an examination of management control systems in not-for ...€¦ · asia pacific business &...

AsiaPacificBusiness&EconomicsPerspectives,Summer2017,5(1).

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Anexaminationofmanagementcontrolsystemsinnot-for-profitresearch

institutions:Aliteraturereviewoncurrentsituationandfuturedirections

TaeSasakiKobeUniversityKobe,[email protected]

ABSTRACT

This study ismotivatedby the increasing importanceofmanagementactivities in not-for-profit organizations because of macro factors, such as government resource cuts. Inaddition,manyauthorshavebeenarguedthat it ismoredifficult tomanageprofessionals(e.g., doctors, lawyers, and accountants) than non-professionals because the former haveprofessionalism, which is likely to conflict with organizational norms. The purpose of thisstudyistocritically investigateexistingframeworksandempiricalfindingsofmanagementcontrol,toidentifytheirissuesofdispute,andtoconsiderfutureresearchdirectionsinnot-for-profit research institutions, especially in terms of the motivation and performancemanagementsystems.Thisstudyappliesaliteraturereview,andspecificallyselectsvariouscanonicaljournalsinthefieldsofmanagementaccountingandpsychology.ThestudymainlyfocusesonEuropean countriesbecauseof their advancedmanagementpractices inpublicand not-for-profit organizations. As a result, it raises the following point: although it hasbeenagreedthatoutput-basedcontrolsystemscauseconflictwithprofessionalsand/ornot-for-profitorganizations,theorganizationsmightuseanytypeofcontrolsystemifthereareways tomitigatenegativeeffectsof such systems. Furthermore, to clarifydetailed factorsand contexts that affect the relationship between management control systems andindividual/organizational outcomes (e.g., managers’ experiences and eagerness,organizationalsize,andorganizationalstructure),thisstudyencouragesmorecaseandfieldstudies. The findings of this study could contribute to the development of performancemanagement practices in not-for-profit and/or professional organizations and to theadvancementofacademicresearchonthoseorganizations’management.Keywords:researchactivities,autonomousmotivation,performancemanagement,managementcontrolsystems

INTRODUCTION

Performance management has been of interest to management accountingresearchers and practitioners over the years. It is closely related to the concept of amanagementcontrolsystem(MCS).Variousframeworkshavebeenestablishedandalotofempiricalresearchhasbeenaccumulatedtodate.

Althoughmanagement accounting researchhaddevelopedusing the assumptionoffor-profit companies, performance management in not-for-profit organizations has


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becomeimportantsincethe1980s.Themainbackgroundofthismovementisnewpublicmanagement (Hood, 1995) inOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment(OECD) countries and the accompanying cutting of resources by governments in manycountries(Parker,2012).Traditionally,itisverydifficulttoapplyfinancialmeasurestonot-for-profit organizations. In addition, it has been argued that professionals have to becontrolled in different ways from non-professionals, because for example, professionalstendtoconflictwithorganizations(Abernethy&Stoelwinder,1995;McGregor,Killough,&R.M.Brown,1989;Shafer,L.J.Park,&Liao,2002)mainlyduetotheirprofessionalism.Forthis reason, it would be fruitful to focus on performance management of not-for-profitresearch institutions, as representative organizations with performance managementdifficulties.

Infact,manyscholarshaveinvestigatedmanagementaccountingpracticesinnot-for-profitand/orprofessionalorganizations.Whenweconsiderorganizationalcontrol,oneofthemostimportantquestionsis“whatdowehavetocontrol?”Intermsofcontrolobjects,it generally has been considered that professional and not-for-profit organizations cancomeintoconflictwithoutput-basedcontrolsystems.Forexample, inhighereducationalorganizations, includinguniversities,researchoutputsarethenumberofpublicationsandcitationswhileteachingoutputsarethenumberofdegreesconferredandcourses(Deem,2004; Kuoppala, 2005; Ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012). Some authors have found thatperformance evaluation based on the outputs has negative effects, especially onautonomousmotivation(K.-M.Kallio&T.J.Kallio,2014;TerBogt&Scapens,2012).Ontheotherhand,there isevidencethatnegativeeffectsofoutputcontrolcanbemitigatedbyimplementing performance evaluation that values autonomous motivation of evaluatedpeople(Sutton&D.A.Brown,2016).Giventheresultsofsuchpriorstudies,examinationof current research on MCSs in not-for-profit and/or professional organizations issignificantforthefollowingthreereasons.First,incontrasttofor-profitorganizations,itisusually difficult to apply financial control to not-for-profit organizations. Examiningalternative control systems in such circumstances would contribute to managementpractices in these organizations. Second, the applicability of control systems that havebeen considered to cause conflict with professionals and/or not-for-profit organizationscan be proposed. Finally, as mentioned above, environmental changes around not-for-profitorganizationshaveintensifiedtheimportanceofperformancemanagementinthoseorganizations.

In light of these motives, this study employs a literature review as its researchmethod. Revealing the conflicting evidence from existing studies and considering futureresearchdirectionsareimportantforbothresearchandpractice.Fortheliteraturereview,the target areas aremanagement accounting and psychology, because the evidence onMCSs for professionals has been complemented with that from psychology. The targetyearsareprincipallyfromthe1980s,becausetheimportanceofperformancemanagementbegan to be stressed in this era. Target nations aremainly European countries, becausethesecountriesareadvancedinnewpublicmanagementandaccompanyingperformancemanagement.

