An international system under transformation –

three ways to mute the security dilemma

Von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades einer Doktorin der

Philosophie genehmigte Dissertation

vorgelegt von

Evgenia Gordeeva

Berichter: Universitätsprofessor Dr. Ralph Rotte

Universitätsprofessor Dr. Emanuel Richter

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 28.06.2016

Diese Dissertation ist auf den Internetseiten der Hochschulbibliothek online verfügbar.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ralph Rotte who gave

me the opportunity to write my PhD Thesis at the chair of Political Sciences of the RWTH

Aachen University and at all times supported me with constructive advice and met my

research proposals with understanding and interest.

I would further like to thank Prof. Dr. Emanuel Richter for accepting to take the place of my

second supervisor despite the late research stage of my doctoral analysis.

A special thanks goes to Dr. Jaap Hoogenboezem, docent at Maastricht University, who has

supervised me during my Master Thesis which has provided the intellectual starting point of

the analysis undertaken throughout my doctoral study.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and especially my mother, Natalia Gordeeva, who

has always supported me in any possible way, and without whom my doctorate would not

have been possible.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction p.1

Part I. Theory

2. The Security Dilemma p.6

2.1. The complex nature of the concept of security p.8

2.2. The state and security p.11

2.3. Accounts on the security dilemma p.15

2.3.1. The defence/offence approach and

the Balance of Power model p.15

2.3.2. Mature anarchy model p.18

2.3.3. Federal World Government p.25

3. The three models to mute the security dilemma p.29

3.1. The general problems behind macro modelling in social science p.30

3.2. Geopolitics – an alternative model of the international system p.32

Part II. Analysis

4. Federal World Government (model 1) p.37

4.1. Federal World Government vs. Issue-Related Cooperation p.40

4.1.1. Integration from below p.42

4.1.2. Integration from above p.47

4.2. Results p.50

5. From Issue-Related Cooperation towards Mature Anarchy? (model 2) p.54

5.1. Mature Anarchy vs. Balance of Power:

globalization – an intervening variable p.56

5.1.1. Universal values p.58

5.1.2. Global interlinkages p.74

5.1.2.a. Society p.74

5.1.2.b. Economy p.82

5.1.2.c. Environment p.87

5.2. Results p.96

6. The Balance of Power model (model 3) p.105

6.1. The English School p.108

6.2. Factors of Internal Stability and External Power of civilizational blocs p.114

6.3. Identifiable blocs p.119

6.4. Stability through Balance of Power? p.144

7. Conclusion p.158

8. Bibliography p.165

Annex p.183

List of Figures and Tables

Figures:

Figure 1: The component parts of the state p. 13

Figure 2: The prisoner’s dilemma p. 20

Figure 3: Battle of the Sexes p. 21

Figure 4: Types of International Regimes p. 22

Figure 5: Systems Theory p. 31

Figure 6: The Coleman scheme p. 32

Figure 7: The world of civilizations p. 71

Figure 8: States Party to the Geneva Convention p. 76

Figure 9: Major Free Trade Areas p. 86

Figure10: Sustainable development: linking economy, ecology and society p. 89

Figure11: Negative and positive externalities p. 91

Figure12: Civilizational blocs p.119

Figure13: Interaction Opportunities p.146

Figure14: Allocation of Attention p.147

Figure15: Multipolar Power System p.153

Tables:

Table 1: Possible paths of the state’s transformation p. 29

Table 2: Federal World Government p. 50

Table 3: Cooperation vs. Coordination p. 55

Table 4: Mature Anarchy vs. Balance of Power p. 58

Table 5: Global regimes p. 96

Table 6: Internal strength and external relative power of potential blocs p.140

Table 7: Stability of Balance of Power systems p.155

List of Abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BOP Balance of Power

CAN Andean Community

CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CISFTA Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

DELC Division of Environmental Law and Conventions

DG Directorate-General

ECOWAS Economic Community Of West African States

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Area

GAFTA Greater Arab Free Trade Area

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GC Geneva Conventions

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDLR International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles

IFCR International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IR International Relations

IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreement

MERCOSUR Common Market of the South

MPS Multipolar Power System

NAFTA North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Alliance

P Protocol

PMB Private Marginal Benefits

PMC Private Marginal Costs

Res. Resolution

RTA Regional Trade Agreement

SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area

SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

SMB Social Marginal Benefits

SMC Social Marginal Costs

SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement

SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missiles

TBT Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

UNCHE United Nations Conference of the Human Environment

UNEP United Nations Environmental Program

UNHR United Nations Human Rights

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO World Trade Organization

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1. Introduction

In its constant evolution, mankind has undergone different forms of societal organization

depending on the respective modes of production each echoing the corresponding levels of

technological development. Today, the globe is divided between nation states, which is the

dominant form of societal organization at the moment, interacting with each other in the

international system. While the set-up of the system to its greatest part is admittedly

ambiguous which is reflected in the existence of often contradicting, yet all reasonable

theories of international relations, the validity of the state as the absolute and highest form of

authority seems to currently be beyond any doubt and of no question to any rational

discussion. However, as any natural system, which mankind undoubtedly is a part of, the form

of societal organization changes over time as a result of intervening variables the most

important of which seem to be the very essence of human progress – technology. Technology,

in turn, evokes changes in societal organization, which then lead to a transformation of the

entire system.

Today we experience two major shifts in the system structure: the first and major one

is the tendency away from unipolarity and towards multipolarity, and the second one is a

phenomenon most strongly manifested in weak states and pointing at a change in the self-

identification of the citizens away from utterly national towards increasingly civilizational

bonds. The fact that the second factor is most obviously reflected in weak states might be an

indicator for the effect of state mechanisms to ’nationalize’ its citizens, which, once gone,

leave the people to re-establish their sense of ethno-cultural affiliation inherent from pre-

nation state times. If found to be correct, this assumption would imply that the state is not the

ultimate form of societal organization, but merely one of the historical steps of societal

development such as tribal society or feudalism have been.

In this context, the first question to be answered in the upcoming analysis is whether

the state in its current form can be expected to prevail in the system as the ultimate authority

or will give in to the forces of transformation and change its form or be completely replaced

by a higher hierarchical level of societal organization. The rationale behind this question is

not merely theoretical, but has a very practical background in the face of the growing inability

of the state to fulfil one of its primary duties – to provide for the security of its citizens. The

root of this problem lies in the fact that while the state has adapted its procedures of how to

exert internal and external violence during its lifetime, its conceptual basis has remained

rather static over the years. This, however, cannot be said about the nature of threats mankind

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has to face in the 21st century. The so-called ’new’ threats are of a trans-national character and

require global solutions, which the state cannot provide.

This is because the modern state system is constructed around the concept of

sovereignty, which empowers the state to rule within its area of jurisdiction which is limited

to a state’s territory. While a resolution of this problem would be cooperation, the anarchic

nature of the international system does not allow states to effectively collaborate in the

absence of an overarching authority which would provide the rules necessary to overcome the

security dilemma that otherwise makes collective action hard to achieve and even harder to

maintain (Waltz, 1990; Wendt, 1992).

The resolution of the security dilemma in international relations and the enhancement

of individual security as a result has been addressed by many philosophers such as Emmanuel

Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and by the representatives of the

different schools of international relations (IR) theories, among them Ernest Haas, Alexander

Wendt, Hans Morgenthau or Robert Keohane to only name a few. Barry Buzan provides a

very useful insight into the complexity of the concept of security suggesting that the sheer

acknowledgement of the concept’s complex and fluid nature might provide a step towards a

higher level of security in the system. As identified by Buzan, security is either seen to be a

derivative of power (realist school) or a consequence of peace (federalist/idealist school). The

author himself argues that a fully developed understanding of security has to lie somewhere in

between the two extremes (Buzan, 1983). One attitude common to both approaches is that war

is to be seen as the highest form of insecurity and, thus, to be avoided.

The question of how to avoid war has been extensively addressed, among others, in

the work of the prominent structural realist Kenneth Waltz “Men, the state and war”, the main

idea of which was that in order to achieve peace one has to understand the causes of war first

(Waltz, 1959, p. 2). Waltz’s analysis was based on the observations of three famous

philosophers – Spinoza, Kant and Rousseau. According to Waltz, there are three main causes

– or ’images’ – of war, as he calls it, namely: men, the state and the international system

(Waltz, 1959). In his understanding of war, Spinoza blames the very nature of human beings,

which is aggressive and violent, while Kant and Rousseau see the problem in the state as a

societal entity. Waltz himself puts particular attention on the anarchical nature of the

international system as the main cause of war, while recognizing that a full picture of the

causes of war can only be gained by considering all the three images.

These contemplations lead to the assumption that war is an inevitable companion of

any kind of a fragmented society. By this, the international system in its current form becomes

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a major threat to itself due to the unresolved security dilemma. There have been a number of

theoretical suggestions of how to overcome the security dilemma and they can be categorized

in three main groups: The first one stems from the federalist and neo-functionalist schools of

thought and bases its arguments on the idea of global integration suggesting for an abolition

of the state-system in favour of a supranational geo-political entity in form of a federal world

government. This group mainly blames the state for the security dilemma and, thus, tries to

abolish it.

The other two groups incorporate the rationalist schools of thought in international

relations - realists and liberals. These groups accept the anarchical nature of the system as it is,

while blaming it for all the insecurities a state faces and trying to find strategies to counter-act

it by means available to the state. Both theories treat the state as the main and ultimate actor in

the IR system. There is a crucial difference between the two, though. Liberals believe in the

collaborative power of international regimes, while neo-realists view them primarily as

additional means of power projection used by states. Instead, realists rather suggest for

balance of power structures to manage the security dilemma. Accordingly – and in line with

the general observation made by Barry Buzan in his “People, States and Fear” –, liberals

would advocate the establishment of a so-called mature anarchy model induced through the

empowerment of global international regimes backed by a common normative background,

while realists would suggest to achieve a higher stability in the international system by means

of a balance of power system in which the world would be divided between a number of more

or less equally powerful (externally) and stable (internally) geopolitical blocs.

At this point, it is conceptually useful to recall the causes of war summoned by Waltz:

men; the state; the international system. So, while the federal world government model (to be

referred to as model 1 in the subsequent analysis) concentrates on the elimination of the state

as the main cause for violent conflict, the mature anarchy model (to be referred as model 2 in

the subsequent analysis) is believed to be induced through the men-dimension, while the

realist balance of power model (to be referred as model 3 in the subsequent analysis) attacks

the third image of war – the international system.

The search for a model capable of reducing the risk of war in the system marks the

major difference between the structural research conducted throughout this essay and

conventional geopolitical research, which most of the time does the opposite – in its attempt

to enhance the relative power of one particular nation state at the expense of others, it

increases the risk of war in the international system, by doing so, reducing its own state’s

national security. This is because geopolitical research is most of the time guided by national

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strategic considerations, which disregard the national security of other actors in the system.

By doing so, it diminishes the international and the individual security of both its own and

foreign citizens, which are but inseparable components of national security, consequently,

geopolitics is often counterproductive when applied in relation to the notion of ’security’.

Examples of such conceptually misguided studies are diverse and most of the time

tightly linked to highly competitive up to openly aggressive foreign policy behaviour. Among

the most prominent geopolitical analysts there is Halford Mackinder with his Hartland theory,

which found its application among others in Nazi Germany and influenced the Containment

strategy developed by Nicholas J. Spykman which has provided the basis of the Truman

doctrine, or, to give a more current example, – Zbigniew Brzeziński, whose research follows

the highly offensive tradition of his predecessors.

The normative dubiousness of a number of geopolitical analyses is often accompanied

by a lack of a substantial scientific framework reflected in the absence of measurable

indicators or another reasonable basis upon which the argument is founded (Ex: Samuel P.

Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”), as well as a resulting misinterpretation of core

indicators, which leads to faulty conclusions (Ex: Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History and

the Last Man”). This problem is also present in a number of attempts of macro-model

building undertaken by IR theorists and philosophers, who base their argument on either

purely theoretic elaborations not backed by relevant and quantifiable criteria (Ex: Kant’s,

“Perpetual peace”), or on interpretations of idealized laboratory conditions created to fit a

respective theoretical framework in which the study is conducted (Ex: Marx’s and Engel’s

“Manifesto of the Communist Party”) and generating results which are detached from reality.

Given the current systemic crisis, which is reflected in the high number of intra-state

conflicts and a revived struggle between the major powers in the system, the conceptually

determined inability of the state to effectively collaborate with other states on core issues and

the resulting increasing level of insecurity in the system, as well as in light of the

insufficiencies in purely theoretical or purely strategy-oriented studies currently available, the

aim of this analysis shall be to find the answer to the question of which of the three structural

models presented in the previous paragraphs is more likely to prevail in the system and to

assess the potential of the dominant model to enhance the overall level of security in the

international system through the mitigation of the security dilemma. Hereby, the different

tenets of the main international relations theories shall be taken account of during the analysis

to get the highest possible level of objectivity, while measurable indicators shall ensure that

the results are based on verified criteria.

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In order to reach the aim of this study, the essence of the security dilemma will be studied in

the theoretical part. This shall entail a detailed inside into the complexity of the concept of

security, which will be interpreted in light of the current realities shaped by the forces of

globalization. Then, the state will be defined by reference to its constitutive features and in

relation to security on the individual, the national and the global levels. The succeeding

section will be dedicated to the establishment of the three systemic macro-models: the balance

of power model (incl. the defence-offence approach), the mature anarchy model, and the

federal world government model. The final section of the theoretical part will discuss the

general problems of conducting analyses in social sciences, especially in relation to macro-

modelling, as well as present an alternative approach to systems analysis offered by

geopolitics. To reach the aim of the theoretical part of the present doctoral thesis, secondary

sources on the concept of security, the defining features and competences of states, as well as

on the main integration and international relations theories and approaches will be used.

The analytical part of this work will examine the three models identified before with

regard to their ability to prevail as the dominant set-up of the international system and their

potential to stabilize it. For this purpose, the mechanisms required for the transformation of

the current system into one of the three suggested structural macro-models will be established

and verified in the context of their ability to mute the security dilemma. The prevalent system

model will be tested for its stability by means of identified stability criteria. The broad

theoretical framework applied throughout this work might, therefore, probably, best fit the

theoretical framework of the English School. The data applied throughout this section will be

extracted from primary as well as secondary sources. The primary source used for this

purpose has been a survey which was conducted by the author in 2013 by means of a

questionnaire.

It should finally be noted that a study that is aimed at an analysis of the transforming

system structure can be expected to establish the most-likely scenario, which should not be

regarded as a fixed prediction. Still, the strict application of theories, as well as the

establishment and verification of existing dependencies between the respective identified

dependent and determining variables are sought to make the study of this broad theoretical

topic as scientifically founded, while as closely related to reality, as possible. Therefore, the

essay can be expected to provide a valid analysis of the possible future concept of the

international system, which can be used for both theoretical and practical purposes.

6

Part I. Theory

2. The Security Dilemma

The fatal combination of the anarchical nature of the international system, the potentially

aggressive nature of the state and the inclination towards organized violence as means of

conflict resolution inherent by men creates a serious security problem for each state struggling

to survive in that highly competitive and uneven system – a situation known as the security

dilemma. The concept of the security dilemma was born in the early 1950s as a product of the

Cold War and was simultaneously and independently formulated by John Herz in his “Idealist

Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” and Herbert Butterfield in his “History and

Human relations”. The essence of the security dilemma lies in the fact that “many of the

policies that are designed to increase a state’s security automatically and inadvertently

decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 1982, p. 358, based on Herz and Butterfield), and, by

doing so, their own one, as other states feel threatened and take measures in return. “Since

none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition

ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on” (Herz, 1950, p. 157).

The reasons for this mischief are three-fold. As argued by Kenneth Waltz in “Men, the

state and war”, the notion of war – which is to be understood as the highest form in insecurity

(see next sub-section) – can be looked at from three interdependent perspectives: men, the

state and the international system. The men-dimension focuses on the violent nature of men,

which is seen as the main cause for wars; the state-dimension blames the institute of the state

for being aggressive outwardly and suppressive inwardly; the dimension of the international

system sees the problem in its anarchical nature, which forces the state to fight for survival

due to the absence of any superordinated power which would maintain the rule of law on the

international arena. The motivation to resolve or at least lessen the intensity of the security

dilemma is that to achieve the highest possible level of security in the system, in other words,

that would mean to avoid armed conflicts between the nations.

The resolution of the security dilemma in international relations and the enhancement

of national and individual security as a result has been a concern to many philosophers and

theorists of international relations. Those can be categorized in three main groups: The first

one stems from the federalist and neo-functionalist schools of thought and bases its arguments

on the idea of global integration suggesting for an abolition of the states system in favour of a

supranational geo-political entity in form of a federal world government. This group mainly

blames the state for the security dilemma and, thus, tries to abolish it. The other two groups

7

are rationalist in nature - realists and liberals. These groups accept the anarchical nature of the

system as it is, while blaming it for all the insecurities the state faces, and trying to find

strategies to counter-act it. This is where one of the crucial differences between the two

becomes tangible. Liberals believe in the collaborative power of international regimes, while

neo-realists view them primarily as additional means of power projection used by states.

Accordingly, liberals would advocate the establishment of a so-called mature anarchy (Buzan,

1983) induced through the empowerment of global international regimes backed by a

common normative background, while realists would suggest to achieve a higher stability in

the international system by means of a balance of power (BoP) system in which the world

would be divided between a number of more or less equally powerful (externally) and stable

(internally) geopolitical blocs.

The security dilemma, however, is not necessarily linked to the system structure as it

is now. The problem of how to secure one’s group “from being attacked, subjected,

dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals” (Herz, 1950, p.157) has

accompanied mankind throughout its entire history periodically intensifying and defusing

again as a result of either the interplay of the three images of war indicated above, or as the

natural consequence of the end of a historical cycle manifested in a systemic crisis, which re-

structures the organizing principles of the system. As every natural system, societal structures

are governed by life cycles that take turns conditional upon time and space (Danilevski, 1869).

The cyclical and rhythmical repetitions in social phenomena can be studied by means of

observable trends characteristic for certain periods of time, which can turn out to be part of a

long-term cycle (Sorokin, 1998).

If accepting the premise of the theory of social cycles as right, the system structure can

be expected to follow the regular life-cycle from birth over a pique of development up to a

decay until a final breakdown, which would ring the initiation of a new cycle. In this logical

construct, the security dilemma would be most intense during the period of a system’s

breakdown. Indeed, if we recall historical examples, we will find that the transitional periods

from one type of societal organization to another, such as those from tribal society to

feudalism or from feudalism to the nation state, as well as from the nation state towards a

federative regional bloc, have been marked by violent armed conflicts.

Following this line of argument, one could further hypothesize that the phase of the

decay of the era of a state-based structure was already induced with the Russian Revolution in

1917, at the cause of which the conventional concept of statehood based on the idea of

nationalism and organized as a bureaucratized capitalism was discredited and replaced by an

8

artificially created ideology institutionalized in a prototype of a civilizational bloc of the kind

to be thoroughly studied in the succeeding analysis – the Soviet Union. Although the

experiment of the Soviet Union ended in 1991 when the Union collapsed, the initiation of a

broader geo-political entity than the state might have been a herald for a permanent change in

the system structure.

Indeed, the ongoing systemic crisis unambiguously indicates the inefficiency of the

international system in its current form. Given the truly global and deadly threats mankind has

to face in the 21st century such as environmental degradation, overpopulation, the risk of mass

infection or the danger of old and new wars, the nature of the state in its current form proves

incompatible with the exertion of its primary task to protect its citizens. This is due to its very

essence lying in the idea of national sovereignty coupled with the premise of the national

interest contradicting any practical application of cooperation on any issues of high politics

and limiting it to mere technical issues. Thus, the international system in its current form,

consisting of states and lacking any overarching authority automatically proves insufficient in

its function as a global regulator. In light of this simple observation, a structural change seems

inevitable. How this change will look like and by means of which of the theoretical

approaches briefly presented above to be analysed in detail in the course of this piece the

security dilemma can be muted remains the concern of the upcoming analysis. Before we can

start it, however, it is crucial to become aware of the complexity of the notion of security and

to learn of the fact of how hazardous a simplification of this key concept in IR can be.

2.1. The complex nature of the concept of security

The concept of security is a core concept in the modern world as it substantiates all the

foreign and defence policies, but also internal policing measures, conducted by the state.

While being at the core of national and international politics, this concept is yet strongly

underdeveloped. This underdevelopment, however, becomes a security problem in itself. To

put it in Barry Buzan’s words: “[…] an underdeveloped concept of security constitutes such a

substantial barrier to progress that it might almost be counted as part of the problem [referring

to the national security problem]” (Buzan, 1983, p. 1). The general confusion about a precise

definition derives from the fact that security might be looked at not only from different levels

(individual security, national security, international security), but also from different

theoretical perspectives (realism, liberalism, federalism, constructivism, etc.). Furthermore, a

threat to security might be generated by a great number of factors which change according to

9

the level of analysis and incorporate not only the society, but also the economy and the natural

environment.

The confusion with the concept of security is well demonstrated in the fact that a

general definition of ’security’ is lacking. In his analysis of the matter, Buzan accentuates the

definition given by John E. Mroz which manages to avoid absolutist bias and is not too

specific, so that a broad application of the concept becomes possible (Buzan, 1983).

According to Mroz, security is “the relative freedom from harmful threat” (Mroz, 1980, p.

105). However, to get a thorough understanding of the notion of security, we need to

differentiate between the individual, national, and international levels of security, as well as to

account for the diverse theoretical points of view on the matter, while simultaneously paying

attention to the three core dimensions of human activity (society, economy, environment),

which generate sources of insecurity.

In this challenging task, we shall first acknowledge that security is a relative concept

that is much easier to apply to things than to people. As argued by Buzan, it is “far more

complicated, not infrequently contradictory, and plagued by the distinction between objective

and subjective evaluation” (Buzan, 1983, p. 18). Furthermore, full security can never be

achieved, and the dilemma between the balance of freedom and security further complicates

things. Individual security is more fragile than national security, as an individual is much

easier to harm than the state simply due to the obvious fact that an individual has a physical

body which, once dead, stays dead, while a state is a social and to a great deal abstract

construct, which can be reconstructed, redefined etc.

Individuals experience a range of so-called social threats, which can be classified in

four groups: physical threats, economic threats, threats to rights, and threats to position or

status (Buzan, 1983, pp. 19, 20). National security, on the other hand, has to operate on only

two fronts: the protection from external threats (group defence), and the protection from

internal threats (maintenance of internal order). At the same time, individual security is

intertwined with national security, as the state provides a mechanism through which

individuals seek to defend themselves against social threats. The irony is that by fulfilling its

task for security provision, the state itself becomes a source of threat to an individual (Ibid.,

p.21). This can find expression both in excessive policing measures equating to suppression,

and in the state’s engagement in a struggle with a foreign power. Overall, it can be argued,

however, that the highest form of insecurity is war, as it affects all the three levels of security

on all three dimensions of human activity in the strongest possible way.

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Before the end of the Cold War, ’national security’ clearly dominated the definition of this

social term, primary focusing on power measured in military capabilities, which were

available to the state when facing threats deriving from other states. Power was directly linked

to security, which was thought to be best achieved by superior military capabilities. Due to the

centrality of the concept of power governing the notion of national security, the concept of

power shall be explicitly defined. Thus, power in international relations refers to “the ability

of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do” (Keohane & Nye,

1977, p. 11). If we compare this definition to that of war given by Clausewitz (“an act of

violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will” (Von Clausewitz, 1832, p. 5)),

we will recognize the similarity of both concepts. This simple fact provides support for the

realist claim that “conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among

political power units” (Herz, 1950, p. 158).

Power in international relations can be measured both in terms of potential resources

and in terms of outcomes. The difference between these two approaches is huge. While

potential resources certainly affect power outcomes, they do not necessary determine them.

The actual power of a state is measured in outcomes which depend not only on the state’s

stock of resources and its ability to play out its cards, but on its sensitivity and vulnerability

vis-à-vis the resources of other states. These concepts explain power relations in the

interdependent world of modern politics. Hereby, sensitivity refers to the short-term extent to

which a state can be negatively affected from outside though a dependency relation, for

example the dependency on foreign energy resources. Vulnerability illustrates the extent to

which a state can adapt to the negative effect in the long-run (Keohane & Nye, 1977).

A typical definition of national security interpreted in terms of power, which was

archetypal for the Cold War period, was given by Walter Lippmann, who suggested that: “a

nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it

wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war”

(Lippmann, 1943, p. 51). Such an understanding of national security is rather defence-

oriented, as the essence of national security is understood in a nation’s ability to maintain its

central values. One could equate this position to that of a defence-oriented status quo state.

There are, on the other hand, far more aggressive understandings of national security:

“National security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of

national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital

national values against existing and potential dangers (Trager & Simonie, 1989, p.36). Such a

notion of national security implies the necessity to exert influence beyond the territory of the

11

own state. The adaptation of such an attitude is potentially dangerous, as it directly threatens

the integrity of other states.

2.2. The state and security

When speaking on national security, the object we are referring to is, obviously, the state.

When asked, most people would declare to know what a state is, but only few will be able to

give a clear definition to this broad and complex concept. Most people would say “I know it

when I see it”, as was put by an American judge in reference to a concept he could not define

(cited in Hawkins and Zimring, 1988, p. 20). Having in mind that people are subjective in

their judgements, social constructivists view the state according to Michael Foucault’s

definition as “no more than a composite reality and mythicized abstraction” (Foucault, 1991,

p.103). Although being correct, this definition does not leave us any of the state’s defining

features, its essential elements common to all forms of modern states. In his “Economy and

Society”, Max Weber provides us with a broad definition of the concept of statehood,

whereby he indicates “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement

of its order” as its main feature (Weber, 1978, p. 54). His broad definition includes altogether

eight key features of the state, which Christopher Pierson summarizes in his “The modern

state” and to which he adds one more feature: (monopoly) control of the means of violence;

territoriality; sovereignty; constitutionality; impersonal power; public bureaucracy;

authority/legitimacy; citizenship and taxation.

I would argue that among the indicated characterizing features of the state, three key

components upon which the other ones are built can be identified. Those are Population;

Territory and Monopoly control over the means of internal and external violence. Let me

explain why. As states are ’resting on a contract’ (Kant, 1795, p. 52) between its subordinates

and those who are chosen to rule them in order to safeguard peace within the community

(Hobbes, 1968), population - or here: citizens - is the initial pre-condition for the

establishment of a state. The second and also straightforward condition for the establishment

of a state is its territory, as it has to occupy a certain territory on which its citizen-subjects can

live and over which it can claim “sole legitimate authority” (Pierson, 2004, p. 9). This brings

us to the third key condition - monopoly control over the means of internal and external

violence. Internally, the state has to administer itself; it has to ensure that its orders are being

obeyed by its subjects and that law and order triumph over the aggressive and egoistic nature

of men. Externally, the state has to ensure its survival against other political units.

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For this reason sovereignty exists. Hinsley defines this concept as “the idea that there is a final

and absolute political authority in the political community [, while] no final and absolute

authority exists elsewhere” (Hinsley, 1986, p.26). By this, sovereignty establishes the area of

a state’s jurisdiction within a world of similar sovereign units of nation-states and provides

legitimacy for a state to exert both internal and external violence. But in order to act, the state

needs to have a set of rules, which are provided by a constitution or some other kind of

general legal code. An automatic and logic consequence of having a set of rules is the

indicated feature ’rule of law’. This is an old claim in political theory referring to impersonal

power – law above men, not the other way around. This leads to the ability of the state to act

both authoritative and legitimate. When all the preceding criteria are provided, the population

of a state should automatically regard its actions as legitimate. This acknowledgement allows

the state to act authoritative, as most of its subjects comply voluntarily, out of personal

conviction. Those who do not, are sanctioned – an expression of the internal use of the means

of violence, which was identified as the third key feature of a state.

Authority and legitimacy also refer to the external use of violence, as in order to have a

standing army a state has to have the authority and legitimacy, both internally and externally,

to do so. For the internal organization of the modern state, public bureaucracy fulfils the task

of administering the state’s population. This feature is also linked to all previous ones, as

bureaucrats act authoritative and their actions are considered legitimate due to them being

regulated by specific rules resting upon laws, by this, they act impersonal. Taxation is also

indicated as a characteristic of the state. Unlike public bureaucracy, which is unconditionally

linked to modernity (Weber, 1978), taxation is one of the oldest mechanisms of the ruler to

extract resources from its subjects.

In his “People, states and fear”, Barry Buzan suggests a compact and neat model to

describe the state. The model incorporates all the components named above and groups them

as follows:

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Figure 1. The component parts of the state

Source: Barry Buzan, 1983, p. 40

The idea of the state represents its raison d'être, which precedes and justifies the other two

components. The physical base of the state refers to the population and the territory of a state.

The institutional basis incorporates the ruling machine through which the state acts – the

government – including all of its administrative, legislative and judicial bodies. Thus, and in

line with the conclusions above, the state exists because of the individuals who comprise it.

Bound together in a “collective political unit” (Buzan, 1983, p.36), those individuals create

and maintain the state, which, in turn, affects the individuals.

If we recall our conclusions from section 2.1, we will remember that national security

can be threatened in two general ways: from outside the state, and from within. When we

equate this acknowledgement with the above model, we will see that each component can

contain a threat to the existence of the state, as they are interlinked. Further, the sources of

threats to the components are likely to be different. While a foreign military attack threatens

the physical base of the state (although the other two will be threatened as a consequence), the

institutional base has rather to be secured against internal threats. The idea of the state can be

undermined both from within and from outside the state by both internal and external forces

operating on that level (as a consequence of a foreign instigation of dissident political groups,

or as an outcome of internal ideological/political dynamics).

Consequently, states can not be treated as “like units”, as suggested by Waltz, but

must be differentiated in accordance with both their relative power vis-à-vis other political

units, and their internal strength (Buzan, 1983). As Buzan put it: “States vary not only in

respect of their status as powers, but also in respect of their weakness or strength as members

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of the category of states. When the idea and institutions of a state are both weak, then that

state is in a very real sense less of a state than one in which the idea and institutions are

strong” (Buzan, 1983, p. 66). Therefore, he introduces the notion of a strong state to refer to

an internally stable political unit, whereas a not stable one is to be labelled weak state.

The idea of a state is stable in case the territory of the state is inhabited by people

considering themselves to be one nation, or when bound together by one organizing ideology

(example: Soviet Union). A nation can create a nation-state, in which a nation is represented

by one ethnos (examples: Japan, France). This is, nevertheless, not the only type of nation,

which can serve the basis of a strong state. A nation can be created by the state, as in the case

of the United States. This type is referred to by Buzan as state-nation. According to him, there

are also part-nation states, in which an ethnic group is divided among several states, such as

the German ethnos in Germany, Netherlands and Denmark. Furthermore, there are

multinational states, which comprise two or more nations within their boundaries, such as the

Russian Federation or India (Buzan, 1983, pp. 46-48).

Ideas can be compensated by a strong institutional basis to some extent through the

use of extensive policing measures. The most prominent example of this kind of substitution

is the Polizeistaat in Nazi Germany. Still, the idea and institutions are in no way substitutes, as

even strong institutions require some idea to justify their existence, while strong ideas need an

institutional base to be practically applicable (Buzan, 1989). Thus, in the upcoming analysis

we need to differentiate between strong and weak states.

To protect the physical base of the state, the concept of relative power matters. Here,

the actual military capability of a state and the availability and efficient use of resources is as

important as the eventual dependency (both with regard to sensitivity and vulnerability) on a

foreign resource. States, which relative power is great, are generally referred to as powerful

states.

Another important aspect of national security is linked to the differentiation between

status quo and revisionist states. This logic provides an important chapter in the tradition of

the realist school of thought in international relations theory which goes back to the writings

of Carr and occupies an important place in the works of Morgenthau. This approach is based

on the power model categorising the states in accordance with their relations to the current

set-up of the system. Status quo states are those who are satisfied with their acquired position

within the system and try to maintain it the way it is, while revisionist states try to change

their position by challenging the dominance of the status quo states.

15

According to Hirsch and Doyle, a status quo state can adopt different styles of leadership: co-

operative, hegemonic, or imperial, which offers different models of relations among each

other and in relation to revisionist states (Hirsch & Doyle, 1977). Further, status quo states

can “be differentiated according to the power hierarchy between them. Depending on its

power, a state which is in sympathy with the system may become an associate, a client or a

vassal of the hegemon” (Buzan, 1983, p. 179).

Revisionist states generally have a negative connotation, as these are trying to

undermine the legitimacy of hegemonic status quo powers which define the system, thus,

revisionist states threaten the system. The most prominent example of a revisionist state is,

probably, Hitler’s Germany. Revisionism can be orthodox, revolutionary, or radical in

character. Orthodox revisionism does not challenge the functional principles of the system,

but the distribution of power and/or resources in the system, aiming at redistribution. An

example here might be provided by Imperial Japan or Prussia during the 18th century.

Revolutionary revisionism challenges the organizing principles of the system, as Republican

France challenged monarchical Europe in the beginning of the 19th century, and the Soviet

Union – the capitalist system a century later. Radical revisionism lies somewhere in between

the two other extremes, being to imprecise as to be put in one of the two categories (Buzan,

1983, pp.179-186). An example of this type of revisionism is currently served by the self-

proclaimed Islamic State.

2.3. Accounts on the security dilemma

2.3.1. The defence/offence approach and the Balance of Power model

Overall, we can agree that the sources of national insecurity and the attempts to enhance

national security are often closely interrelated. This observation captures the essence of the

security dilemma – “An increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others”

(Jervis, 1978, p. 186). In his “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, Robert Jervis

suggests two general methods by means of which the security dilemma can be approached:

the game theory, the logic of which will be analysed in the succeeding subsection, and the

defence/offence approach.

In the defence/offence approach, the key questions to be answered are whether

defensive weapons can be distinguished from offensive ones and whether the defence or the

offence has the advantage (Ibid.). These variables are mostly affected by geography,

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technology, as well as by the security doctrine of the respective state. The geographic position

of a state determines whether it has a natural barrier between itself and the potential adversary

(a mountain range, an ocean, a great river), and whether it is surrounded by powerful

neighbours (as Germany has been throughout its history by Russia, France, and Great Britain),

or isolated on an island, as Great Britain or the US. In the context of the defence-offence

approach, technology mainly concerns the weapons available to a state and determines its

relative military power. Hereby, the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons is

of key importance (Jervis, 1987).

Such a distinction is possible only partly, however. Generally, total immobility defines

whether a system is defensive only, such as fortifications. Heavy tanks and mobile heavy

artillery, on the other hand, clearly indicate offensive weapons, as they are used to destroy

fortifications (Jervis, 1983). Weapons of limited mobility represent a grey zone, which is hard

to precisely identify as offensive or defensive. So, short-range fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft

missiles, for example, can be used for defence, as well as a means to cover an attack. This

became visible, among others, during the “Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 [, which] would

have been impossible without effective air defences that covered the battlefield” (Jervis, 1987,

p. 203). Nuclear weapons represent a specific type of weapons, as their main purpose is

deterrence rather than actual use. In case two status quo powers possess nuclear weapons and

second-strike capability, the probability of a war between the two drastically declines, by this,

lessening the security dilemma. This was clearly illustrated during the Cold War, which was

an overall secure period due to the general clearness in the set-up of the international system

divided between the US and the Soviet bloc with their respective spheres of influence.

The difficulty to classify most of the weapons as defensive or offensive was referred to

by a French Foreign Minister during the inter-world-war years as follows: “The only way to

discover whether arms are intended for purely defensive purposes or are held in a spirit of

aggression is in all cases to enquire into the intentions of the country concerned” (speech cited

in Jervis, 1978, p. 201). Thus, as a classification of weapons into defensive and offensive ones

is difficult, we shall concentrate on the ends which these weapons are sought to serve. This is

determined by how the state defines its security, which, in turn, is affected by the

considerations of which strategy has the advantage – defence or offence. In case the defence

has the advantage, it is easier to defend a territory than to take it. The offence has the

advantage when it is easier to conquer than to protect, or in case it is believed to be that way

by the respective actor.

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In cases where the offence has the advantage, the security dilemma is most intense. While

revisionist states – by definition – define their security in terms of change, thus, favouring the

offence, a status quo power may also find itself in the situation when the offence has the

advantage over the defence (or when the state is convinced that it has). In that case, the status

quo power will behave as an aggressor. In case the defence has the advantage, the status quo

power may enhance its security without necessarily endangering others. This leads us to the

first possible solution of the security dilemma – to the balance of power model (model 3). As

argued by Jervis: “if the defence has the advantage and if the states are of a roughly equal

[power], not only will the security dilemma cease to inhibit status-quo states from cooperating,

but aggression will be next to impossible, thus rendering international anarchy relatively

unimportant” (Jervis, 1978, p. 187).

The balance of power is a system model which is maintained by the anarchic nature of

the system. As reasoned by Buzan: “the balance of power and the international anarchy are

opposite sides of the same coin. If we accept Vattel’s classic definition of the balance of

power [as “such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to

predominate, and prescribe laws to the others” (Vattel, 1844, p.311)], then it becomes simply

another way of describing the basic structure of anarchy” (Buzan, 1983, p.103). The essence

behind a balance of power system is that the relative external power of each of the key actors

in the system should be roughly equal, while those powers need to be internally stable status

quo powers. In order for the internal and external factors to manifest, a number of criteria

need to be fulfilled. Those criteria will be discussed in detail in section 6.

The conditions of internal stability and rough equality in external relative power are

the two pillars of the success of a BoP system. This is due to the fact that, as Waltz puts it: ”in

international politics balance of power is simply a theory about the outcome of unit`s

behaviour under conditions of anarchy” (Waltz, 1979, p. 57), and “among men as among

states, anarchy […] is associated with the occurrence of violence” (Waltz, 1979, p. 102). This

makes the international system a self-help system, in which the logic of survival commands

the behaviour of states. This is why it is important to have near equality in the external

relative power of the key actors in a BoP system. In case such is provided, the costs of an

open act of military aggression of one key actor against another one become too high.

The conditions of internal stability, a status quo orientation and a defensive security

strategy are necessary factors to make the balance of power work. This is because a

revisionist state would incline towards an offensive national strategy despite a lacking

rationale to do so, while an offensive security strategy adopted by a status quo state will lead

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to the instability of a BoP system through a continuous arms race, which would at some point

result in the downfall of the system. An internally instable actor, naturally, cannot be expected

to become or to maintain its external power. From this it follows that while the units in the

system may all have different characteristics, some criteria need to be given for all relevant

system actors as to enable the establishment of a stable balance of power system (see in detail

in section 6). This statement contradicts the assumption common for the realist school of

thought in IR, according to which under the conditions of anarchy, states behave as like units.

“[…] so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). This statement,

however, is only true in respect of their self-help situation – thus, the state of affairs in the

international system –, but not in regard to their internal characteristics, which, in turn,

influence the shape of the system.

Thus, a balance of power system is one of the possible solutions to the security

dilemma and a way to enable international coordination on core issues, which is needed so

badly at current times. While the BoP model was very prominent during Cold War times, it

has lost some of its legitimacy after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the succeeding

tendency towards the establishment of a unipolar system. This had mainly to do with the fact

that people are reflective, and in case they cannot observe a phenomenon, they stop believing

in its existence. When it became clear, however, that the system tends towards multipolarity

rather than unipolarity (see section 5), the balance of power model regained in relevance. Its

potential to mute the security dilemma generally coincides with the realist line of argument,

while is vigorously opposed by liberal thinkers, who insist on the power of international

institutions and see the solution in enhanced international cooperation brought about by

economic interdependence and a universalization of norms and values.

2.3.2. Mature anarchy model

The essence of the differences in the accounts on the security dilemma which exist between

the neo-realist and the neo-liberal schools of thought is marked by the on-going neo-neo

debate. As was suggested by Alexander Wendt, “the debate is more concerned today with the

extent to which state action is influenced by ’structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of

power) versus ’process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions” (Wendt, 1992, p.391).

Both realists and liberals are rationalists meaning that their arguments are based upon the

assumption that states act on the basis of rational choice. Both schools recognize states to be

self-interested dominant actors in the international system – its ’agents’ –, operating in an

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anarchical system. With regard to international cooperative undertakings, these two schools

also share a number of assumptions, such as that international regimes are established by

states on the basis of cooperation in the international system with the aim to promote

international order (Little, 2011). Here the similarities end, though, as the two schools have

distinctly conflicting attitudes towards international cooperation and the power and

effectiveness of international regimes and institutions.

