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Appendix A: NA TO Sanctions over Martial Law In Poland 1

The following is the text of the communique issued after a special ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council:

I. The allied governments condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and denounce the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties in contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Final Act of Helsinki.

2. The process of renewal and reform which began in Poland in August, 1980 was watched with sympathy and hope by all who believe in freedom and self-determination: it resulted from a genuine effort by the overwhelming majority of the Polish people to achieve a more open society in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki.

3. The imposition of martial law, the use of force against Polish workers, with the thousands of internments, the harsh prison sentences and the deaths that followed, have deprived the Polish people of their rights and freedoms, in particular in the field of trade unions. These acts threaten to destroy the basis for reconciliation and compromise which are necessary to progress and stability in Poland. They are in clear violation of Polish commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the principle relating to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Developments in Poland demonstrate once again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact regimes with respect to those changes necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of their people [see note on p. 115]. This endangers public confidence in cooperation between East and West and seriously affects international relations.

4. The allies deplore the sustained campaign mounted by the Soviet Union against efforts by the Polish people for national renewal and reform, and its active support for the subsequent systematic suppression of those efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be reconciled with the Soviet Union's international undertakings and in particular with the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki, especially those dealing with sovereignty, non-intervention, threat of force, and self-determination. The Soviet Union has no right to determine the political and social development of Poland.

I Source: London Times (12 January 1982) pA.

113

114 Western Trade Pressure on the USSR

5. The allies call upon the Polish leadership to live up to its declared intention to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform. They urge the Polish authorities to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested, and to restore immediately a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

Only with reconciliation and genuine negotiation can the basic rights of the Polish people and workers be protected, and the economic and social progress of the country be secured. Poland could then expect to enjoy the benefits of stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations with the West.

6. The allies call upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference and to respect the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for national renewal and reform. Soviet pressure, direct or indirect, aimed at frustrating that desire, must cease. The allies also warn that if an outside armed intervention were to take place it would have the most profound consequences for international relations.

7. In their communique of December 11,1981, NATO ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work for a climate of confidence and mutual restraint in East-West relations: what has since happened in Poland has great significance for the development of security and cooperation in Europe. The persistence of repression in Poland is eroding the political foundations for progress on the full agenda of issues which divide East and West.

8. The allies remain committed to the policies of effective deterrence and the pursuit of arms control and in particular have welcomed the initiatives contained in President Reagan's November 18 speech. The Soviet Union will bear full responsibility of its actions with regard to Poland and its failure to live up to existing international obligations damage the arms control process.

A return to the process of real reforms and dialogue in Poland would help create the atmosphere of mutual confidence and restraint required for progress in negotiations in the field of arms control and limitations, including the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces due to resume on January 12.

9. In view of the grave developments in Poland, which constitute a serious violation of the Helsinki Final Act, the allies agreed that the Madrid conference should deal with the situation as soon as possible at the level of foreign ministers.

10. The allies will also intensify their efforts to bring to the attention of world public opinion and international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization, the violation of human rights and acts of violence in Poland.

11. Each ally will, in accordance with its own situation and legislation, identify appropriate national possibilities for action in the following fields:

(A) Further restriction on the movements of Soviet and Polish diplomats, and other restrictions on Soviet and Polish diplomatic missions and organizations; (B) Reduction of scientific and technical activities of non-renewal of exchange agreements.

NATO Sanctions in Poland 115

Meanwhile, the allies emphasize: Their determination to do what lies in their power to ensure that the truth about events in Poland continues to reach the Polish people despite the obstacles created by the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow in direct contravention of their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act;

Their resolve that the quality of their relations with the military regime in Poland should reflect the abnormal nature of the present situation and their refusal to accept it as permanent; Their willingness to contribute, with no other governments, to the solution of Polish citizens now abroad and unable or unwilling to return to their own country.

12. The allies recognize the importance of economic measures to persuade the Polish authorities and the Soviet Union of the seriousness of Western concern over developments in Poland, and stress the significance of the measures already announced by President Reagan.

13. Regarding economic relations with Poland, the allies: Noted that future commercial credits for goods other than foods will be placed in abeyance; Noted that the question of holding negotiations about the payments due in 1982 on Poland's official debts should, for the time being, be held in suspense;

Affirmed their willingness to continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-governmental organizations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended. Noted that those allies which sell food to Poland will seek the clearest possible Polish commitments with regard to the use of the food.

14. In the current situation Poland and the Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet actions towards Poland make it necessary for the allies to examine the course of future economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. Recognizing that each of the allies will act in accordance with its own situation and laws, they will examine measures which could involve arrangements regarding imports from the Soviet Union, maritime agreements, air services agreements, the size of Soviet commercial representation and the conditions surrounding export credits.

15. The allies maintain close consultations on the implementation of their resolve not to undermine the effect of each other's measures.

16. In addition to agreeing to consult on steps to be taken in the near future, the allies will also reflect on longer-term East-West economic relations, particularly energy, agricultural commodities and other goods, and the export of technology, in light of the changed situation and of the need to protect their competitive position in the field of military and technological capabilities.

Note: The Greek delegation has reserved its position on the sentence beginning 'Developments in Poland demonstrate once again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact regime' and on paragraphs II to 14 inclusive.

Appendix B: Subsidized Exports, Credits and East-West Trade

According to a report to Congress by the U.S. General Accounting Office in April 1980, to avoid the costs of an international credit war, the U.S. and 21 other countries established in April 1979 voluntary guidelines for governmentally supported export credits. Called the International Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (or OECD Arrangement), it included agreements on minimum interest rates, minimum cash payment, and maximum repayment periods. These three factors were instrumental in determining the real rate of interest and extent of subsidization below commercial rates, although it ignored the use of official guarantees on commercial loans to lower the cost of borrowing in the financial markets (which may be thought of as an indirect subsidy).

The rates and conditions agreed to in the OECD Arrangement included a 15 percent minimum cash payment based on the export value of goods sold, maximum repayment terms 10 years for poor countries and 8 years for 'nonpoor' countries, and a minimum interest rate of 7 1/4 percent to 8 per cent per year. As a result of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) being established on a self-financing basis and with lending limits set by the Congress, the U.S. found its credit terms less competitive than most OECD members.

A comparison of officially supported export credit rates showed Japan to have the lowest rates, followed by the U.K.:!

U.S. FRG France U.K. Japan

Basic interest rate 10.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% plus fees 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 plus insurance nla 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.3

Real interest rate 10.7% 8.4% 8.6% 8.3% 8.0%

It should be noted all countries except the U.S. offered their credits at the minimum allowed by the Arrangement, but in some cases what are called 'mixed' credits (consisting of both direct subsidized aid and discounted official

! Source: 'Financial and Other Constraints Preventing Eximbank from Consistently Offering Competitive Financing,' GAO.

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Subsidized Exports and East-West Trade 117

export credits) made the rates even lower. So the GAO reported one case where the U.S. won a sale when Eximbank matched a French mixed credit by financing 100 per cent of the loan at 6 percent interest. The U.S. did not consider this loan a subsidy because it was simply matching terms offered by another country.

Nevertheless, the effect on the cost to the borrowing country is the same, and it was a de facto subsidized sale. The problem, as the U.S. has recognized, is that subsidies of other countries require the U.S. to offer matching rates if U.S. exporters are to avoid being out-financed for a share of world markets. And some countries - for example, France - see subsidies as a cheap and logical method of organizing sustained employment as part of their social welfare program. (They also point to low U.S. energy costs as a form of U.S. subsidy to energy-intensive U.S. manufacturers, with low costs of production naturally passed along in the export selling prices.)

The fact is the benefit to the seller in expanding a market and keeping factory orders and employment high may encourage a non-market calculation of cost, which disregards the actual aid to the buyer generated by the subsidy. The more countries try to win orders by providing cheap credit terms, the larger the subsidy to the buyer will become.

The OECD has recognized the seriousness of this problem, stating that heavy subsidization of interest rates has transformed export credit into a form of aid. Its estimate of the cost of subsidies in 1980 alone was over $5.5 billion; with the French share $2.3 billion, the U.K. at $1.1 billion, Japan at $566 million, Italy at $425 million, the U.S. at $315 million, and the FRG at $215 million.

With this background on the credit subsidy issue, it should be recognized that U.S. pressure to limit subsidized credits to the Soviet Union was part of a larger subsidy problem. In fact, officially subsidized and guaranteed credits to the USSR and to Eastern Europe throughout the last decade have been falling consistently. According to a study for the Joint Economic Committee, official export credits to the East bloc totalled roughly $21 billion by the end of 1980, as opposed to roughly $39 billion in 1971 and, therefore, fell from 45 percent to 25 percent of total debt during that period. In addition, providing officially supported credits to the Soviet Union at the same interest rate as to other countries does not necessarily mean it is being treated equally vis-a-vis nonCommunist buyers. What little information there is on relative maturities, for example, shows that on all officially supported long-term credits in 1959-70, the average maturity was lower for exports to CMEA countries than for exports to all countries generally.

This highlights the extreme difficulty in determining the actual amount of subsidy present in export financing, and especially with regard to credits to the USSR and Eastern Europe. From a purely commercial risk standpoint, bankers in the 1970s considered loans to centrally-planned economies safer, since they were sovereign borrowers and since central planning would allow orderly pay-back schedules on the loans. Accordingly, commercial rates were lower to the USSR, than to - say - Ghana, without being unfairly discriminating for, or against, either country for political reasons.

Notes and References Chapter 1 Introduction

1. F. Bock, 'The Impact ofInternational Economic Factors on the Conduct of Foreign Policy,' in R. Bauer (ed.), The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1975) p. l36. See also: J. Finlayson and P. Marantz, 'Interdependence and East-West Relations,' Orbis (Spring 1982), p. 176.

2. F.D. Holzman and Robert Legvold, The Economics and Politics of East-West Relations,' in C.F. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1975) p. 313.

