JOURNAL OF TEACHING IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION, 1992, 12, 115-127

An Epistemological Postscript

Tom Sharpe Univ. of Nebraska-Lincoln

Andrew Hawkins West Virginia Univ.

What each man knows is, in an important sense, dependent upon his own individual experience: he knows what he has seen and heard, what he has read and what he has been told, and also what,f?om these data, he has been able to infer. (Bertrand Russell)

The fundamental assumption underlying our work in field systems analysis (FSA) is that alternative research approaches are desirable, even necessary, in order to enhance our understanding of teaching in general and teaching expertise in particular. However, to adopt altematives indiscriminately is a dangerous practice. No one engaged in any scientific enterprise can ever be assured that all alternative forms of research are created equal. It is important to understand the various approaches in light of their epistemological foundations in order to properly appreciate and evaluate the results they produce. Chief among the epistemological issues relevant to a consideration of scientific altematives are these: (a) the question of origins, or the sources of knowledge; (b) the distinction between appearance and reality, or the nature of knowledge; and (c) the discrimi- nation of truth from error, or the validity of knowledge.

How knowledge is defined and generated, and how researchers construe explanation, varies among the relevant paradigms. In our judgment, researchers would benefit by a discussion of (a) the philosophical foundations from which various research traditions stem; (b) contemporary paradigmatic camps, including their inherent advantages and shortcomings; and (c ) the epistemological context of FSA.

Philosophies of Science

As there is much conflict within and across scientific and philosophic camps regarding definitions of terms, we will use the descriptions from Table 1 for discussion purposes. Though the reader may disagree on the finer points, it is necessary to employ a consistent taxonomy in order to maintain coherent communication.

It behooves researchers to consider what comprises adequate explanation, the branch of philosophy known as epistemology. When considering the question of explanatory adequacy, it is helpful to first distinguish between philosophy and science. The term science refers to the investigation of phenomena by purposeful and strategic observation. A philosophy of science concerns the study of science itself, or the question of the validity or utility of various strategies and tactics. Therefore, the distinction between science and philosophy is far from clear-cut.

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Table 1

Philosophical Traditions

Essentialism: Galileo, Newton Strongest proponent of causal inference, of which there are three necessary conditions:

Contiguity between presumed cause and effect. Temporal precedence of the cause specific to the effect. Constant conjunction (i.e., causal presence whenever the effect is obtained).

Causal inference assumes dependency between presumed cause and effect; a mechanis- tic, push-pull philosophy.

Cause does not have to precede an effect, but the two variables must be related. Causal inference and explanation are synonymous. Experimental variables explain a phenomenon in terms of their necessary and sufficient

presence for the effect to occur. Assumes powerful prediction and successful forecasting. Highly aligned with activity theory of causation in that causes are what we can manipulate. Proponent of closed-system research, from which all known extraneous forces are excluded. Rationalism: Bunge, Descartes Clearly identifies causal relationships. Causal relationships exist outside the human mind and cannot be perceived with total

accuracy by our imperfect sensory and intellectual capacities. Existence of a special survival value to knowing about manipulable causes. Empiricism: Hume, Locke Divorces the notion of causality from explanation without abandoning the notion of cause. All knowledge stems from experience or sensory perception, as opposed to rationalism. Knowledge is limited to what can be experienced, and what we experience is accurately

and universally perceived, which places primary emphasis on our power of observation. Probabilism: Suppes, Toulmin The real cause of effects are not certain. Presumed causes have relative probability and causal inference is de-emphasized. Presumed causes are fallible rather than inevitable. Empirical observations can be explained in terms of an infinite number of hypotheses. Pragmatism: Dewey, James, Pierce Explanation that is useful in a practical sense is the only viable scientific pursuit. Seeks to mediate between opposing philosophical perspectives. Deplores the search for ultimate cause or absolutes. Nature is the reality beyond which we cannot go. Settles for a pluralistic multiple-perspective approach. Aligned with relativism. Positivism: Comte, Mache, Russell De-emphasizes the notion of cause in its entirety. Cause is unnecessary since it is not implied by functional mathematical relationships. Descriptive, noncausal approach to explanation. Correlation does not infer causation. Inference of probabilism and pragmatism.