While realists believe that “international cooperation will not happen unless states

make it happen” (Baylis & Smith, 2001, p.190), is difficult to achieve and even more difficult

to maintain because of the prevalence of national interests, liberals argue that international

cooperation is possible to achieve and maintain in areas of mutual interests to states (Lamy,

2011, p. 215). Realists argue that while cooperation occurs between states, it is “constrained

by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can

eliminate” (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 9). According to realists, there are two main factors

hindering cooperation: the problem of cheating and the problem of relative gains (Baylis,

2008, p.232).

The problem of cheating basically refers to the uncertainty one state faces when

dealing with another state. Due to the absence of a centralized authority in international

relations, states have to assume the worst case scenario when dealing with a counterpart. This

means that there is always a prospect of one state to take advantage out of the other state’s

weakness. The problem of relative gains has its roots in the same cause – the competitive

logic of the international system. Thus, a state not only has to try to maximize its gains (which

would mean to concentrate on the absolute gains), but to compare its gains to those of other

states, thus, to be concerned with relative gains. While absolute gains might appear greater

than the relative ones, the mistrustful and competitive nature of the international system does

not allow this optimal outcome to occur and makes states concentrate on gains relative to

those of other states.

Liberals disagree with the fatality of the realist world view. They claim that these two

problems can be overcome by means of international institutions. For them, the problem of

cheating might be solved through information exchange made possible in the framework of

international regimes. The problem of relative gains is believed to be solved the same way, as

states would potentially start attempting to reach mutually beneficial outcomes rather than

undermining their own security by cheating. Liberals illustrate their assumptions by means of

a model taken over from microeconomics and developed by Vilfredo Pareto. This model

20

addresses the problem of collective action and is known as the “Prisoner’s dilemma” of Game

theory (Figure 2).

Figure 2. The prisoner’s dilemma

Source: own figure, adapted from R. Little, 2011, p. 302

In the absence of a higher authority, the parties – in our case states – mistrust each other on

issues where mutual interests would otherwise have allowed for cooperation. This leads to

suboptimal policy outcomes, as effective collaboration is hindered by a lack of information

exchange and control mechanisms. This problem might theoretically be overcome by the

establishment of international regimes, though, which would enable the parties to achieve

optimal policy outcomes on issues concerned – the so-called “Pareto optimum”.

Realists, on the other hand, view international regimes as another means of states to

project and enhance their power. The resulting negotiated outcome, consequently, would

reflect the power relations between states which are party to the respective regime. To

illustrate their point, realists resort to the model “Battle of the Sexes” of Game Theory (Figure

3). It describes a situation in which power relations determine the outcome of a coordinated

action, which can be demonstrated by means of the “Pareto frontier”. The Pareto frontier is a

straight line illustrating the respective coordinated outcome depending on the relative power

21

of an actor vis-à-vis the other one. In theory, in case of equal power relations between states,

there is a perfect compromise.

Figure 3. Battle of the Sexes

Source: own figure, adapted from R. Little, 2011, p. 305

According to the theoretical framework established above, international regimes can be

sought of as possible arenas for information exchange enabling states to either cooperate or to

coordinate their actions. As defined by Stephen Krasner, international regimes are “sets of

implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’

expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 141).

According to him, the four basic elements of a regime were to be understood in the following

way:

1. Principles are theoretical statements which represent the basic beliefs of a regime.

The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), for example, operates upon liberal

economic principles. 2. Norms represent the general standards of behaviour defined in terms

of rights and obligations, which build its raison d'être upon the respective principles of a

regime. On the example of the GATT, the basic norm is that hindrances to free trade, such as

tariffs and non-tariff barriers, should be eliminated. 3. Rules specify the prescriptions for

actions determined by the norms of the respective regime. In the GATT, there is a consensus

rule, for example. 4. Decision-making procedures basically identify the prevailing practices

for the rules’ implementation. Often, decisions are implemented through a binding

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international agreement, which is an example of the fourth defining principle of an

international regime (based on Krasner, 1985).

International regimes are examples of international institutions. According to John

Mearsheimer, there is no widely accepted definition of international institutions. Generally,

they are defined in a very broad way as to incorporate all the possible variants of a “regulated

pattern of activity between states” (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 8). Maurice Duverger defines

international institutions as “the collective form or basic structures of social organization as

established by law or by human tradition” (Duverger, 1972, p.68).

As previously mentioned, many international regimes are accompanied by the creation

of an international organization. While international regimes provide the framework for

cooperation among states, they do not possess an independent capacity to act. This capacity is

granted to a regime by the respective international organization, which is a regulative body

with the rights and means to act. International organizations were thoroughly studied by Clive

Archer, who defined the concept as follows: “an international organization […] represents a

form of institution that refers to a formal system of rules and objectives, a rationalized

administrative instrument […] which has a formal technical and material organization […]”

(Archer, 2001, p. 2, based on: Selznick, 1957 & Duverger, 1972).

International regimes can be classified in a number of ways, depending either on their

regulative potential vis-à-vis the degree of institutionalization (no regime; tacit regime; dead

letter regime; classic regimes) (Levy et al., 1995), their geographical basis (bilateral, regional,

global), number of participants (bilateral, multilateral), or by issue (security regimes,

environmental regimes etc.) (Little, 2011). The classification suggested by Levy et al.

establishes a typology along two scales – convergence of expectations and formality (Figure

4).

Figure 4. Types of International Regimes

Source: Levy et al., 1995, p. 272

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The upper scale (convergence of expectations) describes the extent to which states expect or

anticipate the established regime to affect their behaviour. This scale may be considered

historical, as the state’s expectations are formed on the basis of precedence. The degree of

formality illustrates whether a regime is accompanied by the creation of formalized

agreements, procedures, or is even followed by the establishment of an international

organization. In case of a low degree of formality, as well as a low convergence of

expectations, one cannot refer to the respective social institution as a ’regime’. Where

formalized rules have been established – either legally binding or not –, which, nevertheless,

can be expected not to be followed, we can speak of a so-called ’dead letter regime’.

Examples of this type of regime are the conflict regulation undertakings in Bosnia, which

were highly institutionalized, yet ineffective.

If, on the contrary, there are few up to no formal agreements, but the mere existence of

specific norms embodied by the respective regime leads to the compliance with these norms

by states, there is a ’tacit regime’. The Balance of Power system of the 19th century or the

division into spheres of influence after World War II provide good examples of this type of

regimes. In case of both a high degree of formalization and a high degree of expectation of

convergence we can speak of a ’classic regime’. An example here is the GATT, or the Marine

Pollution Regime (based on Levy et al, 1995). Classic regimes can be inferred when” (1) clear

violations remain the exception, (2) parties harmed by violations protest against them by

implicitly or explicitly referring to the agreed upon rules and (3) violators do not deny the

rules and norms referred to in these protests” (Levy et al, 1995, p. 272).

Furthermore, one can classify regimes on the geographical basis by differentiating

between global and regional regimes. It is further possible to focus on the number of

participants: bilateral or multilateral regimes. A classification of regimes by issue is also

common. There are, for example, environmental regimes, economic regimes or security

regimes. Hereby, the dimensions of low and high politics play a decisive role for the

functional type of a regime. So, cooperation is far easier to achieve in regimes covering low

political issues, than high political ones. Due to the relevance of the prevalence of cooperation

over coordination for the formation of the mature anarchy model, the closer examination of

regimes covering issues of high politics – whereby security regimes can be seen as perfect

representatives of this group of regimes due to their unambiguous allocation to the domain of

high politics – seems inevitable.

As in line with the definition given by Robert Jervis, security regimes are “those

principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief

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that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that

facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run

self-interest” (Jervis, 1982, p. 357). In his “Security regimes”, Jervis identified criteria for

regime formation on the high political dimension which is relevant for the mature anarchy

model: First, the great powers must be willing to establish it. Second, the regime’s

participants must believe that the others share the value of mutual security and cooperation.

Third, the actors of a regime have to be status quo powers not pursuing expansion. The fourth

condition is that “war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly” (Jervis,

1982, pp. 360-362). Another important factor is the belief in reciprocity. Jervis sees this

condition as key for successful international cooperation and supports his point by the

example of the success of the Concert of Europe governing the relations among the five Great

European Powers: Russia, Prussia, Austria, France and Great Britain from 1815 to 1823

(Jervis, 1982).

In line with this reasoning, the normative dimension turns out key to successful

formation and maintenance of regimes covering issues of high politics. To support this claim

with a historical example, one could compare the SALT 1 and SALT 2 regimes (1970-ies)

between the United States and the Soviet Union to the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

regime, which were both designed to bring the arms race under control. While highly

institutionalized, both SALT regimes turned out ineffective, as neither of the superpowers

trusted its opponent to indeed restrain from developing new weapons. The comparative

effectiveness of the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons regime, which started as a tacit

regime designed to prevent any further increase in the number of states possessing nuclear

weapons in the late 1970s and developed into a classic regime with almost all countries of the

globe participating in it by 2004 (Little, 2011), lies in the broad acceptance of its norms.

From this it follows that in order to mute the security dilemma in accordance with the

mature anarchy model (model 2), a common normative basis must be given on a global scale

as to establish global regimes which would make cooperation on high political issues possible.

To illustrate the difference between an immature and a mature anarchy, I will revert to the

concept father’s words: “An extreme case of immature anarchy would be where each state

recognized no other legitimate sovereign unit except itself, and where relations among the

units took the form of a continuous struggle for dominance”, while “[…]an extremely mature

anarchy would have developed as a society to the point where the benefits of fragmentation

could be enjoyed without the costs of continuous struggle and instability” (Buzan, 1983, p.

96).

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Although exaggerated, this line of argument corresponds with the debate between the realist

and the liberal schools of thought presented above. An immature anarchy is marked by power

relations and a continuous struggle for power, which seems to be best dealt with by means of

the establishment of a balance of power system or a world government, as the realist

assumption that ’as long as there will be states, there will be war’ marks this line of argument.

A mature anarchy, instead, is characterized by the realisation of the advantage of cooperation

motivated by optimum outcomes as in line with the liberal theory. For a mature anarchy to

develop, though, the sheer presence of interlinkages within the system and the

acknowledgement of the potentially greater gains of cooperation are not enough. What is

currently missing in the system is a common normative basis. This is the missing ’men’

component in the Waltzian causes of war, which is key to the resolution of the security

dilemma in accordance with model 2 through its decisive effect on the system in accordance

with the social constructivist agent-structure logic. Whether or not such a basis might be

inducted into the system as an intervening variable brought in by, for example, the forces of

globalization, remains to be studied in the upcoming course of this piece. For now, we shall

examine the last model designed to approach the security dilemma – the Federal World

Government model.

2.3.3. Federal World Government

The Federal World Government model bases its assumptions on the theory of federalism

suggesting the “abolition of national independence and the fusion of different political entities

into one” (Andreatta, 2005, p.23) as a solution to the security dilemma. This assumption is

based on the ideas of Kant and Rousseau seeing the problem of (in)security in the state as a

societal entity. According to these two great thinkers, the solution to the problem to achieve

peace among states is to replace the state with what Kant refers to as a “federation of free

states” in his famous “Perpetual Peace”. Here, Kant emphasizes that the “federation of

nations” should not be constructed as a state, because a “state” implies the relation of one who

rules to those who obey and, by this, to only one nation (Kant, 1795, pp. 128, 129). Instead,

Kant suggests for a federal union which other political entities would like to join out of free

will.

As predicted by Kant more than two centuries ago, violent competition over resources

remains the key threat to the survival of mankind today, even though the conflicting parties

might have shifted from the state only towards increasingly more private actors. The vast

26

increase of intra-state conflicts – being conflicts between a state and a non-state actor –

suggests for the emergence of a great number of private armed actors willing to fight over the

ever shrinking number of resources on our planet. Even water becomes a scarce resource,

which is painfully felt in Africa, the leader in the number of non-state conflicts. Non-state

conflicts can be defined as conflicts between two non-state actors (Uppsala Conflict Data

Program, 2012). These alarming tendencies, together with the prospect of terrorist groups to

acquire weapons of mass destruction and the inability of states to efficiently cooperate on a

number of pressing issues requiring trans-border decisions such as the preservation of the

environment or joint security undertakings, might indeed advocate the necessity to abolish the

state in favour of a federal world government.

Federalists, who are primary concerned with issues of high politics, suggest for rather

revolutionary measures to initiate global integration processes, such as the introduction of a

new federal world constitution (Andreatta, 2005). Such type of integration taking place from

above would require rather drastic incentives to occur, as it would have to overpower the

realist logic prevalent for issues of high politics. Therefore, I would argue that for such radical

changes in the international system to take place, two interdependent mechanisms need to be

provided. The first one refers to a catastrophic external event, which might be caused by a

global environmental disaster or a world war. Such external pressure is expected to bring

about a rapid institutional integration starting with high political issues. The other mechanism

is societal pressure and it can either be triggered by the first mechanism of external pressure

forcing mankind to change the present global political system in order to survive, or by an

independent, naturally initiated change in the mind sets of the world population who can be

regarded as agents constituting the structure which is the international political system. This

mechanism would lead to a change in the political system triggered from within.

The normative logic behind this argument rests upon the social constructivist agent-

structure problem described by A. Wendt on the basis of structural theory. Here, structure is

defined as “a set of internally related elements”, which could be “agents, practices,

technologies, territories – whatever can be seen as occupying a position within a social

organization” (Wendt, 1987, p. 357). In our case, structure refers to the international geo-

political system. Structures are made of the practises of its agents which, in turn, are

socialized in – and by – the structure. Therefore, these two elements are interdependent: “Just

as social structures are ontologically dependent upon and therefore constituted by the

practices and self-understandings of agents, the casual powers and interests of those agents, in

their own turn, are constituted and therefore explained by structures” (Ibid., p. 359).

27

Building on this logic, the current organization of the international political system – which is

an intergovernmental structure – is expected to function only as long as it is maintained the

way it is by its agents. States can be considered agents of the international system structure,

too, but states themselves are structures consisting of individuals which constitute the most

basic agent-unit. Therefore, during our analysis of model 1, we will refer to individuals as

agents acting within domestic as well as international structures. Drawing on the logic of

structural theory, a shift in the self-identification of the agents constituting the structure will

lead to the adaptation of the structure to a new social reality. The structural change, in turn,

will bring about the effect of socialization, further influencing the agents. Thus, for a change

of the type of societal organization to take place from above there needs to be a massive

external pressure coupled with the shift in the agents’ mind sets.

A gradual transformation of the international system, on the other hand, is the type of

integration advocated by neo-functionalists and, unlike the previous one, it takes place from

below. As federalists, proponents of approaches of gradual integration would also find

support in Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” suggesting that a gradual integration “from a State of

Nations [,] would be ever increasing and finally embrace all peoples of the earth” (Kant, 1795,

p.136). This type of gradual integration can occur through two interrelated mechanisms – the

spill-over effect and the socialization effect. The mechanism behind the socialization effect

was already described in the preceding paragraphs. It rests upon the social constructivist logic

arguing that a change in the structure leads to the adaptation of the agent further influencing

the integration effect from within the structure. Socialization is intertwined with the spill-over

effect, as those two parallel effects cannot function independently of each other.

The spill-over effect implies that integration in one functional area will almost

necessarily lead to integration in other areas. According to Ernest Haas, “integration brings

loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess

or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958, p.139). This

mechanism of integration operates through the functional spill-over from the national to the

more effective supranational level, which is further empowered by a technical spill-over. The

technical spill-over, in turn, may lead to a political spill-over resulting in a gradual shift of

control from the national to the supranational level, leading to the unification of several states

into one political entity as its end result (Andreatta, 2005).

The effectiveness of the spill-over effect was demonstrated in the European Union

(EU), where initial economic cooperation led to the Union transforming into a political entity

willing to deepen its integration even further. The transformation from an issue-related,

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technical corporation into a deep integrated geo-political entity was made possible, among

others, by the bureaucracy and its capacity to rationalize and depoliticize issues through

standard operating procedures, which has led to an institutional spill-over. The socialization

process among EU-bureaucrats, on the other hand, created a supranational mentality, which,

in turn, further influenced the integration process. Thus, for the federal world government

scenario to become true through a gradual integration from below, the technical spill-over

effect has to be accompanied by the socialization process turning the minds of officials within

an international organization towards a deeper integration.

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3. The three models to mute the security dilemma

In light of the above discussion, the question of how to mute the security dilemma under

modern conditions becomes one of whether the absolute security level within the international

system will be high or low. We can, thus, speak of international security as to embrace

national as well as individual security within one concept. As further concluded, a relatively

high level of security can theoretically be achieved by three macro-models each echoing the

logics of its founding schools of thought in international relation. Thus, the current

intergovernmental system with limited issue-related cooperation could – given specific

circumstances – develop into a mature anarchy (model 2) allowing states to cooperate on the

basis of common values and joint interests. In a power balanced world divided between blocs

(model 3) of more or less equal relative power and internal stability, the logic of deterrence

would prevail and restrain the security dilemma. The security dilemma might also be resolved

by the establishment of a world government (model 1), as proposed by federalist writers.

In order to make a distinction between the different nature of arguments in favour of

models 1 and 2 which are to be examined first, I will apply the approach to integration

suggested by Filippo Andreatta. This is due to the fact that both models require a certain

amount of integration to come into being. In case of a development of the current system into

a mature anarchy, less integration would be needed than in the case of the foundation of a

world government. Still, Andreatta’s approach should fit both models.

Studying the phenomenon of integration in the European Union, Andreatta was able to

sketch the typology of the main theories of European integration into a table with two

variables for each of the two possible results of integration. Having adjusted his approach to

the global dimension of all countries on our planet, the following typology of the classical

theories of integration and international relations is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Possible paths of the state’s transformation

Policy fields

High Politics Low Politics

End result of

integration

Issue-Related

Cooperation

Neo-Realism Neo-Liberalism

Federal World

Government

Federalism Neo-Functionalism

Source: own table

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Having identified the main ideas behind the models, the next thing to do is to analyse the

current systemic trends and correlate them with the established mechanisms through which

the models can theoretically be induced. Before we can turn the theoretical discussion into a

practical analysis, however, we shall first discuss the general problems of modelling in social

science with the particular focus on the difficulties of macro-modelling. An alternative

approach to the analysis of the processes taking place in the international system, that of

geopolitics, shall be presented as well.

3.1. The general problems behind macro-modelling in social science

The problem haunting the domain of social science is that of objectivity, as most of the

analyses undertaken cannot provide irrefutable results. This is due to the fact that social

science, being primarily concerned with society and human behaviour, can most of the time

not rely of the experimental method which characterizes the domain of natural sciences. The

research methods applied in social science are divided into quantitative and qualitative,

whereby the former refer to the analysis of quantifiable data, such as statistical analyses, and

the latter – to observations and the analysis of already existing literature. A logical

consequence thereout is that qualitative research is always a product of the subjective results

attained by a researcher. Hereby, the analysis, be it qualitative, quantitative or a mixture of

both, generally takes place in the broader framework of one or several theories.

As reasoned by King, “most of the theories in the social sciences attempt to explain

underlying continuous processes, [while] we generally observe only finite numbers of discrete

events. […] For example, influence among political actors, the continuing allocation of

resources, constituency representation, and other aspects of politics can all be described as

unobserved continuous processes that generate observed discrete events” (King, 1989, p. 123).

Vice versa it is the same – events generate, or even define processes, as these can be

understood as a continuous line of concrete events. In case the observed events can be

quantified and statistically evaluated, its relatedness to a verified process can be substantiated

more unambiguously than in case an event has to be understood and interpreted by the

observer. In that case it is especially important to resort to a theory capable of providing a

generalized theoretical framework from which the respective event or number of events can

be classified.

The two-level approach is a common technique applied in social sciences. So, the

most common approach in international relations is the systemic approach. As according to

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Waltz, “the system is […] defined as “a set of interacting units. At one level, a system

consists of a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it possible

to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere collection. At another level, the

system consists of interacting units. The aim of systems theory is to show how the two levels

operate and interact, and that requires marking them off from each other” (Waltz, 1979, p. 40).

Thus, in order to analyse the system, we need to understand the units of which it consists, and

in order to understand those units, we need to analyse the structure.

Figure 5. Systems theory

International structure

Interacting units

Source: Waltz, 1979, p. 40

The above reasoning suggests for the interrelatedness between the micro and the macro levels

of analysis. In order to jump from the macro to the micro level and back again, however, we

need to have some ’bridges’, which would connect the two. Those ’bridges’ are provided by

the micro-macro model. As summarized by Opp in his analysis of the micro-macro model:

“There is a macroproposition, its independent variables have causal effects on independent

variables of a micro-theory, and the dependent variable of the micro-theory has a causal

impact on the dependent variable of the macroproposition” (Opp, 2011, p. 209).

The structure of the micro-macro model can best be illustrated by means of the

Coleman scheme (Fig. 6) explaining the model on the example of Weber’s assumption that

the development of capitalism was influenced by Protestantism. The upper arrow indicates the

proposition at the macro level chosen for this example, arrow 2 – the proposition at the micro

level, while arrows 1 and 3 represent so-called ’bridge assumptions’ that characterize the

relationships between the micro and the macro levels (Opp, 2011). According to Opp,

macropropositions are not causal propositions, but correlations, as they require the other three

linkages to, on and back from the micro-level to hold true. Hereby, empirical bridge

assumptions need to be backed by a theory and require evidence for the existence of the

32

respective relationship between the micro and macro levels. Evidence can be acquired from a

number of indicators, which need to resonate with the applied theory.

Figure 6 . The Coleman scheme

Source: Coleman, 1990, p.8

Thus, in order to study the system, we need to establish criteria that would enable us to

analyse the system’s units and develop indicators that would allow verifying the bridge

assumptions necessary to correlate the system and the units levels. Hereby, the chosen

indicators need to be backed by a theory. This reasoning corresponds with my observations

made above – the qualitative analysis of data requires the application of clear theory-backed

criteria upon which the data can be selected, analysed and evaluated, while both qualitative

and quantitative research must be conducted in the general framework of a theory, which

would allow a scientifically founded interpretation of the obtained results. However, despite a

strict application of theories and the effort to process the data as objective as possible to make

the study comprehensible and minimize subjective bias ever present in social sciences, the

problem of objectivity and exactness will remain in any systems analysis conducted in the

field of social sciences.

3.2. Geopolitics – an alternative model of the international system

While there are no macro-theories, macro-models exist in international relations. Three such

models were already presented above. Each of them is constructed around a core IR theory

and is based on analytically verified indicators. However, a model of international relations

does not necessarily have to be founded upon an IR theory – so is geopolitics. The concept of

geopolitics goes back to the end of the 19th century and was coined by the Swedish political

33

scientist Rudolf Kjellen to describe the nature and resources available to a state relative to the

other states under considerations of their geographic position. Due to its use as a means to

promote nationalist thinking and its direct association with expansionist policy in general and

fascism in particular, the concept of geopolitics was generally condemned after World War II.

During the Cold War, however, this concept was revived in the United States mainly by the

efforts of Henry Kissinger, to become the typical approach used for studies undertaken for the

sake of the practical conduct of power politics.

While geopolitics represents an approach used in international relations, it does not

represent one of the IR theories. Its primary focus on the distribution of resources and power

throughout the world might remind of realism, however, here the similarity between the two

ends. As put by Ò Tuathail and Agnew in their article observing the practice of geopolitics: ”

By its own understanding and terms, geopolitics is taken to be a domain of hard truths,

material realities and irrepressible natural facts. Geopoliticians have traded on the supposed

objective materialism of geopolitical analysis. […] The great irony of geopolitical writing,

however, is that it was always a highly ideological and deeply politicized form of analysis” (Ò

Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 95). Hence, the meaning of a specific geopolitical approach must

be understood in the particular context of its use. As Ò Tuathail puts it: “geopolitics is

discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the

geographical dimension of power” (Ò Tuathail, 2006, p.1). Thus, geopolitics aims at the

production of knowledge designed to enhance the power of a state. Hereby, its particular

context can be analysed by means of discourse analysis, which as Ò Tuathail and Agnew

argue in their work “Geopolitics and Discourse”, might be seen as its theoretical basis (Ò

Tuathail & Agnew, 1992).

In their article, the authors suggest to reconceptualise geopolitics as a “study of the

spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states” (Ò Tuathail &

Agnew, 1992, p. 95). In such a construct, the geographic element would be non-politicized,

while the social element could be analysed by means of discourse analysis. However, in that

case, geopolitics would still not represent a theory of international relations, but be a practical

analysis most of the time conducted with the primarily motivation to find ways to enhance the

relative power of a given state. Hereby, the discourses used and methods suggested would

differ depending on the context in which they are applied. So, in case a country adopts a

defensive security doctrine, its geopolitical strategy also becomes of a defensive nature; in

case it adopts an offensive security doctrine – the geopolitical strategy becomes so as well. By

34

this, its discursiveness, among other factors, represents the element which prevents

geopolitics from becoming a scientific, theoretically founded approach.

The lack of a theory of geopolitics can be seen as the standard critique of the

geopolitical approach. Indeed, its strategic practical orientation, volatility and general

inclination towards simplifications of social and natural processes suggests for its remoteness

from being a scientific approach. While discourse analysis might shed light on the raison

d’être of a particular geopolitical strategy taken up by a country, it lacks the power to make it

a theory of international relations.

However, geopolitics exists as an approach to analyse the system of international

relations and in doing so, it does not leave out the realm of security. In geopolitical writings,

the notion of security is generally limited to the understanding of national security. Hereby,

transnational threats, as well as the regionalization of the international system are being taken

account of by most modern geopolitical analyses. On this simple observation, the

contradictory nature of the geopolitical approach to security becomes visible. Transnational

threats cannot be eliminated by a national security strategy without impinging on the principle

of sovereignty – the highest principle in international relations –, while the enhancement of

national security by conventional means being the enhancement of one’s military abilities,

decreases the national security of other system actors and, as a result, the security of the one

who has started the arms race in the name of ’security ’.

Attempts to approach the supranational level of security undertaken by geopolitical

analysts have fallen to the same contradictory logic resulting out of a lack of theoretic

framework in which the issue could be analysed. To make an example, in his analysis of the

matter, Nayef Al-Rhodan indicates five dimensions of global security, which he suggests to

approach by means of the “multi-sum security principle”, which he defines as follows: ” In a

globalized world, security can no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game involving states

alone. Global security, instead, has five dimensions that include human, environmental,

national, transnational, and transcultural security, and, therefore, global security and the

security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that

guarantees security through justice for all individuals, states, and cultures” (Al-Rhodan, 2007,

pp. 15, 16).

This very norm-filled expression is totally detached from reality and completely out of

place in a serious study of the problem of security in international relations, not to speak of a

national-interest-oriented geopolitical study of the matter. Despite a description of the major

current problems of mankind, and, perhaps, also a normatively correct depiction of its causes

35

offered throughout his study, Al-Rhodan does not provide any useful or at least sufficiently

reasoned proposals of how to realistically enhance security through justice or reach the ideal

of good governance. Instead, he suggests the ’cooperative-security concept’, which would

foresee the ’looking outward’ beyond the borders of a security zone: “ [The cooperative-

security concept] goes beyond collective security in that it not only looks inward, ensuring

security and stability within a cooperative security zone, but also outward. Looking outward

implies promoting stability outside the cooperative security space, in the near abroad or even

further afield” (Al-Rhodan, 2007, p. 102). In other words, he suggests to interfere in the

affairs of other states, by doing so, violating the principle of sovereignty, and as a logical

consequence thereout, further enhancing the degree of global insecurity, as well as the

insecurity of all participants of such an unfortunate ’security cooperation’ undertaking. Apart

from the logical inconsistency of such a proposition, the question of how such an intervention

into the affairs of a sovereign state should be carried out. The only legal instrument that

comes into mind would be a humanitarian intervention sanctioned by the Security Council

(see discussion in section 5.1.2.). However, Al-Rhodan does not go as far as to elaborate on

that matter in any more detail. Yet, from this in fact highly offensive standpoint of security, he

concludes that when following this principle, “security is no longer considered a zero-sum

game” (Al-Rhodan, 2007, p. 102).

Apart from the conflicting proposition elaborated upon in the preceding paragraph, Al-

Rhodan suggests for “collaborative activities between states” as to reach the goal of his multi-

sum security principle. Hereby he seems to refer to both multi-civilizational alliance-building

(Ibid., p. 104) and cooperation between states on a number of security issues (Ibid., p. 112).

However, while multiple alliance building indeed provides an effective means to approach

security issues in general and the security dilemma in particular, as the resulting balance of

power system is capable of effectively approach the issues concerned (see analytical sections

5 & 6), cooperation between states is not possible under conditions of the security dilemma

and the current system structure. Finally, in his succeeding book on the same matter Al-

Rhodan refers to a sort of an international division of labour as a mechanism of security

provision (Al-Rhodan, 2008). However, international division of labour is not possible under

the conditions of anarchy (Waltz, 1979) and as there is no overarching authority in the

international system yet, the nature of the system remains anarchical for the time-being. Thus,

there can be no such question seriously discussed in a systemic analysis.

Overall one can conclude that the only reasonable approach to global security offered

by geopolitics is the formation of regional security groupings, which basically resembles the

36

balance of power model analysed throughout this piece. The idea of strategic regionalization

was elaborated upon, among others, by Paul Reuber and Mathias Albert in their analysis of

the emerging global order, reaching the following conclusion: “within the emerging global

order, political practices do lead to the construction of regions in many different ways”

(Reuber, Albert, 2007, p. 554).

To conclude, the geopolitical approach to systems analysis is both conceptually and

normatively inappropriate to the ends of this piece. This is primarily due to the lack of a

theory of geopolitics, and its preoccupation with the enhancement of national relative power.

Resulting thereout, any geopolitical approach to international security must be considered

highly carefully, as the methods suggested by such an analysis can be expected to lead to the

opposite result and further sharpen the security dilemma. As the aim of this piece is to

establish a theoretically founded model capable of muting the security dilemma and not one

that would culminate it until a fatal escalation, and due to the remoteness of geopolitics from

the carcass of conventional international relations theory building the framework of this

analysis, the model of geopolitics will not find a practical application throughout this piece.

However, despite all the critique listed above, the stark practical orientation together

with the taking into account of geographical factors next to the social, political and economic

factors conventionally used in social sciences, make out the strong side of geopolitical

analysis. So, while it cannot be used as a theoretical basis upon which a systemic model

would be formulated to be applied throughout this analysis, the mixed techniques of analysis

characteristic for geopolitics will well find application throughout this piece, as will be the

results of some already conducted geopolitical analyses (see Huntington and Fukuyama in

section 5).

37

Part II. Analysis

4. Federal World Government (model 1)

Before we start our analysis, we need to acknowledge that in order to test model 1, we need to

find a platform on which global integration forces could act. This platform needs to both

incorporate all states of our planet and to be regarded as generally legitimate by world society.

Only one international body fulfils both criteria and, by this, possesses a potential to become a

forum for the foundation of a federal world government – the United Nations. The upcoming

section is, thus, dedicated to the examination of the UN vis-à-vis the established global

integration processes.

The need for collective action in world politics was felt particularly strong after the

defeat of Nazi Germany by the Allied Powers. The horrible crimes committed by the Nazi

regime should never happen again – this belief brought about the birth of a unique

international organization founded in 1945 with the overarching goal of maintaining

international peace and security. Starting with 51 members, the UN today provides a forum

for 193 countries to express their views on the further development of our planet (UN, 2013).

Over the years, the UN has proven to be a stable international organization which gradually

broadens its profile and provides a platform for intergovernmental conferences on a number

of vital issues of global politics. Whether or not the UN itself possesses any real power will be

studied in the upcoming course of the section, but it can already be claimed that over the last

decades the UN has evolved into a normative power, without which the international political

system can hardly be imagined today. Normative power is commonly defined as “a power that

is neither military nor purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions” (Diez,

T., 2004, p.615). Indeed, even though the UN’s official statements might be highly debated

and not always agreed upon by different actors, its opinion is still appreciated by most.

This suggests that the UN can be regarded as the most likely candidate to become a

platform for a deeper form of global integration, given that it will take place. Notwithstanding

the scenario international cooperation might follow in the coming years, the UN can be

expected to remain at the heart of action. Therefore, we will concentrate our analysis on the

integration process taking place both from outside and from within the UN in accordance with

the two different dimensions of high and low politics. In order to start analysing the type of

transformation the world system can be expected to undertake, we need to first identify the

competences the UN possesses, as well as to compare them to those available to the state.

38

As indicated earlier on in the text, apart from the idea of the state - which with regard to the

UN would mean the existence of universal values, an assumption to be tested in a later section

–, the modern state consists of a physical base incorporating population and territory, and an

institutional base or, putting it differently, the monopoly control over the means of internal

and external violence. Thus, we need to search for those three components in the UN in order

to establish whether it already constitutes some state-like features and might be able develop

others in future. Let us start with population.

According to the Oxford dictionary, a citizen is “a legally recognized subject or

national of a state or commonwealth, either native or naturalized”. That means that to become

a so-called ’citizen of the world’ and, by this, a subject to the UN, one has to be legally

recognized as such. This implies that as soon as the people of our planet start to recognize

themselves as citizens of the world rather than nationals of a state, thus, the agent’s perception

changes, it starts to change the structure from within in a way that could empower the UN to

indeed become a legitimate body able to recognize people as its citizens. This social

constructivist argument suggests that the feature of population might develop in future given

the change in the agents’ mind sets. Whether or not such development can already be verified

will be tested in the coming sub-sections, in which the socialization effect among the UN staff

is going to be tested against the mind sets of individuals not working for the international

organization.

Territory in our given context is commonly defined as “an area of land under the

jurisdiction of a ruler or state” (Oxford dictionary, 2013). Currently, the UN does not possess

any territories. The world is divided between states. But, taking into account the changing

character of today’s world – even if hardly imaginable –, states might relax their sovereignty.

This might lead to a change in the territorial division of our planet, which could enable the

UN to acquire the second feature necessary to gain state-like characteristics.

The monopoly control over the means of internal and external violence is a feature

that marks the last and decisive step from constituting just a political entity towards being a

state. If we split this feature into its parts, we will see that it already is partially present in the

UN. To legitimately exert power, the UN needs to have a set of rules, on which it can base its

actions. This set is provided by the UN Charter which can be regarded as the Constitution of

the UN. The UN has its own bureaucracy – the Secretariat –, making it an impersonal power.

The criterion of the ability to act legitimate and authoritative, though, is provided only partly.

While the General Assembly of the UN as well as its other organs have no enforcement

powers – they can only give recommendations and use soft techniques such as ’naming and

39

shaming’ as political levers – , the Security Council has the power to make decisions which

member states are obligated to implement under the Charter (UN, 2013). That means that for

security issues, there is a supranational body that can legally enforce decisions upon states.

If we, nevertheless, analyse the Security Council, we will see that in reality things

might look different. The Security Council consists of five permanent members (Russian

Federation, United States, China, France and the United Kingdom) that all constitute current

or former structural powers, as well as of ten non-permanent members elected for two-year

terms by the General Assembly. Each member has one vote on a security issue, whereby

decisions are made in case of an affirmative vote by all permanent and four more non-

permanent members (UN Security Council, 2013). This implies that the Security Council does

not act as a supranational body, but provides a forum for the most powerful states of our

planet to project their ’will’, pretty much in accordance with the realist view upon

international organizations. Furthermore, although formally legally binding, the Security

Council can not enforce decisions upon its permanent members, each constituting a powerful

geo-political entity, as it lacks means of enforcement, such as own military forces. The UN

peacekeeping troops consist of national military staff seconded to the UN by their

governments – they are “first and foremost members of their own national armies” and

regularly stay with the UN only for a period of up to one year (UN Peacekeeping, 2013).

Therefore, they cannot be regarded as subjects under the UN’s command. The Security

Council’s inability to enforce decisions upon a powerful member state became obvious, for

example, on the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which happened despite a negative vote by the

Security Council.

With regard to a further privilege of the state – taxation, the UN’s budget regulation

might very well be interpreted as taxation. The UN is financed through assessments to all of

its member states, which pay according to their economic capacity. A failure to pay its

contribution can lead to a state losing its right to vote in the General Assembly (Global

Political Forum, 2013). Logically, the UN is able to use this economic power as a lever to

exert influence on its member states. Still, its monopoly control over the means of external

violence is limited. Although it can influence its member states through economic as well as

soft instruments such as ‘naming and shaming’, its ability to use ’hard power’ is restricted.

Hard power refers to the ability and the likelihood of the use of military force by a political

entity (Smith, 2011). When supported by the permanent members of the Security Council, the

UN can act as a hard power, as it can rely on resources provided by its powerful member

40

states. When there is no accord between the permanent members of the Security Council,

though, the UN loses its ability to act effectively and becomes a sole normative power.

By this, we have established that the today’s UN is far from becoming a state-like geo-

political entity. Nevertheless, we are aware of the fact that we live in a period of globalization

that at some point will most likely lead to a transformation of the institution of the state.

Despite the ambiguous future of the state, the international system is itself changing under the

pressures of globalization and due to structural reasons. Thus, the system as well as its units

are potentially undergoing a transformation. We also know that the UN possesses

considerable international legitimacy which makes the emergence of another platform for

global integration improbable. In order for the UN to evolve into a more powerful global

political entity, though, the state has to either vanish to be replaced by a supranational

government, or relax its sovereignty to allow for cooperation in certain issues under the

framework of the UN. While issue-related cooperation of this sort can already be observed on

the international arena, albeit predominantly in technical issues, relevant transformational

tendencies of the state can not yet be seen. However, the currently visible systemic changes,

as well as the growing inability of the state to coup with the challenges of the 21st century

provide powerful stimuli to test each of the possible systemic models established above, one

of which is the foundation of a world government. In order to verify this option, the system

needs to be searched for the activity of global integration mechanisms established earlier on in

the text, whereby the direction into which those mechanisms, in case detected, work needs to

be established. This task shall be the concern of the remaining part of this section.

4.1. Federal World Government vs. Issue-Related Cooperation

Which development path the state and the UN are going to take in future can be

prognosticated by analysing the effects of the mechanisms of global integration on the current

international political system. While an upgrade in issue-related cooperation is required by

both integration models (models 1 and 2), such an upgrade when in line with the mature

anarchy model would result in enhanced cooperation within global international regimes in an

otherwise unipolar state-based system, whereas integration in accordance with the federal

world government model would imply a gradual transition from a state-based towards one

unified federalised system. Thus, the mechanisms of integration required for model 1 and

model 2 to be induced substantially differ between the two models. This is due to the fact that

the underlying logic of the mature anarchy model is based on the assumption that it is the

41

men-dimension which is to be focused on in order to resolve the security dilemma, thus, it

suggests for a system structure that is similar to the one we have today, albeit with intensified

issue-related cooperation upgraded from solely technical to high political issues. According to

the federalists, on the other hand, it is the state that needs to be abolished in favour of a

federal world government to overcome the security dilemma.

In order to identify whether or not the foundation of a federal world government can

be anticipated in the foreseeable future, we need to establish theoretically founded

mechanisms through which a transformation of the current state-based international system in

accordance with model 1 could occur. Those mechanisms of integration were already shortly

discussed in the theoretical section of this analysis (see section 2.3.3.). They build two sets of

two interrelated integration instruments each and constitute the independent variables

determining the likelihood of a federal world government to be the end result of global

integration. The two interdependent variables leading to integration from above are external

and internal pressures, whereby the former is created by a sudden external event and the latter

by societal pressures transforming the structure ’from within’. The variables leading to a

gradual transformation of the international system from below are the spill-over and the

socialization effects.