3. R.W. Mansbach, et al., The Web of World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 28, suggests that the state-centric model of international relations is becoming obsolete and its use obstructs the accurate mapping of affairs in an increasingly complex global system. On the decline of states' sovereignty, see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 55. On the growth of systemic interdependence among states, see E.L. Morse, 'Interdependence in World Affairs,' in J. Rosenau, K. Thompson and G. Boyd, World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1976).

4. See HJ. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edn, (New York: A. Knopf, 1966). For the characteristics of the militaristic ideal type within the political realist school, see J.P. O'Leary, 'Envisioning Interdependence: Perspectives on Future World Orders,' Orbis (Fall 1978) pp. 526-7. He includes a discussion on the usefulness and effectiveness of force, and on the military view of issue hierarchy.

5. L.B. Krause and J.S. Nye, Jr, 'Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations,' in C.F. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975) p. 327.

6. R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr, Power and Interdependence (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown and Co., 1977) pp. 16--17 discusses asymmetric interdependence and the power potential inherent in such relationships. James A. Caporaso, 'Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis,' International Organization (Winter 1978) gives an excellent theoretical analysis of asymmetric interdependence, including a discussion of 'Intensity' and 'Symmetry of Involvement' as structural sources of power. KJ. Holsti, 'A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence,' International Organization (Spring 1978) p. 516, discusses vulnerability interdependence.

7. See David Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,' International Organization (Autumn 1980) pp. 492-3, for brief discussion of the 'dependencia' theory.

118

Notes and References 119

8. Robert Gilpin, Three Models of the Future,' in CF. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1975) p. 40. 'The cost of the ensuing inefficiencies in order to assert national autonomy or other nationalistic goals would be too high.'

9. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 169. Also on this subject, see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 84-8.

10. James N. Rosenau, 'Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy,' in R.B. Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ind.: North-western University Press, 1966) p. 65, says that 'cogent political analysis requires a readiness to treat the functioning of national systems as increasingly dependent on external events and trends.' For a discussion of Waltz's view of interdependence, see Kenn Waltz, 'The Myth of National Interdependence,' in CP. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation (London: MIT Press, 1970).

11. Waltz, 'The Myth of National Interdependence,' p. 206. 'If the interdependence of nations is high and becoming higher, we must expect international difficulties to multiply.'

12. L.B. Krause and J.S. Nye, Jr, 'Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations,' in CF. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975) p. 334.

13. Sir Norman Angell, Foundations of International Policy (London: W. Heinemann, 1914).

14. An early theoretical conceptualization of asymmetric vulnerability is provided in Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (London: John Wiley, 1964) pp. 118-19.

15. For further discussion, see K.J. Holsti, 'A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence,' International Organization (Spring 1978) p. 516.

16. On this interdependence continuum, see R.J. Barry Jones, The Definition and the Identification of Interdependence,' unpublished paper, delivered to the SSRC International Relations Theory Group (London, 1982).

17. The question of structuring interdependence to enhance national power is discussed below.

18. See Klaus Knorr, 'International Economic Leverage and its Use,' in K. Knorr and F.N. Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977) p. 103.

19. C.A. Murdock, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability,' in K. Knorr and F.N. Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977) p. 83.

20. For an excellent introduction to East-West interdependence issue, see F.D. Holzman and Robert Legvold, The Economics and Politics of EastWest Relations,' in E.P. Hoffman and F.J. Fleron (eds), The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1980).

120 Notes and References

21. The best earlier theoretical work on this subject was done by Albert Hirschman, in 1942, while under a Rockefeller fellowship, and published in 1969 under the title: National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969). Another major book is Thomas A. Wolf, U.S. East-West Trade Policy: Economic Warfare versus Economic Welfare (London: D.C. Heath Lexington Books, 1973). Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (London: Macmillan, 1973) stands out as the power analysis; and R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co. 1977) takes the interdependence perspective. David Baldwin's book Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), and his articles 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,' International Organization (Autumn 1980), and The Power of Positive Sanctions,' World Politics (October 1971) are substantial contributions to the literature; as is James A. Caporaso, 'Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System,' International Organization (Winter 1978). Johan Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,' World Politics (April 1967); Margaret P. Doxey, 'International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis,' International Organization, Vol. 26, No.3 (1972); R.S. Olson, 'Economic Coercion in World Politics,' World Politics, Vol. 31, No.2 (1978); and Peter Wallensteen, 'Characteristics of Economic Sanctions,' Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 3 (1963) are also useful references on the theory of economic sanctions. Finally, Gary Hufbauer and J.J. Schott, 'Economic Warfare: Sanctions in Support of National Policy Goals,' unpublished paper, 10 June 1983 for the Institute for International Economics, tries an unusual statistical method of comparing case studies on sanctions. Most other accounts are historical or prescriptive.

22. H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950) p. xix.

23. Margaret Doxey, 'Economic Sanctions: Benefits and Costs,' The World Today (December 1980) pp. 485-6.

24. On the other hand, J.L. Kunz, 'Sanctions in International Law,' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 54 (1960) p. 340, says that 'protest is not a sanction, but a declaration which needs a sanction in order not to deteriorate into an ineffective "paper protest".'

25. Personal discussion by author with Alec Nove at NASEES Conference, Cambridge University (27 March 1982). Nove compares use of economic sanctions to a jilted lover using a voodoo doll to punish an unenamoured partner; although the action may have no effect on the partner, it does make the jilted partner feel better. The author suggested to Nove that it may serve a more important role, namely keeping the jilted from killing the jilter, by providing an alternative outlet for hostility. The same may apply to states who, in the absence of sanctions as a policy option, would be likely to resort to force.

26. Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds), Power. Capabilities. Interdependence (London: Sage Publications, 1979) p. 2. David Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,' International


Organization, Vol. 32 (Autumn 1980), footnote 22, p. 476, notes that vulnerability interdependence is not entirely new-it was alluded to, it seems, in the writings of Epictetus, an ancient Stoic philosopher. Nevertheless, the systematic application of this idea to contemporary international relations may be considered new.

27. Daniel Yergin, 'Politics and Soviet-American Trade,' Foreign Affairs (April 1977) p. 519.

28. G. Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947-1967 (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968) p. 10.

29. C.F. Bergsten, R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr, 'International Economics and International Politics,' in C.F. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975) p. 10.

Chapter 2 Economic Sanctions: pre-World War II Through Cold War

I. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Council (April 1925) pp.447-50.

2. G. Adler-Karlsson, 'The US Embargo, Inefficient and Counterproductive,' Aussenwirtschaft (June 1980).

3. J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations (London: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 129, says Japan insisted that her Manchurian adventure was not a war, but only an operation to 'bring order' to China - ironically, China was forced to accept this definition for a different reason, namely, to avoid the U.S. Neutrality Act which in time of war precluded the large shipments of U.S. military aid to China needed to fight the Japanese. In the Greco-Bulgarian dispute of 1925, and the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute of 1932, the League also did not involve the definition 'resorts to war' under Article 16's provisions for imposing sanctions.

4. See P.A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter- War Years (Plymouth, England: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954) p. 113.

5. D. Vare, 'British Foreign Policy through Italian Eyes,' International Affairs (January-February 1936) p.91.

6. See G. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) p. 326.

7. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 331. 8. 'Either because Paris or London did not wish to upset the Fascist regime,

or because they wished to avoid any risk of war whatever, only those sanctions that could neither paralyze Italy nor provoke a military rejoinder from her were applied,' says Raymond Aron, Peace and War, English edn (London: Doubleday, 1966), p. 114.

9. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 374. 10. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 100. 11. H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) p. 144, says:

'From the point of view of the balance of power . . . the effect of sanctions against Italy was simply that Italy would be driven into the arms of Germany.'

12. As E.H. Carr so aptly phrased it: 'In sanctions, as in war, the only motto is 'all or nothing,' and economic power is impotent if the military weapon


is not held in readiness to support it.' See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939) p. 164. In his footnotes, Carr speculated that what paralyzed the League sanctions was the common knowledge that the League powers were not prepared to use the military weapon. This is echoed by Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 325, who observes that in their secret talks of 10 and 11 September 1935, Hoare and Laval agreed war against Italy was simply too high a price to pay for the protection of Ethiopia, under the existing conditions, for maintenance of the universality of the League covenant.

13. Halsbury's Statutes, Vol. 38, p. 296. 14. See W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vols I and II (London:

HMSO, 1952, 1959) for a full account of wartime embargo activities. 15. R.S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis

Books, 1976), p. 143. 16. Declassified Documents Quarterly, NSC 1980, 4th Qtr., p. 377-B,

Appendix B, 'List of Actions by the National Security Council.' 17. Summary of the 39th Meeting of the NSC (5 May 1949), 18. See testimony of K. Hanson, in Hearings before Subcommittee on

Foreign Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (16 February 1954) p. 32.

19. See Sect 1304 of P.L. 843, effective 7 September 1950 (Cannon Arndt); and Sect 1302 of P.L. 45, effective 2 June 1951 (Kern Arndt); and Sects 103(b), 104 and 5,202 and 3, of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act).

20. For a brief discussion on the creation of COCOM, see G. AdlerKarlsson, Western Economic Wmfare, 1947-1967 (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968) pp. 51-2.

21. As contained in a declassified report prepared by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, entitled 'The U.S. Position on China Trade Controls,' 9 April 1956, Tab D, 'Diagram on the Organization of Consultative Group, COCOM and CHINCOM.'

22. For an indepth look at this whole period, see D.W. Folts, The Role of President and Congress in the Formulation of U.S. Economic Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 1947-1968,' Ph.D. Dissertation, Notre Dame University (1971).