(cont.)

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Table 1 (cont.)

Falsificationism: Popper Diametrically opposed to the descriptive "confirmationist" position of positivism. Stresses the ambiguity of confirmation in that corroboration gives only the comfort that the

presumed cause has been tested, has survived the test, and is thus not yet disconfirmed. Infers a skeptical probabilistic nature. Proposes the inescapable predicament that we cannot ultimately prove a causal proposition. Establishes cause via elimination of rival-case possibilities. Idealism versus realism: A philosophical subcategory Idealism: Berkeley, Hocking, Kant, Plato Causal inference is couched in terms of the laws of thought, consciousness, and "hidden"

meaning rather than by methods of objective science. Asserts that reality consists of ideas, thoughts, minds, or selves rather than material objects

and forces. All we are aware of is perceptions; therefore, perceptions become reality, which is closely

related to metaphvsics. . . Aligned with phenomenalism, which involves a search for meaning behind the observable

and the distinction between the appearance of reality in consciousness and reality itself. Also aligned with existentialism, which involves humans' attempt to describe their existence

in terms of inner conflict and its origin (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sarte). Relativist and pragmatist camps are threatening, for if the truth is relative to individual

perceptions, there is no consensus. Realism: Aristotle, Macmurray, Alfred North Whitehead

The state of being existent, as opposed to that which is metaphysical or in our thoughts. The position that the objects of our senses are real in their own right and exist indepen-

dently of their being known to, perceived by, or related to mind. Most highly aligned with essentialism and causal inference due to the unchanging nature of

the physical realm and the existence of universals apart from our sensory experience.

Note. Bakkerand Clark (1 988), Cookand Campbell (1 979), andTitus, Smith, and Nolan (1 986).

It is perhaps best to consider philosophy and science, not as sharply different fields, but as segments on a spectrum of types of inquiry. On one end may appear technology, which does not test scientific propositions but assumes them in order to design practical applications. Adjacent to technology would be science, which derives principles from the systematic observation and analysis of data. Philoso- phy may be viewed as next in the array, concerning itself with questions of method and the logic of explanations.

Explanation is central to the conduct of science. A traditional definition of explanation is one that clearly identifies a cause. This definition is the core of an essentialist or rationalist interpretation of epistemology (Bunge, 1959; see Table 1). Natural scientists, especially before Einstein, have routinely employed research paradigms that are predominantly aligned with their perspectives. This approach takes independent causality for granted. Paradigms that have arisen from this approach and been adopted by the social sciences have been the dominant force in educational research in this century.

Much of the current paradigm debate in educational research centers around the supposed inappropriateness of adopting natural-science paradigms in the social sciences, that the strategies and tactics used to generate knowledge from

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the nonhuman world ought to differ somehow from the strategies and tactics used to generate knowledge from the human sphere. Although we question the validity of adopting the essentialist or rationalist paradigm in the social sciences, we don't do so by imagining that studying the social world is fundamentally different than studying the so-called natural world. Our concerns stem from the realization that essentialism and rationalism are not the only epistemologies guiding the scientific enterprise, even in the natural sciences.

Taking their lead from Hume in a departure from the essentialist and rationalist perspectives, some scholars have attacked the idea of causality as a viable construct (Hendel, 1963). Those who have accepted this empiricist position tend to deemphasize the search for independent cause as the appropriate model for explanation. Some thinkers, generally associated with the positivist school, have even come to doubt our ability to ever know for certain the causes of phenomena and therefore advocate that scientists minimize or even abandon causality altogether (Russell, 1929).

We argue that the total rejection of causality is unwarranted. Like Suppes (1970) and Toulmin (1961), we are more inclined to believe that causal connec- tions between antecedents and consequences are more accurately characterized as probabilistic. In a sense, our analysis of causation in FSA leads us to agree with Cook and Campbell's (1979) conception of cause, which avoids an essentialist explanation and settles for probing, probabilistic causal connections, using de- scription as the fundamental analytic vehicle.