The applicability of those so far theoretically founded mechanisms was demonstrated

through practical application. So far there have been two historical examples of the

unification of several states into one geopolitical entity – the Soviet Union and the European

Union. Cases of forced annexations of states in the course of a war or as its outcome are

excluded from the analysis, as they do not fall under the theoretical framework of this study,

which is dedicated to the analysis of the natural development of the system and its units. The

Soviet Union was born out of the 1917 October revolution with a succeeding civil war, which

has led to the fall of the Russian Empire and the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 as a

result of the unification of some of its former parts. The revolution came as a result of the

interplay between the two mechanisms established as triggers of the integration from above –

external and societal pressure. The external pressure was the wearing World War I, which

turned broad layers of the Russian population against the Emperor. The societal pressure for

change, which has existed already before the war due to a number of internal reasons, was

aggravated by the external pressure leading to the February Revolution and finally escalating

to the bloody October Revolution with the resulting start of the civil war. As in line with the

logics established in the theoretical part of this work, integration form above is likely to occur

42

abruptly and violently, as no state or ruler will voluntarily give up his power, while a grave

pressure is required for the population to turn against an established system.

The mechanisms at work for the formation of the European Union were different. The

European Union has its roots in the European Coal and Steel Community founded in 1951 by

the treaty of Rome with merely economic objectives. In the following years the initially

purely economic integration deepened and spread towards increasingly political issues, while

the number of participants grew as a result of several rounds of enlargement. Apart from the

political will among the ruling elites of the Union, which creates, shapes and maintains the

idea of Europe, the deepening of the integration in the EU was made possible through the

mechanisms identified by the neo-functionalist school of thought – the spill-over and the

socialization effects. Operating on the low political level, those two mechanisms transform

the system (here referring to the European Union) from within, gradually and unnoticed. The

newly defined system, then, influences its agents (here the EU Member States’ decision

makers), who, in turn, continue re-shaping the Union’s idea.

Thus, the formulated mechanisms of integration on the two political levels have

already been validated by real life application. As already established above, the UN

constitutes a ready-made platform, which theoretically might serve as the initial idea, which

could acquire additional competences though one of the two established ways to eventually

take over the functions of a world government. In order to find out how probable such a

development path for the system is, the defined mechanisms need to be searched for in the

system. In case of negative results with regard to the establishment of model 1, the only

remaining integrative option will be model 2, which shall be examined in section 5. When the

results will be negative, too, issue-related cooperation can be expected to remain a

phenomenon on the low political dimension, while the security dilemma will be found to be

best approached by means of coordination in a balance of power system in line with the realist

tenets reflected in model 3. As for now, however, let us start with the examination of the

likelihood of the establishment of model 1.

4.1.1. Integration from below

Integration from below is a gradual process occurring through the two parallel effects of spill-

over and socialization. These effects are interrelated and, taken together, determine whether or

not integration from the current state of affairs in the international system towards a federal

43

world government can be expected to take place. Let us start with the examination of the spill-

over effect first.

The spill-over effect described in detail in section 2.3.3 implies that integration in one

functional area, which is usually an area of low politics, is expected to lead to integration in

further areas. This mechanism functions through bureaucracy and is coupled with the effect of

socialization, both leading to the national tasks shifting to the more efficient supranational

level. In order to check whether there has been a transfer of governmental functions from the

national to the supranational level represented by the UN, the spill-over effect will be

examined on the example of two typical areas of low political international regimes – the

environment and human rights protection.

Those two political fields share a number of similarities, making them the most

prominent examples of intergovernmental cooperation. Among the major similarities between

environmental and human rights regimes are the fragmented rules and institutions by and

through which the regimes are put into practice. While the two have basic treaties as their

bases, a large number of global as well as regional treaties exist in both fields of politics.

Treaty bodies are established partially independent of already existing institutional structures.

However, environmental law remains more fragmented than international human rights law,

because the latter is coordinated through the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who was

introduced in 1993, while the former lacks a coherent coordination body. A further significant

similarity is that both regimes constitute cross-cutting issues, connecting a number of

interrelated fields and sub-areas of policy. Moreover, both regimes include a number of

specialized agencies and concern issues that primary fall under the exclusive national

jurisdiction of states. At the same time, there are increasing cross-border implications of both

regimes, which can be explained by a considerable interest on the part of the states in

developing common rules and policy approaches to those fields of policy (Fauchald, 2011).

Apart from the similarities, there are considerable differences with regard to the

mechanisms of implementation and compliance, though. In general, multilateral

environmental agreements (MEAs) have less developed mechanisms to ensure

complementation than human rights treaties have. This is because in the domestic ratification

process of international human rights law, national governments are obliged to adapt domestic

measures in accordance with the intentions of the treaty obligation to which they are party.

This is unlike the implementation of international environmental law, where the initial treaty

might be interpreted according to the regional needs of the respective country.

44

International human rights treaties are based on the widely accepted Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted in 1948. Where domestic legal proceedings fail

to address human rights issues properly, mechanisms and procedures for individual

complaints or communications should be available at the regional and international levels

(UNHR, 2013). Although the complaint method cannot be seen as a real means of

enforcement as it obviously lacks any hard power, its normative dimension should not be

underestimated. However, this statement mainly concerns democratic regimes, as this method

to exert influence does hardly have an effect in other types of political regimes, in which

public opinion is not an instrument of power projection. Therefore, while partially effective,

the international human rights regime does not provide evidence for the presence of the spill-

over effect.

International environmental legislation is created during multinational environmental

conferences and can also be legally binding upon the member states who are party to the

respective MEA (Fauchald, 2011). The body within the UN responsible for the definition of

international environmental norms is the Division of Environmental Law and Conventions

(DELC) within the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) (UNEP, 2013). The

organ itself, though, has no power to create a piece of international environmental law. This

power is only with the member states participating in an international environmental

conference. There, they can decide whether or not the MEA is going to be legally binding. In

case of a binding agreement, the implementation takes place on the national level. Despite its

function to set standards of international environmental laws, the DELC has to support

national and regional projects through the provision of resources aimed at a strengthening of

local environmental initiatives. Although the economic support might serve as an incentive

for a member state and, by this, could be seen as a soft mechanism of enforcement, it is

unlikely that it can be regarded as an effective means to ensure implementation due to its

insignificance vis-à-vis the possible costs faced by a country during the implementation

process. Thus, considering the lack of any hard power in the UN, the only layer that the

UNEP has at its disposal is its normative power, which – like in human rights law – is often

and, more or less, successfully used by the UNEP.

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that MEAs are negotiated between states,

whereby the bargaining position of the state varies according to its relative power vis-à-vis the

other states, as well as the current state of affairs in the international system. That means that

the outcome of the negotiation might reflect, or, at least, favour the position of the most

powerful state, or a group of such, who dominates the respective conference. This fact

45

coupled with the lack of any effective enforcement instruments at the UN’s disposal leads to a

rather voluntary compliance by the member states. A good example to this state of affairs is

the famous ‘Earth Summit’ that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (UN, 1992). During this

International Conference, the today so popularly used concept of ‘sustainable development’

was officially introduced. Although the principles of the Earth Summit were recognized by its

participants, the threshold for emissions set by the summit was too low to realistically be

achieved by the world community of states. In the absence of any enforcement mechanisms

available to the UN, its provisions had to be relaxed in the Johannesburg Conference in 2002,

during which it was reformulated in such a way that left each member state the freedom to

interpret the concept of ‘sustainable development’ almost freely according to its respective

needs.

By this, the analysis has verified that the spill-over effect did not take place in both

international environmental regimes and the human rights regimes. The findings so far reflect

that the neo-realist logic of the prevalence of national interests over intensified cooperation

seems to indeed hinder a deeper integration that could otherwise have been initiated through

the spill-over effect. The voluntary cooperation between states is formally assured by the

respective agreements, but in the absence of any effective enforcement mechanisms of

international law this de jure cooperation might de facto not take place. That means that the

voluntary transfer of national competences to the supranational level of the UN does take

place formally, although in the absence of mechanisms of enforcement the international

decision becomes of a non-binding character in practise.

The parallel effect required for the formation and effective transition of the technical

spill-over to a political spill-over is the socialization effect. The absence of a real delegation

of institutional functions from the national level of each UN member state towards the

supranational level represented by the UN itself, which has been elaborated upon in the

previous paragraphs, might be caused by a lack of the socialization effect among its officials.

This is at least what theory tells us, but let us examine this assumption. The effect of

socialization is sought to be present in case of a change in the mind set of an official working

for a given organization. In our case, the official is an employee working for the UN. Like the

spill-over effect, socialization was often referred to in European integration theories. Its

repercussions have been studied on European bureaucrats who proved to have established a

tendency of the former national mind sets to have become “Europeanized” (Spence, 2011).

In order to find out whether a similar effect can be observed among UN officials, a

survey was conducted with both respondents employed by the UN and those who were not.

46

The obtained data was compared and examined for indications of a difference in the mind sets

of the two groups of people. The evaluation revealed that the position among the two groups

indeed differed with regard to self-identification as well as to the attitude towards the UN.

United Nations’ staff members were rather indifferent to all of the traditional personal

characteristics and inclined to avoid direct answers about their self-perception as a national or

as a cosmopolite. This differed from the answers given by respondents not employed by the

UN considerably. Here, it appeared that for non-UN employees, national self-identification is

rather secondary to personal achievements, such as one’s social class, or occupation. Overall,

indicators for cosmopolitan identity could be observed as often as those for national identity,

while for both cases regional identity appeared to be rather unimportant.

The tendency observed among UN officials might suggest for an intention to conceal

their true attitudes towards self-identification so that they do not appear being in conflict

between their national identity as a citizen and the professional obligation as an UN official.

The assumed conflict was further supported by contradictory statements on the questions

concerning power international organizations should possess. While most respondents

strongly disagreed with the statement that “for certain problems, like environment pollution,

international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions” (Q. VII, see annex), the same

officials argued that their country “should follow UN decisions, even if it does not agree with

them” (Q. IX, see annex). This contradiction might indicate a conflict between the still

national identity of UN officials and their professional ethic. It can also be an indicator for a

disconnection of the UN and other international organizations in the UN officials’ mind sets,

whereby the UN is seen as a superior.

One way or the other, the results obtained with this social constructivist method

correspond with those gained though the analysis of the spill-over effect. The respondents

practically confirmed the current state of affairs in the UN and their willingness to maintain

the structure the way it is: The UN should retain its current status as an advisory body

empowered by its normative dimension, but without any real enforcement power. Thus, while

an effect of socialization among UN officials could be verified, this effect did not yet show

characteristics of a diminishing national identity in favour of a supranational one. It rather

created a certain professional ethic making the UN staff loyal to the organization, while at the

same time retaining their national identities and loyalties. Logically, the effect proven among

UN officials is not the same socialization effect that leads to a transition from a technical to a

political spill-over, as was the case in the European Union. By this, the global integration

47

scenario taking place from below through the mechanism of the socialization effect could not

be confirmed.

4.1.2. Integration from above

For the integration process to be triggered from above, a massive external pressure needs to

either directly affect the international structure, or create pressures from within the system by

changing the agents’ mind sets. Unlike the mechanisms for gradual integration elaborated

upon above, those two function abruptly, which is in accordance with the neo-realist logic

prevalent for issues of high politics. This logic does not allow for a gradual integration

process taking place in low politics first and spilling over to core political functions of the

state due to the ever-present primacy of the national interests over the global common good.

To change the structure from above, the current system needs to prove ineffective to its agents

in order for them to initiate a change. Thus, to examine the likelihood of a transformation of

the current international political system in accordance with the federal world government

scenario, we need to examine the presence of the mechanisms of external and internal

pressure, as well as their effects on the forces of integration.

As a typical example of a high political issue, security and defence policies provide a

good case study for our purpose. The national defence policies are a highly guarded political

field in which the states seem to maintain full control. This fact would suggest for the national

governments to be the highest authority when it comes to security issues. Unlike these

expectations, though, there is a supranational organ within the UN, which is able to formally

overrule a state’s decision on a security issue. Founded after the end of the Second World War

by the victorious Allied Powers, the Security Council of the UN serves as a guard to

international peace and security. Formally, all members of the UN agree to accept and carry

out decisions made by the Security Council. This grants it its unique status as the only UN

organ being able to oblige the member states to follow its decisions, while other organs of the

UN can only make recommendations (UN Security Council, 2013).

The formal obligation, nevertheless, is diminished by the absence of any enforcement

mechanisms at the Security Council’s disposal. Although the UN does have military forces –

the UN peacekeeping forces –, they are comprised of national military staff seconded to the

UN by their governments. They are subjects to their respective governments and can therefore

not be regarded as the UN’s own. Consequently, the Security Council can only act effectively

if its permanent members, who are all – current or former – structural powers, agree on an

48

issue. A good example of the UN’s inability to enforce a decision is the US-led invasion of

Iraq in 2003, which was not sanctioned by the Security Council. On the contrary, the decision

was taken by the US unilaterally and contravened the UN Charter. Even though most

countries in the world agreed upon the unlawfulness of the act, among them military strong

ones as Russia or China, there was no force available to prevent the US from breaching

international law. This case is a reminder of the UN’s lack of hard power, as well as the

prevalence of the neo-realist logic when it comes to the national interest of a powerful country

such as the US.

Notwithstanding its lack of hard power, the Security Council’s formal power to

influence a state’s security policy provides evidence for the theoretical claim about external

pressure to be true. The traumatic experiences of the Second World War were strong enough

to overcome the dominant neo-realist logic in the agents’ minds and complement the

international state-dominated structure with the foundation of the supranational organ of the

Security Council. It was sought to be powerful enough to prevent such horrors as those

committed by the Fascist regime from happening again. Its supranational power, though, was

based on the accord between the winners of the Second World War and major powers of that

time: the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and China. The well-

functioning of the Security Council, thus, depended on the ability of those powers to agree on

a security issue. It is well possible that in the absence of the Cold War period which followed

soon after the defeat of the Third Reich, the Security Council might have become a much

more powerful body than it is today. This is because the Cold War revived the competitive

logic of neo-realism, which made it impossible to complete the task of the creation of a

supranational security body.

Weakened by the ideological battle of the Cold War, the Security Council became a

mere shadow of its initial idea, serving as a diplomatic battle field for the major world powers.

This tendency is present until today, which was proven on a number of occasions, such as the

Iraq War, the tensions about Kosovo, or a lack of help for Africa on several occasions (Olivier,

2009). A continuing support for the Security Council, which was initially triggered by the

change in the agent’s mind sets, would possibly have allowed for the UN organ to acquire the

means necessary to exert external violence granting it effective means of enforcement.

Consequently, it can be assumed that unless another external event creates the external

pressures needed to trigger a deepening of the global integration process, the currently already

existing supranational organ might be empowered through a parallel mechanism of integration

taking place from above – societal pressure.

49

Societal pressure can be either evoked by an external event, as described in the previous

paragraphs, or evolve insidiously as a result of negative external stimuli, such as a worsening

of living conditions or considerable environmental degradation. The dissatisfaction with the

state of affairs will generate a realization in the agents’ minds that a change in the system

structure is needed. This awareness by the agents will then alter the structure due to it being

made of the practices of its agents. This social constructivist logic is based on Wendt’s agent-

structure problem and suggests for a mutually dependent and equal relationship between the

agent and the structure. According to him, the agent is influenced by the structure as much as

the structure is influence by the agent. Thus, according to this theory, as soon as people stop

seeing themselves as nationals, but citizens of the world, or, at least, will start questioning the

monopoly over the means of violence currently owned by the state, the international system

might be transformed in a way similar to the federal world government scenario.

While a massive external pressure, such as another world war or a natural disaster, can

hardly be predicted, a change in the agents’ mind sets independently of any traumatic events

can be identified by means of a survey. The analysis of data obtained by means of a

questionnaire revealed a balanced ratio of national and cosmopolitan identities among people.

While those two groups might suggest for a divided society, there is also one finding that is

true for all respondents – regional identity seems to lose its overall relevance. This tendency

might be explained by modern technology allowing both worldwide communication and

travelling with high speed at comparably low costs. This relatively recent technological

achievement has become a standard for the modern society making it mobile and less

influenced by territorial hindrances, which leads to a diminishing of the regional bonds.

Apart from the division into nationals and cosmopolitans, there are conflicting views

within society on the attitude towards the power the UN should possess vis-à-vis the state.

While most respondents acknowledge that a state benefits from being a member of the United

Nations, they at the same time do not want the UN to enforce decisions upon their state.

Unlike UN officials (see sub-paragraph 4.1.1), when it comes to cooperation on issues of low

politics, such as environmental protection, most respondents support the idea of an

international body being able to enforce decisions upon states, while a condition of such a

provision is that those bodies should be composed of representatives of the national

governments. According to the majority of the respondents, the power relations between the

United Nations and the state shall be generally equal, except for areas in which national

governments have willingly surrendered their monopoly to govern.

50

Such partial relaxation of sovereignty suggests for an inclination of society towards the

scenario of issue-related cooperation, rather than towards a full integration into a federal

world government. However, issue-related cooperation can possibly be expected to deepen in

specific areas in a way that would allow for the respective supranational authority to enforce

decisions upon states. According to the respondents, this authority does not necessarily have

to be the UN, though. On the contrary, while a further empowerment of the UN seems not to

be desired by the public, enforcement ability for selected issues in the framework of another

supranational entity is favoured. This entity, though, should be comprised of representatives

of the national governments.

The type of issue-related cooperation envisaged by the public seems to be similar to

the ’shared competences model’ used in the EU. While in the EU there are areas in which the

EU’s supranational body represented by the Commission has exclusive competences, though,

this seems not to be desired by the public yet, at least not in the framework of the UN.

Consequently, an intensification of the global integration process with the UN as its platform

is unlikely to be triggered by societal pressures in the next future.

4.2. Results

The analysis revealed that the scenario of a transformation of the current international system

composed of nation states into a federal world government could not be verified. The results

obtained from the data examined in the previous paragraphs are summarized in table 2.

Table 2. Federal World Government

Dimension Mechanisms Federal World

Government

Federalism

High politics External pressure Societal pressure Integration from above

no no no

Neo-functionalism

Low Politics Spill-over effect Socialization effect Integration from below

no yes no

Source: own table

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According to the logic suggested by the theoretical basis of this essay, the scenario of a

federal world government could turn into reality as a result of two sets of interdependent

effects, each set constituting the independent variable leading to the dependent outcome

which is the initiation of a global integration process either from below or from above. The

study revealed that the scenario of the federal world government is not expected to become

reality, because all sets of independent variables turned out to provide negative results vis-à-

vis the dependent variable, thus neither of the mechanisms can be expected to lead to the

anticipated outcome.

The variables leading to the federal world government to become the end result of

global integration taking place from above are external pressure and societal pressure. While

the ability of external pressures to initiate integration processes could be confirmed – the

foundation of the Security Council after World War II –, it is hard to predict whether there

will be another dramatic external event taking place in the next future. The only fact that can

be verified is that the global natural environment has worsened, that international terrorist

group activity provides a permanent threat to society and that the struggle over power

between the major powers in the system has resumed. The question of whether another

dramatic event will result in a deepening of integration or will rather provoke the opposite

effect is also essential. The terrorist attack of 9/11 can certainly be seen as a dramatic event,

which, nevertheless, did not lead to a sudden boost of the global integration forces. On the

contrary, the ’War on Terror’ that has resulted out of the external pressure led to the

securitization of almost all spheres of international migration. That caused a drastic

degradation of global integration, while revived national tendencies gained in power. Thus, it

remains unclear what the consequence of another dramatic external event will be and whether

such an event will take place at all. Due to its unpredictability, the variable ’external pressure’

cannot be expected to initiate a global integration process taking place from above.

The other variable that is sought to lead to the outcome of a federal world government

from above is societal pressure. This mechanism bases its relevance on the social

constructivist logic suggesting that the agents – in our case world society – can change the

structure – in our analysis the international political system composed of states – according to

their mind sets. The mind sets of agents with regard to self-identification, as well as their

attitude towards the power international organizations should possess vis-à-vis national

governments, were analysed by means of a survey. Here, special attention was paid to the UN.

The results demonstrated no tendencies towards a further empowerment of the UN, while

revealed a societal approval of inter-state cooperation on issues of low politics, the

52

environment in particular. This data provides evidence for the likelihood of the deepening of

the current form of issue-related cooperation in low political issues, which, in general,

prevails over the tested scenario of a full integration with a final abolition of the state-

dominated system.

The two interdependent effects of spill-over and socialization were expected to lead to

a gradual global integration taking place from below. A spill-over effect similar to that

established in the European Union could not be verified within the UN. While issue-related

cooperation in fields of low politics does take place between states in form of international

agreements, and the outcome of such undertakings is often a legally binding agreement, the

UN lacks any means of effective enforcement, which makes the formally binding law of a

non-binding character in practise. Overall, no functional spill-over from the state towards the

UN could be verified during the analysis, as all organs of the international organization –

except for the Security Council – turned out to be advisory bodies with no governing

functions. Whether or not the spill-over effect might set in in future, thus, could depend on the

other variable – the socialization effect.

This is because in accordance with the social constructivist predictions, the socializing

forces prevalent in international organizations change the mind sets of the bureaucrats who

work there. Those officials become increasingly detached from their national governments

and start initiating a transition of governmental functions from the national towards the

supranational level. This effect was proven to have considerably contributed to the integration

process in the European Union. The same effect was expected to be found among UN

officials, too. The data obtained by means of a survey did indeed reveal a socialization effect

within the UN, but one that influenced the bureaucrats through professional ethic, rather than

stimulated a change in their self-perception from a national towards a cosmopolitan identity.

It is unlikely that this verified type of socialization will initiate the onset of the spill-over

effect, as the survey data revealed a tendency of the UN officials to incline towards a

preservation of the current state of affairs in the UN and in the international system in general.

The UN is, therefore, expected to remain an advisory body, while cooperation on selected

issues can be anticipated to continue taking place among states on a voluntary basis. This

outcome confirms the results obtained by the analysis of the integration mechanisms

operating from above in the beginning of the sub-section.

Summing up, so far we have established that the foundation of a world government is

extremely unlikely to set in in the foreseeable future, while issue-related cooperation can be

anticipated to continue taking place in low political issues. Whether or not it can be expected

53

to intensify, spread to the domain of high politics and activate the mechanisms of integration

reforming the system in accordance with the mature anarchy model or whether the systemic

pressures will rather evoke forces of segregation transforming the system in accordance with

the balance of power model remains the concern of the next section of this analysis.

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5. From Issue-Related Cooperation towards Mature Anarchy? (model 2)

Based on the results of the preceding section, we can expect issue-related cooperation in

international relations to continue taking place in low political issues. The question that

remains to be answered is whether this cooperation can be expected to deepen and to embrace

issues of high politics as to develop in accordance with the mature anarchy scenario, or

whether coordination of selected, most of the time low political issues will remain the only

form of international collaboration in an otherwise power-based system determined by the

respective power balance between the participating actors. In order to be able to answer this

question, the independent variables determining the dependent outcome, which is the answer

to our question, need to be identified first.

As argued above, international cooperation in line with the mature anarchy model

requires an increased delegation of the state’s governing functions to specific international

organizations acting on behalf of respective international regimes. The core precondition here

is that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of deception. The calculations of the

costs of deception differ among states in accordance with their relative power, the operating

security doctrine, the nature of relations they have with other actors in the respective regime,

etc. – as argued by Jervis, “difference[s] in countries’ perspectives weaken most regimes

[…]” (Jervis, 1982, p. 368). Those factors can be divided into two groups. The first

determinator is related to relative power of the participants vis-à-vis the degree of

interdependence in the system, the second – to the operating normative basis. Consequently,

those two variables can be regarded as the determinants of the success or failure of regimes.

Thus, in case the interdependencies in the system coincide with a common normative

basis, the respective regime can be expected to function on the basis of cooperation. In case

the existing interdependencies necessitate the maintenance of a regime despite a lack of a

common norm, the regime can be expected to generate coordinated outcomes based on the

participants’ relative power. Logically, when there are no interdependencies at all, the regime

loses its relevance and is likely to dissipate (table 3). Thus, the variable of interdependencies

is responsible for regime formation, while the variable of a common norm – for the

prevalence of either coordination or cooperation as its functional type. Consequently, in order

for the system to develop in accordance with the mature anarchy model, despite global

interlinkages, it requires the existence of universal norms allowing global regimes to function

on the basis of cooperation rather than coordination (table 4).

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Table 3. Cooperation vs. Coordination

Regime formation

Interdependencies yes yes no no

Common norms yes no yes no

Functional type

of regime

cooperation coordination no regime no regime

Source: own table

As already indicated by the author in the beginning of the analysis, technology was found to

be the major force shaping the organizational type of society in its cyclical development.

Today, technology has interconnected the planet in a network of communication and

transportation making societies interdependent through mainly economic mechanisms

and ’shrinking’ the world through a phenomenon known as ’time-space compression’ – a

concept introduced by David Harvey in his “The Condition of Postmodernity” and referring to

a phenomenon describing the decreasing amount of time required to travel and/or

communicate from one point to another, by this ’shrinking’ the space and ’accelerating’ the

time. Technology has affected not only human societies, though. The progressing

environmental degradation alongside with the growing population and the shrinkage of

resources has become one of the main concerns of the 21st century.

The technological progress has created global interdependencies and pressures

embracing all domains of human activity – society, economy and the environment, and

affecting both their physical and the mental dimensions, by this, necessitating the formation of

global regimes, which demands a subsequent transformation of the system structure. This

process is also known as globalization – a complex and fluid concept, which yet turned out to

become tangible through the identification of the more or less static mechanisms by means of

which it functions: global physical and mental interdependencies. Both mechanisms act

interdependently and simultaneously. While the variable of global physical interdependencies

constitutes a vector directed towards a higher degree of interdependence in the system, the

mental interdependencies can have twofold repercussions: they can either exert a unifying

effect on the system through the creation of universal values, or lead to its segregation as a

result of generated systemic pressures.

While scientific opinions on whether globalization as a broadly defined concept is a

recent phenomenon or rather a historical process differ, one can claim with certainty that

when defined as the interplay between global physical and mental interdependencies,

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globalization is a phenomenon characterizing the late 20th and 21st century. If we, thus, accept

globalization as the intervening variable shaping the system through the two mechanisms

identified above, the answer to the question of whether globalization will lead to the

formation of a mature anarchy system or induce a segregation of the world into blocs in

accordance with the balance of power model can be given by studying the variable of mental

interdependencies vis-à-vis the existing physical interdependencies. This is what the rest of

this section shall be dedicated to.

5.1. Mature Anarchy vs. Balance of Power: globalization – an intervening

variable

As suggested by Ian Clark in his “Globalization and International Relations Theory”,

globalization might be a natural point of development in the history of mankind and provide

the missing component which would overcome the so-called ’Great Divide’ – a concept

describing the different natures of the system of the state and the system of international

relations. The differences are straight forward: the state constitutes a geopolitical entity

regulated by the rule of law, while the international system has an anarchical nature due to the

absence of an authority higher than the state.

The realist theoretical tradition regards states as a bulwark of the rule of law against

the anarchy in the system, which surrounds it. It is the nature of the international system –

which is given – which constitutes the major obstacle to collective action. For federalists, on

the other hand, it is the state that hinders a deeper integration into a form of world community,

the achievement of which is desired. So, the state should be abolished in order to achieve

peace. Those seem to be starkly opposed positions suggesting contrary solutions to the

problem of collective action, which – through the process of globalization – has become more

pressing than ever. If we, nonetheless, recall Waltz’s three images of war, we will realize that

those are mutually dependent and interrelated effects of one and the same phenomenon. This

is because the state as well as the international system are concepts constructed and

maintained by men, who, consequently, can be expected to represent the main component out

of the three.

Thus, in the constructivist tradition, it can be assumed that men can create and – which

is far more important for our analysis – reshape their reality according to their needs and

preferences. Yet, the sheer acknowledgement of the common problems of mankind, which

generally already took place in the global public, is not enough for a change to occur. There

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needs to be a mechanism through which those imagined changes could be initiated. To put it

in another way, the state and the international system require a linkage in order to overcome

the security dilemma, which hinders a more peaceful and efficient evolution of mankind. As

already indicated above, Ian Clark suggests that this linkage might be provided by

globalization, which “[…] is a quality, condition or form that [human material or mental

behaviour] or activity might take” (Clark, 1999, p. 6). According to Clark, acting though the

men-dimension, globalization can establish a bridge between the state and the international

system by establishing a set of universal values, or, more precisely, by eliminating the

inherent dichotomy between ’thick’ and ’thin’ moral codes (see sub-section 5.1.1). It can,

however, do the opposite and initiate a segregation of the international system into its parts as

a result of pressures created by globalization.

As already elaborated upon in the beginning of the section, globalization acts through

both physical and mental channels. While the physical channel affects the activities linked to

globalization, which can be grouped into three main domains of human activity: society,

economy and environment, the mental channel influences an individual’s worldview and self-

perception. Both dimensions operate simultaneously and are interdependent. Therefore, it is

not possible to look at one without taking the other into account. In order to make the concept

more tangible, though, we will still separate the two while staying well aware of the other

dimension and referring our observations back to it.

So, the global interlinkages created by globalization lead to regime formation. The

functioning type of the resulting regimes (cooperation or coordination) primarily depends on

the existence or absence of common norms between its participants (see table 3). In this

respect, the potential creation of a set of universal values indeed becomes the key criterion of

the success or failure of the mature anarchy model, as such a set should be capable of turning

all the existing global regimes towards cooperation, by doing so, overcoming the ’Great

Divide’ as in line with Clark’s line of argument. However, in case globalization does not

induce a universalization of the system, but its fragmentation, the created conditions will

favour the establishment of a balance of power model, in which global regimes are run by the

principle of coordination.

Thus, globalization turned out to constitute the intervening variable we were looking

for, which acts through the Waltzian men-dimension and transforms the system by means of

the interrelated mechanisms of physical and mental interdependencies by either unifying it

through the creation of a link between the state and the IR system which has been absent so

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far, or by further separating it as a result of created pressures (table 4). The answer to this

question shall be the concern of the remaining part of section 5.

Table 4. Mature Anarchy vs. Balance of Power

Type of system Mature anarchy Balance of Power

Globalization Global interlinkages cooperation coordination

Universal values yes no

Source: own table

5.1.1. Universal values

The assumption that globalization could create a set of universal values which might unite the

world in a global moral community is very controversial. This issue lies at the core of the

normative debate between communitarians and cosmopolitans. While the former regard

community as a given and oppose the possibility of a ’creation’ of a global community, the

latter are much more enthusiastic about the community’s evolutionary capabilities (Clark,

1999). In this discussion, Walzer’s contribution might provide a useful insight. He suggests

for a division into ’thick’ and ’thin’ moral codes. Hereby, thick moral codes refer to those

present within a specific community, while the thin ones – to a universal moral code, which

might entail a minimum set of values common to all people. He further suggests that the thick

moral code is in no way a next stage evolved from the thin one, but that those two coexist

(Walzer, 1994).

His argument is based on the simple fact that our world is divided into communities

created throughout the course of history. Those communities’ socio-cultural heritage is

reflected in their respective thick moral codes. At the same time, people of the Earth are held

together by thin moral codes – basic notions that make us human. The thin moral codes found

in virtually all communities on the planet reflect those basic dos and don’ts required for the

survival of us as a species, such that murder, theft or betrayal are generally seen as bad, while

working, the raising and protection of children etc. – as good. Those basic virtues might still

differ from community to community in the subtleties attached to these concepts, which are

determined by a respective community’s thick moral code defined throughout its historical

development. So, while in some cultures any type of murder is not tolerated as a rule, in

others, the murder of a traitor or a murderer, for example, is an act of justice. Furthermore,

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even if a thin universal moral code theoretically exists, in order to be practically applied on a

global scale there needs to be perfect information in the system, which can hardly be given at

all, especially not in the case of a multiple actor system due to the bias incorporated in any

type of reporting, either intentionally or not. Indeed, as was argued by Bull: “All governments

have opportunities to control and distort mutual awareness and contact, and even where the

conditions for awareness of other societies are most favourable, what one society knows about

another is always selective and partial” (Bull, 2012, p. 270).

This point is related to the conflict of interest embedded in the international system.

According to Johan Galtung, the conflict of interest is “a situation where parties are pursuing

incompatible goals” (Galtung, 1971, p. 81). In case such a conflict may arise, and as was put

by Waltz: “Whether in the family, the community, or the world at large, contact without at

least occasional conflict is inconceivable […] (Waltz, 1979, p. 102). Thus, as soon as a

conflict of interest arises between any actors in the system, information becomes a weapon,

by means of the distortion of which the populations of the conflicting parties, as well as their

protectorates, associate states etc., are being manipulated and turned against each other.

Deriving from that fact, rationality, if given at all, may only apply to those actors in the

system, which have access to undistorted information allowing them to meet rational

decisions based upon real facts. Apart from that, as argued by Galtung, the dogma for the

rationality of actors in IR is faulty due to two reasons. First, “actors do not necessarily know,

or they are unable to express, what their interest is. [The second] reason is that rationality is

unevenly distributed, that some may dominate the minds of others, and that this may lead

to ’false consciousness’ (Galtung, 1971, p. 82).

Thus, regardless of a presumed common set of ’thin’ humanizing values, it is

inappropriate to claim for a currently existent ’thick’ global moral code, or to envisage the

creation and effective application of such any time soon. Apart from that, any attempt to

artificially create a set of universal values, or to impose the set of values characterising one

civilization upon another is dangerous – and counterproductive – in its potential to generate

conflict. This is because such an attempt would imply that the set of values of one group is

superior to those existing in other ethno-cultural communities and needs to be imposed on

them in the name of the common good. This will inescapably result in inter-civilization

conflict, and in case one civilization would succeed in imposing its value system upon another

civilization, this will inescapably lead to the destruction of the latter, because each civilization

represents a closed moral community existing in its specific scale of coordinates (Danilevski,

1869). In this respect and in reference to the fact that universalism is the idea of the so-

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called ’Western’ world, Huntington rightfully commented that, “imperialism is the necessary

consequence of universalism [and] as a maturing civilization the West no longer has the

economic or demographic dynamism to impose its will on other societies and any effort to do

so is also contrary to the Western values of self-determination and democracy” (Huntington,

1996, p. 310).

In the context of the national interest consideration around which conventional

geopolitical analyses are centred such a statement is correct. Indeed, when applied in the

discourse of a national development strategy, universalisms is inescapably linked to

imperialism, as it requires measures which would enable to impose the set of values of one

group upon another with the aim to enhance one’s state’s relative power. However, in case a

universalization of values around the globe would develop naturally as a consequence of

systemic transformations as in line with the reasoning of some liberal and, at times, federalist

theorists of IR, the concept would get another connotation. So, as already argued above, Clark

sees globalization as force capable of universalizing the system by overcoming the ’Great

Divide’ between the state and the IR systems through the elimination of the inherent

dichotomy between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism: “Normatively speaking,

globalization raises important questions about the creation, sustenance, and spread of values

and is resistant to simple categorizations of the universal and the particular. […]Moreover,

if ’particular’ identities are now developed with reference to the ’universal’, then the

relationship between these two ceases to be one of opposition and become instead one of

mutual adaptation” (Clark, 1999, pp. 31,32). Overall, while in some theoretical circles the

idea of a universalization of the value system on the planet is still in discussion (even so

considerably rarer in recent times), most practice-oriented analyses seem to be in general

consensus on the multicivilizational nature of the current system structure.

The idea that the values of the Western liberal democracy have ’won’ the ideological

battle on the planet and became universalized, probably most prominently advocated by

Francis Fukuyama in his “The End of History and the Last Man”, was proven wrong by

reality. The discrediting of Fukuyama’s study was the result of his failure to undertake a

thorough analysis of the subject, but to base all his assertions on two indicators: the growth of

Western consumerism and the restructuring of the economies of previously non-capitalist

governments in accordance with liberal principles. What he failed to realize, though, was that

those two criteria were indicators of one and the same, namely, the downfall of the Soviet

Union with the resulting temporary political and economic dominance of the system by the

United States.

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Hereby, he further disregarded this restructuring’s obviously forced nature resulting out of the

shift in power relations in favour of the United States, whereby he overestimated the role of

ideology vis-à-vis the historically determined differences between the existing socio-cultural

communities and their ever on-going struggle to preserve their respective unique cultures. As

a result, Fukuyama ignored the obvious fact that the shift in the system did not occur naturally

and was not a consequence of systemic pressures, thus, could have been expected to be – and,

indeed, turned out to be – of a temporary nature. Thus, Fukuyama misinterpreted the

determining variable of normative interdependencies by overestimating the role of ideology,

while underestimating the existing socio-cultural tradition in identity formation, which led to

the faulty conclusions in his analysis.

This important factor was, however, fully acknowledged by Samuel Huntington in his

“The Clash of Civilization” – a geopolitical study with contrary results. In his analysis,

Huntington argued that after the Cold War, the world has become “both multipolar and

multicivilizational” and is now divided among today’s dominant civilizations: the Western,

the Orthodox (Russian), the Sinic, the Hindu, the Latin American, the Islamic, the Buddhist,

the African and the Japanese, along which the new fault lines can be drawn. In his definition,

“a civilization is the broadest cultural entity” (Huntington, 1997, p.43), which is “a particular

concatenation of worldview, customs, structures, and culture (both material culture and high

culture) which forms some kind of historical whole and which coexists (if not always

simultaneously) with other varieties of this phenomenon” (I. Wallerstein, 1991, p.215).

While the civilizations Huntington segregated certainly provide a good starting point

for our analysis to follow, there are certain shortcomings in his work, though, that need to be

corrected in order to be able to apply his findings to our purpose. Apart from his failure to

establish precise criteria upon which he draws the divisional lines between the different

civilizations, he also confuses the role of religion with that of politico-cultural influence and

historical heritage. His confusion probably stems from the fact that before the institute of

legislation together with the state and its ability to enforce it upon its subjects, religion took

on the role of the statute – it provided a set of rules, which clearly represented a primitive, but

for that period of time most efficient lever of pressure on the people. The institute of a

monotheistic religion was an effective governing instrument, as it created a self-control

mechanism through the intimidation by means of an all-mighty and all-seeing God, which

would merciless sentence any rule-violator through eternal torture in the afterlife, while

granting the ruling class the right to govern as it was God-given. Thus, while religion might

indicate the origins of specific value-systems of the different civilizations, it is by no means to

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be equated with culture or ethnicity or to be regarded as a reliable mechanism upon which to

identify the boundaries of modern civilizations.

As a result of a lack of clear criteria, the boundaries of the civilizations delineated by

Huntington not always coincide with reality and are at times rather inaccurate (figure 7). So,

he identifies a ’Western’ civilization, which includes the Anglo-American states outside

Europe all being former parts of the British Empire – (the United States, Canada, Australia,

New Zeeland, Papua New Guinea), as well as the current territory of the European Union and

of its economic area, while equating this geo-political formation with the notion of

the ’European people’, which is – even if applying the definition used by Huntington himself

– not correct. So, in his work, the ’European people’ are defined as people who “shared a

common culture and maintained extensive contacts via an active network of trade, constant

movement of persons, and tremendous interlocking of ruling families” (Huntington, 1996, p.

52), whereby ’cultural homogeneity’ is sought to include: “language, law, religion,

administrative practice, agriculture, landholding, and perhaps kinship as well” (Tilly, 1975, p.

18).

Following this definition, the ’Western’ civilization should either include Russia, or –

if Russia is excluded – differentiate between ’old’ Europe and the United States, Canada and

the Anglo-American islands. This is because when speaking of Europe in line with the above

definition, Russia needs to be included into the notion of the ’European people’, while the

United States together with Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and Papua New Guinea –

excluded due to a clear lack of the major defining features. When applying the conventional

criteria of the European civilization, such as Christianity, Enlightenment, the Renaissance,

Roman law, Reformation, as well as a phase of colonization, the result is the same.

Thus, as argued by Huntington, one of the key defining features of a civilization is that

“most commercial, cultural and military interactions” occur within one and the same

civilization (Huntington, 1996, p. 50). When studying the history of Europe starting at about

700 A.D., it becomes obvious that Russia was an essential part of all the major interactions

within Europe be it of a cultural, commercial, or a military character, and went through the

same stages of administrative development: from tribal society over feudalism to the nation

state – in contrast to the United States, which emerged as a state only in 1776 when it declared

independence from Great Britain to become an artificially created state-nation consisting of

immigrants originating from the European civilization. By this, while the first settlers of the

United States were certainly part of the old European nations each of which was involved in

the commercial, cultural and military interactions with one another, the United States as a

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state did not up to recent history. It appeared on the European geo-political arena only at

about the period of the First World War, in which it nonchalantly and – as always – distantly

participated as a part of the Entente coalition.