23. Export Administration: Annual Report, FY80 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), p. 33.

24. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (20-27 March 1954) p. 13478A. 25. D.W. Folts, 'The Role of President and Congress in the Formulation of

U.S. Economic Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 1947-1968,' p.102. 26. The arguments for rapid Soviet economic growth ignore the fact this was

attributable to 'extensive' rather than 'intensive' development. The Soviets had a large pool of underutilized labour, plentiful raw materials, and a lack of technical development. The growth rate fell once the USSR entered a phase where it had to utilize higher intensity production methods, and qualitative improvements in technology.

27. Declassified memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (22 May 1956) 'Status Report on CHINCOM-COCOM,' p. 3.

28. 'Status Report on CHINCOM-COCOM,' p. 4.


29. Susan Strange, The Strategic Trade Embargo: Sense or Nonsense?,' The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 12 (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd, 1958).

30. Declassified memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (5 October 1956) 'Informal Comments on Department of State Progress Report on "Multilateral Export Controls on Trade with Communist China'" p. 2.

31. What constitutes a strategic commodity continues to be a matter of dispute within the Western Alliance. One view is that only goods which have direct military applications should be seen as strategic; a second view is that dual-use items (which may be used for both peaceful and aggressive purposes) should be defined as strategic depending on the political relations with the purchaser; and a third view, now less widely supported, is that any product which strengthens the economy of a potential adversary should be treated as strategic (the so-called economic warfare model).

Chapter 3 East-West Economic Relations (1960-85)

1. See Z. Brzezinski's personal account of this bridge-building, in G.R. Urban, Detente (New York: University Books, 1978) p. 262.

2. Brzezinski, Detente, p. 262. 3. A. Yergin (Stent), East-West Technology Tramfer: European Perspectives

(London: Sage, 1980). 4. R. Oakeshott, 'The Strategic Embargo,' The World Today (1963) p. 245. 5. World Petroleum No.5 (May 1963) p. 29. 6. See Declassified Documents Quarterly, 1980, 2d Qtr., NSC, p. l69-C,

Summary Record of NSC Meeting (1 October 1963) 'Proposed Sale of U.S. Wheat to the USSR.'

7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Harold J. Berman, 'A Reappraisal of U.S.-USSR Trade Policy,' Harvard

Business Review (July-August 1964) pp. 139-40, says that the wheat sale sparked off a national debate on whether the U.S. should or should not trade with the USSR.

10. For a legal analysis of the basis for Castro's expropriation of U.S. factories, which led the State Department to invoke economic sanctions, see Monroe Leigh, 'The Supreme Court and the Sabbatino Watchers,' Virginia Journal of International Law (Fall 1972). In this article, he explains that the U.S. Supreme Court actually found the State Department guilty of aggression in suspending Cuba's sugar quota in an effort to displace Castro, and that his .mnexing of U.S. property could be seen as a just reprisal.

11. U.S. State Department, 'Presidential Talking Points Paper,' for the visit of British Prime Minister Douglas-Home, dated 7 February 1964.

12. J.J. Marshall, 'Foreign Policy Aspects of American Trade Regulations,' University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, Vol. 24 (April 1966) p. 73.

13. L.T. Lee and John McCobb, Jr, 'U.S. Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1970,' New York Journal of International Law and Politics (Spring 1971),


p. 10. The first dent in the economic "Great Wall" occurred on July 23, 1969, when the Foreign Asset Control Regulations were amended by the Nixon Administration to permit American tourists to bring home up to $100.00 worth of Chinese goods.' See also Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979) p. 179. The time had come to modify our trade embargo against China. The actual change was unimportant but the symbolism was vast.'

14. C.F. Redick, 'Recent Changes in the U.S. Trade Regulations Affecting the PRC: A Market Decontrolled,' Virginia Journal of International Law (Fall 1972) provides a full list of decontrol measures.

15. Richard Nixon, The Real War (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980) p. 226. 'In 1972 we wanted Soviet help in extricating ourselves from Vietnam . . . Trade was one of the principal things we had to offer in return for political and diplomatic concessions.'

16. See the list of agreements signed in Moscow at this Summit. 17. It should be pointed out the term 'most-favored-nation' is misleading,

and does not give its recipient most favored treatment, but only equal treatment to other trading partners.

18. Paula Stern, Water's Edge (London: Greenwood Press, 1979) p. 132. 'Was this an effort to find a way out of the emigration empasse? Or, was Jackson using the negotiations ... as a tactic for delaying and possibly killing the Trade Bill?'

19. Ibid, p. 142. 20. Jurgen Notzold, 'East-West Economic Relations,' Aussenpolitik, Vol. 32,

No.4 (1981) p. 381, says that it was the attempt explicitly to link economic concessions and political demands that doomed the strategy of drawing the Soviets into a more dependent relationship in the framework of detente.

21. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 26850, for the agreement between Kissinger and Jackson to keep secret the Soviet emigration quota.

22. According to Daniel Yergin, 'Politics and Soviet-American Trade: The Three Questions,' Foreign Affairs (April 1977) p. 531, the USSR reluctantly agreed to accept the 'publicized' Jackson-Vanik amendment, but the Stevenson amendment limiting credits to $300 million destroyed the package.

23. L. Brezhnev, Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

24. Richard Pipes, in G.R. Urban, Detente (New York: University Books, 1976)p.I72.

25. G.K. Bertsch, 'U.S. Export Controls: The 1970s and Beyond,' Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 15, No.1 (1981) p. 76.

26. K.W. Abbott, 'Linking Trade to Political Goals,' Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 65 (1980--1981) p. 795.

27. R.S. Elliott, 'Comment: The Export Administration Act of 1970: Latest Statutory Resolution,' Columbia Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 (1981) p. 288.

28. Cited in R. Paarlberg, 'Lessons of the Grain Embargo,' Foreign Affairs (Fall 1980) pp. 152-3.


29. Alan Abouchar, The Case for the U.S. Grain Embargo,' The World Today, Vol. 37 (July-August 1981) p. 277.

30. U.S. News and World Report (3 August 1981) p. 72. 31. S.E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (London: Penguin, 1971) p. 113. 32. For example, see D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins (New

York: Doubleday, 1961). 33. J. Fitchett, 'West and Poland: Test for NATO,' International Herald

Tribune (31 March 1981) p. 4. 34. Information confidentially provided to the author by a member of the

Ditchley meeting. See also: Ditchley Conference Report (August 1981) p. 5, for a partial rendition.

35. Cited in International Herald Tribune (4 September 1981) p. 2, under title 'Economy seen as a factor in Soviet restraint.'

36. Ibid. 37. Fitchett, 'War and Poland.' 38. Time Magazine (5 July 1982) p. 10. 39. Michel Tatu, 'East-West Trade - Europe's Spoilt Kids,' as reprinted in

Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 127 (1 August 1982) p. 11. 40. Author's personal interview with William Martin, NSC Staff (29 October

1982).

Chapter 4 A Conceptual Framework for Sanctions

1. L.M. Goodrich, 'International Sanctions,' D.L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968) p. 5.

2. Margaret Doxey, 'International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis,' International Organization, Vol. 26 (1972) p. 528. 'Sanctions in the context of a legal system are negative measures which seek to influence conduct by threatening and, if necessary, imposing penalties for nonconformity with law.' In her book Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 1, Doxey says: 'Sanctions, to deserve the name, must be conformity defending instruments related to behavior which is expected by custom or required by law.' These legalistic interpretations of sanctions, while valid in the context of their use in international organizations like the UN or the OAS, do not prove as useful in the broader range of international problems, and particularly in East-West relations, where the fundamental principles of law are disputed.

3. 'It is of little use to attempt to make law where nations clearly have no interest in being bound,' says Louis Henkin, in How Nations Behave (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968) p. 261. The famous Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN General Assembly Resolution 3281, of 12 December 1974, adopted 120 to 6, which mandates that no state will use economic, political or any other means to coerce another state, is observed more in exception than in rule.

4. Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (London: John Wiley, 1964) pp. 116-17. 'The definition of power should be amplified, there-


fore, to read that it is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance.'

5. David A. Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions,' World Politics, Vol. 24, No I (October 1971).

6. See B. Gert, 'Coercion and Freedom,' and V. Held, 'Coercion and Coercive Offers,' in R.J. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds), Coercion (New York: Atherton Press, 1972).

7. While it is recognized that the use of 'positive' sanction as a term may be unfamiliar to some readers, there is a long record of its use in the literature. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) p. 51 says: 'Negative coercion is based on the threat of extreme punishment, whereas positive coercion is based on the prospect of very large gains.' Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (London: John Wiley, 1964) p. 116, footnote 3, says: Talcott Parsons makes a parallel distinction between coercive power that rests on deterrence through negative sanctions and inducements in exchange transactions that rest on positive sanctions.'

8. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (London: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 3, says: 'One needs the adversary to understand what behavior of his will cause the violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld. The victim has to know what is wanted, and he may have to be assured of what is not wanted.'

9. See R.F. Taubenfeld and H.J. Taubenfeld, 'The Economic Weapon: The League of Nations and the UN,' in M.S. Finkelstein and L.S. Finkelstein (eds), Collective Security (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Co., 1966) p. 185.

10. G. Baer, 'Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the ItalianEthiopian War, 1935-1936,' International Organization, Vol. 27, No.2 (l973)p.173.

11. For a discussion of the distinction between public and secret sanctions, see Richard Olson, 'Economic Coercion in World Politics,' World Politics, Vol. 31, No.2 (1978). J.A. Hamilton, To Link or Not to Link,' Foreign Policy (Fall 1981) p. 130, says: 'Making a diplomatic demand or linkage public forces the other nation, almost inexorably, to assume a public posture of defiance.' For a good treatment of bargaining theory and reputational costs in public versus private negotiations, see Ken Oye, 'Bargaining: The Logic of Contingent Action,' unpublished paper, Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1982) pp. 4-16. In this analysis, he suggests that in cases of positive sanctions (so-called backscratching), publicity may keep parties from breaking the contract, but in cases of negative sanctions (so-called blackmailing), the publicity raises the costs of compliance of the target.