This leads us to an empirical view of research, which tends to divorce causality from explanation without completely abandoning a causal conception. We should, perhaps, take more seriously the proposition that all we know scientifi- cally we learn from experience, and couple it with the judgment that experience tells us that something is the case rather than how or why it is the case (Hendel, 1963). This philosophical course leads to the intriguing possibility that explanation is very similar (if not identical) to description.

If we are to agree that explanation is constantly evolving, and that the most plausible explanation of a past event may prove erroneous at present and change in the future, then the best we may hope to achieve scientifically is accurate, all- inclusive description of our world. Science, then, seems a largely descriptive enterprise. Investigators are largely engaged in reporting and organizing facts. Insistence on the proposition that science is fundamentally associated with de- scription may enable us to stick to the main scientific task: that of revealing our world. Unfruitful speculation seems to result from the certainty of present explanations in the form of causal inference, rather than viewing explanation in a probabilistic light until a more plausible one comes along.

A final proposition that we take seriously is that adequate scientific explanation is one that is useful, or pragmatic. Arguments about the form of scientific explanation are not satisfying to someone who expects science to solve practical problems. Especially germane to educational circles is the idea that the best scientific theories are those that offer practical advantages, that the most scientific explanation in teacher-effectiveness research is the one that helps integrate a teacher's intent, the content being taught, the context, process, and outcomes, and assists in looking for ways to improve these components (Metzler, 1989). In our judgment, great promise may be seen if pedagogical content knowledge is enhanced by using alternative paradigms grounded in an empirical, probabilistic, pragmatic framework.

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A Critique of Current Traditions

There have historically existed two general traditions of research on teach- ing (Shulman, 1987). For the purpose of our discussion, we will term one qualita- tive, of which ethnographies and classroom ecologies are well-known examples. This family of research draws heavily from anthropology, sociology, and linguis- tics. It relies on an interpretive focus and utilizes a largely subjective perspective (M.C. Smith & Lytle, 1990). The other general tradition will be stipulated quanti- tative, which in educational research has been largely behavior analytic in charac- ter.' Correlation of teacher processes with student products in a linear fashion has typified this avenue of exploration (Borich, 1986; Medley, 1979). Though various definitions of each research tradition appear throughout the literature, we have chosen to use Sparkes's (1989) paradigmatic outline as a starting point.

A discussion of the focus and limitations of these two paradigms should provide the necessary requisites for exploring alternative strategies. Great discus- sion has been devoted to the rhetoric of quantitative versus ethnographic research, underscoring the proposition that each paradigm carries an underlying meaning (Firestone, 1987). This meaning is frequently the driving force in the meaning- method relationship. Consequently, the question arises, is the paradigm of choice searching for meanings, or are our meanings and intentions determining the method of choice?

Ethnography

Ethnography comes to educational research from the field of cultural anthro- pology. In this paradigm the research setting is said to impose interests upon the researcher. The researcher is an active participant and an integral part of the study. The focus has typically been upon the relationships between the environmental events that occur within natural settings and relevant teacher and pupil responses (Doyle, 1978).

A major source of confusion has arisen in discussions of qualitative research in that it has often been regarded as if it were one approach (e.g., Jacob, 1982; Lutz & Rarnsey, 1974; Magoon, 1977; Rist, 1977; J.K. Smith, 1983; Wilson, 1977). Jacob (1988) and M.L. Smith (1987) have classified qualitative traditions from a broad array of strategies into the areas of human ethology, ecological psychology, holistic ethnography, cognitive anthropology, ethnography of communication, and symbolic interactionism. A central theme to all of these is participant observation of as many behavioral and setting variables of interest as possible. The desired end product is a verbal synthesis of an extensive field-note chronology.