During the interactions between the different European nations as of about 700 A.D.,

five Great European Powers developed into empires through expansion by either the

establishment of political control over external territories – a process known as colonization,

or by direct expansion of its territory – as, despite some overseas colonies, the most prominent

of which was, probably, Alaska, in the case of Russia. These Great Powers – Russia, Prussia,

Austria-Hungary, France and Great Britain formed what became to be known as the Balance

of Power system, which established a hegemonic order to rule over the world divided between

the Great Powers of a roughly equal relative power. Other than the Western and Central

European Empires, which established overseas colonies, for most of its part, Russia’s

expansion resulted in the direct accession of the conquered territories of the East inhabited by

nomad tribes. This difference was evoked by the geographic factor – unlike Western

European Empires, the Russian Empire’s expansion took place mainly on land which allowed

the establishment of one continuous border.

The interlocking of the ruling families is a further indication of the Russian affiliation

to medieval Europe. To make an example, Nicholas II of Russia was the cousin of King

George V of the United Kingdom, to him he was physically very similar, as well as the

Prussian Kaiser Wilhelm II. Another criterion, religion, is also provided, as the Orthodox

religion is one of the branches of Christianity. What does distinguish the Russian Orthodox

Church from the Catholic and the Protestant Churches is its autocephaly – its autonomy from

the Roman Church –, which was established in 1448 under the rule of the Grand Duke Vasily

II of Moscow. Anyways, the existence of different branches within one religious flow is no

criterion upon which to separate a distinct civilization. The Sunni and the Shia branches of

Islam did not motivate Huntington to identify a distinct Persian civilization, for example.

Further criteria of the European civilization are the Renaissance, the Reformation, the

Enlightenment, as well as the practice of the Roman law. The Renaissance, which began in

Italy in the 14th and touched its peak in the 16th century, reached Russia in the 17th century,

while the epoch of Enlightenment has been a roughly 18th century phenomenon in both

Western Europe and Russia. The Roman law, which has served as the model for the modern

law of the European countries, the system also known as continental law, was taken over from

the Roman Empire by Western and Central Europe, while the legal system of Russia was

adapted from the Byzantine Empire, the legal code of which, in turn, reflected major tenets of

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the Roman Law (Tkachenko, S., 2006 & Pokrovsky, I, 2004). The Reformation went its own

path in Russia, which was distinct from that of Western Europe due to the autocephaly of the

Russian Orthodox Church.

Summing up, we can conclude that it is not correct to equate the European people with

a ’Western’ civilization which includes the US, but excludes Russia, as the term would

diminish the role of the Great European Powers, while virtually include the United States,

together with the other Anglo-American states outside of Europe into the history of the ’old’

Europe in which it did not participate. What the term ’Western’ rather refers to is the current

zone of direct influence of the United States, which evolved as the result of the Cold War and,

unlike the Soviet zone of influence, remained intact after the end of the war. Thus, this term

describes a recent set-up of the system, which has nothing in common with the system as it

was before the Russian Revolution in 1917. Therefore, I argue that when talking about

civilizations, the European civilization should be distinguished from both the Russian and the

American civilizations due to their all unique paths of development.

As already indicated, the other major inaccuracy in Huntington’s analysis is his

confusion of the concept of religion with that of political, historical or cultural influence, as

well as the substitution of the civilization defined as the broadest cultural entity with that of a

geo-political bloc, in which the criterion of cultural homogeneity only applies to the core state

of the bloc, while its territory – thus, the associated member states – is determined by the

outreach of the sphere of influence of the respective core state. To substantiate my claim, I

will provide examples. So, Huntington labels Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as a part of what he

refers to as the ’Orthodox’ civilization. If we assume a civilizational bloc to be the broadest

cultural entity defined primarily in terms of a common religion – in line with the definition

presented in Huntington’s analysis – then Huntington is wrong in his allocation, because the

majority of both Kazakhstan’s and Azerbaijan’s population are neither Orthodox – they are

Muslims – nor do they represent the Slavic ethnos or have any wider cultural similarities with

Russia. In case Huntington was simply very imprecise in his definition of a civilization, so

that what he actually meant appeared to be a geo-political bloc defined in terms of political

influence, he should have included the other former Central Asian Soviet Republics with

similar properties into the bloc as well.

The same argument is true for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a country with a

majority of Muslim population represented by non-Slavic ethnic groups and sharing no

common culture with Russia. Thus, it cannot belong to the Orthodox empire by definition. If

we, nevertheless, apply the concept of the spheres of influence, we will recognize

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Huntington’s logic, as Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted a part of Yugoslavia, which

belonged to the Socialist bloc, thus, to the Russian sphere of influence. This reasoning would,

nonetheless, contradict Huntington’s allocation of Greece into the Orthodox empire. Although

sharing the roots of its religion, Greece was never a part of the Russian zone of influence; thus,

an association with the Russian civilization is misleading. If, nonetheless, it is religion which

makes Huntington group countries into one civilization, he should have restrained from

allocating Muslim countries into the Orthodox civilization. It is either or. Thus, the criteria

used by Huntington as motives for his grouping of civilizations remain unclear. In his work,

he was right to allocate Rumania and Bulgaria into the Russian civilization, as both possible

criteria used by Huntington would be accurate given the time span of his analysis – 1997.

Nowadays, though, Rumania and Bulgaria, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and

Greece all belong to the sphere of influence of the European Union.

What Huntington was precise about in his observation was that the major modern

conflicts occur between civilizations and along the civilizational fault lines. So, border

regions where civilizations meet become battle fields in the direct and the figurative sense.

The region just discussed, former Yugoslavia and Albania, for example, is located at the

junction of three civilizations: the European, the Russian and the Islamic. As a logical

consequence, the conflict between the different ethno-cultural communities inhabiting the

territory of the former Yugoslavia is nothing other than a result of the historical struggle

between the major civilizations taking turns at conquering parts of this territory. This resulted

in the mix of cultures, religions and loyalties among the different groups of people inhabiting

this region. This is also true for the Ukraine, for example, the western part of which belonged

to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the XVI—XVII centuries, until it was

returned under Russian control as a result of the Russian-Polish war. This is also the reason

why the western part of the Ukraine is Uniate and the eastern part – Russian Orthodox.

By this, Huntington identified the cause at the core of the conflict, but he did not

elaborate on the sources for the conflict. The latter, however, are crucial in a study conducted

not only for the sake of theory, but allowing for a practical application, because the conflict’s

sources can – unlike the causes – be eliminated, or at least minimized. This is of core

importance due to the fact that inter-civilizational conflicts considerably diminish the overall

level of security in the system and should, therefore, be of primary concern to any student of

international relations. As already said, the causes for inter-civilizational conflict can hardly

be eradicated, as they lie at the heart of the ethno-cultural self-identification of groups of

people, which were determined by the course of history. The relevant question to ask is under

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what circumstances those differences result in violent conflicts. There are two mechanisms, I

would argue, that activate those processes: the dissolution of a central authority, be it a result

of a failed state or the process of decolonization, and the artificial relocation of national

boundaries and resettlement of people.

When taking the example of Yugoslavia, it becomes obvious that nationalism is a

direct consequence of the dissolution of a central authority, in this case of a state. This is

because the resulted colourful bouquet of threats to the individual security needs to be

compensated and, as we know from unfortunate examples of the past, nationalism rises as a

consequence. The other source of conflict is the resettlement of one group of people into a

region inhabited by representative of another civilization. An illustrative example of this case

is the Near East conflict. This obviously major conflict in contemporary history was discussed,

but not illustrated on the map presented by Huntington, where he indicated Israel as a Muslim

country with a footnote proclaiming that this is due to the fact that Israel does not constitute

one of the major civilizations. While this assumption might be reasonable, it does not explain

why this reasoning did not lead Huntington to declare it part of the Western civilization, as he

did with Hong Kong, or the Philippines, for example. While those Asian communities can

rather be appointed to the Sinic civilization, I would argue, Israel is largely inhabited by

representatives of three major Northern civilizations: the Russian, the European, and the

American, which would definitely justify its labelling as ’Western’ when in line with

Huntington’s interpretation of this term.

Before we move on to indicate the other major inter-civilizational centers of conflict, it

shall be noted that, while probably correct from the religion-based approach to civilizations

adapted by Huntington, it is not productive for our purpose to include the Central African

states, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia into the Islamic civilization, because neither of them

either belonged to the Arab Caliphate, currently belongs to the Arab League, or is composed

of representatives of the Arab ethnos. By this, those states’ inclusion would be not only non-

representative, but confuse the entire categorization established so far. At the same time,

Bangladesh needs to be included into the Islamic civilization not only due to the prevalence of

the Islamic religion among the population (around 88 %), but primarily due to its undeniable

connection with the Islamic civilization through Pakistan, a part of which Bangladesh has

constituted until 1971.

Today, the Islamic civilization, originating from the Arabian Peninsula and dating

back to the beginning of the 7th century, is not coherent due to the lack of a core state, but

divided between five centers of influence, whose zones of interest often do not coincide:

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Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This is mostly due to the overall relatively

low legitimacy of the nation state in the Islamic world. This problem has to do with the fact

that “they [states] are for the most part the arbitrary […] products of European imperialism,

and their boundaries often do not even coincide with those of ethnic groups such as Berbers

and Kurds” (Huntington, 1996, p. 175). Furthermore, the inclination of the Islam to merge the

state and religion legitimates religious organizations to exert politico-administrative functions

creating an all-Islamic network, which potentially neglects the existing state borders.

Turkey’s geo-political interests stretch into the Russian civilization, which

incorporates considerable Muslim communities. Accordingly, the line of intersection between

the Islamic and the Russian civilizations contains areas of episodically sparking or permanent

conflicts, such as in Chechnya or in Nagorno-Karabakh. Egypt, which is situated bilaterally

along the Suez Canal, is seen as the leader country on the southern and eastern coast of the

Mediterranean basin, along with Syria and Lebanon. In this region, the major source of

conflict is between the Islamic civilization and Israel (which is part of the large-scale defined

West), as well as the European and the American civilizations over the control of the Suez

Canal. Saudi Arabia constitutes the third leader state within the Islamic civilization. This is

due to the fact that the Islamic sacred sites are situated within the territory of this country, as

well as due to its economic and political weight gained through the support from the US,

which is influential in this state.

Iran exerts its influence in the Islamic civilization mainly through its revisionist

attitude towards the current division of power in the system and pleas for the ’liberation’ of

the Islamic region from foreign influences. This posture has mainly to do with the fact that in

the bipolar world established after the Second World War, Iran was a country torn between

three competing ideologies exerted through the other core Islamic states: the socialist-oriented

Egypt and Iraq; Saudi Arabia loyal to the ’West’; and traditionalist Muslims basing their

ideology either upon ethnicity or the Muslim religious identity. Iran’s gained independency

from both the Western and the Socialist influences has resulted in the prevalence of the third

source and brought about the development of islamo-centrism propagated in that region.

Another important source of conflict at the intersection of the Islamic civilization with

another one is that between Pakistan and India, which constitutes the center of the Hindu

civilization. The Pakistani-Indian conflict arose around the membership of the Kashmir region

and dates back to 1947 when both countries gained independence from Great Britain, where

they formed one colony together with Bangladesh and Myanmar (former Burma). Similarly to

the process at work in the former Yugoslavia, the dissolution of centralized state structures

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has led to a revival of nationalist sentiments of the different ethno-cultural groups within the

heterogeneous population. So, the process of decolonization of the former British India –

which is not comparable to the breakup of Yugoslavia, which has been a sovereign state, not a

colony, yet it includes the same feature of a dissolution of a centralized authority –, resulted in

a territorial conflict among two major groups divided by religion: the Muslim Pakistan and

the Hindu India.

The modern Hindu civilization is the descendant of several successive ancient Indic

civilizations that have evolved on the Indian subcontinent since the Bronze Age (ca. 3000

B.C.). Hinduism has been central to the culture of the Indian civilization since the second

millennium B.C. India has been the homeland of two world religions – Buddhism and

Hinduism. Buddhism did not become the major religion in India, but was exported to

Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, as well as Mongolia (Huntington, 1997). While

Buddhism did not take root as the major religion in the land of its birth, Hinduism proved

continuity and survived several periods of European and Arab domination. Being the central

feature of the Indian culture, Hinduism became the eponym for the modern Indian civilization.

Apart from the conflict with Pakistan, India seems not to engage into a struggle for influence

over the neighbouring Buddhist countries with its other bordering Sinic civilization.

Some of the Buddhist states indicated in the preceding paragraph as well as the

Muslim Indonesia and the Christian Philippines did unite into a Customs Union known as

ASEAN, still, they cannot be regarded as a separate civilization as done by Huntington due to

a lack of any other criteria. Being currently divided between the spheres of influence still

generally inherent from the Cold War, those states are undergoing a process of re-alignment

dominated by ethno-cultural-affiliation-before-ideological-alignment-logic typical for the

recent period of the re-making of the unipolar world into a multipolar one. So, the Philippines,

currently under US influence, are likely to shift preferences towards China – the core state of

the Sinic civilization. This process can also be expected to affect the other Asian states

delineated by Huntington as Buddhist, as well as Indonesia and Malaysia – indicated as parts

of the Islamic civilization by Huntington –, plus Japan, which can for now be regarded as a

separate civilization.

The Chinese, or Sinic civilization as referred to by Huntington, like the Hindu,

appertains to the oldest civilizations on Earth dating back at least to 1500 B.C and can be

regarded as a hegemon in the Asian region. Given the continuous increase in Chinese relative

power, its sphere of influence can be expected to grow even further. As a result, conflict

between China and the United States – and probably, but to a much lesser extent, the Islamic

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world – over the South Asian Sea in general and particular states, such as Japan, Indonesia

and the Philippines, can be prognosticated for the near future to occur along the civilizational

lines.

Apart from the ASEAN states, Mongolia also became a source of a non-violent inter-

civilizational conflict, this time between China and Russia. In its struggle for independence

from China, Mongolia aligned with the former Russian Empire and remained a Russian

protectorate after the Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union. After the

Soviet Union’s breakup, Mongolia now maintains close ties with both Russia and China,

which provides a reason for potential conflict between the two hegemons. Another, although

far more tense, source of conflict at the intersectional line of the Sinic and another civilization

is its struggle with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.

The Japanese civilization, which has been an offspring of the Chinese civilization in

the period between 100 and 400 A.D. (Huntington, 1996), was delineated as a separate

civilization due to a number of features distinguishing it from the other Far Eastern countries.

The most obvious one is its strong economy with a world’s third biggest GDP after the United

States and China (World Bank, 2014, data from 2013). As contrary to the other civilizational

blocs, Japan’s civilization consists of only one state and considering its comparatively small

territory, the prosperity of this civilization-state provides for its position as a separate

civilization. Apart from the territorial conflict with China over the Senkaku Islands, Japan

also has disputes with Russia over the Southern Kuril Islands.

Another civilization identified by Huntington is the Latin American. The Latin

American civilization is an offspring of the European civilization with which it shares some

criteria, such as a common ancestry and religion. Its separateness on the South American

continent, though, has determined its unique path of development. Another reason of its

distinctiveness is the inclusion of indigenous Indian cultures, which were practically wiped

out in North America, into the Latin American civilization. Furthermore, the division of the

public opinion within Latin America on the question of their affiliation to the Western

civilization (which is not the correct term as already explained above) provides another

indication of its distinctiveness. According to Huntington, Latin America might thus be either

regarded as a sub-civilization within the Western civilization, or a separate civilization, yet

closely affiliated with the West (Huntington, 1997). .

No serious current inter-civilizational conflicts were identified for Latin America.

While Brazil generally endeavours for more influence on the international arena, there are no

territorial disputes or struggles over spheres of influence between the Latin American and

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another civilization. The political tensions between Cuba and the United States are a remnant

of the Cold War, rather than an indication of an inter-civilizational conflict. The virtual

absence of a serious fault line conflict for the Latin American civilization has to do with its

isolation on a separate continent where it shares its border only with its northern neighbour –

the American civilization, which is far too powerful relative to Latin America, so that no

serious conflicts can evolve there yet.

The final civilization identified by Huntington is the African. While he recognizes that

there can hardly be a question of an African civilization at this moment of time with the North

of the African continent belonging to the Islamic civilization, and the rest being torn between

different religions (the Muslim Sudan and Somalia, the Orthodox Eritrea, Ethiopia

constituting a historical civilization on its own) and tribal identities, which often prevail over

national self-perception – a concept foreign to the indigenous population and imposed on

Africa by its former European colonizers. Despite the foreign elements of Western culture

artificially injected into African communities, Huntington argues that “Africans are […]

increasingly developing a sense of African identity, and conceivably sub-Saharan Africa

could cohere into a distinct civilization with South Africa possibly being its core state”

(Huntington, 1996, p. 47). Even in case such a trend might be under way, the African

civilization will neither develop a common culture soon, nor can it become economically

independent, or acquire sufficient military capabilities to compensate for its economic

weakness in the foreseeable future to be counted as a civilizational bloc in the analysis to

come.

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Figure 7. The world of civilizations

Source: own figure, adapted from Huntington, 1996, pp.26-27

The logical consequence of the division of the world into civilizations is the effective

exclusion of the possibility of a further integration of the different socio-cultural communities

into bigger entities on the grounds that a civilization already constitutes the broadest cultural

entity. According to Huntington, the circulating faulty assumption that a universal civilization

might be emerging rests upon three major arguments: The first is rooted in the Cold War

perspective on world politics assuming that the only alternative to communism is liberal

democracy and that the demise of the former implies the triumph of the latter. The failure of

this type of arguments is obvious. There exist many types of regimes, ideologies etc., which

are alive and in practical use throughout the world. The second argument concerns the forces

of globalization. While certainly true with regard to the increased interconnectedness of the

international system brought about by the processes of globalization (to be studied in the sub-

section to follow), its mental component evidently does not create universal values, but

revives the sense of ethno-cultural affiliation. This assertion is supported by the increase in

intra-regional ties as well as the evidence of inter-civilizational conflicts occurring at the

points of intersection between the civilizational units.

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The third argument in favour of the creation of a global civilization is the most valid one out

of the three and concerns modernization. The processes of modernization have begun in the

18th century and involve “industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy,

education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational

structures” ( Huntington, 1996, p. 68). The resulting type of modern society possesses similar

characteristics throughout the different nations making them more similar than they have been

under conditions of a traditional society. This is because a traditional society is based on

agriculture and is highly dependent on natural environmental factors, such as the quality of

soil, which may give rise to different types of societal organization determined by geography.

Modern society, on the other hand, is based on industry and is, hence, much less dependent on

the natural environment, which results in the establishment of a type of societal organization

which resembles each other from state to state. Still, while certainly true, civilizational self-

identification seems to prevail over potential similarities in the organizational patterns of a

modern type of society. Furthermore, while – generally speaking – the North is composed of

modern civilizations, the South is not. So, this potentially unifying force can be applied only

to roughly a half of the world.

By this, we have so far established that the set of thin universal moral codes elaborated

upon in the beginning of the sub-section cannot be expected to evolve into a set of thick

universal values – an assumption in line with Walzer’s theory. As could further be concluded,

inter-civilizational conflicts, once sparked, can be mitigated by means of a central authority –

a case in which institutions would act as a substitute for the common idea as in line with

Buzan’s elaborations (see sub-section 2.2). So, the analysis conducted throughout this section

has proven that acting on the dimension of mental interdependencies, globalization has re-

created the relevance of the ethno-cultural affiliation and revived the historically established

inter-civilizational bonds gradually shifting from the level of the state towards a higher

hierarchical level of a civilizational bloc. Thus, contrary to the liberal claim of the creation

of ’universal values’ as a result of globalization, which would embody the values of the

Western liberal democracy, globalization transforms the system in accordance with the

existing civilizations making it both multipolar and multicivilizational. Furthermore, the

analysis has revealed that the mechanisms of hard power – in this case related to the means of

state-owned violence – are the only ones capable of stabilizing the system, which will

otherwise be dominated by inter-civilizational conflicts.

This assertion can be further supported by the investigation of strategic alliances.

Those are interesting testing objects, as they often incorporate representatives of different

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nations, or even civilizations, who yet successfully ally in the face of a common threat. The

most recent and prominent case has been the Anti-Hitler coalition containing representatives

of several civilizations successfully united against the Fascist coalition. Thereout follows the

assumption that, possibly, a serious common threat might be enough to overcome the

civilizational fault lines and induce integration between the different ethno-cultural

communities. History, however, has told otherwise and has proven the accuracy of the

theoretical findings elaborated upon above – after the victory over fascism, the former

coalition partners became adversaries in the succeeding Cold War, each building another

coalition against its former partner – the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO (North Atlantic

Treaty Alliance). Both alliances again incorporated representatives of different civilizations.

Despite the heavy propaganda to which the socio-cultural communities on both sides

were extensively exposed, neither coalition developed into any form of a unified community.

Each civilizational group remained to the greatest part within its cultural niche, although it

can certainly be claimed that the ideology of the dominating nation – Russia in the case of the

former Warsaw Treaty and the US in the case of NATO – did affect its subordinated nations.

This effect can be seen as temporary, though, which became apparent on the inflamed

national movements within the non-Russian parts of the Warsaw Pact after the breakup of the

Soviet Union, or on Turkey’s reluctance to act against other Islamic actors in the course of the

history of NATO as well as other expressions of civilizational kinship dividing the NATO

bloc. This observation would suggest that within alliances, “citizens may be bound as

members of a community of fate who do not share common sentiments, but who recognise in

the face of adversity that it is best to hang together. An important strand of political thought

suggests that individuals in this sorry condition form as association rather than a community”

(Linklater, 1998, p. 1, based on Toennies, 1955).

Thus, the formation of a mature anarchy system induced through the establishment of

universal values can be excluded with reasonable certainty. What remains to be checked is

whether a restructuring of the current set-up of the system in accordance with the mature

anarchy model can be initiated through the other variable of global interlinkages. In order for

this to happen, cooperation needs to prevail over coordination as the functional type of global

regimes (see table 4).

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5.1.2. Global interlinkages

As established in the beginning of the section, the physical dimension through which

globalization operates incorporates society, economy and the environment as the three major

domains of the modern man-nature system. I will refer to these channels as ’interlinkages’, as

to make a clear separation between the physical and the mental interdependencies through

which globalization acts, because the term ’interdependency’ implies a correlation between

the two variables, while for analytical purposes we need to work with clearly distinguishable

channels. Globalization affects society in a number of ways, which can be both positive and

negative. Having in mind the focus of this paper – the security dilemma, we shall therefore

establish how security was affected by the forces of globalization on all domains of human

activity proceeding in the following order: society, economy, and environment. For this

purpose, the sources and causes of the main security threats for each of the three domains, as

well as the security regimes that result from those threats, will be identified in the course of

sub-sections 5.1.2.a, b and c.

Then, in sub-section 5.2, the major security regimes generated by each of the

respective security niches of the domains society, economy and environment will be evaluated

in relation to their type of regime, functioning type – either coordination or cooperation, and

the effect they exert on the system. The identification of the type of regime is important to

understand whether the regime is established globally and by which mechanisms it exerts its

influence. The detection of a regime’s functioning type is decisive for identifying the

direction in which the system is developing – towards mature anarchy or a balance of power

system. The comprehension of whether a regime has a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on

the system is important as to assess the conflict potential of both the regime’s domain and the

regime itself, as well as to prognosticate this regime’s potential longevity in the new system

after its transformation has been completed.

5.1.2.a. Society

The main threat to security on all of the three levels (individual, national, international)

generated by society has always been and is likely to remain for the time being – war. This

permanent companion of human history has been affected by the forces of globalization as

strongly, as have been all the other aspects of our modern life. Following the definition given

by Claus von Clausewitz, war is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil

our will” (Von Clausewitz, 1832, p. 5). According to Clausewitz, while the form of war might

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change over time, the nature of war could not. Although he formulated his claims at the time

of the Napoleonic wars, they are still precise in their ability to describe the properties of war.

It is the aim of war which is meant by its ’nature’. The aim of war – its ’nature’ – has always

been and will remain an attempt to enforce the will of one actor upon another.

War in its traditional form (I will refer to this type as ’old wars’ in the upcoming

analysis) can be characterized by a substantially developed set of rules set up by the Hague

conferences (1907), the UN Charter (1945) and a number of succeeding UN resolutions, as

well as the Geneva Conventions (1949) and its complementing protocols (1977). The III

Hague conference established how to open the hostilities; the UN Charter limited the use of

force to cases of individual or collective defence, or with a resolution by the UN Security

Council. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 made an explicit distinction between combatants

and non-combatants, and set rules for the treatment of both groups in case of occupation or

war imprisonment. The 1949 Geneva Convention defined the rules of war by explicitly

describing them in its four component Conventions which outline the way to treat combatants

(GC I – III) and non-combatants (GC IV) (UN, 1994). All countries are legally part to the

Conventions, so it certainly constitutes a global security regime.

Not all countries have ratified the amendment Protocols I and II (1977), though, the

former dealing with the protection of victims of international armed conflicts and the latter –

with victims of non-international hostilities, as well as Protocol III (2005) introducing the

Additional Distinctive Emblem – a protective sign identifying medical or religious personnel

as humanitarian personnel to be protected from both sides of the armed conflict (International

Committee of the Red Cross, 1977 & UN, 2005). Figure 8 shows the status of all countries

within the established Geneva rules of war regime. Notwithstanding the different obligations

given by the 6 groups of countries, with notable deficiencies from big countries such as the

US, Pakistan, India, Turkey and Iran who did not sign one or several of the relevant additional

protocols, as well as several cases of breeches of the Geneva Convention, it can still be

regarded as a classic regime. This is because both the degree of formalization and the

expectations that the rules will be adhered to are high. This can be illustrated by means of an

example: when the cases of torture and abuse of dubiously imprisoned people accused of

terrorism by the US in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, 2004, and in Guantánamo since 2002 came to light,

US officials publicly acknowledged the breeches and investigated against the most obvious

offenders, such as Lynndie England in the case of the Abu-Ghraib-Scandal. This example

demonstrates the strong normative relevance of the regime’s established principles.

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Figure 8. States Party to the Geneva Convention

Source: own figure, based on: ICRC annual report 2010

While old wars remain an enormous threat towards individual, national and international

security, they got company by their newer forms transformed through the forces of

globalization. As in line with Clausewitz’s observations, the evolution of warfare brought

about by technological advances and the changes in the socio-political organization of society

affected the form of war, while its nature remained untouched. Phenomena, such as the so-

called ’Revolution in military affairs’, which refers to the use of superior technology, and its

counter-technique – the so-called ’Asymmetric warfare’ – provide good examples for this

assertion. These developments were referred to by Mary Kaldor as ’new wars’. This social

phenomenon, she argued, emerged in the 1980-s and was a direct consequence of

globalization, which Kaldor defined as “a contradictory process involving both integration

and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalization and

localization“ (Kaldor, 1999, p.3). Based on Kaldor’s observations, new wars can be defined as

violent conflicts typically based around the disintegration of states and mainly focused on

identity. Just like the old wars can be said to have been linked to the creation of states, new

wars result out of the opposite process – the degeneration of the state.

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This phenomenon has been often associated with the negative effects of globalization eroding

the institution of the state. Contrary to that opinion, Clark argues that such an attitude is

misleading, as globalization not erodes, but transforms the nature of the state (Clark, 1999).

Notwithstanding the causes, it can be claimed that weak states constitute a threat to the

security of strong states and the overall stability of the system. This is not only due to the fact

that those states generate a breeding place for armed conflicts within themselves. Those

conflicts tend to spread to neighbouring weak states turning from intra- to inter-state conflicts,

as was the case in Africa on a number of occasions. Furthermore, weak states awaken the

desire of hegemonic powers to conquer them as a sphere of influence, as happened in Serbia

in 1999 when US-led NATO forces invaded the country in order to gain a part of the

traditional sphere of influence of Russia, which at that point of time was still too weakened by

the collapse of the Soviet Union as to effectively counter this process. The US did not succeed

again, though, when it tried a similar strategy in South Ossetia in 2008, or, recently, in the

Ukraine, due to Russia’s recovery.

Indeed, it can be claimed that new wars have their origin in so-called failed states –

states that have lost control over their population due to them being too weak to carry out one

or several of its key responsibilities. An important feature of new wars is that the distinction

between ’soldier’ and ’civilian’ blurs (Sheehan, 2011). The centrality of the questions of

identity and self-determination were identified as a key feature to new wars. Those identity

problems can be created by a dissolution of states or empires (as in the case of Yugoslavia), a

weakening of the state (such as in the case of the Ukraine) and pressures created by the forces

of globalization (rise of religious extremism in the Islamic world). A further reason for the

emergence of new wars identified in literature on that issue has been the breakdown of the

traditional societal cleavages based on class and ideology, which have been replaced by an

increased importance of culture and identity (Kaldor, 1999). As a direct consequence of one

or several of those determinants, wars – a former privilege of states – have increasingly

been ’privatized’ by non-state actors, such as warlords and terrorist groups, but also

paramilitary civilians fighting in guerrilla wars (Sheehan, 2011). The emergence of new

actors fighting wars has led to the rise of new practices, such as humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian intervention constitutes a contested concept in international relations.

The ambiguity of the concept rests on its legal uncertainty. The UN Charter explicitly

prohibits any use of force on the part of individual states (Art .2(4)) apart from cases of self-

defence not covered by the UN Charter, and leaves this right only to collective measures

carried out with a resolution of the Security Council (Art. 24 & 42). By this, any intervention

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without the authorization of the Security Council is illegal. Despite the obvious and

unequivocal prohibition, humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization

has evolved as a state practice mostly carried out by US-led NATO forces, as has been seen

on a number of occasions, the most prominent examples being that of Kosovo in 1999, where

NATO forces invaded Yugoslavia, or of Iraq in the 1990s. While the argument behind such an

illegal way to use force always rests on the claim of humanitarianism, the real reasons are

most of the time strategic.

Despite its obvious misuse, the humanitarian claim seems valid to a certain group of

people. According to Ian Hurd, there are three arguments suggesting for the legality of

humanitarian intervention. The first implies that the prohibition of the use of power has lost

its force because of its repeated violation. Such an attitude is logical; indeed, the repeated

cases of rule violation remained without punishment and if the breach of a rule remains

unpunished, it suggests that this rule does not have to be followed. This argument rests upon

the premise of anarchy referred to by the rationalist theorists of international relations, as in

the absence of a superior authority there is no enforcement power available in the

international system. The second argument rests on the normative layer suggesting that “the

normative environment of world politics has changed such that the rule of non-intervention

has receded in the face of the progress of a norm of humanitarianism” (Hurd, 2011, p.302). It

is claimed that those presumed changes have shifted the norm from the sanctity of sovereignty

towards enforceable humanitarianism.

The two arguments presented above are rather dubious, as a presumed breach of a

subjective norm is an instrument all too easy to misuse, and the suggestion that a continuous

violation of a rule legitimates the violation cannot be tolerated by any civilized society. The

third argument, though, is the most well-founded one as it suggests that the concepts of

sovereignty and of humanitarian intervention do not contradict, but rather complement each

other. This is because sovereignty is conditional on a government which respects the

obligation to protect its own people (Hurd, 2011, p.302). Once this obligation is not fulfilled,

it implies that the sovereignty of that particular state has also expired, as a country’s

government is one of the three main pillars constituting sovereignty. While certainly making

sense, such an interpretation is dangerous, as it might be used to justify military action against

a weakened government for strategic reasons. In that case, humanitarian intervention becomes

a disguised instrument of power projection, as already happened on a number of occasions as

elaborated upon above.

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While it is obvious why the practice of humanitarian intervention constitutes a threat to the

national security of the state to which it is applied, it should also be regarded as a threat

towards the individual and international security. This is because while humanitarian

intervention might protect the rights of a certain group of people within a country, it

simultaneously threatens those of other groups – as was the case with the Serbs during the

NATO Kosovo-intervention. This is also because each violation of a country’s sovereignty

impinges upon the sanctity of a nation’s culture, but also out of the simple logic that each use

of violence threatens an individual’s life and his/her other core rights. Apart from individual

security, international security also suffers as a direct consequence of military actions, as

every destabilization increases the general level of anarchy in the system.

Unlike old wars, new wars lack the carcass of rules regulating them. This makes them

unpredictable and – therefore – probably even more dangerous than old wars have been. In

this regard, another from of new wars comes into mind - terrorism. Terrorism can be

perceived as a form of war rather than a criminal act, some would argue, due to its political

message, which crimes generally lack. The nature of terrorism can be interpreted in the sense

of Clausewitz’s criteria of war – it is an act of violence intended to compel one actor to fulfil

the will of another. While a precise definition of terrorism is difficult to give due to the

complexity of the phenomenon, it can certainly be argued that the characterizing property of

terrorism is the use of violence against non-combatants. When speaking of terrorism, though,

one should probably keep in mind that historically, “the term ’terrorism’ described violence

against citizens during the French Revolution” (Kiras, 2005, p. 372). Today, the concept of

terrorism has changed, nevertheless, and the new notion of terrorism is closely linked to

globalization.

While modern technology and the global communications network associated with

globalization allow terrorist groups to arm, exchange information and recruit new members

worldwide, the pressures created by globalization constitute its cause. There are cultural,

economic, and religious aspects of terrorism, whereby the motivations of low ranked

members of terrorist groups might often considerably differ from those of its leaders (Kiras,

2005). According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, there are four types of terrorist organizations

operating today: left-wing terrorists, right-wing terrorists, ethno-nationalist terrorists, and

religious or ’sacred’ terrorists. These categories are only partly applicable to real live cases,

because there is often a mix of motivations within and/or among the different terrorist groups,

although one ideology mostly dominates. All the four main types of terrorist groups have

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enjoyed periods of certain prominence, with religious terrorism having become the most

conceptually relevant form of terrorism today (Cronin, 2002, p. 39).

The terrorist attacks conducted in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001

started the era of so-called postmodern or ’new’ terrorism, which is generally motivated by

religious reasons and uses mostly suicide tactics. Due to the large scale character of the

terrorist attacks of 9/11, it attracted worldwide attention becoming a catalyst for a new

understanding of the threat deriving from terrorism by the public and leading to a re-shaping

of the concept of national security by a number of states. This is especially true for

the ’Western’ community of states, where ’securitization’ has affected a number of policies,

such as migration, asylum, or the surveillance of civilian population. Securitization is a

concept originally developed by Ole Weavers and defined by Georgios Karyotis as a ”process

through which an issue becomes a security one, not necessarily because of the nature or the

objective importance of a threat, but because the issue is presented as such” (Karyotis, 2007,

p.3).

The reasons why the tragic events of 9/11 have had such a great worldwide resonance

were simple. The terrorist attacks aroused primal fears of the unknown, as already suggested

by the term ’terrorist’, which does not include a concrete definition of the enemy. Thus,

anyone could possibly be a potential murderer. Moreover, the fact that terrorists are not part

of the official military of an enemy state – they are most of the time civilians –, do not declare

war before they attack and do not follow the rules established by the Geneva Conventions as

the military – ideally – would, enhances the level of insecurity. Thus, the threat is not only

deriving from an undefined and ruthless enemy, but is also permanent, as an attack can take

place at any time. These natural fears were effectively sparked by the media and, due to the

pictures burned into the minds of the masses by Hollywood action films, the real life events of

9/11 caused panic by many. This is especially true for the Western civilization, as religious

terrorism is directly and openly aimed against Western values represented not only by a

political system – contrary to political right-or left-wing terrorism, for example –, but by

regular people, who are seen by religious terrorists as non-believers the murder of which will

be rewarded in the afterlife.

New terrorism has been referred to by some authors as ’sacred’ terrorism or

the ’global jihad’ and is generally seen as a “reaction to the perceived oppression of Muslims

worldwide and a spiritual bankruptcy of the West” (Kiras, 2005, p. 377). The suicide tactic

might appear to be an invention of the Jihadists, but was actually used for assassinations

during the entire history of mankind. Probably the most colourful example were the concept’s

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name givers – Assassins – who used suicide killers for political assassinations already in the

early 12th century. Nonetheless, the revived suicide tactic for public attacks against civilians is

another product of the era of globalization.

Following the simple logic of the assumption that a common enemy has a massive

unifying potential to otherwise competing parties, one might think of terrorism as a force

terrifying enough to overcome the collective action problem in security issues governing over

the international system. However, as already noticed above, a successful regime requires a

common normative framework on the basis of which it can act, which is evidently missing.

From this, one can infer that the establishment of a global counter-terrorism regime turns out

highly unlikely. The accuracy of this analytically acquired statement is supported by reality.

Terrorism, as well as other forms of new wars, has led to disagreements between states on

how to combat it. These disputes resulted in the creation of two major groups of states.

The first group could be referred to as ’Anglo-American’ and is led by the US and

Great Britain. This group defines terrorism in terms of war, and chooses to combat it by

military means both nationally and internationally acting though a ’coalition of the willing’

united in a ’war on terror’. This cooperation has been designed to enhance as to create a

“’global counter-terrorism network’ of states able to detect, track, and eliminate threats, while

non-military efforts [would] address the root causes of terrorism” (Kiras, 2005, p. 383). The

other group of states, supported mainly by continental European countries, disagrees with the

use of the concept of ’war’ when combating terrorism. In their view, dealing with terrorism by

military means contains a danger of terrorist retaliation and a return to the original

connotation of terrorism – state repressions against its own citizens. Instead, this group treats

terrorism as a crime which should be dealt with by law enforcement methods. This would

ensure that states “uphold the rule of law, maintain the high moral ground, preserve

democratic principles, and prevent the establishment of martial law (Kiras, 2005, p. 383). On

this division we can see that there is no global norm on counter-terrorism upon which a global

anti-terrorism regime could be based, but that there are rather two co-existing attitudes

dividing not only the traditionally opposed countries, but also the allied members of the

NATO, which itself constitutes an inter-governmental security organization.

To sum up, we have established that the domain of society incorporates three major

threats to security, namely: a direct armed attack by a foreign power - old wars –; civil war

and humanitarian intervention; an attack by a private actor either from inside the host country

or from outside – new wars. New wars generally arise around failed states, which is most

often a final degradation stage of a weak state. Here, the cause of threat is the existence of

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weak states and insufficient compliance with international law. Old wars, on the other hand,

are dominated by the realist logic of the struggle over resources and power, and are initiated

either by revisionist states attempting to change the status quo, or by status quo powers with

an offensive security doctrine. Thus, weak as well as revisionist and offensive status quo

states constitute the main security threat to the international system originating from the

society domain.

5.1.2.b. Economy

Economy constitutes the other major interlinkage through which globalization operates.

Indeed, a number of authors have argued that economy is the main force of globalization.

“Generations of functionalists and integrationists have regarded economic interaction as the

primary vehicle for developing a regional or world society, from which political restructuring

would inescapably flow” (Clark, 1999, p. 89). The logic behind those arguments is based on

the assumption that capitalist states have lost autonomy over their national economies. Within

this line of argumentation, it is claimed that the vehicle running the global economy is

situated in the World Trade Organization (WTO), former GATT, which is an organization

representing a global economic regime aimed at the promotion, spread and strengthening of

neo-liberal economic doctrines such as privatization and deregulation, and constitutes the

stronghold of the capitalist globalized economic regime determining the life of most

inhabitants on our planet. This so-called free trade regime can be classified as a classic

regime, as both the degree of formality and the expectations of convergence are high.

Economic globalization was possible through modern technology allowing to transfer

capital and labour all over the globe as well as to communicate without a time lag. The most

illustrative example of the globalized economic procedures are, probably, the global cycles of

production turning former national companies into corporations influencing the economic

welfare and socio-political decisions in a number of countries simultaneously. These

corporations can be national, which would most of the time induce that they will act in

accordance with their country’s national interest, or private and de-nationalized enough to

truly follow the neo-liberal doctrine of the almighty hand of the market.