12. Symbolic sanctions must have the appearance of instrumental effectiveness to be seen as more than mere propaganda. This requirement for an appearance of instrumentality has, however, several negative consequences. First, the credibility of all threats made by the sanctioning state are weakened when one threat (economic deprivation) is not actualized. The sanctioner may develop a reputation of 'paper tiger.' and the target may be likely to confuse those cases where the sanctioner


is more serious in his threats. Second, the problem of allied coordination is aggravated by the uncertainty over whether the sanction is instrumental or symbolic. The sanctioner may find himself imposing instrumental sanctions, while his Allies are taking symbolic ones, or vice versa. This situation naturally undermines support for sanctioning efforts and can promote serious mistrust and disagreement within an Alliance.

13. In the case of the Soviet gas pipeline sanctions, Roger Robinson, a staff member of the NSC, explained to the author that the embargo's real intent was not to block the West European participation in the pipeline, but only to alert them to U.S. concerns over subsidized credits, and to encourage them to strengthen COCOM's technology control standards. Although it was possible that such credit and technology control agreements were made easier as a result of the pipeline dispute, it appears doubtful that this was the original outcome planned by the NSC.

14. R. St J. MacDonald, 'Economic Sanctions in The International System,' The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 7 (1969) pp. 77-8, explains that for a sanctioner's threat to be effective, it must be directed at a group that understands, in terms it understands, and this group must have the capability to insure compliance with the demands. From this, we should note that it does little good to sanction a group which does not have power to bring about the changes being sought. This requires an analysis of political power structures and elite groups in the country to be sanctioned prior to formulating a sanctioning strategy.

15. See David A. Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics,' World Politics, Vol. 31, No.2 (1978), p. 165, for a discussion of power resources. Baldwin's important conclusion is 'what functions as a power resource in one policy-contingency framework may be irrelevant in another.' S. Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System,' in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds), The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 110, explains that value preferences do not exist independently of the situational context. This means that power resources must be used flexibly given the unique characteristics of any particular situation.

16. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) pp. 50-1.

17. For an excellent treatment of value hierarchies, the assignment of value priorities, and changing patterns of values (from horizontal, geographic, power elite to vertical, issue-area, interest group), see James N. Rosenau, 'Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy,' in R.B. Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ind.: Northwestern University Press, 1966) esp. p. 76. On the problem of a sanctioner clearly identifying the value hierarchy at any given time and in any given policy-context of a target state, S. Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System,' p. 110, says: 'If arriving at a value ordering for an individual is difficult, arriving at a joint preference ordering for a group is even more difficult.'

18. For a theoretical explanation of central versus peripheral values, see Clyde Kluckhohn, et al., 'Values and Value Orientation in the Theory of


Action,' in Talcott Parsons and E.A. Shils (eds), Towards a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951 ).

19. Margaret Doxey, 'Sanctions Revisited,' International Journal (Canada) (Winter 1975-1976) p. 68.

20. Seweryn Bialer, 'Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions, Trends,' in A. Dallin (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 432-3.

21. See James N. Rosenau, 'Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy,' p.90.

22. Charles Kindleberger, Power and Money (London: Macmillan, 1970) p.96.

23. For an interesting discussion of the non-linear relationship between value deprivation and political disintegration, see Johan Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,' World Politics (April 1967), pp. 388-9.

24. T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 101.

25. Robert E. Klitgaard, 'Sending Signals: Foreign Policy (Fall 1978). 26. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: Little,

Brown and Co., 1979) p. 191. 27. Ibid, p. 191. 28. J.M. Bingham and v.c. Johnson, 'A Rational Approach to Export

Controls,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No.4 (1979) p. 910. 29. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 5th edn

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967) p. 230. 'If one party gains a reputation for bluffing ... future threats will be less credible.'

30. Castro gained credit in the Third World for resisting U.S. sanctions, which after the Bay of Pigs became largely symbolic in effect.

Chapter 5 Economic Dimensions of Sanctions

1. It should be noted that these data consider intra-EEC trade as exports and imports, and the overall trade dependence implication would be much lower if only trade outside the Common Market were considered foreign trade.

2. The calculation of Soviet GDP is, at best, an estimate since trade and production data in the USSR are classified. For a discussion of determining GDP in the USSR in the absence of exchange prices, see V. Treml, 'Measuring the Role of Foreign Trade in the Soviet Economy,' in Senate Foreign Relations, Committee Print, The Premises of EastWest Commercial Relations' (December 1982) U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 98-101.

3. Significantly, these 1980 data reflect Canada's sales to the USSR of grain following the 1979 U.S. grain embargo, and must be considered an abnormality in traditional Australian export volumes to the USSR.

4. Of course, this calculation is only a rule of thumb derived from the labor input to dollar value of production for domestic production. It would not necessarily be the same ratio if U.S. manufacturers were to sell excess


production, in which case the marginal labor to value ratio would be less. Also, the firms that export tend to be more high-tech and less laborintensive than U.S. manufacturing as a whole.

5. From the pattern, it may be observed that the Soviet Union today is not unlike it was under the Tzar in economic relations: the Europeans supplied Russia with manufactured goods while the Russians served as a source of raw materials for Europe.

6. For a good discussion of the whole issue of European dependence on Soviet gas, see J. Stern, Soviet Natural Gas Development to 1990 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1980).

7. Strictly speaking, not all economic and trade restrictions are sanctions: for example, so-called short supply controls applied in the U.S. during times of domestic scarcity are not imposed to achieve any foreign policy objective. On the other hand, even such domestic restrictions can produce foreign policy consequences, intended or unintended. In the case of a 1973 soybean embargo on exports, the effects were felt in Japan and led it to expand trade with Brazil to reduce dependence on the U.S.

8. The term 'boycott' originates with a certain Captain Boycott who was employed in Ireland in the 19th Century as a tax collector. The peasants organized against him, refusing to sell goods or services, which resulted in his growing discontent and in him leaving the country. Thus originated the term which developed to connote a refusal to sell, export or offer for sale, any goods or services to a party for the purpose of obtaining political, rather than purely economic, concessions. See Y.Z. Blum, 'Economic Boycotts in International Law: Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 12 (Winter 1977) p. 6.

9. Article XXI of the GATT, signed in Geneva, Switzerland. 30 October 1947, Sect(b) says nothing concerning agreement to 'prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.' See A.F. Lowenfeld, Public Controls on International Trade (New York: Matthew Bender 1979), p. DS-44. In fact, the GATT can be openly violated even without Article XXI justification, as when the U.S. undertook sanctions on Idi Amin in Uganda. In this case, the U.S. argued that moral grounds and universal human rights preempted the GATT requirement for nondiscrimination in trade provision. See R. Ullman, 'Human Rights and Economic Power,' Foreign Affairs (April 1978).

10. On East Bloc membership in the GATT, see M.M. Kostecki, East-West Trade and the GATT System (London: Macmillan, 1979). As he explains, Czechoslovakia was an original signatory of the GATT. Yugoslavia joined in 1966, Poland in 1967, Romania in 1971, and Hungary in 1973. Bulgaria has observer status in the GATT.

11. House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Committee Print, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1981, entitled 'Iran: The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement Agreement: p. 43.

12. Hearings before Senate Banking Committee, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 February 1982, entitled To Discuss Polish Debt' p. 99, includes a written reply by the State Department' the scenario ... whereby Western Governments would declare Poland in default and cut off all credits to


East Europe could well lead to an East Bloc-wide default.' On p. 39, it is revealed that during renegotiations on Polish debt in April 1981, a socalled 'tank' clause was added, calling for automatic default in case of exceptional circumstances such as internal repression (if Soviet tanks invaded Poland). See also Radio Free Europe Research, Vol. 7, No.7, Part 3 (19 February 1982) p. 34, which says, in part, 'opponents of an official declaration of default ... argue that an official declaration of default by even a few banks would have such drastic adverse consequences for the Western banking system that the costs to the West of such a decision would far outweigh the benefits.'

13. According to Mr H. Sherwood, who was Commercial Attache for the U.S. Embassy in Bonn at the time, the West Germans threatened to call Mexico into default if the U.S. declared Poland in default. Since the U.S. held the majority of Mexican debt, and there could be a spillover effect on other U.S. loans in Latin America, the Germans felt this threat would deter any U.S. default action against Poland, where Germany had the greatest debt exposure. It is reported this argument made to Ambassador Burns convinced him strongly to oppose the Defense Department on this matter. According to Technology and East-West Trade, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979) p. 28, the U.S. ranked only fifth in official credits to the East Bloc, behind the FRG, France, Japan and the UK.

14. R.C. Porter, The Potential Impact of International Trade and Investment Sanctions on the South African Economy,' CRED, University of Michigan, Discussion Paper 77 (February 1979).

15. R.C. Porter, 'Sanctions on the South African Economy,' Journal of Conflict Resolution (December 1979) p. 585. 'Statistical analysis assumes the elasticity of substitution in both production and consumption increases the longer the period considered. Thus, for the basic theory, sanctions must work quickly for they are increasingly averted by long run adjustment.'

16. For a discussion of Israel's water vulnerability and the threat of its curtailment as the basis for Israel's occupation strategy, see 'Water and Israel's Occupation Strategy,' Merip Reports (July-August 1983).

17. For an excellent discussion of bottlenecks in the Soviet economy, see F.D. Holzman, 'Import Bottlenecks and the Foreign Trade Multiplier,' Western Economic Journal (June 1969). Also, Peter J. Wiles, 'Economic War and the Soviet Type Economy,' Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, No. I (1965).