Participant observation may be, at the same time, ethnography's primary advantage and its chief shortcoming. Human beings have a remarkable capacity for observation. We are unsurpassed as data collectors. Our capacity to gain insight into natural settings through observation is nothing short of magnificent. However, this process invariably involves highly reductive data analysis based largely upon researcher intuition, with conclusions couched within the inherently value-laden perspectives of the researcher and the subjects. Although the qualita- tive nature of this paradigm may provide valuable insight, it is difficult to distinguish cause from effect, with overall systemic coherence becoming a com- plex determination. The main weakness lies in the need for grounding the descrip- tive chronologies in research techniques that provide a more objective context

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for data interpretation. The inference is that the descriptive details from which intuitive conclusions stem are in need of criteria for consistent data interpretation across studies.'

Behavior Analysis

Behavior analysis has as its chief advantage a more objective data collection and analysis process and a clearer demonstration of causal connections, but this approach is not free from validity and feasibility concerns either. Historically, quantitative educational research has passed through many phases, focusing on teacher characteristics, teacher processes, 'teacher processes as related to pupil products, teaching methods, and teacher processes related to pupil processes (Borich, 1986; Medley, 1979). Behavior analysis is seen as a more focused avenue of study than its ethnographic counterpart. However, by stipulating category systems prior to data collection, researchers may be imposing their own ideas upon the setting, since data collection is preceded by a knowledge of what the researcher wishes to observe.

One constraint to this tradition lies in the practice of isolating behaviors from the complex stream of events in which they occur. This is remarkable in light of the claim that behavior analysis is akin to the philosophical school of "contextualism." In reality, behaviors under investigation are essentially re- moved from the contextual flow of the experimental setting. Temporal locus (location in time) and temporal extent (duration) are largely ignored. Conse- quently, distortions in data interpretation may occur.

Another principle that challenges the validity of the logical, positivist philosophy upon which behavioral methods are often based arises out of an intractable dilemma concerning the process of confirming scientific theories (Gamson, 1986). Confirmation of anything from the grandest theory (T) to the most simple hypothesis (H) consists of drawing a logical implication from the hypothesis or theory to an experimental conclusion (E). If T or H is true, then E will be observed. If the empirical conclusion is actually observed, then the theory or hypothesis is said to be verified. The problem is that this schema is logically invalid, representing what has been called the fallacy of affirming the consequent (Garrison, 1986; Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980). Premises 1 and 2 may be true and the conclusion nonetheless false. This means that a well-confirmed theory may still eventually prove to be fallacious.

Paradigmatic Compatibility

Much debate currently centers around the perceived necessity of the qualita- tive and quantitative camps remaining separate due to their supposed incompati- bility (Howe, 1988). The problem seems to revolve around how closely research traditions are tied to their respective philosophical foundations. Firestone (1987) argued that these connections are rhetorical. We know that quantitative methods express the assumptions of a positivist philosophy that holds that behavior can be explained through objective data. Design and instrumentation persuade within this method by showing how bias and error are eliminated. On the other hand, qualitative methods often express the assumptions of a phenomenological philoso- phy that states that there are multiple realities, all socially and perceptually

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defined. Rich description persuades through a researcher who, having been im- mersed in the setting, provides enough verbal detail to enable an audience to make intuitive sense of the situation. Firestone (1987) proposed that although rhetorically different, the results of the two methodologies can be complementary.

Finn (1988), and Shavelson and Berliner (1988) emphasized the need for alternative methodologies that draw from the advantages of each tradition. They stressed that the major ailment of educational research is one of great skepticism in the public regard. Though teacher-effectiveness research yearns for the attention and respect given the hard sciences, the hard sciences have gained respect due to the enormous practical differences they have made, through technology, in peo- ple's lives. These authors argue that the lack of public respect for research on teaching may be related to the lack of paradigmatic communality.

During the past 2 decades, regard for qualitative methods in educational research has evolved from one of ridicule, to one of utility in provisional explora- tion, to wholehearted acceptance as a valuable alternative in its own right. It is now necessary to embrace it as capable of integration with quantitative methods.