Theremainderofthispaperiscomposedoffoursections.Thenextsectiondescribesthe theoretical frameworks and empirical findings onMCSs. The two sections thereafterfocus on the prior literature on performance management systems in not-for-profitresearch institutions including universities and other professional organizations, and


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examine several factors that affect MCSs in those organizations, respectively. The lastsectiondiscussesthefindingsandconcludeswithfutureresearchdirections.

THEORETICALFRAMEWORKSANDEMPIRICALEVIDENCEONMCSSThepurposeofmanagementcontrol istheimplementationofstrategies(Anthony&

Govindarajan, 2007). Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) proposed that “managementcontrolinvolvesavarietyofactivities,includingplanningwhattheorganizationshoulddo,coordinatingtheactivitiesofseveralpartsoftheorganization,communicatinginformation,evaluating information, deciding what, if any, action should be taken, and influencingpeopletochangetheirbehavior”(p.7).

There are various frameworks in prior research onmanagement control. First, it isnecessary to consider what should be controlled. This study refers to two studies todescribe theobjectsofmanagement control (Osterloh, 2010;Ouchi, 1979).Ouchi (1979)developedaframeworkbyconsideringtwoconditions:theabilitytomeasureoutputsandknowledgeofmeans–endsrelationships.HisframeworkisillustratedinTable1.

Knowledge of the transformation process represents means–ends relationships.Whentherelationshipsareclear,effectivecontrolcouldbeachievedbyhavingsomeonewatchthebehaviorofemployeesandtheworkingsofmachines.InTable1,therefore,itisarguedthatbehaviorcontrolissuitableifknowledgeisperfect.Abilitytomeasureoutputsmeans that desired outputs can be measured with some precision.When this ability ishigh, output control is likely to be appropriate. If the ability is low and knowledge isimperfect,clancontrolwouldbeencouraged.Clancontrol isexercisedthroughritualandceremony, which communicates organizational values and beliefs. Ouchi (1979, p.845)stated that “many organizations, particularly those in relatively stable manufacturingindustries, fit the requirements for behavior control or for output control,” whereas“organizations in thepublic sector, inservice industries,and in fast-growing technologiesmaynotfitthesespecificationsandperhapsshouldhaveculturalorclanformsofcontrolinstead.”

Table1.ConditionsdeterminingthemeasurementofbehaviorandoutputAbilitytomeasure

outputs Knowledgeofthetransformationprocess

Perfect ImperfectHigh Behaviororoutput

measurementOutputmeasurement

Low Behaviormeasurement

Ritualandceremony,“clan”control

Source:Ouchi(1979,p.843)

Subsequently,Osterloh(2010)developedacontrolobjects’frameworkforacademiabased on Ouchi’s (1979) framework. Osterloh (2010) considered two conditions. Theconditionsareknowledgeofoutputmeasurabilityand/orattributability,andknowledgeofappropriateprocessesorrulestobeapplied.Accordingtoher,performanceevaluationinresearchisincreasinglybasedonnumbersofpublications,citations,andimpactfactorsbutsuchoutputcontrolisusuallyusedwithoutconsideringsomepreconditions.Sheproposedoutput,process,and inputcontrolandthenarguedthattheadaptabilityof thesecontrolmechanismsdependsontheextentof theabilityandknowledge.ThethreecontrolsandexamplesofeachtaskarepresentedinTable2.


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Osterloh(2010)describedthefollowingpreconditions.First,theoutputindicatorsareclear-cut and stable, and measure research performance unambiguously. Second, themeasurement of research output motivates researchers not to have unintended sideeffects of measurement compensating the intended performance increases. Third, theresearchinstitutioncanallocateresourcesinanoptimalwaytoproducethedesiredoutputin the future. As presented in Table 2, it is necessary to have high levels of outputmeasurabilityand/orattributabilitywhenorganizationsapplyoutputcontrol.Table2.Controlmodesandtaskcharacteristics

Knowledgeofoutputmeasurability/attributability

Knowledgeofappropriateprocesses/rulestobeapplied

High LowHigh Outputand/or

processcontrolOutputcontrol

=ratings,rankingsLow Processcontrol

=peercontrolInputorpersonnel

control=selection,

socialization,placementSource:WrittenbyauthorbasedonOsterloh(2010,p.269)

Process control needs in-depth knowledge about the processes and/or rules to beapplied,butitdoesnotneedasmuchoutputmeasurability/attributability.Osterloh(2010,p.269) pointed out that “the preconditions are that evaluators (a) have the appropriateknowledgeofcause-effect relationshipsorappropriatemethodologies tobeapplied,and(b) use their knowledge without biases and malevolence.” Process control in academiatakes the form of peer control. Process control is similar to behavior control in theframeworkofOuchi(1979).

Inputorpersonnel control is appliedwhen thepreconditionsof output control andprocess control are notmet. The intent of the control is to ensure that individuals haveinternalized norms and professional standards evenwhen there is no feasible output orprocesscontrol.ThecontrolissynonymouswithclancontrolinOuchi(1979).

Finally,thecircumstancesthatfitoutputand/orprocesscontrolarethosethatcanbecontrolledbyoutputsand/orwell-definedprocesses.Suchtasksrefertosimpletasksapartfrom research and are not relevant in academia. Osterloh (2010) mentioned thatpractically, these types of control are used in combination, and optimal combination ofcontroltypesshouldbeselecteddependingonthetypeofthetaskandtheknowledgeoftheevaluatoraboutthetaskcharacteristics.However,sheemphasizedtheimportanceofinputorpersonnelcontrol,becauseithelpswithheterogeneityofvariousacademicviewsanditaidsscholarstointernalizeprofessionalnormsandstandards.

