesandorigin.139Afghanistan,likeallnations,isamodern 138ZubairSafi,‘TheAmericanintellectualinvasionofAfghansocietyanditsdevastatingimpact,’Al-Somood,28November2008.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].139RazmigKeucheyan,TheLeftHemisphere:MappingCriticalTheory,London,Verso2013.WilliamT.Cavanaugh,TheMythofReligiousViolence:Secular

invention,butitisimaginedbytheTalebanandothersasextendingintothedistantpast,testedtimeandagainbyvariousinvaders.

TheTalebanrejectthevalidityofnon-Sharia-basednormativesystems,buthavenotrejectedcoexistencewiththosesystemsintheinternationalstatesystem.Forexample,ina2009statementaddressedtotheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation,abodyledbyChinaandRussia,thegroupsaid:

TheIEAwantstohavegoodandpositiverelationswithallneighboursbasedonmutualrespect,andtoopenanewchapterofgoodneighbourlinessofmutualcooperationandeconomicdevelopment...TheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistan,asperitspeacefulpolicy,wantsconstructiveinteractionwithShanghaiforummembers,forpermanentstabilityandeconomicdevelopmentintheregiononthebasisofmutualrespect.140

ItisinstructivetocomparethissortofIslamistnationalismtoagroupliketheIslamicStateEvenifsuchstatementsweremererhetoric,thefactthattheTalebanseektoportraythemselvesinthiswayisastarkdifferencewiththeIS,whoopenlyflouttheinternationalorder,broadcastingtheircrimesanddenouncingallnationstates.TheTalebanhasnevercarriedoutanattackoutsideitsborders.Incomparison,theIslamicStaterejectsthecurrentinternationalorder,particularlytheSykes-PicotpartitioningoftheMiddleEastandtheprospectofcoexistencewithnon-sharianormativeframeworks.

TheTaleban’simaginedcommunityislimitedtoAfghans.Althoughthegroupliteraturefrequentlymentionstheumma(theglobalcommunityofMuslims),inpractice,thegroupisonlyconcernedwitheventsinsideAfghanistan.TherootsofthisphenomenoninfactdatetotheinceptionoftheIslamicEmirateandthedemandsofrunninganationalstateandhavedevelopedtotheirfullexpressioninthecurrentinsurgencyperiod.ConsiderthefollowingdecreefrommullahMuhammadOmarin2000:

Peaceandblessingsbeuponyou!SincethelastmorethansixyearstheIslamicEmiratehasorderedthefaithfulpeopleofthecountrytogrowtheirbeardsaccordingtothewaytheProphet.Though,mostoftherighteouspeoplehavegrowntheirbeardsinaccordancewithShari’s,unfortunatelyaminorityofpeoplearestillbeing

IdeologyandtheRootsofModernConflict,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress2009.140‘OpenLetteroftheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistantotheShanghaiSummit,’www.shahamat-english.com,14October2009(author’scopy).



witnessedintownsandvillageswhotrimtheirbeardsandonmanyoccasionevenarguewiththepersonnelofviceandvirtuedepartment.InsidethecountrytheEmirate’sofficialsareresponsiblenottosettleatall,exceptinsomeveryexceptionalcircumstance,themattersofthosewhohavetrimmedtheirbeardsagainstthewayofShari’a,soasallthepeoplegrowtheirbeardsproperlythenourShariaresponsibilitywillbefulfilled.However,foreigners,evenMuslims,areexemptedofthisorder.141[Emphasisadded]

Inthecurrentperiod,insurgentpropagandaoftenemphasisespatriotismandnationalistcredentials.HereisanofficialTalebanresponsetochargesthatthemovementistooclosetoPakistan:

IwanttoappealtoallthesensibleAfghansnottopayanyattentiontothiskindofpropaganda.TheTalibanisapatriotic,independentmovementandlovessovereignty.TheyhavetheirownfreeIslamicideology.ItisamistaketothinkotherwiseabouttheTaliban.TheTalibanmustbecompletelyunderstood.Theirspiritforthepursuitoffreedommustbecomprehended.142

Officialpropagandagoestogreatlengthstoportraythemovementasnational:

Brother,weshouldtrytomakeaunityamongallsectionsofournationsforthesakeofanIslamicsystemandournationalinterest.Likeinthepast,todayalsoeveryethnicgroupsparticipateintheongoingjihad.WearewitnesstotheMujahidinattackswhichtakeplaceintheeast,west,northandsouthofthecountry.Allethnicgroupsofthenationparticipateintheseoperations.InSarePul,Jozjan,SamanganandFaryabdespiteallproblemsanddifficulties,ourUzbekandTurkmenbrothersshouldertoshoulderwiththeirPashtunbrotherstakepartinJihad.Theyhaveofferedalotofsacrifices.Timeandagaintheyparticipateinsuicidalattacks.InBadakhshan,Takhar,KunduzandBaghlanourTajikbrotherstogetherwiththeirPashtunbrothersparticipateintheprocessofJihad.Despitealltheirlocalproblemsanddifficultiestheyoffersomanysacrifices.OurHazarabrotherstoo,inaccordancetotheircapacity,despitealllocalproblems,participateinJihadintheprovincesofBamyanandHeratandotherareas.Idon’tthinkthatJihadiswagedonlybyoneparticularethnicgroup,thoughmostofmostoftheoperationstakeplaceinPashtunpopulatedareas,becauseofthepresenceofbetter 141MullahMuhammadOmar,‘TheOrdinanceofIslamicEmirateofAfghanistanaboutthebanonthesettlementoftrimmedbeards,’RasmiJarida,9February2001[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].142TalibanQuestionandAnswerOnlineForum,27January2012.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].

circumstancesforJihadintheseareas.HopefullythewholenationwillparticipateinourJihad.Allthepeoplewillcomeforwardtosupporttheirbrotherinthefightagainstthecommonenemy.143

TheIslamicState’simaginedcommunity,ontheotherhand,istheentire(Sunni)umma,anditsgoalistorecreateacaliphatethatexplicitlyrejectstheWestphalianorder,andwithit,anynationalidentity.WhenAbuBakral-Baghdadiclaimsthemantleofamirul-mumenin,hedoessoaspurportedleaderoftheworld’sSunnis.Comparethefollowingexchangein1996,inanArabicpublication:

[AlMajallah]:YouappointedMohammadOmarasamirofthebelievers.IsthisonlyforAfghanistanorforallMuslims?

[ForeignMinisterMullahMuttawakkil]:ThisisonlyforAfghanistan.144

FromtheEmirateonwards,onlythevirtueofAfghanswasalegitimateobjectofdiscipline.After2001,whendisciplineturnedinwards,itwastheloyaltyofAfghansthatwasunderscrutiny.ThustheobjectoftheTaleban’spoliticalaims,andthesubjectoftheirimaginedcommunity,isallAfghans,regardlessoftribeorethnicity.

ThesecondimportantfeatureoftheTaleban’sIslamicnationalismisthatitisdistinctfromPashtunnationalism.Thelatterisasecularandlargelyurbanphenomenonthatisexplicitlyethnocentric.PashtunnationalismtodayisweakinAfghanistanandhasastrongerexpressionacrosstheborderinPakistan.TheTaleban’sIslamicnationalismbearsastrongersimilaritytothatofHamasinPalestineorAhraral-ShaminSyria—bothofwhicharefocusedonthegoalof‘nationalliberation’–thanitdoestoanyideologyinAfghanistan.

Third,theTaleban’snationalismisinherentlycontradictory.Ontheonehand,itisperhapsthemostpotentnationalistideologyonofferinAfghanistanatthemoment.Ontheother,itisconstrainedbytheextremelyweakformalinstitutionsthatmarkAfghanpolitics.Duetoinstitutionalunderdevelopmentandfailuresinstatebuilding,AfghanistanlargelylacksformalisedpoliticalpartiesofthetypethatexistintheWest.Instead,Afghanpoliticsismarkedby“neopatrimonialism,”whichAfricanistChristopherClaphamaptlydescribesas“aformoforganisation

143TalibanQuestionandAnswerOnlineForum,21March2012.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].144BBCMonitoring,‘LondonArabicmagazineinterviewsTalebanspokesmanonaims,philosophy;’(Al-Majallah,23October1996.(Authors’copy).

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inwhichrelationshipsofabroadlypatrimonialtype[i.e.,patron-clientbased]pervadeapoliticalandadministrativesystemwhichisformallyconstructedonrational-legallines.”145Thismeansthat,whatevertheintentionsofpoliticalactorsmightbe,theinstitutionalpovertyoftheAfghanpoliticalsceneforcesindividualstorelyonpatronageandtrustasthemeansthroughwhichsolidarityisachieved.Therefore,despiteTalebanaspirationsforanationalmovement,Talebansolidarityinpracticeismediatedbykinship,clientship,tribeandpersonalloyalties(so-calledandiwalnetworks).(ThisisnotlimitedtotheTaleban,butthecaseforAfghans,generally.)Moreover,theruinousconsequencesoftheUSoccupationandwarhavebeenlimited(largely)toPashtuncommunities.Thesetwofactstogetherexplainwhy,despitetheTaleban’simaginedsolidarityencompassingallAfghans,itisstillthecasethatmostTalebanarePashtuns,andmostTalebanleadershailfromsouthernAfghanistan.