A major concern of those who argue for incompatibility is that capitulation to "what works" ignores the incompatibility of the competing realist and idealist philosophical outlooks (refer to Table 1) that are said to undergird quantitative and qualitative methods, respectively. However, Howe (1988) proposed an appealing pragmatic alternative. He argued that no incompatibility between methods exists at either the level of practice or the level of epistemology and argued that there are no reasons for educational research to fear forging ahead with "what works."

According to Howe, such a contention for compatibility rests upon two points. The first involves the domain of research practice. In practice, differences between quantitative and qualitative data, design, analysis, and interpretation may be accounted for in terms of differences in research interests and how best to pursue them. If differences can be accounted for by these means, it prompts suspicion about the need to promote different conceptions of reality and different philosophical underpinnings as the rationalization to use different research meth- ods. Further, it may lead one to wonder about whether the quantitative/qualitative debate is just a contrived invention.

Howe's (1988) second point is dependent upon the first. Those who argue for incompatibility admit that problems arise not so much at the level of practice but at the philosophical level: Realist and idealist philosophies underlie quantita- tive and qualitative methods; these two philosophies are incompatible; therefore, the two methods are incompatible. The rejoinder states that a principle implicit in this argument-that abstract paradigms should determine research methods in a one-way fashion-is untenable. Paradigms must demonstrate their worth in terms of how they inform, and are informed by, successfully employed research methods. If such a two-way relationship between methods and philosophies is viable, then paradigms can be evaluated in terms of how well they correspond with the demands of research practice, and "incompatiblism" must vanish.

Though each paradigm has a different philosophical claim to authority, mediated in a different way and arising from differing sources, each has particular benefits that may complement the other. Due to the ability of each avenue to negotiate the obstacles of the other, alternative strategies that incorporate some benefits of both traditions may be valuable. Methodological rapprochement is further supported by the prospects of coupling the qualitative paradigm's ability

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to uncover subtle influences in a setting context with the quantitative paradigm's ability to more objectively determine the nature of environmental-behavioral relationships (Locke, 1989; Siedentop, 1989).

Recommendations

Some scholars argue that the lack of alternative research paradigms may be due to the narrow focus of traditional research-methods courses (Sage, 1989). Typically, graduate students are taught a quantitative version of knowledge pro- duction as the only legitimate way to do research. If alternative forms of social- science research are mentioned at all, they are usually portrayed in a disparaging light. A convincing case needs to be made in these courses that there are viable alternatives to traditional scientific inquiry. Researchers should not be made to conform solely to one perspective for their fieldwork to be thought legitimate.

Glaser and Strauss (1967) offered an alternative to selecting the methodologi- cal framework prior to field research, as is typical with quantitative efforts. They recommend the grounding of theory in social research itself. In other words, the theoretical framework should be generated from the actual data collected. A ground- ed-theory notion presupposes induction, claiming that only if a theory is grounded in the data will it fit and work. In essence, a data-to-theory path is advocated.

Schutz (1989) also cautioned that strong advocacy of one particular paradigm could encourage researchers to adopt the "have method, need problem system" (p. 31). He argued that researchers should stress the development of the research question prior to framing it within a methodological context. That the research question ought to dictate the method of investigation is perhaps the most self- evident, yet most often ignored, principle of science in our age. The most prominent field systems theorist in psychology, J.R. Kantor (1979), also maintained that any science that insists on the priority of methodology is not yet true science.

Bliss, 'Monk, and Ogborn's (1983) work described one of the few docu- mented category-quantification schemes utilized in qualitative research. This work may be the closest approximation in the literature to methodological commu- nality. It requires the coding of observations into categories while still preserving the inductive nature of the data. The end result of the category scheme is a "tree diagram" that shows related, independent, and conditional categories. The tree structure may be invaluable to researchers for organizing large sets of descriptive categories into a structured system and for enhancing the clarity of research reporting and interpretation.