Ouchi’s (1979) framework was developed by focusing on the R&D environment(Rockness & Shields, 1984). Rockness and Shields (1984) investigated the relationshipsbetween the importance of controls and four task characteristics (i.e., knowledge of thetransformation process, measurability of the output, dependence, and complexity) byconducting survey questionnaires for 10 organizations located in the U.S. The authors’empiricalstudywasexploratory,buthadsignificantimplications.Inotherwords,notonlytaskcharacteristicsbutalsotheorganizationalcontextshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenconsideringappropriatecontrolsystems.


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In addition, the literature has discussed the nature, issues, elements, andeffectiveness of four controls, namely, results, action, personnel, and cultural controls(Merchant&VanderStede,2012).First,resultscontrolsinfluencebehavioranddecision-making,because theymakeemployees consider theirbehavior and the consequencesofdecision-making. Employees purse a behavior aiming to maximize their chances ofproducing the organization’s desired results, even without direct supervision orinterference from superiors. Typical results controls are pay for performance. They areusefulwhendefinitionandmeasurabilityofthedesiredresultsaresatisfied,andwhentheemployeecancontrolthemeasuredresultssufficiently.

Action controls ensure that employees perform (do not perform) certain actionsknown to be beneficial (harmful) to the organization. They are effective whenorganizations can determine (un)desirable actions, and when organizations are able toensure that (un)desirable actions (do not) occur. Personnel controls foster employees’natural tendencies to control or motivate themselves. Personnel controls might beexecuted through selection, placement, training, job design, and resourcing. “In otherwords,findingtherightpeopletodoaparticularjob,trainingthem,andgivingthembothagoodwork environment and the necessary resources is likely to increase the probabilitythatthejobwillbedoneproperly”(Merchant&VanderStede,2012,p.88).

Finally,culturalcontrolsaredesignedtoencourageapowerfulformofgrouppressureon individualswhodeviate fromgroupnorms and values. They aremost effectivewhenorganizationalmembershavesocialoremotionalconnectionswithothers.Organizationalcultures can be shaped by example aswell as inwords. For instance, codes of conduct,grouprewards, intra-organizational transfers,physicalandsocialarrangements,and toneatthetopshapeorganizationalcultures.Thecostrelatedtopersonnelandculturalcontrolsisoftenlowerthanmoresalientformsofcontrolsare,andthecontrolsmightbeexpectedto produce fewer harmful side effects. Therefore, the controls could be used in almostevery setting. Abernethy and Brownell (1997), a notable study that applied theseperspectives, examined the role of accounting and non-accounting (i.e., behavior andpersonnel)controls inanR&Dsetting.Theauthorsdistributedsurveyquestionnairesandconductedinterviewstocollectdata.Thesubjectswere150seniorresearchofficersintheR&D divisions of a large Australian industrial company and a major US scientificorganization.Giventaskuncertaintyandthenumberofexceptions,thethreecontrolshaddifferenteffectsonperformance.Theresultsrevealedthatrelianceonpersonnelcontrolshadpositiveeffectsonperformancebutrelianceonaccountingandbehaviorcontrolshadsignificantly negative effects on performance in environments in which task uncertaintywashigh. Inaddition, theauthors found thataccountingandbehavior controlswerenotsuitabletoenvironmentsthathavemanyexceptions.

As mentioned earlier in this section, traditional frameworks have considered onlyorganizational characteristics. However, for example, anMCS affects individual attitudesand also is affected by environmental characteristics. Thus, simply applying theseframeworks to empirical researchmight lead to distorted conclusions. It is necessary toconsider individualand/orenvironmentaldimensionswhenweexamineanddescribetheactualconditionsofMCSpracticesinrealorganizations.Inparticular,sincetheemployeesofprofessionalandnot-for-profitorganizationshavedistinctnatures(e.g.,professionalism)and environments (e.g., prevalence of performance-based funding without regard todifficulty of measuring output), it is important to scrutinize the effectiveness of theframeworksindifferentcircumstances.


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Anotherperspectiveoftheframeworks(Malmi&D.A.Brown,2008;Simons,1995)isnotable,namely,theideathatanMCShasseveralcomponents.Thisstudysummarizestheconcept of Malmi and D. A. Brown (2008) and Simons (1995). Specifically, the study ofMalmiandD.A.Brown(2008)isusedastheframeworkofSuttonandD.A.Brown(2016),whichyieldsveryimportantfindingsforthisstudy.Simons(1995)proposedfourleversofcontrol: beliefs systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactivecontrolsystems.“Abeliefssystemistheexplicitsetoforganizationaldefinitionsthatseniormanagers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values,purpose, and direction for the organization” (Simons, 1995, p.34). Boundary systemsdelineatetheacceptabledomainofactivityfororganizationalparticipants.Byusingbeliefsystems together with boundary systems, active opportunity exploration within anacceptabledomainwouldbeexpected.

“Diagnosticcontrolsystemsaretheformalinformationsystemsthatmanagersusetomonitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards ofperformance”(Simons,1995,p.59).Inaddition,interactivecontrolsystems“aretheformalinformation systemsmanagers use to involve themselves regularly and personally in thedecisionactivitiesofsubordinates”(Simons,1995,p.95).Thesefourleversofcontrolarealllinkedtocorporatebusinessstrategies.TheyareillustratedinFigure1.