CONCLUSION

IfandwhenUStroopsdepart,itwouldseemthatoneofthekeyplanksofTalebanideology—reclaimingAfghansovereignty—shoulddissolve.YetovertheyearstheTalebanhaveprovenremarkablyadaptabletothechangingcircumstances,andthesameunderlyinglogicthatdrovetheirtransformationtoIslamism—theexigenciesofseekingandholdingpower—willcontinuetooperate.

ThisviewfitswithintheTaleban’spreoccupationwiththe“nearenemy”(astandardtermusedbyIslamistsaroundtheworld)thattheyhavedevelopedoverthepastdecade.TalebanulemahavedeclaredAfghanistandarul-harb,or“houseofwar,”ahadithictermreferringtoaterritorywhereMuslimsareunabletopracticeopenly.MostIslamicscholarshaveinterpretedthephrasetomeanacountrywhereMuslimsareoppressedandcannotprayorcelebrateEidopenly,butSalafistinterpretationsgomuchfurtherbypinningthedesignationonthepoliticalnatureoftheregimeinpower.FormanySalafists,sucharegimecouldbeMusliminallformalaspects—thatis,byoutwardappearance,byitsadherencetoIslamicritualisticnorms—butbasedonitspoliticalallegiance(allieswiththeUnitedStates,forexample)oritspoliticalacts(suchasactsofrepression),itwouldnotbeconsideredIslamicatall.(NoticeheretheparallelwiththeepistemologyofmodernistIslamism.)Forthisreason,some 145ChristopherClapham,ThirdWorldPolitics:AnIntroduction,UniversityofWisconsinPress1985,48.

SalafistcurrentsevenconsiderSaudiArabiaasdarul-harbonthegroundsthatitisamemberoftheUnitedNations—abodythatdoesnotuseshariaasasourceofitsguidelines—andisalliedwiththeUS.AlessextremeversionofSalafismadmitsSaudiArabiaandsimilarcountriesintodarul-Islambutexcludescountriesrunbyrulerswho,intheSalafists’view,areMusliminnameonly—likethelateQaddafi’sLibya.TheTaleban’suseofthetermissimilartothelatterinterpretation;oneeditorialinDeMujahedGhag(TheVoiceoftheMujahed)stated:

InfactAfghanistanisadarul-harbbecausethewholeadministrationisinthehandsoftheinfidels…youmusthaveheardfromradiosandsourcesofmassmediathattheKhalqandParchampartiesofUloomiandJalilihavebeenregisteredbytheMinistryofJustice.Themembersofthesepartiesareexplicitlyinfidels.Theyarethekillersofoneandhalfmillionmartyrs.HowcanwecallthisanIslamicgovernment?146

JustificationsofAfghanistanasdarul-harbintheTalebanpropagandagobeyondthequestionoftrooppresence,whichsuggestsoneimplicationofthisview:theKabulregimecanremaina‘puppetstate’longafterthepuppetmaster’stroopshavedeparted.Therefore,Talebanideologyisreadyandcapableofaccommodatingthefightinthecaseofanactualwithdrawal.

Nonetheless,theshiftsintheTaleban’sideologyoverthepasttwodecadesdoallowfortentativestepstowardsengagement.Theirde-emphasisingofcertainnormsofthesouthernPashtunvillageandthedisplacementoftheobjectofdisciplinetointeriorlifemeansthatsomeofthemostnotoriouspracticesoftheIslamicEmirateareunlikelytoberepeated.Theseincludethedeploymentofaggressivereligiouspolice,thecurtailingoftelevisionandfilmortheenforcementofcertainaspectsofpersonalappearance.Moreover,withtheMinimaxprinciplenolongerguidingTalebandecision-making,itisunlikelythatshock-therapyapproacheslikebanningallfemaleeducationorproscribinggameswouldevermakeacomeback.Infact,Talebaneffortstosupportgirls’religiouseducationhaveincreasedinrecentyears,andmoregenerally,attacksoneducationalfacilitieshavedeclined.147ItisunlikelythattheTalebanwilleveragainattempttoforcetheentirecountrytofollow,inexcruciatingdetail,thenormative

146Authorunknown(2004),‘AQuestionandaDecree,’DaMujahedZhag,1383(3),July18.[TalibanSourcesProjectarchive].147SeeGiustozziandFranco,‘TheOngoingBattleforEducation,’[seeFN139].



frameworkofIslamasitisfoundinthesouthernPashtunvillage.