Chapter 6 Political Significance of Economic Sanctions

1. This became a major dispute in Alliance relations, because the Europeans felt they were not consulted prior to imposing sanctions, because they did not think the situation in Poland justified such stringent measures (since they doubted the sanctions' effectiveness), and finally because the U.S. removed grain from the list of controlled products, highlighting the uneven burden-sharing dimension of the sanctions. President Reagan announced sanctions against Poland on 23 December 1981, but no measures were taken against the USSR at that time. See New York


Times, 24 December 1981, p. I for an account of a letter Reagan sent to Brezhnev, urging him to permit restoration of human rights in Poland, and the Miami Herald (25 December 1981) p. 21A, for a list of sanctions taken against Poland. Following a rejection by Brezhnev of Reagan's appeal, arguing that the USSR had no responsibility for Poland's martial law, the U.S. President announced on 28 December 1981 additional sanctions against the Soviet Union. See New York Times (30 December 1981), p. 6 for a list of sanctions taken against the USSR. The U.S. called a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council (the ministerial level group in NATO) to take place on 11 January to discuss a unified response to the Polish crisis. See Times (London) (II January 1982) p. 4, and Guardian (12 January 1982) p. 26 for a discussion of the NATO meeting; and see Appendix for a full text of the communique issued. On the Buckley mission, see Financial Times (London) (17 March 1982) p. I, and Times (London) (17 March 1982) p. 4. Both Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, and Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, opposed Buckley's efforts to halt subsidized credits to the USSR, with the former saying the time was not 'ripe,' and the latter merely 'taking note' of U.S. suggestions. Continued unsuccessful negotiations persisted right up until the Summit in June 1982.

2. In the 1962 case, Europe's suspicion over economic considerations was accentuated by the U.S. determination to halt the sale of large gauge steel pipe to the USSR, a suspicion that was later confirmed. In this earlier case, the U.S. moved the decision into NATO after COCOM, which requires unanimous consensus in its decisions, appeared to oppose the controls. While the U.S. was successful in blocking the shipment, it required the Adenauer government in West Germany to resort to extraparliamentary measures to comply with the NATO decision. To make matters worse, the USSR was able to get the pipe from Sweden, so the restrictions only undermined confidence in French and German suppliers, while not hurting the Soviets. Adding insult to injury, only ten months later, President Kennedy proposed the first massive sale of U.S. wheat to the USSR, all the while continuing the press the Swedes to stop shipping pipe to Russia. For a brief summary of this, see Angela (Yergin) Stent's book, From Embargo to Ostpolitik (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

3. The u.S.-USSR energy cooperation deal fell through in October 1975 only when President Ford attempted directly to link the sale of U.S. grain to a letter of intent to purchase Soviet oil at below the world market price.

4. Robert W. Tucker, 'The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics,' Commentary (May 1982) p. 69, says there are two detentes: the global American detente, and the regional European detente. Kissinger describes this as 'differential detente' in H. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co., 1979) p. 132. And as was reported in House of Commons, Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1979-1960, entitled 'Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and its Consequences for British Policy,' (London: HMSO, 1980), p. xii: The U.S. tended to regard detente as 'indivisible,' that is Soviet misconduct in


one part of the world was bound to affect superpower relations throughout the world. For the Europeans, this was perhaps becoming a luxury they could not afford.'

5. Information on the proceedings of this meeting were provided confidentially to the author by a participant, but see Ditchley Conference Report, No.7, 1981,(19-21 June 1981) 'Soviet Empire in Europe.'

6. International Herald Tribune (4 September 1981) p. 2. 7. New York Times (30 December 1981) p. Y-7. 8. International Herald Tribune (4 September 1981) p. 2. Although not

mentioned in the article, there were also the so-called 'tank' clauses in U.S. loans to Poland, which would automatically trigger default in the event of Soviet invasion of Poland.

9. Says Margaret Doxey, 'International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis,' International Organization, Vol. 26 (1972) p. 533, 'It is obvious when deterrence has failed, but not when it has worked. This presents a fundamental difficulty in any empirical study of the sanctioning process.'

In retrospect, the deterrence capacity of the British 'positive' sanctions on the U.S. were not sufficiently strong to prevent the Carter Administration from undertaking a para-military rescue attempt.

10. Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 50. 'The attribution of deterrence must always be a highly conjectural inference about calculations in others' minds of which we have no firsthand knowledge, but our own common experience tells us that deterrence is seldom a product of a single factor.'

11. Paula Stern, Water's Edge (London: Greenwood Press, 1979). 12. Jackson was actually called 'that Senator from Boeing' because he came

from Seattle, Washington, the home of the Boeing Corporation, a major U.S. defense contractor.

l3. Paula Stern, Water's Edge, p. 142. 14. See Jurgen Notzold, 'East-West Economic Relations,' Aussenpolitik,

Vol. 32, No.4 (1981) p. 381. Also see Theodore C. Sorensen, 'Most Favored Nations and Less Favored Nations,' Foreign Affairs (January 1974), p. 278. George F. Kennan, 'America's Unstable Soviet Policy,' The Atlantic Monthly (November 1982) concluded the Jackson Amendment was the turning point in the period of detente and in general U.S.Soviet relations, with a steady deterioration thereafter.

15. A personal discussion with Roger Robinson, Senior Advisor to the National Security Council for International Economic Affairs.

16. U.S. News and World Report (3 August 1981) p. 72. 17. See Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations

(London: Macmillan, 1981) p. 232, for a discussion of balancing political and economic costs in economic sanctions. And says C. Lloyd BrownJohn, Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 371, 'Sanctions, regardless of type, must be viewed as a political rather than economic function.'

18. James Mayall, 'To Sanction or Not to Sanction', LSE Quarterly (Winter 1987) pp. 372-4.


Chapter 7 Sanctions and East-West confrontation

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto,' in Emile Burns (ed.), The Marxist Reader (New York: Avenue Books, 1982) p. 27. The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of towns ... so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.'

2. For a discussion '1f Marxist views on the economic nature of war, see Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939) esp. pp. 19-30.

3. On the other hand, the capitalist states are not the only ones to use economic coercion to pursue their aims - Stalin used economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, and Khrushchev used them against China, for example. See R.O. Freedman, Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc (New York: Praeger, 1970); and Jonathan Steel, Eastern Europe Since Stalin (London: David and Charles Publications, 1974), pp. 101-7.

4. J.D. Clarkson, A History of Russia, 2nd edn (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 246. For another good discussion of the unique aspects of Russia's history which impact on its present political system, see T. Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

5. The Russian Orthodox religion is apparently alive and well in the western part of the Soviet Union, with its particular fatalism about achieving happiness on this earth. For an interesting account, see Hedrick Smith, The Russians, Chapter 17. esp. pp. 578-586 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977).

6. However, it appeared in the mid-1980s that Japan would overtake the Soviet Union.

7. One Western journalist visiting Moscow in the early 1980s was asked by several citizens, 'Why are you trying to starve usT Obviously, if a message was communicated to the common Russian with the grain embargo, it was that the Western capitalists were trying to overthrow the USSR, not that it disapproved of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan or Poland. The Western sanctioners must understand the insulated nature of communications, and the ability of the Soviet regime to twist any message being sent to the masses to fit its purpose.

8. We should distinguish between 'use value' and 'market value.' For example, a bullet for a gun is worth much more than the cost of producing it if it is needed urgently. The cost of production, or even market value over the counter of a store, has little connection to the use value in time of urgent need. In the case of bottleneck situations, the cost of not getting the needed commodity is much greater than the market cost, since it entails production delays, idle plant equipment and workers, and lost opportunity.

9. Much of the discussion on the Soviet economic system included in this chapter is drawn from Franklyn D. Holzman, International Trade Under Communism - Politics and Economics (London: Basic Books, 1976).

10. Jonathan Steel, Eastern Europe Since Stalin (London: David and Charles Publications, 1974) p. 181.


11. 'Kulak' was the term used for richer farmers immediately after the October 1917 Revolution, who were held accountable for expropriative pricing of goods sold to the cities, leading to Stalin's liquidation of the kulaks in the 1920s. From a market perspective, the kulaks were acting logically in resisting price controls, but Stalin saw their effort as one of counter-revolution to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.

12. See Franklyn D. Holzman, International Trade Under Communism -Politics and Economics (London: Macmillan, 1976) p. 67. For a discussion of the creation of CMEA in reaction to the Marshall Plan of 1947, see Michael Kaser, Comecon, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

l3. Richard Nixon, The Real War (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1980) p. 228. 'The Soviets use their economic stranglehold over their satellites in Eastern Europe to keep them in line politically. Any alternatives the West can provide lessens Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviets.'

14. J. Wilczynski, 'Strategic Embargo in Perspective,' Soviet Studies, Vol. 19 (1968) p. 76, says the U.S. approval of sale of a nuclear reactor to Romania was to express political pleasure at her 'growing nationalism in defiance of Moscow.'

15. Klaus von Beyme, 'Detente and East-West Economic Relations,' The Journal of Politics (November 1981), p. 1198. 'The finding emerges that the extension of Western trade seems to correlate with the relative independence of socialist countries from Soviet foreign policy.'

16. See J. Hardt and K. Tomlinson, 'Soviet Economic Policies in Western Europe' (September 1982) paper given at the University of Washington, p.67.

17. So concluded the Trilateral Commission study 'The Triangle Paper: 15 -An Overview of East-West Relations,' in Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports. 15-19 (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp.48-9.

18. Robert Legvold, 'The Nature of Soviet Power,' in E. Hoffman and F.J. Fleron (eds), The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Press, 1980) p. 688.

19. See William Zimmerman, 'What Do Scholars Know About Soviet Foreign Policy?,' International Journal (Canada), Vol. 37 (Spring 1982), p. 199.

20. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Co., 1979) p. 132.

21. Richard Pipes, in R.J. Pranger (ed.), Detente and Defense (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976) pp. 186-7.

22. Richard Portes, 'Eastern Europe's Debt to the West: Interdependence is a two-way Street,' Foreign Affairs (July 1977) p. 775. 'The policy of detente was of course designed to create interdependence, a web of mutual interaction, which would constrain both sides.'