Simons’(1995)leversofcontrolframeworkhasbeenappliedanddevelopedbymanyscholars to date. Tessier and Otley (2012) developed Simons’ (1995) framework byreclassifyingthetypes(i.e.,socialandtechnical),levels(i.e.,strategicandoperational),andpurposes (i.e., performance and compliance) of controls. In addition, Simons’ frameworkhas underpinned empirical investigations on, for example, the relationship betweeninteractivecontrolsystemsandinnovation(Bisbe&Otley,2004),theintroductionofanewinteractive performance measurement system in a case firm (Tuomela, 2005), therelationshipbetweendiagnosticandinteractiveuseofperformancemeasurementsystemsandorganizationalcapabilities(Henri,2006),andthebenefitsandcostsofcontrolsystems(Widener,2007). Ingeneral, these studies reveal that interactivecontrol systems requireand consume much attention, but they work more effectively for performanceimprovementinuncertainenvironments.

Figure1.FourleversofcontrolSource:Simons(1995,p.7)


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MalmiandD.A.Brown(2008)conductedaliteraturereviewandpointedoutthatanMCS does not operate in isolation. They developed an MCS package made up of fivecomponents: planning, cybernetic controls, reward and compensation, administrativecontrols,andculturalcontrols.Figure2representstheirframework.First,planningdirectseffort and behavior by prescribing the goals of the functional areas of the organization.Long-rangeplanningandactionplanningareincludedinplanning.Theformerprovidesthegoalsandactionsforthemediumandlongrun,whilethelatterdeterminesthegoalsandactionsfortheimmediatefuture,usuallya12-monthperiodorless.

Cybernetic controls “can either be an information system or control systemcontingent upon how it is used” (Malmi & D. A. Brown, 2008, p.292). Specifically, theywould provide information and support decisions ifmanagerswere to detect unwantedvariances by themselves andmodify their underlying behavior or activity that influencesthevariancewithoutothers’involvement.However,cyberneticcontrolswouldbeacontrolsystemwhen linking behavior to targets and establishing accountability for variations inperformance. Cybernetic controls include budgets, financial measures, non-financialmeasures, and hybrids that contain both financial and non-financial measures—forexample,theBalancedScorecard.

Reward and compensation, especially introduction of results-oriented systems,promotemotivationandincreasetheperformanceofindividualemployees(Shima,Kawai,Hashimoto, & K. Park, 2010). Administrative controls enable organizations to direct thebehavior of employees through the arrangement of organizationalmembers,monitoringbehavior,andspecificationofthewayinwhichtasksaretobeperformed.Administrativecontrols encompass governance structure, organization structure, and policies andprocedures.Finally,culturalcontrolsincludeclans,values,andsymbols.Althoughcultureisusuallyviewedasacontextforanorganization,itwouldbeacontrolsystemwhenusedtoregulatebehavior.Culturalcontrolscanbeviewedasaparallelconceptofbeliefssystems(Simons,1995)andclancontrol(Ouchi,1979).

CulturalcontrolsClans,values,symbols

Planning Cyberneticcontrols Rewardandcompensation

Long-range

planning

Actionplanning

Budgets Financialmeasurement

systems

Non-financialmeasurement

systems

Hybridmeasurement

systemsAdministrativecontrols

Governancestructure Organizationstructure Policiesandprocedures

Figure2.MCSpackageSource:MalmiandD.A.Brown(2008,p.291)

Withregardtothetwoframeworks,thisstudysuggeststhatitisstillunclearhowweshouldcombinesomecomponentstoincreaseorganizationaleffectivenessineachsetting.

MANAGEMENTCONTROLINPROFESSIONALANDNOT-FOR-PROFITORGANIZATIONSThissectionsummarizesexistingmainfindingsaboutMCSsandtheconsequencesof

these findings in not-for-profit research institutions, including universities, and


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complementally refers to management accounting research on other professionalorganizations and not-for-profit institutions. Performance management systems are acontrol framework thatattempts toensure thatcertainendsareachievedandparticularmeansareusedtoattaintheseends(Broadbent&Laughlin,2009).

Managers should take some characteristics of not-for-profit organizations intoaccountwhenapplyinganMCStotheirorganizations.Thereareninefeaturesofnot-for-profit organizations. First, there is the absence of a profit measure. Second, there aredifferent tax and legal considerations. Third, there is a tendency to be serviceorganizations.Fourth,therearegreaterconstraintsongoalsandstrategies.Fifth,thereislessdependenceonclientsforfinancialsupport.Sixth,thereisdominanceofprofessionals.Seventh, there are differences in governance. Eighth, political influences are important.Finally, there is a traditionof inadequatemanagement control (Anthony&D.W. Young,2003,p.53).