The free market is generally seen as a sacrosanct foundation by liberal thinkers. This is

also logical, as the liberal school of thought is a product of the American civilization – the

designer of the global free trade concept in its current form, which has built it around itself as

its center. As argued by Galtung, the system of the free market is maintained by imperialist

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structures, which are designed to satisfy the needs of the ’center’ – which is currently the US

– and, to a lesser extent the ’go between nations’ – the semi-center –, which is, roughly

speaking, – also to different extents – the rest of the industrialized states of the North. These

needs are to be satisfied at the expense of the ’periphery’, which are Third World Countries

generally situated in the South (Galtung, 1971). This logic deriving from the dependencia

school is based on the Marxist doctrine of class division and suggests that “the world consists

of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery”

(Galtung, 1971, p. 81) Hereby, “imperialism is a relation between a Center and a Periphery

nation so that (1) there is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nation and the

center in the Periphery nation, (2) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery

nation than within the Center nations, (3) there is disharmony of interest between the

periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation” (Galtung, 1971, p.

83).

So, the imperialist system structure is maintained by the harmony of interest between

the center in the Center and the center in the Periphery, as well as by the disharmony of

interest between the periphery of the Center and the periphery of the Periphery, “because the

relative advantage of the former depends on the maintenance of the system which exploits the

latter” (Buzan, 1983, p. 131). Thus, while the imperialist arrangement is stabilized by points 1

and 3, point 2 provides a source of its destabilization, because the high inequality in the living

standards within the Periphery nation caused by the fact that there are far less resources to

share in the Periphery nation than it is in the Center inescapably leads to conflict between the

center and the periphery in the Periphery nation (based on Galtung, 1971). This discussion is

relevant to our study in as far as it indicates a source on another security threat which should

be incorporated into the analysis. This threat is constituted by the current set-up of the global

economic system, which represents a major menace to the economies of the periphery states,

which indirectly, yet inescapably results in a threat towards the center and the semi-center as

well.

So, the conflict within the Periphery nation may have two security repercussions on

the system. First, it may cause a rebellion of the periphery against the center in the Periphery

nation, which would further weaken the already weak Periphery state – assuming that most

Periphery states constitute weak states – or even result in its overall collapse. Second, apart

from the direct threat for the Periphery state, this would also entail a major source of

destabilization for the Center and the semi-center due to the dangers entailed in the existence

of weak states (see sub-section 5.1.2.a), and the threat towards the well-being of the Center

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nation resulting from the disturbances in the imperialist economic structure, which might lead

to a rebellion of the periphery against the center within the Center nation due to the growing

gap in the living standards. The center of the Periphery nation, might also decide to unite with

its periphery against the Center nation, which would potentially cause a violent conflict

between the two. It is also possible the several periphery nations might unite against a Center

nation. Further, the domestic economies of the semi-center are also in danger, as they are

potentially being pushed out of the near-center towards the near-periphery by the cheaper

production in developing countries. One scenario or another, it becomes clear that the current

imperialist economic system structure based on high inequalities between its member

constitutes a major security threat to the international system and, hence, all of its units.

While the above paragraphs argue for the conflict embedded in the imperialist nature

of the current set-up of the global trade system, the type of the economic system, which is

capitalist, may also constitute a security threat for the international system. Apart from the

exploitative relation between the ruling class and the working class embedded in capitalism,

which alone represents its unstable nature and entails the danger of revolution, the functional

structure of capitalism entails a self-destructing mechanism resulting from the fact that in

order to function, it needs to constantly produce profit and accumulate capital. As argued by

Marx: “Since the aim of capital is not to minister to certain wants, but to produce profit […], a

rift must continually ensue between the limited dimensions of consumption under capitalism

and a production which forever tends to exceed this immanent barrier“(Marx, 1894, p. 175).

Those conditions lead to rotating booms and recessions characterising the capitalist system,

which, as argued by Marxism, coupled with a centralization of capital, and growing

discontent of the exploited workers strengthened by their better education and organization,

will at some point lead to the system’s downfall due to the inability to recover from the

continuous crises of overproduction.

Moreover, the need for constant production and capital accumulation will at some

point inescapably lead to an exhaustion of natural resources evoked by the lack of centralized

planning and the adherence to the principle of sustainability in their use (see sub-section

5.1.2.c.). One way or another, in the long-run, capitalism can be expected to either collapse or

to be fundamentally restructured, so that it ceases to be capitalism by definition. However, as

for the moment, the worldwide abolition of capitalism in its present form seems unlikely due

to its inseparableness from the current system structure, measures to protect the domestic

economies are incorporated in the global economy. Those protectionist policies do not

constitute a global regime by themselves, but are most often organized around a set of

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regulations formed by either individual states or macro-regional groups of states building

customs unions, free trade areas or even common markets (figure 9).

Protectionist policies, associated with (neo-)mercantilism, are sought to protect the

domestic economy from uncontrolled forces of the market. It includes tariffs, quotes on

imports, anti-dumping policies, the granting of subsidies to selected domestic industries, or

the control of exchange rates. All these policies are actively discouraged by the WTO, as it

disturbs the regime it is designed to promote. Still, virtually every country employs

protectionist policies, although to different degrees. The WTO, being the only global trade

regime currently available, tolerates only regulations on two issues which might grant a state a

minimal degree of protection: the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS)

being a regulation on food safety, animal and plant health standards, and the Technical

Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) setting minimal product quality standards (WTO, 2014).

Apart from their primary aim to ensure the quality of the products sold in the wealthy

countries, protectionist measures are also instruments designed to restrict the imports from

economically underdeveloped countries, thus, to keep the center-periphery division intact.

This is because those countries cannot keep high quality standards and produce at a low price

at the same time. Thus, import restrictions in line with the WTO prescriptions contribute to

the growing income gap between the economically developed and underdeveloped countries.

Overall, the current set-up of the global economic system constitutes a serious source

of insecurity to both the economically developed countries at the center and the semi-center

and the underdeveloped countries at the semi-periphery and periphery. This is because the

population of the periphery countries experiences an immediate threat to their life and health

due to an existence of often far below 1 Dollar per day (Worldbank, 2000/2001). The integrity

of the periphery countries is also endangered, because, as argued above, there is a huge

interest gap between those countries’ elites and its population. Resulting thereout there is a

security threat to the developed countries, as mass unrest in the Third World might – and will

– at some point spread over these countries’ borders and crash onto the affluent center. This

might result in a hot war over the resources, in which the starving people will fight because

they will have nothing more to lose, but seemingly everything to gain.

Overpopulation, which is already experienced in a number of countries, intensifies the

problem of both income distribution and growing resource shortage. In addition to that, many

Third World states already constitute weak states and a worsening of their economic situation

will lead to their even further degradation, as well as the potential emergence of new weak

states. As already established above, weak states constitute a security threat by their very

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existence. Therefore, they should be strengthened through an improvement of their domestic

economic situations and administrative measures. Notwithstanding this simple logic, reality

looks different.

Figure 9. Major Free Trade Areas

Source: own figure, based on WTO RTA list, 2015

A final source of insecurity generated by the economy domain is the ability of a country to

inflict damage upon another country by means of economic mechanisms. Manipulations of

the market constitute non-military means of power projection and can take various forms: the

setting of a ban upon the export or import of certain goods, such as in the current ’sanctions’

against Russia; an economic embargo, such as that set on Iran as a reaction to its refusal to

quit its atomic programme (Security Council, 2006), or the stopping of imports of a

product/resource, upon which a country is dependent. It might affect one key resource, which

most of the time concerns mineral fuels – a good example of an energy-dependent geo-

political entity is the EU, most of which member states is highly dependent on foreign energy

resources (around 60 % of EU’s energy supply and this dependency is expected to even rise in

future) (European Commission, DG Research and Innovation, 2013); military assistance, as in

the case of Israel and the US (Barnett, 1990); or in case a country is export oriented, such as

most of the developing countries (Hancon, 2010) or the ’Asian tigers’ during the phase of

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their rise, – foreign money inflows. There is currently no regime which would protect a

country from these forms of non-military threat, apart from potentially existent bi-or

multilateral agreements, which are mostly not solely of an economic, but also of an important

political nature.

Summing up, the domain of economy constitutes three major sources of security

threats: the first two are intertwined, while seemingly mutually exclusive products of the

current set-up of the global economic system: global free trade and protectionism. This is

because both are aimed at the maintenance of the dominance and flourishing of the center of

the system at the expense of the periphery. The third source of threat is represented by market

manipulations by a foreign power or a group of states. The existence of this threat is

connected to the uneven distribution of resources and differences in the level of technological

and economic development governing the life on our planet.

5.1.2.c. Environment

The final and, certainly, most undeniable and obvious domain through which mankind is

interlinked is the natural environment. Still generally neglected in many core political

decisions and, as a rule, treated as a low political issue, the natural environment constitutes

the zone of life on our planet – the biosphere. Being the key determinant for the maintenance

of life on Earth, the biosphere should, as a rational consequence thereout, be treated by

mankind as its most valuable resource which is to be protected for the very sake of our

survival. As argued by Andrew Hurrell “a political theory of the environment is concerned not

simply with the ideas of the “good life”, but also with the means to ensure human survival

best” (Hurrell, 1995, p. 130).

Unfortunately, decision makers are often rather occupied with immediate gains and

irrationally leave out the fundamental question of how to preserve the intactness of the

environment. Since the beginning of sedentary life, people have begun to transform the

biosphere according to their needs creating what in the early 19th century V. Vernadsky, –

who emphasized the decisive role of living organisms as the main transforming force on our

planet –, referred to as ’noosphere’ – a concept describing a point in our planet’s evolution

when the reasoned activities of men become a determining factor in the development of its

biosphere.

The two World Wars fought in the 20th century, certainly, slowed down the general

realization of the fundamental and – potentially – fatal role human beings play in the

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transformation of the properties of its living environment resulting out of the contradiction

between the growing needs of the world community and the biosphere’s inability to provide

those. These topics periodically emerged on the political agenda of the different countries of

the world, yet an institutionalized environmental policy can generally be regarded as a

product of the 20th century. In Western Europe, for example, environmental preservation

started to gain in importance since the 1970s when acid rains fell in Great Britain and

environmentalists managed to successfully attract the interest of mass media (Hannigan,

1995). The environment as a policy domain became subject to international discussion and

legalization at the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment (UNCHE)

(Keohane et al., 1995).

Yet, the formulation of a global concept of environmental preservation took place only

in 1992 when it was institutionalized in the Declaration of the UN Conference on

environment and development, informally known as the ’Earth Summit’. During the

Conference, virtually all states of the Earth adopted three agreements: Agenda 21 — a

comprehensive programme for global action in all areas of sustainable development; The Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development — a series of principles defining the rights and

responsibilities of states; and The Statement of Forest Principles — a set of principles to

underlie the sustainable management of forests worldwide; as well as two legally binding

conventions agreed upon during the Conference: the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change and The Convention on Biological Diversity. The resulting global regime

aimed at what became to be known as ’sustainable development’ – a concept consisting of

three interdependent building blocks: society, economy and ecology (figure 10). The social

domain referred to the human moral and values, their relationships and institutions. These

have to be in favour of sustainable development so that it can function. The economic domain

concerned the allocation and distribution of resources and capital in such a way as to make

sustainable development possible. The third pillar was ecology and involved the contribution

of both the economic and the social domains to the preservation of the environment (Baker, S.,

2006, p.7).

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Figure 10. Sustainable development: linking economy, ecology and society

Source: own figure, based on Baker, S., 2006, p. 10

When talking about the preservation of the environment, the main emphasis lies on the

attempt to ensure – excluding unpredictable large-scale natural catastrophes – that unlimited

natural resources, such as sunlight, air or water, remain unlimited, and on the using of limited

natural resources in a way that would provide that those resources remain available for future

generations. For clarification it is important to note that limited resources are additionally

divided into renewable and non-renewable ones. Renewable resources can be created or re-

create themselves after a certain period of time. An example for this category would be

mineral resources. Non-renewable resources are, for example, soils or animals – they cannot

be renewed or re-created once they are gone.

For this purpose, a number of regional, national, but also international environmental

legislation exists. MEAs provide a good example of international environmental regulations,

although, as already established in the previous section, they lack any real means of

enforcement. National environmental legislation can be ranked as more successful, because

national governments do have means of enforcement at their disposal. However, while

theoretically available, the effectiveness of these mechanisms majorly depends on the two

dimensions analysed above: the economy and the society.

The problem of finding a financing system necessary for a transition towards a more

sustainable form of economy has been the main concern for the economists Lukin and Lukina.

In their analysis of that issue, they argue that such a financing system could be formed out of

two sources which would not contain a financial disadvantage for the society: the rent from

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land and the accumulated global capital (Lukina, O. Lukin, S., 2011). The sole investments

into ecological safety may not lead to the desired goal. To make an example, in the 20 years

between the UN Conferences on the Environment in Stockholm (1972) and the Earth Summit

in Rio de Janeiro (1992), the global environmental situation considerably worsened, although

more than 1,3 trillion US Dollar were spent on the conservation of the environment (Ibid.).

For the evaluation of sustainable development, which has set the framework for the

most recent MEAs, conventional economic indicators such as the growth rate, the GDP or the

intensity of the use of resources are not sufficient. In order to gain relevant results, these

solely economic indicators should be correlated with ecological and social ones. Those are the

employment rate, the costs of environmental preservation, the efficiency of resource

exploitation and the use of new technology to increase environment safety.

In most cases, there is a conflict between economic and environmental factors,

because their goals seem incompatible. The free market economy aims at the gaining of

maximal profits with the smallest input in the shortest period of time, but it does not take into

consideration the environment. However, natural resources, which are necessarily used for

production, have their own possibility frontiers. Once they are crossed, the productivity of

these factors starts to decrease until their partly or even full destruction. A perfect example

here is the degradation of soils, which can be balanced with an increase of the use of another

factor of production – of capital (the use of machines, fertilizer etc.), but only up to a certain

point. After this, land gets unfertile and can even become so-called ’dead land’ which cannot

be used for agricultural purposes. Furthermore, capital inputs also have their possibility

frontiers. To make an example, phosphorites used for fertilizers belong to the non-renewable

resources meaning that someday they will be gone.

The conflict between the free market economy, the environment and society described

above was approached by three main instruments used in environmental policy. The first

instrument is of a ’command and control’-type and “entails legislation to fix norms and

environmental standards that have to be complied with. This may take the form of a

prohibition of certain products or substances, or emission standards combined with

requirements to use certain types of technology” (Senior Nello, S., 2009, p. 325). The other

instrument is market-based and refers to the carrying out of cost and benefit analyses and to

the setting of standards, which determine whether to offer a firm a financial incentive for the

compliance with the standards, or to tax the production of negative externalities (Ibid.).

Negative externalities are emissions into the environment caused by the actions of an industry.

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The tax for negative externalities is also known as the Pigovean tax and can be best described

by means of a figure (figure 11).

Figure 11. Negative and positive externalities

Source: own figure, based on Senior Nello, S., 2009, p. 313

Pigou’s solution lies in the ’internalization’ of the negative externality through a respective

tax. On the figure, where private marginal benefits (PMB) intersect the private marginal costs

(PMC), there is the market optimum of demand and supply, which the regular economist pays

attention to. Through the introduction of the social marginal costs (SMC) and the social

marginal benefits (SMB), the identification of negative and positive externalities of a

producer becomes possible. Following thereout, where the social marginal costs exceed the

private marginal costs, there is oversupply of the activity causing the externality, as quantity 1

is supplied instead of quantity 3. So, there is a negative externality produced. This would

mean that this industry should be taxed so that the negative externality is internalized. If, on

the other hand, the social marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits, thus, quantity 1

is supplied instead of quantity 2, there is an underproduction of the activity causing the

externality, thus, a positive externality. According to this market determined instrument, in

that case, the producer should get a financial incentive (in the form of a subsidy, for example)

to internalize the positive externality.

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Another instrument used in environmental politics refers to voluntary agreements between

producers to reduce their emissions and to introduce more environmentally friendly

technologies. Their motivation is mostly the wish to improve their image or a desired increase

in competitiveness (Senior Nello, S., 2009). Additionally, I would argue that a proper

environmental education also constitutes an effective environmental instrument, which would

act through the normative dimension and address the root of the problem.

Despite the large number of environmental legislation ranging over all the

international, national and regional levels, global environmental regimes remain of a dead

letter type. The potential of environmental regimes to gain in effectiveness is provided,

though. According to Keohane et al., there are three preconditions for an effective

management of environmental problems: governmental concern, a hospitable contractual

environment and the necessary political and administrative capacity (Keohane et al., 1995,

pp.19,20). Governmental concern refers to the awareness of the problems which are to be

tackled and the readiness to devote resources to solve those problems. This precondition is

partially given in the system, although the degree of the awareness varies across countries.

This can be seen on the fact that virtually all governments participate in international

environmental conferences and voluntarily accept obligations with regard to the environment,

although the expectation that those obligation will be adhered to strongly varies from country

to country and from issue to issue.

This is because the readiness to allocate resources to environmental protection

generally depends not only on the governmental concern, but also on a country’s capacity to

devote resources to an environmental undertaking. This capacity depends on the wealth of a

country, its dominant sector of production (agriculture, industry or service), and its

administrative intactness. So, China’s priority, for example, momentarily lies in quick

industrialization, which is inevitably connected to environmental degradation on the stage of

industrial accumulation, rather than in large-scale environmental programmes. In Europe,

which is already a post-industrial society with a dominating service sector, environmental

preservation has a qualitatively different value. This has two reasons: First, it has exported

many of its production facilities into other countries, mainly into the Third World. So, the

relative economic sacrifice made in the name of the environment is smaller than that of China

would be, for example. Second, due to the fact that the environment of most Western

European countries has been considerably damaged by the end of the 20th century,

environmental programmes became a necessity for those countries, while in Russia, for

example, the environmental question has never been that pressing due to the large territory

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and the low density of population resulting in a lower environmental pressure. Administrative

intactness is connected to the internal strength of a state. Thus, a weak state will have no

administrative capacity to enforce any decisions, while a strong state can be expected to

comply with its environmental obligations provided it has a high level of governmental

concern.

The third precondition – a hospitable contractual environment – refers to the state`s

ability “[…] to make credible commitments, to enact joint rules with reasonable ease, and to

monitor each other’s behaviour at moderate cost so that strategies of reciprocity can be

followed” (Keohane et al, 1995, p. 19). In general, this criterion can be argued to be given in

the international system, as the already established international environmental regimes are

most of the time institutionalized by means of respective organizations functioning in the

broader framework of the UN, in which regular environmental conferences provide a forum

necessary for the mutual monitoring between states, while environmental issues remain

generally detached from power politics, by this, making cooperation possible.

The environmental domain constitutes not only preventive security measures, though,

but also reactionary ones. Those can be found within the category representing another

security threat generated within the environment dimension: natural & technological

disasters. Natural disasters arise out of a natural force, such as a volcano eruption, a hurricane,

or an earthquake. Technological disasters are those caused by men, such as an oil tanker

accident, or an emergency at a nuclear power station. According to data provided by the

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFCR) from a long-term

study from 2003 to 2012, most disasters occur on the Asian continent and the overall number

of natural disasters is higher than that of technological disasters. This does not mean, however,

that the total destruction caused by technological disasters is lower than that caused by natural

disasters. Technological disasters are most of the time of a fatal character, as their long-term

effects are often far worse than the immediate damage done. Nuclear catastrophes serve a

good example for that case. The fatality of technological disasters has mainly to do with the

fact that most ramifications of technological disasters cannot be undone by natural

mechanisms, as the contamination is of an unnatural origin.

Technological disasters can sometimes be a direct consequence of a natural disaster, as

was the case in Japan in 2011 when an earthquake caused a tsunami which triggered a failure

at the Fukushima nuclear power plant resulting in a leakage of radioactive substances. As

everything in nature is interdependent and interlinked through the natural cycles, so are

disasters and environmental degradation. A disturbance in the balance of nature will

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inevitably affect the number, location and strength of natural disasters, as well as their

implications and the recovering ability of the environment. Apart from interlinkages within

the domain, environmental degradation is directly connected to the domains of society and

economy, which represent the causes for environmental degradation and, by this, indirectly or

directly through human or technological failure, for natural disasters.

The legal base governing this domain rests upon customary law based on a number of

UN resolutions – the latest ones being Res. 63/139, 63/141 and 63/137. Those resolutions

reaffirm the basic UN governing instrument for disaster response – Res. 46/182 setting out the

guidelines for the provision of humanitarian assistance for the victims of natural disasters and

other emergencies. This resolution emphasizes the need to collectively approach the disaster

response, whereby it explicitly prohibits the provision of assistance without the consent of the

respective state (UN Res. 46/182, §3) and its primary role in all the processes related to

humanitarian assistance (UN Res. 46/182, §4). The assistance, in case provided, shall be

carried out in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (UN Res.

46/182, 2).

The series of 63/_ resolutions, while reaffirming the provisions of resolution 46/182,

encourage the states to make use of the International Red Cross Guidelines for the domestic

facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance – the

so-called international disaster response laws, rules and principles (IDLR) (IFCR, 2011).

Those are thought to ensure that states affected by disasters receive the international

assistance they require through the establishment of a proper legal basis for those kinds of

emergencies. While the IFCR represents the practical institutionalization of the IDLR

guidelines, the guidelines for assistance are of a non-binding character. They rather provide a

framework for good governance and, due to the generally high expectation of convergence

while being legally non-formalized, can be regarded as a global tacit regime. While there is no

legal obligation for assistance, there is, according to Seamone, customary international law

obliging a state to at least warn its neighbour of potential transboundary threats arising out of

an emergency on its territory (Eburn, 2010).

The provision of assistance motivated by the desire to minimize or avoid

transboundary damage is a shady area of international disaster management. While the

normative difference between humanitarian concerns and national interest may remind of the

problems governing the domain of humanitarian intervention, the conceptual framework of

the provision of disaster relief clearly forbidding any actions without the consent of the

affected state – at least de jure – draws a clear border-line between humanitarian intervention

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and disaster management. There have been precedents in our recent history, though, where

this border blurred.

So, in 1992 the Security Council authorized military action in Somalia to deliver

humanitarian aid to the people in the country. While the delivery of humanitarian aid is not

necessarily part of disaster management, it is at the same time also not a regular reason for

Security Council authorization of a military operation. This intervention was possible through

a definition of the Somalia conflict as a threat towards international peace and security in

accordance with Art. 24 of the UN Charter and with reference to Chapter VII of the United

Nations. By the time the humanitarian intervention took place, Somalia had no government

and was dominated by substantial internal violence making the delivery of aid without

military presence hard to implement (Eburn, 2010). Despite the potentially right action from

the standpoint of humanity, such reasoning may be dangerous, as a legally rather dubious

reference to Chapter VII dealing with threats to international peace might be treated as a

precedent for future misuse of the Charter to interpret it in accordance with one’s strategic

needs.

When it comes to conventional disaster management, though, it is well possible to

draw a clear line between emergency assistance and humanitarian intervention. This is due to

the fact that disaster relief regimes are far less politicized and can hardly be used as disguised

instruments of strategic planning. This is not only due to the fact that a disaster, either

technological or natural, can hardly be predicted to occur in a specific moment in time as to

be planned in into a state’s conquering strategy. The other reason for the non-suitability of

disaster relief as a means of strategic power projection is its strong normative basis closely

linked to the reassurance of the primary role of the affected state in every kind of process that

might occur on its territory as a result of a disaster, as well as an explicit prohibition to deliver

any kind of assistance without the consent of the affected state. Those principles are

consolidated through a number of UN resolutions and have not been violated so far.

Summing up, the domain of the environment entails three threats to security:

environmental degradation, natural and technological disasters. All the three threats are

interlinked and affect each other either directly or through the natural cycles. The causes for

environmental degradation and natural as well as technological disasters are the overuse of

natural resources and all types of pollution. From this it follows that the threat is generated by

unsustainable human activities motivated by the current set-up of the global economic system

which principles are incompatible with those of sustainable development.

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5.2. Results

Table 5. Global regimes

Source of

threat

Security regime Type of regime Cause for threat

Domain

So

ciet

y

Foreign power Rules of war regimes Classic regime

Revisionist states; status quo

powers with an offensive

security doctrine

Terrorism Counter-terrorism

regimes

No regime

Class division;

religious/nationalist/political

radicalism

Civil war;

humanitarian

intervention

Humanitarian regimes

Tacit regime

Weak states; non-adherence to

international law

Eco

no

my

Global free trade Free trade regimes

Classic regime

Current set-up of the global

economic system

Protectionism

Regulations on trade

barriers

No regime

Market

manipulations

Bilateral/Multilateral

contracts

No regime

Uneven distribution of

resources

Na

tura

l en

vir

on

men

t

Natural disaster

Disaster management

regimes

Tacit regime

Natural force

Technological

disaster

Human factor

Environmental

degradation

Environmental

regimes

Dead letter

regime

Overuse of natural resources

Source: own table

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The above table (table 5) summarizes the findings of the analysis of sub-section 5.1.2 under

consideration of the type of regime by Levy, as well as in relation to the regimes’ effects on

the system (regulative, neutral or destabilizing effect, see geometric form) and with regard to

their type of functioning (either cooperation or coordination, see colour of the geometric

form). The aim of this analysis was to establish whether the regimes created by the

interlinkages of the system – our second determining variable –, display a potential of the

system to integrate in accordance with the mature anarchy model despite a verified lack of

universal values, or rather indicate a movement towards a balance of power system, which

would be consistent with the findings of the analysis of mental interdependencies which

turned out clearly in favour of a multicivilizational world. The obtained results on the

inclination of each domain’s constituent regimes towards either cooperation or coordination

were visualized by means of corresponding colours, the mixes of which have given the

resulting colour of the respective domain. Apart from that, the effect the regimes have on the

system were established in order to assess whether the regimes are useful in the mitigation of

the security threats generated by their respective domains, and resulting thereout, their

perspective of further existence and development in the envisaged new system structure.

The environment displayed the highest potential to generate cooperation on the global

scale. This is because both regimes governing this domain are already established globally

and show some preconditions required for a transition towards a mature anarchy. The

presence of those preconditions is determined by the fact that the three threats generated by

this domain: environmental degradation, natural and technological disasters, require collective

action to be successfully approached and are menacing enough to encourage international

cooperation, while technical enough to stay outside of the general struggle over power

governing the international system. The remarkable property of this domain is that the

majority of security threats generated by it is caused by the interacting other two dimensions –

society and economy, which points at the technical nature of this domain.

Even though disaster management regimes lack a binding legal basis, the expectation

that the principles of the regimes will be complied with are high. By this, it represents a global

tacit regime. Due to their hardly strategically usable and non-politicized nature, disaster

management regimes may be seen as truly humanitarian instruments conducing collective

action by means of cooperation. Environmental preservation regimes, on the other hand, do

have a globally binding legal basis, while – as all international legislation – lack any hard

means of enforcement. Hereby, the expectations of convergence on the international level are

rather low, as all environmental acts are carried out on the national or regional levels.

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Therefore, they have been classified as a global dead letter regime. This is mainly caused by

the very different economic and political characteristics of the regimes’ participants, which

leads to disparities in the willingness to devote resources to environmental preservation. Due

to the prevailing national character of implementation resulting in their overall global

inefficiency, environmental preservation regimes were rated neutral with respect to both

cooperation and coordination.

As was expected, the domain of society is governed by the competitive logic of the

security dilemma, yet the existing global security regimes provide for some regulation in the

otherwise anarchical system by means of international law on dispute regulation, the

normative relevance of the Charter of the United Nations and the role of the Security Council

as well as the established rules under which force can be used formulated by the Geneva

Conventions and its additional Protocols. Despite a lack of a supranational authority, the

recognition of the established normative framework for the use of military means in old wars

by virtually all states and a voluntary adherence to at least some of its principles indicate a

globally established classic regime and provide evidence for the experienced need of a

regulative framework in the system. This acknowledgement is already a big step towards a

diminishing level of anarchy in the system, although not through cooperation in line with the

mature anarchy scenario, but by means of coordination.

The verified minimal stability provided by the existing status quo and its theoretical

guarantee under international law can be threatened by revisionist states or states with an

offensive security doctrine. This is because this type of states is most likely to violate the

principles of the rules of war regime. The overall amount of threat to international, national

and individual security posed by these categories of states depends on their relative power.

The more powerful a state is, the more threat it can pose. The adoption of an offensive

security strategy or a revisionist position by a powerful system actor will inescapably decrease

of the overall level of security in the system. The resulting struggle over power can be

expected to be carried out not through the instrument of old wars as it used to be before the

era of nuclear weapons, but by means of new wars waged on the territories of secondary states

most likely weakened by internal dispute.

In this case, humanitarian intervention mutates into a disguised instrument of power

projection and, consequently, constitutes a threat to the national integrity of weak states, as

well as to the international security on the whole. Humanitarian intervention constitutes a

globally established tacit regime, because there is a clear discrepancy between its legal basis

and actual application which invalidates the regime’s otherwise provided legal framework.

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Due to its application as an instrument of active power projection, humanitarian intervention,

unlike rules of war regimes, was rated as a destabilizing feature of the system.

While the above paragraphs identify strong revisionist or aggressive states as the

causers of new wars and weak states as its major victims, things can also turn out differently.

Weak states can constitute breeding places for illegal activities, such as terrorism or organized

crimes, while intra-state conflicts can spread beyond such states’ borders. In that case, the

practise of humanitarian intervention gets a different connotation, although the problem of

objectivity certainly haunts this policy domain.

Albeit not established as a global regime, anti-terrorist measures do certainly exist as a

practice undertaken within regional voluntary coalitions of states and, therefore, occupy a

security niche within the society domain. Hereby, there exist two major groups of states

treating terrorism either as a military threat or a criminal activity. Due to the absence of an

established global anti-terrorism regime and the diverse and regional character of current anti-

terrorist undertakings, it was rated neutral in relation to both the facilitation of cooperation vs.

coordination and the effect it has on the system. While within one coalition, cooperation on

anti-terrorist measures can exert a stabilizing effect on the relations between the participating

actors, it at the same time can antagonize non-participants, by this destabilizing the system.

Furthermore, it is well possible that within such an anti-terrorist coalition, coordination

determined by power relations turns out the dominating functional type.

Summing up, the domain of society was found to favour coordination over

cooperation, while revealing both stabilizing and destabilizing regimes. The main threats

generated by this domain turned out to be caused by revisionist states, states with an offensive

security doctrine and the existence of weak states. The probability that the reason of men

would turn offensive security doctrines into defensive ones is rather low due to the verified

continuity nations showed in their basic strategies with regard to both the internal, but most

important the external affairs despite changes in government or regime. As concluded by

Bruce Russett, “[…] one is strongly inclined to discount the role of most internal (sub-system)

pressures – they account for little of the variance. The national interest may be neither

objectively defined nor immutable, but short of utter domestic upheaval the men who most

powerfully control national foreign policies have held rather constant preferences and/or

perceptions of alternatives. Governments rose and fell without great change in states’

positions on the central super-issues of world politics” (Russett, 1967, p. 92). Thus, internal

pressures cannot be expected to lead to any real changes in the security doctrine. This finding

is supported by real life examples, such as the prevalence of the offensive strategy in the US

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security doctrine, which, despite minor fluctuations depending on the President-in-power,

showed a remarkable continuity since the introduction of the Truman doctrine. A change can

be induced by systemic factors, though (see section 6).

Revisionist and weak states can be expected to even gain in number due to the

growing gap in the distribution of wealth and resources on the planet. As established

throughout this section, one of the prerequisites for the establishment of a mature anarchy is

that there are no weak states in the system, thus, that all states become strong states. This is

due to the fact that weak states are likely to become either revisionist in nature or breeding

places for armed conflicts and illegal activities of every kind, while their very existence may

evoke a desire to conquer of strong states with offensive security strategies. One way or

another, weak states constitute a persistent source of systemic instability. As Kalevi Holsti

puts it: “the relationship of state strength to war […] is emerging: since 1945 most wars of all

types have originated within and between weak states. Strong states have warred against weak,

but not against each other” (Holsti, 1996, p.99).

All the three regimes identified for the domain of the economy were found to generate

coordinated outcomes reflecting the current economic power relations in the system, whereby

the resulting outcomes were identified to exert a destabilizing effect on the system. This

conclusion coincides with the Marxist school of thought arguing for the conflict embedded in

the capitalist system. This is because the global free trade system is built around an

exploitative relation on both the national (class division) and the international (center-

periphery structure) levels. This problem is intertwined with the problem of weak states

discussed in the framework of the society domain. This is due to the fact that the existence of

weak states is closely linked to the uneven distribution of wealth. By this, the current set-up of

the global economy was found to constitute a major destabilizing force in the system.

As argued by Marxism, the development of the civilized mankind underwent a number

of historical cycles depending upon the modes of production affecting the organization of the

respective society. Each stage was marked by its unique relations of production, whereby each

stage of societal development contained a conflict within its class division resulting in the

transformation of that society into a higher form of social development: “the history of all

hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx, Engels, 1848, p.14). Those

stages are, chronologically: primitive communism, the Asiatic mode of production, the

ancient, the feudal, the capitalist, the socialist modes, and, finally, communism, which is seen

as the ideal of societal organization and its highest form of development (Ibid.).

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Each mode of production created its characteristic type of societal organization. So, primitive

communism was the economic system of tribal society. The Asiatic mode can be

characterized as a pre-feudal initial form of class society propagated in ancient China, India,

the Nile and Euphrates river valleys and organized as a theocratic autocracy, in which the

rulers were seen as incarnations of gods. The ancient mode of production is similar to the

Asiatic mode, but distinct in the property of the existence of slaves absent in the Asiatic mode.

The typical examples of this mode of production are the ancient Greek and Roman societies.

These despotic types of societal organization were followed by feudalism ruled as a monarchy,

which, in turn, developed into capitalism. Capitalism is based on a two-class society, where

the ruling class is the bourgeoisie and the working class – the proletariat, whereby the

organizational form of society is the modern state serving the needs of the bourgeoisie.

According to Marxism, capitalism is doomed to fall as a result of class struggle and

continuous crises of overproduction, as to be replaced by socialism, which will serve the

democratically determined needs of the public with the means of production being owned

publicly (Marx & Engels, 1848). Here, the state would remain the dominant actor, but society

would be ruled by the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie. Socialism, in turn, is predicted to

gradually develop into communism, which is described as a classless global society, in which

oppressive mechanisms such as the state will no longer be needed and scientific management

of things will replace the management of people (Ibid.).

When following this line of thought, communism seems to resemble the idea of a

mature anarchy in its property of the taking over of state functions by institutionalized

international regimes, in which political issues will be managed by means of cooperation

possible only in the presence of a common global normative background. Considering the

verified destabilizing effect capitalism has on the system suggests the assumption that the

current set-up of the global economy might entail the greatest obstacle to the establishment of

a mature anarchy. By this, the establishment of a mature anarchy system would need to be

triggered from the economic dimension and, hence, by economic mechanisms, which is

contrary to the model of a federal world government already analysed, as well as to the

balance of power model. This is because the latter two are the outcomes of the interplay

between systemic factors and the mechanisms of the interaction between individuals and

nations; thus, they are determined by the society domain.

As it turned out during our analysis, though, the mature anarchy model seems to be

determined by the economic domain. Thus, its success or failure can be expected to depend on

the economic system, which – according to Marxism – is, indeed, a variable influencing the

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very system and enabling a transition towards a new stage of human development determined

by the induction of a new mode of production. This finding is contrary to the initial

assumption suggesting that mature anarchy can be a result of globalization influencing the

primary agent in the system - men. This hypothesis turned out wrong, as the success of the

mature anarchy model was found to be linked to the organizational principles of the global

economy.

Thus, the mechanism required for the establishment of a mature anarchy seems to be

the transition from the current capitalist to a higher mode of production. In the “Manifesto of

the Communist Party” it is argued that the forces unleashed by the global market – we should

not forget that Marx and Engels wrote their article in 1848 when the term ’globalization’ was

yet unknown – lead to the vanishing of initially class and finally national differences and

antagonisms: “In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will be put an

end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as

the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to

another will come to an end” (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 25). By this statement, the authors

basically reformulate my claim made above – the forces of globalization might only lead to a

unification of the world under the aegis of universal values, when the set-up of the global

economy changes.

While antagonists might argue against this assumption by referring to the downfall of

the Soviet Union, which can be regarded as a large-scale experiment of a socialist society

which failed, the fact that the Soviet Union ceased to exist does not automatically discredit the

theory. Further, as established by the analysis undertaken in this section, the current set-up of

the global economy does represent an obstacle towards mature anarchy, while the system as

we know it is evidently undergoing a transformation triggered by the forces of globalization.

Whether or not the changes will affect primarily the economy or rather the society and

whether those changes will lead to the establishment of socialism or a similar system is

questionable. What can be speculated about with certainty, though, it that the currently more

or less free trade regime will have to transform into a more planned type of economy at some

point due to the scarcity of resources which is constantly worsening in the face of the ever

growing population. Anyways, as it can hardly be predicted when a change in the economic

system will occur, how the new system will look like, and – most important to our study –

whether a restructured economy will favour a mature anarchy as the dominant set-up of the

system or will be run by means of coordination by civilizational blocs in a balance of power

system, for the time being, the current set-up of the global economy is to be treated as a

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negative factor towards mature anarchy and as a transformative force with regard to the

system.

The last threat entailed in the domain of the economy is connected to the use of

economic instruments as means of power projection. This source of insecurity is not governed

by any type of regime, but regulated in bi- or multilateral agreements between countries

provided that those have been concluded. In case they exist, those agreements often reflect the

currently existing alliances subordinated to their respective centers. The sensitivity and high

polarization of that domain stems from the fact that it is used as one of the instruments of

modern warfare – alike humanitarian intervention – which virtually excludes a classic type of

war between the major systemic powers due to nuclear weapons. Such a utilization of

economic means coupled with an absence of any globally formulated rules turns this domain

into one of the major destabilizing factors in the international system directly linked to the

society domain governed by the security dilemma.

Thus, economy clearly stands against any attempt to establish a mature anarchy

system, while also impedes coordination due to a lack of a regime regulating economic

warfare and exerts an overall destabilizing effect on the system forcing it towards bloc

competition. Society constitutes a better regulated domain, in which power-based

coordination clearly dominates cooperation, thus, also implying the prevalence of the balance

of power model. The environmental domain turned out to indeed generate cooperation as far

as disaster management regimes were concerned. Environmental regimes, in general, also

clearly displayed features in favour of a mature anarchy system, yet, mainly due to the very

different socio-economic characteristics of its participants, were still subjected to the national

interest hindering cooperation. By this, the second determining variable of global

interlinkages was found to clearly favour coordination over cooperation as the functional type

of most existing regimes.

Summing up, both mechanisms through which the identified intervening variable of

globalization acts turned out to clearly indicate a transformation of the system in line with the

balance of power model (see table 4). The mental dimension attacked the values of people and

the assumption in this section was that globalization might have a unifying potential through

the creation of universal values. The result was the opposite. Instead of unifying the world, it

turned out to have reactivated the sense of ethno-cultural affiliation dividing the world into

civilizational blocs absorbed in inter-civilizational conflict. The physical dimension of

globalization entailed interlinkages which have affected the three domains of human activity:

society, economy and the environment. Apart from the environment, which constitutes a low

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political issue not governed by the security dilemma, both other domains revealed a clear

inclination towards limited coordination of core security issues in the framework of a

multipolar power system.

As for the destiny of the tested regimes, it can be anticipated that the regimes rated as

having a regulative effect on the system will continue to exist as means of international

regulation in core issues, while those identified as destabilizing can be expected to either

disappear or to transform. So, rules of war regimes are likely to remain intact as to generate

coordinated outcomes required to guarantee a minimal level of stability in the system

obligatory for the survival of its actors. The rather technical disaster management regimes can

be expected to remain in power in a similar way they do now, while environmental regimes

will probably gain in competences turning from dead letter to classic regimes due to a

sharpening of environmental problems and growing resource scarcity in combination with

growing population anticipated for the future.

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6. The Balance of Power model (model 3)

Following the conclusions of the previous section, globalization was found not to induce a

universalization of the international system, but rather its fragmentation into civilizational

blocs triggered by a revived sense of ethno-cultural affiliation. The liberal claim that

international regimes enhance cooperation turned out wrong with regard to all issues defined

as high politics. While international regimes provide efficient instruments of coordination in

issues identified as stabilizing factors of the system, they are not capable of fostering

cooperation in issues of high politics. On the contrary, they rather reflect the currently already

visible division of the world into civilizational blocs, which manifests itself in the processes

of regionalisation detected within the regimes.