The pedagogical literature has thus recommended broadening the under- standing of research methodology in order to begin a search for new research tools. As weaknesses still exist within the current traditions, the exploration of tactical alternatives should be undertaken. These alternatives may circumvent some of the constraints inherent in current strategies while incorporating their strengths. A more inductive systems approach may be the key to unlocking the mysteries of teaching expertise. At the very least, a field systems perspective may give researchers a more comparable understanding of science, providing a basis for advocating further alternatives.

Toward a Systems Approach

The consensus among mainstream contemporary pedagogical researchers is that traditional scientific attempts to analyze teaching as a preplanned or

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predictive process are difficult and time-consuming. This is made clear in Jack- son's (1968) statement that within the classroom setting, events come and go with astonishing rapidity, with the teacher engaging in about "200 to 300 interpersonal interactions every hour of hisfher working day" (p. 149).

It is not easy to determine what comprises successful teaching, for we are dealing with a vast array of pupil, teacher, classroom, and school variables (Omstein, 1986). Failure to control accurately for multiple variables and their interaction effects leads to inconsistent findings and difficulty in recommending behavioral prescriptions for "good" teaching. Cruickshank (1976) suggested that teaching is so complex that it is better evaluated in terms of a single content and setting. Johnston (1988) stated that applied behavioral research should focus upon which variables produce optimal effects within the unique contextual arrange- ments of the particular study, rather than attempt to determine which are better in an external or universally generalizable sense.

Arnold (1987) has advocated a descriptive/analytic paradigm for its ability to provide a wealth of detailed, objective information. Descriptive data, he argued, should make educators more aware of what they are doing and how to change their behavior toward more optimal instruction. What is necessary is the development of a strategy that provides a detailed account of the instructional act and couples this with a contextual and temporal orientation.

Field Systems Epistemology

Field systems analysis is a technological and methodological evolution of the philosophical work of J.R. Kantor (Morris, Higgins, & Bickel, 1983). In his reexamination of the foundations of psychology, Kantor recommended complete abandonment of the traditional approach of combining epistemology and meta- physics. He contended that if this were done, no barrier would remain to the erection of a sound naturalistic psychology. His basic premise is one of all sciences arising from a single, vast matrix of events--all within the natural sensory realm (Lichtenstein, 1983). In Kantor's view, this avenue of inquiry necessarily precludes any possibility for a doctrine that regards humans as in part natural and in part transcendental.

As defined by Pronko (1980), the interbehavioral field is "that complex or totality of interdependent factors [organismic behaviors and environmental events] that constitute or participate in a psychological [or behavioral] event" (p. 5). The ternfield in this context is synonymous with the term environment, or more specifically, the totality of elements contained within a particular environ- ment under study. The field is viewed as dynamic and continuously evolving and as unique to each individual, both within and across settings. The field at a given point in time is also a function of previous fields and of contextual/environmental factors participating in that setting. The interaction and interdependence among setting and behavioral events is thought to take an a priori place in setting analysis, rather than the behaviors or events themselves. Though generality may be of eventual concern to this paradigm, its primary interest lies in the clear operationali- zation of all events specific to a particular instructional setting. Scrutiny of simultaneous or overlapping behavioral or setting elements is paramount, allowing analysis of elements within the context of their relationships in time with one another as they actually occur.

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Essentially, FSA emphasizes the connections among organismic behaviors and setting arrangements. This allows for a focus on the contextual nature of a particular stream of events. Each behavior and event is considered unique, for all preceding, succeeding, and overlapping events surrounding it are also thought unique. From a conceptual perspective, the particular behavior or event category is not paramount, but the temporal stream or context in which it appears is. Thus, the basis for analysis is temporal. This allows for representation in the form of an elemental "score," much like a musical composition used by a conductor who is able to see all the elements of the musical system as they are temporally related to one another.

From the standpoint of initial data collection, we conceive of a "marriage" between the enormous verbal data base of ethnography and the systematic devel- opment and analysis of behavior-analytic category systems. Though the categori- zation process is more complex than in traditional behavior analysis, the time frame in which data collection occurs is a microscopic slice of typical ethno- graphic endeavors.