Therearecriticalstudiesonresearchperformancemanagement.Thesestudiesfocusonworkmotivation,stress,anxiety,productivity,andqualityasconsequencesoftheuseofperformancemanagement. As formotivation, particularly various conclusions havebeenobtained.K.-M.KallioandT.J.Kallio(2014)analyzedtheimpactofmanagement-by-results(MBR)onacademics’workmotivationwithinternet-basedsurveyquestionnairesfor2870Finnishacademics.Theirstudyshowedthreemainresults.First,only2.5%ofrespondentsevaluated their ownwork performance only ormostly quantitatively, whereas 49.7% ofthemreportedthattheiruniversityevaluatedthemonlyormostlyonquantitativecriteria.Theseresultsimpliedthattherespondentswerestronglyinfavorofqualitativeevaluation.Second,withregardtorespondents’satisfactionwithandtheeffectsofthecurrentMBRevaluation,“only15%oftherespondentsweresatisfiedwiththeirrespectivesystems”but“over 40% expressed their dissatisfactionwith the current systems” (K.-M. Kallio & T. J.Kallio, 2014, p.579). In addition, the effects of quantitative evaluation and qualitativeevaluation differed significantly. Specifically, “although as many as 40.7% of therespondents indicated that quantitative evaluation lowered their work motivation, only16.7%reportedthesameeffect in thecaseofqualitativeevaluation” (K.-M.Kallio&T. J.Kallio, 2014, p.581). Furthermore, approximately 35% of the respondents stated thatqualitative evaluation had positive effects on their work motivation. Third, as many as77.7%of the respondents agreed that emphasis on especially quantitativeMBR reducedthequalityofresearchinuniversities.Thisresultdidnotdifferbetweentherespondents’characteristics (e.g., status, university, and faculty). Therefore, the result representsextensivedissatisfactionwithquantity-orientedevaluationsystems.

Ter Bogt and Scapens (2012) investigated three questions through field studies inaccountingandfinancedepartmentswithintwouniversitieslocatedintheNetherlandsandEngland: (1) the way in which judgmental performance evaluation systems are used inuniversities, (2) the way in which the systems are used to evaluate the performance ofindividual academics, and (3) the effects of these judgmental performance evaluationsystems on individual academics at the department level. The authors mentioned thatperformanceevaluationinuniversitieshadbeentraditionallydevelopmental,butinrecentyears, judgmental types of evaluation had been increasing, that is, the purpose ofperformance evaluation had changed from the improvement of individual futureperformancetothequantitativemeasurementofperformanceinthepast.

Although the two universities differed in countries, regions, cultures andenvironments, theeffectsof theuseof judgmentalperformanceevaluationon individual


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staffweresimilarinbothuniversities.Specifically,anxietyandstressofindividualmembersofstaff increasedbecauseofuncertaintyofthemeaningsofperformanceevaluationandpressure to perform tasks with scarce resources. Ter Bogt and Scapens (2012) wereconcernedwithperformanceevaluation,which reliesexcessivelyon journal rankingsandthe number of publications in journals. Such performance indicators are objective butexcessive reliance on them creates a tendency to follow the preferences of top journalsandtoavoidhigh-riskresearchthatneedslongerperiods.

Assuch,MBRsystemsarelikelytobeinterpretedasaviolationofacademicfreedomandmightcausemuchresistanceinpractice(K.-M.Kallio&T.J.Kallio,2014).K.-M.KallioandT.J.Kallio(2014)stressedthatMBRsystemsneedtobedesignedcarefullysoasnottosuffocate intrinsic work motivation, because professionals have much interest in jobcontentandrelativelylowinterestinmonetarycompensation.

On the other hand, Sutton and D. A. Brown (2016) demonstrated that individualautonomousmotivationmightbevarieddependingonthedesignanduseofanMCS.Theauthors reliedonself-determination theoryand implementedexploratorycasestudies intwofacultieswithinauniversitytoinvestigatehowuniversitiesmanageresearchactivitieswithout threatening the autonomous motivation of their researchers. They conductedinterviewsforaresearchadministrator,seniorresearchers,middle-careerresearchers,andearly-career researchers ineach faculty.Thecontentsof interviewswererecordedbasedonMalmiandD.A.Brown’s(2008)MCSpackage.

Consequently, the importance of motivation in research activities was confirmed.Therewerethreetypesofresearchers’motivation.First,someresearchersexhibitedtheirmotivationsteminherentlyfromtheirdiscipline,andtheactualcontentandideasoftheirresearch.Thistypeofmotivationwaslabeledas“interested”bytheauthors.Second,manyresearchersexpressedtheirinterestinthetechnicalprocessofperformingresearchtasks.This type was categorized as “technicians.” Third, some researchers were motivated bytheir position as public intellectuals, that is, their contribution to society by providingresearchoutcomes.Thistypewaslabeled“idealists.”

Likeother institutions, thetwofacultiesusedfundingandpromotionsystemsbasedon output and subjected to the consequences of performance evaluation. Although it isassumed that tangible external rewards undermine motivation in self-determinationtheory,SuttonandD.A.Brown(2016)observedsomecharacteristicsthatpreventnegativeeffects of these incentives. For example, unlike periodic performance evaluation,“researcherscanchoosewhethertoparticipateintheincentivesystemornot”(Sutton&D. A. Brown, 2016, p.593). In addition, in contrast to evaluation that requires outcomeswithinshorterperiods,thelengthofevaluationperiodscouldspanseveralyearsorevenanentire career in their study. Performance evaluation with longer periods reducesresearchers’ perceptions that they are controlled. These characteristics mitigatedysfunctionspointedoutbyTerBogtandScapens(2012).AshighlightedbyPop-Vasileva,Baird,andBlair (2011)whostudied job-relatedattitudesofAustralianacademicsthroughsurveyquestionnaires,thecharacteristicsofperformancemanagementsystemsarecrucialfactors that influence attitudes. Attitudes are significant for developing performancemanagementsystemsforbetterperformance,providingaccurateperformanceevaluationandfruitfulfeedbacktoindividuals, improvingmotivation,andsoon(Pop-Vasileva,Baird,&Blair,2011).