As outlined already in the 1960s by Bruce Russet in his thorough study on regionalism,

while an overall increase in the number of institutions throughout the world has grown, the

proliferation of institutional ties has occurred within ’pre-existing groupings’, and has not led

to the emergence of new clusters or induced any major shifts by countries from one node to

another (Russett, 1967, p. 116). When speaking of groupings, Russett referred to ’regional

federations’, which he considered useful units for the analysis of world politics. On this we

can see that the tendencies so obvious today have already been traceable in the middle of the

Cold War period, which coincides with the argument made above that the historically

determined ethno-cultural affiliation is a much stronger factor of unity than ideology. His

finding resembles the modern tendencies in the system favouring the formation of a

civilization-based world system as captured by Huntington and elaborated upon in detail in

section 5. Assuming that the emergence of globalization as an intervening variable has been a

natural consequence in the evolution of mankind, it would imply that time has come for a

transition towards a new form of societal organization induced by the forces of globalization,

which would be evoked through the domain of society – as contrary to the mature anarchy

model dependent upon the economic domain.

Hereby, it is worth mentioning that, due to the integration forces at work under the

mature anarchy model, at some point, the international system would likely to have

transformed into a structure of the world similar to a world government. Such a type of

system would be institutionalized thought the work of global regimes functioning on the basis

of cooperation similar to the “solidarity of States” model referred to by Bull in his analysis of

possible alternatives to the states system (Bull, 2012, pp. 230-232). Hereby, the mature

anarchy model can be sought of as a possible preliminary stage to any global, centralized type

of system structure, because it is expected to be induced mainly as a consequence of a

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universalization of values, which has been the basis for two of the mechanisms established as

necessary prerequisites for the setting up of a world government when in accordance with

model 1 – societal pressure and the socialization effect. Therefore, one could argue that by the

testing of the mature anarchy model, we have found another way to test the society-based

mechanisms identified as necessary for the establishment of a world government.

The on-going transformation of the state-based system has begun with the Russian

revolution in 1917 through the establishment of a higher geo-political entity than the state –

the Soviet Union –, which can be seen as a first attempt to establish a regional federative bloc.

The two-polar system that emerged out of it – the Cold War system – appeared to be unstable,

though. The Soviet Union dissociated, among others, as a result of an increased frequency and

intensity of war inherent in the nature of bipolarity as compared to multipolarity – an

argument to be discussed in detail in the course of this section. Despite the temporary going

back to the prevalence of the states system, this system structure turned out to be unstable, as

its validity date was already expired. Indeed, as argued by Russett: “Over the past several

centuries a clear trend is visible, a trend toward the integration of lower levels of the hierarchy

into higher ones. Small political units such as city-states have become absorbed into nations,

and existing nations have become more thoroughly integrated as the degree of homogeneity

and interaction among their component units have risen” (Russett, 1967, p. 221).

The fact that our current set-up of the system is undergoing a change becomes tangible,

predominantly, on the disturbances in the system well visible on both the re-established

struggle over the spheres of influence by the major powers and the struggle for regional self-

determination by the existing civilizational units, taking the most violent form in the Arab

world. The ongoing systemic crisis might indicate that we find ourselves now at point in

history when the international system experiences a restructuring from a unipolar world

dominated by the hegemonic power represented by the US established for a short period of

time after the dissolution of the bipolar system shared between the Soviet Union and the

United States, to a multipolar world of civilizations balanced between the modern structural

powers each constituting a leader within its civilizational bloc: the United States, Russia,

China, and the secondary powers.

The transition is caused by the recovery of Russia after the break-up of the Soviet

Union; the continuous rise of China’s economic and military influence, along with Brazil’s

and India’s, although to a lesser extent; the unification of the European states into the

European Union; as well as multiple unrest in the Islamic world, which is alarmingly

revisionist in character. Provided a unification of the now dispersed Islamic civilization, we

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might soon face another global player. The strengthened regional identity is a consequence of

the forces of globalization which have re-activated national sentiments and upgraded the

importance of the criterion of ethno-cultural affiliation towards an individual’s cultural

community, the highest form of which is a civilization. This struggle can be expected to

continue until a new balance of power is achieved in the system.

The balance of power model is a realist system model based on the assumption that the

anarchy in the system is a given and deriving its logic from the notion of relative power.

Based on the conclusions reached in the above analysis, the units between which the power is

going to be balanced in the system will be of a higher hierarchical level than the state and

established on a civilizational basis. As for the states, they can be expected to remain the

major organizational unit within the federative civilizational blocs. Thus, what we will deal

with in this section are regional federations (hereafter to be referred to as ’blocs’) of states

sharing a number of criteria making them stable geo-political entities internally and powerful

externally, so that a new balance of power system can be established. As in line with the

tenets of realism, the security dilemma will continue to govern the system, while it can be

expected to mute due to a stabilizing effect exerted on the system by balanced power relations

provided that the blocs manage to adopt a defensive security strategy and settle on the new

status quo in a regulative framework provided by means of globally coordinated rules-of-the-

game regimes.

Those regimes can be expected to be formed out of those which were rated as having a

regulative effect on the system and were envisaged to remain intact by the analysis

undertaken throughout section 5, and probably some new ones which may be formed in the

years to come. Those regimes will constitute the institutional carcass maintaining the order

within the new balance of power system. This is due to the fact that, as outlined by Schelling:

“The coordination game probably lies behind the stability of institutions and traditions and

perhaps the phenomenon of leadership itself. Among the possible sets of rules that might

govern a conflict, tradition points to the particular set that everyone can expect everyone else

to be conscious of“ (Schelling, 1960, p. 91). By this statement, Schelling practically

formulates the idea behind the rules of war regime analysed in the preceding section. Thus,

coordination in a BoP system constitutes the framework for the stabilizing institutions of the

system, such as the principle of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law etc., which provide

the element of ’order ’ in the otherwise anarchical system (see subsequent section 6.1).

As for those regimes based on cooperation, as in line with the findings of section 5,

cooperation on non-politicized issues can and has to continue taking place, yet, without

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inducing a deeper integration between the units. Those regimes based on cooperation might,

possibly, represent the opposite type to the “strategy of conflict” prevalent for cases of pure

coordination as outlined by Schelling, namely, cases of “pure collaboration […] in which the

players win or lose together, having identical preferences regarding the outcome” (Schelling,

1960, p. 84). Those regimes might serve as institutions generating the element of ’justice’ in

the otherwise anarchical system (see subsequent section).

6.1. The English School

The conclusions reached by the analysis of the international system undertaken in the course

of this piece were obtained by the research methods of the core theories of IR – (neo-)realism,

(neo-)liberalism, constructivism, (neo-)functionalism, and, as for the economic

interdependencies, Marxism. Such an integrative research approach can be placed within the

general theoretical framework of the (New) English School. Indeed, the English School can

be seen as an integrative theory, which “incorporates realist postulates, such as an emphasis

on the primacy of states interacting in an anarchic system, but combines that realist

understanding with the notion of a human element emerging from the domestic sphere”

(Murray, 19, p. 9). Hereby, as summarized by Little, the theoretical carcass of the English

School is based on the distinctions of the three elements being: the international system,

international society (also referred to as ’society of states’), and world society (Little, 1995,

p.11). Those elements can generally be related to the three main traditions in IR theory –

realism, constructivism (or rationalism as according to Wight, 1996), and liberalism (or

revolutionism as according to Buzan, 2001), respectively.

As argued by Buzan: “broadly speaking, these terms [in relation to international

system, international society, and world society] are now understood as follows:

• International system (Hobbes/Machiavelli) is about power politics amongst

states, and Realism puts the structure and process of international anarchy at

the centre of IR theory. […]

• International society (Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest

and identity amongst states, and Rationalism puts the creation and maintenance

of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. […]

• World society (Kant) takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately

the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and

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arrangements, and Revolutionism puts transcendence of the state system at the

centre of IR theory. […]” (Buzan, 2001, pp. 474 ,475).

These three elements build the “formal structure of the global social complex” (Suganami,

2010, p. 17), which the English School seeks to analyse. Hereby, the international society can

generally be seen as the key element of the English School, which “operates based on the

influence of both the international system and world society” (Murray, p. 9), and is

maintained by means of institutions, which are, according to Bull: balance of power,

international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management. Hereby, the

term ’institution’ does “not necessarily imply an organization or administrative machinery,

but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (Bull,

2012, p. 71).

Those elements of international society, I would argue, can be divided into those

related to anarchy and defining the structure of the international system – extent and relevance

of war, presence or absence of balance of power, relations between the existent great powers –,

and into those related to the balance between order and justice (or coordination and

cooperation, see subsequent paragraphs) and defining the nature and stability of the

international system – international law, diplomacy. Hereby, the term ’great power

management’ might probably require some clarification. So, one of Bull’s interpretations of

this term is as follows: “great powers manage their relations with one another in the interest of

international order by (i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or

control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars

among one another.” (Bull, 2012, p. 200).

Currently, the international society consists of states, and is governed by anarchy. As

Suganami puts it: “It is an anarchical society of sovereign states” (Suganami, 2010, p. 18).

This position coincides with the realist tenet that “States are the units whose interactions form

the structure of international-political systems” (Waltz, 1979, p. 95). Thus, when adopting a

constructivist line of argument, one could say that the English School links the system of

international relations, in which the structure is the international system and its agents are the

states, with the system of the state, in which the structure is the state, and the agents –

individuals. However, the English school approach foresees one more category, namely, a

system of global society, which stands in a clear contrast to the system of states.

Yet, the notion of world society is considerably underdeveloped in the conceptual

basis of the English School, because, as pointed out, among others, by Buzan, it cannot

provide an answer to the question of “where the organized but non-state component of global

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civil society should be located. If transnational firms and international non-governmental

organizations are part of world society, it is far from clear how they relate to world society

conceived in terms of shared identity at the individual level” (Buzan, 2001, p. 477). Such

criticism largely coincides with other empirical data elaborated upon and analysed throughout

this piece, suggesting that there is no global identity among the Earth’s population, but a

regional one, which bases its relevance on the historically established ethno-cultural similarity

of groups of people the highest level of which is a civilization.

While the international system operates under the conditions of anarchy, the state of

anarchy does not necessarily mean the absence of order on the international arena. As already

touched upon above, the element of order is provided by the established institutions designed

to maintain a minimal degree of stability in the system, which is defined by a set of rules

which build the carcass of international law. Those institutions are located within the element

of international society. As argued by Bull: “A society of states (international society) exists

when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a

society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in

their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 2012,

p. 13). Thus, the establishment and maintenance of order in the international system depends

upon the interplay of three factors: the existence of common interests, which will allow the

formation of rules, and their succeeding legitimization by means of the establishment of

respective institutions (Bull, 2012). Hereby, there is a disagreement between the scholars

counting themselves to the English School about the way those institutions function, which

divides the school into two camps – pluralists and solidarists,

Solidarists emphasize the normative dimension through which the international society

operates by insisting on the relevance of shared norms and the resulting status of international

law. Hereby, solidarists operate with such notions as ’justice’ or ’standards of civilization’

when analysing word politics, and advocate interventionist measures to obtain those perceived

standards, while generally assuming that national sovereignty defined in the classical way as

“the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community [,

while] no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere” (Hinsley, 1986, p.26) can be

diminished by the obligations which the state has laid upon itself, and which are generally

manifested in international law (Linklater & Suganami, 2006). Hereby, the questions of

legitimacy and social relevance of the set of rules prescribed by the body of international law

is payed primary attention to. As observed by Manning: “The imputation to it [in reference to

international law] by the society it serves of its status as law is by the same token an

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imputation to it of binding character. Not naturally, but in point of status, it is binding”

(Manning, 1975, p. 106).

While supporting the premise that international law becomes binding through its status,

pluralists argue that the successful implementation of international law is only possible in the

presence of an interplay between the institutions of the balance of power and of great power

management. As argued by Bull: “The efficacy of international law in international society

does in fact depend on measures of self-help. In the absence of a central authority with

preponderant power, some rules of international law are in fact upheld by measures of self-

help, including the threat and use of force” (Bull, 2012, p. 126). Hereby, pluralists emphasize

the importance of sovereignty for the maintenance of international order by stressing that

“sovereignty is about the cultivation of political difference and distinctness” and attribute a

rather minimal scope role for the international society “centred on shared concerns about

international order under anarchy, and thus largely confined to agreement about sovereignty,

diplomacy and non-intervention” (Buzan, 2001, p. 478).

Thus, apart from the general condemnation of humanitarian intervention without the

resolution of the Security Council due to danger of its misuse as an instrument of modern

warfare (elaborated in detail in section 5.1.2.) by the author, the solidarist position on

international society entails a number of theoretical impurities which are worth emphasizing.

So, the concentration on just one of the institutions outlined by Bull (balance of power,

international law, war, diplomacy, great power management), as in the case of solidarists and

international law, involves a cognitive dissonance. This is due to the fact that, as already

outlined in the course on this analysis, de facto, there is no international law. This derives

from the very assumption of anarchy, which governs the international system and constitutes

one of the key tenets of the English School. The solidarist reference to such notions

as ’individual justice’ when analysing the international society is fairly questionable, as those

concepts are inseparably linked to the state and the institute of citizenship. This is due to the

commonly accepted fact that the state is governed by the rule of law, while the international

system is governed by the rule of anarchy. As put by Waltz: “A national system is not one of

self-help. The international system is“ (Waltz, 1979, p. 104). As there is no world government

in the system which could recognize individuals as its citizens, ’individual justice’ is a

concept only applicable at the national level. From this also follows that the reference to the

normative dimension when analysing states as the agents of the system, and not individuals, is

still incorrect, as it would undermine the accepted premise of anarchy.

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The emphasis on the relevance of international law is valid. However, it is valid only as long

as the other institutions established to provide for a minimal degree of order in the

international system, such as the balance of power, diplomacy, and sovereignty, are intact.

This is due to the simple logic that in the absence of an overarching authority in international

relations, which could guarantee the adherence to the established international law, the only

way to maintain order, is by the means of coordination thought balanced power relations,

institutionalized in international regimes, as well as in the practice of diplomacy and other

available channels on inter-state interaction. Hereby, the existing regulation does not

necessarily need to be incorporated in the formal corpus of international law, as tacit regimes

turned out to be at least as effective as classic ones (see section 5.1.2.). The relevance of the

international norm as an instrument through which international society acts, works only for

technical issues, while those rated as highly politicized are governed by the competitive logic

of the international system, according to which “the state of nature is the state of war” (Waltz,

1979, p. 102). These logical conclusions coincide with the results obtained in the analysis

undertaken in section 5, according to which some rules-of-the-game regimes were rated as

having a stabilizing effect on the system, which is maintained by means of coordination in

issues of high politics, and by means of cooperation in technical issues.

This reasoning might contribute to the debate between solidarists and pluralists, as it

could mediate the dichotomy between the notions of order and justice. These notions can be

regarded from their instrumental side, by this, becoming generic terms of coordination and

cooperation, respectively. If interpreted in such a way, these hard-to-study elements of

international society become more tangible through their institutionalization within global

regimes. Indeed, the classic definition of international society given by Bull and Watson as:

“a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which

not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the

calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules

and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in

maintaining these arrangements“ (Bull & Watson, 1984, p.1) basically coincides with the

definition of a regime “sets of implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making

procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international

relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 141).

In this line of argument, international society could be interpreted as a combination of

global regimes. Such an interpretation would allow giving an answer to the question on where

world society could be located, raised earlier on in this sub-section. When applying the

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conceptualization of the element of international society in such a way, those regimes which

were found to function on the basis of cooperation, thus, following the ideal of justice, at least

among its participants, would be regarded as arenas in which the abstract global population

could practically generate a global normative basis. This basis, however, can be expected to

remain of a narrow and highly specified – ’thin’ – character on the global scale, while being

largely coherent – ’thick’ – on the level of regional federations of states, as in line with the

findings of section 5.

Thus, overall, the analysis of the international and world societies conducted in the

theoretical framework established above comes to the same conclusion arguing that the

normative dimension of the global social complex is decisive for determining the resulting

type of system structure. Today, clear tendencies indicating the rise of the relevance of

regional federations and the increasing importance of civilizational identities throughout the

world can be traced, which favours the establishment of a balance of power system as in line

with the analysis undertaken throughout this piece. In case, however, a global world society

institutionalized by means of a norm-based international society institutionalized through

global regimes could have been traced, we might have been able to speak of an initiation of a

more integrative type of system structure, such as in the case of the mature anarchy model.

Such a state of affairs would “represent the fulfilment of the Grotian or solidarist doctrine of

international order, which envisages that states, while setting themselves against the

establishment of a world government, nevertheless seek, by close collaboration among

themselves and by close adherence to constitutional principles of international order

[embodied in the United Nations Charter] to which they have given their assent, to provide a

substitute for world government ” (Bull, 2012, p. 230). The prevalence of the states system

over a full-fledged world government was already confirmed throughout this study, as the

nation state proved to retain its central position in the international system.

The essence of the disagreement between the pluralist and solidarist conceptions of

international society largely reminds of the neo-neo debate splitting the community of IR

theorists into two camps. While this further substantiates the conceptual relevance and

legitimacy of the neo-neo debate, this implies that some scholars previously adhering to one

of the competing schools of thought, either realism or liberalism, have simply broadened their

initial theoretical frameworks by accepting some of the premises of their counterparts, by

doing so, becoming part of the rather varied theoretical camp of the English School. The

theoretical framework of the English School allows rather broad interpretations on a variety of

IR phenomena, and its still underdeveloped core concepts allow for even more freedom of

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interpretation. While the theoretical broadness certainly constitutes one of the major

weaknesses of the English School, which has been a source for occasional criticism

throughout IR literature, this condition may also be seen as the theory’s key advantage, as its

theoretical framework becomes less restrictive, and allows for a more reality-driven study of

the system of international relations.

6.2. Factors of Internal Stability and External Power of civilizational blocs

As already touched upon above, the major units of interaction in the new balance of power

system are sought to be civilizational blocs, which need to fulfil a number of criteria to be

both internally stable geo-political entities and sufficiently powerful externally. Factors of

internal stability of a bloc can be adopted from Russett’s “International Regions and the

International system”. To delineate congruent regions, he identified five indicators: social and

cultural homogeneity; political attitudes or external behaviour; political institutions; economic

interdependence; and geographical proximity. According to the author, social and cultural

homogeneity refers to the similarity of nations within the groupings. Thus, this criterion might

be equated with the civilizational approach applied by Huntington and elaborated upon in

subsection 5.1.1. which was dedicated to the examination of the ethno-cultural unity within

regions. Political attitudes can be best deduced from the external behaviour of a state, which

can most easily be inferred from a state’s voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly, as

well as from its decisions on core issues of world politics. As already outlined above, in his

analysis, Russett came to the conclusion that the national interest discounts the role of internal

political factors, while is determined by systemic factors. Thus, the voting behaviour of states

can be expected to be determined by the respective region it can be classified to. The factor of

political attitudes, thus, just as the ones to follow and in line with the findings of this analysis,

suggests for continuity and a strengthening of intra-regional integration, rather than for

change and inter-regional unification.

Political institutions are important with regard to regional stability as they are sought

to foster integration. By doing so, they contribute to the establishment of so-called ’security-

communities’. Deutsch et al. (1957) defined the two interrelated concepts of security-

communities and integration in the following way: “A security-community is a group of

people which has become “integrated”. By integration we mean the attainment, within a

territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and

widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful

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change” among its population. […] By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social

problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical

force. A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the

members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes

in some other way” (Deutsch et al, 1957, pp. 123, 124).

By this, political institutions can be crucial instruments to reduce the probability of

armed conflict between its participants. However, while intra-regional regimes indeed provide

the ground for a deeper form of integration allowing the formation of a security-community,

and, by this, increase the level of security within the community, they at the same time might

be sought of as phenomena decreasing global security. This is due to the fact that they at the

same time strengthen the regional bonds and alienate the regions from each other through an

increased homogenization of each region relative to the other. By doing so, regional security-

communities transfer the security dilemma from the state level, towards the level of the

regional federations united within a security-community. As argued by Russett, “[…] regional

integration is a choice against the cross-pressures or cross-cutting solidarities that bind […]

the diverse nations from all parts of the world” (Russett, 1967, p. 229). According to the

author, the role of cross-pressures in international conflict prevention is enormous. Cross-

pressures has originally been a sociological concept referring to different loyalties an

individual might have with regard to his basic attributes, such as ethnic background, religion,

or occupation. Empirical studies carried out in the United States have revealed that conflicts

between heterogeneous groups, in which the members were cross-pressured (thus were

composed of representatives of different ethnic groups, professions or religions) tended to be

less polarized and severe than between homogeneous groups (Ibid.).

Economic interdependence was identified as the fourth criterion of a stable region.

This factor resembles the findings above. As argued by Russett, the observed economic

linkages suggest for continuity with regard to the stability of the already existing regions,

rather than the creation of a universalist system. He makes the example of the decline of

colonial rule, which did not result in the dissolution of the former inner-colonial ties. He

further argues to abstain from the usage of the level of trade as an indicator for political

integration. This is because political integration presupposes a relation between the parties on

an equal basis, not one based on coercion and suppression, in which one side always have to

make concessions to the stronger counterpart. So, in case the disparity in the market power of

the ’trading partners’ is large, there can be no question of a political integration. On the

contrary, the author makes the example of United States – Cuba relations, which were based

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on the disparity schema just described. This trade patterns created pressures, which resulted in

Cuba shifting the Alliance and turning to the Soviet camp (Russett, 1967, pp.126, 127).

Furthermore, and in line with the findings of the previous section, the current set-up of

the economic system does not contribute to a reduction of the prosperity gap between the

richest and the poorest nations of the Earth, as well as counteracts a deeper form the global

integration. As found by Russett, intra-regional trade has gained the upper hand over world-

wide commerce in the northern regions, where a Common Market has been formed in

Western Europe and in Eastern Europe, which was the communist camp during the time

Russett conducted his study, while the rest of the world experienced the contrary trend with

world commerce surpassing intra-regional trade. Following thereout, one can see that the

prosperity of the regions where intra-regional trade regulated by customs unions has the

advantage is much greater than in regions where inter-regional trade has the advantage, which

all happen to be developing countries. This matches the theory of the center-periphery

relations governing the current set-up of the global market economy.

By this, the core criterion reflecting the determining components of the first four

criteria described above can be cumulatively referred to as socio-economic homogeneity. It

can be regarded as a central criterion, because, as we have observed, the second, the third and

the fourth criteria (political attitudes, political institutions and economic interdependence) are

all determined by systemic factors dependent upon the socio-cultural homogeneity of the

existing regions, which, in turn, is historically established in case the fifth criterion

(geographic proximity) is provided. The regions, in turn, roughly resemble the existing trade

blocs (criterion four). Thus, in case the intra-regional economic bonds coincide with the

civilizations delineated in section 5, we might speak of a more or less stable geo-political

entity.

The final criterion, geographic proximity, has been a necessary condition for the

formation of the socio-cultural bonds which now provide the basis for the delineation of

civilizations – criterion one. Today, it seems to lose its importance due to the technological

advantages of the modern age, though. Indeed, the global communication network as well as

the modern means of transportation have made distance a relative notion largely removing its

previously dividing potential. While certainly correct as long as the global trade is concerned,

geographic proximity continues to play a major role in the maintenance of the existing regions.

A continuous border line between the civilizational blocs is needed for its internal strength

with regard to the preservation of civilizational ties, the avoidance of assimilation of a

region’s parts by neighbouring civilizations, etc. By this, we have established the factors

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making a region stable, which can be equated with the notion of a strong state, albeit applied

to a higher level of geo-political integration.

Geographic criteria determine not only the internal strength of a bloc, though, but also

its external power vis-à-vis the other blocs. If we recall that for a successful functioning of the

balance of power model, the defence has to have the advantage over the offence in a bloc’s

security strategy, the criterion of geographic proximity becomes crucial again. While modern

warfare allows for waging wars over long distances through the use of long-distance missiles

and alike, the defence of an enclave is certainly much more difficult than of a territory

enclosed by a single boundary. Another important geographical factor is the existence of a

natural barrier between a bloc and its potential adversaries. The best position for such a large

geo-political entity as a regional confederation is to occupy an entire continent, as in the case

of the United States and Canada building the stable part of the American bloc (see sub-section

6.3), which has a clear advantage over the Eurasian blocs due to its remoteness. Further, as

already brought up, the blocs need to be of a roughly equal physical size, because in case one

bloc is considerably smaller in comparison to the other relevant actors, such as Japan, for

example, its comparative disadvantage becomes non-compensable at a point when the capital

inputs cease to substitute a lacking resource, which would have been available provided for a

greater size of the bloc.

Another prerequirement for a bloc to be powerful enough to succeed in the

civilizational balance of power model is general military capability, the availability of nuclear

weapons and missiles to carry them, as well as second-strike capability. While general

military capabilities apply to the availability of military machines, equipment and personnel,

strategic nuclear weapons is a necessity, because they lift the country up to another relative

power dimension offering enough deterrence for the other blocs as to refrain from a direct

attack, which allows the actor to apply a defensive-oriented security strategy. Provided that no

anti-missile system capable of blocking a nuclear attack will be developed and effectively

deployed by one of the powers, the other major blocs have similar military technology at their

disposal and maintain a defence-oriented security doctrine, the possession of a sufficient

nuclear arsenal becomes a guarantor that the respective actor will not be directly attacked by

its potential adversaries. Thus, the overall level of security in the system would grow

considerably.

Another criterion making a bloc externally powerful is its potential for economic self-

sufficiency. This factor is insofar important, as it determines the dependency of a bloc on

foreign imports of a key resource, product, or service. Here, it should be differentiated

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between sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity refers to the short-term damage which can

be inflicted upon an actor through the denial of a major good. The more harmful type of

dependency is vulnerability, as it refers to the ability to adapt to the lack of imports in the

long-run. This adaptation may entail substitution of the good, the initiation of the domestic

production of the respective good or technological innovations allowing to abandon this good.

An illustrative example of the difference between the two can be drawn from the

Russia-EU trade relations. In case Russia ceases to import its gas to the European Union, a

double-effect comes into force. The EU, which is both sensitive and vulnerable with regard to

fuel imports, will be damaged gravely, as it will not be able to compensate the lacking energy

resources through neither substitutes from other importers, nor will it be able to live without it,

unless it overcomes its vulnerability by the invention of a new source of energy, which is

unlikely to happen in the next future. Russia, on the other hand, will also be heavily damaged

in the short-run, as its economy relies on the money inflow from the fuels trade with the EU.

In the long-run, however, Russia will be able to adapt by either substituting one trading

partner for another, or by a restructuring of its economy so as to cease to rely on foreign

money inflows. Thus, while both blocs are sensitive with regard to their energy-trade relations,

the degree of vulnerability of the two differs.

The last criterion providing for the relative external power of a bloc is the existence of

a core state which possesses both the legitimacy and the required power to lead its respective

civilization. An effective center is required for a bloc to be able to efficiently exploit its

resources. This necessary factor for the success of a bloc is well known from history. The

unification of a formerly disperse feudal society under one central authority has led to the

establishment of a more powerful geo-political entity of the state ruling over a united nation.

Provided that the organizational system of society follows the currently visible trend towards

an integration of the lower hierarchical levels to higher ones, the former centralization of

power which has led to be establishment of nations might now be the force turning the related

nations into civilizations held together in regional confederations. Summing up, so far we

have established criteria for the internal strength of a bloc, as well as for its external relative

power. The internal strength can be estimated by the correlation of the determining variables

of the socio-cultural homogeneity with the respective civilization’s economic interconnections

reflected by the corresponding Free Trade Areas (FTAs), which – if coincide – will indicate

the socio-economic homogeneity of a civilizational bloc. Geographic factors matter for both

the internal and the external strength of a civilizational bloc. A sufficient size; general military

capabilities, the possession of nuclear weapons and second-strike capability coupled with a

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defensive security strategy; potential economic self-sufficiency; and the existence of a core

state, provide the necessary criteria for a bloc’s relative external power. What remains to do is

to check each of the delineated civilizations for their potential to form a bloc capable of

becoming one of the powers between which the influence in the world will be divided and

power – balanced.

6.3. Identifiable blocs

As already indicated above, the potential blocs can be segregated according to the

civilizations inhabiting the respective territories. This work has been generally undertaken in

the preceding section and is illustrated on figure 12. Currently, eight civilizational blocs can

be delineated in the system: the American, the European, the Russian, the Islamic, the Hindu,

the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Latin American. The established criteria for internal

strength are: 1. socio-cultural homogeneity; 2. intra-regional economic interdependence (Free

Trade Areas); 3. geographic proximity. The criteria for external relative power are: 1.

existence of natural barriers; 2. sufficient size; 3. possession of nuclear weapons and second-

strike capability; 4. potential economic self-sufficiency; 5. the existence of a core state. Now

that the parameters are set, let us begin with the blocs’ examination.

Figure 12. Civilizational blocs

Source: own figure

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The American bloc constitutes the first geo-political entity to be examined with regard to its

internal strength and external power. The American civilization can be regarded as an

offspring of the European civilization and is composed of states dominated by ethnical

Europeans, who have lost their loyalty to the European host countries, and, by doing so,

became part of a new civilization distinct from ’old’ Europe. The bloc incorporates the United

States, which is this civilization’s core state, Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and Papua New

Guinea. According to US government data for 2013, the population of the United States is

composed of three main races: White (62,6 %), Hispanic or Latino (17,1%) and Black or

African American (13,2%). Hereby, the first two categories apply to immigrants from Europe,

dominated by former either English and, to a lesser extent, Spanish speakers. The third

category refers to former Africans shipped to America to be sold as slaves. This rather diverse

composition accompanied by further immigrants from all over the world evolved into what

became to be referred to as a state-nation, created by means of massive governmental efforts

on nation building. Here, the formerly ethno-culturally diverse population united not on the

basis of common culture or historical heritage as regular nations did, but on the basis of

loyalty towards a state.

The population of the remaining member states of the American civilizations is

dominated by immigrants from Europe, mostly English-speakers. New Zeeland and Papua

New Guinea can be seen as exceptions here, as the population with a European origin makes

up only 56.8% of the total population of New Zeeland, and is virtually absent in Papua New

Guinea, which is composed of indigenous people represented by Melanesians, Papuans,

Negritos, Micronesians and Polynesians (Nation Master, 2013). Overall, it can be argued that

the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the majority of this bloc’s population, as well as the existence of

a common language, which is English, and a common institutional basis and ideological

principles of those societies’ organization make the American civilizational bloc a largely

homogeneous entity. Despite its ethnic deviation, Papua New Guinea is also counted as part

of the American civilization due to its British colonial heritage, which is still present in as far

as the British Queen is seen as the formal head of state, which makes this state a direct zone

of influence of the broader ’West’, while its disposition far from the European mainland

excludes its possible association with the European civilization.

Intra-regional economic interdependence is given only partly for the American bloc.

While the United States and Canada – together with Mexico, which is a representative of the

Latin American civilization – are economically tightly integrated in the North Atlantic Free

Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Australia, New Zeeland and Papua New Guinea are not included

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in this economic alliance. This fact has mainly to do with the criterion of geographic

proximity, which divides the delineated American civilization into two parts – the American

core consisting of the USA and Canada, and the South-Asian colonized satellite-islands of the

Western world: Australia, New Zeeland and Papua New Guinea.

The importance of economic interdependence as a criterion of effective regionalism

becomes visible when we consider the fact that during the 1990s, Australia was about to take

the course of defecting from the ’West’ and ally with the Asian region. As observed by

Samuel Huntington, the main supporter of this trend in the 1990s was Australia’s Prime

Minister Paul Keating, who justified his preferences by reference to Australia otherwise

remaining a derivative society subordinated to Britain and debilitating its future which lies in

Asia and the Pacific region. This trend was triggered by a prevalence of trade with East- and

Southeast Asia, which accounted for 62% of Australia’s exports and provided 41% of its

imports by 1994, while Australia’s exports to the then European Community accounted for

only 11,8% and to the United States – for 10,1% (Huntington, 1997, p. 151). On this example

we can see that the prominent slogan that “trade follows the flag” can be reversed. Although

this course was not the mainstream to both the Australian public and its ruling elites, it

indicated Australia as a torn country meaning that its population was divided upon which

political course to follow. Regarding the lacking intra-regional economic ties, the physical

distance and the growing socio-cultural differences between mainland America and the

English-speaking islands, it may be predicted that at some point of history those islands may

leave the Western sphere of influence as to ally with Asia.

Starting with geography, external relative power can be determined by the dislocation

of a bloc. The American bloc occupies the entire continent of North America, where it is

isolated from other civilizations, thus, from potential adversaries – except for Latin America,

which is subordinated to the American civilizations due to considerable differences in the

external relative power, by this, not constituting a real threat – by the Atlantic and the Pacific

Oceans. The criterion of a sufficient size is also obviously given, as the combined area of the

American bloc amounts to 27.775.650 km² (calculated with data from: Geographic directory,

2014). Thus, the geographic criteria of a powerful potential bloc can already be seen as

satisfied.

The availability of a clear leader state provides another criterion determining the

success or failure of the external power dimension of a civilizational bloc. The American

civilization is led by the United States. The United States achieved the highest rating in the

military review conducted for the Russian journal for economic strategy with regard to both

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its nuclear power – 10 out of 10 points and its overall military capabilities – 9,7 points, while

Canada received – 2,4, Australia – 2,2 and New Zealand – 1,2 points (Ageev et al., 2011). By

this, the American bloc was identified as the most powerful military bloc on the planet.

Potential economic self-sufficiency refers to the degree of the dependence of one bloc

on a key resource from another bloc, the refusal of which is capable of damaging a vital

function of a bloc. Imports of raw materials, such as fuels, which cannot be substituted or

produced locally, would provide a good example for such a capability to inflict fatal damage

on a dependent actor. Imports of anything that could potentially be produced locally or

substituted, on the other hand, only affect the sensitivity of a bloc’s economy and not its

vulnerability. Therefore, they do not fall under this category. Hence, in order to examine the

factor of economic self-sufficiency of a bloc, we need to search the import list of a bloc’s

major economies for vital and non-substitutable goods.

Among the five top imports of the United States, we find crude petroleum (around

15%), machines (14%), electronic equipment (13%), vehicles (11%) and medical equipment

(3%) (International Trade Center, 2014). Among those imported goods, only oil constitutes a

non-substitutable good. Thus, in order to estimate the level of economic self-sufficiency of the

American bloc, we shall concentrate, as anticipated, on energy resources. According to

government data from 2013 and in accordance with the verified numbers of US energy

imports, domestic energy production satisfied around 85% of the total energy demand in the

United States (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). Canada turned out to be a net

exporter of energy; indeed, it is one of the six largest energy producers in the world and one

of the sources of US energy imports. Australia has been the world’s second-largest coal

exporter in 2013, while its imports of oil have increased to fill the gap between domestic

consumption and production, which has declined since the 2000th (Ibid.). This short overview

of the general energy situation in the American bloc should suffice to draw the conclusions

necessary for our analysis. So, the American bloc produces much energy and is generally self-

sufficient with regard to other raw materials, while due to large consumption, the US still

needs to fill a gap of approximately 15% of its energy demand through imports.

The next potential bloc to be examined is the European, which is represented by the

European Union’s member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Denmark (together with Greenland), Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,

Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom, plus the four members of

the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and

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Switzerland. Not all of these states coincide with what is referred to as the European

civilization. Indeed, the majority of Bulgaria’s, Romania’s and Greece’s population is

Orthodox – which made Huntington delineating these countries as part of the Orthodox

civilization –, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia and Poland – while

being Catholic – are inhabited by (West or South) Slavs, while the Baltic states were

Republics of the Soviet Union before its dissolution, and parts of the Russian Empire earlier

on – in addition to Finland –, and contain considerable Russian minorities. By this, these

countries are swinging between the Russian and the European civilizations and cannot

unequivocally be allocated to the European civilization. Yet, they belong to the European geo-

political bloc. Swinging states between the Islamic and the European civilization are also

included in the European bloc through Malta and Cyprus.

Consequently, the only truly ’European’ EU member states that remain can be

subdivided into those inhabited by German, French, Italian, Spanish and British peoples. Here

again, ethno-cultural differences exist between the groups, three participants of which

represent the successors of former Empires – Germany, Great Britain and France. The British

do not belong to continental Europe, have always shown reluctance to integrate into the

European Union and even displayed a certain secession potential, while maintain close ties

with the United States and its former colonies. The Iberian peoples differ from the rest of the

Western Europeans in as far as their level of economic development lags behind, while close

ties with South America provide an alternative to the European Union, thus, the potential of

secession is given, too. What remains is the stable core of the Union consisting of its founding

countries: Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries (represented by German and

French peoples). Yet even here socio-cultural similarity can be claimed for only the most

recent history. Former enemies and participants of the 30 years’ war, France and Germany,

may well again find themselves competing over an issue or resource provided the importance

of the issue for the national interest of one or both participants. Picturing its composition, a

rather unstable vision of the European Union evolves, at least as far as the socio-cultural

dimension is concerned.

Intra-regional economic ties are very strong in the European Union, which is not just a

Free Trade Area in which internal trade barriers were removed, but a Customs Union with a

common external tariff. Having started as the European Coal and Steel Community, the

European Union was bound by economy from the beginning. Economy provided the main

mechanism of integration and, given the non-existent European identity among the broader

population, is still the major force holding the EU member states together. While political

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integration does take place in the Union, the individual member states have retained veto

powers as well as the right for self-determination on core issues such as foreign and defence

policies or energy issues. The exclusion of the public from EU politics, as well as its general

disinterest often coupled with cautious resentment towards the Union, all suggest that the

future success of this ’supranational’ undertaking will certainly depend on the national

interest of its core Member States.

The criterion of geographic proximity is fully given for the continental part of the EU

as the territory is not divided by any natural barriers; Great Britain is separated from

continental Europe by the English Channel, which is a relatively small distance, while Iceland

and Greenland are segregated from mainland Europe by substantial water masses of the

Atlantic Ocean. Still, in comparison to the other blocs – if we exclude Greenland and Iceland

from the analysis on grounds of their relative irrelevance to our purpose –, geographic

proximity is certainly a blessing, while at the same time a curse for Europe. This is because

throughout the course of history, armed conflicts over resources and territory became

inevitable between the Great European Powers due to their physical proximity. With regard to

the current effects of the geographical factor on the EU’s external power, the Mediterranean

Sea provides a natural barrier between the European and the Arab bloc (except for Turkey and

potentially Bosnia and Albania), while the Atlantic Ocean separates it from the American bloc.

The only border directly shared with another bloc is the eastern one, which intersects with the

Russian bloc.

The criterion of a sufficient size must be approached relative to the other potential

blocs existent in the system. So, the area of EU 28 plus EFTA covers 4.912.759 km²

(calculated with data from: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 2014). By contrast, the area of the

American bloc covers 27.775.650 km², while that of the Russian bloc constitutes 22.203.216

km², of Latin America: 20.028.831 km² and of the Arab bloc: 18.136.569 km² (calculated

with data from: Geographic directory, 2014). By making this comparison, we see that the

territory of the entire European bloc amounts to only about one quarter of the average territory

of the blocs rated 3 on the size criterion.

With regard to general military capabilities, the possession of nuclear weapons and

second-strike capability, the EU profits from the membership of two nuclear-armed states:

France and Great Britain. According to the military review used throughout this analysis, the

EU was rated 8 out of 10 points with regard to its nuclear potential. Due to the comparative

character of the notion of power, let us apply some further examples of the level of nuclear

capabilities of the other powers in order to be able to assess the score. So, Russia received 9,5

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points, China approached 8,5, while India had 6 and Pakistan – 5 (Ageev et al., 2011). Thus,

the level of EU’s nuclear potential is the lowest among the recognized nuclear powers, while

higher than that of the rest of the nuclear-armed powers in the system.

The main reason for the EU’s lower relative nuclear potential than that of Russia, the

US and China is its limited availability of the carrying systems to deliver the weapons. So,

Great Britain possesses only 58 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), while

France has 96, plus 4 Ballistic Missile Submarines and 84 Air-to-Surface Missiles. If

combined, those numbers outweigh the means available to China, while not even closely

approaching those available to Russia and the US. Apart from that, the EU lacks Short- and

Intermediate- Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM, IRBM), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(IBM) and strategic bombers – which only the three superpowers US, Russia and China,

possess (Ageev et al., 2011). The EU’s overall combined military capabilities were ranked

considerably high – 7,8 out of 10 points (Ibid.). Thus, while certainly being military capable

with regard to other powers in the systems, the EU lacks the potential to effectively fight one

of the superpowers.