23. Winston Churchill, in a speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (25 June 1954) remarked: 'Nothing is more likely to bring about a modification of the rigid Russian system than contact between the Russian people and the world - cultural contacts and trade contacts.' See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 13665a.


24. Richard Portes, 'Eastern Europe's Debt to the West: Interdependence is a two-way Street,' Foreign Affairs, (July 1977) p. 775. Of course individual European states had more narrow motives grafted on to this general ambition. For example, the FRG sought closer relations with the East Germans, and France sought to be power broker among European states.

25. See for example Ole R. Holsti, et al., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1973) pp. 17 and 28.

26. See T. Hopmann, 'Effects of International Conflict and Detente on Alliance Cohesion,' in Ole R. Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1973) p. 144.

27. Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West (London: Penguin Books, 1978) p.85.

28. W. Diebold, Jr, 'East-West Trade and the Marshall Plan,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26 (July 1948).

29. Technology and East-West Trade, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (Washington, D.C., 1979) p.187.

30. R.S. Olson, 'Economic Coercion in World Politics,' World Politics, Vol. 31, No.2 (1978) p. 476, footnote 17.

31. On the need for closer consultation between Western Allies, see G. Angelli, 'East-West Trade: A European View,' Foreign Affairs (Summer 1980) p. 1032.

32. J. Stern, Soviet Natural Gas Production to 1990 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1980), p. 139 explains that the European steel industry was experiencing recession in the latter part of the 1970s. Hence there was added reason for resisting the pipeline sanctions by members of this hard pressed industry.

33. See, for example, Margaret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 106-7, and R. St J. MacDonald, 'Economic Sanctions in the International System,' Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 7 (1969) p.73.

34. See Wu Yuan-Li, Economic Warfare (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952) p.354.

35. Margaret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 106.

36. International Herald Tribune (2 September 1982) p. 1. 37. It should be taken as given that at least some politics will enter into trade

with the USSR, since it is necessary to deal directly with the Soviet government rather than individual citizens or companies.

38. The Economic Directorate of NATO, although recently strengthened, in the 1970s had little influence over NATO action and could be compared to the U.S. Library of Congress (a policy think-tank).

39. The reader will recall this occurred with the League's sanctions against Italy, and expedited the demise of that organization.

40. This latter organization, known as COCOM, was until recently almost unknown, and even now does not constitute a formal treaty organization. While the membership is known, many states do not admit formal


affiliation with the group, some to preserve the appearance of neutrality, others to avoid criticism by left wing factions of their government. It is a fragile coalition designed exclusively to control critical defense-related commodity transactions to insure that such products are not diverted to East Bloc countries. It would be impractical and inappropriate to consider this organization as one to engage in the highly political practice of economic sanctioning.

41. W.N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade. Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1952) pp. 141-8 discusses the neutrality issue in time of war. For an interesting analysis of neutrality in time of 'limited' war, see T.D. Brown, Jr, 'World War Prize Law Applied to a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions on Neutral Shipping with Israel,' Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 50, esp. pp. 850-2.

42. The author was told by several high V.S. officials that the President and other world leaders had spent an inordinate amount of time on the issue of sanctions, so the Economic Summits would seem to be an appropriate forum for addressing this issue.

Chapter 8 Politico-Economic Prescription for East-West Relations in an Interdependent World

1. Z. Brzezinski, 'V.S./Soviet Relations,' in E.P. Hoffman and F.T. Fleron Jr. (eds), The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1980) p. 331.

2. For a discussion of the distinctions between dependence, interdependence, and autarky, see James Caporaso, 'Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System,' International Organization (Winter 1978).

3. See A. Armstrong, 'The Political Consequences of Economic Dependency,' Journal of Conflict Resolution (September 1981).

4. J.N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence (London: Francis Pinter, 1980) p. 41.

5. K. von Beyme, 'Detente and East-West Economic Relations,' Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, p. 1192. He says in part: 'The idea that linkages can exist between peace and trade certainly is not new. Indeed, the theoretical attack on mercantilism in the late 18th century launched the notion that trade is good for peace. This notion is present implicitly in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter 2. Later it is advanced by Cobden, Bastiat, Constant and others.'

6. See F.D. Holzman and R. Legvold, 'The Economics and Politics of EastWest Relations', in C.F. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds), World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1975). See also Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations: From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design (London: Greenwood Press, 1981) esp. pp.92--4.

7. For example, Walter C. Clemens, Jr, The USSR and Global Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978) p. 93.

8. Ken Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence; in c.P. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation London: MIT Press, 1970);


and Richard Rosecrance, 'Rewards, Punishment and Interdependence,' Journal of Conflict Resolution (March 1981).

9. See Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

10. For a good explanation of 'systemic' interdependence, see Edward L. Morse, 'Interdependence in World Affairs,' in J.N. Rosenau, K. Thompson and G. Boyd (eds), World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1976). On the manipulation of interdependence, see Klaus Knorr, 'Economic Interdependence and National Security,' in K. Knorr and F. Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977).

11. R.L. Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960) pp. 34-44.

12. See Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 216. Concerning the Soviet Union's own position on structuring trade, see F.D. Holzman, 'Soviet Central Planning and its Impact on Foreign Trade Behavior and Adjustment Mechanisms,' in A.A. Brown and E. Neuberger (eds), International Trade and Central Planning (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968). pp. 283-4. Holzman points out that the USSR does not try to achieve free trade optimum levels, but rather operates below the free trade optimum for reasons of national security - to reduce the risk of being subjected to economic warfare.

13. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1969) p. 26, argued 'the possibility of a conflict between the policy of maximization of national income, on the one hand, and the policy of securing the greatest position of influence with the trading partner, on the other.'

14. Viktor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: Macmillan, 1984) pp. 110-11.

15. Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p.85.

16. For a discussion of lost opportunity costs imposed by withdrawn investments, see R.C. Porter, The Potential Impact of International Investment Sanctions on the South African Economy,' CRED, University of Michigan Discussion Paper No. 77 (February 1979).

17. Thomas A. Wolf, U.S. East-West Trade Policy: Economic Warfare versus Economic We(fare (London: Lexington Books, 1973), esp. Chapter 3, discusses structuring foreign trade under economic security constraints.

18. For a discussion of economic summits, see R.D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984). On p. 19, the authors speak of heads of state being capable of balancing conflicting pressures and developing 'packages' covering action in several different fields.

19. The U.S. planning for the 1988 Economic Summit in Toronto, Canada included as a topic for discussion East-West Economic Relations and Implications for Allied Security. A 20 May 1988 cable (State 162495) from Secretary of State G. Shultz to all U.S. ambassadors cites one


accomplishment of the Versailles Summit as highlighting a need for greater consensus on East-West economic relations.

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Index

Abbott, K.W. 124 Abouchar, A. 125 absolute need 72 Acheson, D. 19 Adler-Karlsson, G. 8, 121, 122

sanctions lO, 11, 14 Afghanistan 1

sanctions after invasion of 10, 34-5, 84

Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy 76, 131

Agreement on East Bloc Credits (Versailles Agreement) 38-9

Allen, R.L. lO4, 137 alliance management 75-8, 82 Ambrose, S.E. 125 Angell, Sir N. 4, 119 Angelli, G. 135 Angola 33 arbitrage 71 Argentina 35, 45, 66 Armstrong, A. 136 Aron, R. 121 assets, freezing 68-9 asymmetrical interdependence 4-6,

102, 104, 119 Australia 66

exports 57, 60, 61, 128 Austria 55, 60, 61 autarky lO2 authoritarianism 87

Baer, G. 121, 122, 126 League of Nations 15,44-5

Baldwin, D.A. 118, 120, 126 power resources 127 vulnerability

interdependence 120-1 Ball, G. 27 Barry Jones, R.J. 119 Battle Act 19, 26, 122 Bauer, R. 118

Bayne, N. 137 Benelux countries 60, 61 Bergsten, C.F. 11, 118, 119, 121,

136 Berman, H.J. 123 Berne Convention 94 Bertsch, G.K. 34, 124 Beyme, K. von 103, 134, 136 Bialer, S. 48-9, 128 Bingham, J.M. 51, 128 Blau, P.M. 119, 125-6, 126 Blum, Y.Z. 129 Bock, F. 118 bottlenecks 72-3, 88, 100-1, 107,

133 boycotts 66-7, 73, 129 Boyd, A. 89 Boyd, G. 118, 137 Brandt, W. 32 Brazil 44 Brezhnev, L. 124

emigration and trade linkage 33, 34, 81

imperialist nations 90 Poland 131 bribes 42 Brown, A.A. 137 Brown, T.D. 136 Brown-John, C. Lloyd 132 Brussels Treaty Organization 18 Brzezinski, Z. lO2, 123, 136

Ditchley Park conference 36 linkage politics 34

Buckley, Ambassador 75, 131 buffer stocks 71, 72 Bulgaria

inter-bloc trade 90, 91 international organizations 94,

129 Bull, H. 121 Burns, A. 69, 130 Burns, E. 133 burden-sharing 77-8, 97-8

154

Index 155

Caldwell, D. 136 Canada 55, 60, 61, 128 Cannon Amendment 19, 122 capitalism 86, 133 Caporaso, J.A. 118, 120, 136 Carr, E.H. 121-2 Carrington, Lord 131 Carter, J. 45,51 Carter Administration I, 132

Afghanistan invasion 34--5 human rights 34 Iranian sanctions 46

Casey, W. 76 Castro, F. 31, 123, 128 Catherine the Great 87 Chamberlain, A. 14 Charter of Economic Rights and

Duties of States 125 Chapman, J.W. 126 Cheysson, C. 131 Chile 46 China 133

decontrol of trade 31-2,50,124 international organizations 94 Japan and Manchuria 121 Korean War 21-2 strategic embargo 22, 23, 29;

differential 23-5 China Committee

(CHINCOM) 23-5 Churchill, Sir W. 22, 134 Clark, R.A. 21 Clark, W. 38 Clarkson, J.D. 133 Clemens, W.C. 136 Cline, R.S. 122 coercion 41-2 Cold War 22 Collins, Brigadier General R. 24 commercial policy, East-West

relations and 107-10 commodities trade 62-6 conflict, interdependence and 103-4 Consultative Group (CG) 19, 22 Continental Grain Company 28 Coordinating Committee

(COCOM) 30,99, 108, 131, 135-6

strategic embargo 19, 20

costs of economic sanctions 77-8, 97-8

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEAI COMECON) 24--5

trade 90-2 countertrade 68 credit

economic defence 106 as financial sanction 69 subsidized 116-17

Versailles Agreement 38-9 Cuban Assets Control Act 29 Cuban embargo 29-31,45 Czechoslovakia

international organizations 94, 129

trade 90-3 passim

Dahl, R. 126, 127 Dallin, A. 128 Dalton, Sir H. 17 decision-making, sanction 98-100,

107-10 defence, economic 105-6 Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S.