Ontheotherhand,intermsofproductivityandquality,Kuoppala(2005)analyzedtheeffects of MBR on university management through case studies implemented in four


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universities in Finland. Since the end of the 1980s, MBR has been implemented anduniversitieshavebeenviewedasentrepreneurialunitsinFinland.Economicrecessionandcutsinfundingfromthegovernmenttohighereducationinstitutionsoccurredinthesameperiod,whereasexternalfundingincreasedapproximatelyfourtimesbetweenearly1990sand 2002. Kuoppala (2005) noted that MBR expanded the direct authority of topmanagement and improved academic productivity, such as the number of degreesconferredandthenumberofstudycredits.

The findings of the abovementioned studies are mapped in Figure 3. Positive ornegative signs in the figure represent the directions of influence of performancemanagement systems. However, as described by Sutton and D. A. Brown (2016), theproposition that performancemanagement systemshave negative impact onmotivationmight be questionable. It is possible that performance management systems protectand/orimproveindividualintrinsicmotivation.

Figure3.Mappingofmainresults

It goes without saying that we must consider the purpose of performancemanagement,especiallyperformancemeasurement.Simultaneousrealizationofefficiencyandflexibilityisachievedbyexploitingenablingcontrol,whichencouragesefficientcopingwithcontingencies (Jørgensen&Messner,2009).Chiesa,Frattini, Lazzarotti, andManzini(2009) conducted multiple case studies in 15 Italian technology-intensive firms andindicated the firms had diverse objectives of R&D performance measurement (e.g.,motivating researchers and engineers, assessing profitability of R&D projects, andstimulating organizational learning). Hence, making the purposes and styles ofperformancemanagement known to organizationalmembers is important for increasingtheeffectivenessofperformancemanagement.

Furthermore, it would be meaningful for this study to extract main findings fromstudies that focus on other professionals and not-for-profit organizations. For example,medicalprofessionalswhohavehigherprofessionalorientationconflictwithbureaucraticnormsandvalueswhereoutputcontrol isdominant (Abernethy&Stoelwinder,1995). Inaddition, conflicts between organizations and professionals explain large parts of jobsatisfactionandturnoverintentions(McGregoretal.,1989;Shaferetal.,2002).Moreover,


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relationships between human and physical inputs, production processes, andeffectiveness/efficiencyoutcomesinknowledgeworkers’performancemanagementwereinvestigated (Abernethy, Horne, Lillis, Malina, & Selto, 2005). Professionals link theirknowledge to outcomes. Therefore, this causality needs to be further detailed byconsideringsomevariablesthathaveimpacts.

In a professional context, individual involvement in designing and implementingmanagementaccountingsystemsisnoteworthy.ShieldsandS.M.Young(1994)foundthatcost budget participation and cost knowledge are required to improve the costconsciousness of R&Dprofessionals. Participation ismore important than knowledge forconsciousness. Eldenburg, Soderstrom, Willis, and Wu (2010) analyzed the effects ofphysicians’participationonthedevelopmentofhospitalaccounting informationsystems.Their result suggests that physician involvement has an impact on their behavior.Specifically, the physicians redeployed resources toward sicker patients, led costcontainment, and ultimately improved financial performance (Eldenburg et al., 2010).Involvementinthedevelopmentandimplementationofthesystemscouldbeimportantinanon-professional setting too. Inparticular, the consequencesofparticipativebudgetinghave beenwidely investigated (Chong, Eggleton, & Leong, 2006; Shields & S.M. Young,1993).Forexample,there isevidencethatparticipation inastandardsettingreducesthejob-relatedstressofautomobiledesignengineers(Shields,Deng,&Kato,2000).

MAINFACTORSAFFECTINGMCSINRESEARCHINSTITUTIONS

Existingconceptsofmotivation

As noted earlier, existing frameworks of management control consider onlyorganizational characteristics and not external and individual characteristics. This isproblematic because there is a relationship between motivation and performance. Asdiscussed in the previous section, motivation is highly important in research activities(Sutton& D. A. Brown, 2016; Ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012). Self-determination theory hasbeenwidelyquotedinmanagementaccountingresearch(Kunz,2015;Kunz&Linder,2012;Sutton&D.A.Brown,2016;Wong-On-Wing,Guo,&Lui,2010).Whileintrinsicmotivationand extrinsic motivation are typical classifications, self-determination theory delves intoextrinsicmotivationinassessingthedegreeofautonomy.

Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, and Ryan (1991) employed self-determination theory andreferredtointrinsicandextrinsicmotivationineducationandlearningactivities(Decietal.,1991). Ryan and Deci (2000) suggested “Intrinsically motivated behaviors, which areperformedoutof interestandsatisfythe innatepsychologicalneedsforcompetenceandautonomy,aretheprototypeofself-determinedbehavior”(p.65).Bycontrast,extrinsicallymotivatedbehavior is instrumental to some separable consequence. Extrinsicmotivationcan be classified into four types according to the extent to which it represents self-determination.