Ontheotherhand,theTaleban’scurrentmanifestationasanIslamistorganisationmeansthatthereislittlehopethatitwouldeverrespectindividuallibertiesortherightsofwomen—ifonlybecausefewIslamistgroupseverdo.WiththedeclineintheformalisticaspectsofTalebandiscipline,thegroupmaynolongerstandoutasappearinguniquelyoppressivetowardswomenandmaysimplyblendintothepanoplyofauthoritarian,anti-women’srightsforcesinAfghanistan,fromelementsoftheAfghangovernmenttotheoldmujahedincommanderstotriballeadersinthecountryside.Intheend,thebesthopemaybethatchangesintheTalebanmakeitpossible,intheeventofanegotiatedsettlement,forthegrouptoevolveintoadirectionthatcanpeacefullycoexistwithmoreliberalforces.Butthechallengesaheadmeanthatsuchadayisstillfarfromreality.

Intheend,thethreeoverarchingthemesofthisstudycanhelpserveasguidepostsinfutureattemptstomakesenseof,andpossiblyreconcilewith,theinsurgency.Thefirstthemeisthat,despiteattemptsbypoliticalopponentsanddetractorstopaintthegroupasaforeignphenomenon,theTalebanmovementisultimatelyanAfghanphenomenon.Thisisreflectedinthelocalrootsofitsbeliefsystem:nearlyallthepracticesthathavebroughttheTalebansuchillreputehaveantecedentsinAfghanhistory.TheTaleban’sworldviewisthatofanIslamasitwaspracticedandidealisedinthesouthernPashtunvillage,albeitonethatwasamplifiedandstandardisedthroughadecadeofhorrificSovietrepressionandcynicalUSandPakistanimanipulationthroughpatronageoftheIslamistmujahedin.TheTalebanbeliefsystemisrootedinoneamongmanycompetingnormativeframeworksthataregenuineandauthentictolocaltradition,fromtribaltourbantothemanysubculturesfoundthroughoutthisremarkablydiversecountry—eachofwhichisasquintessentiallyAfghanasthenext.

Second,Talebanideology(likeanyideology)isnotfixed,butalivingandbreathingsetofpracticesandmentalschemasthatareinconstantinteractionwiththesocialandpoliticalenvironment.ThustheTalebannolongeradherestrictlyorobsessivelytotheconceptionofIslamasfoundinthepre-1979southernPashtunvillage—theirviewshavebroadenedandmorphedintoanideologythatappearsmuchcloser,forbetterorworse,tomainstreamIslamism(likethePalestinianHamasortheTunisianal-Nahda)intheArabworld.

Third,theTaleban’sformertraditionalistideology,ortheircurrentIslamistideology,isnotsimplyamechanical,literalisttakeonIslamthatisadvocatedunthinkinglybyzealousideologues.Rather,itistheresultofasophisticatedinternallogic,arichepistemologythathasparallelsinthehistoryofWesternChristianity,whichmaintainsthatfaithspreadsthroughgooddeedsandproperritual.Thepointofdrawingattentiontothisinternallogicisnottomitigateanyaspectoftheideology—whichultimatelyserveddeeplyrepressiveends—buttoexplainwhysuchabeliefsystemcouldlayholdoftheimaginationofthemanywhoformedthebackboneoftheTalebanmovementovertheyears.Asaphenomenon,theTalebanwillremainafixtureofthesceneforyearstocome,andcomingtotermswiththelessonsimpliedbythesethreethemeswillbenecessary,thoughperhapsfarfromsufficient,forhelpingbringtheTalebanintothepoliticalprocess.

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ABOUTTHEAFGHANISTANANALYSTSNETWORK(AAN)TheAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork(AAN)isanon-profit,independentpolicyresearchorganisation.ItaimstobringtogethertheknowledgeandexperienceofalargenumberofexpertstoinformpolicyandincreasetheunderstandingofAfghanrealities.

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AUTHORBIO

DrAnandGopalisanassistantresearchprofessorattheCenterfortheStudyofReligionandViolence.HeistheauthorofNoGoodMenAmongtheLiving:America,theTaliban,andtheWarThroughAfghanEyes.HereceivedhisdoctoratefromColumbiaUniversityandspecializesinnetworkanalysisandcivilwar.

DrAlexStrickvanLinschotenisawriterandresearcher.Heco-editedMyLifewiththeTaliban,PoetryoftheTaliban,andco-authoredAnEnemyWeCreated.HedefendedhisPhD,“MullahWars:TheAfghanTalibanbetweenvillageandstate,1979-2001”,attheWarStudiesDepartmentofKing'sCollegeLondonin2016.Heisaco-directorofFirstDraftPublishing,aBerlin-basedpublishinghousespecialisingintranslationsofimportantprimarysourcetexts.HelivesinAmman,Jordan.

©AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork2017.

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwisewithoutfullattribution.

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