(DIA) 36, 78, 79, 99 demand, elasticity of 70-2 Deniau, J.-F. 39 Denmark 60, 61 dependencia theory 3 deprivation, relative 49-50 detente 134

disagreement within NATO 76-7,95-6,131-2

era 32-4 deterrence, sanctions as 78-80, 82-

3, 132 Diebold, W. 135 differentiated detente 95, 131 Ditchley Park conference 36, 78, 79,

132 domestic politics

effect of sanctions and 80-1, 83 and international politics 108-9

Douglas-Home, A. 30 Doxey, M. 9-10, 120, 128, 135

burden-sharing 97 core values 48

156 Index

Doxey, M. (cont.) deterrence 132 sanctions 125

Dresser Industries 34 dual-use items 66-7, 123

Eastern bloc, coordination and sanctions 98

Eastern Europe ties with USSR 90-3 U.S.: building bridges to 26;

weaning 92, 134 see also under individual countries

economic sanctions see sanctions economic summits 99-100, 109-10,

136, 137 economy, structure of target's 72-3 effectiveness of sanctions 44-5, 84

measures of 46-7 Eisenhower, D.D. 26 elasticity of demand 70-2 Elliott, R.S. 124 embargoes 67-8

strategic see strategic embargo emigration policy, Soviet 33, 34,

80-1 employment, sanctions' impact

on 61 energy

agreement 76, 131 trade 65, 66

engagement policy 27, 28, 39-40 Engels, F. 133 Ethiopia 33

League of Nations sanctions over 14-15, 16,44, 122

Europe see Eastern Europe; European Economic Community; Western Europe; and under individual countries

European Economic Community (EEC)

boycott of Argentina 45 Poland's martial law 38 trade with USSR:

commodities 64-6, 129; exports 56-7; GDP and 53, 54, 128; imports 57,

58; 1965-1980 29, 30; and sanctioner states 93; volume 57, 59

export controls, post-war 18-21 see also strategic embargo

Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) 116-17

export sanctions (boycotts) 66-7, 73, 129

exports, subsidized 116-17

Falklands crisis 45 Farrell, R.B. 119, 127 fatalism 87, 133 Fawcett, J.E.S. 121 financial sanctions 68-70

see also credit; investments Finkelstein, L.S. 126 Finkelstein, M.S. 126 Finland 55, 57, 60, 61 Finlayson, J. 118 Fischer, D. 39 Fitchett, J. 37, 125 Fleming, D.F. 125 Fleron, F.J. 119, 134, 136 Folts, D.W. 22-3, 122 food supplies trade 62, 63, 65-6

see also grain Ford, G. 33, 81, 131 Foreign Assets Control Act 29, 124 Foreign Assistance Act 19 foreign policy 9-10

independence within NATO 96-7 sanctions and domestic

policy 108-9 security policy and 18

France 135 export controls 19, 24 export credit 116, 117 independent foreign policy 96 League of Nations sanctions 14,

15-16, 121 Poland's martial law 37 USSR: credit 38-9, 76;

trade 21, 55, 60, 61 Frankel, J. 118, 119 Freedman, R.O. 133

Galtung, J. 120, 128

Index 157

General Accounting Office, US (GAO) 116-17

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 68, 94, 129

German Democratic Republic international organizations 94 trade 90, 91

German Federal Republic (FRG) 135

export credit 116, 117 Osthandel 32 pipeline dispute 26-7, 76, 131 Poland 37; Mexico 130 trade with USSR 21, 55, 58-9,

60,61 Germany

League of Nations 15, 16, 121 trade with USSR 21 World War II 17

Gert, B. 126 Gilpin, R. 119 Goldman, K. 10, 120 Gomulka, W. 26 Goodrich, L.M. 125 Gorbachev, M.S. 105 grain

embargo after Afghanistan invasion 35, 46, 133; Reagan's lifting 35, 51

exclusion from embargoes 97 Kennedy administration

sale 27-8, 123 Greece 60, 61 gross domestic product (GDP), trade

and 53, 54, 55 Gurr, T. 49, 128

Haig, A. 38, 76 Hamilton, J.A. 126 Hanson, K. 122 Hanson, P. 132 Hardt, J. 92, 134 Harriman, W. Averell 19 Held, V. 126 Henkin, L. 125 Hirschman, A.O. 120, 137 Hitler, A. 16, 20 Hoare, S. 15, 16, 122 Hoffman, E.P. 119, 134, 136

Holsti, K.J. 118, 119, 128 Ho1sti, Ole R. 135 Holzman, F.D. 91, 118, 119, 130,

133, 134, 136, 137 East-West interdependence 103

Hopmann, T. 135 Hufbauer, G. 120 human rights 34 Hungary


trade 90--3 passim Huntington, S. 34

IBRD 94 IMF 94 Import, Export and Customs Powers

(Defence) Act 17 import sanctions 67-8 instrumental sanctions 47-50

examples of 45-6 symbolic sanctions and 126-7

interdependence 2-6 asymmetrical 4--6, 102, 104, 119 East-West 13, 102-12;

commercial policy 107-10; sanctions and 6-8; structure of trade relations 105-7; systemic 103-5

sensitivity 4 symmetrical 4, 102, III vulnerability 4, 65-6, 120-1

interest groups 80--1, 83, 108-9 interest rates 116 International Arrangement on

Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits 116-17

International Chamber of Commerce 94

investments financial sanctions 69-70 offensive economic measures 107

Iran 46-7, 69 Ireland 60,61 Israel 45, 72, 130 Italy

export credit 117

158 Index

Italy (cant.) League of Nations 14-16, 44-5,

45, 121, 122 trade with USSR 21, 55, 59, 60,

61

Jackson, H. 32, 80, 132 Jackson-Vanik Amendment 32-3,

45, 84, 124, 132 interest coalition 80--1, 107-8

Japan 133 export credit 116, 117 Manchuria invasion 14, 121 soybean embargo 129 trade with USSR 21,93;

exports 55,56,57,59,60,61; GDP and 53, 54, 55; imports 57, 58

Jaruzelski, General 12 Jewish emigration 80-1 Johnson, L.B. 28, 30 Johnson, V.c. 51, 128

Kaldor, M. 96, 135 Kaplan, A. 8, 120 Kaser, M. 134 Kern Amendment 19, 122 Kennan, G.F. 132 Kennedy, J.F. 26,27-8, 131 Keohane, R.O. II, 118, 120, 121

power 2-3,5 Khrushchev, N. 28-9, 133 Kindleberger, c.P. 49, 119, 128, 136 Kissinger, H. 124, 128

Chinese trade decontrols 50 differentiated detente 95, 131 Jackson-Vanik amendment, 32-

3, 33, 81 linkage politics 2

Klitgaard, R.E. 128 Kluckhohn, C. 127-8 Knorr, K. 48, 119, 120, 127, 137

interdependence 103 Koch, M. 62, 63 Korea, North 22, 29 Korean War 20, 21-3 Kostecki, M.M. 129 Krause, L.B. 118, 119, 121, 136

interdependence 4

security 2 kulaks 92, 134 Kunz, J.L. 120

Lasswell, H. 8, 120 Laval, P. 16, 122 law, sanctions and 41, 125 League of Nations 14-16,44, 44-5,

45, 135 Lee, L.T. 123-4 Legvold, R. 103, 118, 119, 134, 136 Leigh, M. 123 less developed countries (LDCs) 3,

33-4 linkage strategy 2, 7-8, 10 Lowenfeld, A.F. 129

MacDonald, R. St J. 127, 135 Manchuria 14, 121 Mansbach, R.W. 118 Marantz, P. 118 market value 88, 133 Marshall, J.J. 123 Marshall Plan 18, 19,23 Martin, W. 38, 125 Marx, K. 86, 133 material balances 88 Matko, D. 21 Mayall, J. 84, 132 McCobb, J. 123-4 Meany, G. 80 Medlicott, W.N. 17, 122, 136 Mexico 130 Ministry of Economic Warfare

(MEW) 16--18 Mitterrand, F. 39 mixed economy 92 Morganthau, H.J. 2, 118 Morse, E.L. 118, 137 Murdock, c.A. 6, 119 Mussolini, B. 14-15, 44, 45 Mutual Defense Assistance Control

Act (Battle Act) 19, 26, 122

nationalism 87 na vicerts 17 need, absolute 72 Netherlands 55, 60. 61 Neuberger, E. 137