Table3 isareplicationofataxonomytableofhumanmotivationdescribedbyRyanandDeci (2000). “At the far leftof this table isamotivation,which is thestateof lackingintentiontoact”(Ryan&Deci,2000,p.61). Individualsfeel lowcompetenceandperceivenon-contingencyinthisstate.Justtotherightofamotivationistheleastautonomousformof extrinsic motivation, a category labeled external regulation. The person performsbehaviortoachieveanexternaldemandortoobtainanexternallyimposedrewardinthecondition.


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Next, introjection is more self-determined than external regulation but less self-determined than identification. When introjected, individuals act in order to obtainapproval from themselves or others. “Amore autonomous, or self-determined, form ofextrinsicmotivationisregulationthrough identification”(Ryan&Deci,2000,p.62). Inthisstate, the individual recognizes thepersonal importanceof activity. Finally, integration isthe most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation. “Integration occurs when identifiedregulations havebeen fully assimilated to the self” (Ryan&Deci, 2000, p.62). At the farrightofthetableisintrinsicmotivation,whichisaprototypeofself-determinedactivity.

The findings based on self-perception theory can be expected to strengthen thisargument. For example, a study employing self-perception theory (Calder& Staw, 1975)predicts that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation do not combine additively. Rather, theymight operate interactively. Calder and Staw (1975) made male college students solvepuzzles in their experiments, in which either blank puzzles or picture puzzles with orwithout rewardswere assigned to subjects. Thedependent variables of the experimentsare task satisfaction and motivation. The results show that subjects had lower intrinsicmotivationforblankpuzzlesandtheirinterestincreasedwiththeintroductionofmonetaryrewards. On the other hand, picture puzzles induced higher intrinsic motivation andsubjects’ interest decreased with the introduction of monetary compensation. Thesefindingsdemonstratethe interactionbetweenintrinsicandextrinsicmotivation(Calder&Staw,1975).Table3.Ataxonomyofhumanmotivation

Regulatorystyles AssociatedprocessesAmotivation Perceivednon-contingency,lowperceived

competence,non-relevance,andnon-intentionalityExtrinsic

motivationExternalregulation

Salienceofextrinsicrewardsorpunishments,compliance/reactance

Introjection Egoinvolvement,focusonapprovalfromselforothersIdentification Consciousvaluingofactivity,self-endorsementof

goalsIntegration Hierarchicalsynthesisofgoals,congruence

Intrinsicmotivation Interest/enjoyment,inherentsatisfactionSource:WrittenbyauthorbasedonRyanandDeci(2000,p.61)

Interestinmotivationhasalsobeengrowinginmanagementaccountingresearch.Forexample, in recentyears, the relationshipbetweenobjectiveandsubjectiveperformanceevaluation and autonomous motivation has been investigated (Kunz, 2015). The resultsshowthatthemeasuresthemselvesareindependentofautonomousmotivation,butwhenassessingtheextentofmeasures’accuracy,autonomousmotivationchangessignificantly.In addition, Kunz and Linder (2012) investigated the interplay of rewards andintrinsic/extrinsic motivation by implementing a vignette experiment. Adler and Chen(2011) attempted to understand the compatibility of creativity and control. Aspsychologists stress, both intrinsic and autonomous extrinsic motivation are related tomanagerial performance, job satisfaction, trust, and well-being in workplaces (Gagné &Deci, 2005). In general, although the importance of motivation in any activity isacknowledged,thereisroomforfurtherresearchontheprocessbywhichmotivationleadstoperformance.


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Changeof internalandexternalenvironments. It is inevitablethatweconsiderthechangeofenvironmentswhenwediscussperformancemanagement in thenot-for-profitsector. In particular, new public management (Hood, 1995) and worldwide cuts inresources by governments (Parker, 2012) have made not-for-profit organizations moremanagement oriented. The aim of new publicmanagement is to achieve activation andquality improvement of the public sector with introducing philosophy, methods, andsuccesscasesofprivatesectormanagement.Theconceptprevailedinthe1980sinOECDcountries (e.g.,EnglandandNewZealand).Hood (1995)proposedseven itemsrelatedtonewpublicmanagement, suchaspromotingcompetitionbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,controllingresourceusage.

Thesechangeshavecausedsignificanttransformation.Thispaperpicksupuniversitiesas an exampleof organizationswhose internal andexternal environments have changeddramatically. For example, in the UK, an expansion policy increased the number ofuniversities from25 to45 in the1960s (Deem,2004).However, theexpansion tendencyhasreversedsince1979aftertheConservativeParty’selection.TheConservativePartyinthe UK cut public expenditure, thereby exposing the public service and professionalsengaged in public services to quasi-markets and systems of for-profit private sectors(Deem,2004). Even thoughacademicsareoriginally knowledgeworkers, theyhavebeenrequired to achieve good performance based on short-term outcomemeasures, such aspublicationandteachingevaluationfromstudentsinrecentyears.Consequently,somanyscholars are involved in the role of management and they are required to accomplishgenerating revenue and monitoring expenditure as well as increasing academicachievements(Broadbent,2011;Deem,2004).

Accompaniedbyuniversities’commercialorientation,studentshavebeentreatedascustomers, teachingand researchprogramshavebeen treatedasproducts, andexternalenvironments have been treated as markets (Parker, 2012). Recently, universities haveembarkedon the formulationof financial strategies, endeavored toaccumulate researchfor acquire resources, and restructured less profitable teachingprograms (Parker, 2013).However, some differences remain between universities’ peculiar cultures and those ofcompanies (Christopher & Leung, 2015). Christopher and Leung (2015) conductedqualitative interviewsandusedsecondarydata todemonstratecharacteristics thatcausetensionsinthetransitiontocorporateculturesinAustralianpublicuniversities.Asaresult,the authors found 10 aspects that lead to tensions, for example, risk-averse culture,tenuredworkforce,andresistancetocorporateperformancemanagementsystems.Thesefacts implythatperformancemanagementneedstobedesignedtaking inherentculturesintoaccount.