Apart from energy imports, which amount to 30% of the EU’s total imports,

machinery and vehicles (26%) and other manufactured goods (23%) constitute the bloc’s

other core imported groups of products (Eurostat, 2014). The latter two are not basic products,

which could affect Europe’s vulnerability in case of a trade war. Thus, the potential economic

self-sufficiency of the European blocs can be measured on the basis of its energy dependence.

According to official data, EU’s energy imports covered roughly a half of its combined

energy demand for 2012 with a rising tendency despite an intensified use of renewables and

nuclear energy (European Commission, 2014).

A core state is missing in the European bloc. The European Union was referred to as a

supranational body – a unique geo-political formation, in which the power is shared between

the supranational authority embodied by the European Commission and the Member States

represented in the Council – thus, in contrast to the other designated potential blocs in the

system, it already has established a centralized governance system. Yet it is this system of

competence-sharing that constitutes a great weakness of the EU as a potential bloc in the

balance of power model. This is because the European Commission cannot be regarded as a

core state due to it clearly lacking executive powers, its multinational nature of torn loyalties

among the servants, as well as a clear tendency of the major member states in the Union to

retain their veto right on core issues to the national interest. Apart from that, the population

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inhabiting the territory of the European bloc generally adheres to their respective national

loyalties and opposes further European integration.

Among the European member states, three core states can be identified – Germany,

France and Great Britain. Those are the three most powerful states in the European bloc,

having the biggest say within the EU and the highest potential to become the bloc’s leader.

Due to their relative economic and very roughly military equality – as Germany has the

capability to re-establish its military potential and Great Britain – to enhance its – the question

of leadership within the European bloc is likely to remain unsolved and in case it needs to be

answered, will with great certainty revive the old enmities between the Great Powers.

The Russian bloc is the next one to be examined. It is constituted by Russia, the

former Republics of the Soviet Union except for the Baltic States (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,

Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizia and

Tajikistan), as well as the Orthodox ex-Yugoslavian Republics: Serbia, Montenegro and

Macedonia. This potential bloc was delineated by means of three main criteria: ethnos,

religious affiliation and the spread of non-religious socio-cultural influence of the bloc’s core

state Russia upon the associate countries.

So, the main ethnic groups inhabiting the Russian civilization are East Slavs,

represented by Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples. Orthodox Christianity is the

prevalent religion, which puts the Yugoslavian states into the Russian bloc. The Central-Asian

ex-Soviet republics are represented by Turkic and other Central-Asian peoples – although the

percentage of Russian population is high, especially in Kazakhstan – generally professing to

Islam, yet socio-culturally influenced by Russia and economically, military and, hence,

politically dependent upon the bloc’s core state. While Russia, Belarus and eastern Ukraine

display considerably high levels of ethno-cultural homogeneity, this bloc’s other component

states show not so much of a cultural, but rather a socio-political homogeneity with the bloc’s

core state Russia. Overall, the socio-cultural homogeneity within territories inhabited by

Russian people – which constitute the largest part of the Russian bloc –, as well as the socio-

political homogeneity of the rest – except for western Ukraine as for the moment, which is yet

to be regarded as temporary unrest brought about by external interference, not a stable,

naturally developed secessionist trend –, is sufficiently provided.

Intra-regional economic interdependence in the Russian bloc is carried out through the

CISFTA incorporating almost all members of the bloc except for the ex-Yugoslavian

republics. Here, the factor of geographic proximity of all the members of the Russian bloc

plays an important role, because it allows for trade with fuel and energy commodities

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(32,16% of Russian exports to the CIS countries) (Birkova, 2013) by means of the most

efficient method of transportation through pipelines, as well as keeps the transportation costs

of other commodities low. It further stimulates trade relations between the border regions of

the bloc’s members, by this, simultaneously enhancing the socio-cultural interaction between

the participants. This, among others, allows to continuously update the relations between

Russia and the rest of the bloc, by doing so, counteracting potential secessional tendencies of

the bloc’s members through their coming too much into the influence of other blocs, such as

of the Muslim states to the countries from the Arab bloc and the ex-Yugoslavian states or the

Uniate parts of the Ukraine – to the European bloc. Thus, geographic proximity plays a key

role not only in the economic sphere, but also in the maintenance of the socio-cultural

homogeneity of the bloc.

Being the biggest country in the world, Russia stretches over Eurasia’s entire North.

Provided that fact, it shares a border with almost each of the other existing civilizations (apart

from the Hindu and the Latin American ones). To its West, Russia borders with Europe, to its

South-West – with the Islamic world, to its South-East – with China, and to its Far East – with

Japan and the American bloc. So, only its North is geographically secured by the Arctic

Ocean. For this reason, throughout its history, Russia always had to envisage an attack on one

of its borders and to confront one or several enemies often coming from opposite directions at

the same time. The geographic factor, thus, was responsible for Russia being forced to wage

continuous wars on its territory throughout history, which constituted a big considerable

disadvantage as compared to the US, for example, which had known no war with its

devastating effects on population, economy and infrastructure taking place on its territory

since its civil war in the 1860-ies.

The criterion of a sufficient size is obviously provided in the Russian bloc, as Russia

alone (17.124.442 km²) occupies a territory roughly four times bigger than that of the entire

EU, and twice as big as China. The overall territory of the Russian bloc amounts to

22.203.216 km² (calculated with data from: Geographic directory, 2014). The nuclear abilities

of Russia are the second-highest on the planet (9,5 out of 10 points), while its overall military

capabilities were rated 7.5 points (Ageev et al., 2011). Thus, it has both a well-developed and

equipped military and a sufficient arsenal of nuclear weapons and different kinds of means to

deliver them. All the other members of the Russian bloc have displayed comparatively low

military capabilities – from 1,1 in Tajikistan and Kirgizia to the highest in Belarus (2,2) and

Ukraine (2,3) (data from 2010) with none of them having nuclear weapons at their disposal,

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which by no means diminishes the combined military capabilities of the bloc thanks to

Russian military competences making it the second-strongest military bloc in the system.

The Russian bloc is not dependent upon foreign imports of a key resource due to the

fact that it can potentially provide itself with all necessary raw materials and has the capacity

to manufacture all types of products domestically. This has not only to do with its geographic

location and considerable territory constituting regions with fertile soils, more than enough

easily available drinking water supply and raw mineral reserves at its disposal, but also with

the partly still available production facilities and routes of transportation designed to satisfy

the needs of a potentially closed bloc-economy inherent from the Soviet Union, which was

planned in a way as to network the extraction, production and consumption areas within its

territory. The today’s Russian bloc resembles the former Soviet territory, thus, the self-

sufficient planning of the Soviet economy now provides Russia with a considerable

comparative advantage due to the low vulnerability of its economy to import cuts.

This reasoning is generally supported by the analysis of Russia’s imports. So, the top

inter-regionally imported products by Russia for 2013 constituted machines, engines, pumps

(18%), vehicles (12,5%), electronic equipment (11,5), pharmaceuticals (4,5%) and plastics

(3,5%) (International Trade Center, 2014). These are goods which might affect the sensitivity

of the Russian economy in case of import failure, but this is not the type of product to which

Russia should not be able to adapt by means of local production in the long-run. As for the

rest of the bloc, the dependence on a foreign key resource is also absent, as the Central Asian

states are rich in energy resources, the energy demand of the other bloc’s members is covered

by Russia, while intra-regional foods and drinking water production is also capable of

covering the bloc’s demand (with data from Birkova, 2013). So, the vulnerability of the

Russian bloc to economic manipulations is relatively low due to the Soviet-established intra-

regional trade structures not all of which were destroyed in the period after the Soviet Union’s

breakup and despite the verified Russian sensitivity with regard to foreign money inflows

through its energy exports.

It was problematic to unambiguously delineate an Arab bloc due to its internal

disunity resulting not so much out of the religious separation of Sunnites and Shiites, but

primarily out of a lack of a core state, which is a consequence of the breakdown of the Arab

Caliphate in the 13th century after the Mongol intrusion, which followed a gradual weakening

of the Arab Caliphate starting in the 9th century, in the course of which Persia, Egypt, Syria,

Morocco and other parts of the Empire seceded with a separate leader each. The demise of the

Caliphate was followed by a continuous domination of the Arab civilization by the Christian

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civilizations to its North. In order to still be able to segregate an Arab bloc, religion was

chosen as the major criterion, because the current spread of Islam roughly resembles the

former boundaries of the Caliphate and, by this, delineates one historically determined socio-

cultural community as well as indicates the today’s sphere of Islamic influence.

Despite its necessity, religion as a criterion merely reflects the past boundaries of a

formed politico-judicial tradition of a society, which is – as already outlined above – due to

the fact that during the Middle Ages religion substituted the legislative, executive and judicial

powers which are today replaced by the three arms of the inner means of violence available to

the state. So, while religion certainly reflected a clear-cut dividing line between the Muslim

and the Christian worlds during the Middle Ages, today this criterion simply delineates those

past boundaries, while is insufficient to reflect the modern complex network required for the

maintenance of an intact bloc if not complemented by further criteria.

Despite those difficulties, an attempt to delineate and visualize an Arab bloc has been

undertaken by the author, for which purpose certain states needed to be allocated into the bloc,

while others excluded despite the prevalence of the Islamic religion within their territories,

such as a number of states in Western Africa. In case of an exclusion of an unequivocally

Islamic state from the Arab bloc, ethnicity and the depth of Muslim tradition have been the

decisive criteria. As a result, the delineated Arab bloc includes: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman,

the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and

Sahara, Mauretania, Sudan, Somali, Djibouti and Comoros.

Notwithstanding considerable common elements in the culture, ethnicity and historical

heritage, the Arab bloc lacks cohesion mainly as a result of an absent legitimate core state.

Instead, the bloc is divided between five centers of influence with their respective zones of

interest, which not always coincide: Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. So,

Turkey’s main interest generally concern territories and people in the Russian and the

European blocs; Egypt’s area of interest largely focuses on its neighbours Syria, Lebanon and

Israel; Iran currently displays pretensions to become the leader of the Arab bloc, while

momentarily lacks the required means to do so, such as adequate economic and military

power as well as political legitimacy and a sufficient representation in international

organizations; Saudi Arabia’s interests are intertwined with those of the US, as the country is

too dependent upon the United States to exert an independent foreign policy, which is the

reason that it is not considered as a potential leader of the Arab bloc despite its overall

economic power; and Pakistan – while having nuclear weapons at its command – is able to

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exert only regional influence in terms of both power and legitimacy within its area of focus,

which is India and the Cashmere region. By this, just like the Arab Caliphate, which

disintegrated as a result of inner struggle for power, the today’s Arab bloc still suffers from

internal division.

According to an analysis conducted for the Journal of Economic Cooperation and

Development, in 2008 Arab intra-regional trade was rather low not exceeding 9% and 12% in

terms of exports and imports, respectively (Abdmoulah, 2011, p.49). These numbers reflect

trade when oil is included. Overall, the study revealed that when oil is included, a common

border is largely trade-enhancing, while when oil is excluded from the analysis, the Arab

region seems not to profit much from contiguity. For this reason, GAFTA was founded in

1997. Containing only some of the countries from the Arab bloc except Turkey, Iran,

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh and Sahara, the Free Trade Area showed only modest

results in enhancing intra-regional trade when counted with and, especially, without oil,

though.

The main trading partners of the Arab region are represented by APEC countries, the

EU 15 and NAFTA countries, which indicates the bloc’s weak economic integrity as one geo-

political entity. Here, “[the] Arab region mainly exports oil (73,4% in 2005) followed by

manufactures, machinery and transport equipment and food and drinks (with 13,2%, 3,4% and

3% respectively in 2005), inversely, Arab countries imports are dominated by manufactures,

machinery and transport equipment and food and drinks (37,7%, 26,3% and 14% respectively

in 2005)” (Abdmoulah, 2011, p. 49). On this overview we can clearly conclude two things.

First, due to the large proportion of oil in exports, we see that the economy of the Arab bloc is

clearly resource-based and needs to be diversified to gain more independence. Second, due to

the resembling core imported and exported products we see that in case intra-regional trade

would be enhanced, the bloc could abstain from importing those products from foreign blocs,

as they are obviously produced within the bloc, yet the intra-regional distributive mechanisms

seem to be missing.

As with regard to the import list of the Arab bloc, it is dominated by manufactured

goods and does not contain any mineral resources, although it entails a relatively high

percentage of food and drinks, a smaller percentage of which, however, is also being exported

from the bloc. Import cuts in manufactured goods can be potentially compensated for by local

production, although such a compensation in case of a trade war requires that a bloc has a

relatively high level of technological development, a well-developed, diversified economy

and a strong centralized planning authority – factors currently all absent in the Arab bloc.

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Furthermore, the relatively high percentage of food imports, given the largely not very fertile

soils and unfavourable climate conditions combined with the typical problems with water

shortage known for the southern regions – all factors expected to become more problematic

due to the on-going climate change and a growing population –, indicates a potential

economic dependency of the bloc on imports of basic foods and water increasing this bloc’s

level of economic dependency.

The Arab bloc stretches through Northern Africa over the Arabian Peninsula towards

Central Asia. By this, the bloc forms a line running from the North of the African continent,

over the South of Europe to build its eastern border in Asia, covering a territory amounting to

18.136.569 km² (calculated with data from: Geographic directory, 2014). While certainly

occupying a sufficient territory, its elongated shape makes the establishment of a well-

defended border extremely difficult, especially in the face of the bloc’s powerful neighbours

to its North and East, despite its comparatively advanced geographic position with regard to

natural barriers.

This is due to the fact that the bloc is secured on its West by the Atlantic Ocean, its

North-West is also largely protected by the Mediterranean Sea, which provides a natural

barrier between the Arab and the European blocs; the Caucasus Mountain range, the Black

Sea and the Caspian Sea shield its central states from the Russian bloc, while the Hindu Kush,

Pamir and Karakorum mountains stretching along Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s north-eastern

border provide a natural barrier between the Arab, the Russian and the Chinese blocs. The

South-East of the Arab bloc is secured by the Arabian Sea. Its southern border on the African

continent is not secured by any natural barrier. However, the African territories with which it

intersects do not pose a serious threat, as they cannot even yet be identified as a potential bloc

due to both internal inconsistency and extreme external economic, military and political

inferiority vis-à-vis the other system actors. Thus, the Arab bloc’s most relevant border

lacking a natural barrier is that between Pakistan and India.

Here, in can be claimed that the Arab bloc has compensated for the lack of a

geographic barrier between Pakistan and India by the acquirement of nuclear weapons. Indeed,

those weapons seem to be aimed explicitly and solely against Pakistan’s adversary India: the

number of nuclear warheads amounts to only 30-50 and the means of delivery are limited to

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles. Those limitations led to Pakistan scoring 5 out of 10 in the

nuclear capabilities table, while its general military capabilities were estimated at 4,3 of 10

points (Ageev, 2011). By this, Pakistan is the most military advanced country of the Arab

bloc, as the rest of the potential bloc’s leading countries rated roughly 3 on the overall

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military capabilities, while none of them has nuclear weapons at its disposal. Pakistan is

unable to take on the role of the Arab bloc’s core state, though, which is due to its geographic

remoteness of the heart of the Arab civilization, which is built around the Arabian Peninsula,

and its comparatively low economic and political scores hardly sufficing for the status of a

regional power maintained by Pakistan largely thanks to its nuclear weapons compensating

for its otherwise inferiority to India in the region.

The next potential bloc to be analysed is the Indic bloc represented by India, Nepal,

Bhutan and Sri-Lanka. The socio-cultural homogeneity of the Indic bloc is mainly determined

by the Hindu religion, which is practised by about 80% of the country’s otherwise very

diverse population. Indeed, being the bloc’s core state and a country with the second-highest

population in the world after China, India also ranks second with regard to its cultural,

linguistic and ethnical diversity after that provided on the African continent. Hindi is the

official language of India; English – mostly used among businessmen and administrative

officials – is used as a secondary, supportive language. This fact alone speaks for the ethno-

cultural diversity of the population.

Thus, Hinduism provides the socio-cultural force allowing for a common-law

cohabitation of the population of India. The same is true for Nepal and Sri-Lanka, where

around 80% and 70% of the population, respectively, practise Hinduism. In Bhutan, the

majority of the population in the North practice Tibetan Buddhism – which is explained by

the fact that this part of the country shares a border with Tibet –, while the South is majorly

Hindu. By this, the religious integrity of the Indic bloc is determined by the geographic

proximity of the bloc’s constituent states, as well as the existence of a core state India, both

legitimate and powerful enough to lead the bloc.

The Indic bloc is bound not only by religion, but also by economic interdependence

institutionalized though the SAFTA. While all states of the Indic bloc are included in the Free

Trade Area, so are some states from the Islamic bloc: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and

Maldives. This inter-civilizational mix within one trading bloc, and especially the unresolved

conflict between Pakistan and India (Bashir et al., n.d., Maqbool et al., n.d.), as well as the

different levels of economic development of the trade bloc’s members – India, Pakistan and

Sri Lanka are developing countries, while Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan are least

developed countries – was denounced as being the main hindrance to its success by a number

of analysts of that region. Overall, SAFTA is a new agreement launched in 2004 to be fully

implemented by 2015. The primary objective of the establishment of the South Asia Free

Trade Area has been to benefit the small countries in the region (Maqbool et al., n.d).

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According to Maqbool and his colleagues, large welfare gains are unlikely to be achieved

under the agreement, though, not only due to the reasons identified above, but also due to high

inland transportation costs and intra-regional trade costs, such as customs procedures,

differing product standards and complicated banking and payment procedures (Ibid.).

Given those difficulties, the potential economic self-sufficiency of the bloc in case of a

trade war is far from being secured. So, “regional trade in South Asia now accounts for less

than 6 per cent of total trade, compared to 22 per cent within the ASEAN Free Trade Area,

and 65 per cent within the European Union” (Maqboot et. al., p. 10). The main products

imported by India are energy resources: crude petroleum, coal briquettes, refined petroleum

and petroleum gas (25%, 5%, 2% and 2% of total imports, respectively), and jewellery: gold

and diamonds (11% and 3%, respectively) (Observatory of economic complexity, 2010).

Despite India’s overpopulation, the anticipated imports of basic foods and drinks are

missing, which can be explained by fertile types of soils which the region has at its disposal:

alluvial soils on the Indo-Gangetic plain, black cotton soils on the Deccan lava, red soils on

large parts of the rest of Hindustan and ferralitic soils on the peripheries of the peninsula

(Encyclopaedia “Krugosvet”, n.d.). The remaining states of the Indic bloc have small

economies due to their comparatively low level of economic development, for which they

cannot compensate with a large physical size, as in the case of India. By this, the bloc’s

potential economic self-sufficiency can be estimated through that of India’s, which is not only

the core state of that bloc, but also the leading country of SAFTA.

As far as natural barriers are concerned, India is well-situated on the Hindustan

peninsula. On land, it borders with only two blocs – the Chinese in the North-East and the

Arab in the North-West–, whereby the border with China is secured by the Himalayas. By this,

the only border relatively unsecured by natural barriers is that between India and Pakistan,

although it runs through the valley of the Indus River, which also provides a minor natural

barrier. So, the Indic bloc directly shares only one border – which is as much as the American

bloc (if the Bering Strait is considered wide enough to sufficiently separate the United States

from Russia). Yet, India is situated not on a separate continent, but on one which it shares

with two major and two further secondary blocs.

The territory of the Indic bloc amounts to 3.546.881 km² (calculated with data from:

Geographic directory, 2014). Given the high number of India’s population with about

1.236.687 thousand inhabitants in 2012 resulting in a population density of 376.2 people per

km² (UN data, 2012) and given its growing tendencies with a population growth rate of 1.2

for 2013 (which fell from 1.3 as compared to the previous four years) (Worldbank data, 2014),

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the Indic bloc’s comparatively small size constitutes one of its major internal shortcomings, as

the overpopulation creates serious internal problems which constrain the bloc’s – and most

important its core state India’s – ability to increase its external relative power through the

enhancement of its military, economic and political weight.

In the strategic military analysis applied throughout this study, India was rated 6 out of

10 points with regard to its nuclear abilities and 5,8 with regard to its overall military

competences (Ageev, 2011). By this, its relative military power surpassed that of its main

strategic adversary Pakistan by roughly 1 point each. This is due to India possessing twice as

many nuclear warheads as Pakistan does, while having not only Short-Range Ballistic

Missiles (although less than Pakistan has), but also Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles at

its disposal.

The Chinese bloc comprises China (incl. Hong Kong and Taiwan) – the bloc’s name

giver and core state, the two Koreas and Vietnam. The core criterion upon which the borders

of this potential bloc were delineated has been the weight of the Chinese socio-political

influence. This involved the formation of culture and writing system. The territory of the bloc

is inhabited by a variety of peoples with own traditions and languages (although most of the

languages belong to the Sino-Tibetan language group), so, in China alone, 56 minority ethnic

groups are officially recognized, yet they constitute only around 7% of the total population of

China (estimated 1.377.065 thousand people for 2012 (UN Data, 2012)) with the

overwhelming majority (around 92%) being Han-Chinese (China ABC, 2011).

The Chinese socio-cultural inheritance is largely reflected in the tenets of the

philosophical teachings of Confucianism and Taoism. While those two reflect the living

principles of the majority of the Chinese population, Buddhism is also practised within the

bloc, as are nature religions and ancestor cults. The Muslim and Christian minorities in China

are so insignificant (Muslim – 1,5-2% of total population, Christian – around 1,8%), as not to

seriously disturb the overall prevalence of the Chinese socio-cultural dominance in the bloc.

With regard to intra-regional trade, the Chinese bloc is not so much integrated in the

Asian region as it is with the APEC countries, which comprise representatives of the

American, Russian, Latin American and Japanese blocs, as well as with some non-allied

Asian countries, such as Brunei, Malaysia or Singapore, plus with Germany. Overall, while

intra-regional trade is well intact, China’s extensive trade with the rest of the world hinders its

deeper integration within the Asian region. While a regional trade agreement (RTA) exists

between the ASEAN FTA and China, ASEAN is at the same time engaged an RTA with

Australia and New-Zeeland, India, and Japan (WTO RTA list, 2015). From this it follows that

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a fuller integration of the ASEAN countries with the Chinese bloc would certainly provide for

an enhanced Chinese influence in the region and, consequently, worldwide.

The criterion of geographic proximity is given, as all participants of the Chinese bloc

directly border with China (except South Korea) and can establish a continuous border. The

Pacific Ocean creates a natural barrier on the eastern border of the Chinese bloc, although the

relative proximity of Japan to its North-East and the Philippines – a strategic partner of the

US – to its South-East reduces this comparative advantage. Its western and south-western

border to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is guarded by the Himalaya Range. The Tian Shan

mountain range on its north-western border separates China from the Central Asian states of

the Russian bloc (Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan), while the Altai mountain range

in the North-West of China and the Amur River in the North-East, although a river is a not

very significant barrier – from Russia. Big parts of the Chinese-Mongolian border are secured

by the Gobi desert. By this, the only relevant land border lacking any natural barriers is that to

the Chinese bloc’s South, which is of secondary significance, though, as its southern

neighbours are non-allied Asian states with a generally Buddhist orientation and lacking any

real military capabilities.

While China alone represents a country with a third-largest territory after Russia and

Canada, the small number of states currently belonging to the Chinese bloc constitutes the

reason for its relatively non-impressive combined size of 10.146.334 km² (calculated with

data from: Geographic directory, 2014), which amounts to roughly a half of the average

results of the blocs rated 3 on the size criterion (American, Russian, Latin American and Arab

blocs). With regard to its military capabilities, China, while certainly representing a military

superpower, lacks behind the US and Russia in its ratings on both its nuclear abilities and

overall military competences. So, the nuclear power of China was rated 8,5 of 10 and the

overall military capabilities – 7,3 (Ageev, 2011). China’s number of nuclear warheads is >500,

which is far from reaching the arsenal of Russia (>4000) or the US (>6000) and so is its

number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. In respect of Intermediate-Range and Short-

Range Ballistic Missiles, the geo-political factor, logically, determines their priority among

the superpowers. So, China is the only one to have Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles and

more Short-Range Ballistic Missiles than Russia does, while the US does not possess any of

them due to its location on a separate continent and the uselessness of having some as long as

Latin America does not acquire means to pose a potential military threat.

Being a currently industrializing country with a constantly growing economy, China

needs raw materials and energy on the one hand and requires technical equipment on the other.

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This simple logic is consistent with China’s reported imports for 2014. So, among the core

import products for the year 2014 were mineral products (27%), machinery and electrical

equipment (23%), products of chemical or allied industries (7,5%) and base metals (7,5%)

(Indexmundi, 2014). If following the logic applied earlier on in this analysis, energy resources

and other raw materials required for the effective survival of a bloc constitute the most

vulnerable parts of the import package. In our case, thus, – a substantial part of China’s

imports. If we consider the fact that China is a newly industrialized nation, the imports of

machines, electrical equipment and other high technology products currently lacking in China,

also gain much in importance, as their absence would not destroy, but prevent China from

further rising its power and, by this, from being able to sustain, not to speak of enhancing, its

current status as a superpower. By this, China’s overall dependence of foreign imports turned

out comparatively high.

The Japanese bloc consists of only one country – Japan. This is due to this country’s

strong economy – the third strongest after the United States and China with regard to its GDP

for 2013 (World Bank, 2014), distinguishing it from other Asian countries and, along with

secondary socio-cultural factors, providing the major motivation to delineate it as a separate

civilizational bloc. Japan serves as a classic example of a nation state due to its ethno-cultural

and linguistic homogeneity. Thus, in that bloc the socio-cultural homogeneity factor reaches

its highest possible rank. Due to the Japanese bloc consisting of only one country, the two

further criteria for internal strength, as well as the question on a core state can be left out.

As far as its geographic position is concerned, Japan is situated on an island, which is

located in the immediate proximity to Russia in the North and South Korea and China in the

West and South-West. Thus, it directly borders with two other blocs, which are comparatively

far more powerful than Japan. Its South and East are secured by the natural barrier provided

by the waters of the Pacific Ocean. With regard to its size, Japan occupies only 1/10th of the

territory of the Indic bloc, which has so far been the smallest one among the delineated blocs.

This comparative disadvantage can also not be compensated by Japan’s military means, as it

does not possess nuclear weapons and was rated only 3,2 on its overall military competences

in the comparative military review applied throughout this study. Thus, the only instrument of

power projection that remains at Japan’s disposal is its strong economy.

Apart from its efficiency under the currently given system, Japan’s economy is not

self-sufficient, but designed as a trade economy. What is even more important is that the main

products important by Japan are raw materials and energy resources such as oil, coal

briquettes or wood and foodstuffs (Indexmundi, 2014). Those are products required for the

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basic survival of a country, thus, Japan is both highly sensitive and vulnerable towards

imports cuts. Japan’s main trading partners are China and the United States, followed by

South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Germany and the United Arab

Emirates (Japan-guide, 2014), by this, Japan is economically well-integrated both in the world

and in the Asian region.

The final bloc to be analysed is the Latin American. It is inhabited by representatives

of three major civilizations: the indigenous Indians who ceased to exist as a distinct

civilization, but survived as an ethno-cultural group within the modern Latin American

civilization, Africans brought as slaves to the European colonies, and descendants of the

European civilization inhabiting today’s Central and South America as a result of Spanish and

Portugal colonization. This is when the Iberian-Roman languages – Spanish and Portuguese –

were brought to Latin America to give it its name (Roman languages originate from Latin).

The population of the Latin American bloc is of a variety of races and ethnic groups,

but generally bound by politico-cultural inheritance, which is often reflected in a common

language. So, the Spanish-speaking countries as well as the Portuguese-speaking Brazil are to

be included in the delineated Latin American region, while the English-speaking countries of

Central and South America, as well as the Dutch-speaking Surinam should be excluded from

the group. This is because although considerable parts of those countries’ population consist

of native Indians, which is also true for some of the Central and South American countries

such as Paraguay, Bolivia or Guatemala, the component of a ’Latin’ heritage is missing there,

consequently, they should not be included into the Latin American civilizational bloc. Thus,

the Latin American bloc which was delineated on the basis of the criterion of the spread of the

socio-cultural influence of Iberian-Europeans, consists of the following countries: Argentina,

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa-Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay

and Venezuela.

This bloc’s intra-regional economic interdependence is rather modest. This has not so

much to do with the fact that Latin America is divided into two Free Trade Areas –

MERCOSUR consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela; and the

Andean Community with its four members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru –, for since

2006 an MERCOSUR-Andean FTA exists, but with Brazil trade structure’s (which is the

economic leader of MERCOSUR and, together with Argentina, accounts for almost 97,7%

(2005) of MERCOSUR’s GDP) orientation towards the world market, rather than the

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MERCOSUR countries (European Commission, 2007), as well as Mexico’s absence in one of

the two FTAs and its overall orientation towards the United States.

So, Brazil’s trade with other MERCOSUR members represented mere 9,4% of its total

trade over the period 2002-2005, while that of other members was considerably higher –

25,8% for Argentina, 37,0% for Uruguay and 55,7% for Paraguay (Venezuela was not yet a

member) (European Commission, 2007). Despite Brazil’s orientation towards trade on the

world market – which is a valid economic strategy applied by a number of FTAs with one

leader economy –, MERCOSUR led by Brazil attempts to strengthen the regional economic

interdependence by enhancing trade with the Andean Community, which is, nevertheless, also

rather modestly integrated with internal trade accounting for only 10% of the FTA’s total

trade in 2004 (Ruiz-Dana et al, 2007, p. 26).

Geographically, Latin America occupies the entire continent of South America and the

southern part of North America, which provides for its countries’ physical proximity, as well

as ensures its relative isolation from potential adversary civilizations through the water barrier

of the Atlantic Ocean to its East and the Pacific Ocean to its West. Its only unsecured border

is to its North, where Latin America borders with the United States. Hereby, it is important to

note that the disparity in military power between the Latin American and the American blocs

prevents the former from fully profiting from its isolated geographic position – a relative

advantage fully exploited by the US. Still, Latin America certainly profits from its geographic

apartness in as far as it did not have to fight off intruders, unlike, for example, Russia had

throughout its entire history due to it bordering with the absolute maximum of other

civilizations. The overall military capabilities of the leader of the Latin American bloc, Brazil,

were rated 3 out of 10 by the strategic military review applied in this analysis, while

Colombia had 2,3, Chile – 2,0 and the rest of the bigger Latin American countries – an

average of 1,7 points (Ageev, 2011). Nuclear weapons are completely absent in the Latin

American bloc. By this, the military power of Latin America is far inferior to that of the major

blocs in the system, as well as to all secondary blocs. Thus, this deficiency can already be

identified as the major shortage of the Latin American bloc.

With regard to its size, Latin America takes the third place among the blocs,

occupying a territory of 20.028.831 km² (calculated with data from: Geographic directory,

2014) and was rated the maximum of 3 points. The Latin American bloc’s economy is

potentially relatively self-sufficient, as its combined key imports majorly do not consist of

primary products (verified minor combined energy imports, while Brazil, Mexico and

Argentina are net oil exporters; virtually absent basic food imports), but of machinery and

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electrical equipment, which is the main imported type of product in Latin America (36,5% of

total imports for 2011 in Mexico, 26,5% in Brazil, 26,5% in Argentina and 21% in Chile),

followed by products of chemical or allied industries (8,7% in Mexico, 16,7% in Brazil,

15,1% in Argentina and 8,8% in Chile), vehicles and aircraft (10,7% in Mexico, 13,8% in

Brazil, 22,5% in Argentina, 17,1% in Chile), while the imports of base metals (9% in Mexico,

6% in Brazil and Argentina, 5% in Chile) and mineral products (3% in Mexico, 14% in Brazil,

7,6% in Argentina and 19% in Chile) vary from country to country within the bloc never

crossing the 25% mark (Indexmundi, 2014). Hereby, Mexico’s overall imports account for

more than 50% of the bloc’s total imports, Brazil’s – for roughly 17%, those of Chile and

Argentina – for around 7% (Latin Focus, 2010).

As far as the final criterion of a powerful bloc, the presence of a core state, is

concerned, Latin America does have a tacit, yet not explicit leader – Brazil. The reason for

this ambiguous leadership is both historically determined and power-based. Brazil belonged

to the Portuguese Empire, while the rest of the bloc was part of the Spanish Empire, which

separates Brazil by language (although the differences are minor). Apart from this, Brazil’s

relative power vis-à-vis the other countries in the bloc is not as overwhelmingly greater as it

should be in order to be able to clearly make out a leader state. This is mainly expressed not

so much in economic terms, as Mexico, Argentina and, to a lesser part, Venezuela, Colombia

and Chile also have relatively strong economies – still, Brazil’s numbers are, certainly,

significantly higher – or political weight – Brazil is well-represented on the international

arena –, but in terms of military power (or in that case – weakness). Despite the relatively

small power disparity among the bloc’s members as compared to those in blocs with a clear

core state, Brazil still fits the role of a core state better than its potential competitors due to

Brazil’s overall higher economico-political weight on the regional and the global scales.

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Table 6. Internal strength and external relative power of potential blocs

Internal

Strength

External Relative

Power

Results

Blocs 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 Internal External

American 3 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 2 2,8

European 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 2,3 1,4

Russian 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 2,7 2,6

Arab 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 0 1,3 1,4

Indic 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 3 2,3 1,8

Chinese 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2,7 2,4

Japanese 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 3 3 1

Latin American 2 2 3 3 3 0 2 2 2,3 2

Source: own table

The above table visualizes the findings of the analysis of the internal strength and the external

relative power of the delineated potential blocs. The colours in the external power column

indicate the identified status of a bloc as a major bloc (green), a stable (yellow), or an

unstable bloc (red).

The modest results with regard to the internal strength of the American bloc derive

primarily from the geographic distance between the United States and Canada on the one

hand, and Australia, New-Zeeland and Papua-New Guinea on the other. The disposition of the

former part of the bloc on the North American continent and the latter – in South Asia have

led to the alienation of the two descendant parts of the European civilization with the United

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States and Canada forming a unity in itself, and the South Asian countries tending to divert

from its alignment with ’the West’, thus, with the American and the European blocs, in favour

of the Asian countries to whom they are geographically closer, which eases trade by a

reduction of both transportation costs and time.

As far as its external power is concerned, the American bloc – with the most relevant

United States as its core state – constitutes a major bloc, which only weakness is its

dependence on foreign oil making its affluency and the maintenance of its current level of

power directly dependent on an ensured access to oil reserves. Furthermore, in order to keep

its economic superiority, which has a direct influence on military power, the US needs to

control the set-up of the global economic system. These factors determine much of its foreign

policy ensuring this bloc’s current level of power, but at the same time constituting its main

weakness. This is because its aggressive foreign policy determined by an offensive national

security doctrine creates conflicts in the international system which leads to tensions with the

other relevant players on the international arena and reduces the overall level of security in the

system. By doing so, it hurts itself, because its own national security as well as the individual

security of the bloc’s inhabitants decreases as a result.

The European bloc scored medium with regard to its internal strength. This derives

from its high economic integrity and geographic proximity, while its internal socio-cultural

disunity hinders the attainment of higher results and makes the prospect of a future deeper

integration of the Union improbable. This is because the European Union consists of intact

and, most of the time, strong nation states inhabited by people with high levels of national

consciousness widely denying the very legitimacy of the European Union as a law-making

entity, not to speak of granting it further law-enforcing or other powers reserved for the nation

state alone.

This internal disunity might have been compensated through either a presence of a

core state, which is absent within the bloc as the possible candidates: Germany, France and

Great Britain are of a roughly equal political, economic and military power, or through a

further empowerment of the European Commission as a substitution for a core state, the

probability of which to come is, however, very controversial due to reasons already elaborated

upon above. The lack of a core state is not yet the only factor preventing the European bloc

from becoming more powerful externally. Its military capabilities, even if counted combined

– although a common defence policy is effectively missing in the EU –, are lower as

compared to those of the American, the Russian or the Chinese blocs, while its energy

dependence limits its potential economic self-sufficiency further weakening the EU’s position

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on the international arena. Overall, the European bloc could be identified as an unstable bloc

consisting of a mix of great and weak powers.

The Russian bloc is generally stable internally, although the Muslim republics within

Russia, the Central-Asian largely Muslim members of the Russian bloc, as well as the Uniate

parts of the Ukraine, create a source of permanent internal instability. The presence of a core

state – Russia – generally compensates for the lacking socio-cultural homogeneity between

those regions and the rest of the Russian bloc through economic interdependencies, military

superiority and the overall socio-political influence being made possible by the geographic

proximity of the bloc’s members. The Russian bloc represents a major bloc in the system with

both sufficient military power and the highest-possible results on the criterion of potential

economic self-sufficiency, although the short-term effects through a trade disturbance would

still considerably damage the Russian economy, which needs to be further diversified in order

to rid itself of this weakness. Its major problem, though, lies in its continental positioning

depriving it of any sufficient natural barriers between itself and other civilizations, with four

of which (if the American bloc is counted due to the insufficient width of the Bering Strait to

be regarded as a valid natural barrier) – two being major blocs – Russia shares a border.

The Arab bloc’s main weakness obviously lies in its internal division, as well as a lack

of a clear prospect towards the emergence of a core state strong and legitimate enough to

unite the Islamic countries under its rule. Unless such a state emerges, the Arab bloc will not

gain in power vis-à-vis the other blocs, because each of its relevant regional powers pulls the

bloc in often opposite directions, by doing so, tearing apart its resources, which, if

successfully combined, might have sufficiently strengthened the Arab bloc’s economy,

accumulated its military capabilities and – first of all – given it the overall internal strength

required for the acquisition of external legitimacy as a power. This legitimacy is mandatory

for the Arab bloc, though, to liberate itself from its current image of an aggressive revisionist

power which is not to be trusted, by this, which military capabilities are not to be allowed to

be enhanced and the legitimacy of which claims is to be put in question. Before this

legitimacy is gained, the Arab bloc is doomed to remain an internally torn and externally

weak to-be-bloc consisting of regional and weak powers, which – if combined – might very

well be capable of gaining the status of a stable bloc.

The Indic bloc turned out to be a reasonably stable bloc, which longevity was proven

by history, as the Indic civilization belongs to one of the ancient civilizations. Provided that it

gets its birth rate under control, it can be expected to continue to exist as a hegemon in its

region. In order to enhance and maintain its power vis-à-vis the other blocs, most of which

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have a much bigger territory at their disposal inhabited by far less people and are

economically and military stronger, India – constituting the bloc’s core state – needs to

deepen the SAFTA integration to enhance intra-regional trade which would increase India’s

relative influence in its region and, automatically, its relative external power vis-à-vis the

other blocs, as well as to increase its military power.

Although rated as a major bloc, the results of all external relative power criteria (apart

from core state) of the Chinese bloc turned out to be inferior to those of the other two major

blocs in the system, thus, to the American and the Russian bloc, as for the moment. Those

shortcomings stem from the fact that both the United States and Russia constitute old

superpowers, while China is currently emerging as one and still requires to acquire more

power in order to be able to claim and, most importantly, to be able to maintain this status. In

order to do so, it needs first of all to increase the territory of its sphere of influence through

the enhancement of its trade with the ASEAN counties, gain full control over the South China

Sea to acquire further sources of oil supply and overall influence in the region and the world,

as well as to catch up with the level of military power of Russia and the US.

The respective levels of military capabilities of the superpowers are a product of the

post-Cold War world. China’s approached position as a superpower is still in its making,

while the old superpowers undergo major adaptations to the recently changing geo-political

situation: Russia recovers from the dramatic breakdown of the Soviet Union and re-makes

itself as a superpower, while the US develops in the opposite direction by losing power and its

position as a world hegemon in favour of that of being just one of the three planetary

superpowers sharing a multi-civilizational world between their three respective poles of

power.