Index 159

neutrality 17, 18,99, 136 New York Times 78, 132 Nixon, R. 32, 124, 134 Nixon Administration 2

decontrol of Chinese trade 22, 31-2, 124

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1-2

alliance management 82; Urengoi pipeline 75-8

decision-making on sanctions 98-9

differing views on detente 76-7, 95-6,131-2

export controls 19 formation 18 foreign policy independence

within 96-7 pipeline embargo 26-7 Poland: preparations for sanctions

over expected Soviet invasion 36, 78-80, 98-9; sanctions over martial law 38,75, 113-15, 130--1

summits 110 North Korea 22, 29 North Viet Nam 29, 31 Notzold, 1. 124, 132 Nove, A. 10, 120 Nye, J.S. 11, 118, 119, 120, 121

interdependence 4 power 2-3, 5

Oakeshott, R. 27, 123 offensive economic measures 106-7 oil

Arab embargo 5-6 shipments to USSR 24

O'Leary, J.P. 118 Olson, R.S. 96, 120, 126, 135 Organization of American States

(OAS) 45 Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) 38, 117

OECD Arrangement 116-17 sanction decision-making 99

Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 19

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 6

Osgood, R.E. 3, 119, 132 Oye, K. 126

Paarlberg, R 124 pan-Slavism 87 Paris Union 94 Parsons, T. 126, 128 peace, trade and 103, 136 Pennock, R.J. 126 Perle, R. 32 pipeline embargo (1962) 26-7, 44,

76, 131 see also Urengoi gas pipeline

Pipes, R. 33, 95, 124, 134 Poland

inter-bloc trade 90, 91, 93 international organizations 94,

129 martial law I, 12, 76-7, 78-80;

sanctions over 10, 35-7, 84, 113-15, 130--1

NA TO preparations for Soviet invasion of 36, 78-80, 98-9

U.S.: and debt 69, 129-30; trade 26

political effects of sanctions 12-13, 75, 81-5

Porter, RC. 130, 137 Portes, R 134, 135 positive sanctions 42, 126 power

anatomy of 41-2, 125-6 asymmetric and issue areas 9 asymmetrical interdependence

and 5-6 and sanctions 43

power potential 2-3 power resources 47, 127 Pranger, R.J. 134 public sanctions 46, 51, 126 Pugachev, E. 87 Putnam, R.D. 137

Rashish, Myer 76

160 Index

Reagan, R. 1, 8 Brezhnev and Poland 130-1 lifting grain embargo 35, 51

Reagan, R. (cont.) Versailles Summit 37, 38-9

realism 2, 118 Redick, e.F. 124 relative deprivation 49-50 rewards 42 Reynolds, P.A. 121 Rhodesia 45 Robbins, L. 133 Robinson, R. 127, 132 Romania


nuclear reactor 134 trade 90, 91

Rosecrance, R 103-4, 137 Rosenau, J.N. 118, 127, 128, 136.

137 interdependence 103, 119 rowboat model 4

sanctions 41-52 academic literature on 8-11 anatomy of power 41-2 burden-sharing 77-8, 97-8 case for against USSR 6-8 decision-making 98-100, 107-10 defined 43-4, 125 economic impact 70-3 effectiveness 44-5, 46-7 instrumental 45-6, 47-50, 126-7 political effects 75,81-5 positive 42, 126 symbolic 45, 50-2, 126-7 types of 66-70 'voodoo economics' 10, 120

Schelling, T. 126 Schott, J.J. 120 secondary boycotts 67 security 2

policy and foreign policy 18 Selassie, Haile 44 sensitivity interdependence 4 Shanghai Communique 32 Sherwood, H. 130

Shils, E.A. 128 Shultz, G. 137 Sills, D.L. 125 Sjostedt, G. 120 Slavism, pan- 87 Smith, A. 136 Smith, H. 133 Solidarity 36, 76-7, 78 Sorensen, T.e. 132 South Africa 45 sovereignty, national 3-4 Spain 60, 61 Sperry Rand Corporation 34 Stalin, J. 36, 133

kulaks 134 strategic embargo 20, 24, 83 Steel, J. 133 Stent, A. (Yergin) 131 Stern, J. 129, 135 Stern, P. 80, 124, 132 Stevenson amendment 124 stockpiles 105-6 Strange, S. 24, 123 strategic embargo 83, 123

COCOM 19,20 Cold War 22-3 dropping CHINCOM

differential 23-5 foreign policy 26 pipeline embargo (1962) 27

strategic technology 99, 135-6 subsidies

for domestic industries 106 export financing 116-17

substitution, sanctions and 70-1, 130

Suez crisis 24 summits, economic 99-100, 109-10,

136, 137 Suvorov, V. 137 Sweden

exports 55, 60, 61 pipeline dispute 27, 131 World War II 17

Switzerland 55, 60, 61 symbolic sanctions 50-2

examples of 45 instrumental sanctions

and 126-7

Index 161

symmetrical interdependence 4, 102, III

systemic interdependence 103-5 Szamuely, T. 133

target state, sanctions' impact on 70-3

absolute need 72 elasticity of demand 70-2 structure of economy 72-3

TASS computer 34 Tatu, M. 39, 125 Taubenfeld, H.l. 126 Taubenfeid, R.F. 126 Thatcher,M. 97 Third World 3, 33-4 Thompson, K. 118, 137 Time Magazine 38, 125 Tomlinson, K. 92, 134 Toronto Summit 137 Totten, Colonel R. 23-4 trade flows, East-West

1930-60 21 1965-80 28-9, 30 patterns 53-66; distribution by

commodity 62-6; distribution by region 56-8; GDP and 53-5; volume 58-61

trade ministry, allied EastWest 106, III

trade relations' structure 105-7, 111-12

trade sanctions 66-8 Trading with the Enemy Act 17, 22 Trager, F.N. 119, 137 Treml, V. 128 Truman, H.S. 35-6 Truman Doctrine 1 Tucker, R.W. 131

Uganda 129 Ullman, R. 129 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR) Afghanistan invasion 34--5 bottleneck vulnerability 73 case for sanctions against 6-8

credit agreement with France 38-9, 76

economic growth 87, 88, 122 instrumental sanctions;

against 45, 46, use of 45 international organizations 94 Khrushchev's 'peaceful

coexistence' 28-9 operates below free trade

optimum 137 pipeline embargo 26-7, 131 Poland: debt 69; expected

invasion 36, 78-9, 98-9; martial law 36-7, 75, 78-80, 113-15, 130-1

political effects of sanctions 83-5 prohibition of oil shipments to 24 relations with U.S. see United

States strategic embargo 19-21, 23,

24--5, 26 subsidized credit 117 symbolic sanctions against 45, 51 'target state' 86-98; authoritarian

rule 87; Eastern European ties 90-3; economic profile 87-90; nationalism and panSiavism 87

Third World 33-4 trade with 53-66;

commodities 62-6, 129; distribution by region 56-9; GDP and 53-5, 128; 1930-60 21; 1965-80 28-9, 30; politics and 135; volume 59-61

Urengoi pipeline 12-13, 37-8,44, 75-8, 82, 97, 135

value hierarchy 48-9 United Kingdom (U.K.)

Cuban embargo 30 export credit 116, 117 League of Nations 15-16,45,121 MEW 16-18 sanctions against Iran 46-7 strategic embargo 19, 23-4 trade with USSR 21, 55, 60, 61 Urengoi pipeline 97

United Nations (U.N.) 45, 114, 125

162 Index

United States (U.S.) Afghanistan invasion 34-5 China: CHINCOM

differential 23-4; 'courtship' 50; Nixon's decontrol of trade 31-2

Cuban embargo 29-31 Eastern Europe: building

bridges 26; weaning 92, 134 economic structure 72 export credit 116-17 grain: embargo 35,46, 51, 133;

sale to Soviet Union 27-8, 123

instrumental sanctions 46 interest rates raised 43-4 international organizations 94 Iranian sanctions 46-7, 69 Jackson-Vanik

amendment 32-3, 45, 80-1, 84, 107-8, 124, 132

Korean War 21-2 Neutrality Act 121 pipeline embargo (1962) 26-7,

127, 131 Poland 35-6; debt 69, 129-30;

martial law 37-8, 75, 82-3, 130-1; trade with 26

relations with USSR 1,2; detente 32-4, 95; disagreement with Western Europe 7-8; energy cooperation 76, 131; expectations of sanctions 10; interdependence 103; interference in emigration policy 33, 34, 80-1; most favored nation status 32, 124; post-war fear 18-19

soybean embargo 129 steel trigger prices 44 strategic embargo 19-21, 22-3,

23-4 trade with USSR:

commodities 62-4, 65-6; exports 56-7, 60, 61, 128-9; GDP and 53, 54, 55; imports 57, 58; 1930-60

21; 1965-80 28, 29, 30; volume 57, 59

Ugandan sanctions 129 unfair burden-sharing 77, 97-8 Urengoi pipeline 75-8 view of detente differing from

Europe's 76-7,95-6, 131-2 Universal Copyright Convention

(UCC) 94 Urban, G.R. 123, 124 Urengoi gas pipeline 12-13, 37-8,

44, 82, 97, 135 Alliance management 75-8

use value 88-90, 133

value hierarchy 47-9, 127 values

power and 41, 42 sanctions and 43, 44

Vare, D. 15, 121 Verba, S. 127 Versailles Agreement 38-9 Versailles Summit 37-9, 75, 76,

109-10, 137-8 Viet Nam, North 29, 31 vulnerability interdependence 4,

65-6, 120-1

Walesa, L. 36, 78 Wallen steen, P. 120 Waltz, K.J. 3, 119, 136

interdependence 4, 103 war, capitalism and 86 weaning policy 92-3 Weinberger, C. 69 Western Europe

interdependence strategy 6-7, 7-8

strategic embargo 23 unfair burden-sharing 77-8, 97 view of detente 76-7, 95-6 see also European Economic

Community; and under individual countries

Wilczynski, J. 134 Wiles, PJ. 130 Wolf, T.A. 120, 137 World Petroleum 27, 123 World War II 16-18, 92

Yalta formula 36 Yergin, A. 26-7, 123 Yergin, D. 10, 121, 124 Yuan-Li, Wu 97, 135

Index

Yugoslavia 129, 133

Zabijaka, V. 62, 63 Zimmerman. W. 95, 134

163