While this study specifically focuses on universities as an example of researchinstitution,thephenomenadiscussedinthispapercanbeobservedinothernot-for-profitorganizations, includinghospitals, research institutions, and local government. Sincenot-for-profit research institutions faceuncertaintyofoutcomes,management controlof theorganizations would be remarkably difficult. Nevertheless, it is increasingly crucial toanalyzethetrendsofperformancemanagementsystemsthat improveorganizationalandindividualeffectiveness.

DISCUSSIONANDCONCLUSIONThis study,motivated by the question ofwhether output control can be applied to

professional and not-for-profit organizations, organized existing findings of performance


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management,ormorebroadly,managementcontrolofresearchactivities.Sinceresearchinstitutions, including universities, are often not-for-profit and can be consideredprofessional organizations, this study took the perspective of professionals and not-for-profitorganizationsasthemainobjectsoftheliteraturereview.

As presented in the frameworks of controls, traditionally it has been argued thatoutput control does not fit research activities. In fact, empirical research on MCSs inuniversities and other professional organizations suggests that quantitative performancemanagementhasnegativeeffectsonautonomousmotivationand/orbringsaboutconflictsbetween professionals and organizations. Precisely, some authors have revealed thatmeans–endsrelationshipsareimperfectandtheirabilitytomeasureoutputsislowinsuchorganizations. In addition, output control might fundamentally conflict with intrinsicautonomousmotivation.

However, the conventional frameworks that this study refers to hardly haveconsidered individualdimensions, suchasmotivation.TheeffectsofMCSsonmotivationhave beenwidely investigated. According to prior literature, individualmotivationmighttypically improve through participation in designing and implementing managementaccountingsystems.Sinceprofessionalsoftenhavemoreautonomythannon-professionalsdo,professionals’ involvementinmanagementcontrolshouldbeencouragedmoreinthefuture.

Furthermore,environmentalchangesdemandthatnot-for-profitorganizationsapplyperformance management that relies on outputs and/or outcomes for the purpose ofpromotionandfundallocation.Thus,wemighthavetoconsiderhowtoapplyandutilizeoutput control rather thanavoid its application,because itwill be increasingly inevitablefor not-for-profit environments in the future. The result of this review has a beneficialimplication, namely, that output control might be applicable to organizations, which iscontrary to the prior literature, which deems output control to be incongruent withorganizations.

Twolimitationsofthisstudyshouldbeconsideredwheninterpretingitsresults.First,this study does not consider differences of institutional context in each country and/orregion.Indeed,thereisevidencethatresearchevaluationsystemsinfluencedesignanduseofanMCSwithinuniversitiesintheUK(Agyemang&Broadbent,2015).InJapan,nationaluniversities’ corporatization and the accompanying introduction of operating expensegrants (un-eihi koufukin in Japanese) have forced national universities to implementeffective and efficient performance management (Yamamoto, 2004). In summary,adaptabilityandnecessitytoadaptoutputand/orothercontrolmightbecontingentuponinstitutional context.Therefore,effectivenessofoutputcontrol inonecountrymightnotbeavailableinanothercountry.

Second, there could be some factors that impact the design and use ofMCS otherthan those referred to in this study. In practice, there are many determinants of theeffectivenessofanMCS.Forexample,beliefsandculturemighthavesignificantinfluencesonanMCS(Malmi&D.A.Brown,2008;Merchant&VanderStede,2012;Simons,1995).Hence,otherindividualandorganizationalcharacteristics(e.g.,managers’experiencesandeagerness,organizationalsize,andorganizationalstructures)shouldbeconsideredtofindevidencethatisclosertopractice.

Despite these limitations, this study makes several academic and practicalcontributions.Fromtheacademicperspective, thisstudycontributestothedevelopmentoftheseriesofMCSstudiesonnot-for-profitorganizationsandprofessionalorganizations.


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Itisnoteworthythatconventionalframeworksoncontrolsystemsshouldbeemployedandinterpreted by adding individual and environmental characteristics. Communicating thepurpose of performance management is important because control systems requireorganizational members’ understanding. From a practical perspective, this studycontributestoadvancingMCSpracticesinprofessionaland/ornot-for-profitorganizations.Compared to commercial companies, business administration in these organizations isdeveloping. This study provides some clues for more successful MCS practices in theseorganizationsbyreviewingtheexistingevidenceand identifyingsomeimportantfeaturesthatimpactMCSs.

In conclusion, the following propositions can be derived from this study. Whenorganizations apply an MCS, they also have to focus on other than their taskcharacteristics. In this regard, this studyencourages theuseof caseand field studies forfutureresearchdevelopment.Casestudiesandfieldresearchwouldenableustoobservedetailed contexts that interact with MCSs. For example, in Japan, field studies inmanagement accounting have continued to develop (Yokota et al., 2010). Although caseand field studiesarepoorwith regard togeneralizability, theyareexpected toelaboratetheoriesbeyondsimplydescribinguniquecases.Otherscanutilize superiormanagementaccounting practices in some organizations through case description from variousperspectives.

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