The Japanese bloc’s maximum scores on the criteria for internal strength derive from

the fact that it consists of only one, yet economically very strong nation state – Japan. The

reason for its internal strength simultaneously constitutes the reason for its external weakness:

Japan is simply too small, too deprived of resources and too militarily weak to survive in a

world of civilizational blocs. By this, Japan can rather unambiguously be predicted to cease to

count as a separate power, but to ally with China and join the Chinese bloc in the years to

come. This claim can be substantiated by geographic closeness and ethno-cultural similarity

between the two – which are both decisive criteria in the post-Cold War inter-civilizational

world we currently live in. The Japanese are not only ethnically related to the Chinese, their

socio-cultural heritage reflected much in the Shinto is strongly influenced by Chinese

mythology, philosophy and culture. The ethno-cultural factor, being the core criterion when

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delineating a civilization, gained influence after the devaluation of the Cold War two-fold

cleavage and determined Japan’s predicted unification with the Chinese bloc in the long-run.

The Latin American bloc turned out to be fairly stable internally and to show a

promising potential with regard to the enhancement of its external power. This is because,

unlike in the Arab bloc, a core state comes to the fore in Latin America, namely, Brazil. Being

the biggest, economically, militarily and politically strongest state in the bloc, Brazil is both

powerful and legitimate enough to take over the role of a bloc leader. In case it is able to

acquire nuclear weapons and means of deliver them, as well as to enhance its overall military

competences, and provided its current attempts to enhance regional economic integration turn

out a success, the bloc has the potential of becoming a fully integrated stable bloc.

Summing up, as concluded by the analysis, the current systemic crisis transforms the

state-centered unipolar system of today in accordance with the multipolar power system.

Hereby, eight potential blocs with different relative power levels could be delineated in the

system: 3 major blocs, 2 stable blocs and 3 unstable blocs. Now, the only question that

remains to be answered is whether or not such a system structure has a potential to diminish

the pressures created by the security dilemma and to stabilize the international system, as well

as to estimate the stability of the new balance of power system. This shall be the concern of

the last section of this analysis.

6.4. Stability through Balance of Power?

As already touched upon above, in order to be stable, balance of power systems need to fulfil

a number of criteria. So, all participants must be stable status quo powers with a defensive

security strategy. In order for this to happen, there need to be no weak or unaligned states in

the system, while nuclear weapons shall be at the disposal of at least all major powers,

although stable actors should also acquire this instrument of deterrence to enhance the overall

level of stability in the system. This is due to the fact that, as already established by the

preceding analysis, the availability of nuclear weapons allows the deterrence logic to upgrade

the defence as to make it prevalent over the offence in the national security strategy of an

actor. In case a power has nuclear weapons with means of delivery and second strike

capability at its disposal, its opponent is not likely to directly attack it, but will attempt to

invade a weak or unaligned state within the sphere of its adversary’s influence. This logic

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leads us to the precondition of the absence of weak or generally unaligned states within the

new balance of power system as to exclude the option of proxy wars.

Thus, if the system is globally divided between clearly defined territories belonging to

nuclear armed status quo blocs, the probability of new wars to take place sharply decreases.

As a result, the defence gains an overall comparative advantage over the offence among all

rationally calculated security strategies, by this, solving the problem caused by otherwise

offensive security doctrines. This logic does not apply to revisionist states, though, which, by

definition, will attempt to change the status quo despite rational calculations that would

otherwise have favoured the defence.

Apart from a defence oriented security doctrine, the absence of weak or unaligned

states and revisionist powers, the number of actors in a balance of power system also plays a

role in determining its level of stability. The rationale for the relationship between the number

of independent actors in the system and its stability rests upon three arguments formulated by

Karl Deutsch and David Singer in their “Multipolar Power Systems and International

Stability”. The first refers to the positive effect of the reduction of the number of dyadic

relations through additional actors brought into the system. This argument is based on the

logic of the pluralism model indicating a cross-pressuring as well as self-correcting effect of a

multipolar system, in which the increasing range of possible interactions increases the

flexibility of the actor’s behaviour through a greater number of available choices and

constrains the probability of violent conflict escalation through cross-pressures. This effect is

found by using the standard formula for pairs: (N*(N-1))/2.

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Figure 13. Interaction Opportunities

Source: own figure, adapted from Deutsch and Singer, 1964, p. 395

The second argument implies that “as the number of independent actors in the system

increases, the share of its attention that any nation can devote to any other must of necessity

diminish” (Deutsch and Singer, 1964, p. 396). This claim rests upon the simple mathematics

assuming that with each additional independent actor in the system the number of dyads in

which one actor is a member will also increase by one following the formula: N-1. Thus, with

each increment in the number of dyads in which an actor participates, the share of attention

devoted to any one pairing will decrease as a result. If the condition that only those dyads to

which an actor is a party can drain this actor’s attention is dropped, thus, if every possible

dyad potentially catches an actor’s attention, the attention curve responds even more sharply

to an increase in the number of actors in the system following the reversed formula applied to

establish the opportunities for interaction: 100*(2/(N*(N-1))).

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Figure 14. Allocation of Attention

Source: own figure, adapted from Deutsch and Singer, 1964, p. 398

The stabilizing effect of the decreasing share of attention a nation can devote to another is

explained by means of communication theory recognizing that if a signal drops below a

certain signal-to-noise ratio, it becomes essentially undetectable. The same logic can be

applied to social interaction due to a substantial overlap between the interaction between two

nations and communication theory (Schelling, 1960). Thus, each state will treat messages

from its most prominent adversary as the relevant signal and all other messages become the

noise. As a minimal attention ratio is required to provoke a conflict, the increasing ratio of

“noise” has a pacifying effect on the system, as the likelihood of conflicts to occur declines

with the decline of the average attention that one actor can devote to any other actor in the

system. The critical attention ratio – thus, the minimum attention required for an actor to

engage in a conflict – varies from state to state (or from bloc to bloc) depending on its

respective security strategy and the general attitude towards conflicts, but is still in each case

affected by the minimal attention ratio logic (Deutsch and Singer, 1964).

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The third argument for a higher stability of balance of power systems with multiple actors

rests upon the Richardson model of arms race, which Deutsch and Singer have modified

throughout their analysis as to make it more applicable to real life conditions. The classical

Richardson model assumes that the conflict behaviour of each of the two parties in a bipolar

power system grows at an exponential rate. The growth rate is determined by the competitive

logic of the system, in which an increase in the armaments of one actor is perceived as a threat

by the other actor and motivates a reciprocal response as to keep the previous ratio of arms

budgets. This leads not only to a growth in absolute amounts of arms, but also to increases in

arms spending on both sides.

According to Deutsch and Singer, such a simple model would hold equally for both

bipolar and multipolar systems. Instead, one has to assume that “a country [– or a bloc in our

case –] is most likely to respond to an increase in the arms expenditure of a rival only in

regard to that part which appears likely to be deployed or directed against itself” (Deutsch and

Singer, p. 401). While this adaptation has little effect in a bipolar system, in a multipolar

world, the difference made by this logic is great, because the adjustments to arms

expenditures one power has to undertake in case of an increase by its adversary in order to

keep the balance of power are less due to the possibility of allying with second- and third-rank

powers. So, as long as the powers are free to move from one coalition to another and provided

that their self-interest goes in favour of keeping the balance of power in the system, the arms

race logic also favours a multipolar system over a bipolar one (Deutsch and Singer, 1964).

To sum up, for the balance of power model to turn out stable, there need to be three or

more actors in the system as to profit from the numerical factor, thus, it has to be multipolar;

the system has to embrace all states of the Earth, therefore, it needs to be globally established

as to withdraw the destabilizing presence of weak or unaligned states from the system. This

will have a stabilizing effect provided that nuclear weapons allow for the adaptation of a

defence-based security strategy as a result of the double effect of the deterrence from a direct

attack on an adversary power, while simultaneously excluding the option to compensate for

old wars thought the use of the instrument of new wars as a result of the absence of weak and

unaligned states in the system. Those criteria allowing for the defence to gain the upper hand

over the offence generally do not apply to revisionist states, as the rational logic established

above loses its validity with regard to powers attempting to change the status quo. By this, the

stability of a balance of power system depends upon four major criteria: 1. multiple actors, 2.

global establishment, 3. nuclear weapons; 4. no revisionist or weak powers among key

players.

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The validity of these criteria can be verified by means of historical examples. So, human

history has known two major balance of power systems: the Balance of Power system of 19th

and early 20th century Europe divided between Russia, Prussia (later on the German Empire),

Austria-Hungary, France and Great Britain; and the Cold War system balanced between the

Soviet Union and the United States. Both systems broke up after periods of relative longevity

– the former lasted for about 100 years starting with its establishment after the defeat over

Napoleon and its demise as a result of World War I, and the latter came into being in 1947

with the empowerment of the Truman doctrine and the succeeding foundation of the NATO

and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The reasons for the downfall of both

balance of power systems can be verified by means of the established criteria (see table 7).

The European BoP system consisted of 5 actors, was regionally established, the major

powers had not yet acquired nuclear weapons, while Prussia can be regarded as a revisionist

power, and all Empires were temporary weakened from within as a result of revolutionist

movements. By this, the only criterion fulfilled by the European balance of power system has

been the numerical one (criterion 1). As a result of the lacking other criteria, an offensive

security strategy finally gained the upper hand, which culminated in the First World War and

a consequential demise of the Concert of Europe. As argued by many historians, the reasons

for the demise of the Concert of Europe are to be found in the normative differences which

have arisen between the BoP system’s members. I would argue that those differences could

have been managed in case all of the delineated stability criteria would have been present in

the system. Let me elaborate on this in some more detail.

The wide chain of incidents which has gradually undermined the accord between the

European Great Powers, can be explained applying the logic established to formulate the

stability criteria. Hereby, three key events of particular importance to the system’s demise can

be highlighted: The Crimean War, in which France and Great Britain have joined the Ottoman

Empire, already weakened by the Russian-Turkish war, in a coalition against Russia as to

counter its efforts to gain influence in the Black Sea region; Germany’s struggle for more

influence as an Empire, which has become more striking after its alliance with Italy, and

which was mainly directed against France, as Germany was interested in gaining France’s

Elsass and Lothringen regions; Austria’s and Russia’s disputes over influence in the Balkans.

All of them happened in the general framework of a revolutionary wave, which has rolled

over Europe as a result of increased class struggle. Those internal tensions brought about by

the revolutionist movements have weakened the five Empires. As in line with the theory

established above, a standard response of the weakening of the state is nationalism, and this is

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exactly what happened – a nationalist stance was applied by the imperial powers, which then

turned towards expansionism and, consequently, the adoption of offensive security doctrines –

stability criterion 4.

The orientation towards an expansionist policy was possible due to the plenty of

available relatively easy-to-conquer territories within the reach of the Empires – this

reasoning leads us to the second unfulfilled criterion of a system’s global establishment. If

there were no such territories due to an already complete division of the world onto spheres of

influence of the five respective Great Powers, no expansionist policy options would have been

open to any rationalist status quo player. This assumption would, however, only hold if each

of the powers would have had nuclear weapons at its disposal – criterion 3 – because nuclear

potential reduces the probability to be directly attacked by an adversary, by this allowing to

adopt a defensive security strategy without the danger of being destroyed as a result of the

inclination towards peaceful co-existence rather than expansion.

The Cold War system, on the other hand, was a bipolar, globally established system, in

which the major actors had a sufficient nuclear arsenal at their disposal as to be used for

deterrence and could generally be seen as settled status quo powers. Apart from its global

character, the system yet entailed weak and pending states, in which the affiliation to one of

the two powers was unclear or could be changed with relative ease by military, economic or

political means. This factor counteracted the pacifying effect of deterrence gained through

nuclear weapons, as wars over power could be waged on the territory of these unaligned or

weakly bound secondary and tertiary states, by this, upgrading the offence as to turn an

otherwise settled status quo power into a revisionist position. Despite, as established above,

bipolar systems are prone to escalation due to the highest available share of attention given in

two-actor systems. This high intensity of conflict has led to the dissolution of the Soviet

Union in 1991.

The immediate reason for the breakdown of the Soviet Union cannot be identified

unequivocally. While some historians argue for economic misplanning embedded in the

socialist type of economy, others blame the direct leadership of the Union, in particular

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, combined with the subversive activities of

the ’Western’ secret services (Ivanova, n.d.). What can be assumed with certainty is, however,

that if not for the extreme level of military, economic and overall political competition

resulting out of the highest possible share of attention with the least number of available

policy options provided in two-actor systems (criterion 1), the Soviet Union – which has

successfully functioned throughout its 70-years’ history, which included the Second World

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War and numerous proxy wars of the Cold War period (an argument against the assumption

about the lacking viability of socialist systems) – would have not dissolved so easily as a

result of internal inconsistencies.

As a summary conclusion for the short discussion of the historical examples of BoP

systems, one can infer that in balance of power systems no peace can be maintained solely

based on norms due to the anarchical nature of the system. In order for the BoP system to turn

out effective, all stability criteria need to be provided and function in accord. Hence, so far,

history affirms the theory.

Let us now concentrate on the analysis of the features characterizing the new balance

of power system anticipated to be established in the coming years. So, eight potential

civilizational blocs of unequal internal strength and external power could be delineated in the

system – three major blocs: the American, the Russian and the Chinese, two internally stable,

but externally rated as second-rank powers: the Indic and Latin American blocs and three

unstable blocs with different external power levels: the European, the Arab and the Japanese

blocs. Hereby, it should be noted that at the moment, the international system is highly

unstable. The reasons for this have to do with the fact that the multipolar set-up of the system

divided into civilizational blocs is still in its making: the new borders of the spheres of

influence of the three leader powers are not yet set; the very division into civilizational blocs

is not yet fully completed. Hereby, the secondary powers, which are supposed to be

independent of the major blocs in order to make the numerical stability criteria work, need to

rid themselves from the influence of the system leaders, as well as safeguard their internal

stability. Thus, the inter-civilizational multipolar power system (MPS) of today has not yet

reached its stable position. The most crucial changes can be expected to pre-dominantly occur

in the three unstable blocs – the Arab, the European and the Japanese, which all can be

expected to undergo substantial transformations in the years to come.

As already argued in the previous sub-section, Japan is likely to cease to exist as a

separate civilization, but to join the Chinese bloc due to its inability to survive as an

independent bloc on the one hand, and its ethno-cultural and geographical closeness to China

– on the other. The European bloc’s future is ambiguous: it can either retain its position as a

distinct bloc through internal socio-cultural integration, which is rather unlikely to occur in

the face of both a lacking core state and motivation for further EU-integration by the public,

or dissolve into two or three spheres of influence divided between either the American and the

Russian blocs, or the former two plus the Latin American bloc provided that it can assert itself

as an independent power in the system through an increase in its relative external power. This

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anticipated dissolution will come as a consequence of the European bloc’s counter-

civilizational composition and, resulting out of it, a lack of a common identity, as well as a

missing core state, which might have compensated for this shortcoming though institutional

substitution.

The Arab bloc’s future is even more difficult to predict due to the heavy contradictions

haunting the bloc: on the one hand, its members are to the major part the descendants of one

and the same civilization and share the same religion, which is an important factor with regard

to this specific civilization, while on the other hand, the internal division of the bloc is not

likely to be overcome any time soon primarily due to a lack of a core state and in particular

combined with an inherent disregard for a centralized authority in general. A legitimate, both

internally and externally, center, however, is one of the major preconditions for power

acquisition – a factor directly dependent upon internal stability.

If we, nevertheless, assume the best case scenario for both the European and the Arab

blocs with regard to their ability to retain their positions as distinct blocs through internal

stabilization at least in the short-run and apply the resulting adaptations to the analysis

conducted above, we will find a world divided between seven blocs: three major ones, two

stable and two potentially unstable second-rank powers (figure 15). Given that the second

rank powers manage to safeguard and maintain their independency from the major powers as

in line with the theory established above, the new BoP system will count 7 separate blocs.

With seven powers in the system, the number of interaction opportunities would amount to 21

(figure 13) and the share of attention – to 5% (figure 14). To make a comparison, in a bipolar

system there is only one possible dyad for interaction and, as a consequence, the share of

attention amounts to 100%. Thus, its very set-up makes the bipolar system unstable due to its

inclination towards highly competitive behaviour and conflict escalation. The multipolar

power system, on the other hand, fulfils the first stability criterion.

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Figure 15. Multipolar Power System

Source: own figure

The second criterion is a global establishment of the balance of power system. It is given only

partly primarily due to the disperse and unaligned Africa all consisting of weak states, the

currently unaligned states in the Southeast Asia, which, however, can be expected to align

with the Chinese bloc in line with the reasoning established throughout this section, as well as

Australia and New Zeeland, which were estimated as prone to leave the American bloc as a

result of their remoteness and a consequential lack of socio-cultural interaction and relevant

economic interdependencies. This deficiency provides a potential source of instability of the

envisaged new balance of power system due to the dangerous presence of easy-to-conquer

states in the system, potentially turning the defence-offence ratio in the national (bloc)

strategy calculation in favour of the offence, by this, re-sharpening the security dilemma and

reviving the competitive logic among the major powers.

The distribution of nuclear weapons is uneven in the system. So, the three major

powers have sufficient arsenals at their disposal as to profit from the deterrence logic

theoretically allowing to apply a defence-oriented security strategy. The EU, India and

Pakistan representing the only nuclear power within the Arab bloc, also possess nuclear

weapons, but their number and/or means of delivery are comparatively insufficient. Latin

America does not possess nuclear weapons at all. Such a distribution supports the division of

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the system into first- and second-rank powers, while puts Latin America into a comparative

disadvantage vis-à-vis the other second-rank powers as the only civilizational bloc not having

nuclear weapons at its disposal, which increases its level of insecurity as the result and

potentially forces this otherwise stable status quo power to adopt a more offensive security

doctrine.

The fact that the Arab bloc has, although a comparatively insufficient, arsenal of

nuclear weapons, as well as the fact that Iran currently attempts to develop its own nuclear

capabilities, represents a further destabilizing factor for the envisaged new BoP system. This

is due to the fact that the Arab bloc currently consists of many radical revisionist actors

attempting to change both the power distribution in the system as well as its organizing

principles. This factor is most likely to induce that the defence-over-offence logic rationally

calculated by the status quo powers in a global balance of power system backed by nuclear

weapons is not likely to apply to this actor. By this, Arab radical revisionism impinges upon

the stability of the new balance of power system.

Another potentially revisionist actor in the system is the European Union. Its

revisionism differs from that of the Arab bloc by the fact that it does not aim at a restructuring

of the organizing principles of society, but a re-distribution of power and resources, by this,

making its revisionism of an orthodox nature. This manifests itself through continuous

attempts to change the existing status quo through expansionist policy carried out by non-

military means of enlargement, which threatens the status quo of the Russian civilizational

bloc since the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 when states traditionally belonging to the

Russian sphere of influence were included in the EU, and decreases the overall level of

security in the system as a result. The tragic events currently taking place in the Ukraine are

also a product of the European enlargement and neighbourhood policy, as the Euro-Maidan,

which took place in November 2013 and can be seen as the starting point of the current civil

war, was a direct consequence of EU’s actions. In this case, the Ukraine constitutes an

illustrative example of how a weak state becomes a source of destabilization for the entire

international system as in accordance with the theory established above. However, evidence

suggests that the enlargement of the EU has finally come to an end, which would imply that

its revisionist behaviour has so as well. This would leave the Arab bloc as the only revisionist

player in the system. Unlike with the EU, though, its destabilizing role seems not to end any

time soon. Overall, both revisionist powers in the system turned out to be internally unstable

geopolitical entities, which might indicate a correlation between the two factors.

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Table 7. Stability of Balance of Power systems

BoP systems Criteria for stability of BoP systems

1. Multiple

actors

2. Global

establishment

3. Nuclear

weapons

4. No revisionist or

weak powers

European BoP 5 No No No

Cold War system 2 Partly Yes Yes

MPS 7 Partly Yes No

Source: own table

Summing up, the multipolar power system fulfils the numerical criterion of stability as well as

the precondition of the availability of nuclear weapons, although those are only sufficiently

available to the three major powers in the system. Yet, this factor shall not disturb the overall

integrity of the BoP system, as the secondary powers are not supposed to be of the same

power level as the major powers for the system to be stable, but need to be sufficiently

independent to freely switch coalitions as to make the first criterion of the number of actors

work. Thus, as established by the theoretical framework for the BoP model, the major blocs

(US, Russia, China) would “manage” the system as to keep the general balance of power

intact and make the coordination of the rules-of-the-game regimes identified as stabilizing

throughout the preceding section work, while the secondary powers will contribute to the

stability of the system as in line with the above reasoning.

While the precondition of the independence of secondary powers might be achieved in

the short-run, however, in the long-run, the coalitions are still inclined to solidify. Indeed, as

argued by Deutsch and Singer, there are two factors making a balance of power system

unstable in the long-run. One weakness of the multipolar power system is its requirement of

all the relevant powers to stay independent and free to switch coalitions in order to maintain

the overall balance of power in the system. This weakness manifests itself in the fact that once

joined an alliance, it might appear extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, for a weaker

power to leave the coalition. Thus, the system is prone to lose flexibility in the long-run,

which might constitute its downfall due to the mathematics of a reduced number of powers

leading to a reduced number of opportunities for interaction and a renewed concentration of

the share of available attention increasing the possibility of conflict escalation similar to the

situation described on the Cold War example.

The other factor concerns the Machiavellian zero-sum assumption prevalent in the

international system. This would involve a continuation of highly competitive behaviour

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between the actors in the system despite the lacking structural rationale to do so. This can

come as a result of the two criteria marked red and yellow in table 7: the presence of

unaligned weak states in the system potentially altering the defence-offence strategy of a

relevant actor in favour of the latter, and a revisionist attitude taken up by one of the powers.

This will decrease the level of security of the other actors and force them to also revise their

security strategies. Historical evidence of such behaviour in a multiple-actor system is the

European balance of power system of the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, unlike a

century ago, the result of a revived harshness of the security dilemma in a global bloc-based

balance of power system in the presence of nuclear weapons might gain on fatality.

It can turn out the other way, however, because the new balance of power system

differs in three major ways which might decrease the easiness of conflict escalation: First, it

consists of more solid geopolitical entities represented by the above delineated civilizational

blocs (at least with regard to those rated as stable) than the Empires of the old European BoP

system. Second, the availability of nuclear weapons allows a bloc to adopt a predominantly

defensive security strategy without running the risk of a deprivation of power in the best case

or destruction in the worst, as has been the case in pre-nuclear days. Furthermore, the

deterrence effect caused by the fatality of the destructions caused in case of the use of nuclear

weapons may be menacing enough as to alter the defence-offence calculations in favour of the

former due to the simple logic that the comparative advantage of defence in a nuclear-based

system is considerably higher than the potential gains from a started war even if on the

territory of unaligned states due to the losses in case of an uncontrollable conflict escalation

still overweighting the potential gains for both status quo as well as revisionist powers. Third,

the intervening variable of globalization with its main features of improved transportation and

communication together with the other intervening variables of the threat of environmental

degradation and non-reversible loss of vital resources coupled with the menacing threat of

overpopulation have made the world both more interconnected and more interdependent

potentially further influencing the security strategy calculations in favour of a stable balance

of power system allowing for coordinated actions in specialized regimes as in line with the

conclusions reached by the undertaken analysis.

Within such regimes, the zero-sum game could be reversed into what Schelling

referred to as the “nonzero-sum game” envisaged by the author for cases of mutual

dependence given compatible interests, and defined in the following way: “These are the

“games” in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual

dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual

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accommodation – tacit, if not explicit – even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster”

(Schelling, 1960, p. 83).

Anyways, even if the zero-sum assumption can be overcome by the rational logic of

the new systemic episode in the history of mankind potentially affecting the zero-sum premise,

the numeric reduction of independent actors in the system in the long run will still cause its

subsequent transformation. This transformation combined with additional pressures created

by problems of overpopulation, the decrease of resources and general environmental

degradation most likely more pressing by that time, might either result in the establishing of a

new balance of power system with even bigger geopolitical entities than the civilizational

blocs and consisting of fewer actors, or – which is more likely – induce the beginning of a

new historical cycle, which would follow the established trend of the emergence of ever

bigger geo-political entities, and finally lead to the emergence of a World Government

established from above through the mechanisms of external and, resulting thereout, societal

pressures similar to those formulated for the federal world government model.

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7. Conclusion

This analysis sought to address the question of how the set-up of the international system can

be expected to develop in the next future, more precisely, of whether the state will prevail as

the ultimate authority in the system or will give in to the transforming mechanisms and evolve

into another form of societal organization, as well as of how the framework of the new

international structure will affect the overall level of security in the system. For this purpose,

the concepts of the state and security were defined and analysed in the context of the current

system structure. In order to verify whether a transition of the system structure takes place and

in which direction it develops, three systemic models and their respective mechanisms

required for the transition of the system to occur were defined and evaluated in relation to the

identified systemic trends. In addition, the geopolitical approach to systems analysis and the

methods it applies were presented and discussed as an alternative to the three established

macro-models. Hereby, the basic problems of macro-modelling in the field of international

relations, as well as the general difficulties of qualitative analyses in social science were

indicated.

The study of model one – Federal World Government – was based on the main ideas

of the integration theories of federalism and neo-functionalism and applied the logics of the

core tenets of neo-realism, neo-liberalism and social constructivism throughout the analysis.

The assumptions provided by the theories were studied by means of the established key

mechanisms of integration, each of which was examined and evaluated with regard to its

effects on global integration processes. For this purpose, the state’s defining features –

population, territory and monopoly control over the means of internal and external violence –

were identified and contrasted to the competences presently at the UN’s disposal, which was

found to be the currently only available form of global governance.

The study revealed that the UN does not yet possess any state-like features and that

those cannot be expected to develop in the foreseeable future. This is because a

transformation of the current state-dominated international system into one single geo-

political entity in accordance with the federal world government scenario is unlikely to take

place, which could be concluded from the observed absence of integration forces operating

either on the high, or the low political levels. An integration process taking place from above

could not be verified due to the hardly predictable nature of one of its determining variables –

external pressure –, as well as a lack of the other established independent variable – societal

pressure. An integration from below occurring through the interconnected mechanisms of

spill-over and socialization could not be identified as well, despite a verified socialization

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effect. This is due to the finding that the socialization effect which could be detected within

the UN does not have the same capacity to initiate a spill-over process as was the case in the

European Union. On the contrary, this type of socialization seemed to rather counteract a

deepening of the integration process in the framework of the UN, as UN officials appeared to

favour a preservation of the current form of intergovernmental cooperation. Therefore, an

intensification of the international integration process could hardly be expected to be initiated

through this mechanism, too.

The preservation of issue-related cooperation in its current form turned out to be not

only supported by UN officials, but also desired by the public. Unlike UN officials, people

not employed by the UN were in favour of an intensified international cooperation, however,

only on selected issues, such as environmental preservation. According to the interviewees

surveyed for the purposes of this study, such cooperation must not necessarily take place

within the framework of the UN, while it has to be supervised by representatives of the

national government. Overall, the results obtained from the survey imply that the state can be

expected to continue playing a key role in international relations in the next future.

Intergovernmental cooperation on selected issues mostly of a low political character is

expected to continue taking place in regimes in the absence of a higher authority, while issues

of international high politics are likely to generate coordinated outcomes of power-based

coordination.

While the state is likely to remain a dominant actor in the system, the system itself can

be expected to change due to the transformational forces currently at work. This becomes

visible on the overall destabilization of the global IR system reflected in an increased number

of hot intra-state conflicts within weak states in a framework of a revived struggle over

spheres of influence by the major powers in the system. Consequently, the question that

remains to be answered is whether the issue-related cooperation of today can be expected to

intensify and to exert a pacifying effect on the system as in accordance with the liberal

assumption about the capacity of international regimes to generate cooperation between states

as in line with the mature anarchy model, or whether the realist logic of the security dilemma

born out of the anarchical nature of the international system preventing any cooperation in

high political issues from happening and only leaving room for coordination will gain the

upper hand and move the world towards a balance of power system.

To answer this question, the intervening variable in charge of the current systemic

transformations was identified as globalization, which was found to act through the

interrelated mechanisms of physical and mental interdependencies influencing the system

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simultaneously on two dimensions: the physical dimension captures the activities linked to

globalization which can be grouped into three main categories by the domain which they

affect: society, economy and environment; and the mental dimension which is sought to

influence an individual’s worldview and self-perception. Thus, the evaluation of the main

trends created by the interrelated variables of mental and physical interdependencies could be

expected to establish whether globalization acts as a unifying force through the creation of a

set of universal values and, as a result, generates cooperation within international regimes as

in line with the mature anarchy model (model 2), or whether it further separates the system as

a result of revived ethno-cultural tensions and favours power-based coordination of

international issues in an inter-civilizational multipolar power system as in line with model 3.

The hypothesis that by acting through the Waltzian men-dimension globalization could

create a set of universal values, which would establish a link between the state and the IR

system, by this, overcoming what Ian Clark referred to as the ’Great Divide’, could not be

verified throughout the analysis. Despite a minor set of ’thin’ humanizing core values existing

in any ethno-cultural community, globalization turned out to induce the contrary effect,

actually. Due to the pressures created by the forces of globalization, ethnic and socio-cultural

factors re-emerged as the major factors of personal self-identification leading to revived

national tenets in general and the creation of civilizational tenets in particular following the

verified trend of the last centuries of the integration of lower levels of the hierarchy into

higher ones.

In order to test the effects on the physical dimension of globalization, the major global

regimes generated by the interlinkages existent within the three domains of human activity:

society, economy and the environment, were established under consideration of the

corresponding sources of and causes for the threats that have necessitated the creation of the

respective regimes. Hereby, the regimes were classified according to their type (classic, tacit,

dead letter; regional or global), and assessed in respect of whether they generate cooperation

or coordination and whether they exert an overall stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the

system.

The results were non-surprising: in the low political domain of the environment, both

the environmental and the disaster management regimes turned out to exert a stabilizing effect

on the system, although even here pure cooperation could only be verified in disaster

management regimes, while environmental regimes turned out to incorporate elements of both

cooperation and coordination, as their dead letter type marked by a dichotomy between a

strong normative basis and an equally present national interest consideration, deriving

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primarily from the different levels of economic and political development of the participant

states, prevents any true cooperation from taking place.

Within the utterly politicised domain of society, only one regime was rated as exerting

a stabilizing effect on the system, namely, the rules of war regime governing the domain of

old wars. This regime turned out to constitute the carcass of the rules required to ensure a

minimum level of order in the otherwise anarchical international system, which is a

prerequisite for the survival of all of its actors, and the maintenance of which is, hence, in

their interest. This is unlike the two regimes characterizing both branches of new wars –

humanitarian intervention and anti-terrorist measures, as the former was identified as a

destabilizing feature of the system due to its repeated misuse as an – often poorly – disguised

instrument of modern warfare, while the latter turned out to be an overall insignificant feature

of the system due to its regional orientation, and conceptual underdevelopment. Hereby, all

regimes of the society domain were found to clearly incline towards power-based

coordination rather than cooperation.

The third dimension – economy – appeared to incorporate only destabilizing regimes,

which is a consequence of the (mis-)use of the current economic structure as a non-military

means of power projection, or modern imperialism to use the concept applied by Johan

Galtung in his analysis of the matter (in reference to free trade regimes and regulations on

trade barriers), as well as instruments of modern warfare (in reference to market

manipulations). Consequently, all outcomes generated by regimes of the economy domain

reflect the respective levels of power of its participants, whereby, their positioning in either

the center, the semi-center, the semi-periphery, or the periphery, plays an important role in the

resulting distribution of wealth. By this, the very essence of the current set-up of the global

economic system proved to be a destabilizing systemic factor, which was found to be a major

obstacle to the establishment of the mature anarchy model that turned out to be an economy-

centered model, as contrary to the balance of power model which is society-centered. Hereby,

the surprising resemblance of the principles of the mature anarchy model to those of

communism was observed.

By this, the forces of globalization instrumentalized through the diverse types of

international regimes and affecting the mentality of people turned out not to induce a deeper

global integration, but to invoke forces which revive the importance of the ethno-cultural

heritage of groups of people, the highest form of which is a civilization as to favour inter-

civilizational multipolar power relations over international cooperation in a framework of a

unipolar system.

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As a consequence of the interplay of the observed criteria, federalised civilizational blocs

consisting of states and organized in a balance of power system in which coordination of

international politics builds the regulative structural framework turned out to be the most

likely scenario towards which the system might be drifting. Hereby, the regimes which were

rated as having a stabilizing effect on the system can be expect to build the framework for the

rules of the game which will provide for some minimum degree of order required for the

survival of the actors in the anarchical system of international relations.

These conclusions, as well as the methods applied throughout the analysis to reach

those conclusions, largely fit the ideas of the integrative teachings of the English School,

which advantage lies in its positioning as a middle-approach, which allows it to merge

elements of (neo-)realism, (neo-)liberalism and (neo-)functionalism as to generate an

approach to the study of international relations, which would be as close to reality as possible.

This position resembles the main idea behind this study, which has been the conduct of a

theoretically less restrictive analysis of the international system, which would allow to test the

hypotheses of opposing IR theories, and even merge some of their elements within the

established macro-models, as well as to combine different types of methods to obtain results

which would be closely related to reality, and yet theoretically and empirically founded.

The analysis of currently existing tendencies of civilizational bloc formation revealed

eight potential blocs within the system, which were tested with regard to their internal

strength and external relative power by means of assessment criteria formulated for this

purpose. The criteria for internal stability were found to be: socio-cultural homogeneity, intra-

regional economic interdependence and geographic proximity; criteria for external relative

power were identified as: the existence of natural barriers between the blocs, sufficient size,

the possession of nuclear weapons and second-strike capability, potential economic self-

sufficiency and the presence of a core state.

The results revealed three major blocs: the American, the Russian and the Chinese,

two stable blocs: the Indic and the Latin American, and three unstable blocs: the European,

the Arab and the Japanese. The careful, yet most positive consideration of the ability of the

unstable blocs to overcome their major shortcomings, the potential of the stable blocs to

remain stable, and the capacity of the major blocs to retain their leading position revealed the

demise of Japan as a separate bloc, by this, leaving seven primary and secondary powers: the

already identified leaders US, Russia and China remaining primary systemic actors leading

their respective major blocs, with the rest turning into secondary blocs with different levels of

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internal stability: while India and Latin America can be expected to remain stable, the

European and the Arab blocs entail serious features of potential instability.

In order to estimate the stability of such a system structure, four major criteria were

identified. So, for a balance of power system to be stable, there need to be three or more

actors in the system due to the mathematics of a decreasing potential for conflict escalation

with the increasing number of systemic participants through a resulting decrease in the share

of available attention and an increase in number of possible policy choices. The second

criterion is the requirement of a global establishment of the BoP system in order not to have

unaligned or weak states as to exclude the option to wage proxy wars, and to be able to profit

from the third criterion of the pacifying logic of deterrence provided through the possession of

nuclear weapons by the major powers. This is due to the fact that in the absence of easy-to-

conquer actors, such as weak or unaligned states, in a nuclear-based power system, the

calculations of the prevalence of defence vs. offence shift in favour of the former, if

conducted rationally. This precondition leads us to the fourth criterion being the absence of

revisionist powers among the relevant actors, as their rationality in the calculations of the

security strategy will substantially differ from that of a status quo power, and most likely

favour the offence over the defence.

The results of the conducted analysis revealed that the number of actors in the system

is sufficient (7), nuclear weapons and means to transport them are available to the major blocs,

which all constitute status quo powers. However, the new balance of power will not be

established globally, as Africa is largely unaligned, and so are some of the Southeast Asian

states, while the possibility of a split-off of Australia and New Zeeland might also turn into a

problem. The presence of revisionist secondary powers in the system also constitutes an

immediate problem to the stability of the MPS system. Yet, those factors of instability can be

overcome in the short-run. In the long-run, however, the multipolar power system is still

likely to break up and once again require a transformation as a result of the solidification of

coalitions and a subsequent loss of flexibility in the system. This will lead to a reduction in

the number of system actors, resulting in a decreased number of interaction opportunities and

an increased available share of attention devoted to the remaining actors, which will increase

the potential for conflict escalation and, by doing so, rationalize the initiation of a new

historical cycle.

As a conclusive summary, the following results shall be pointed out: the international

system is undergoing a change, the main trends of which indicate the establishment of a

multicivilizational balance of power system “managed” between three major powers: the US,

164

Russia and China, and four secondary powers: the EU, India, Latin America, and, probably,

an Arab bloc. The state can be expected to remain a central organizational unit within such

civilizational blocs. Hereby, the system will be stabilized by the presence of global regimes

functioning on the basis of coordination in issues of high politics, and probably incorporate

some degree of cooperation in non-politicized issues, which will set the rules of the game and

provide for some degree of order and perhaps even justice (in relation to single states or blocs,

not in relation to individuals, as this would only be possible at the domestic level of a state)

within the otherwise anarchical international system.

Taking into account the complexity of the international system, the unpredictability of

possible external shocks rapidly and drastically changing the system, it should be

acknowledged that this analysis is not a precise prognosis of the outcome of the current

system transformation, but the evaluation of the main trends determined by the verified

independent variables representing the mechanisms required for each of the tested macro-

models to turn into practise, and the assessment of their effects on the international system in

general and the security dilemma in particular. The indicators established throughout this

study are sufficiently precise as to be used for further research. The findings of this analysis

are scientifically justified and, by this, can serve as a basis for subsequent studies to any

student of international relations.

165

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Annex

Questionnaire:

National vs. Cosmopolitan Identity I. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? (Please

tick one box in each column)

Most important

Important Less important

1. Your current or previous occupation

2. Your ethnic background

3. Your gender

4. Your age

5. Your religion

6. Your preferred political party, group, or movement

7. Your nationality

8. Your family or marital status

9. Your social class

10. Your regional identity

II. a). How close do you feel to…?

Very close Close Not very close

Not close at all

Can’t choose

1. Your town or city

2. Your country

3. Your continent

4. The world as a whole (as world citizen)

b). How close do you feel to your ethnic group?

Very close □

Close □

Not very close □

Not close at all □

Can’t choose □

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III. How important is each of the following for you?

Very important

Fairly important

Not very important

Not important at all

Can’t choose

1. to have been born in (COUNTRY)

2. to have (COUNTRY NATIONALITY) citizenship

3. to have lived in (COUNTRY) for most of one’s life

4. to be able to speak ( COUNTRY LANGUAGE)

5. to be a (RELIGION)

6. to respect (COUNTRY NATIONALITY) institutions and laws

7. to feel ( COUNTRY NATIONALITY)

8. to have (COUNTRY NATIONALITY) ancestry

IV. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

a) It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions □

b) It is better if groups adapt and blend into larger society □

c) Don’t know □

V. Which of these statements comes closer to your own view?

1. It is essential that (COUNTRY) remains one (nation/state/country) □

2. Parts of (COUNTRY) should be allowed to become to fully separate □

(nation/state/country) if they choose to

3. It is desirable that (COUNTRY) becomes part of a supranational organization □

4. Can’t choose □

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VI. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Agree strongly

Agree Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree Disagree strongly

Can’t choose

1. (COUNTRY) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy

2. Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local business

3. (COUNTRY) should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations

4. Free trade leads to better products becoming available in (COUNTRY)

5. Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in (COUNTRY)

VII. How much do you agree with the following statements?

Agree strongly

Agree Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree Disagree strongly

Can’t choose

1. For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions

2. In international organizations, decisions should be left to national government representatives

3. In general, (COUNTRY) should follow the decisions of international organizations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them

4. International organizations are taking away too much power from the national government

6. Increased exposure to foreign firms, music, and books is damaging our local cultures

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7. A benefit of the Internet is that it makes information available to more and more people worldwide

VIII. Generally speaking, would you say that (COUNTRY) benefits or does not benefit from being a

member of the United Nations?

1. Greatly benefits □

2. Largely benefits □

3. Somewhat benefits □

4. Benefits only a little □

5. Does not benefit at all □

6. Don’t know □

IX. How strongly do you agree or disagree with following statement?

Agree strongly

Agree Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree Disagree strongly

Can’t choose

(COUNTRY) should follow UN decisions, even if it does not agree with them

X. Generally, do you think that the United Nations should have... Much more, more, etc. power

than the national governments of its member states?

1. Much more □

2. More □

3. As much □

4. Less □

5. Much less □

6. Can’t choose □

* Evgenia Gordeeva, 2013, based on the resources of the International Social Survey Program: www.issp.org