This strategy may provide one conceivable remedy to the intrinsic disadvan- tages of qualitative and quantitative traditions. The lack of objectivity and inher- ently value-laden properties of ethnography remain in check, though the fine- grained inductive forms of description are exploited. The temporal dilemmas of traditional behavior analysis are also avoided by an emphasis on streams or chains of events, though an operationalized category system is utilized in retaining an element of objectivity.

Criticisms of Field Systems

There are a few criticisms of FSA that should be addressed (Lichtenstein, 1983). The first stems from its descriptive nature, which is not, then, thought to be explanatory. This concern is based upon the conceptual distinctions that could be made between description and explanation. We regard the two as roughly synonymous. In what sense can a scientific psychology do more than provide a relatively complete description of behaviors, their conditions, and their probabilis- tic interrelationships?

A typical rejoinder in psychological circles is that behavior is explained by reference to conscious or unconscious mental events. This answer has generally been satisfactory to the layman, the psychoanalyst, and even the contemporary cognitive psychologist. But this point leads to another criticism.

FSA implies that no constructs are required other than those derived directly from observable behavioral data collected via normal sensory perception. The difficulty lies in a presupposed denial of the realm of cognition, unconscious mental events, and the metaphysical domain. Several meanings, however, have been ascribed to the term behavior in psychological circles, resulting in much confusion. Often, behavior has meant a muscular or glandular response, though in other instances it has meant the response of the organism as a whole. If we were to generalize, psychologists have identified behavior with movement and thus have given the impression that mental and intracerebral events have been eliminated from the behavioral realm.

Kantor (1922), on the other hand, provided the required philosophical foundation for the idea that behavioral psychology studies both overt behavior and mental experience. He objected to the position that behaviors are only actions

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of muscles, nerves, and glands. He postulated that a behavioral datum is the total interaction of organism and environment, with movement playing an important but not defining role. If we are to accept Kantor's definition of behavior, it becomes possible (and necessary) to embrace thinking, feeling, and perceiving within the behavioral framework, though we have not, as yet, found as parsimoni- ous a means of systematically observing "cognition."

Conclusions

Locke (1989) stated that "any kind of science can be done as rigorous and systematic inquiry, just as any can be done as a careless or dishonest contribution to the pollution of knowledge. . . . superiority rests not in the method, but in the match with particular problems" (p. 11). Though true, this observation begs the question of whether the standard methods of inquiry, done rigorously and systematically, still leave us with an inadequate understanding of the teaching setting. Alternative approaches may be necessary in surmounting the current constraints plaguing pedagogical research. There are alternative approaches and applications of formalized data analyses, though problems, criticisms, and unre- solved methodological questions still remain. Problems abound even in the cur- rently accepted traditions. A larger repertoire of available research methods can only serve to enhance the quality of research in general.

The fact that the underlying assumptions of any paradigm pose limits to the knowledge that has been generated is well demonstrated (Schempp, 1987). Subscribing to one dominant mode of inquiry could be of dire consequence to the development of the body of knowledge. Though Siedentop (1987) and others have focused concern upon the misrepresentative depictions of traditional research paradigms, no one has yet addressed the inherent limitations of the two traditional research approaches in terms of offering a practical remedy.

Good (1979) stated that better conceptualization of variables and alternative measures of teacher effectiveness are sorely needed. This, coupled with the inherent disadvantages of current research traditions, leads us to believe that the pursuit of alternative strategies is warranted. If demonstrable conclusions are an outcome, a more substantive foundation will have been laid in establishing research on teaching as an enterprise on the cutting edge of science.

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Notes

'Even quantitative research that has been characterized as "psychometric" or "cog- nitive" can be regarded as behavior analytic. The behaviors or the products of behavior are always studied, though the results are interpreted in nonbehavioral terms.

2Some do not regard the inherent subjectivity in ethnography as a weakness. "Bias" is sometimes said to be "exploited" rather than restrained. Intersubjective agreement is thought to be irrelevant. Our intent is not to critique these views. We simply contend that to reject intersubjective agreement is to dangerously alter the nature of science.